ML20100M521
| ML20100M521 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 11/29/1984 |
| From: | Carey J DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TAC-42459, NUDOCS 8412120353 | |
| Download: ML20100M521 (79) | |
Text
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'At3 Telephone (412) 393-6000 Nuclear Division P. O. Bor 4 Shippingport, PA 15077-0004 November 29, 1984 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 1 Division of Licensing Washington, DC 20555
Reference:
Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No.1 Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment Gentlemen:
On December 27, 1982, Duquesne Light Company (DLC) received the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) regarding the Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment at Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No.1 (BV-1).
The SER contained a Technical Evaluation Report (TER), written by Franklin Research Center (FRC) under contract to the NRC, which noted a number of environmental qualification documentation deficiencies for safety-related equipment at BV-1.
Responses required by the SER were submitted by DLC in February and March of 1983.
On April 5,1984, a meeting was held with members of the NRC Staff to discuss Duquesne Light Company's proposed method of resolution of each of those deficiencies. The proposed resolution, as discussed in detail with the Staff, for each of the environmental qualification documentation deficiencies listed in the TER is summarized in Enclosure 1 to this letter. Discussions also took place at the meeting regarding Duquesne Light's general methodology for compli-ance with 10CFR50.49, " Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Impor-tant to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants," which became effective February 22, 1983. The purpose of this letter is to provide documentation of the discussions held at the April 5 meeting. to this letter contains an updated " Equipment Qualification Items Summary" which contains a summary description of the method of environ-mental qualification for each equipment item as discussed with the Staff at the April 5, 1984 meeting. contains a revised " Master List of Elec-trical Equipment Requiring Qualification" which lists all equipment at BV-1 within the scope of 10CFR50.49. The equipment list is similar to the list of equipment submitted in response to the 10CFR50.49 rulemaking by our letter dated May 20, 1983.
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- Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No.1
- Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66
- Environmental-Qualification of Safety--
' Related Electrical Equipment Page.-2 f
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For.those equipment' items for which the. documentation of environmental qualification is ~ not yet completed, justifications for continued operation (JC0s) have been provided by DLC in previous submittals to the NRC. JCOs submitted prior to the issuance of the TER were reviewed and found acceptable z
by FRC. As a result of the SER, however, additional-JCOs were submitted by g
DLC on February 1,1983.
Duquesne Ligh.t Company considers that its previously.
t i
-submitted JC0s renain valid and that continued safe plant operation is not impaired.. As requested, those JC0s still:being relied upon have been-included-4 as Enclosure 3.
. At the April 5,1984 meeting, the Staff requested that all design-basis
- events. at BV-1 which could result in a potentially harsh environment, including -
flooding outside containment, be identified. ' The methodology for the evalua -
tion of equipment and the detemination of the environmental conditions.was included in Sections 2 and 3 of our EQ submittal dated October 15, 1981 for IEB 79-018.
For convenience, a summary of our methodology _ has been included as_ Enclosure 4 to this letter. As our methodology indicates, all design-basis-events at BV-1 which could result in a potentially harsh environment,. including -
flooding outside containment, were considered in the identification of 'elec--
trical equipment within the scope of Paragraph (b) (1) of 10CFR50.49:(i.e.,
" Safety-related electric equipment... relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events.. ~.").
The method of identification of electrical equipment within the scope of
' Paragraph (b) (2) of 10CFR50.49 (i.e., "Nonsafety-related electric equipment whose-failure under postulated ervironmental conditions could prevent. satis -
I factory accomplishment of safety functions...").is also described in No additional electrical equipment at BV-1 was identified during this review, which was not previously included in the " Master List of Equip -
ment Requiring-Qualification."
4 The method used to identify electrical equipment within the scope of Paragraph (b)- (3) of 10CFR50.49 -(i.e., "Certain post-accident monitoring equip-ment") involves a variable-by-variable comparison of the specific guidelines.
i-of Regulatory Guide 1.97, " Instrumentation to Access Plant snd Environmental Conditions During and Following an Accident," to the design of BV-1.
An-evaluation of this comparison is being conducted to detemine environmental-qualfication needs for the subject instrumentation and sampling equipment at BV-1. The results of this Regulatory Guide 1.97 evaluation will be submitted L
by November 30, 1985 in accordance with our Confimatory Order dated ' June 12,
. 1984 based on our 10CFR50.54(f) response to Generic Letter 82-33. Post-l.
- accident monitoring equipment which was installed in the plant during recent' outages to satisfy Regulatory Guide 1.97 and NUREG-0737 criteria has been i
- reviewed, 'as described in Enclosure 4, to identify environmental qualification j
- needs. These items have been included in the " Master List of Equipment Requir-l_
- ing Qualification."
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November 29, 1984 Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No.1 Docket No.' 50-334,' License No. DPR-66 Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment
-Page 3 In summary, we believe that the enclosed " Master List of Equipment Rcquiring Qualification" complies with the scope requirements of Paragraph.(b) of 10CFR50.49 as described above.
Additional questions at the April 5,1984 meeting concerned the DLC reso-lution of the chemical spray deficiencies identified in the TER and the DLC program regarding ongoing EQ maintenance. These issues were discussed in the meeting, and further details are provided in Enclosures 5 and 6, respectively.
Other supporting EQ information and documentation are maintained in the BV-1 EQ File. We believe the environmental qualification documentation maintained in the BV-1 EQ File complies with the requirements of 10CFR50.49.
This file is available for audit at any time.
As a result of our meeting, we understand that a supplemental SER will be issued to indicate that Duquesne Light-Company's Equipment Qualification Pro-gram, as-described in this letter, meets the requirements of 10CFR50.49 and that the deficiencies noted in the SER dated December 16, 1983 have been addressed.
Very trul yours, J. J.'Carey Vice President, Nuclear Enclosures I
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November 29, 1984 Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No.1 Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment Page 4 c'c: Mr. W. M. Troskoski, Resident Inspector.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-Beaver Valley Power Station
.Shippingport,'PA 15077 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission c/o Document Management Branch Washington, DC 20555 Director Safety Evaluation and Control Virginia Electric & Power Company P.O. Box 26666 One James River Plaza Richmond, VA 23261 Mr. Peter Tem, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Phillips Building Washington, DC 20555
- Mail Stop 438 -
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Attn:
Dr. Thomas E. Murley Regional Administrator Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406
1, ENCLOSURES A
1; Equipment Qualification Items Sumary r.
' 2. -
Master List of Electrical Equipment Requiring Qualification 4
3.-
Justifications for Continued Operation 4.
Methodology for Master List Development and-Environmental Service '
Conditions 5.
Chemical Spray Analysis-6.
EQ Maintenance 6
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ENCLOSURE 1 EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATI0tLITEMS
SUMMARY
- BEAV.ER VALLEY POWER STATION UNIT NO.-1
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' EQUIPNENT QUALIFICATION ITENS SUte4ARY i
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Nuclear Engineering Department
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l DESCRIPTION OF 95tC QUAllrlCATION EVALUATION CATECORIES la Qualified Ib Modification.
l Ila Qualification Not Established l
lib Not Qualified Ilc Qualified Life Deficiency l
Ella Exempt lilb Not in Scope I
IV Documentation Not Available l
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403.3.24/400K (2)-
l 79-01B FRC Els Description Nanufacturer TER De+1clency Outstanding items Resolution Status Qualification Status 1
70 Power Kerite None None
- 0ualified by test Qualified (la)
Cable a
69 Power Cerro wire
- inadequate None
- Letter from Conditionally.
-(lla)
Cable and cable qualification manufacturer has
-Qualified company documentation '
established the material (Pending results (Rockbestos)
- Similarity siellarity to what of future vendor was successfully testing program) tested.
- lE Notice 84-44 indicated that back up documentation for Rockbestes test reports was unavailable.
3 68 Power Okonite None None
- 0ualified by Qualified (la)
Cable test 4
71 Control Okonite None No'ne
- 0ualified by test Qualified (la)
Cable Page 1 of 14 403.3.24/400K (2)79-01B FRC El#,
Description Ma nuf acturer TER Deficiency Outstandine items Resolution Status
- Qualification Status '
5 72 Instrument Conti nental
- Radiation levels None
- Satisfactorily
-Qualified (Ib)
Cable Wire Company
- Chemical spray tested for D.L.C.
" Aging evaluation
@ Wyle 6
75 Penetration Viking
' Radiation levels None
- Satisfactorily Qualified (lla)
- Aging evaluation tested for D.L.C.
2
@ Wyle 7
79 Terminal Buchanon
- Radiation levels None
' Satisfactorily.
Qualified (Ib)
Block
- Traceability tested for D.L.C.
Aging Evaluation
@ Wyle (for use in control & power circuits) 8 80 Terminal Penn Union
- Similarity None
- A review of actual Qualified j
(lla)
Block
- Steam exposure installed terminal j
blocks and lugs compared to what was tested has resulted I
in the conclusion
~
l that the test was
{
conducted on the exact type of terminal block i
and ring compression lug used in the plant.
5 DLC had conducted its own qualification testing on the terminal blocks which was not i
addressed in the TER.
- This DLC test did in
_ f act subject the terminal biceks to a more severe steam.
1 environment than that Page 2 or 14 required by the plant conditions.
V 79-01B FRC El#
Description Manufacturer TER Deficiency
. Outstanding items Resolution Status Qualification Status -
9 76 Control Rockbestos None None
' Letter from Conditionally (la)
Cable Firewall SIS manufacturer has Qualified established the material (Pending results similarity to what of future vendor was successfully testing program) tested.
- lE Notice 84-44 Indicated that back up documentation for Rockbestos test reports was unavailable.
4 to 29 Solenoid ASCO
' Chemical spray Requires conduit
- Install conduit seals Conditionally 30 Valve seals to prevent migration of Qualified 31 chemical spray into 32 the solenoid laternals 33 during the 4th 34 Refueling Outage.
35 j
(Ib) 4 l
11 59 Limit NAMCO
- Inadequate
- Requires conduit
- lnstall qualified Conditionally (Ib)
Switch steam exposure seals replacement limit Qualified switches with silicone gaskets and conduit seals during the 4th Refueling Outage to l
prevent steam migration and eliminate the steam exposure deficiency.
Unassigned la l
Number Page 3 of 14 403.3.24/400K (2)
d 79-010 FRC Els Descript h Manufacturer TER Deficiency Outstanding items Resolution Status Qualification Status 13 57 Limit NAMCO
- Inadequate
' Requires conduit
- Install qualified Conditionally (Ib)
Switch steam exposure seals replacement limit Quellfled switches with silicone gaskets and ccndlut seals by the end of the 4th Refueling Outage to prevent steam migration and eliminate the steam exposure deficiency.
14 38 Flow Fischer
- Aging
- Inadequate
- Replace with qualified Pending (Ib)
Transmitter Porter
- Radiation level qualification Barton 1.ot 5 Modification
- Steam exposure levels Transmitter by the
- Testing anomaly end of the 4th
- Test duration Refueling Outage margin 15 36 Flow Barton
- Similarity
- Inadequate
- Replace with qualified Pending (lla)
Transmitter 386 ~
- Aging qualification Barton Lot 5 Modification
- Test duration levels Transmitters by the
' Chemical spray end of the 4th
- Submergence Refueling Outage
- Accuracy 16 48 Level Barton 386
- Aging
' Soldering
- Barton 386 has been Pending (Ib)
Transmitter
' Accuracy replaced with a Modification
- Similarity qualtfled Barton
- Test duration 764 Lot 2 that will
- Spray be further enhanced by soldering the connector Page 4 of 14 403.3.24/400K (2)
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79-018 FRC Els Description Manufacturer TER Deficiency outstanding items liesolution Status Qualification Status 49 Level Barton 764
' Aging
- Soldering _
- Solder the Ponding (lla)
Transmitter Lot 2
- Test anomaly connector in the Modification qualified transmitter for increased reli-ability.
17 41 -
Level CEMS
- Similarity
- 0r'iginal and
- Will be replaced Pending (Ib)
Transmitter
- Aging replacement with qualified Modification
- Temperature equipment have unit during the
' Pressure inadequate 4th Refueling
- Chemical spray qualification Outage
- Submergence level s 18 83 Level Mason-Nellan
- Inadequate
- None
" Review indicates Exempt (Ib)
Transmitter qualification item outside scope Outside the scope documentation of 50.49 of 50.49 19 47 Pressure Fischer
- Inadequate
' Inadequate
- Will be replaced Pending 91 Transmitter Porter qualification qualification with qualified Modification (Ib) documentation level Barton Lot S transmitter during the 4th Refueling Outage 20 46 Pressure Barton 763
' Aging
- Aging analysis
" Solder pin Pending (lla)
Transmitter Lot 2
- Test anomaly
- Soldering connectcr in the Modification procedure quallfled transmitter for increased rell-ability Page 5 of 14 9
403.3.24/400K (2)
l 79-01B FRC Els Description Manufacturer TER Deficiency Outstanding items Hesolution Status Qualification Status 21 40 Level
- Barton,
' Similarity.
