ML20096F407

Proposed Tech Specs Re Control Room Ventilation Sys Chlorine & Sulfur Dioxide Analyzers

ML20096F407
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	04/20/1992
From:	COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20096F398	List: ML20096F394 ML20096F407
References
NUDOCS 9205210163
Download: ML20096F407 (52)

Text

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b ATi ACHMENT C "

Wup Pages for Proposed Changes DEB-29 DPR-30

-i 3.2/4.2 3 3.2/4.2 3  !-

3.2/4.2-11 3.2/4.2 8 3.2/4.2-28 3.2/4.2-17 .

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' QUA04.! TIES DPR-29

. E. Postaccident Instrumentation E. Post' accident Instrumentation The limiting conditions for operation Postaccident instrumentation shall be for the instrumentation which is read functionally tested and calibrated as out in the control room, required for Indicated in Tchle 4.2-2.

postaccident monitoring are given in Table 3.2-4.

F. Control Roce Ventilation System F. Control Room Ventilation System 150-Isolation 14 tion

1. The control rose ventilation 1. Surveillar:ce for instrumentation systems are isoitted from which inttlat" Isolation of outside air on a signal of high control room "6ntilation shall' 1rywell pressure, low water be as specified in Table 4.2 1.

] level, high main steamilne flow, high toalc gas concentration, high radiat'on in either of the reactor building venttiation- {

exhaust ducts, or manually.

Limiting conditions for.

operation shall be as indicated in Table 3.21 and Specificaticn 3.2.H. age 1.2.F.2..-

2. The toxic gas detection 2.- Manual isolation of the control instrume'dation shall consist of "" room.-ventilation system shall be )

a Mertw4ammontat tri ::!;tur -demonstrated once every d!::'d: a(alyzen vlThptrip

• refueling outage, setpoint-set at? 6 SClppm .

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m.. m r .... _ .

. . . . . . . . . . . .1.. _

c. $dhhE h'..W ce- e-tree!en ; 3 :; .

The' provisions of Specification 3.0.A. are not abolicable.

1

, 0674B/0333Z 3.2/4;2-3 -Amendment No.

I

.x . . . . . . .

QUAD-CITIES OPR-29 The Instrumentation which is provided to monitor the postaccident condition is listed in Table 3.2-4 The instrumentation listed and the limiting conditions for operation on these systems ensure adeguate monitoring of the containment following a loss-of-coolant accident. Information from this Instrumentation will provide the operator with a detailed knowledge of the conditions resulting from the accident; based on this information he can make logical decisions regarding postaccident recovery.

The speelfications allow for postaccident instrument $ tion to be out of service for a period of 7 days. This period is based on the fact that several diverse instruments are available for guiding the operator should an {

accident occur, on the low prooability of an instrument being out of service and an accident occurring in the 7-day period, and on engineering judgment.

The normal supply of air for the control room ventilation system Trains "A" and "B" is outside the service building. In the event of an' accident, this source of air may be required to be shut down to prevent high doses of raftation in the control room. Rather than provide this isolation function on a radiation monitor installed in the intake air duct, signals which indicate an accident, i.e., high drywell pressure, low water level, main steamilne high flow, or high radiation in the reactor building ventilation

' duct, will caur isolation of the intake air to the control room. The above trip signals re alt in immediate isolation of the control room ventilation system and thus minimize any radiation dose. Manual isolation capability is also provided. Isolation from high toxic chemical concentration has been added as a result of the " Control Room Habitability Study" submitted to the NRC in December 1981 in response to NUREG-07W Item JII 0.3.4. is ;;;;hb;d

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1. A L Sectic' 3 e' tH : :tdy, m b,-e Mr %: . =d :;!;tr_ db;td; d;;;;t k,n c

W '- 9 tty he; teen g orhief. The setpoints chosen for-the control room ven..lation isolation are based on early detection in the outside air supply at the odor threshold, so that the toxic chemical will not achieve toxicity limit concentrations in the Control Room.

The radioactive liquid and gaseous effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor the release of radicactive materials in llQuid and gaseous effluents during releases. The alarm setpoints for the instruments are provided to ensure that the alarms will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 20.~

06748/03332 3.2/4.2-11 Amendment No.

4

I4' Quad Cities.

DPR-29 ,

INSERT FOR TECHNICAL SPEC!r! CATION PAGE 3.2/4.2-11 Anunonia, chlorine and sulphur dioxide detection capability was t.dded to the plant in response to the referenced study. In a report generated by.Sargent and Lundy in May, 1988, justification was provided and the chlorine and sulphur dioxide detectors were deleted from the plant. .

9-b 4

1329B

, _ _ _ _ . - _ _ - _ _ _ - - - . _ . _ _ - _ ---- -L a-_ -- - --

QUAD-C!t!ES DPR 29 TABLE 4.2-1 (Cont'd).

4 Instrument Ir.strument Functignal Instr Channel Test u) Calibration (2) Cneckymjnt 2

RCIC ! solation

1. Steamilne high flow Once/3 mo'nths(9) Once/3 months (9) None

2. Turbine area hign temperature Refueling outage Refueling outage None

3. Low reactor pressure Once/3 months Once/3 months None HPCI Isolation

1. Steamline high flow (1) -(9) Once/3 months No' )

2. Steamline area high Refueling outage Refueling outage Non temperature

3. Low reactor pressure (1) Once/3 months None Reactor Building Ventilation System Isolftion and 3tanC0y Treatment System Initiation

1. Refueling floor radiation (1) Once/3 months Once/ day monitors Steam Jet Air Ejector cff-Gas ! solation

1. Off-gas radiation monitors (1) (4) Refueling-outage Once/ day Control Room Ventilation System Isolation

1. Reactor low wu'er level (1) Once/3 months once/ day

2. Drywell.high p issure (1) Once/3 months None

3. Main steamline tilgh flow (1) .Once/3 months Once/ day

4. Toxic gas cnalyzerf- Once/ month Once/18 months Once/ day (elor'n:. ammonta p e!;her i dio:ldc)

Notes

1. Inttially onge per month untti exposure hours (H as-defined on Figure 4.1-1) are 2.0 X 1031 thereafter, according to Figure 4.1-1 with an interval not-less than i month nor more than 3 months. The compilation of instrument failure rate. data may include data obtained from other boiling water 5

reactors for which the same design instrument operates in an environment similar to that of Quad Cities Units 1 and 2.

2. Functional' tests, calibrations, and instrument checks are not required when these instruments are not' required-to be operable'or tripped.-

0674B/0333Z 3.2/4.2-28 Amendment No1

.j

QUAD-CITIES OPR-30 F. Control Room '/entilation System F. Control Room Ventilation System 150-Isolation lation

1. The control room ventilation 1. Surveillance for instrumentation systees are isolated from which initiates isolation of outside air on a signal of high control room ventilation shall drywell pressure, low water be as specified in Table 4.2-1.-

level, high main steamline flow, high toxic gas concentration, high radiation _in either of the reactor building ventilation exhaust ducts, or manually.

Limiting conditions for operation shall be as indicated in Table 3.2-1 and Specification 3.2.H. and 3.2.F.2.

2. The toxic gas detection 2. Manual isolation of the control instrumentation shall consist of- room ventilation _ system shall be an a monia analyzer wl'5 a trip

. demonstrated once every setpoint set at 150 ppm.- refueling outage.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.A. are not applicable.

G. Radioactive Liquid Effluent Instru-- G. Radioactive Liquid Effluent Instru-mentation mentation The effluent monitoring instrumenta- Each radioactive ligt.!d effluent mon-tion shown in Table 3.2-5 shall be itoring instrument shown-in Table operable with alarm'setpoints set to 4.2-3 shall be~ demonstrated operable ensure that the ilmits of Specift- by performance of the given source cation 3.8 B are not exceeded. The check. instrument check, calibration- ,

alarm setpoints shall be determined and functional test operations at the in accordance with the ODCM. frequencies shown in Table 4.2-3.

1. Nith a radioactive 11guld'af-fluent monttoring instrument alarm / trip setpoint less con-servative than required, without delay suspend the release of ra- -

dioactive 11guld effluents mont-tored by the affected instru-ment, or declare the instrument inoperable, or change the set-point so it is acceptably con-servative.

13308/ 3.2/4.2 3 Amendment No.

- mm__m________.- _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ i

QUAD-CITIES l

DPR-30 so that none of the activity released during the refueling accident leaves the reactor building via the normal ventilation stack but that all the activity is processed by the standby gas treatment system.

The instrumentation which is provided to monitor the postaccident condition is listed in Table 3.2-4. The instrumentation listed and the limiting conditions for operation on these systems ensure adequate monitoring of the containment following a loss-of-coolant accident. Information from this instrumentation will provide the operator with a detailed knowledge of the conditions resulting from the accident; based on this information he can make loalcal dectsions regarding postaccident recovery.

The specifications allow for postaccident instrumentation to be out of servita for a period of 7 days. This period is based on the fact that several diverse instruments are available for guiding the operator should an accident occur, on the low probability of an instrument being out of service and an accident occurring in the 7-day period. and on engineering judgment.

The normal supply of air for the control room ventilation system Trains "A" and "B" is outside the service building. In the event of an accident, this source of air may be required to be shut down to prevent high doses of radiation in the control room n ter W provide this isolation function <

on a radiation monitor instal td la t 1 3ta 9 *1r duct, signals which indicate an accident, i.e., h @ s p ej n et ./e, low water level, main steamli u high flow, or high rw h t y m b i n ctor building ventilation duct, will cause isolation of the no.e att to the control room. The above trip signals result in immediate isolation of the control room ventilation system and thus minimize any radiatiot, dose. Haneal isolation capability is also provided. Isolation from high tcxit. chemical concentration has becn added as a result of the " Control Room Habitability Study" submitted to the NRC in December 1981 in response to NUREG-0737 Item III 0.3.4. Ammonta, chlorine and sulphur dioxide detection capability was added to the plant in response to the referenced study. In a report generated by Sargent and Lundy in May, 1988, justification was provided and the chlorine and sulphur dioxide detectors were deleted from the plant. The setpoints chosen for the control room ventilation isolation are based on early detection in the octside air supply at the odor threshold, so that the toxic chemical will not achieve toxicity 'amtt concentrations in the Control Room.

The radioactive liquid and gaseous effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor the release of radioactive materials in liquid and gaseous effluents during releases. The alarm setpoints for the instruments are provided to '

ensure that the alarms will accur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 20.

1330B 3.2/4.2-8 Amendment No.

