ML20083L818

To TMI-1 Steam Generator Repair Safety Evaluation. Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790)

ML20083L818
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	09/30/1982
From:	Graham M GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20079G498	List: ML20079G494 ML20079G577 ML20079G627 ML20079G631 ML20079P579 ML20083L687 ML20083L696 ML20083L711 ML20083L720 ML20083L742 ML20083L745 ML20083L765 ML20083L771 ML20083L818 ML20083L827 ML20083L847 ML20083L883 ML20083L917 ML20083L926 ML20083N580 ML20083N593 ML20083Q797 ML20083Q838 ML20083R357 ML20084A675 ML20084A678 ML20084E041 ML20084E070 ML20084G789 ML20084G981 ML20084H016 ML20084H026 ML20084H029 ML20084L863 ML20084M019 ML20084M127 ML20084M623 ML20084N540 ML20085C982 ML20086K631 ML20086K636 ML20086K659
References
FOIA-83-243, FOIA-83-A-18 TR-006, TR-006-R01, TR-6, TR-6-R1, NUDOCS 8210130553
Download: ML20083L818 (38)

Text

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• TMI-1 STEAM GDiERATOR PJJAIR SAFETT EVALUATION TR-006 Rev. 1 Proj ect No:

5000 51712 M. J. Graham J. D. Jones Septer:bar 30, 1982 Approvals:

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O Review / Comment c Construction O As.Builts O Procurement a Record c Coerations/Mamtenance a Hold Construction Originator M.J. Graham

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Company Document No.

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QCL GPUN Topical Report 1

TMI-1 Steam Generator Repair 006 Safety Evaluation SpecialInstructions

'l DISTRIEUTION:

J.J. Colitz D. G. Slear B.Elam C. W. Smyth F.S. Giacobbe J. R. 'Ihorpe J. Jcues P. S. Walsh S. Levin E. G. Wallace T. Moran R. F. Wilson J. Pearson (B&N) EDCC 11 nsforences i

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Nuclear Safety / Environmental impact Evaluation Summary Sheet (Refer to EP.o16)

Title M-1 Seeats Cenerator Reoair Safety Evaluation 1.(a)

Does the change require revision of the system / component description in the Safety Analysis Report?

YESG NO O (b) Does the change alter procedures from those described in the Safety Analysis Report?

YESO N05 (c)

Are tests or experirnents conducted which are not described in the Safety Analysis Report?

YESO NO 9 Note: If any of the answers to 1(a). (b). or (c) are YES.a detailed evaluation must be attached.

2.fa)

Has the probability of occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment YESO irnportant to safety previously evaluated in the Gafety Analysis Report been increased 7 NO E (b)

Has the possibility for an accident or malfunct. an of a different type ttyan any evaluated YESO previously in the Safety Analysis Report been created?

NO E (c) Has the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification been reduced?

YESO NO E Note:

If any of the answers to 2(a). (b). or (c) are YES. the change must be approved by the NRC.

3.

Does this design change. test or experiment adversely affect Nuclear Safety and therefore. is it an YESO

. "Unreviewed Safety Question" fper 10CFR50:59)?

NO E Note: If the statement in 3 above is checked YES. either redesign or provide supporting documentation which will permrt licensing to request the NRC's approval.

4.

Does the design change possibly involve a significant environmentalimpact or an environmental question YES C not having previous regulatory agency review and approval?

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Note: If the statement in 4 above is checked YEG either redesign or provide supporting documentation wnich l

will permit licensing to request the necessary reguistcry approval, i

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SAR Chapter 10 SDD See attached.

if 1 b) b) or k)is YES indicate Task Request assignments below:

i Yes No TRs Does the change require an update of the FSAR?

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Does the change require a Technical Specification amendment?

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Coos the change require a Quality Classification Ust amendment?

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ABSTRACT Analysis and testing of the OTSC repair program proposed for TMI-1 has been conducted. Comparison of the kinetic joint with the design basis, the expansion qualification program, the effects of the repair on the OTSC, and the environmental impact were examined.

It was concluded that the successful completion of the qualification program vill demonstrate that the repaired joint meets all design bases of the original joint.

Results of this program vill be racessary to support a later evaluation of return of the plant to service.