- Inadequate
- Will be replaced Pending (Ib)
Transmitter 386
- Aging qualification with qualified Modification
- Qualified life
-level Barton tot 5
- Test duration transmitter during
- Chemical spray the 4th Refueling Outage 22 52 Marrow range Sostman
' Aging
- Thermal aging
- Chemical, aging, and Qualified (lla)
' Chemical spray analysis accuracy analyses
- Similarity,
- Chemical, spray have been completed
- Accuracy
' Accuracy analysis which are supplemental to previous RTD testing l
l 53 Wide range Sostman
- Inadequate
- Thermal aging
'Sased on previous Qua11 fled (Ib)
RTD documentation analysis testing by Westinghouse
- Aging
' Chemical spray and supplemental
' Chemical spray
- Accuracy analysis analysis, issues related to radiation and thermal aging as well as chemical spray have been addressed 23 55 Electric Trinity
- Inadequate
- Conduit seal
- Trinity units Conditionally l
(Ib)
Thermometer qualification have been replaced Quallfled I
documentation with qualified Conax RTD's.
- Will install qualified conduit seal during 4th Refueling Outage on the replacement Conax RTD's Page 6 of 14 403.3.24/400K (2)
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79-018 FRC Ele, Description Manufacturer TER Deficiency Outstanding items Resolution Status Qualification Status 24 1
M3V Limitorque
' Aging
- Not reviewed
' Valves are locked Esempt (lla)
- Inadequate because equipment closed.
Outside the scope qualification considered exempt of 50.49 documentation
'Stellarity 25 3
M3V Limi torque
- Inadequate None
' Valve manufacturer Qualified j
4 qualification has documented
]
5 documentation traceability.
(lla)
- Siellarity
' Aging 2
M3V Limitorque
- Inadequate
' Similarity
- MOV-CH-310 will be Pending (lla) qualification
- Aging analysis replaced with a Modifica*.lon documentation
- Radiation qualified operator
- Similarity during the 4th
- Aging Refueling Outage.
90 MW Limitorque
- Inadequate
' Similarity
- MOV-SI-842 will Pending (Ib) qualification
' Aging analysis be replaced with Modification documentation
- Radiation quallfled operator l
- Siellarity during the 4th
- Aging Refueling Outage, i
26 56 Pump Motor G.E.
' Similarity
' Aging
- An aging & thermal Pending (lla)
- Aging analysis has been Modification
- Temperature performed. Motor exposure for lead splices will be i
inadequate replaced with qualified durations splices during the 4th Refueling Outage
{
- COC obtained from C.E. establishes siellarity between plant motor and j
Page 7 or 14 what was tested.
403.3.24/400K (2)
- 018 FRC El#
Description Manufacturer TER Deficiency Outstanding items liesolution Status
' Qualification Status 27 50 Accelerometer ENDEVC0
- Inadequate
- Ampitfier
- Will install Pending 51 Aspitfier Unholtz-evidence of requires conduit qualified TEC Hodification Dickle documentation seal amplifier in a (Ib) of the system "Ampitfier has transient shield inadequate housing during qualification the 4th Refueling level.
Outage.
38 6
liHR Various
- Inadequate
'None
' Cold shutdown Exempt 7
System qualification equipment is not Outside the scope 8
Equipment documentation cons'idered to be of 50.49 9
within the scope 45 of the Rulemaking 54 60 (lla) 29 81 Terminal Marathon
- Steam None
- A walkdown was Qualified (Ib)
Eilock 1500 Series exposure performed to establish
- Test Anomaly similarity between the units installed and the units that were' successfully tested.
30 78 Cable Okontte None None Qualified by teat.
Qualified (la)
Eplice Page 8 of 14 403.3.24/400K (2)
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79-018 FRC Els Description Nanufacturer TER Deficiency Outstandine items Resolution Status Qualification Status
~
31 77 Cable Kerite
- Temperature None
- Rep 1 aced during Qualified (Ib)
Spilce
- Radiation 2nd Refueling Outage with qualified Kerite splice 33 74 Control C.E.Vulkene
- Inadequate None
- Any Vulkene Qualified (Ib) cable qualification cable found in the MCC documents or in air operated valve circuit was replaced during previous RFO's with qualified Vulkene/ Supreme control cable.
33 73 Control C.E. Vulkene
- $fallarity None
- Similarity was Qualified (lla) cable Supreme established by 57279 collecting plant specific references and the matching manufacturer's product data sheet NCD-380.
- The cable was qualified by test 34 (Not Assigned)
Page 9 cf 14 403.3.24/400K (2)79-018 FRC Els Description Manufacturer TER Deficiency Outstanding items Resolution St'atus Qualification Status-35 65 Motor Allis
- Inadequate None
- Replaced the motor Qualified 66 Control Chalmers qualification control center's 67 Center documentation transformer with a (lla)
- Similarity quellffed unit that
- Aging was the same as the
- Radiation transformer tested to achieve complete similarity.
- Radiation analysis performed 36 26 Solenoid ASCO
- Inadequate None
- Replaced with Qualified 27 valves qualification qualified solenoid 28 documentation valves during 2nd (Ib)
Refueling Outage 37 24 Solenoid ASCO
- Inadequate None
- Replaced with Qualified 25 valve qualification qualified solenoid (Ib) documentation valves during 2nd Refueling Outage e
38 58 Limit NAMCO
- Indadequate None
' Replaced with Qualified (Ib) switches qualification qualified limit documentation switches during 2nd Refueling Outage Page 10 of'14 403.3.24/400K (2)
79-0 0 FRC Els Description Manufacturer TER Deficiency Outstanding items Resolution Status Qualification Status 39 84 Limit NAMCO
- Inadequate None
- Plant modifications Qualified (Ib) switches steam exposure changed service condi-tions such that limit switches alli not be exposed to steam during the accident for which they are required to operate.
40 39 Flow Fischer
- Inadequate Inadequate '
'Will replace with Pending 43 transmitter Porter qualification qualification qualified Barton Modification (Ib}
documentation levels Lot 5 transmitter during 4th Refueling Outage s
41 37 Pressure Fischer
- Inadequate inadequate
- Will replace Pending 42 transmitter Porter qualification qualification with qualified Barton Modification (lb) documentation levels Lot 5 transmitter during 4th Refueling Outage 42 44 Pressure Fischer
- Inadequate Inadequate "Will replace with Pending (Ib) transmitter Porter qualification qualification qualified Barton Modification documentation levels Lot 5 transmitters during 4th Refueling Outage Page 11 of 14 403.3.24/400K (2) 9
e 79-018 FRC Els.
Description Manufacturer TER Deficiency Outstanding items liesolution Status Qualification Status-43 16 MOV Limitorque None None
' Equipment exempt Exempt 82 because equipment Outside the Scope (Illa) is not exposed to of 50.49 20 harsh environment for (llc) the accident condition 17 for which it must 18 function.
19 21 85 87 (Illb) 86 (Ita) 44 22 MOV Limi torque
- Inadequate None
' Manufacturer has Qualified 23 qualification established 88 documentation similarity.
(lic) between valve operators in the plant and the test specimen.
- 1f non-nuclear parts or motor brake assemblies are found, part replacement all) be scheduled as part of the plant's routine preventive maintenance program.
Page 12 of 14 433.3.24/400K (2)
4-79-01B FRC Eis Description Manufacturer TER Deficiency Outstanding items Resolution Status Qualification Status 45 10 MOV Limitorque
'Inadeq'uate None
'Hanufacturer has Quallfled-12 qualifiction established 15 documentation similiarity (lla)
- Aging between valve 11
- Siellarity operators in plant 13 and test specimen.
14
- lf non-nt. clear grade 89 parts or motcr brake (lic) are found, their assemblies replacement will be seneduled as part of the plant's routine preventive maintenance 46 61 Motor Louis
- Inadequate None
- Replaced outside Qualified (Ib)
Allis qualification recirculation documentation spray pump motors with qualified Siemens Allis motor during 2nd Refueling Outage.
62 Motor Louis
- Inadequate hone
- Supplemental
'Oua11 fled (lla)
Allis qualification analysis demonstrates documentation qualification for the auxiliary feedwater pump motors.
Page 13 of 14 403.3.24/400K (2)
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, l' 2n'i'2efueling Outage -.
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' Aging
' Aging analysis
' Motor splices were
' Documentation
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' Duration of
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Incomplete
. test lubricants, 2nd Refueling r
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' Aging analysts'is underway.
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1 Page 14 of 14 403.3.24/400K (2)
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ENCLOSURE 2 c
MASTER LIST 0F ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT REQUIRING QUALIFICATION BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION UNIT NO. 1 9
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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY HARSH AREA REPORT DATE 111/30/84 PAGE 1 t
l EQ ITEM DESCRIPTION MANUFACTURER MARK NUMBER 1
POER CARE KERITE NFB-16 2
POWER CAR E CERR0 WIRE NFB-65 3
POWER CARE OKONITE X-N/A 4
CNTRL CARE OKONITE X-N/A 5
INSTRUMENT CK CONTINENTAL W1C X-N/A i
6 PENE. TYPE II VIKING X-N/A 6
PENE. TYPE I VIKING X-N/A 6
PENE. TYPE V VIKING X-N/A 6
PENE. TYPE VIII VIKING X-N/A s
,6 PENE. TYPE III VIKIN6 X-N/A 6
PEE. TYPE IX VIKING X-N/A 6
PENE. TYPE IV VIKING X-N/A
,- 7 TERMINAL KK BUCHANAN X-N/A 8
TERMINAL KK PE M W ION X-N/A l
9 SIS WIRE ROCKBESTOS X-N/A 10 SOLEMID ASCO S0V-CC-103A1 10 SOLENDID ASCO SOV-CC-10381 10 SOLEN 0ID ASCO SOV-CC-103C1 10 SOLEN 01D ASCO SOV-CC-105D1 10 SOLENOID ASCO S0V-CC-105El 10 SOLENDID ASCO S0V-CC-107D1 10 SOLEN 0!D' ASCO SOV-CC-107El
' 10 SOLEMID ASCO SOV-CC-110D i
10 SOLEN 0IP, ASCO SOV-CC-110E3 10 S0LEN01D ASCO SOV-CC-111A2 10 SOLENOID ASCO SOV-CC-111D1 4-'
10 SOLEN 01B' ASCO SOV-CH-200Al 10 SOLEN 0ID ASCO SOV-CH-20081 10 SOLENDID ASCO SOV-CH-20001 10 SOLEN 0ID ASCO SOV-CV-102-1 10 SOLENDID ASCO SOV-DA-100A 10 SOLENGID ASCO SOV-D6-108A 10 SOLENDID ASCO SOV-DG-109A2 10 SOLENDID ASCO SOV-LM-101A 10 SOLEMID ASCO SOV-LM-101B 10 SOLEMID ASCO SOV-RC-455C1 10 SOEEN0ID ASCO S0V-RC-455C2 10 SOLENOID
, ASCO S0V-RC-455D1 10 SOLEN 0ID ASCO S0Y-RC-455D2 10 SOLEN 0ID ASCO S0V-RC-456-1 10 SG.ENOID ASCO SOV-RC-456-2 10 SOLEN 0ID ASCO SOV-SI-101-2 10 SOLEN 0ID ASCO S0V-SS-000A li LIMIT SWITCH NAMCO LMS-CC-105D1 s
11\\
LIMIT SWITCH NAMCO LMS-CH-200A LMS-CC-111D1
/
lil LIMIT SWITCH NAMCO 11 '
LIMIT SWITCH NAMCO LMS-CH-200B 11 LIMIT SWITCH NAMCO LMS-CH-200C i
11 LIMIT SWITCH NANCO LMS-RC-455C i
11 LIMIT SWITCH NANCO LMS-RC-455D 11 LIMIT SWITCH NAMCO LMS-RC-456 11 LIMIT SWITCH NAMCO LMS-SI-101-2
1 DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY HARSH AREA REPORT
- DATET11/30/84 PAGE 2 E9 ITEM DESCRIPTION MANUFACTURER MARK NUMBER 11 LIMIT SWITCH NANCO LMS-SI-865A 11 LIMIT SWITCH NAMCO LMS-SI-865B 11 LIMIT SWITCH NANCO LMS-SI-865C 13 LIMIT SWITCH NANCO LMS-CC-105El H
E18E" EE8 M!:EE:iN!