. QUAD-CIT!!5 DPe-30 TAttt 4.2-1 (Cont'd) ,

Instrument Instrument functlgnal Instr thannti 1111. I Lil}hratlDnIII (htLLgnt HPCI Isolation

1. $ team 1tne high flow (1) (9) Once/3 months hone

2. tteamline area high temperature Refueling outage Refueling outage hone

3. Low reactor pressure (1) Once/3 months none teactor tutiding Ventilation System Isolation and $tandby Treatment system initiation

1. Refueling floor radiation (1) Once/3 months Once/ day wenitors Steam Jet air tje: tor Off-Gas Isolation

1. Of f-gas radiation monitors (1) (4) Refueling outage Dnce/ day Control Room venttistion $ystem ! solation

1. Ee.ctor low water level (1) Once/3 months once/ day

2. Drywell high pressure (1) Once/3 months hone

3. Main steamitne high flow (1) Once/3 months once/ day

4. Toute gas analyzer On6e/Honth Once/18 months once/ day (annon ta)

Katti ,

1. Initially on are 2.0 x 10ge; thereafter, per month untti exposure according hours (M to Figure as defined 4.1-1 with soon Figurenot interval 4.1-1) less than 1 month nor more th6n 3 months. The coastlation of instrument f atture rate data may include data obtained from other belling water reactors for which the same desten instrument tiperates in an anytronment sistlar to that of Ouad Cities Units 1 and R.

2. Functional tests. calibrations, and inttrument checks are not required when these instruments are not requires to be operable or tripped.

3. This instrumentation is excepted f rom the functional test definition. The function test shall consist of injecting a simulated electric signal into the measurenent channel.

4. This instrument channel is excepted from the functional test 6efinitions and shall te celtbrated using simulated electrical signals once every 3 months.

$. Functional tests shall be perforned before each startup with a reputred freovency not to exceed once per week. Calibrations shall be perf orned during each startup or ouring controlled shutoowns with a required frequer.cy not to exceed once per week.

6. The positioning mechanism shall be calibrated every refueling outage.

7 togic systee functional tests are performed as spectf ted in the applicable section for those systems.

8. Functional tests shall inc~lude verification of operation of the degraded voltage, & minute timer and 7 second inherent itser.

9. Vertf tcation of the time delay setting of 31 t i 9 seconds shall be performed during each refueling outage.

13308 3.2/4.2 17 knenoment No.

i

ATTACHMENT D Evaluation for Significant flazanis Considoration of Proposed Changes As described in Attachment B, the proposed changos involve deletion of the chlorine and sulfur dioxide analyzers insolation trip functions and surveillance requirements from the Control Room Ventilation System isolation instrumentation Technical Specification. These changes have been reviewed tey' Commonwealth Edison, and we believe that they do not present a Significant Hazards Consideration.

The basis for our determination is documented as follows:

BASLS FOR NOElGNIELCANT HAZABQS_ CONSIDERATION Commonwealth Edison has evaluated this proposed amendment and determined that it involves no significant hazards consideration in accordance with the

, a proposed amendment to an oaorating license involves critoria of 10 no significant CFR cons hezards 50.92 (c)iderations if operation ty, of inthe facil accordance with the proposed amendment, would not:

1. Involve a significant increase In the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because:

The proposed changes involve deletion of the control room air intake chlorine and sulfur dioxide analyzers isolation trip functions. This change does not involve any accident precursors and, therefore, cannot increase the probability of an accident previously evaluated. In order to determine if the chlorine and sulfur dioxide isolation functions are needed, a habitability study of the control room following postulated accidents involving chlorine and sulfur dioxide shipments in the vicinity of Ouad Citles Station was performed.

The results of this control room habitability study Indicate that by combining conservative calculation with reasonable qualitative arguments, the 3robability of causing uninhabitable control room conditions by accidents nvolving railroad shipment of chlorine and sulfur dioxide falls within the acceptable limits as defined by Reg. Guide 1.70 and the SRP. Therefore, these potential events should not be considered design basis events and the chlorine and sulfur dioxide detectors isolation functions should be deleted at the Quad Cities Station without significantly increasing the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The correction of the typo " streamline" is and administrative change to the Unit Two Technical Specifications which by its nature cannot involve a significant hazards consideration.

2. Create the possibility of a new or dif'ferent kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because:

The deletion of the isolation functions of the chlorine and sulfur dioxide analyzers has been evaluated and found to meet the criteria of applicable Regulatory Guides and the SRP The realisoc probability of occurrence of an event involving chlorine or sulfur dioxide that would cause the control room to become uninhabitable has been determined to be low enough such that these events no longer need to be classified as design basis events.

/scl:1316:54

e .

The detector isolation functions that are being deleted are only required to provide a trip function in the event of a very low probability chlorine or sulfur dioxide spill. Therefore, the deletion of these detectors from the plant cannot create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Involve a significant reduction in the maigin of safety because:

The installation of the chlorine, ammonia, and sulfur dioxide detectors was based on a survey of performed in 1981 which determined that concentrations of these substances would exceed toxicity levels in the control toom in less than 2 minutes after detection. This 1981 survey did not consider whether uninhabitable conditions could be caused in the control room during an actual offsite accident which releases chlorine or sulfur dioxide. This study also did not consider the probability of occurrence of and event where chlorine or sulfur dioxide would be released in sufficient quantitles to make the control room uninhabitable.

The recent completed study makes the determination using accepted probability analysis methods, that these events are of sufficiently low probability of occurrence that they should not be classified as design basis events. The study also demonstrates that the 1981 study was overly conservative and as such, should not be used to establish a basis for a determination of a reduction in a margin of safety. If the methodology used in the latest study had been used in the 1981 study, then these chlorine and sulfur dioxide detectors would have probably never been installed in the plant. Since these detectors are not needed in the plant to mitigate a potential chlorine or sulfur dioxide release that would make the control room uninhabitable, then the deletion of these detectors' isolation functions does not involve a significant reduction in any margin of safety.

/scl:1316:55

s ATTACllMENT E Environmental Assonsment of the Proposed Changos The pro >osed changes to the Quad Cllles Station Technical Specifications involve she deletion of isolation functions and surveillance requirements for the Control Room Ventilation System automatic isolation instrumentation (Technical Specification (TS) 3.2.F.2 and Tabis 4.21). The proposed changes will reduce unwarranted challenges to the Control Room Ventilation system die to spurlous trips of the chlorine and sulfur dioxide analyzers. The 3roposed change is based upon an analysis which indicates that these solation functions are not required to ensure control room habitability following a postulated accident involving chlorine and sulfur dioxide shipments in the vicinity of Ouad Citles Station.

Commonwealth Edison has evaluated the proposed amendment in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 51.21 and has cietermined that the amendment meets the requirements for categorical exclusion as specified by 10 CFR 51.22 (c) (9).

The proposed change to TS 3.2.F.2 and Table 4.2-1 for the Control Room Ventilation System isolation instrumentation does not change the types of effluents or increase the amount of eiNents that may be re eased offsite.

Engineering studies have indicated that the proposed change would not impact the habitability of the Control Room following a >ostulated accident involving chlorine and sulfur dioxide shipments in the y cinity of the Quad Cities Station. Based upon this fact, the celetion of the isolation functions for chlorine and sulfur dioxide analyzers would not affect the ability of control room personnel to mitigate the consequences (including the types or amounts of effluents released offsite) of previously evaluated accidents.

The proposed change does not significantly affect individual and cumulative occusational radiaNn exposures. The deletion of the Control Room Vent lation system Dxic gas isolation functions would reduce unwarranted challenges to a safety system, without im aacting the habitability of the control

room during postula'.ed toxic gas accidenus. Individual and cumulative radiation exposures would not be significantly affected since the radiation levels in the plant are independent of the toxic gas isolation instrumentation, in conclusion, the proposed amendment will not result in any increase in the environment consequences beyond those already accepted by the NRC in the Final Environmental Statement.

i 1

/scl:1316:56 V - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

ATTACIMENT F Report LS-7125, Revision 1. April,1991,'llabitablNty of Control Room Following Postulated Accidents imotving Chiorine and Sulfur Dioxide Shipments in the Vicinity of Quad CWes Station" ,

t 1

l

/scl:1316:57

cAn:ENT O LUNGY

" ?d.57.!"0 HABITABILITY OF CONTROL ROOM FOLLOWING FOSTULATED ACCIDENTS INVOLVING CHLORINE SULFUR DIOXIDE SHIPMENTS IN THE VICINITY OF QUAD CITIES STATION-REPORT SL-7125 REVISION 1 Com0NWEALTH EDISON COMPANY CHICAGO, ILLIN0IS 1

Project Number 8827-14

- April 199P-a 4

PREPARED BY SARGENT & LUNDY ENGINEERS CHICAGO. ILLINDIS

CARDENT O LUNDY

" NiI5.* -

1.0 INTRODUCTION

in 1982. Commonwealth Edison Company provided the final control room habitability report for the Quad Cities Station to the Nuclear-Regulatory Comission (Reference 1). This report was required by NUREG 0737 Item 111.D.3.4. The Quad Cities Station Control Room Habitability Study included a 1981 survey for potentially toxic chemicals stored or '

transported onsite or within a 5-alle radius offsite of Quad Cities Station Units 1 and 2. This survey was conducted to meet the

-equirements of Attachment 1 to NUREG 0737 Item 111.D.3.4.

Tha control room habitability study was performed to meet the criteria of Sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3 and 6.4 of the Standard Review Plan (SRP) following guidance.provided in Regulatory Guides 1.78 and 1.95.

The 1981 survey indicated that concentrations of chlorine and sulfur dioxide would exceed toxicity levels in the control room in less than 2

-minutes after detection, and therefore monitors would be needed at the control room air intake to detect chlorine and sulfur dioxide and isolate the control room upon-detection. At that time no further ,

analysis was performed to determine whether uninhabitable conditions could be caused in the control room during an accidental release of chlorine and sulfur dioxide. Instead, to expedite the licensing of the plant, redundant chlorine and sulfur dioxide detectors were provided on each outside air intake of the control room.

A second survey was conducted between February and April 1988 in order to supplement the 1981_ data. -The purpose of the second survey was to gather additional data needed to perfom quantitative analyses of._the

-Quad Cities Station Control Room habitability and exposure risk due to 4 accidental releases of. chlorine and sulfur dioxide. Two distinct types of analyses were performed. The first analysis considered the dispersion of the vapor released from a postulated accident to the-

, station and subsequent infiltration into the contal room.- This 2nalysis uti"tod the nomal air exchan9e rate of the control room based-on the design makeup air and the control room volume. The second 1-

'. ceewr e, wuay

" fa'J a consisted of a detemination of the probability that uninhabitable conditions in the control room could be caused by_ an accident involving rail tank cars contain**g chlorine and sulfur dioxide. The probability analysis considered the statistical data for rail tank car accidents and '

the meteorological parameters, based on wind direction and atmosphnic stability, that could cause the development of toxic concentration, in the control room. A description of the control room HVAC system is

• presented in the Quad Cities Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 10 (Reference 2).