With respect to the current evaluation, it was concluded that the repair process itself neither increases the probability or consequences of an accident nor creates the possibility of an unanalyzed accident.

No Technical Specification changes are required to repair the plant in the current shutdown condition.

Performance of repair activities will not adversely affect the remainder of the plant, and will have usinimal environmental impact.

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-. - --.... -. - -. ~ - -

l TABLE OF CONTENTS t

TOPIC PACE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1 2.0 EPAIR PROGRAM OVERVIEW 2

3.0 OTSC DESIGN BASIS 3

4.0 COMPARISON OF KINETIC JOINT WITH DESIGN BASIS 7

5.0 REPAIR QUALIFICATION PROGRAM 11 6.0 EFFECTS OF REPAIR 21 6.1 Chemical Impurities 21 6.2 OTSG Structure 23 6.3 Adjaesnt Previously Expanded Tubes 23 6.4 Adjacent Previously Plugged Tubes 23 20 6.5 Reactor Coolant System 7.0 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT AND ALARA 24 7.1 Man-Rem /Estir.ces 24 7.2 ALARA 25 7.3 Environmental' Considerations 26 7.4 Safe Handling of Explosives On-Site 26 7.5 Detonation Noise Bazard 32 8.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE AND QUALITY CONTROL 33

9.0 CONCLUSION

S 33 10.

REFERENCES 34 FICURES Figure 1 Effect of After Hits - Uncorroded Block (PROPRIETARY)

Figure 2 Effect of After Hits-Corroded Block (PROPRIETARY)

Figure 3 Effect of Tube Yield on Pullout Load (PROPRIETARY)

Figure 4 Quantity and Distance Table for Unbarricaded Mr.gazines.

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1 ho KHTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose The purpose of this report is to set f orth the analysis of safety considerations in the proposed TMI-1 OTSC tub e repair process, including a verification that ths kinetic repair meets original design bases, and tha t repair activities will not have an adverse effect on

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the remainder of the plant.

Other safety considerations involved in returning TMI-1 to operation with the repaired OTSC's will be covered in a supplemental report.

1.2 background 1.2.1 A large number of 'DtI-1 OTSG tubes in each of the two OTSC's have been found to have through-wall circumferencial cracks within the upper 16 inches of the upper tubesheeet.

Relatively fewer tubes have similar cracks below this level.

The details of the failure analysis are contained in reference 1.

1. 2. 2 A repair program has been proposed in which tubes with defects I

in the upper 16 inches of the upper tubesheet' will be explosively expanded, sealing off the defects, and tubes with def ec ts below that

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1evel vill be plugged.

An overview of the explosive repair process is provided in section 2.0 of this report.

The plugging repair addressed in other safety evaluations.

The effect of processes are plugging on plant safety is included in the later supplemental report.

1.3 Summary of Principal Results 1.3.1 The kinetic joint produced by the explosive expansion meets or exceeds the design basis properties of the original tube to tubesheet joint.

1.3.2 The explosive expansion process is to be qualified with regard to:

i 1.3.2.1 The contaminant concentrating effect of crevice

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dryout prior to expansion.

1.3.2.2 Chemical residue produced.

1.3.2.3 Leak tightness.

1.3.2.4 Load carrying ability of the kinetic joint.

1.3.2.5 Residual stress left in repaired j oint.

1.3.3 The effects of the repair on the OTSC are to be tested with regard to:

1.3.3.1 Introduction of chemical impurities.

1.3.3.2 Effe'ct on the OTSG structure.

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5 1.3.3.3 Effe.ct on adjacent previously expanded tubes.

1.3.3.4 Effect on adjacent previously plugged tubes.

1.3.4 The environmental impact of the repair has been found to be satisfactory with regard to the following areas:

1.3.4.1 Effluent Impac ts 1.3.4.2 Man-Rea exposure 1.3.4.3 Explosive hazard 1.3.4.4 Noise 1.4 Conclusion It was concluded that the repaired joint meets all design bases of the original joint and that the repair process does not increase the o

probability or consequences of an accident or creates the possibility of an unanalyzed accident.

i Further, it was concluded that the performance of the repair does not adversely affect the remainder of the plant, and that environmental impact is minimal.