13 LIMIT SWITCH NAMCD LMS-CC-110E3 13 LIMIT SWITCH NANCO LMS-CV-102-1 13 LIMIT SWITCH NANC0 LMS-DG-109A2 14 FLOW TRANS FISCER PORTER FT-MS-474 14 FLOW TRANS FISCER PORTER FT-MS-475 14 FLOW TRANS FISCHER PORTER FT-MS-484 14 FLOW TRANS FISCER PORTER FT-MS-485 14 FLOW TRANS FISCHER PORTER FT-MS-494 14 FLOW TRANS FISCHER PORTER FT-MS-495 15 FLOW TRANS ITT BARTON FT-SI-961 15 FLOW TRANS ITT BARTON FT-SI-962 15 FLOW TRANS ITT BARTON FT-SI-963 164 LEVEL TRANS ITT BARTON LT-FW-474 16A LEVEL TRANS ITT BARTON LT-FW-475 164 LEVEL TRANS ITT BARTON LT-FW-476 16A LEVEL TRANS ITT BARTON LT-FW-484 16A LEVEL TRANS ITT BARTON LT-FW-485 164 LEVEL TRANS ITT BARTON LT-FW-486 i
16A LEVEL TRANS ITT BARTON LT-FW-494 16A LEVEL TRANS ITT BARTON LT-FW-495 16A LEVEL TRANS ITT BARTON LT-FW-496 16A LEVEL TRANS ITT BARTON LT-RC-459 16A LEVEL TRANS ITT BARTON LT-RC-460 16A LEVEL TRANS ITT BARTf'N LT-RC-461 19 PRESS TRANS FISCHER JRTER PT-RC-472 19 PRESS TRANS FISCHER FORTER PT-RS-152A 19 PRESS TRANS FISCHER PORTER PT-RS-1528 20 PRESSURE TRANS ITT BARTON PT-RC-402 20 PRESSLRE TRANS ITT BARTON PT-RC-403 20 PRESSURE TRANS ITT BARTON PT-RC-455 20 PRESSURE TRANS ITT BARTON PT-RC-456 1
20 PRESSURE TRANS ITT BARTON PT RC-457 21 LEVEL TRANS ITT BARTON LT-FW-477 21 LEVEL TRANS -
ITT BARTON LT-FU 497 21 8.EVEL TRANS ITT BARTON LT-FW-497 22 TEMP RES BULB SOSTMAN TRB-RC-410 22 TEMP RES BULB SOSTMAN TRB-RC-412B 22 TER RES BULB SOSTMAN TRB-RC-412D 1
22 TEMP RES BULB SOSTMAN TRE-RC-420 22 TE F RES BULB S0STMAN TRB-RC-422B 22 TEF RES BULB SOSTMAN TRB-RC-422D 22 TEMP RES BULB SOSTMAN TRB-RC -423 22 TEMP RES BLA.B SOSTMAN TRB-RC-430 22 TEMP RES BULB SOSTMAN TRB-RC-4328 22 TEMP RES BULB SGSTMAN TRB-RC-432D l
22 TEMP RES BULB SOSTMAN TRB-RC-433 REPORT. SORTED ON EQUIPMENT ITEM
_1 DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY HARSH AREA REPORT-
~~
4 DATE l11/30/84 PAGE 3 EQ ITEM DESCRIPTION MANUFACTURER MARK NUMBER 24 DANPER MOTOR LIMITOROUE VS-D-5-3B 24 DAMPER MOTOR LIMIT 0E00E VS-D-5-5B 25A MOTOR OP VRVE LIMITOROUE MOV-CH-310 25A MOTOR OP VALVE LIMITOROUE MOV-CH-378 25A MOTOR OP VRVE LIMITOROUE MOV-RC-535 25A MOTOR OP VRVE LIMITOROUE MOV RC-536 25A MOTOR OP VALVE LIMITOROUE MOV-RC-537 25A MOTOR OP VRVE LIMITOROUE MOV-SI-842.
25A MOTOR OP VALVE LIMITOROUE MOV-SI-865A 25A MOTOR OP VALVE LIMIl0 ROUE MOV-SI-865B 25A MOTOR OP VRVE LIMITOROUE HOV-SI-8650 26 PUlf MOTOR GENERR ELEC RS-P-1A 26 PUMP MOTOR GEERAL ELEC RS-P-1B 27A ACCELEROMETER ENDEVC0 FE-RC-100A1 27A ACCELEROMETER ENDEVC0 FE-RC-100A2 27A ACCELEROMETER ENDEVC0 FE-RC-100B1 27A ACCELEROMETER ENDEVC0 FE-RC-100B2 27A ACCELEROMETER ENDEVC0 FE-RC-10001 27A ACCELEROMETER ENDEVC0 FE-RC-10002 27A ACCELEROMETER ENDEVC0 FE-RC-101A1 27A ACCELEROMETER ENDEVC0 FE-RC-101A2 27A ACCELEROMETER ENDEVC0 FE-RC-10181 27A ACCELEROMETER ENDEVC0 FE-RC-10182 27A ACCELEROMETER ENDEVC0 FE-RC-10101 27A ACCELEROMETER ENDEVC0 FL-RC-101C2 27B CRG AMPLIFIER UNHOLTZ-DICKIE FY-RC-100A-1 278 CRG AMPLIFIER UNHOLTZ-DICKIE FY-RC-100A-2 27B CRG AMPLIFIER UNHOLTZ-DICKIE FY-RC-100B-1 27B CRG AMPLIFIER UNHOLTZ-DICKIE FY-RC-100B-2 27B CRG AMPLIFIER UNHOLTZ-DICKIE FY-RC-100C-1 i
27B CRG AMPLIFIER UNHOLTZ-DICKIE FY-RC-100C-2 273 CRG AMPLIFIER UNHOLTZ-DICKIE FY-RC-101A-1 27B CRG AMPLIFIER UNHOLTZ-DICKIE FY-RC-101A-2 27B CRG AMPLIFIER UNHOLTZ-DICKIE FY-RC-1018-1 27B CRG AMPLIFIER UNHOLTZ-DICKIE FY-RC-101B-2 27B CRG AMPLIFIER UNHOLTZ-DICKIE FY-RC-101C-1 27B CRG AMPLIFIER UNHOLTZ-DICKIE FY-RC-101C-2 1
28 MOTOR OP VALVE CONTROL PRODUCT h0V-CC-112A2 28 MOTOR OP VALVE CONTROL PRODUCT MOV-CC-112A3 I
28 HOTOR OP VALVE CCNTROL PRODUCT MOV-CC-112B2 28 MOTOR OP VALVE CONTROL PRODUCT MOV-CC-11283 28 MOTOR OP VALVE CONTROL PRODUCT MOV-RH-605 28 MOTOR OP VALVE CONTROL PRODUCT MOV-RH-700 28 MOTOR OF VALVE CONTROL PRODUCT MOV-RH-701 28 MOTOR OP VALVE CONTROL PRODUCT H0V-RH-72CA 28,
MOTOR OP VALVE CONTROL PRODUCT MOV-RH-720B 28 MOTOR OP VALVE CONTROL PRODUCT MOV-RH-758 l
28 TERMOC00PLE CONTROL PRODUCT RH-P-1A 28 TERM 0000PLE CONTROL PRODUCT RH-P-1E 28 THERMOCOUPLE CONTROL PRODUCT TC-2 28 TERM 0 COUPLE CONTROL PRODUCT TC-20 28 THERMOCOUPLE CONTROL PRODUCT TC-22 IWPf11Pt RfleTFD rW FDilTPMAli TTid
'a.._______.__,.~.__.-.___.__._,_.-_..___._..,_
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY HARSH AREA REPORT DATE 111/30/84 PAGE 4 EQ ITEM DESCRi TION MANUFACTURER MARK NUMBER 28 THERM 0 COUPLE CONTROL PRODUCT TC-23 28 TERM 0 COUPLE CONTROL PRODUCT TC-24 28 THERMOCOUPLE CONTROL PRODUCT TC-3 28 TERM 0 COUPLE CONTROL PRODUCT TC-5 28 THERMOCOUPLE CONTROL PRODUCT TC-6 29 TERMINAL BLK MARATHON NONE 4
30 CABLE SPLICE OKONITE X-N/A 32 SIS WIRE GENERAL ELEC X-N/A 33 SIS WIRE GENERAL ELEC X-N/A 35 MTR CNTRL CNTR ALLIS CHALMERS MCC-1-E12 35 MTR CNTRL CNTR ALLIS CHALMERS MCC-1-E3 35 MTR CNTRL CNTR ALLIS CHALMERS MCC-1-E4 35 MTR CNTRL CNTR ALLIS CHALMERS MCC-1-E5 35 MTR CNTRL CNTR ALLIS CHALMERS MCC-1-E6 39 LIMIT SWITCH NANCO LMS-FW-103A 39 LIMIT SWITCH NAMCO LMS-FU-103B 40 R 0W TRANS FISCHER FORTER FT-FW-100A 40 FLOW TRANS FISCHER PORTER FT-FW-1.00B 40 ROW TRANS FISCHER PORTER FT-FW-100C 40
- ROW TRANS FISCHER PORTER FT-RW-102A 40 R0W TRANS FISCHER PORTER FT-RW-102B 41 PtESS TRANS FISCHER PORTER PT-LM-100A 41 PtESS TRANS FISCHER PURIER PT-LM-1003 41 PRESS TRANS FISCHER PORTER PT-LM-100C 41 PRESS TRANS FISCHER PORTER PT-LM-1003 41 PRESS TRANS FISCHER PORTER PT-RS-156A 41 PRESS TRANS FISCHER PORTER PT-RS-156B 42 PRESS TRANS FISCER FORTER PT-MS-474 42 PRESS TRANS FISCER PORTER PT-MS-4E 42 PRESS TRANS FISCHER PORTER PT-MS-476 42 PRESS TRANS FISCHER PORTER PT-MS-484 i
42 PRESS TRANS FISCER PORTER PT-MS-485 l
42 PRESS TRANS FISCHER PORTER PT-MS-486 42 PRESS TRANS FISCHER PORTER PT-MS-494 42 PRESS TRANS FISCHER PORTER PT-MS-495 I
.42 PRESS TRANS FISCER PORTER PT-MS-496 l
44 MOTOR OP YALVE LIMITOROUE MCV-SI-863A i
44 MOTOR OP VALVE LIMITOROUE MOV-SI-863B 44 MOTOR OP VALVE LIMITOROUE MOV-SI-864A i
44 MOTOR OP VALVE LIMITOROUE MOV-SI-864B l
44 MOTOR OP VALVE LIMITOROVE MOV-SI-885A 44 MOTOR OP VALVE LIMITOROUE MOV-SI-885B 44 MOTOR OP VALVE LIMITOROUE MOV-SI-885C 44 MOTOR OP VALVE LIMITOROUE MOV-SI-885D l
44 HOTOR OP YALVE LIMITOROUE MOV-SI-890A 44 MOTOR OP VALVE LIMITOROUE MOV-SI-890B 44 MOTOR OP VALVE LIMITOROUE MOV-SI-890C 45 MOTOR OP VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-CH-115B 45 MOTOR OP VALVE LIMITOROUE MOV-CH-115C 45 MOTOR OP VALVE LIMITORQUE MOV-CH-115D 45 MOTOR OP VALVE LIMITOROUE MOV-CH-115E 45 MOTOR OP VALVE LIMITOROVE MOV-CH-275A REPORT SORTED ON EQUIPMENT ITEM
L.
i DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY HARSH AREA REPORT DATE :11/30/84 PAGE 5 EQ ITEM DESCRIPTION MANUFACTURER MARK NUMBER 45 MOTOR OP VALVE LIMITOROUE MOV-CH-275B 45 MOTOR OP VR VE LIMITORQUE HOV-CH-275C 45 MOTOR OP YALVE LIMITOROUE HOV-CH-289 45 MOTOR OP YALVE LIMITOROUE MOV-CH-370 45 MOTOR OP VALVE LIMITOROUE HOV-CH-373 45 MOTOR OP VALVE LIMITOROUE MOV-CH-381 45 MOTOR OP VALVE LIMITOROUE MOV-SI-836 45 MOTOR OP VALVE LIMITOROUE HOV-SI-860A 45 MOTOR OP VALVE LIMITOROUE MOV-SI-860B 45 MOTOR OP VRVE LIMITOROUE MOV-SI-S62A 45 MOTOR OP VALVE LIMITOROUE MOV-SI-862B 45 MOTOR OP YALVE LIMITOROUE MOV-SI-867A 45 MOTOR OP VALVE LIMITOROUE MCV-SI-867B 45 MOTOR OP VRVE LIMITORQUE MOV-SI-867C 45 MOTOR OP VR VE LIMITOROUE MOV-SI-867D 45 MOTOR OP VRVE LIMITOROUE MOV-SI-869A 45 MOTOR OP VRVE LIMITOROUE M09-SI-869B 46 PUMP MOTOR LOUIS R LIS FW-P-3A
-46 PUMP MOTOR LOUIS ALLIS FW-P-3B 47 PUMP MOTOR WESTINGHOUSE SI-P-1A 47 PUMP MOTOR WESTINGHOUSE SI-P-1B 48 PtkiP MOTOR WESTINGHOUSE CH-P-1A 48 PUMP MOTOR WESTINGHOUSE CH-P-1B 48 PUMP MOTOR WESTINGHOUSE CH-P-1C 9
l l
l l
l
1 ADDITIONAL SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT INCORPORATED IN BV-1 SINCE THE SECOND REFUELING OUTAGE
- Qualification Status Key:
t Q
Qualified CQ Conditionally Qualified 1
DI Documentation. Incomplete
~
SC Significant Concern e
9 403.3.24/400K
I DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY EQ STATUS DATEj11/30/84 PAGE 1 EQ ITEM DESCRIPTION MANUFACTURER MARK NUMBER STATUS 2008 SOLEN 0ID YALYE ASCO S0Y-BD-100A 0
2008 SOLEN 0ID VR VE ASCO SOV-BD-100B 0
2008 SOLENOID YALVE ASCO SOV-BD-100C 0
2008 SOLEN 0ID VALVE ASCO S0V-FP-105 0
2008 SOLEN 0ID VALYE ASCO SOV-FW-102 0
2008 SOLEN 0ID YALVE ASCO SOV-FW-103A 0
2008 SOLEN 0ID VR VE ASCO S0Y-FW-103B 0
2009 MOTOR SEIMENS ALLIS RS-P-2A 0
2009 MOTOR SEIMENS ALLIS RS-P-28 0
2010 SOLEN 0ID YALYE YALCOR SOV-FW-478A 0
2010 SOLENDID VALVE VALCOR SOV-FW-478B 0
2010 SOLEN 0ID VALYE YALCOR S0Y-FW-488A 0
2010 SOLEN 0ID YR VE YRCOR SOV-FW-4888 0
2010 SOLEN 0ID V R VE YECOR SOV-FV-498A 0
2010 S0LEN0ID VALVE YALCOR SOV-FV-498B 0
2015 RAD MONITOR YICTOREEN RM-RM-219A 0
2015 RAD MONITOR VICTOREEN RM-RM-219B Q
2018 SOLEN 0ID YALCOR TV-CV-150A 0
2018 S0LEN0ID YALCOR TV-CV-150B Q
4 2018 SOLEN 0ID VALCOR TV-SS-102A1 0
2018 SE.EN0ID YALCOR TV-SS-102A2 0
2018 SOLENDID VALCOR TV-SS-105A1 0
2018 SOLENDID YALCOR TV-SS-105A2 0
2018 SOLENGID YALCOR TV-SS-106D 0
2019 FLOW TRANS ROSEMOUNT FT-MS-102A 0
2019 FLOW TRANS ROSEMOUNT FT-MS-102B 0
2019 FLOW TRANS ROSEMOUNT FT-MS-102C 0
2020 LIMIT SUITCH NAE 0 LMS-CC-103A1 0
2020 LIMIT SWITCH NANCO LMS-CC-103B1 0
2020 LIMIT SWITCH NAMCO LMS-CC-103C1 0
2020 LIMIT SWITCH NAE 0 LMS-CC-110D 0
2020 LIMIT SWITCH NAMCO LMS-CC-111A2 0
2020 LIMIT SWITCH NAMCO LMS-DA-100A 0
2020 LIMIT SWITCH NAE 0 LMS-DG-108A 0
2021 LIMIT SWITCH NANCO LMS-BD-100A 0
2021 LIMIT SUITCH NAMCO LMS-BD-100B 0
1 2021 LIMIT SWITCH NAMCO LMS-BD-1000 0
2021 LIMIT SWITCH NAMCO LMS-BD-101A1 0
3 l
2021 LIMIT SWITCH NAMCO LMS-BD-101A2 0
2021 LIMIT SWITCH NANCO LMS-BD-101B1 0
2021 LIMIT SWITCH NAE 0 LMS-BD-10182 0
2021 LIMIT SUITCH NAMCO LMS-BD-101C1 0
2021 LIMIT SWITCH NANCO LMS-B3-101C2 0
2021 LIMIT SWITCH NAKO LMS-FP-105 0
2021 LIMIT SWITCH NANCO LMS-FP-106 0
2021 LIMIT SWITCH NAMCO LMS-FP-107 0
2021 LIMIT SWITCH NAMCO LMS-MS-105A 0
2021 LIMIT SUITCH NAE 0 LMS-MS-105B 0
2022 SOLEN 0ID VALVE ASCO SOV-FP-106 0
2022 SOLENDID YALVE ASCO SOV-FP-107 0
0 = OUALIFIED SC = SIGNIFICENT CONCERN ~
CD = CONDITIONALLY DUALIFIED PM = PENDING MODIFICATION DI = DOCUMENTATION INCOMPLETE E = EXEMPT FROM QUALIFICATION
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY EQ STATUS DATE! 11/30/84 PAGE 2
~
EQ IT5'M DESCRIPTION MANUFACTURER MARK NUMBER STATUS 2022-SOLEN 0ID VALVE ASCO SOV-MS-105A 0
2022 SOLEN 0ID VALVE ASCO S0V-MS-105B Q
2024 REST. TE F DET. CONAX TRB-RS-150A PM 2024 REST. TEMP DET. CONAX TRB-RS-150B PM 2025 CABLE SPLICE KERITE COMPANY X-N/A 0
2027 SOLEN 0ID TAR 6ET ROCK SOV-RC-102A
-0 2027 SOLENDID TARGET ROCK SOV-RC-102B 0
2027 SOLEN 0ID TARGET ROCK SOV-RC-103A 0
2027 SOLEN 0ID TAR 6ET ROCK SOV-RC-103B Q
2027 SOLEN 0ID TARGET ROCK S0V-RC-104 0
2027 SOLENOID TAR 8ET ROCK SOV-RC-105-0 2036 TRANSFORER HEVI DUTY TRF-PWR-29 PM 2038 TER SWITCH RUID COMPONENT TS-AS-101A 0
2038 TEMP SWITCH RUID COMPONENT TS-AS-1018 0
2038 TEF SWITCH RUID COMPONENT TS-AS-102A 0
2038 TEMP SWITCH FLUID COMPONENT TS-AS-102B Q
2038 TEMP SWITCH FLUID COMPONENT TS-AS-103A 0
2038 TEF SWITCH RUID COMPONENT TS-AS-1038 0
2038 TEMP SWITCH RUID C0FONENT TS-AS-104A 0
2038 TEMP SWITCH RUID COMPONENT TS-AS-1048 0
2038 TEMP SWITCH RUID COMPONENT TS-AS-105A 0
2038 TEF SWITCH RUID COMPONENT TS-AS-105B Q
2038 TEMP SWITCH RUID COMPONENT TS-AS-106A 0
2038 TEMP SWITCH RUID COMPONENT TS-AS-1068 0
2038 TEMP SWITCH FLUID COMPONENT TS-AS-107A 0
2038 TER SWITCH RUID COMPONENT TS-AS-107B Q
2038 TEMP SWITCH FLUID COMPONENT TS-AS-108A 0
2038 TEMP SWITCH RUID COMPONENT TS-AS-108B Q
2038 TEMP SWITCH FLUID COMPONENT TS-AS-109A 0
2038 TEMP SWITCH FLUID COMPONENT TS-AS-109B Q
2038
.TEF SWITCH FLUID C0 FONENT TS-AS-110A 0
2038 TER SWITCH RUID COMPONENT TS-AS-110B D
2038 TEMP SWITCH RUID COMPONENT TS-AS-111A 0
2038 TER SWITCH FLUID COMPONENT TS-AS-111B 0
2038 TEF SWITCH RUID COMPONENT TS-AS-112A 0
l 2038 TER SWITCH FLUID COMPONENT IS-AS-112B 0
2038 TEMP SWITCH FLUID COMPONENT TS-AS-113A 0
2038 TEMP SWITCH FLUID COMPONENT TS-AS-113B 0
2038 TEMP SWITCH FLUID COMPONENT TS-AS-114A 0
2038 TEMP SWITCH FLUID COMPONENT IS-AS-1143 0
2038 TEMP SWITCH FLUID COMPONENT TS-BD-100A 0
2038 TEMP SWITCH FLUID COMPONENT TS-BD-100B 0
2042 SDLENDID VALCOR S0V-HY-102-Al 0
l 2042 SDLEN0ID VALCOR S0V-HY-102-A2 0
2042 SOLENDID VALCOR S0V-HY-102-B1 0
2042 SOLEN 0ID VALCOR S0V-HY-102-B2 0
2042 SOLEN 0ID VALCOR S0V-HY-103-Al 0
2042 SOLEN 0ID VALCOR 50V-HY-103-A2 0
2042 SOLEN 0ID VALCOR S07-HY-103-B1 0
2042 SOLEN 0ID VALCOR 50V-liY 103-B2 0
0 = QUALIFIED SC = SIGNIFICENT CONCERN C0 = CONDITIONALLY QUALIFIED PM = PENDING MODIFICATION DI = DOCUMENTATION INCOMPLETE E = EXEMPT FROM GUALIFICAT!0N
._.-.. _.j
I i
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY E0 STATUS DATE: 11/30/S4 PAGE 3 EQ ITEN' ' DESCRIPTION MANUFACTURER MARK NUMBER STATUS
.. -_... --_____=
2042 SOLEN 0ID VALCOR S0V-HY-104-A1 0
2042 SOLENDID VALCOR S0V-HY-104-A2 0
2042 SOLEN 0ID VALCOR SOV-HY-104-B1 0
2042 SOLENDID VALCOR SOV-HY-104-B2 0
2042 SOLEN 0ID UALCaR TV-CV-102 0
2042 SOLEN 0ID VALCOR TV-CV-102-1 0
2044 SOLEN 0ID ASCO S0V-CH-204 0
2044 SOLEN 0ID ASCO S0V-SI-884A 0
2044 SOLEN 0ID ASCO S0V-SI-884B Q
2044 SOLEN 0ID ASCO SOV-SI-884C 0
2045 CABLE SPLICE RAYCHEM X-N/A 0
2046 TERMINAL BLK PENN UNION TB-805 0
2046 TERMINAL BLK PENN UNION TB-206 0
2047 CABLE SPLICE RAYCHEM X-N/A 0
2051 RELAY AMERACE CORP RELAY 152A-BXAE D 2051 RELAY AMERACE CORP RELAY-152-BXAE D 2051 RELAY AERACE CORP RELAY-152-BXDF 0 2051 RELAY AMERACE CORP RELAY-152A-BXDF 0
.2051 ' RELAY AMERACE CORP RELAY-1R 0
2051 RELAY AMERACE CORP RELAY-2R 0
2051 RELAY AMERACE CORP RELAY-3R 0
2051 RELAY AMERACE CORP RELAY-4R 0
2051 RELAY AMERACE CORP RELAY-52-BXAE O
2051 RELAY AMERACE CORP RELAY-52-BXDF 0
2051 RELAY AMERACE CORP RELAY-5R 0
2051 RELAY AMERACE CORP RELAY-6R 0
2062 REST TEMP DET RDF CORP NOT ASSIGNED 0
2064 TERMINAL BLK MARATHON X-N/A 0
2064 TERMINAL PLK MARATHON X-N/A 0
2066 PRESS TRANS ROSEMOUNT
.PT-LM-101A 0
2066 PRESS TRANS ROSEMOUNT PT-LM-101B 0
2067 RAD DETECTOR KAMAN RIS-NSC-05A DI 2067 RAD DETECTOR KANAN RIS-NSC-05B DI
~
i 2068 MICRO-PROCESSOR KAMAN MICRO-PROC-A DI 2068 MICRO-PROCESSOR KAHAN MICRO-PROC-B DI 2073 LEVEL TRANS GEMS LT-DA100 PM 2073 LEVEL TRANS GEMS LT-RS151A PM 2073 LEVEL TRANS GEMS LT-RS151B PM 2081 SELECTOR SWITCH WESTINGHOUSE CS-30 0
2081 SELECTOR SWITCH WESTINGHOUSE CS-31 0
2081 SELECTOR SWITCH WESTINGHOUSE CS-32 0
2081 SELECTOR SWITCH WESTINGHOUSE CS-33 0
2081 SEl.ECTOR SWITCH WESTINGHOUSE CS-39 0
2081 SELECTOR SWITCH WESTINGHOUSE CS-8N15 0
2081 SELECTOR SWITCH WESTINGHOUSE CS99P15 0
2081 SELECTOR SWITCH WESTINGHOUSE HS-CV-102-1X 0
2081 SELECTOR SWITCH WESTINGHOUSE HS-CV-102X 0
2081 SELECTOR SWITCH WESTINGHOUSE HS-CV-150AX 0
2081 SELECTOR SWITCH WESTINGHOUSE HS-CV-150BX 0
2081 SELECTOR SWITCH WESTINGHOUSE HS-SS-102A1X 0
0 = QUALIFIED SC = SIGNIFICENT CONCERN CQ = CONDITIONALLY QUALIFIED PM = PENDING MODIFICATION DI = DOCUMENTATION INCOMPLETE E = EXEMPT FROM OUALIFICATION
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY E0 STATUS DATE: 11/30/84 PAGE 4 EQITN DESCRIPTION MANUFACTURER MARK NUMBER STATUS 2081 SELECTOR SWITCH WESTINGHOUSE HS-SS-102A2X 0
2 91 SELECTOR SWITCH WESTINGHOUSE HS-SS-105A1X 0
2081 SELECTOR SWITCH WESTINGHOUSE HS-SS-105A2X 0
2081 SELECTOR SWITCH WESTINGHOUSE X-N/A 0
2106 REST TEMP DET ROSEMONT TRB-RC-413 0
i c-l l
i 0.= QUALIFIED SC = SIGNIFICENT CONCERN C0 = CONDITIONALLY QUALIFIED PM = PENDING MODIFICATION DI = DOCUMENTATION INCOMPLETE E = EXEMPT FROM OUALIFICATION
ENCLOSURE 3 JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CONTINUED OPERATION O
e e
r e
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEN NO. 10 Franklin Tab 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 79-01B Tab 10 ASCO Solenoid Valves S0V-CC-103Al RC Pump A Cooling Inlet Isolation 50V-CC-10381 RC Pump B Cooling Inlet Isolation S0V-CC-103C1 RC Pump C Cooling Inlet Isolation
~
S0V-CC-10501 RC Pump Cooling Outlet Isolation S0V-CC-105El RC Pump Cooling Outlet Isolation S0V-CC-107D1 RC Pump Thermal Barrier Outlet Isolation 50V-CC-167El RC Pump Thermal Barrier Discharge Valve S0V-CC-110D Containment Air Recirculation Coolers Discharge Isolation 50V-CC-110E3 Containment Air Rec'irculation Coolers Inlet Isolation 50V-CC-111A2 CRDM Shroud Cooling Supply Isolation S0V-CC-11101 CRDM Shroud Cooling:0utlet Isolation S0V-CH-200A1 Letdown Orifice Isolation Valve 50V-CH-20081 Letdown Orifice Isolation Valve S0V-CH-200C1 Letdown Orifice Isolation Valve S0V-CV-102-1 Air Activity Nonitor Outlet 50V-DA-100A Containment Sump Pump Discharge SOV-DG-108A Primary Drains Transfer Pump 50V-DG-109A2 Primary Drains Transfer Pump Vent SOV-LM-101A Contair. ment Vacuum & Leakage Monitoring 50V-LM-101B Containment Vacuum & Leakage Monitoring 50V-RC-455C1 Pressurizer Power Relief SOV-RC-455C2 Pressurizer Power Relief S0V-RC-45501 Pressurizer Power Relief S0V-RC-455D2 Pressurizer Power Relief S0V-RC-456-1 Pressurizer Power Relief 403.3.41 Page 1
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM NO. 10 (Continued)
S0V-RC-456-2 Pressurizer Power Relief S0V-SI-101-2 Nitrogen to Accumulator Isolation Valve
'50V-SS-000A Containment Isolation Sampling System I.