A third survey was conducted between October and November 1990 in order to _suppleannt the 1988 data. -The purpose of the third survey was to gather more recent data needed to perform quantitative analyses of the -

Quad Cities Station Control Room Habitability and exposure risk due to accidental releases of chlorine and sulfur dioxide.

The following discussion describes the Regulatory Guides which fom the basis of the_ control room habitability evaluation, the results of the two surveys, and-the analysis regarding evaluation of chlorine and sulfur dioxide-as a. hazard to the-Quad Cities Station control roon..

Based on the information collected to date, it'is concluded that.

chlorine and sulfur dioxide detectors s're not required at the Quad Cities Station.

2.0 REGULATORY GUIDE $

Regulatory Guide 1.78'(Reference 3) identifies chlorine and sulfur dioxide as hazardous chemicals and requires.a control room habitability analysis in case there is an accidental release.from stationary or

~

mobiie sources near the_ plant.= It also provides a methodology for-analyzing the effects of the release.

Regulatory Position 1 of Regulatory Guide-1.78 ' states that' chlorine and ,

c Ifur' dioxide stored or-situated at. distances greater than five miles, from the controi room'need not be considered in evaluating-habitabili_ty-analysis, ,

2

CACOUNT Q LUNDY '

' N U..'

• In order to establish the design basis events for a plant, Section 2.2.2.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.70 (Reference 4). requires identification of hazardous and toxic chemicals processed, stored or transported in the i vicinity of the site. It further requires considsration-of all facilities and activities within five miles of the plant and inclusion of facilities and activities at greater distances as appropriate to I their significance. For evaluation of potential accidents, section -

2.2.3.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.70 defines the design basis-events external to the nuclear plant as those accidents that have a probability of occurrence on the order of about 10 4 per year or greater and have potential consequences serious enough to affect the safety of the plant ,

to the extent that 10CFR Part 100 of the guidelines could be exceeded. }

For toxic chemicals, the Regulatory Guide requires consideration of I accidental releases of these chemicals from onnte storage facilities ,

and nearby mobile and stationary sources.. These toxic chemical- l concentrations detemined for a. spectrum of meteorological conditions ]

then should be used in evaluating control room habitability according to I Regulatory Guide 1.78. ,

Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2L of the standard Review Plan, WREG-0800 (Reference 5) requires a review of identified hazardous materi.ls which .

are stored and/or transported in accordance with Regulatory guide 1.78.

The review procedures require' identification of facilities and' '

activities within eight kilometers (5 miles) of the plant. Facilities  !

and activities ~ at greater distances should be considered'if they : ,

otherwise have the potential for affecting the plant-safety related- ,

features.- '

i f

As'part of its acceptance crit'eria,-.Section 2.2.3'of-the. standard review- 'i Plan (SRP) provides. A probability criteria.for detemining if a toxic .

release need be considered a design basis event.- Specifically, it-.

5 states:-

The probability of occurrence of thaLinitiating events--

leading to potential consecuences in excesf of 10 CFR 3

- - .a. -, ..a.-- ...-.-.----.~.w wa-

CAGOENT O LUNDY

" " EdiE '.." "'

Part 100 exposure guidelines should be estimated using assumptions that are as representative of the specific site as is practicable. In addition, because of the low probabilities of the events under cJnsideration, data are often not available to permit accurate calculation of probabilities. Accordingly, the expected rate of occurrence of potential exposures in excess of the 10 ~

CFR Part 100 guidelines of approximately 10 per year is acceptable if, when combined with' reasonable qualitative argunsnts, the realistic probability can be shown to be lower.

3.0 SURVEY OF CHLORINE AND SULFUR DIDX1DE SHIPMENTS ARfWmD DUAD CITIES STATIDH 3.1 1981 Survey of Chlorine and Sulfur Diaride Shi nts The 1981 survey revealed that chemicals could be transported within 5 miles of the Quad Cities Station on the Mississippi River; Chicago,-

Milwaukee, St. Paul, and Pacific-Railroad; Chicago aid Northwestern

, Ratiroad; U.S. Route 67, and Illinois state Road 84. There are no toxic chemicals present ensite requiring control ' room habitability evaluation. --

Chlorine and sulfur dioxide were found to be shipped by railroad at frequencier greater than 30 tiens per year, 'and requiring control- room habitability evaluation. Based on the U.S. Aruy Corps of Engineers data on commodity shipments by barge, it _was concluded that the actual number of shipments for toxic chemicals would not exceed the shipmentiroquency for barges (50 per year); therefore,; barge shipments of chemicals (including chlorine and sulfur dioxide) were not analyzed; Data on' highway conwdity traffic showed that chlorine was shipped in one-ton containers.. Reforence'I and'UFSAR Sections 2.2 and 2.8 provide the' location of the= plant site transportation rout'es, and potential; y hazardous materials. transported near.the site.

)

• 4-O

____m_.___._

CAOCENTQ LUN3Y rweswarmo l SX81 Ate e i

. t 3.2 1988 Survey of Chlorine and Sulfur Diaride Shinnents I i

A survey was conducted between March and April of 1988. The purpose of i this survey was to identify all industrial, unicipal, transportation, l and other facilities that handle containers of chlorine or sulfur dioxide large enough to pose a potential hazard to the power plant in.  !

l the event of an accidental release. The following entities were  :

contacted to obtain information:

15 government agencies and public organizations 40 industries and municipalities located within-10 miles _ of the- l power plant:  !

15 barge t'eminals located on the Mississippi River between the  ;

closest upstream lock (lock #13 near Fulton, Illinois) and the

~

closest downstream lock (lock #14 near Rapids City, Illinois).- .

j 25 chemical. producers and distributors; and 11 railroads, barge lines -and trucking companies.- '

i The results of this survey are summarized below:  :

Chlorineand sulfur Dioxide Containers that Could Affect Tyne of Facility the Quad Cities Station Control Raam Habitability Industries and municipalities None-within 10 miles Barge teminals- ~None Barge transportation- None Highway transportation None -

Railroad transportation  :

Chlorine and. sulfur dioxide pant cars carried by the Soo Line and

. Chicago and Northwestern '

Railroads

.'The 500 Line Railroad now ' operates on the tracks previously owned by, '

Milwaukee, St. paul: and Pacific Railroad.

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CAROUNT O LUNDY.

ENQiNEEQs e:ac.Aeo .

According to the Soo Line Railroad records (Reference 6), in 1987 the Soo Line shipped 276 tank cars (90 tcn capacity) of chlorine and 132 tank cars (90 ton capacity) of sulfur dioxide on the tracks within 5 miles of the Quad Cities Station. All of these shipments were on the  !

lowa side of the Mississippi River; none were in Illinois. The tracks on the Illinois side' are for local runs and do not involve shipment of '

these chemicals. '

The closest approach from the Quad Cities control room make-up air intake to Soo Line tracks on the Iowa and Illinois side is 1.78 and 0.71 miles, respectively.

According to the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad personnel (Reference 7),in198721 tank cars of chlorine and 45 tank cars of sulfur dioxide were shipped on tracks in the power plant vicinity. The closest approach from the Quad Cities control room air intake to these tracks is 5.0 miles.

1 3.3 1990 Survey of Chlorine and Sulfur Dioride Shi-nts A survey siellar to one conducted -in 1988 was pefonsed and a detailed listing of sources contacted is enclosed as Appendix A. As a result of the survey, some changes in the 1987 1988 information occured.- These l

changes are discussed below:

Of the companies contacted in the 1988 survey, eight now do business under new names. An additional 17 sources were contacted based on information obtained from the original sources. Also, two companies contacted in 1988 have since gone out of business. Transportation of  :

chlorine and sulfur dioxide by truck is done at two establishments. The '

ypbag, r however, are not affected since-the routes'are #

outside of the 5.mi e radius of the control roseg Also, thett are no-barge shipments of-either chlorine on 50, in the area. These maximums, '

~

l identified as "1988-1990. Maximum Shipments", are compared with the 1987 shipments as follows: '

. 6

\

,we. .,7 9 -,-.y, -.w+.-.4 ,, , ..%., g ,. ,y,-.. g,3a-y9.r- y-- y;,,, ' , , _,,y, e, ,- .<m, +-

,g= ms-, _ . ,y s -.m +

CACCCNT Q LUNOY wgw r,a , a s C&W Railroad  ;

U[00Line r Er Ur Er 1987 Shipments 276 132 21 45 168 144 29 41  !

1988 1990 Maximum Shipments 276- 144 29 45-Since some of the 1988-1990 maximum shipsent data exceeds the 1987 data, presented in the 1988 survey, dispersion and probability analysas of the' data obtained were conducted. Listings of the entities contacted are shown in Appendix A.

4.0 DISPERSION ANALYSIS AND CONTROL ROOM INFILTRATION IN ACCQEANCE WITH RMULATORY GUIDE 1.78 Regulatory Guide 1.78 states in Paragraph C.2 that "If hazardous chemicals such as those indicated in Table C 1 are known or projected to be frequently shipped by rail, water, or road routes within a five-mile radius of a nuclear power plant, estimates of these shipments should be ,

considered in the' evaluation of control room habitability... Shipments are defined as being frequent if there are 10 per year for truck traffic, 30 per year for rail traffic, or 50 per year for barge traffic.' Based on this, rat 1 road traffierof chlorine and sulfur i

dioxide need to be considered.for the Quad Cities Station.

In Paragraph C.4 the regulat'ary guide states: "The toxicity limits should be taken from appropriate authoritative sources such as these listed in the References section. For each. chemical considered, the l

values of importance are the human detection threshold and the maximum concentration can be tolerated for two minutes without_ physical l

incapacitation of an average human (i.e., severe coughing, eye burn, or.

l severe skin irritation). The lattar concentration is considered the 1

' Truck shipments of chlorine probably exceeded the shipping frequency of 10 per year. However, the quantities shipped are less than quantities requiring.

a control room habitability analysis per Table C-2 of Regulatory Guide 1.78.

• l No truck shipments of sulfur dioxide were found to pass within 5 miles of the site.

7

,. _ _ _ _ - _ ~ . . -_ _ , ,

OAMOI.M OL. UNDY

$U5!"

> . " toxicity limit." Based on this_ the human detection threshold for )

chlorine is 3 ppe and the toxicity limit is 15 ppe. Similarly, fore  !

sulfur dioxide, the human detection threshold is 3 ppe and the toxicity l

limit is 5 ppa.

