ML20090B505
| ML20090B505 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 05/20/1982 |
| From: | Houston R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Lainas G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML082380335 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-91-106 NUDOCS 8206020197 | |
| Download: ML20090B505 (7) | |
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AEB Plant File ADRP R/F PEasley MAY 2 01982 TQuay EHORANDUM FOR:
G. Lainas. Assistant Director for Safety Technology. DL FROM:
R. Wayne Houston. Assistant Director for Radiation
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Protection. DSI
SUBJECT:
GENERIC REcotNEhDATIONS BASED ON THE REVIEW 0F THE GINNA STEAM GENERATOR TUDE RUPTURE W
In response to the memrandtsn from Harold L. Der, ton to the Division Directors.
dated May 3.1982, attached are generic reconvuew3ations from each of the three
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. anches in Radiation Frotection. All of these relate to the Task Force report
-etion on Radiological Consequerces.
Input from Task Force member Jack
':honias is also incorporated.
4 CristWA Sk " N g, Wayne P.o : ten R. Wayne Houston Assistant Director for Radiation Protection
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Division of Systems integration Erclo3ures:
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Ceneric Ducen-tndetion from ETSB t
The high range noble gas ef fluent monitore installed at the R.E. Ginna Nuclear j
Power Plant to satisfy the requir?ments in NUD.EG-0737, Item II,F.1, Attachment
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1, failed to nonitor ce grantify the releases of airborne radioactive materials f
during the sicSm ger.erator tube rupture incident.
The a:nitor failure is i
a beliamd ~to have been associated with the monitor installation and operational
- ro;edures rather than desion deficiency.
It is reco nended, therefore, that j
. lf:cr.!ces be advised to review End modify, if r.ecessary, their installation p
and oper6 ting procedures for such r;onitors so as to assure tisoir proper ner-j for ince when needed, l
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Sl62.t ( c;' pr.. rit r alf ur.ct icns and op; rat cr a ct icns satsequent to the steam generator tube rupture at Ginna resulted in everfilling of the affected steam cenerator. Oserfillirig of this ger-erator negated the ability of the moisture separators in retaroing t'he flow of fission products to the environnent.
In ad:itico, the level in the secondary 5, s t e m r 4 cr ed
- he stean line and i
resulted in water in the inlet of the code safety valves.
This water gag he.e us,inatel/ led to f ailure ir these valves.
Failure in these valves all:ws in un;ent rolled releas e t o the ervirc'"ent end c re.ents iscistion of
- be af f ected steam gene rat or.
's & result of the events, it :en be concl;ded that cr.erating precedo res and plant r e s.pce.s e li ci t at ions
".3y pr: duce acci O nt s cis tinctly differcnt frem thuse an$ly cd previously w r ere the e C;idynt s.ere ass cnec to be terrinated
.s in spc r cxinat ely thirty minutes and pr:per water levels werr r.aint cined in ik e af f e cted sie:. gene rat er s (ac ove rfilling). It is also the staff's cor.-
g c l,; s ' cn t h a t plant resp onse t o ste n ge ne rat or tuca rap;ure (SGTR) a::idents shaald p ref erentialLy use tha turbine c:ncenser, if it is avai'able.
Increasec reliability and availability of the turbir.e tyrzss system may be necessary.
Further in the event of loss of the condenser, the atncspheric duop valves e
should be used to prevcnt the ove rfilling of the af f ected steem gent-ator and lifting of the code safety valser. This conclusian is based upon t,o C C95 i de ra t i ons i
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PL'R designs typically incorporate ot.cck valves on the atmospheric d;ns valves, and theref ore, f ailure of the ds-a valve t o close wilt will not result in an ur.cor.t rolled rele ase to the er.vi rct. tant; and h
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Mainttnance of the steam space in the steam generators retards a
the flow of certain fission products to t he environment by utili:& tion of t,h e, m o i s t u r e separators, or by simple gas / liquid partitioning.
The staff concludes that previous analyses of the offsite consequences of SGTR accidents ray not adequately envelope the range of condition, resulting fron operator actions at specific plants.
Of primsry concern are such factors as overfilling the upset s t e s ". g e r e r a t o r, unanticipated relief valve releases, the accident duration, low p r i r.a r / L t o secondary systen decontamination i
factors following overfilling, ivdice spiking, and pr mary coolcnt acti"ity levels prior to such accidents.
On the basis of this conclusion the staff r e c o e r.e n d s that:
or to:n ';SS5 sender affected shoutd be 1.
SGTR steidents 8 reassessed by li:ensees ri d teplicants to assure that pisnt
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procedures and designs are adequate such that that offsite dose consequences during incidents in which releases are purposely made for periods substantially longer and via other release pcints than previously assassed for design basis accidents recain vi*hin acceptable limits.
These analyses t h o u ', d specifically address the a s s u n p t i e r: a in SRP section 15.6.3.
At Ginna, the operation of the ventilation system vhile the safety valves were relieving caused radioactivity to be drawn into tne auxiliary building t ie r cu g h the nearby ventitaticn bI
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. -3 The staff therefore, recommends:
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All operating PWRs should consider restricting ventilation int,ake while at.ospheric dump /retief or safety valves on a faulted steam ;enerator are open.
Otost of the initiative 4
and study for this should cene from the licensee, not the staff.)
The coolant activity level of radiciodines at the time of.the
-accident at Ginna was about 2% of the plant's technical specification limit, thereby limiting the release of iodine activity over what mi gh t have been released.
The licensee (RGBE) already committed to proposed changes cn activity as recocmended by the staff, resultinglrom a 3ystematic Evaluation Program H evaluation of this design basis accident.
However, eleven PWR's do not have any specific limits on radiciodine, but do have limits on total samma activity.
While the totat primary coolant activity might remain substantially below.the t ot al ectivity' technical specification shutdewn value, the actual radiciodine levels could be very high.
- Further, i
iodine Apiking must be accommodated, but cont rolled, and
- surveillance to assure compliance is tiecessary It has been previously reconmended (c. f.
NUREG-0651, " Evaluation of Steam Generator Tube Ruoture Events") that a limit on iodine activity-be~ incorporated in technical specifications for p lant s without any.
In aedition, the m e n.o r a n d u m for Coccissioner.Gradford fron e
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4 W.- J.- D i r c k s (d a t e d 2/ 9/.82) notes that a ll the reconmendations Lfor indu'stry action are being addressed-as part of on-going ptograms.
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C The staff recommends that:
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A schedule be established for incorporating appropriately con-servative technical specifications for plants that lack either iodine limits or surveitlance requirerents.
The S t anda rd -
i Technical Specifications incorporating dose equivatent i odine concentration limits for all the P' R vendors which
- 1) incorporate suitably constrvative limits, 2) acconmodate but control spikingHot iodine, and 3) incorporate adequate surveillance for both primary and secondary coolants; should be i mp le me nt ed.
4 For,those plants that have radioi;;d. me timits which are higher than the Standard Technical Specification, the staff recommends that a' schedule be established for tbe licensees to provide
-- a n a l y s e s justifying the value,-considering the actual plant i
plant response to this emergency. procedures and. specific accident.
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Generic o.sc :ciendhticn from P.* B licensees located in clinatic regions where it is apr,rocriate should develop specific procedures (for inclusion in enernency response plans) for the uni-form collec". ion of sr.ow sorples if snow is en the oro.,nd or is fallino durino the e:.crgency, so that ground deposition and denosition natterns can be reason-ably quanti fied.
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