SER QUALIFICATION DEFICIENCIES Solenoid valves need conduit seals.
II. JUSTIFICATION'FOR CONTINUED GPERATION The fact that the existing solenoid valves are not installed with conduit seals is not a concern as demonstrated by the failure modes
~
and effects analysis described herein.
Due to the unsealed installed condition, the steam and caustic sprays could enter the coil enclosure and cause the coil to fail open circuited, grounded or short circuited.
A failure mode and effects analysis shows that for each failure mode two initial operational states for the associated coil must be considered:
solenoid initially energized and solenoid initially de-energized.
With the solenoid initially energized, coil failures will affect the solenoid and air-operated valves as follows.
-If the. coil fails open circuited the solenoid will be de-energized and cause the associated air-operated valve to go to its fail safe position (closed) and neeo not be considered further as this is the required safety position.
A failure resulting Jin a single ground would have no effect on the battery power supply which is ungrounded.
A short circJit w:uld at most result in the trip of the circuit breaker that feet the solenoid.
This ' failure would oe-energize the solenoid resulting in the associated air-operated valve going to its fail safe position (closed).
This type of failure would be analogous to loss of air supply to the valve.
403.3.41 Page 2
- ~ _ -
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM NO. 10 (Continued)
If the solenoid is initially de-energized it will be due to any of three possible conditions, not including the coil failure itself.
These three conditions are (1) loss of power, (2) control switch failed open or held continuously in CLOSE position,- and (3) containment isolation signal.
For the three above mentioned conditions, coil failure has no affect on the solencio.
Therefore, no significant degradation of any safety function or misleading information to the operator as a result of failure of equipment under the accident environmental resulting from a design basis event will occur.
b d
403.3.41 Page 3
_ _, _. _ _ _ _.. _, ~, _,. _ _ ~
. JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM NO. 11 Franklin Tab #59 79-01B Tab #11 NAMC0 EA 180 LIMIT SWITCHES LMS-CC-105D1 RCP Cooling Outlet Isolation LMS-CC-11101 CRDM Shroud Cooler Outlet Isolation LMS-CH-200A Letdown Orifice Isolation LMS-CH-2008 Letdown Orifice Isolation LMS-CH-200C Letdown Orifice Isolation LMS-RC-455C Pressurizer Power Relief LMS-RC-455D Pressurizer Power Relief LMS-RC-456 Pressurizer 2ower Relief
' LMS-SI-101-2 NitrogenSupplytoSafetyInjection5ccumulation LMS-SI-865A Safety Injection Accumulator Discharge Valve LMS-SI-865B
, Safety Injection Accumulator Discharge Valve LMS-SI-855C Safety Injection Accumulator Discharge Valve I.
SER QUALIFICATION OtFICIENCIES Inadequate steam exposure.
II. JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION NAMC0 limit switches located in-containmeht (except LMS-SI-865A, LMS-SI-865B, LMS-SI-865C) are used in air-operated valve de solenoid control. circuits.. Under normal operating conditions,. the valve solenoids are energized and their associated air-operated isolation valves are open.
The solenoids are kept in the energized state or
" sealed-in" by means of NAMC0 limit switches.
Figure 1 shows a typical control circuit for an air-operated valve using a limit switch for " seal-in".
The NAMC0 EA 180 Timit switches provide position indication for the air operated valve.
This 403.3.41 Page 4
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM N0. 11 (Continued) indication circuit consists of position indicating lights in-the control room.
No automatic safety functions are associated with this valve position indication circuit.
NAMC0 EA 180 limit switches are used to provide annunciator reflash for M0V-SI-865 A, B, and C.
It should be noted '. chat associated stem mounted limit switches may give an erroneous valve position indication. This is acceptable'since the operator can verify containment isolation by verifying that the redundant isolation valve is closed and that the operator is not required to reposition these valves post-LOCA or utilize th,ei r position indication to establish operating procedures.-
Protection against loss of containment isolation is provided by redundant air-operated valves located outside o f--
containment (TV-CC-10502, TV-CC-11102, TV-CH-204, TV-SI-101-1).
Because these valves anc their control elements are located outside containment they are not subject to the adverse environment resulting from the postulated initiating event.
However, to protect against the unlikely event that this valve experiences a random failure and does 'not isolate, procedural changes were instituted on December 3, 1980 to provide guidance to the control room operator to check for successful operation of these valves and for actions td be taken prior to resetting any emergency safety features or containment isolation function.
No significant degradation of any safety function or misleading 403.3.41 Page 5
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM N0. 11 (Continued) infonnation to the operator as.a result of failure of equipment under the accident environment resulting from a design basis event will occur.
FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS The switches can fail open, grounded, or closed.
A failure mode and effects analysis shows that for each failure mode two initial conditions for the associated solenoid must be considered:
Solenoid initially energized and solenoid initially de-energized.
1 With the solenoid initially energized, limit switch failures will
' affect the solenoid and air-operated v'alve as follows.
If the switch fails open, it will de-energize the solenoid and cause the associated air-operated valve to go to its fail safe position (closed) and need not be co'sidered any further. A failure resulting in a single ground n
~
would have no effect on the batt'ery power supply which is ungrounded.
' Multiple grounds could result in a trip of the circuit breaker that feeds the solenoid.
This failure would cause de-energization of the solenoid resulting in the associated air-operated valve going to its fail safe position (closed) (Refer to Figure 1).
This type of failure would be analogous to loss of air supply to the valve.
If the solenoid is initially de-energized it will be due to any of three' possible conditions, not including the limit switch failure
~
itself.
These conditions are (1) loss of power, (2) control switch 4
failed open or held continuously in CLOSE position, and (3) containment isolation signal.
For the first two conditions, limit
[-
switch failure has no effect on the solenoid.
For the third condition (containment isolation signal present), should the limit switch fail 403.3.41 Page 6
' JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM NO. 11 (Continued) open, there would be no inrediate effect.
Subsequent to the failure, it would not be possible to re-open the air-operated valve unless the control switch were held continuously in the OPEN position.
- However, tnis conoition has no effect on the ability of the valve to perform its safety function, i.e. to close.
In the event that containment isolation is called for and the limit switch fails closed, the isolation function will be performed as required.
However, when the isolation signal is subsequently reset, the failed limit switch would cause its associated solenoid to be re-energized resulting in a re-opening of the air-operated isolation valve (Refer to Figure 1).
~
1 g
a 403.3.41 Page 7
. _, _ ~
~ ~ -
2 CONTROL SWITCH 1
(CLOSED IN CONTACTS (CLOSED IN "0 PEN" AND "AUT0" "0 PEN" (SPRING RETURN POSITIONS)
POSITION)
TO "AUT0" POSITION)
LIMIT SWITCH CONTACT (CLOSED WHEN AIR-0PERATED VALVE LEAVESCLOSEDPOSITION) 3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CONTACT (CLOSED EXCEPT ON CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL) 9 i
S0V l
FIGURE 1 TYPICAL LIMIT SWITCH " SEAL-IN" CIRCUIT FOR CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 403.3.41 Page 8
.. - - =.
JUSTIFICATION F.0R CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM N0. 13 Franklin Tab #57 79-01B-Tab #13 NAMCO EA 740 LIMIT SWITCHES LMS-CC-103Al RCP Cooling Water Inlet Isolation LMS-CC-10381 RCP Cooling Water Inlet Isolation LMS-CC-103C1 RCP Cooling Water Inlet Isolation LMS-CC-105El RCP Cooling Water Outlet Isolation LMS-CC-10701 RCP Thermal Barrier Outlet Isolation LMS-CC-107El RCP Thermal Barrier Outlet Isolation
' LMS-CC-1100
, Containment Air Recirculation Discharge Isolation LMS-CC.110E Containment Air Recirculation Inlet Isolation
~
LMS-CV-111A2 CRDM Shroud Coolers Supply Isolation,
LMS-CV-102-1 Air Activity Monitor Outlet LMS-DA-100A Containment Sump Pump Discharge LMS-DG-108A Containment Isolation Drains (Hydro) System LMS-DG-109A2 '. Primary Drains Transfer Tank Vent I.
SER QUALIFICATION DEFICIENCIES Inacequate steam exposure.
II. JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION NAMCO limit switches located in-containment and shown on the master list are used in air-operated valve de solenoid control circuits.
Under normal operating conditions, the valve solenoids are energized and their associated air-operated containment isolation valves are open.* The solenoids are kept in the energized state or " sealed-in" by means of NAMCO limit switches.
Figure 1 shows a typical control circuit for an air-operated valve using a limit switch for " seal-in".
Ths limit switches also provide position indication for the air operated' valves. This indication circuit consists of OPEN/ SHUT lights in the control room.
No automatic safety functions are associated with this valve position indication circuit, t
w l
l JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM NO. 13
.(Continued)
Protection against a loss of isolation is provided by a redundant air-operated valve located outside of containment.
Because these valves and their control elements are located outside containment they are not subject to the adverse environment resulting from the postulated initiating event. However, to protect against the unlikely event that this valve experiences a random failure and does not isolate, procedural changes were instituted on December 3, 1980 to provide guidance to the control room operator to check for successful operation of these valves and for actions to be taken prior to resetting any emergency safety features or containment isolafion function.
It should be noted that associated stem mounted limit switches may give an erroneous valve position indication. This is acceptable since the operator can. verify containment isolation by verifying that the redundant isolation valve is closed and that the operator is not required to reposition these valves post-LOCA or utilize their position indication to establish operating procedures.
No significant degradation of any safety function or misleading information to the operator as a result of failure of equipment under the accident environment resulting from a design basis event will occur.
FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS The switches can fail open, grounded, or closed.
A failure mode and effects analysis shows that for each failure mode two initial conditions for the associated solenoid must be considered:
Solenoid initially energized and solenoic initially de-energized.
403.3.41 Page 10
~
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM N0. 13 (Continued)
~
With the solenoid initially energized, limit switch failures will
~ ffect the solenoid and air-operated valve as follows.
If the switch a
fails open, it will de-energize the solenoid and cause the associated air-operated valve to go to its fail safe position (closed) and need not be considered any further. A failure resulting in a single ground would have.no effect on the battery power supply which is ungrounded.
Multiple grounds could result in a trip of the circuit breaker that feeds the solenoid.
This failure would cause de-energization of -the solenoid resulting in the associated air-operated valve going to its fail safe position (closed) (Refer to Figure 1).
If the solenoid is initially de-energized it will be due to any of three possible conditions, not including the limit switch failure itsel f.
These conditions are (1) loss of power. (2) control switch failed open or held continuously in CLOSE position,- and (3) containment isolation signal.
For the first two conditions, limit I
switch failure has no effect on the solenoid.
For the third condition (containment isolation signal present) should the limit switch fail open, there would be no immediate effect.
Subsequent to the failure, it would not be possible to re-open the air-operated valve unless the control switch were held continuously in the OPEN position.
- However, this condition has no effect on the ability of-the valve to perform its safety function, i.e. to close.
l-In the event that containment isolation is called for and the limit switch fails closed, the isolation function will be performed.as l
requi' red.
However, when the isolation signal is subsequently reset, the failed limit switch would cause its associated solenoid to be re-energized resulting in a re-opening of the air-operated isolation valve (Refer to Figure 1).
i 403.3.41-Page 11
2 CONTROL SWITCH
,1 (CLOSED IN CONTACTS
/- (CLOSED IN "0 PEN" AND "AUT0" "0 PEN" (SPRING RETURN POSITIONS)
POSITION)
T0 "AUT0" POSITION)
LIMIT SWITCH CONTACT (CLOSED WHEN AIR-0PERATED VALVE LEAVES CLOSED POSITION)
CONTAINMENT ISOLATICN CONTACT 7
(CLOSED EXCEPT ON CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL) f i
SOV l
~
FIGURE 1 TYPICAL LIMIT SWITCH " SEAL-IN" CIRCUIT FOR CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE 403.3.41 Page 12
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM N0. 14 Franklin Tab #38 79-01B Tab #14 Fischer Porter Flow Transmitters FT-MS-474 Steam Generator A Main Steam Flow FT-MS-475
. Steam Generator A Main Steam Flow FT-MS-484 Steam Generator B Main Steam Flow FT-MS-485 Steam Generator B Main Steam Flow FT-MS-494 Steam Generator C Main Steam Flow FT-MS-495 Steam Generator C Main Steam Flow I.
SER QUALIFICATION. DEFICIENCIES Steam, radiation, and spray exposures are not satisfactory.
Fargin for test time is inadequate.
Test failure criteria is lacking.
II. JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION
~
The func' tion of these Fischer-Porter transmitters is to provide a short-term protective trip action.