In Paragraph C.5 Regulatory Guide 1.78 states: "Two types of industrial ,

accidents should be considered for each source of hazardous chemicals: , [

maximum concentration chemical instantaneous release of the total contents of one of the following: (1) the largest storage container falling within the guidelines of Table C 2 and located,at a nearby l stationary facility, (2) the largest shipping container (or for multiple j containers of equal size, the failure of only one container unless the failure of that container could lead to successive failures) falling - I within the guidelines of Table C-2 and frequently-transported near the: .

site, or (3) the largest container stored onsite..." Maximum l

~

concentration accidents were analyzed for Items 1 and 2.

l

~

Exhibit 1 shows the parameters used to evaluate accidental chlorine and sulfur dioxide releases from the tank cars shipped on the 500 Line Railroad tracks in town. The control =' room air exchange rate used in the i analyses is that of a control room.in the aon isolated mode. - According to Regulatory Guide 1.78, this control _ room is classified as a Type C control room. Exhibit I shows that the toxicity limits of chlorine and sulfur dioxide would be exceeded in the control room 2 minutes after detection.

9 5.0 PRDRABILITY OF CAUSING WINHABITABLE CONDITIONS IN THE CONTROL ROM puE TO THE RUPTURE OF A CHLORINE Alm SULFUR DIDXIDE TAl8C CAR DN THE CHICAG0 AND NORTHWESTERN RAILRGAD Ale 500 LINE RAILRGAD Since the dispersion analysis showed that the calculated chlorine .and sulfur dioxide concentrations exceeded the toxicity-limits under__certain

! stability classes, a_ probability analysis was performed by the following method:

Statistical meteorological data for the years 1986' 1999 collected at the Quad Cities Station site (33-foot level) were used _which consisted of: occurrence probabilities of stability' class, wind direction _and wind 8

J** -- w vv pm==m----*r+w- '

+-r

• e-vs7mr-'"--**C--'*~ * -5Fv

CACCENT O LUN3Y w ako magnitude (Reference 8). Exhibit 2 shows the crientation of the wind i direction sectors of the meteorological data with respect to the 500 Line and Chicago and Northwestern railroad tracks and the Quad Cities Station. The probability that the control room could be made uninhabitable is calculated from the probability of an accident within each wind direction sector the probability that the wind had a ,

direction which would carr, eleased vapor to the control room and that '.

the stability of the atmosphere was of a class under which the control room could become uninhabitable. Only the portion of the railroad track within a distance of 5 miles from the station was considered in this analysis according to Regulatory Guide 1.78.

The equation used to evaluate the hazard to the control room is the following:

• N Pa - Pr(c) x F(c) x E L, Pw (D,)

11 where:

Pa = probability of accident resulting in control roon l uninhabitability (accident / year)

Pr(c) - probability of accident with chemical release (accidents / car / mile)

F(c) = frequencyofshipment(cars / year)',

L, = length of track in each sector-Pw(Dj) = probability under certain stability class'es, that wthd is blowins-in a direction such that released chemical is carried to control room air intake Exhibits 3 through 6 show the length of track in each sector and the probability that the wind has a direction that will carry the. ,

9 .

- - - - v ~

g y e-y a sswnw y ,wmr---

I '

CA% CENT C1 LUNDY

" Ex'iMf" released gas to the control room air intake for a given stability class.

O_n1y,those stability classes are shown for which the control room concentration can exceed toxic limits., Exhibits-3 and 4-show the calculations performed for chlorine and Exhibits 5 and 6 show the calculation performed for sulfur dioxide.

Exhibit 7 gives a comparison of railroad accident statistics for various hazardous matarlais and damage thresholds expressed in dollars. Accidents involving tank cars of chlorine and sulfur dioxide are recorded in the category of non flannable gases. For the purpose of the probability calculations, minor releases are excluded because thesu do not result in control room uninhabit-ability. The release probabilities used include major releases; those releases expectw to cause control room uninhabitability by being-capable of causing at.least $5000 in damages i.e., loss-of- ._

cargo, property damage, cleanup crew, etc. The assumption of using accident frequencies with damages *of at least_$5000 is reasonable-since chlorine and sulfur dioxide are shippe1 in quantities which are worth at least $5000. _This yields the accident statistic of 1.g x 10 releases per car per mile (Reference 9).

The evaluation of the probability that occurrences'of control room uninhabitability may occur:is shown in Exhibit 8 for each railroad and for _each gas. . The values are based on shipment frequencies--

recorded by the railroads during the years 1984-1990(

References:

6 and 7)..

c. :

6.0 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS The conservative risk exposure of the contallroom is shown;to be 6.2gx10 4 occurrencos of uninhabitable ceMitions per year Lfor shipments of chlorine and b.800mle:f;for shipments of.sulfu:-

dioxide due to releases-of these chemicals on the Soo line and the.

-Chicago and Northwestern Railroads. . These probabilities are -

acceptable if,Lwhen combined with reasontble_ qualitative

• arguments. -

it is shown that the realistic' risk or probability is lower. The-s following arguments are ' presented to show that the realistic ,

probability is less than,the calculated conservative probability._ $

10 ,

II N .i - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _

e .

CACCENT Q LUNDY Wh " $"u$o* .

1. The railroad accident statistic used to evaluate the hazard to the control room is 1.9x10 s accidents releases per car per mile of travel. This statistic was obtained from Reference 9 (Table 4 34) and is applicable to hazardous materials cargos in the category of non flamaele gas with sn accident thres-hold value of 55000 which represents loss of cargo, property damage, cleanup crew etc. Cargo releases of 90 tons which are' considered in this analysis by themselves exceed the threshold value of $5000 (in terms of values existing in the years 1973-1977 when the statistics of Reference 10 were compiled) and therefore would have a lower release probability of causing uninhabitable conditions.

2. The conservative probability analysis considered sumer ,

meteorological conditions. Since the chemical shipments occur year around, the fraction of chemicals that would evaporate during average conditions would be lower, thereby lowering the probability of causing uninhabitable condition in the control room.

3. The conservative probability considered all wind speeds for the stability classes under which the control room would become uninhabitable. However, the wind speeds that could cause such conditions occur only a certain percentage of time, thereby lowering the probability of causing uninhabitable coaditions.

l l

7.0 CONCLUSION

S Tho quantitative evaluation of the exposure risk of causing unin-habitable control room conditions by accidents involving railroad shipments of chlorine and of sulfur dioxide have been calculated to be 6.29x10/ year and 1.282xj p elr, respectively. These are within acceptable limits as defined by Regulatory Cuide 1.70 and NUREG 0800 - In addition, the realistic exposure risk is shown to be lower when qualitative assumptions are taken into account.

11

CADOONT Q LUN3Y

'"?J,"*'"* .

The results of this analysis show that chlorine and sulfur dioxi,de detectors are not required at the Quad Cities Station. It should be noted that in accordance with plant emergency plans and procedures, self-containing breathing apparatus is provided for assurance of control room habitability in the event of possible i

human detection of chlorine and sulfur dioxide due to accidents.

l j

8.0 ftEFERENCES

1. E. D. Swartz, Commonwealth Edison Company letter dated June j  ;

28.-1982 'Dresden Station Units 2 and 3 Quad Cities Station l

Units 1 and 2 NUREG 0737 Item 111.D.3.4 Control Room .

Habitability Studies NRC docket No. 5 50 237/249 and 50

) 254/265" to D. G. Eisenhut, Director, US Nuclear Regulatory q

! Commission

2. Quad Cities Station Units'I and 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, May 1986.

3.

l U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.78, ' Assumptions for Evaluati.ng -

the Habitability of a Nuclear Powr Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release".

4. U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.70, " Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Report for Nuclear Power Plants", Sectionr i 2.2.3.1 andT2.'t.t.#{

l 5. U.S. NRC Standard Redw Plan, " Evaluation of Potential .

Accidents," Sections.2.2.1,'2.2.2 K 2.2.3. NUREG-0800,-  ;

j Rev.'2, July 1981. ,

6. bats Kerner, Soo Line Railroad, Personal Communication with [

Sargent & Lundy, April 13. 1988.- (SeeAppendixA.forupdated.

reference) ;i

7. Jim N111er, Chicago and Northwestern. Railroad, Personal. ,

Communications with Sargent-& Lundy, March 12,1988.(See-Appendix A-for__updat e reference)

12. ;i ,

4

_. z __ ._ _m _ _ ___ _ .._ .m... _ d

CARCENT Q LUb)Y

• " &,"l. '

i 8. Quad Cities Station Onsite Meteorological Moritoring Data (January 1, 1986 - December 31,1989) collected by Murray &

Trettel for Commonwealth Edison Company.

9. P. R. Nayak and D. W. Palmer, ' Issues and Dimensions of Freight Car Sizes: A *,ompendium,' U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration Report No.

FRA/0RD 79/56.

10. U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.3, ' Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a loss of Coolant Accident for Boiling Water Reactors *, Revision 2, June.I'~4.

l 1

l l

I L

4 l

l 13 4 ~ - a  %

. ..___- . _ . _ . - . - ~ . - - . ~ . . ~ . - , . . _. . - . - - - ~ - - - . - . . . . . ~ . . -

4 .

CADOONT Q LUNDY '

E Na:n O luN. E .E Q S -

r EXHIBIT 1  :

CONTROL ROON HABITABILITY ANALYSIS FOR ACCIDENTS RELEASES ON THE $00 LINE RAILR0AD Liquified Liquif W . i, Material Spilled Chlorine Sulfur Dioxica .

j Weight, tons 90 90 q Closest approach to r control room, ft 9375 9375 Atmospheie stability class p p i

Aehient Temp., 'F 90 90 .  :

-t Concentration detettable by odor, ppa- 3.5 3 Toxic concentration, ppa 15 '5 l Maximum concentration at r Quad Cities air intake, ppm 3,374. - 4,332 j Control room make up air -

flow, CFM 2000 2000 ,

Control room volumn, ft 3 240,500L 240,500 Air exchan9e rate 0.499 0.499  :

~

Maximum concentration in control room 2 minutes 45.4 56.0 after detection, ppe Wind spead causing u.aximum t

concentration in control room,s/sec 2.17 2.21 l

l l-e 14' 1 -w,y,*<w+i +e ,.w-rsw-~- ee,v--, ,-ie%-3, y.-,wr r -- <* v' w s"vn M &w e r e-r '-r'.** - .#1%'+1

_ - . . - . _ - _ . . . . ~ . . ~ . - - . . . - - . - - - . . . - . - - ..- . . . .. . . ~

CA? CENT O LUNDY ENOlNEEQS c8 6f.t.Co SCALEt i 8 8 1 i j o t y -_

3 y g r

MILES g

',- n ./

1 NNE NNV .

l .,  :

l / g,g. NE NW Chie,80 6 go D* * * - ,

f*

• • i' 4

• oo v <

- 4*,s

+%*,$e5-

\ ' '  ;

, ./

/ .-

p * .

