ML20090B519
| ML20090B519 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 05/17/1982 |
| From: | Bryan S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Thompson H Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML082380335 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-91-106 NUDOCS 8206140215 | |
| Download: ML20090B519 (4) | |
Text
.=
?
l',,s.,
^
t O
e DI M
S0 24
&(Ay ; 7 3 g.2 PTR neuding Ol.Ziemann HBClayton SEBryan MEMORANDUM FOR: Httgh L. Thompson, Jr., Acting Director 3)Y{sion of Kumn factors Safety ob*'a %,,f s
dDennisL.,Ziemann, Chief THRU:
V Percedures tend Test Review Branch Division of Humn Factors Safety FROM:
Samuel E. Bryan Section A - Procedures Procedures and Test Review Branch Division of Hunan Factors safety
SUBJECT:
RECOM4ENDAT10NS BASED ON Mf INVOLVEMENT IN THE SGTR TASK FOME ACTIVITIES My recomendations to improve safety resulting from involument in the Ginna SGTR Task force activities are as follows:
1.
Reactor Coolant Pump Trip l
~-
A.
Leave 'a reactor coolant pump (RCP) run when a SGTR is
-the incident by s king the,ing a pump run,uncomplicates the diagnosed event. Leav
. pressurizer spray available for the depressurization to the faulted SG pressure.
This also precludes the need for use of the PORY to depressurize. The PORY de' pressurization, is m ch more difficult to control becatise t'he transient can be on the order of 400 psi per minut'e when the PORY is opened.
Fump operation also prevents formation of significantly operation also provides fo(rced cooling to the vessel sized bubbles by distribu Ing any that may form. Pump and piping to achieve mre uni, form cooling.
- Further, the vessel head region gets forced cooling which it l
would otherwise not get with natural circulation.
Withouttheforcedcoolinc],it'shightemperaturelags I
I the rest of the vessel and on'the ensuin9 depressurization local saturatioptempqatures ',are reached, causing f _,,
bubbles-to form.
N
,/
N m
8206140215 03G547 Y"ri, i
ef ABeeK 04eeems64 L)/[h X'
! O f)
/
x
- e (,_.,......
..... 2.
j i
~'
- ^"'>.. 2.T.T.-~.~.w m.m e d.........
- ^ " >
oc ro.u m ow.m.ac u.,u, OFFICIAL RECORD COPY we mo-n
~
(
l
/
o
.1 Hugh L. Thompson, Jr. g 7g B.
Licensees should select the pressure value for tripping pumps that Westinghouse Owners' Group recomands, if the than Ginna's 1715 psi valu.t va,1ue is significantly lower pump must be tripped. Tha e selected because it was the lowest value from an envirbnmintally qualified pressure transmitter. The lower trip value allows the pumps to continuetooperateforn[ rang'eofSGTRsizesforwhich the RCS pressure decrease can be reversed by makeup and SI pumps before the trip value,is reached.
2.
Restart of RCS Puup The SGTR event procedure should specify the earllust time or plant conditions that a RC$ pump can be restarted.
Ideally that should precede depressurization.
Pump operation makes pressurizer spray available, lts use ensures a more controlled depressurization and pump oper:ation can prevent or collapse bubbles in the RCS.
[
3.
Events Requiring Depressurization There are clear needs to depre,ssurize the RCS during certain operating events i.e., events resulting in the inability to isolate small breaks such as fGTR or pump seal leak't.
Procedures that cope with these events should ensure natural circulation is established if RCS pumps are t[ ripped and should indicate that even though subcooling margins are maintained bubbles can form in the RCS.
Guidance on how to identify their presence, how to eliminate them, and criteria (or Si operation and termination should be included in these pr,ocedures.
4.
A.
S! Pump Termination and Restart Both 51 pump termination tend restart criteria should contain a subcooling nsrvin value[ anc[ this criteria should be included in E0P's.
B.
Guidance and criteria on S! pump o'.aration and termination should be provided in the procedure for coping with a SGTR for plant conditions of a',bubb[le in the RCS and a SGTR.
^
5.