Since the repair is being performed in cold shutdown, with the steam generators not required for use in decay heat removal, no technical specification change is necessary to permit work in the steam generators.

2.0 REPAIR PROGRAM OVERVIEW 2.1 Introduction The OTSC tubes and the tube-to-tubesheat welds are portions of the primary system pressure boundary.

The cut.s are subjected to varying axial loads which may be transmitted through the weld to the tubesheet.

DiI-1 OTSG tube examinations have revealed a 1crge number of tubes with defects within the upper tubesheet.

The repair approach is to establish in those tubes where it is possible, a new primary system pressure boundary below these defects.

This toundary will provide a seal against leakage between the tube and shell sides of the OTSC.

A kinetic expansion of the tube within the tubesheet will be the approach used to effect this repair.

This repair will provide a load carrying leak-tight joint below known defects.

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2.2 Kinetic Tube Expansion The process steps which are involved with this repair have the objective of providing a new pressure boundary below known defects through kinetic (explosive) expansion of the tube within the tubesheet.

Preliminary testing indicates that a certain minimum length is necessary between the lowest defect and the bettom of the expansion to serve as the new pressure boundary.

The specific

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'gc20Gery of the ropeir cud the docails of kinetic charge size and detonation process are proprietary information.

Section 5.0 of this report outlines the repair process qualification program and contains i

these details.

References 2 and 3 previde the charge sizing basis.

2.3 Steps / Sequences The IMI-1 OTSG repair process is as follows.

Step Description 1

Flush the secondary side tube to upper tubesheet crevice.

2 Heat crevice to drive out moisture (vaporize water).

3 Precoat tubes with Immunol l

4 Kinetically expand tubes 5

Clean debris from kinetic expansion The process vill be performed according to procedure as de:cribed in B&W Field Change Authorization 04-3873-00 Kinteic Tube Expansion (Ref.

12).

2.4 Performance Specifications Performance Specifications formally establish the performance requirements of tube to tubesheet repair and outline a qualification program which vill provide assurance of the technical adequacy of the repair process.

Reference 4 sets forth applicable performance specifications.

3.0 OTSC DESIGN BASIS I

'1

't The tube and tubesheet form a portion of the primary system pressure is boundary. The original joint consisted of a shop roll expansion and a tube to tubesheet weId.

The shop roll was intended to hold the tube in tension until it could be welded.

The weld was the primary presssure boundary and structural attachment although the roll expansion shared some of the load.

The joint was designed for a maximum primary pressure of 2500 psi and a maximum secondary pressure of 1050 psi.

The design temperature was 650*F for the primary side and 600*F for the secondary.

The tube and tubesheet meet the primary system pressure boundary requirements, of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III, 1965 Edition, Summer of 1967 Addenda.

3.1 Load Summarv l

3.1.1 Normal Operation Tube Loads The loads on the steam generator tubes are a result of primary and m

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t secondary system pressure and temperature effects.

Because of the d if ferent materials, Inconel for the tubes and carbon steel for the shell, overall temperature change as well as temperature diffarence between parts causes loads to be exerted on the tubes.

There are only a limited number of transients which generate significant tu b e loads.

These are listed below with the tube load re sul ting f rom each.

A positive number indicates a tensile load and a negative number indicates a compressive load.

Transient Load, Ibs.

Heatup frce cold shutdown to 8 power

-775 Cooldown from 8 power to cold shutdown 1107 Power change 0: to 15:

-525, Power change 15: to 0 143 Power loading 8 to 1002

-419 Power unloading 100% to 8:

-100 3.1.2 Accident Condition Tube Loads There are three accident conditions which cause significant loads on the steam generator tubes; large break LOCA, main steam line break, and feedwater line break. The axial loads on the tube are:

Transient Load, lbs.

IDCA 2641 l

Main Steam Line Break 3140 l

Feedwater Line Break

-570 l

i Because the expansioc is well within the tubesheet, lateral tube loads have no ef fect and do not need to be considered.

3.1.3 Thermal / Pressure Cycles As was discussed above for normal operating tube loads, O.are are only a few transients of interest.

These are the ones which cause significant pressure or temperature fluctuations.