The effects of steam flow transmitter failure on these systems and the justification of their acceptability in the interim perico until they are replaceo are as follows:
The protective trip function to mitigate a feedline rupture is a low steam generator level coincident with steam-feed mismatch in the non-faulted steam generator and low-low steam generator level in the faulted steam generator.
The current transmitter qualification is considered adequate to perform the trip because of the completion of the function early-on in an accident scenario, the only concern is one of margin.
Nevertheless, even 403.3.41 Page 13
e JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM NO.'14 (Continued) if. failure of these units is assumed the trip function will be provided by low-low steam generator water level in the faulted steam generator (qualified Barton Lot 2, LT-FW-474 to 476. 484 to -486, to 494 to 496).
No significant degradation of any safety function nor misleading information to the operator as a result of failure of equipment under the accident environment resulting from a design basis event will occur.
403.3.41 p,g, 14
~{
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR IhDEX ITEM N0. 15 Franklin Tab #36 79-01B Tab #15 Barton 386 Flow Transmitters
.FT-St-961 High Head Safety Injection Flow FT-SI-962 High Head Safety Injection Flow FT-SI-963 High Heao Safety Injection Flow I.
SER QUALIFICATION DEFICIENCIES Similarity Aging Test Duration Chemical Spray Submergence II. JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION The High. Head Safety Injection (HHSI) Flow Indication is not used to perform an automatic protective function.
The PAM function performeo by the HHSI Flow as part of the Westinghouse. expanded PAM system may be-accomplished by the use of Boron Injection. Tank Heaoer Flow (FT-SI-943)
(Outside Containment), Boron Injection Tank-Pressure (P,T-SI-943) (Ou,tside Containment), Wioe Range RCS Pressure-(PT-RC-402, 403) -(Qualified Barton-Lot 2), SI Valve Lineup Indications (Outside Containment), and SI Pump Motor Status (Outside Containment).
i This device is - not qualified for submerged operation.
However, if this device is subjected to submergence and fails, its only function of monitoring (1) would have been accomplished prior to submergence and (2) can be performed by other oevices as listed above.
Furthermore, if an erroneous indication should occur due to E
403.3.41 Page 15
s 1:
g,' ' A i ,t u q 3 s s m .A ~.T ' kg;
- .N
.t ~ t s .\\ %,. A ~ / ~. -). JUSTIFICATIONF6iCONTINUEDOPERATIONFOR'INDEXITEMNO.15 ~ (C'ontinued) ~.E - .u s D,' submergence,gNtlshould not mislead the operator since he has been -:.x 4 c;u trairad not-to relay on any single indication. Additional s s instrumentation is available for monitoring the adequacy of injection ~ s ,v-7,fjow, , ~ - 3 e. s., .e _~ No significant degradation of any, safety function or. misleading .i information to the operatGq as a resul3 of failure of equipment' under ,N U dthe accident environment resulting fhxo2 a design. basis event will t. ?A' 9/ . s'- it oCCu r.- + . ~ + s .N' 1 s ~ s -<,.m ,y, s - v a
- 3. y b-
\\ g.- s 4;x s j_ t N,'. 5 s 1
- 'Nyt
,c w," ~ ~ y ~. ~,,. k k' ' %,w e = }~ +. g \\ s w. sN .N., 3 s 4* y -g, - tj ~ ,,.n m. s s. r [ \\.* y ~ ' .. = .k , } /j. F s s g-w,, s ~ + N s 403.3.41 Page 16 ., _...- \\
c JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM NO.'16 e Franklin Tab'#49 79-018. Tab #16 Barton 764-(Lot 2) Level Transmitters LT-FW-474 Steam Generator. Narrow Range' Level ~ LT-FW-475 Steam Generater Narrow Range Level-LT-FW-476 Steam Generator Narrow Range Level-LT-FW-484 _ Steam Generator Narrow Range Level LT-FW-485 Steam Generator Narrow Range Level-LT-FW-486-Steam Generator Narrow Range Level LT-FW-494 Steam Generator Narrow Range Level LT-FW-495 Steam Generator Narrow Range Level-LT-FW'496 Steam Generator Narrow Range Level LT-RC-459 Pressurizer Level LT-RC-460 Pressurizer Level LT-RC-461 Pressurizer Level I. SER QUALIFICATION DEFICIENCIES Aging Chemical Spray II. JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION-a The chemical spray.during the test is representative of the long term c conditions (pH 8.5). The intent of the chemical sprays in this particular qualification testing is to increase the conductivity of any fluid which may leak into the unit, thereby creating a worst case- ~ situation. The testing of these Barton Transmitters showed that the test units did not leak, therefore the higher pH.value used for the i firs,t hcur will not invalidate the qualification. + '403.3.41 Page 17
.a. JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERAIION FOR INDEX ITEM NO. 16 (Continued) The assessment of aging was not a requirement in the qualification. program for the Barton (Lot 2) Transmitter which was developed to IEEE-323-1971 criteria. With the large range of experience and with the amount of testing on this type of transmitter supplied by Westinghouse, it is highly unlikely that a significant in-service aging mechanism exists which could prejudice.the qualification tests, 1 performed by Westinghouse on the new transmitters, within a few years of installation. Aging has been addressed for the Barton (Lot 2) f transmitters through testing by Westinghouse on, similar transmitters a-s and-by an evaluation of the aging properties of the materials in the transmi t'te rs. 4' ,j. No 'significant degradation' of any. safety function or misleading information to the operator as a result of failure of equipment.under the accident environmentj resulting from a design basis event will occur. 3, s v t o { 'f, +. n, a ~ v .i / .t a 3;+
- -..v 403.3.41 Page 18
/
m JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM NO. 17 Franklin Tab #41 79-01B Tab #17 GEMS Level Transmitter LT-RS-151A Containment Sump Level LT-RS-151B Containment Sump Level I. SER QUALIFICATION DEFICIENCIES Note: The original GEMS transmitters which were identified in the SER as having various deficiencies were replaced in 1982. i-II. JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION The' original GEMS level transmitters were replaced in 1982 curing the Second Refueling Outage with GEMS units presumed to be qualified.. The qualification test reports and other documentation provided by GEMS were reviewed by Duquesne Light to evaluate the qualification of these transmitters and receivers. This review indicated that the traasmitter units, although judged to be the best available at the time of procurement, may not be able-to perform their long term required functions following a DBA at BVPS Unit No. 1. It is anticipated that they will function well early-on. in an accident scenario. GEMS has' informed Duquesne Light Company that a new model of the transmitter has' been developed and successfully tested to IEEE 323-74 and IEEE 344-75 Staadards. This qualified mocel differs from our installed units in the substitution of some of-the component materials. The new model has been ordered and an evaluation ' of' the differences has been' performed. The only significant difference is in the type of fill fluid utilized in the unit. Our review indicates that although the fluid in the 403.3.41 Page 19 u ,~
i i JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM N0. 17 (Continued) installed unit is more sensitive to radiation effects, this would not
- be detrimental to the short term operation of the unit.
The installed containment sump level transmitter should operate in the early stages of an accident when it can be used by operators in recognizing and assessing abnormal containment conditions. This is only one of.several means available to aid the operator in his assessment. A possible failure of the transmitter could occur af ter a period of radiation exposure, by which time the operator would be - aware of containment conditions. No significant cegradation of any safety function or misleading information to the operator as a result of failure of equipment under the accident environment resulting from a design basis event will occur. t 403.3.41 Page 20 ~. -
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEN NO. 19 Franklin Tab'#47 79-01B Tab #19 Fischer-Porter Pressure Transmitters .PT-RC-472 Pressurizer Relief Tank Pressure PT-RS-152A Inside Recirculation Spray Pump Discharge Pressure PT-RS-152B Inside Recirculation Spray Pump Discharge Pressure I. SER QUALIFICATION DEFICIENCIES Ste.am, radiation and spray exposures are not satisfactory. - Margin for test time is inadequate. Test failure' criteria is lacking. ~ .II. JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION The function of the pressurizer relief. tank's Fischer-Porter pressure transmitter is to provide post-accident monitoring back-up for the-pressurizer relief valve indication system. This instrument has no impact on control or protection systems. Present operating procedures require the operator to verify that the pressurizer PORV's are closed. Should the original transmitter fail, the operator has been trained to refer to reoundant instrumentation. 1 403.3.41 Page 21
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM NO. 19 (Continued) The following list of' instrumentation is additionally available to the operator to perform this verification: 1. Limit Switches on the PORV's (LMS-RC-455C, 455D, and 456; Index Item 11). 2. Acoustic Monitor (Index Item 27). 3. RCS Wide Range Pressure (PT-RC-402 and 403; Incex Item 20). 4. Pressurizer Pressure (PT-RC-455, 456, and 457; Index Item 20). 5. PORV Block Valve Position (MOV-RC-535, 536, 537; Index Item 25). The function of the Fischer-Porter inside recirculation spray pump' discharge pressure transmitters is to provide control board indication. An alternate means of obtiining the required information' is by monitoring the pump ammeters which will provide a quantitative ~ correlation to the pump discharge pressure. From a system redundancy - standpoint, there is also a redundant 100!, outside recirculation spray. system. ho significant degradation of any safety function or misleaoing information to the operator as a result of failure of equipment under ~ the accident environment resulting from a design basis event will occur. 403.3.41 Page 22
I JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM N0. 20 Franklin Tab #46 79-01B Tab #20 Barton 763 (Lot 2) Pressure Transmitters PT-RC-402' RCS W'ide Range Pressure PT-RC-403 .RCS Wide Range Pressure PT-RC-455 RCS Wide Range Pressure PT-RC-455 Pressurizer Pressure PT-RC-456 Pressurizer Pressure PT-RC-457 Pressurizer Pressure I. SER QUALIFICATION _ DEFICIENCIES Aging Chemical Spray II. JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION The chemical spray during the test is representative of the long term conditions (pH 8.5). The purpose of the chemical sprays in this particular qualification testing is to increase the conductivity of any fluid which may leak into the unit thereby creating a -worst case situation. The testing of these Barton transmitters showed that the test units did not leak, therefore the higher pH value used for the first hour will not invalidate the qualification. The assessment of aging was not a requirement in the qualification program for the Barton (Lot 2) Transmitter which was developed to IEEE-323-1971 criteria. With the large range of experience and with the amount of testing on this type of transmitter supplied by Westinghouse, it is highly unlikely that a signif.icant in-service aging mechanism exists which could prejudice the qualification tests. 403.3.41 Page 23
b 4 ~ JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM NO. 20 (Continued) perfonned by Westinghouse on the new transmitters, within a few years of installation. Aging.has been l addressed for the Barton (Lot 2) transmitters through testing by Westinghouse on similar transmitters-and by an evaluation of the aging properties of the materials in the transmitters. 'No significant degradation of any safety function or misleading information to the operator as a result of failure of equipment under the accident environment resulting.from a design basis event will occur. t 403.3.41 Page 24
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM N0. 21 Franklin Tab #40 79-01B Tab #21 Barton 386 Level Transmitters LT-FW-477 Steam Generator Wide Range Level LT-FW-487 5 team Gene.rator Wide Range Level LT.-FW-497 Steam Generator Wide Range Level I. SER QUALIFICATION DEFICIENCIES Similarity Aging Test Duration Chemical Spray II. JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION The Steam Generator Wide Range Level indication is not used to perform an automatic protective function. The PAM function performed by the Steam Generator Wide Range Level as part of the Westinghouse expanded PAM system, may be accomplished by the use of the Steam Generator harrow range Level (Qualified Barton Lot 2; Index Item 16; LT-FW-474, 475, 476, 484, 485, 486, 494, 495, and 495) or Steamline Pressure (Outside Containment; Index Item 42; PT-MS-474, 484, 494, 475, 495, 476, 486, 496), Wide Range T(HOT) and T(COLD) (Qualified Sostman; Index Item 22; TRB-RC-410, 420, 430, 413, 423, 433) and Auxiliary Feedwater Flow (Outside Containment; Index Item 40; FT-FW-100A, B, and C) whenever the level is below the Narrow Range Steam Generator Level span to determine if auxiliary feedwater is being fed to an intact ~ Steam Generator. The long-term safe condition is water level within the narrow range span. 403.3.41 Page 25
m JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR.INDEX-ITEM h0. 21 (Continued) L No. significant degradation of any safety function or misleading information to the operator as a result _of failure of equipment under the accident environment resulting from a design basis event will occur. ~ 403.3.41 Page 26 I
F- ~ JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR Ih0EX ITEM N0. 23 Franklin Tab #55 79-01B Tab #23 - Electric Thermometer Trinity Inc. TRB-RS-150A Containment Sump Temperature TRB-RS-1508 Containment Sump Temperature I. -SER Qualification Deficiency Inadequate evidence of qualification II. Justification for Continued Operation The Electric Thermometer Trinity Inc. RTD assembly was replaced by a Conax RTD curing ~ the 1982 Secono Refueling Outage. The Conax unit is qualified for its intended function anc a conduit seal is being installed during the Fourth Refueling Outage. These RTD's serve only as a secondary confirmation of the containment-sump level. Any failure or inaccuracies caused - by the lack of a conduit seal would not cause operator confusion to result. .No significant degradation of any
- safety function or misleading information to the operator as a result of failure of equipment under the accident environment resulting from a design. basis event will OCCUR.
