ML20100R320
| ML20100R320 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, Turkey Point |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1983 |
| From: | NRC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20100Q372 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-83-531 NUDOCS 8412170380 | |
| Download: ML20100R320 (13) | |
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l SAFEGUARDS REGULATORY EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW l
l TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNITS 3 AND 4 t
i JUNE 1983 I
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TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 1.0 OVERVIEW.........................
I 1.1 Site Characteristics.................
I 1.2 Security Program Description.............
1 2.0 FINDINGS.........................
2 2.1 Potential Sabotage Vulnerabilities..........
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- 2.2 Safeguards Program Concerns.............
3 2.3 General Observations................
11 2.4 Notable Safeguards Strengths............
12 2.5 Safety / Safeguards Interface Review.........
14 2.6 Reduction of Safeguards Regulatory Burden.....
16 - Background Information - Photographs 4
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SAFEGUARDS REGULATORY EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW 1.0 OVERVIEW 1
A Regulatory Effectiveness Review of Units 3 and 4 of Turkey Point Nuclear Power Station was conducted from May 23 thru May 27, 1983.
The background and purpose of such reviews appear in Attachment 1.
Briefly stated, the main objective of this effort has been to determine if Turkey Point's security program, as implemented, provides the level of protection intended by NRC as expressed in 10 CFR Part 73.
In conducting this review, par-ticular attention was focused on methods and procedures employed to protect vital equipment and the impact of the security program on plant safety.
1.1 Site Characteristics Units 3 and 4 of Turkey Point Nuclear Power Station are Westing-house pressurized water reactors operated by Flori.da Power and Light Company. Units 3 and 4 are 693 MWe units licensed in July 1972 and April 1973, respectively. The two units are co-located on a single site with two other fossil fueled electrical generating plants with which the nuclear plants share some non-safety-related systems.
The site is located in Dade County, Florida, approximately 11 miles from the town of Homestead.
Both units are fueled with standard low enriched uranium LWR fuel.
Biscayne Bay serves as the ultimate heat sink for both nuclear units.
1.2 Security Program Description I
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2.0 FINDINGS 2.1 Potential Sabotage Vulnerabilites A potential sabotage vulnerability is a safeguards program defi-ciency that brings into serious question the licensee's capability to protect against the design basis threat for radiological sabotage.
No deficiencies in this category were found at Turkey Point Nuclear Power Station Units 3 and 4.
1 2.2 Safeguards Program Concerns A safeguards program concern is an observed weakness in the safeguerds program which, while it does not directly increase the risk of radiological sabotage, is considered to be of sufficient significance to indicate a need for prompt remedial action.
These concerns are identified below 31ong with possible corrective measures.
There may be alternative solutions, however, which are better suited to site conditions.
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2.2.1 Perimeter Detection System and Barrier
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2.2.3 Maintenance of Security Equipment l
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-kithough this relatively large number of equipment problems and these deficiencies in repairs that had been completed could have been due to chance, it is suggested that the priority accorded security equipment maintenance and the degree of quality assurance review afforded security main-tenance activities be reconsidered This concern is probably best addressed by increased management attention and improved comunication between security and maintenance supervisors.
2.3 General Observations Observations are relatively minor items that do not require correc-tive action. However, the team believes the following suggestions could improve the licensee's safeguards program.
There may be alternative approaches to those suggested, however, which are better suited to site conditions.
' l 2.3.1 Ear Protection for Security Officers in Defensive Positions Although the security officers posted in site defensive positions are otherwise well equipped to support an armed response, they are not provided with ear protection.
In light of the din that would result from in such a confined area within a resonating structure, eerphone headsets cor.taining ear protection are suggested both to aid in protecting thE security officer's health and, more important, to facilitate'comunications with the defensive positions during and after an armed engagement.
2.4 Notable Safeguards Strengths Notable safeguards strengths are areas of the safeguards program considered to be particularly effective.
These are highlighted to identify good safeguards practices contributing to the overall effectiveness of the program.
Items in this category are enumerated below.
2.4.1 Security Force Firearms Familiarization During the Regulatory Effectiveness Review, the team was quite favorably impressed with site practices that encourage security officers to become proficient in the use of their firearms.
In particular, the assignment of to each security officer for both weapons qualification'and routine use provides increased assurance that security l
officers can employ these weapons effectively, should the need arise. Other site practices that encourage security officers to fire their weapons frequently for familiarization, such as permitting security officers to sign out their weapons for use on the off-site firing range are also beneficial.
Through the use of such practices, security officers fire their weapons, for familiarization or qualification, on the average of about 2
2.4.2 Deployment of Weapons and Ammunition Another asset in responding to a possible security incident is thei t
i 2.4.3 Local Law Enforcement Coordination and Support i
The licensee's coordination with the local law enforcement 7
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from this agency were definite strong points. The licensee's i
efforts to ensure that law enforcement officers are familiar with both the Turkey Point site itself, and the surrounding l
area should be a significant asset if law enforment response to a security incident were required.
2.4.4 Protected Area Access Control and Search Procedures The protected area access control and search procedures at Turkey Point appeared to be both efficient and effective.
Pesonnel searches appeared to be perfonned effectively and the was a definite asset.
2.5 Safety / Safeguards Interface Review In response to the recomendations of the Ad Hoc Comittee to Review Safeguards Requirements at Power Reactors, the Regulatory Effective-ness Review was modified to place increased emphasis upon the review I
of the possible impact of security upon plant safety. The Regulatory l
Effectiveness Review Team did not find any specific instances in which security could reasonably be expected to have an adverse impact on l
plant safety. However, the team believes that the following sugges-l tions could further enhance the coordination and cooperation between site security and plant safety in support of the overall goal of safe operation of the plants.
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2.5.1 Coordination Between Operations and Security Although the team was quite impressed by the attitude of mutual respect between operations and security personnel, the operations personnel interviewed did not always realize the assistance that the security organization could provide.
For example, there might be times when it could be useful to i
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cies must not delay operational response but rather should i
serve to protect operations personnel and ensure their unhin-dered freedom of action to mitigate the consequences of component malfunctions.
2.5.2 Security Support During Emergencies l
Discussions with security personnel indicated that under certain conditions, they might be reluctant to take actions, considered necessary for plant safety by the site supervisor, I
if such actions were in conflict with security procedures.
To mitigate this attitude, it appears useful to emphasize to both security and operations personnel that, under emergency or off-normal conditions,' safe operations of the plant must be of paramount importance to both groups. Thus, l
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if necessary for safe operation of the plant, under certain conditions.
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2.6 Reduction of Safeguards Regulatory Burden One of the objectives of the Regulatory Effectiveness Review program is to identify areas in which licensees' safeguards regulatory burden l
can be eased without significant impact upon security program effec-l l
j tiveness. The following item appears to be in this category.
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l there may be alternative approaches to those suggested which are 1
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2.6.1 Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)f lI c
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