The transients which need to be considered are:

No. of Cycles for Plant Transients Design Life Heacup 240 Cooldown 240 Power chat.,e 0 to 15:

1440 Power change 15: to 0:

1440 Power loading 8 to 100:

43,000 Power unloading 100% to 8:

48.000 Step load reductions 310 Reactor trips 400 Rapid depressurization 30 After the first fifteen minutes, the rapid depressurization transierrt

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'ES3s into narnal cooldown and the plant is avontually returnod to 5

povor via normal hoa tup.

The tube load results from the normal ecoldown/ normal heatup portion of the transient cycle.

Since this cooldown/heatup is already included in the 240 cycles of hea tup / cool d own, the 80 cycles of rapid depressurization are not additive to them.

There are th ree types of reactor trip recovery transients, with a total of 400 design cycles.

Of the 400 design cycles, 340 are taken to be recovery from 540*F, 20 to be recovery from 200*F, and 4 0 t o be from 70

• F.

Only the laccer two repcesent significant recovery temperature ranges.

These two modes represent a total of 60 cycles.

Since the temperature ranges for these reactor trips are similar to and bounded by the range fer the cooldown transient,

these 60 cycles can be added to the heatup and cooldown transient cycles.

In a like manner, step icad reduction cycles can be added to the power unloading cycles since the temperature range for power unloading transient bound s that of the step load reduction transient.

This results in the following table of design cycles to be used for analysis.

Design Transient Life Cycles Beatup 300 Cooldown 300 Power change 0: to 15 1400 Power change 15: to 0:

1400

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Power loading 8: to 100:

48,310 Power unloading 100% to 8:

48,310 3.1.4 Tube Preload (PROPRIETARY) i I

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- 6 3.2 Residual Stresses The re sid ual stresses in the as-built OTSC are of appreciable depth within the tube wall, and are caused by roller straightening of the tubes, weld shrinkage, rolling of the tube within the tubesheet, and by preloading of the tube.

All of these re sid u al stresses are affected by stress relief due to heat treatment during manuf acture of the OTSG.

The residual stresses are essentially the same at the bottom a nd top tubesheett since the weight of the installed tube is negligible.

During fabrication, it was not felt necessary to measure residual stresses after welding to meet OTSC design requirements, so such measurements were neither re quir ed nor performed.

Best estimates values for the TMI-1 tubes at ambient temperature are given below.

TUBE RESIDUAL TENSILE STRESSES (1)

PSI AT FOUR IDCATIONS OF 22iTEREST Location Axial Circumferential Weld EAZ 22,000

-22,000 Roll

-10,000

-22,000 Roll Transition

,26,000(2) 22,000 Tube (between tubesheets)

O to 26,000(2)(3)

O to 22,000 (3)

(1) The stresses in this table are membrane plus bending at the inner surface for the case where the rolled joint is tightly constrained by.the tubesheet.

If th e rolled tube were loose in the tubesheet then we estimate that circumferenti:1 :tr :: in the loose roll area would approch zero and axial stress in the loose roll area would approach about 4000 psi.

Axial stress in the veld EAZ would approach 26,000 psi.

(2)

This stress includes 4000 psi due to tube preload after heat treatment. Such preload stresses are expected to be higher for the periphery of the tube bundle than for tubes located in the center of the bundle.

(3)

Tube stresses between tubesheets a re primarily due to the tube straightening manufacturing process and cay vary considerably depending on the location within the tube.

As no ted abov e, the highest residual stresses are in the area of the I

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e tube-to-tubesheet joint, and are higher in the pe rip he r al tubes than in the center of the tube bundle because of the elastic flexibility of the tubesheet.

3.3 Heat Transfer Requirements The performance of the steam generator is predicted without benefit of assuming any heat transfer from the tubeshe e t to the secondary side.

3.4 Pressure Boundary Leakage The d e sign basis for steam generator tube leakage is to provide generators with no detectable leaks at shipment and to control leakage to an acceptable operating level by monitoring and repair over the 40 yest life of the plant.

Manufacturing and operating require =ents have been established to assure acceptable leakage.

The steam generators were shop tested for tube leakage prior to shipment to an NSS site.

An initial test using helium at ~100 psi is made prior to the ins tallations of the steam generator heads.

The helium test was followed by a full ASME code hydrostatic test with the head s installed.