403.3.41 Page 27
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM NO. 25 Franklin Tab #2 and #90
- 79-01B Tab #25 Limitorque Motor-0perator
'MOV-CH-310 Regenerative Heat Exchanger Charging Line Discharge Isolation Valve MOV-SI-842 SI Accumulator Check Valve Test Line Containment Isolation Valve I. SER Qualification Deficiencies Similarity Inadequate Docunentation Aging Replacement Schedule II. Justification for Continued Operation (MOV-CH-310) The motor-operator for MOV-CH-310 is located below flood level and was not qualified for submergence. MOV-CH-310 is required to close on receipt of a safety injection signal to block off the normal charging flow path for a positive flow path through the Boron Injection Tank. To prevent submergence from having any possibili ty of causing a spurious opening of the valve, a modification was made at the motor control center during the Second Refueling Outage. Relays were installeo to remove power from any control power feeds to the limit and torque switches whenever the valve is closed. Position indication was retained. 403.3.41 Page 28
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED.0PERATION FOR INDEX ITEM NO. 25 (Continued). Because this valve is qualified for non-submergence conditions, _ operates early on during an accident, and has its power automatically removea upon valve closure it is oeemed qualified as a system for its - intended function. Aging has been. assessed and all ofLthe valve parts have a qualifieo life in excess of 40 years. No significant degradation of any safety function or misleading information to the operator as a result of failure of equipment under the acciifent environment resulting from a design basis event will occur. (MOV-SI-842) Automatic $ isolation of MOV-SI-842 is initiated early in the accident transient upon receipt of a containment isolation phase A signal. The subject containment-penetration is also automatically isolated outside containment by TV-SI-889. This is an air operated valve that fails closed on loss of air or electrical power. This redundant valve is not subjected to the same inside containment aaverse environmental conditions to.which valve MOV-SI-842 is subjected. The automatic closure of TV-SI-889 on a containment isolation phase A signal will accomplish the safety function of containment isolation. The MOV-SI-842 valve has a motor that contains Class B insulation and has a qualification operational time period of 8 hours as demonstrated by previous Limitorque testing. This valve's safety function will I have been performed early on in an accident scenario upon receipt of the' containment isolation phase A signal. 403.3.41 Fage 29
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX-ITEM N0. 25 (Continued) No significant degradation of any safety function or misleacing information to the operator as a result of equipment. under the accident' environment resulting from a design basis event will occur. n } t q 1 1 i 403.3.41 Page 30
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM N0. 26 Franklin Tab #56 79-01B Tab #26 G.E. Pump Motors RS-P-1A Inside Recirculation Spray Pump Motors RS-P-1B Inside Recirculation Spray Pump Motors I. SER Qualification Deficiencies Similari~ty Motor Brake Aging Operating Time II. Justifica' tion for Continued Operation The equivalency between the tested model (G.E.
- 5K6319XJ18) and purchased model (G.E.
e5K6319XJ20A) is established. (Refer to Certificate of Conformance providea by G.E. for Requisition No. 297-81938, Customer order number 1-11462 cated March 27,1975.) The lead splice and lead cable insulation may be susceptible to some thermal degradation, however, information on their material content is currcntly being investigated. The data on hand indicates that - the qualified life is justified based on previous testing of the stator and periodic replacement of the motor's lubricant. An investigation of the motor's constituent parts had indicated that ~ ~ there is a high probability of the equipment operating for the post accident duration. This investigation was based on a study of the parts aging phenomenon and the motor's ability to operate under simulated CBE conditions. 403.3.41 Page 31
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM N0. 26 (Continued) We have determined that the motors will be operating continuously for the first 30 days and on an intermittent basis for 1/3 the time for the remaining 5 months. The total equivalent running time is expected to be 80 days in the 6 month interval post accident. As pointed out above, our investigation of the equipment's test report and materials review, indicates that the motor should remain operable for this post DBA period. In addition, the two fif ty (50) percent design capacity, motor driven recirculation pumps that are located inside the containment are backed-up by two additional fifty (50) percent design capacity, motor driven recirculation spray pumps that are located inside the containment are backed-up by two additional fifty (60) percent design capacity, motor driven recirculation spray pumps that' are located outside the containment. The containment depressurization system is designed in such a way 'that the recirculation spray subsystems, together with the quench spray subsystems, are capable of reducing the containment pressure to subatmospheric in less than 60 minutes and remain atmospheric, thus terminating all outleakage to the environment under any combination of credible events. No significant degradation of any safety function or misleading information to the operator as a result of failure of equipment under the accident environment resulting from a design basis event will occur. 403.3.41 Page 32
I r JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR'INDEX ITEM NO. 27 Franklin Tab #51 79-01B. Tab #27 i ENDEVOC'Accoustic Monitor + FY-RC-100A1 FY-RC-100B2 FY-RC-101A1 FY-RC-10182 FY-RC-100A2 FY,-RC-100C1 FY-RC-101A2 FY-RC-101C1 FY-RC-100B1 FY-RC-100C2 FY-RC-10181 FY-RC-101C2 I. SER QUALIFICATION DEFICIENCIES Inadequate. qualification documentation. II. JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION Failure of the accoustic monitor has no impact on control or protection, systems. Present operating procedures require the operator to verify that the pressurizer PORV's are closed. Should the original transmitter fail, the operator has been trained to refer to redundant instrumentation. The following list of instrumentation'is additionally available to the operator to perform this verification: 1. Limit Switches on the PORV's (LMS-RC-455C, 4550, and 456; Index Item 11). 2. Pressure Relief Tank Level (PT-RC-470; index Item 18). 3. Pressure Relief Tank Pressure (PT-RC-472; Index Item 19). 4. RCS Wide Range Pressure (PT-RC-402 and 403; Index Item 20). 5. Pressurizer Pressure (PT-RC-455, 456, and 457; Index Item 20). 6. PORV Block Valve Position (MOV-RC-535, 536, 537; Index Item 25). 403.3.41 Page 33
1 JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM N0. 27 (Continued) If PORV closure cannot be verified due to a qualification deficiency, the ' operator will close the PORY - Black Valves (MOV-RC-535, 536, and 537; Index Item 25). Due to the redundancy of indication it has been determined that no significant degradation of any safety function or misleading information to the operator as a result of failure of equipment under the accident environment resulting from a design basis event will occur. f I e 403.3.41 Page 34
~ t JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED CPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM N0. 40 Franklin Tab #39, #43 79-01B Tab #40 Fischer-Porter Flow Transmitter FT-FW-100A Steam Generator A Auxiliary Feedwater Flow FT-FW-1008 Steam Generator B Auxiliary Feedwater Flow FT-FW-100C Steam Generator C Auxiliary Feedwater Flow FT-RW-102A River Water to Recirculation Spray Heat Exchanger FT-RW-102B River Water to Recircul : ion Spray Heat Exchanger I. SER QUALIFICATION DEFICIENCIES ho qualification documentation available. - II. JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION A failure made and effects analysis shows that the Fischer-Porter flow transmitters can fail in one of three modes; open circuitea, grounded, or 'short circuited. An open circuit failure will result in a low scale flow indication. A failure resulting in a single ground would have no effect, since the 120 VAC vital bus is ungrounded. A failure resulting in a short circuit would result in a low flow indication and at most blow the transmitter power supply fuse, which would in turn also result in a low scale indication. The 1bove mentioned flow transmitter failure modes have no effect on system operation, since the operator will be able to (1) assess 'the auxiliary feedwater flow requirements by observing steam generator narrow range level indication, and (ii) assess river flow by monitoring the river water pump discharge pressure. 403.3.41 Page 35
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM NO. 40 (Continued) The auxiliary feedwater and river water flow transmitters provide main control board indication with no automatic initiation functions. Steam generator level (narrow range) can be used to accomplish the auxiliary feedwater flow function. For example, a decreasing level in the demineralized water storage tank and a constant steam generator level indicates that there is sufficient auxiliary feedwater flow. The river water flow' transmitters are used for post-LOCA mitigation only. The monitoring of the river water pump discharge pressure provides an alternate means for obtaining the required information. The outside recirculation spray discharge ~~ pressure transmitters provide only control board indication with no automatic initiation function.,, An alternate means of obtaining the required information is by monitoring the pump ammeters which will provide a quantitative indication of pump discharge pressure. There is also a redundant 100% inside recirculation spray system. No significant degradation of any safety function or misleading information to the operator as a result of failure of equipment under the accident environment resulting from a cesign basis event will occur. 403.3.41 Page 36
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM NO. 41 Franklin Tab #37, #42 79-01B Tab #41 Fischer-Porter Pressure Transmitter PT-RS-156A Outside Recirculation Spray Pump Discharge Pressure PT-RS-156B Outside Ri. circulation Spray Pump Discharge Pressure PT-LM-100A Containment Pressure PT-LM-100B Containment Pressure PT-LM-100C Containment Pressure PT-LM-1000 Containment Pressure I. SER OUALIFICATION DEFICIENCIES Qualification documentation unavailable. II. JUSTIFICATION FOR C0hTINUED OPERATION Pressure transmitters PT-SR-156A, B are located outside containment and provide control board indication with no automatic actuation function. These Fischer-Porter pressure transmitters are required only for post-LOCA mitigation. A failure mode analysis shows that pressure transmitters can fail in one of three mo' des open circuited, grounded, or short circuited. An open circuit failure will result in a low scale pressure indication. A failure resulting in a single ground would have no effect, since the 120 VAC bus is ungrounded. The above mentioneo pressure transmitter failure modes have no effect on system operat 'en, since they only provide control board indication. An alternate means of obtairing the ~ required information is by monitoring the pump ammeters, which will provide a quantitative indication of discharge pressure. 403.3.41 Page 37
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM N0. 41 (Continued) The containment pressure transmitters PT-LM-100A, B, C, 0 are located outside containment in the safeguards area. These transmitters are used to generate containment isolation an'd safety injection actuations and also are required as a monitoring function to follow the course of the event. A failure mode analysis shows that pressure transmitters can fail in one of three modes: open circuited, grounded, or short circuited. An open circuit failure will result in a low scale pressure indication. A failure resulting in a single ground would have no effect, since the l'20 VAC bus is' ungroi nded. A failure resulting in a short circuit-would at most blow the transmitter power -supply fuse ~and result in a low scale pressure indication. The. only harsh element that the transmitters are exposed is radiation and the transmitters are expected to be available to serve their safety-related function early-on in a postulated accident condition, because the environment around the transmitters will not change. significantly until very late in the monitoring period as the total radiation dose gradually increases. No significant degradation of any safety function or misleading information to the opeator as a result of failure of equipment under the accident environment resulting from a design basis event will occur. 403.3.41 Page 38
E JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM N0. 42 Franklin Tab # 44 79-01B< Tab-#42 Fischer-Porter Pressure Transmitter PT-MS-474 Steam Generator A Main Steam Discharge Pressure PT-MS-475 Steam Generator A Main Steam Discharge Pressure PT-MS-476 Steam Generator A Main Steam Discharge Pressure PT-MS-484 Steam' Generator B Main Steam Discharge Pressure PT-MS-485 Steam Generator B Main Steam Discharge Pressure PT-MS-486 Steam Generstor B Main Steam Discharge Pressure PT-MS-494 Steam Generator C Main Steam Discharge Pressure PT-MS-495 Steam Generator C Main Steam Discharge Pressure PT-MS-496 Steam Generator C Main Steam Discharge Pressure The Fischer-Porter main steam pressure transmitters are located in the auxiliary feedwater pump room where they can be exposed to 400,000 Rads of radiation (40 year dose) during LOCA conditions. These units will have performed their safety-related function in less than an hour and will be exposed to no more than 15,000 Rads within that period. For this type of harsh condition, the transmitters are not expected to degrade in operability or accuracy. The initial plant piping design ha's' been modified to exclude any pressurized steam lines from the auxiliary feedwater pump room via the relocation of auxiliary feedwater turbine block valves outside the cubicle.. These valves require a safety-injection signal to open the block valve and therefore HELB conditions no longer be considereo. Another pressure transmitter, PT-MS-101 (A, B, or C) is also available to monitor the main steam line pressure and is located in a different part of the plant that would not be subjected to that particular steam line break condition. 403.3.41 Page 39
1 JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATI0h FOR INDEX ITEM NO. 42 (Continued) For other breaks inside and outside containment the transmitters environment will not change and they will perform their monitoring function. No significant degradation of any safety function or misleading information to the operator as a result of failure of equipment under the accident environment resulting from a design basis event will occur. t 403.3.41 Page 40
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM NO. 47 Franklin Tab #63 79-01B Tab #47 Westinghouse Motors SI-P-1A L.H.S.I. Pump Motors SI-P-1B L.H.S.I. Pump. Motors I. SER Qualification Deficiencies Evidence.of qualification of motor splice materials Lubricant' bearing-seal system Required time for continuous motor operation II. Justification for Continueo Operation Motor splice materials have now been quald fied for 40 years plus post DBA. Investigation of lubricant-bearing-seal system nas demonstrated a high probability of operation for duration of a 6 month accident. A thermal aging analysis for continuous motor operation assures motor will operate for 40 years of normal operation plus 6 months of post DBA. Beaver Valley Unit I has the capability to cross-tie the Outside Recirculation Spray Pumps to the High Head Charging Pumps which provides additional redundancy for assuring long term integrity of the f recirculation flowpath. No sign.ificant degradation of any safety function or misleading informat' ion to the operator as a result of failure of equipment under the accident environment resulting from a design basis event 'will occur. 403.3.41 Page 41
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM N0. 48 Franklin Tab #64 79-01B Tab #48 Westinghouse Motors CH-P-1A Charging Pump Motors CH-P-1B Charging Pump' Motors CH-P-1C Charging Pump Motors I. SER Qualification Deficiencies Evidence.of qualification of motor splice materials Lubricant-bearing-seal system Required time for continuous motor operation II. Justification for Continued Operation Motor splice materials have been qualified for'40 years plus DBA Investigation of the lubricant-bearing-seal system has demonstrated a high probability of operation for duration of a '6 month accident. A thermal aging analysis for continuous motor operation indicates that motor will operate for 40 years of normal operation plus 6 months of post DBA, Multiple diverse core injection flow paths are provided by the Low Head, Outside Recirculation Spray and High Head Charging Pumps for providing adequate core cooling following the depressurization of the reactor coolant system post LOCA conditions. 403.3.41 Page 42
4 JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION FOR INDEX ITEM NO. 48 (Continued) No significant degradation _of any safety function or misleading information to the operator as a result of failure of equipment under the accident environment resulting from.a - design basis event will occur. D D e e e D e D f e D 9 403.3.41 Page 43
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'4 s..s , r.. 5. y ~. ENCLOSURE 4 w + a. 1 s s ., 5 m t e ;p i .L .t -4, METHODOLOGYFORMASTERLISTDEVEL0 PENT! i
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~ y 4 s 'e AND ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICE CON 0!TlWS s.. ,-s y o s s s-r., .g % ,.A x s m ,N, i o m .s, n 1 ,A .s' .:J j -N., n.s g.4 2 403.3.24/400X ~' '\\ .n )',.,u '. j I s t
o METHODOLOGY FOR MASTER LIST DEVELOPMENT The methodology for the development of the original plant equipment listing associated with 10CFR50.49', Paragraph (b) (1) involved a system . by system review of several different plant documents-including the following:
- Electrical Schematics
- Electrical Physical Drawings
- Emergency Operating Procedures.