/ .< ENE WNW \' ~ . * '"

/ q . , ,e -

, 7* -

W

.,j g /.-

Control E

, , . ,,, - Room i

~. .

/ )a l;\,.

~

,~~......

~ i- ,

i .s -

i 4 i t * .

' ~'

MSM i \ '

. Est

's i' t

e l \' '

r l '

, I

...\s\ N.,

j t SE SM / h .'! *

't o

t

/ l 'r -

. ssE j/ 1

! S s

'ssW - j \

Exhibit 2 - Schematic Showing Relationship Betwee.1 Control-Room, Railroads within 5 Miles, Mississippi River, and Wind Sectors-15 a , , .,-a .,g w& .Jy y- n ---..-a -w., . .

1 i EXHIBIT 3 '

STATISTICAL PARAMETERS FOR ESTIMTE OF HAZARD TO CONTROL FOOM HA8ITABILITY DUE TO CHLORINE SHIPMENTS OF CHLORINE ON S00 LINE RAILROAD L

SUMATION OF '

PR08A81LITIES OF WIND PR08A81LITIES OF '

CLOSEST FROM SECTOR AT WIND FROM SECTOR APPROACH STA8II.ITY CLASSES FOR ALL STABILITY LENGTH OF SECTOR FROM OF fRACK . CAUSING T0XIC CLASSES CAUSING WHICH WIND TO TRACK IN CONDITIONS IN T0XIC CONDITIONS SECTOR, i

~IS 8 LOWING STATION, CONTROL ROON L,xPw(D,)

IN CONTROL ROON FT FT FT (ALL WilEl SPEEDS)

PwfD. )

(ALL WIDE) SPEEDS) L, Pw(DI,)

G F E D NME 480 0.001875 0.001875 11,220 21.0375 N 1.,,200 0.001275 0.00284 0.004105 8,580 .% 2709 ISRf 11,880 0.0009 0.00333 0.00423 5,2M 22.3344 I'~ Inf 10,000 0.001975 0.00453 0.006506 6,600 42.933 WNJ 9,375 0.0034 0.00743 0.03048 0.043131 3,750 154.9325 W 9,375_ 0.0032 0.00589 0.02475 00.03383 4,000 135.32 WSW 10,250 0.001775 0.00315 0.004925 5,000 24.625 SW 12,500 0.00308 0.0056 0.00868 6,750 58.59 SSW 16,000 0.0032 0.00913 0.01233 11,220 J_38.3426 Sum of L,xPw(D,) - E33.32 FT 16 .

'l tr'"' " ' ' ' - m :w -_ =_e_------r------- - _ - - - - - - . - . - - - - - - _ _ _ . - - - -

4 m

i a

5 I

g .h- ~

y a

=e 4 lme

%. W E E.

$ ess =

wm -

(

. me_

e c"m a=Ep. EIge e_. v es g e m~g - cynaz at g = j iE-ggl m

C

-g ~~~5. -g-b (3;

m a 'k-h5$

ECE t

il E

• .. = w -

0 M s -o!g. -.

8

.d g i o y .

o u

4 I

b '-

.33g.

l-

+

"EE 55d m: ^o e >

1

. . _ _ _ - - - - _ _ - - - - 1

, . c

$t 4 ; 5 . *.  ! I* * *E a

m =. .

- a s--=-=

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e

~ -.

s  :

g k

.- i g m f g- 2 .B 8E3 I S -'2 d 8

-u-t ~ ~ I -~-- z , _ -

age aeee4 eaea

-g se 3 m -

1 za

h. -B

. 5t'

~ .u a5-gw 55. . 1..*-

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"3 C -O e5 %gg"O -a s

• R -I' 2 - -

• "R~

-t a s -s a I: a I s le sa d d: d d aeedd F" 98s I"!!

E Essc!e5=g 8G 4 2.-

sgao g -s - ~g

e. _g g c;m

. R2*_

X. g- I.

-s s -s s s s-

. c. 2: . 2.=

R-n wg .m g h W

.g' -

.g

-8 s { l. W3 g g. gu gg*D sm . l. _

m. E EL aa s a a

3

-m sseesses E c,,"gsgls4

3

-eca.

e s_e -,

a 2 x -- e me 5

"l=50=a

_E e t .s a s a Ics, s- s; e s aInf s

s .s s: s

~! 2-h s = _

PN' . . . . - =. -

2" Ee sa . EE a E  ::x1E R =

i a a sos a s s a s- 1, ssss:ssses .

?

- Eg I -

J21 gzw; k E_

w s a~ g g R 2- S g g: Et s.-mm . .. . -m~ ..

-d g-g;

• l2 - :: ;= *= * *  !' 2- -

$j 3

Eng. E$

s- . . . es g*= g.E g:-=

l- _

) y J g];

myn j '

_ . __ __ - 1

'*

• d gk q a

b=5

~

3

=6CC g&W r "

- ~

w a-s O $

C WW

~ modQt eMea

> 4 sd s~

m. - 8 m

Og m

• a mlng am m

h Rw -

W g

--g a W" s-

=

Et !g$sm"z g=d pew ~n -s esa =

5 C*E ow

= " Igm "

t E W -a = .

' m CD g $$

ma u g

• W Jh g -

28mg -

= gam m

=

age m os gG~Id E m-Sug

o

$ ~ 5l E I -

sm5 m

WE>.sg g a a_

" Catg-t 3 E$ =2 -

a m

m egeggamm es s m

yG 5

. -3 8

• b-p Z hd *

& W ,

ens  : :e Esa_-_

5g 5a =

d mEM--

1

CACOSNT Cs LUNDY

"U

""Sd54..

EXHIBIT 7 ACCIDENT FREQUENCIES PER'MILLION CAR-MILES FOR liAZARDOUS MATERIALS COMM00! TIES Damage Threshold ,

50 >5100 >55000 Ext'osives 1.30 0.63 0.210 Non-Flamable Gas 1.00 0.15 0.019*

Flammable Gas 0.94 0.20 0.094 Flammable Liquid 1.20 0.32 0.110 Flamable Solid 0.69 0.17- 0.058-0xidizer 1.60 0.66 -~ 0.069 Organic Peroxide 1.40 1.40- -

Toxic- 1.10 0.43 0.079 Radioactive 3.00 1.30 0.420 i

Corrosive 2.50 0.45- 0.090 All Hazardous Material 1.40 0.33 0.086 >

• chlorine and sulfur dioxide are classified as non-flamable gases Source: Materials Transportation Board Data 1971-77; Arthur D.-1.ittle Inc..

Estimates Excerpted from US DOT FRA/0RD-79/56 (Reference 9) w 20

CARCENT O LUNDY

'" ?J,W.P

• EXHIBIT 8 PROBABILITY OF' CONTROL ROOM UNINHABITABILITY DUE TO RAILROAD SHIPMENTS OF CHLORINE-AND SULFUR DIOXIDE .

Chlorine.

Railway Cars / Year IL,Pw (D,)* P&**

l Soo Line 276 633.32 6.29x10

Chicago & Northwestern 29 3.366 3.513x10'"- -

Aggregate Probability = 6.2935x10'7 lulfur Dioxide Railway Cars / Year IL,Pw (D,)* h** -

Soo Line 144 2474.43 .1.28x101 Chicago & Northwestern 45 10.8 W 1.75Ex141 Aggregate

• bability = 1.282x10 * -

l

• See Exhibits 3 through 6.

Probability of accident resulting in control room

~

• • Pa -

uninhabitability (accident / year)

Pr(c) =

Probability of. accident with , chemical release (accident / car (mile) l'.9 x 10' accidents / car / mile, Reference (9))

F(c) - Frequency.ofshipment(cars / year)

Li = Length of. track in each sector Pw(Di) = Probability under certain stability classics, that wind is-blowing in a direction such that released chemical is carried to control room air intake..

i 21 FINAL  !

J

CAOCENTO LUNDY f Ia$f GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS CONTACTED Rgf. No'.

1. American Waterways Operators Association, Arlington, VA 1

2. Chlorine Institute, Washington, D. C. 2

3. Disaster Services Coordinator, Clinton County, IA 3

4. Disaster Services Coordinator, Scott County, IA 4

5. Emergency Response Coordinator, Rock Island County, IL 5

6. Emergency Response Coordinator, Whiteside County, IL 6

7. . Illinois Department of Transportation, Chicago, IL 7-

8. Iowa Department of Transportation, Des Moines. IA 8:

9. Lockmaster, Lock #13, Fulton, IL 9

10. Lockmaster, Lock #14, Rapids City, IL 10

11. Sulfur Institute for Chemical Research, Washington, D.C. Il

12. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Chicago, IL. I?,

13. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Rock Island, IL. 13

14. U.S. Coast Guard, Chicago, IL.. 14

15. U.S. Coast Guard, Washington, D.C. 15 a:\mtsc\Chloroet.rd A*I i

CAGGENTQ LUNDY -

" N4.$a .

ALL IDENTIFIED-INDUSTRIES WITHIN 5 MILES OF THE QUAD CITIES STATION Comoany Product (s) Chlorine or S0. Use Ref. No.

1. Golden Seed Co., Seed Processing None 16 Cordova, IL

2. Magnetic Materials Magnetic 0xides Included in 3 below - -

Resources, Cordova, IL '

3. Minnesota Mining & Magnetic 0xides, Chlorine in 1-ton 17 Manufacturing, Resins, Adhesives,. cyl inders, - delivered -

Cordova,:IL- Epoxy by truck; no 50,-

4. Xylem Co., Cordova IL Landscaping Materials None 18-y

5. Adept Cutting Die Co., Steel Rule -Dies .

None -19 Camanche, IA-

6. Arcadian Corp. Chemicals Chlorine in 1-ton 23 Cananche, IA cylinders, delivered; by truck;-no-50,

7. Camanche Machine Corp., ' Metal Fabricating &; None 21-Camanche, IA - Machining.:-

8. Compliment. Conversions Car & Truck Conversions -None 20 -

Inc., Camanche, IA

9. Detemann 81acktop Asphalt None- 29 ,

Inc., Cananche IA

10. DuPont, Dehumours & Oriented Polyolefin

- Chlorine11n 150-lb- 22

-Co., Camanche,tIA Film ' cylinders, delivered -

by truck; no 50,

11. Ipsco Steel Inc Steel Products- Chlorine'.in 150-lb 102 Camanche, IA cylinders,- delivered by

truck; no 50i -

12. Service Concrete Co., Concrete None 24

.Camanche 1A

13. Vertex Chemical Corp., Chlorine Bleach Chlorine in railroad- -25 tank cars; no 30,-

Camanche, IA' _

.14. Carver Luder Co., Lumber Products- None -- 26- J

~ Princeton,:IA. j .