The hydrotest was done separately on the primary (tube) side a nd the secondary (shell) side.

The relevant acceptance criteria for both tests was zero (no detectable) leakage.

It is expected during normal and transient operation over t.0 year plant life tha t some detectable leakage will occur.

Initial leakage

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is predicted to be very small, increasing gradually.

Initial detection is usually by radiation monitoring of the condenser air jet ejection vents.

Leakage can be confirmed by chemical analysis of the feedvater for boric acid or radioactive iodine.

Operation of the plant is expected to continue af ter a leak has been detected until a convenient time is reached to shutdown for repair or until a plant technical specification limit is reached and repair is required.

The design basis for steam generator tube leakage is to provide generators with no detectable leaks at shipment but with some expectation of leakage developing over 40 year plant life.

The design is, therefore, considered to meet the intent of General Design Criterion 14 from 10CTR50, Appendix A, i.e.,

" to have an extremely low probability of abnormal leakage, of rapidly propagating f ailure and of gross rupture".

Should unforeseen factors increase that probability, Technical Specification limits have been set to require plant shutdown ar.d repair.

For TMI-1 the Technical Specification limits that apply directly or indirectly are:

Section 3.1.6 Leakage Section 3.13 Secondary System Activity Section 4.19 OTSG Tube Inservice Inspection 4.0 Comparison of Kinetic Joint with Design Bases (PROPRIITARY)

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'5. 0 REPAIR QUALIFICATION 5.1 Details of the Repair Process and Qualification Progrsm 5.1.1 Repair Process (PROPRIETARY) l 5.1.2 Qualification Program j

The repair qualification program is described in subsequent sections.

l Except where noted, all testing has been done on in-stock tubes and p

tubesheet mockups.

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For the manufacture of mockups to be used in qualification testing, three sets of parameters were intended to duplicate or bracket actual steam generator conditions.

The parameters are material properties, surface condition ami geometry.

5.1. 2.1 Material Properties i

TMI-1 tubesheets are SA-508-CL2 nuclear grade f orgings and have.2%

offset yield values from 65.5 KSI to 73.0 KSI.

Material used for the tubesheet portion of mockups which is being used for the various qualification tests, is all SA-508-CL2 nuclea r grade forgings and has.2% of fset yield values ranging from 64.7 KSI to 70.0 KSI.

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y-TMI-1 tubes arelSB-163, Inconel 600 with.2% of f se t yield strength values f rom 41.0 KSI to 64.9 KSI.

Testing of THI-1 tubing in areas which are not cracked has indicated that the mechanical properties i

of the metal are unaffected by the sulfur contaminant.

Measurements of yield and ultimate loads indicate that strength and ductility are compa t ible with those of other tubes with a similar operating history.

Due to schedule considerations, available in-stock tubing was used in the sockups.

Tubing used for the mockups is 55-163, Inconel 600-steam generator tubing with.2% offset yield strengths of 41.5 KSI and 54.7 KSI.

All yield strength values used above are prior to stress relief heat treatment.

Tubing and tubesheet material for mockups for qualification testing have been stress relief heat treated in a manner to simulate stress relief time at temperature seen by the TMI-1 steam generators during fabrication.

Preliminary testing has shown that the use of low yield tubing results in the lowest pullout loads. Therefore, 1ow yield strength tubing (41.4 KSI) is used for most pullout load test mockups with high yield (54.7 KSI) tubing used in some locations for a comparison to assure that low yield is indeed the worst case.

5.1.2.2 Surface condition The holes in the tubesheets of. TMI-1 were gun-drilled; thus, all tubesheet mockups were gun-drilled also.

In cases where the geometry of the test mockup was felt to be more important than precise duplication of surface finish, the holes were honed to obtain exact dimensions.

Mockups used in the measurement of leak limiting and tube load carrying capabilities have been gun-drilled only.

All mockups used for tube pullout and leakage testing have been l' corrosion conditionod to simulate the IMI-1 tube and tubesheet oxide

,j layer chemistry and thickness based on five years of operation.

The thickness of oxide on the upper tubesheet in the crevice region was not and could not be measured without cutting a section of material out of the tubesheet.