- Final Safety Analysis Report
- Electrical Equipment Lists
- Cable and Raceway Schedules
- Plant Service Conditions After an initial listing was developed, Duquesne Light Company operations personnel then reviewed the list. This operation's review resulted in the addition of some equipment items and the deletion of other equipment that were not required to mitigate the consequences of an accident or bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition. This list' contained harsh area electrical equipment that were expected to remain
- operable for all known design-basis events. For this equipment, the following items were considered when determining if the equipment would remain operable: + h k l 5 t i 6
t Th elementary wirino diagrams were reviewed to identify any l, auxiliary devices electrically connected directly into the control or power circuitry of the safety-related equipment whose failure due to postulated environmental conditions could prevent required operation of the safety-related equipment and; The operation of the safety-related systems and equipment were reviewed to identify any mechanical auxiliary systems that are directly connected with electrical components which are necessary for the required operation of the safety-related equipment. Nonsafety-related electrical circuits indirectly associated with the safety-related electrical equipment by common power supply or physical proximity were considered by a review of the electrical design including the use of applicable industry standards (e.g., IEEE, NEMA, ANSI, UL and ENC) and the use of properly coordinated pri)tective relays, circuit breakers, or i fuses for electrical fault protection. Equipment that was reviewed that is classified as."important to safety" in accordance with Paragraph (b) (2) of 10CFR50.49 was considered by Duquesne Light Company to be safety-related and has been previously included in the Master List. 4 fe / / / 1 s ,.,--.,_.____y r
To comply with the requirements of Paragraph (b) (3) of 10CFR50.49 an additional preliminary listing was developed by examining the equipment being incorporated _into the plant to satisfy Regulatory Guide 1.97 and NUREG 0737 as they relate to post accident monitoring. Safety-related j equipment functions were reviewed along with the type of-environmental exposure to determine what specific equipment is required to be qualified because of these hRC regulations. This process involved the review of numerous types of plant documents similar to that examined for the initial BV-179-01B equipment with additional review of: NUREG 0737 Requirements Regulatory Guide 1.97 Requirements Design Change Package Documents Equipment Location Drawings It should be noted that the Master Listing of additional equipment utilized a 2000 series of equipment item identification numbers. This allows the segregation of new or replacement equipment from the origihal 79-01B plant equipment items for ease in maintaining the plant's qualification record keeping system. I e 8 I f 'E r-ie
EhVIRONMENTAL SERVICE CONDITI,0NS The environmental service (.onditions for BV-1 were derived from detailed analyses of system energy breaks both inside and outside containment. The postulated Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), Main Steam Line Break (MSLB), and High Energy Line Break (HELB) effects are discussed in detail in the DLC EQ Submittal of October 15, 1981. Our actions are summarized below. ~ ErlVIRONMENTAL TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE PROFILES INSIDE CONTAINMENT The Duquesne Light Company EQ submittal to the NRC in October, 1981 identified containment environmental profiles consistent with LOCA pressure / temperature profiles presented in the Beaver Valley Unit 1 FSAR. This was done in accordance with Section 4.0 of the " Guidelines for Evaluating Environmental Qualficatiori of Class 1E, Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors". Therefore, pressure and temperature values of 38 psig and 284 F were used for BV-1 equipment qualification. In order to' fulfill the requirements of the initial SER to provide a MSLBtemperatureprof{le,aprofilegeneratedforNorthAnnaUnits1and. 2, assuming a 4.9 ft. break upstream of the flow restrictor, was used which conservatively enveloped the postulated conditions at Beaver Valley Unit I under similar initiating conditions and assumptions. The resultant peak temperature of this analysis was-430 F. e l - l
Because of the short duration of the MSLB 430*F temperature spike, the original temperature profile, based on the LOCA temperature value of i 284"F, was considered conservative for the following reasons: 1. The bulk superheated condition calculations had shown that +.he skin temperature of equipment had not exceeded their qualification temperatures. r 2. FSAR Table 5.2-5 "FSAR Hot Leg DER in Summer" indicated the peak containment temperature during extended auxiliary feedwater flow through a faulted steam generator to be 269.3'F. 3. No safety-related electrical equipment is located in the upper third of the containment. This precludes any equipment from being exposed to a higher-than-average temperature due to stratification in the upper regions of the containment following a main. steam line break. 4. Any stratification in the Beaver Valley Unit No. I containment will only be present for a short period of time, since all the spray systems are active within five minutes following a MSLB or LOCA. These systems include a minimum of three spray pumps'and provide a minimum of 9,000 gpm from spray headers located in the upper regions of the containment. This high flow rate will quickly l disperse any stratified steam in the upper ragions of the containment. I L l
A' containment MSLB temperature analysis has recently been performed for ~ BV-1.- This analysis indicates a peak temperature of 350*F of approximately three (3) minutes in duration. This is considerably lower than'the North Anna profile previously considered. An indicated peak MSLF. pressure value of 45 psig is 7 psi greater than calculated for a LOCa. This increased pressure condition does not result in a lessening of the BVPS-1 equipment qualification status since applicable testing was conducted at pressures greater than 45 psig. ENVIRONMENTAL TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE PROFILES OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT Evaluation of the temperature and pressure requirements for equipment qualification was performed in accordance with APCSB 3-1, Appendix B which resulted in the following building / areas being considered: i 1. Auxiliary Building 2. Cable Vault Area 3. Main Steam Valve House The following high energy line breaks were evaluated in the areas listed above as determined by the locations of safety related equipment, piping runs and buildings geometry: 4 - 1. Steam generator blowdown line 2. Auxiliary steam line 3. Main steam feed line to the auxiliary feed water pump turbine 4. Reac' tor coolant system letdown line 5. Decay heat release line header t e g -,-wa.- e m
SUBMERGENCE Inside Containment The submergence level inside containment (698'9") is predicteo upon 100 ~ percent drainage of the following tanks and systems into the available net free volume at the containment mat elevation: 1. Refueling Water Storage Tank 2. Safety Injection Accumulators 3. Boron Injection Tank 4. Reactor Coolant System 5. Chemical Addition Tank Outside Containment Submergence of safet'y related equipment, due to the failure of high energy . lines outside containment, is not a qualificatioh concern due to the isolation of the fluid medium, either automatically or by operator action. The blowdown dnd auxiliary steam systems will be isolated in 10 and 30 seconds _respectively, while the letdown line will be isolated.in a maximum of 10 minutes (by operator action) or at 14% Pressurizer Level via a . letdown isolation signal. Given these isolation times there will not be sufficient water discharge from the break to submerge any safety related equipment in either the primary auxiliary building or the cable vault pipe tunnel area. r-n,m- ,,.e-- --o,, ,eee.----n-n w w ye, e,- ~w,m-,,e,, ,--ew~ ---og-- n,--ww-
ENCLOSURE 5 CHEMICAL SPRAY ANALYSIS / Y l 4 e 4 403.3.24/400K
CHEMICAL SPRAY ANALYSIS The NRC's SER had requested Duquesne Light Company's review of the plant's chemical spray concentration of boric acid solution. The NRC concern was that equipment qualification testing in several instances had been performed at lower concentrations of boric acid solution than the 15,000 ppm value that was identified in the plant's FSAR. Duquesne Light Company investigated this concentration difference for a wide range of boric acid ppm values (8,000 to 20,000 ppm)' when mixed with various percent weight solutions of sodium hydroxide and found the resulting changes to the solutions pH level to be minimal (See Table 1). The maximum pH sensivity of this range was 'a difference in pH of only 0.66 which occurred when the sodium hydroxide percent weight was 0.3. This amount of change in the pH results in a negligible amount of corrosion stress on the equipment. l The quench spray system is expected to have a boric acid concentration of 11,500 ppm buffered with a.3% weight of sodium hydroxide during accident l conditions. The identified concern does not appear to be significant in terms of overall change in the pH of the spray solution and the difference t is not considered great enough to invalidate any test results on the equipment. 403.3.24/400K (1)
t As depicted in the Table 1, the pH level varies insignificantly with changes in boric acid PPM concentration over a range of 2,500 to 20,005 PPM. TABLE 1 Boric Acid 8oron Sodium Hydroxide (PPM) PPM' (wt%) pH 8,000 1,400 0.1 8.62 10,000 1,750 0.1 8.50 12,000 2,100 0.1 8.41 15,000 2,626 0.1 8.30 20,000 3,500 0.1 8.16 8,000 1,400 0.15 8.86 10,000 1,750 0.15 8.72 12,000-2,100 0.15 8.62 15,000 2,626 0.15 8.50 20,000 3,500 0.15 8.36 8,000 1,400 0.2 9.04 10,000 1,750 0.2 8.89 12,000 2,100 0.2 8.78 15,000 2,626 0.2 8.65 20,000 3,500 0.2 8.50 8,000 1,400 0.25 9.21 10,000 1,750 0.25 9.04 1? 000 2,100 0.25 8.92 15,000 2,626 0.25 8.78 20,000 3,500 0.g5 8.62 8,000 1,400 0.3 9.38 10,000 1,750 0.3 9.18 12,000 2,100 0.3 9.04 15,000 2,626 0.3 8.89 '20,000 3,500 0.3 8.72 1 s 403.3.24/400K(1)
g,. ENCLOSURE 6 EQ MAINTENANCE PROGRAM e 403.3.24/400K
I EQ MAINTENANCE PROGRAM Basic System Equipment maintena'nce qualification entails four closely-related programs: preventive maintenance, corrective maintenance, surveillance of equipment, and surveillance of maintenance activities. The preventive and corrective maintenance programs utilize the Maintenance Work Request and Failure Report (MWR&FR) form as the core document for work initiation and reporting. The MWR&FR documents the equipment problem, the effect on 'its associated system, the failure detection method, the cause of failure, and the corrective action. The MWR&FR is maintained.,as a hard copy in the equipment maintenance file and is used as the input to the computerized Maintenance (quipment History File (EHF) system and the Maintenance Planning and ' Scheduling (MP&S) file. This system is designed so that historical information can be reviewed and analyzed to determine if any recurring problems and trends exist. Replacement Scheduling A pro' gram to schedule the specific times when equipment and their associated component parts must be replaced in order to maintain their respective qualified life values.is now being included in the overall preventive maintenance program. This replacement scheduling is computerized and is designed to provide preventive maintenance schedule dates and work orders for part or equipment' replacement. 403.3.24/400K
Aging Surveillance With regard to the surveillance of safety-related equipment for degradation resulting from aging, a formalized program has been established for preventive maintenance activities. The program is currently being reviewed and expanded to make it more encompassing to facilitate records-keeping and trend analysis. The Preventive and Surveillance Maintenance procedures now in use include documenting periodic surveillance testing of specific equipment parameters, such as insulation resistance readings of coils and windings, and the comparing of this data with data previously recorded. This documentation system therefore provides some indication of ongoing degradation that may be occurring. These procedures will be expanded to include additional surveillance activities to help identify those equipment items which are likely to experience aging degradation as the result of either the environment at their installed locations or equipment wear. Plant maintenance personnel will receive additional training in the use.of these updated procedures in order that they can more closely monitor the materials and components which are susceptible to age-related degradation. Maintenance Program Surveillance s The surveillance of maintenance activities involves the routine checking of maintenance functions to assess that periodic replacement of equipment or parts is occurring as per their established schedule to maintain the 2 equipment qualified life. This surveillance will also evaluate the trending program so that effective age-degradation monitoring is occurring. 403.3.24/400K(1) _ _ - _.}}