ML20090G531

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Forwards SER Input Re Ventilation Procedures During Steam Generator Tube Rupture Releases.No Effect on safety-related Equipment Operation Anticipated
ML20090G531
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 07/28/1983
From: Rubenstein L
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Miraglia F
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML082380335 List:
References
FOIA-91-106 TAC-49343, NUDOCS 8308090060
Download: ML20090G531 (3)


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v Oistrivition Docket IIIe A$8 nda. rile ASS "enbers t r'ubens tein Docket No. 50L.244 jyt '2 B 083 MEW)RANDUM FOR: Frank Miragita, Assistant Director for Safety Assessment.

Division of Licensing, NRR FROM:

L. S. Pubenstein Assistant Director for Core and Plant Systemt, Division of Systems Integration, NRR

SUBJECT:

REVIEW OF GINNA VENTILAff0N PROCEDURCS. TAC NO. 49343 In response to your request (TAC 49343), the Auxiliary Systems Branch has reviewed tr.a licensee's ventilation procedures E-1.4, " Steam Generator Rupture" Revisien 19 and 04.10. " Operation with a Steam Generator Tube Leak Indication" Revision 5, in connection with the possible r.oncern of short-tem reduction in cooling of the safety-related equipment rooms at Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.

This concern is an outgrowth of the Gfnna steam generator tube rupture event wherein the normal auxiliary building ventilation system air intakes were isolated in order to prevent entry of airborne radiation released through the atmospheric dump va'ves.

Based on our review of the TLSAR and the licensee's ventilation procedures, we conc 19de that there will be no effect on stfety-related equipment operation in the event the nomal ventilation intake dampers are closed during a steam generator tube rupture event with its associated radiological releases. The basis for this conclusion is provided in the enclosed evaluation. This completes our review innder TAC 49343.

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% %ihdM A' E L. S. Ruberstein. AssiP...t Director for Core and Plant Systems 1

Division of Systems Integration

Enclosure:

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R. Mattson

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SAFETY EVALUATION REPO,1T INPUT REVIEW 0F VENTIALTION PROCEDURES DURING STEAM GENERATOR TU9E RUPTURE RELEASES R.

E. G!NNA NUELEAR POWER PLANT AUy!LIARY SYSTEMS BRANCH During the steam gener6 tor tube rupture accident at Ginna on January 25, 1982, air contaminated by steam and/or water droplets released from the affected steam generator safety valve was pulled into the auxiliary building through the ventilation intake.

The staff r e c o m tn e nd e d in NUREG-0916,

" Safety Evaluation Report related to the restart of R.

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Ginna Nuclear Power Plant," that the licensee consider a pro-i cedural, change calling for closure of the ventilation intake ports or turning off some of the intake fans in order to i

reduce airborne contamination in the building while a steam generator with a ti/b e rupture has open safety or relief l

valves.

The evaluation of this change should consider poten-tial short-term reduction in the cooling of safety-related ecuipment rooms.

.s In response to our recommendations, the licensee revised two

,r procedures, E-1.4, " Steam Generator Tube Rupture" Revision 19, dated January 18, 1983e and 0-6.10, " Operation with a steam e

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Generato'r Tube Leak Indication" Revisto) $, dated October 19, 1982.

These procedures outs'ne actions which should be con-sidered in order to reduce the intake of radiological contama nonts into buildings by the supply air handling units.

The Licensee's procedure indicates that if the building air mo itoring system indicates that airborne contamination is entering the building, the supply air handling units are to be deenergized.

For the engineered safety f e a t u r e '. pump motors (residual heat removal, s a f e t, y injection and contain-ment spray punps) and the chstging pumps, which are located in the auxiliary building, the Ginna FD$tR states that separate cooling and ventilation systems independent of the normal system are provided for cooling the pump rooms.

These systems maintain the temperature at or below 104* F, which is the pump motor qualification temperature.

Based on our review of the FOSAR and the licensee's ventilation procedures, we conctede that closing the normal, ventilation j

f intakes during unplanned releases will not affect the operat4cn of safety-related equipment as discussed above.

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