It was necessary, therefore to estimate the thickness of the oxide in the TMI-1 cubs.heet crevice l

and to establish conditions that would produce a similar chickness j

of oxide in the mock-up assembly.

Video tapes of the TMI-1 tubasheet area were viewed by S&W personnel and the surface appearance was judged to be typical of that expected due to exposure in a steam environment.

There were no indications of abnormal oxidation.

In addition the surface of tubes pulled from IMI-1 steam generators are very similar with respect to oxidation, I

to those of tubes examined in the laboratory from other cc=mercial power plants and model boilers.

The oxide on the steel tubesheet in the upper portion of the upper l

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l 13 tubesheet crevice in TMI-1 was expected to be mostly magnetite with a very thin surface layer of hematite.

This is the type of oxide

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produced by the action of steam on iron and mild steel over a broad range of temperatures, pressures, and oxygen ac tivities.

Very similar oxide layers are produced by oxidation of iron and steel in air.

Thus, based on laboratory oxidation data, the tubesheet mockups were exposed to air at 1000 7 for 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> to produce a simula-tion of the oxide in the IMI-1 steam generators tubesheet crevice.

5.1.2.3 Geometry Tubing for use in the mockups was obtained from stock sources and therefore the CD of tubing and wall thickness were not controllable dimensions.

The range of possible tub e-t o-tu,be sheet gaps by an accumulation of drawing tolersaces is.003"

.016" diametral.

Experience with the tubing manufacturers has shown that the tubing CD consistently is greater than the minimum and that the tubesheet holes generally tend towards the maximum dimension, giving an effective maximum diametral gap of.012".

Foster Wheelsr experience has shown that a maximum annulus is the worst case condition for leak and load carrying ability.

The 10 hole leak and load test mockups were gun-drilled to produce a diametral annular gap of.013" for the two he=cs and lots of cubing which will be used.

At that point, the maintenance of surface finish in the gun-drilled holes was judged to take precedence over the necessity of producing a.016" gap and the holes were not honed.

In all cases dere pull-out loads and leak rates are measured for use in justifying the repair process, the expansion has been done so to produce a 6" effective length for the qualification.

In one as instance this is acccamplished by use of a 2 part tube simulating a 360' through wall crack and in other cases the expansion itself is only 6" long.

Tests yielding data which may be expansion length dependent such as induced strain tests will be mocked up using a full thickness tubesheet block and full length expansions.

Again, heat treated, certified materials with selected yield strengths will be used for this testing.

Thus control of material properties, surf ace conditions and geometry in the steam generator test moc k-u p s to match or envelope actual TMI-1 OTSC conditions provide the basis for the judgment that this model testing is representative of the repair expansions in every essential parameter.

These geometric parameters include the effective length, duplication of transition zone and diametral configuration.

5.2 Mechanical Tests A series of tests has been used to qualify the kinetic expansion process as producing a joint capable o f carrying required loads and providing a leak tight seal.

Preliminary te s ts were perfocued te i

' ' ' ' ^ ' '

l' estdblish the pa r amet e r s for the kinecie expansicn.

5.3.1 Leak and Axial Load Tests.

5.2.1.1 Preliminary Leak and Axial Load Tests Obj ec tive Determine the parameters required to produce a load carrying, leak tight ax pans ion.

Test Description Kinetic expansions we re t e.s t ed to determine the maximum axial load condition which would cause the expansion to slip.

After a set of x pansion parameters was postulated, leak rate and axial load tests were performed to determine whether the expansion would still appear ade qua te for corroded tubesheet, af ter thermal and pressure cycling, and af ter adj acent tubes have been expanded.

Acceptance Coals I

Analysis of the test data derived to date concentrated on the following acceptance goals:

Water leak at 1275 psig (Primary to Secondary)

< 3. 2 x 10 -5 1b/hr per tube.

Pullout load consistently above 3140 lb per tube.

Margin in follout loads and leak rate to account for possible deterioration.of joint integrity frc=

thermal cycling and for statistical analysis.

Minimize expansion la'ng th.

Minimize longitudinal strain induced in the tube by the expansion process.

Minimize in plane defoemation of the expanded tube block hole and adjacent holes.