15. Johnson ~ Mfg. Co., Solders and Industrial' None - 27 1

-Princeton, IA :Chemicalsi

. .: w .csem .co t.r4- -A-2 =

.i

^

CAOC3NTO LUNDY ENGINEEQo KHttASD .

A Comoany Productfs) Chlorine or S0. Use Ref. No.

16. Schult Engineering & General-Machining & None- 101 Pattern Co. Pattern Princeton, IA

17. C. F. Industries, Inc. Fertilizer Products None 31 Albany, IL (located outside the town but within 5 miles of the power plant)

. s i

7 a:\ misc \Chloroet.rd A-3 t

CARCENT & LUNDY "saAP*

ALL IDENTIFIED BARGE TERMINALS BETWEEN LOCK #13 AND #14 Comoany Product (s) _ Chlorine or 50. Handlina B9f. No.

1. Westway Trading Corp., Fert11trer, Stone, None 28 Cordova, IL Sand, and General Cargo

2. Determann Industries, General Cargo None 29 Camanche, IA

3. Vertex Chemical Corp., Caustic Soda None* 114 Camanche, IA

4. Bunge Corp., Albany IL Grain None 30

5. C. F. Industries, Fertilizer None .

31 Albany, IL

6. Growmark, Inc., Petroleum None' 32 Albany IL

7. ADM Clinton, Alcohol None* 33 Clinton, IA .

8. C. F. Sales, Inc. Petroleum By-Products, Non'e 34 Clinton, IA Dry Materials

9. Interstate Power Co., Coal None* 35 Clinton, IA 10'. Peavy Co., Clinton, IA Corn, Soybeans None 36

11. Pillsbu'ry Co.', Soybeans, Corn, Coal None 37 Clinton, IA

12. AGRI Grain Co. Grain- No7e 38 Fulton, IL

13. Agrico Chemical Co., Fertilizer None 39 Fulton, IL

14. Fulton River Terminal, Fertilizer, Chemicals ' -None 40 Fulton, IL -

15. Le Clair Quarries, Inc.  : Sand, Stone 'None 41 Le Claire, IA i

• None by barge; for' rail and/or truck shipments, see entry in-listings titled Industries / Facilities Within 5/10 Miles of Station.

a:\ misc \ChlorDat.rd 'A-4

CADCENTQ LUNDY.

'" $u$so 4

OTHER SIGNIFICANT FACILITIES WITHIN 10 MILES OF TPE QUAD CITIES STATION.

Comnany Product (s)

_ _ Chlorine or 50. Use hf. No.

1. Water Treatment Facilit r Water and Wastewater Chlorine in 150-lb 42 Cordova, IL Treatment cylinders, delivered by truck; no 50,.

2. Water Treatment Facility Wastewater Treatment Chlorine in 150-lb _

43 Camanche, IA cylinders, delivered by.

truck, April to October; i no 50,-

3. Water Treatment Facility Water and Wastewater Chlorine in 150-lb ' 44 Port Byron, IL Treatment cylinders, delivered by truck; no S0,=

4. Sandstros Products Co., Paint Finishings and None. 45-Port Byron, IL Coatinga

5. Water Treatment Facility Water and Wastewater . Chlorine in 150-lb 46 Albany, IL Treatment cylinders, delivered by .

' truck; no 50,

6. C & J Servi e Co., Blended Fertilizer None 47 Low Moor, IA

7. Cropsate Fertilizer Co., Fertilizer None :48 Low Moor, IA

- 8. Iowa Culvert & Supply Steel Culverts None' 49 Low Moor, IA

9. ADM Clinton, Corn and Dextrose 50, in 90-ton railroad - 33 Clinton, IA Products, Livestock tank carst 50, in-~

Feed and Enzymes- -45,000-lb tank trucks; chlorine-intl-ton.

cylinders, delivered by truck;- the chlorine and 50, truck shipments do not. pass within 5 miles

, of power plant.

10. Balanced Energy Animal Feed None- 103 Clinton, IA_

Pellets-- ,

11. Carlon, Plastic Fittings, None - 50 Clinton,-IA Electrical Conduits a:\etsc\ChlorDet rd A-5

____m-_mm_ _ _ _ _ - - . . _ _ _ _

CALCENT C LONDY da Connany Product (s) Chlorine or SO,:_Use Ref. No.

12. Champion International, Milk Cartons None- 51 Dairypak Div.,

Clinton, IA 4

13. Water Treatment Facility Wastewater Treatment Chlorine in 1-ton 52 Clinton, IA cylinders, delivered by truck; no 50, '

14. Clinton Parks & Municipal Pool Chlorine in 150-lb - . 109 Recreation Municipal cylinders, delivered by-Pool, Clinton, IA ' truck; no 50,

15. Collis, Inc. Welded Wire and Tool 50, in 1-ton cylinders 53:

Clinton, IA Holders delivered by truck; )

no chlorine-f 16. Custom-Pak, Inc., Plastic Products,- None z 54 Clinton, IA Industrial - Parts

17. International Paper Co., Boxes Cartons- S0, in :150-lb " cylinders - 55- -

Clinton, IA -delivered by truck; no

' chlorine-

18. Interstate Power Co., Electrical Generation Chlorine in 1-ton- 35 Clinton, IA cylinders, delivered by- 3' truck;Lno 50,

19. Iowa-American Water Co., -Drinking Water Chlorine in 150-1b - 56 Clinton, IA Treatment cylinders,. delivered by_

truck; no 50,;

20. Johnson's Metalcrafters Metal Fabrication -None" '104 Clinton, IA

21. National By-Products, Petfood,L Meat-[ Scraps - -Chlorine in-l'-toni .

108:

Inc., Clinton, IA; cylinders, delivered by-truck; no 50, ,

22. Pinney Printing.Co. Commercial Printing Mone_ 112-Clinton, IA

23. Quantum .USI Division,

- Plastic R,esins Chlorine in'1-ton. - . 57-Clinton,_ IA-  : cylinders,: delivered by truck;'no So,-

24.- Ralston Purina C$.,- Pet Foods -Mone - 58 ~

Clinton,LIA a:\ misc \ChierDet rd A-6 l

CAROUNTQ LUNDY w A$e Comoany Productfsi Chlorine or S0. Use : Ref. No.-

25. Sethness Products Co., Catamel Coloring Syrup- 50, in 50eton railroad 59 Clinton, IA - tank -cars; - SO ' in 40,000-1b tanktrucks,butnotwithin 5 miles of power plant; no

. . chlorine

26. S. J. Smith Welding Welding Supply Chlorine in 150-lbi '.106-Supply, Clinton, IA cylinders, delivered by truck; r.o 50,

27. Starbuck Machinery Packaging Equipment None 110 International, Components-Clinton, IA

28. Two Mile Machine and Machining and Welding 'None 111 Welding,-Inc.,

Clinton, IA

29. Waldorf Corp., Folding Cartons._ None 'fo Clinton, IA'

30. Beuse's Pattern Works, Metal and Wood Patterns, None- 6' Inc., Le Claire, IA Dies and Molds-

31. Kroeger Co., N.A. -

~ Aluminum Castings None- -105 Le Claire, IA

32. Water Treatment Facility Water and Wastewater Chlorine-in 150-lb 62 Le claire, IA Treatment- cylinders, delivered by-truck; no 50,

33. McKay's Plating Works Electroplating .of NoneL 113 Hampton, IL Metals

34. Central Pool Supply Co., Water Treatment Chlorine in 150 lb. 107 Mol ine, . IL  : cylinders,Ldelivered by a truck;Lno 50, h

j q

a:\ misc \ChlorDat.rd 'A-7 1

CAJiOONT O LUNDY

$ 5?oo .

CHEMICAL PRODUCERS AND DISTRIBUTDRS CONTACTED Bulk Chlorine or 50 Comoany ShinnentsThrouahPowerPhantArea* ha.

1. Air Products & Chemicals, Inc., None 64 Allentown, PA

2. Alexander Chemicals, Lemont, IL S;iipments of 1-ton chlorine and S0, cylinders C5

3. Ashland Chemical Co., Noline, IL None 66

4. Autochem, St. Paul, MN None 81

5. Di-Chen Co., Milan, IL Shipments of 1-ton chlorine ?ylindcts; 68 no 50,

6. Dixie Petrochemicals, St. Paul, MN None 69

7. Dow Chemical USA, Midland, MI None 70

8. Dow Chemical, Plaquemine, LA None 115

9. DuPont, DeNemours & Co., None 71 Wilmington, DE

10. FNC r.orporation, Philadelphia, PA None 72

11. Ceorgia Gulf, Rolling Neadows, _ IL _ None 116

12. Georgia-Pacific Corp., Atlanta, GA .None_ 73

13. Harcros Chemical Co., Shipments of 1-ton chlorine cylinders; - 86 Davenport, IA no 50,

14. Hawkins Chemical Co., St. Paul, MN None 74-t

15. Hoechst-Celanese, Charlotte, NC None 88

16. Hy-Drite Chen, Milwaukee, WI None 117

17. ICI American, Wilmingtot, DE None 63 j

18. Jones Chemicals,.Inc., .None 75.

- Caledonia, NY.

j

19. LCP Chemicals & Plastics, Inc., None 76 Edison, NJ 3

.:\ mise \cmoroot.rd A-8 i

e

CARC,0NT C: LUNDY EN01NEED8 couctr;> .

Cor 'any Bulk Chlorine or 50 ShiomentsThrouahPowerPkantArea* A

20. Liquid Carbonic, Chicago, IL None 77

21. Marsulex, Norwalk, CT None 67

22. Occidental Chemical Corp., None 78 Dallas, TX

23. Olin Corp., Stamford, CT None 79

24. PPG Industries, Inc. None 82 Pittsburgh, PA

25. Rhone-Poulenc None 84 Naperville, IL

26. Specialty Chen Products Corp., None 83 Marinette, WI

27. K. A. Steel Chemicals, Inc., None 85 Chicago, IL

28. Van Waters & Rogers Co., Shipments of 1-ton chlorine cylinders; 87 Burlington, IA no 50, .

2

29. Vulcan Chemicals, Birmingham, AL None 89

• Railroad shipments are not included hera; they are shown in the table.of transportation companies. Bulk shipments are defined as more than 100 lbs (largest single container) on the Mississippi River or more than 1,000 lbs (largest single container) by road.