Reset of Safety Injection and Contain.nent Isolation Operators at Ginna are instructed by procedure to wait for-emptying of tho boric acid storage tank (BAST) before resetting the $1 signal because automatic switchover for SI pump supply I
o"<' t
"'"h.........
oc row m eeo ~.c ono OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
" * =
t c
a iv.
e t
M Hugh L. Thompson, Jr. from BAST to the refueling water storage tank (RWST) will not occur if SI is reset. SI must be reset before containment isolation (CI)signalcanbereset. Rasetting CI allows operability of several pieces 'of equipment imporcent to j
mitigating the event.
Emptyfrig BAST can take several minutes.
The licensee should have the capability to reset S! and CI before the tank empties, perhaps by changing the logic circuitry that prevents automatic switchover from BAST to RWST if 51 is reset.
6.
Cooldown of the Faulted SG The licensee's procedure contains no instructions for cooldown of the SG with the ruptured tube. The procedure should contain options for cooldown and include the preferred method.
It should i
also provide guidance for cool'ing an overfilled SG with water in the steam line.
The procedure should also prescribe any actions needed to maintain the integrity of a water filled steam line.
7.
procedure for SG With a Ruptured Tube and a Faulted Safety or Relief Yalve The licensee should develop a. procedure for coping with a steam generator having a ruptured tube coupled with a failed safety or relief valve.
This case appears to be potentially the worst SGTR case from the viewpoint of offsite releases. The Ginna SG safety *,alve opened five times end appears to have stayed opw on t'ae fifth for about 5d trinutes, closing at a much lower pressure than the first reclosure.
(The SG PORY was isolated by closure of its associated Qlock valve.)
This procedure should contain, instructions for running SI pumps and managing the borated water, supply.
The procedural goals should be to maintain adequate; coolant inventory to keep the core covered, remove decay hea minimize offsite effects while,.t. conserve borated water and cooling and depressurizing the RCS expeditiously.
8.
E0P Clutter l
The Ginna E0P for coping with,SGTR's (E-1.4) contains a se<: tion on the first page under Subsequent Actions that provides-guidance on correction of SG and pressurizer level indication errors caused by increased containment temperatures.
Since SGTR's do not of themselves create high ambient temperstures, the guidance should be removed and placed in a generic instruction or on the panels.
- "'c'>
om>
oc acw m no. ciocu eno OFFICIAL RECORD COPY m "*-
l' l=
6 t.
t' r
0 Hugh 1.. Thornpson, Jr..
Seven separate line items are,placed on the fourth page of E-1.4 to provide update reports to offsite authorities wtien parameters reach certain values.
I strongly recomend that all reporting requirements to, authorities be remved from E0P's. The emphasis in these procedures must be on safety measures to protect the public and anything that detracts from this mission thould be removed.
Reporting requirenents can be given in other documents.
OilInalsit"*kb SamuelE. Bryan
, Section A - Procedures Procedures and Test Review Dranch Division of Human Factors Safety
~
or,,ce p DHF DHFS PTRB L DHFS:PTRB bc.,
w w.we>. S..E. B.'......: a. h.
. H. B.C.l a..y t.on. D.L.Z.i e.m e. n..
..//. Y../. 82... /.f./82 5/i.... '/../ 82 5
5/
om>
Lee row m oo somacu n.o OFFICIAL RECORD COPY e*
m___.__.
-_m__
___m
_m_-m-
.mm_---
um
,,___mr.
m.
_.__.--____m m._.mm-
-_ms_m__._
_____-m_
__________._-m__.-_m-
h 1
l m
WAY 191302 s
e' 8Cet.-
Y M y,,,,.,D a
1..
u,lp.n], f l} ?
n s
ti x
9-If
~
h
/.'