Power plant area-is defined as within' 5 miles of the control room nomal air intake.

a:\ misc \ Chlor 0et.rd A-9 i-

CADCENT Ct LUNDY l rweintras-i CMICACS

~

l l

TRANSPORTATION COMPANIES CONTACTED L i Bulk. Chlorine or 50 Comoany Shia=antsThrouahPowerPkantArea* h ,

, 1. Brent Towing Co., Greenville, MS None 90 l- 2. Burlington Northern Railroad, None '91 l Moline. IL

3. Chicago and Northwestern 29 tank cars of chlorine and 45-tank 92 Railroad, Chicago, Il cars of S0, per year ** .

4. C1inton Harbor Service, None 93-Citaten, IA 5, Javenport, Rock Island and None  ; 94 Northwestern Railroad, Davenport.: IA 3

6. Ingram Barge Line, Nashville, TN None- 96

7. Lock City _ Transportation Co., None 96 -

Menominee MI

8. Port Arthur Towing Co., None 97-Port Arthur, TX 9.. Shotan Transportation Co., None 98 Cincinnati, OH l 10.. Shotan iransportation .None- 80 Mandeville, LA

'll. Soo Line Railroads 276 Tank' cars'of chlorine-.and 144Ltanki 99 L Minnenpolis, m cars of. 50,' per year **J l .

i 12. Southern-Towing'Co., None 100-

!~ Memphis, TN on the4 .

• Mississiopi Bulk- shipments.are defined as1,000 more lbs than 100 lbs~ (largest single container)d or-railroad.

River or more than -(largest single container) by roa

Power plant area is definedias.the area within.5 miles of the control room normal' air-intake.

• • These numbers are the maximum numbers selected from data obtained frami1987-1990; See table next=page.

a:\ misc \ Chlor 0et.rd ' A-10

CACCENT O LUNDY rNoiwerno CMICACO RAIL SHIPMENTS S00 Line C&NW Railroad Cls SQu LLs SQu 1987 276 132 21 45 1988 168 144 29 41 1989 158 132 10 34 1990 161* 110* 10** 34**-

• These are projected numbers for 1990 based-on recorded shipments for January-September 1990 (reference 99).

• • The C&NW spokesman was unable to provide nuebers for 1990, but stated that they are approximately the same as the numbers for_1989 (reference 92).

l l

I

. wg-=i." A-11 i

e v w w

CAOCENT O LufdDY

"" !J "J!!"

REFERENCES TO APPENDIX A

l. American Waterways Operators, Arlington.-Virginia, Ms. Angela Todd, personal commanication with Sargent & Lundy, October 10, 1990,

2. Chlorine Institute, Washington, D.C., Mr. Mp;e Lyden, personal communication with Sargent & Lundy, October o0, 1990.'

4

-3. Disaster Services Coordinator, Clinton County, Iowa, Mr. Walter Henry, personal communication with Sargent & Lundy, October 19. 1990.

4. Disaster Services Coordinator, Scott County, Iowa,'Mr. Bud Whitfield, personal communication with Sargent & Lundy, October 19, 1990.

5. Emergency Response Coordinator, Rock Island County, Illinois, Mr. Dave Carlson, personal communication with Sargent & Lundy, October 22, 1990.

6. Emergency Response Coordinator, Whiteside County, Illinois, Mr. Stewart Richter, personal communication ~with Sargent & Lundy, October 22, 1990.

7. Illinois Department of Transportation, _ Chicago, Illinois, Mr. Jim Johnson, personal communication with Sargent_& Lundy, November 1, 1990.

8. Iowa Department of Transportation, Des Moines, Iowa, Mr. Craig O'Riley, personal communication with Sargent & Lundy, i, November 1, 1990.

9. Lockmaster - Lock #13. Fulton, Illinois, Mr. Ernest. Jackson, personal communication with Sargent &'Lundy, November 1, 1990,

10. Lockmaster - Lock #14,' Rapids,-City, Illinois, Mr. Roger Hofland, personal communication with Sargent & Lundy,-November _l', 1990,

11. Sulfur Institute for Chemical Research, Washington,- D.C.,

Mr. Harold Weber, personal communication with Sargent & Lundy, j l November 9, 1990.. '

12. U.S. Army Corps of. Engineers, Chicago,! Illinois, Mr.. Rick Hurt, personal communication with Sargent & Lunoy, November 9,1990.

13. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,' Rock Island, Illinois,. Mr. Ron Rothert, personal communication with Strgent 1.Lundy, November 14, 1990,

14. U.S. Coast Guard, L.icago, Illinois, Mr. Jim Pilko, personal cosununiation with Sargent & Lundy, November 9, 1990.~

15. U.S. Coast Guard,' Wa;hington, D.C., Ms. Crgstal Hollingsworth, 4 personal communicat'on with Sargent & Lundy, November 13, 1990.

' i

- +.

' OARCENT.Q LUNDY Diem "'

16. Golden Seed Company, Inc., Cordova, Illinois Mr. Don Davis, parsonal t comunication with Sargent & Lundy, October 15, 1990, 17, 3-M Company Cordova, Illinois Mr. John Hardy,-personal comunication with Sargent_& Lundy, October-15, 1990.

18. Xylem Company, Cordova, Illinois, Mr. Chuck Dornfeld, personal comunication with Sargent 1 Lundy, October 15. -19". ,

19. Adept Cutting Die Company,- Comanche, Iowa, Mr. Ebr Kemp, personal communication with Sargent & Lundy, October 15,11990. <

l 20. Compliment Conversions, Camanche, Iowa, Mr. Dan McChane, personal comunication with Sargent &;Lundy, October 15,-1990.

21. Comanche Machine Corporation, Comanche, Iowa, Mr. Estl Hurt, personal comunication with Sargent & Lundy, October 15. 1990.

22. Du Pont De Nemours and-Company,:Camanche, Iowa,: Mr. Dan DuVall, personal communication with Sargent & Lundy, October ~ 16 1990.

23. Arcadian Corp., Camanche. -Iowa, Ms. Kris Rossailler, personal '

communication with Sargent & Lundy, October 16, 1990.

24. Service Concrete Company, Camanche, Iowa, Mr. Robert Holesinger, personal communication with Sargent & lundy, October 16,-1990.

25. Vertex Chemical: Company, Camanche, Iows, Mr. Warren- Ahrens, personal comunication with- Sargent & Lundy,= October 15,1990.

26. Carver Lumber Company, Princeton, Iowa, Ms.- Evelyn Carver, personal communication with Sargent &-Lundy,: October 15,'1990.

27. Johnson Manufacturing Company, Princeton Iowa,lMr. Bill.Meyer,--

personal communication with Sargent & Lundy, October 15, 1990.

28. Westway Trading Corporation, Cordova, Illinois, Mr. Bruce Heuchlin, >

personal communication with Sargent & Lundy, November 2,1990.

i-

29. Determann Blacktop, Inc.,- Cananche Iowa, Mr. Tom Determann, personal comununication with Sargent 1.Lundy, October 15,1990.

30. Bunge Corporation',' Albany, _ Illinois, Mr. Bruce Bastert, personal communication with Sargent & Lundy, November 2, 1990.-

31.  : C. F. Industries, Inc.,: Albany. Illinois, Mr. Ron- Boonstra,1 personal communication with Sargent & Lundy October'16,fl990.'

L 32.- Growmark, Inc., Albany, Illinois,' Mr. Mike Mask? personal ~

communication with.Sargent & Lundy, Novembe'r 2. 1990.

33. . ADM Clinton, Clinton, Iowa, Mr. Paul Caswell, . personal communication.

with Sargent & Lundy, October-17,:1990.

6 w w, , e -vvv e, -- = --wes=,-w,s + + 4 -, v ye--+ -y-, n , e $s 5

CACO 3NT C LUNDY "Nsc"$a .

34. C. F. Sales, Inc., Clinton, Iowa, Mr. Bob Wilkins, personal communication with Sarger.t & Lundy,-November 2, 1990.

35. Interstate Power Company, Clinton, Iowa ' Mr. Gary Carlson, personal communication with Sargent &_Lundy, October 17,-1990.

36.- Peavy Company, Clinton, Iowa, Mr. Jim Veenstra, personal communication with Sargent & Lundy, November 2, 1990.

37. Pillsbury Company, Clinton, Iowa,- Mr. Forrest Stors, personal conmiunication_with Sargent & Lundy, November 2,1990.-

38. Agri Grain Marketing Company, Fulton, Illinois,'Mr. Melvin' Ammon,-

personal communication with Sargent & Lundy, November 2,1990.

39. Agrico Chemical Company, Fulton, Illinois Mr. Russel' Gies, personal-conmiunication with Sargent & Lundy, November 2, -1990.

40. Fulton River Terminal, Fulton. Illinois, Mr.= Rich Shepper, personal cosmiunication with Sargent 1 Lundy, November 2,1990.

41. Leclaire Quarries, Inc., Leclaire, Iowa, Mr. Jerry Wolvaert. personal communication with-Sargent-4:Lundy, October 23,:1990.

42. Water Treatment Facility, Cordova,-' Illinois, Mr. Bill: Churchill- and-Ms. Betty Shaffer, personal-communication with f argent &~ Lundy,-

October 15, 1990.-

43.- Water Treatment Facility, Cananche, Iowa, Mr. Dave Ramsey, personal-communication with Sargent & Lundy, October. 16, 1990.

44. -Water Treatment Facility,: Port Byron, Illinois, Mr. Nel Bowers -

personal communication with Sargd & Lundy, October'16,1990.

45. Sandstron Products Company. Port Byron,. Illinois,- Mr. Allen Hoeschele, personal communication with Sargent & Lundy,-OctoberLl6, 1990.:

46. Water Treatment Facility,- Albany, Illinois, Ms. Janet Price, personal connunication with Sargent & Lundy, October.16,s1990.>

47. C&J Service Company, Low Moor, Iowa, Mr.: Roger 01taan, personal-communication with Sargent & Lundy, October 16,--1990.

48.- Cropeate Fertilizer Company, Low Moor,-Iowa, Ms. Sharon Witt, personal:

communication with Sargent-& Lundy, October 16, 1990.

49. Illowa Culvert &; Supply Company, Low Moor, Ion,- Mr. Jeff Greve,

, personal cosmiunication with Sargent & Lundy,' October:16,1990.

C 50. . Carlon, Clinton, Iowa,-Mr. Rick Heidgerken,t personal communication with Sargent-& Lundy, October.17, 1990.

f I

CAROGNT Q LUNDY ENOlNEEQS -

eme .. 3

51. Champion International, Dairypak Division,-Clinton, Iowa, Mr. Don Hosette, personal- comunication with Sargent _ & Lundy,- October 17, 1990.

52. Water Treatment. Facility, Clinton,: Iowa, Mr.L Virtus Clasen, personal' communication with Sargent'&-Lundy, October 17, 1990.

53. Collis, Inc;, Clinton, -Iowa, Mr. Dan Deters, personal communication ,

with Sargent & Lundy,-October 17 1990.

54. Custom Pak,-Inc., Clinton, Iowa, Mr. Paul Nugent, personal ,

communication with Sargent & Lundy, October 17, 1990.

55. International Paper Company, Clinton, Iowa, Ms. Karen Krause, personal comunication_ with Sargent & Lundy," October 18,.1990.

56. Iowa-American Water Company, Clinton,- Iowa; .Mr.. Ed Stoltengerg :

personal. communication with Sargent & Lundy, October 17; 1990.

57. Quantum,' USI Division',. Clinton,Llowa, Mr. Bob 1Schuter, personal .

communication with Sargent &LLundy, October 17, 1990.

S8. Ralston Purina Company, Clinton, Iowa,- Mr. Dan Bruehl=, personal communication with Sargent & Lundy, October _ 18, 1990. '

59. Sethness Products Company, Clinton, Llowa,, Mr.- William Cotter, personal communication with Sargent & Lundy, October 18, 1990.

60. Waldorf Corporation, Clinton, Iowa, Ms. Mary Korous, personal communication with Sargent &_Lundy,. October 18, 1990 ,

61. Beuse's Pattern Works, Inc., Leclaire,; Iowa, Mr. John Biles . personal communication with Sargent & Lundy, October _18, 1990.

62. Water Treatment Facility, Leclaire,, Iowa,-Mr. Randy Dreese, personal ~

cosmiunication with Sargent & Lundy,i october 23, 1990. *

63. ICI America, Wilmington,1DE Mr. Mike' Starling, personal communication ' ~ '

with-Sargent & Lundy, November 6,-1990.-

64.- Air Products and Chemicals, Allentown,? Pennsylvania, Mr. Kevin

.Raymundo, personal communication with Sargent.&iLundy,-

October 24, 1990.

L ,

l 65. Alexander. Chemical Company, Lemont,-~ Illinois, Mr. Gill 1Lavitt,

- personal commiunication with Sargent & Lundy,- October 25, 1990. -

~

L 66. - Ashiand Chemical Company, Moline,'Illincis, Mr.' Steve Dallman. . -

E personal. communication with Sargent & Lundy, October 24,11990.:

67._ Marsulex, Norwalk, CN,iMr. Eric Bohn, personal communication with' Sargent & Lundy, November 6, 1990.-

- u . c.~. .w e + _+-r ..,r- - .+y.. w- . + , , , , p. y,-ty,,.,--[, ,#, , -y 4 I -e- , -.,,ap -.9--% ,% -

( -..r, 1

, . . 1

-CARCENTQ LUNDY ENGINEEMo CMICASO

68. Di-Chem Company, Milan, Illinois, Mr; Norm Wirtala, personal communication with-Sargent & Lundy October 26,L1990.

69. Dixie- Petrochemical, St. Paul, Minnesota.. Mr. Mike Hambleton, personal ,

communication with Sargent & Lundy, October 24 &!30, 1990.- l

70. Dow Chemical USA,- Midland, Michigan, Mr. Tom Schwartz.. personal communication with Sargent & Lundy, October 24, 1990 -

^

71. Du Pont- De Nercurs, E. I. & Company, Wilmington, Delaware, _

Ms. Edna Cephas, personal communication with Sargent &:Lundy, October 29, 1990.

72. FMC Corporatien,- Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Mr. Larry Margioli, .

personal communication with' Sargent. & Lundy, October 24,:1990. ,

73. Georgia-Pacific Corporation Atlanta, Georgia, Ms~ . Phylis- Erb,; .

personal communication with Sargent & Lundy, October-24,1990.

74. Hawkins Chemical Company., St.'P&ul,_ Minnesota, Mr. John;Eaton, personal communication with Sargent & Lundy.c Octoberf 29,1990. ,

75. Jones Chemicals Inc., Caledonia, _ New York,-_Mr.~ William;Ginther, personal communication-with -Sargent & Lundy, October-29,'1990.

76. LCP Chemic.als and Plastics, Edisor,, New; Jersey, Mr. Greg Schultz, personal communication with Sarger,t4& Lundy, October-26,1990.

i 77. Lisuid Carbonic, Chicago, Illinois, Ms.! Karen Pufahl, personal .

communication with Sargent-1 Lundy,: October _29, 1990.- -

78. Occidental Chemical Corporation, Dallas, Texas,- Mr.sDwayne Carley,

_ personal consunication with Sargent & Lundy, October 26. 1990.

79. Olin Corporation,.Stamford, Connecticuti Mr. Dennis Holgersan,.

personal- communication with Sargent & _ Lundy,i October :30,1990. -

80. Shotan Transportation, Mandeville, LA. Mr.[ FlogWest.cpersonal-communication with Sargent & Lundy,l0ctober 26, 1990.

81. Autochen, St. Pau1Hei, Mr. Bob Gies, personal! communication with-

~

Sargent:& Lundy October'30,,1990._

82. PPG' Industries, Inc., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Mr. Mike.Petrucelli, p'rsonalEcommunication with-'Sargent E-Lundy, November 5,il990.

83. Specialty Chen Products,- Marinette,' WisconsinLMs. Tammi _Salewski,-

personal communication with Sargent & Lundy,; October. 26. 1990.-

-84. Rhone-Poulenc, Naperville IL,- Mr. Ron Lang, personal communication:

~ -

with Sargent &'Lundy, October 31, 1990. ' ,

85. K. A. Stsel_ Chemical Company, Chicago. . Illinois,: Ms. .McFall, personal communication.with-Sargent.& Lundy, October 30, 1990.'

-. - -...-- - -.-. .- - _ . . - - .~.. a . - - . - - . _ . . . - - , . . - .

CACOCNT O LUNDY

, " " Endo' ""

86. Harcross Chemical Company, Davenport, Iowa, Mr. Bill Ryder, personal comunication with Sargent & Lundy October 31, 1990.

87. Van Waters & Rogers Company, Burlington, Iowa, Mr. Peter Goodwin, personal comunication with Sargent & Lundy, November 1,1990.

88. Hoechst-Celanese, Charlotte, NC, Mr. Harold Walton, rersonal comunication with Sargent & Lundy, November 5,1990,

89. Vulcan Chemicals, Birmingham, Alabama, Mr. Ed Phillips, personal comunication with Sargent & Lundy, October 30, 1990.

90. Brent Towing Company, Greenville, Mississippi, Ms. Dixie King, personal comunication with Sargent & Lundy October 23, 1990.

91. Burlington Northern Railroad, Moline, Illinois, Mr. Dick Kenney, personal comunication with Sargent & Lundy, October 23, 1990.

92. Chicago and North Western Railroad, Chicago, Illinois, Mr. Don Fredbeck, personal comunication with Sargent & Lundy, October 30, 1990.

93. Clinton Harbor Service, Clirton, Iowa, Mr. Jim Clark, pctsonal comunication with Sargent & Lundy October 23, 2000.

94. Davenport, Rock Island, and North Western 'bilrced, hver. port, Iowa, Mr. Ron Ries, personal communication with I,ergent & tconuy, Novettber 6,1990.

95. Ingram Barge Line, Nashville, Tennes,.cc, Mh Mm Kristen, personal comunication with Sargent & Lundy, Octobar 23, 1990.

96. Lock City Transportation Menominee, Michigan, dr. Ron Rife, perscrial

'comunication with Sargent & Lurdy, October 23. 1990. ,

97. Port Arthur Towing Company, Port .~rthur, Texas, Mr. Dennis Foret, personal communication with W.gentt Lundy,' October 23, 1990.

98. Shotan Transportation, Cincinnati, Ohto, Mr. Mike Gubser, personal comunication with Sargent & Lundy, October 26, 1990. ,

99. Soo Line Railroad, Minneapolis, Minnesota, Mr. Phil Harbut, personal communication with Sargent & Lundy, November 14, 1sd0.

100. Southern Towing Company, Memphis, Tennessee, Ms. Rachel Embey, personal communication with Sargent & Lundy, October 23, 1990.

101. Schult Sgtneering & Pattern Co., Princeton, Iowa, Mr. Mike Schult, person;.1 comisunication with Sargent & Lundy, October 15, 1990.

102. IPSLO S'. eel Inc., Camanche, Iowa, Mr. Al Decatur, p.trsonal communication with Sargent & Lundy, October 31, 1990.

I o'. . .

CAOCENT O LUNDY

'" UE*J98 103. Balanced Energy, Clinton, Iowa, Mr. Ted Wilson, pe sonal comunication with Sargent & Lundy, October 17, 1990.

104. Johnson's Metalcrafter's, Clinton, Iowa, Mr. Rex Wingel, personal comunication with Sargent & Lundy, October 17,-1990.

h.,

10%. Kroeger Co., N.A. LeClaire, Iowa, Ms. Connie Kroeger, personal comunication with Sargent & Lundy, October 23, 1990.

106. S. J. Smith Welding Supply, Clinton, Iowa, Mr. Mike Mitchell, personal' comunication with Sargent & Lundy, November 5,1990.

107. Central ~ Pool Supply Company, Moline, Illinois.LMr. Scott Wood, personal comunication with Sargent & Lundy, November 6,1990.

108. National By-Products Inc., Clinton, Iowa, Mr. Leroy-Michaelsen, ,

i personal communication with Sargent &-Lundy, October 30, 1990.

109. Clinton Parks & Recreation Municipal V Clinton -Iowa, Mr. Greg Obren, personal- communication with-Sargent & Lundy, October 30, 1990.

110. Starbuck Machinery International, Clinton, . Iowa,'Mr. Dennis Bicker,:

personal communication with Sargent & Lundy, October 18, 1990.

111. Two Mile Machine & Welding Inc., LClinton, Iowa, Ms. Linda Laughlin, personal communication with Sargent & Lundy, October 18, 1990.

112. Pinney Printing Company, Clinton, Iowa, Mr. Bfil Ogan, personal-communication with Sargent & Lundy, October 18, 1990, 113. McKay's Plating Works, Hampton, Illinois, Mr.. San McKay, personal 1 cosaunication with Sargent & Lundy, October 23, 1990.-

114. Vertex Chemical Corp., Clinton, IA, Ms. Dixie Ploog,-personal communication with Sargent & Lundy, November 1 1990. 4 115. Dow Chemical, Plaquemine, LA - Jennifer_ Kusch, personal cosaunication .

with Sargent & Lundy, October- 26. 1990.

116. Georgia Gulf, Rolling-Meadows, Illinois, Mr.- Stan Lewis, personal communication with Sargent & Lundy, October 30..'1990.

117. Hy-Drite, Chem, Milwaukee, WI, Mr. Bob Adams, personal communication with-Sargent & Lundy, November 5, 1990.

l