HDiORAH00f t FOR: Richard 11. Vollmr. 01 rector
/ ggN
Olvision of Engineering FROM:
William V. Johnston, Assistant Director for Materials & Qualifications Engineering Division of Engineering
SUBJECT:
GENERIC REC 0fNDOATIONS DASED UPON REY!EW OF THE JANUARY 25, 1982 GINNA STEAM GEllERATOR TUBE RUPTURE EVENT As requested, tne Inservice Inspection Section of the Materials Engineering Branch. Division of Engineering, has reviewed the NRC Gfnna Task Force report (HUREG-0909) Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation's letter dated April 26.1982 regarding the results of its steam generator examinatlons and investigations subsequent to the Janutry 25. 1982 steam generator rupture incident. and a March 1.1982 trip report submitted by the staff's consultant on eddy current matters (C. Dodd of Oak Ridge National Laboratory).
We have preparod the attached generic recorredations based upon our review of the above doctrents.
William V. Johnston Assistant Director for Materials & Qualifications Engineering Olvision of Engineering Attacheant:
F.emric Reconyndations OlSTRIBUTION:
Central files cc.
R. Yollmr R. E. Itsrtin MTED Reading Files D. Eisenhut J. Lyons MTEB RE 191 G1NNA R. Purple W. llazelton S. Paw 11cki C. Cheng G. Lainas E. Sullivan T. Ippolito E. Murphy K. Wichnan
Contact:
E. Hurphy s
- 0528O M + V ~
x-28 m I
.+.
idli,s xM w (',
s' o,, u,
...;0E j HJE B DE d8p, D.E ff0 DE@[yMQq.
j m m..
> LLM.uT W Jar c.,chen3_
w.1.z.elto y,.Johnstqn
. V1Uf2 5/.. V1; /0L.5/...l.1.I!M 5MN o.,,,
Ime,cnw v pu e ncu u.s OFFICIAL RECORD COPY o w
...-a,..
(,9y, }/. J-f [ j
-[ qf.. [ L " ; f
.a / /. ; ::
' i L "; z sh. 1 L. [ '.
,M
~-
^
^ - - - -
ATTACHMENT GENERIC RECOMMENDATIONS BASED UPON REVIE'd 0F THE JANUARY 25. 1982 O!NNA STEAK GENEPATOR TUBE RUPTURE EVENT INSERVICE INSPECTION SECTION MATERIAL $ ENGINEERING BRANCH 1.
Secondary side inspections using an appropriate camera device should be aerfortred on the entire periphery at the following frequencies for purposes of identifying any loose parts, foreign objects, or peripheral tube OD camage.
A.
N E Facilities During preservice inspection of each steam generator.
B.
Operating Plants (1) Each affected steam generator irrediately af ter any secondary side rnodifications or repairs are made to the steam generator internals, (2) Each affected steam generator whenever eddy current iridications are found in the frJe span portion of peripheral tubes unless it has been clearly established that the iridi-cation did not result from camage by a loose part or foreign object.
2.
Loose parts monitoring systems should be installed in each steam generator prior to initial startup (for NTOL facilitiesi and during the steam generator inspection outace for operating facilities.
Sensors sh?ll be located to allow detection of a loose part in the primary channel h!ad or en the secondary side of 'he tJe Peet.
~
2-3.
Improved QA and QL procedures should be implemnted by each facility to ensure no recurrence of foreign objects in tre primary or secondary sides of steam generators such as those recently observed at Ginna.
Zion 1. prairic Island 1 and perhaps San Onofre 1.
4 f ddy current inspection should include ir,spections in the cbsolute node in addition to inspections in the differential coJe as required by the Ccde i;. order that long wear or f retting type defects such as those occurred ". iinna will proriace an idet.(ifiable signal.
fretting wear ralibration standards should be employed at aii aide for eddy current data interpretatloa of signals for which fretting or wear represents a likely source of the,ignal in crder to assure a (nnsercit {ye interpretation Of the tiqual.
flamples would include slynals at the periphery of the tutte bundle in the free span region, and signals at tube supports (particularly in the preneater region l
of vestinghnuse Model D units).
Use of such a fretting standard in conjunc tion with dr absolute rode inspection would hive resulted in the plugging of the rut'tured tube (i.e., th9 fube which "uptured on January 75,198?) in April 1931 i
l i
1 l
l l
l l
l l
l
. x. u, 5 q,.
- v.
- . ;.,,
t i