I Results (PROPRIETARY) l Pullout Loads (PROPRIETARY)

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AS Leak Testing During preliminary testing, Foster Wheeler bubble tested all 6" qualification expansions made with the selected charges using 100 psig primary-to-secondary air pressure.

No indication of tube leakage was noted.

In addition, limited water tests performed to date on these ex pans ions show that a no-leak indication by air bubble tests correlates well with satisf actory water leak test resul ts.

Two types of water leak tests were performed on these 6"

l qualification expansion test expansions.

The first test set-up used a pressure transducer and a thermocouple to continuously record i

water pressure and temperature.

The wa ter leakage rate was then calculated using pressure decay af ter an initial curing time.

The effects of water temperature changes on water pressure were accounted for in the calculations.

In this test, after initial curing, the water pressure varied betweeen 1525 psig and 1473 psig while the water temperature varied between 69.3*F and 72.4'F over a 60-hour period.' Calculations show leakage rate to be essentially zero.

The second setup used a pressure gauge for water pressure measurement and a mercury thermometer to read anbient temperature, reasoning that the changes in ambient temperature will correspond to changes in the water temperature with a small time lag. After initial curing, the water pressure varied between 2010 psig and 1790 psig while the ambient tenperature v ari ed be twee n 7 0. 5 'F and 79'T over 70 hours8.101852e-4 days <br />0.0194 hours <br />1.157407e-4 weeks <br />2.6635e-5 months <br />.

Leak rate calculations show the upper bound leakage l

to be approximately 0.8 x 10-6 lb/hr/ tube.

g

--we.

-e

16 5.2.1.2 14ak and Axial Load Qualification Tests Objective Pred ic t the leak tightness and confirm the axial load carrying capability of the chosen expansion technique, determine an ef fective method of relating post repair /in-generator leak tests with the results of laboratory leak tests, show what.effect kinetic expanslun will have on adjacent repaired tubes and determine the effect of re-expanding previously expanded tubes.

Test Description Eight ten tube mockups were expanded by the chosen techniques and then tested.

Tubes were inserted into 12" high tube blocks from the top and bottom meeting two inches below the top of the block.

The point where the two tube.s meet, therefore, represents a 360* through wall crack.

The two tube assemblies were then explosively expanded to a d ep th o f 8" from the top providing 6" of seal below the simulated a

Crack.

All blocks were thermally cycled as follows:.

38 cycles 70*F to 610*F to 70*F i cycle 610*F to 400*F in ten mins.

i One block was then exposed to a series of Icad cycles.

These were:

100 cycles 780 lbs. compression to 1110 lbs. tension 180 cycles 635 lbs. compression to 175 lbs. tension 6000 cycles 510 lbs. compression to 125 lbs. compression l

Cycles selected correspond to the 5 years qualification period.

I Most leak tests were performed using demineralized water at 70*F pres'surized on the primary side at 1275 psi dif ferential pressure.

One block of ten expanded tubes was t es ted at 70*F with 275 psi pressure on the secondary side. Another test was made using 2500 psi at 70 *F on the' primary side. Finally, one leak test was done at 1275 psi and 70*F on the primary side on a block with tubes that had been affected by expanding one an additional time, simulating a reexpansion due to a misfire.

In addition to the water leak tests, one bubble test was done at 70*F using 125 psi Nitrogen pressure on the secondary side.

Following cycling and leak tasting described above, all tuber were examined to determine pullout loads.

Tubes in one additional 91ock were pulled without any conditioning to provide baseline data Results of these tests will be provided later.

Acceptance objectives require that a statistical evaluation of the results show a 992 confidence level that 99~ of all tubes expanded will have a.

e

=e

-a..e

1 e

17 pullout load of >.3140 lbs and the mean leakage rate will be less than 3.2 x 10 -5 lbs/hr/ tube (1 lb/hr for the unit).

l 5.2.2 Minimizing Residual Stress

5. 2. 2.1 Preliminary Residual Stress Limitations Obj ec t To determine the expansion parameters which would lead to a smooth transition area, thus minimizing residual stresses.

Test Description A number of insert shapes were evaluated to determine which provided a smooth transition of 1/8" - 1/4".

Results A 30* chamfer on the tube end was found to previde a satisfactory transition.

5.2.2.2 Residual Stress Evaluation 5.2.2.2.1 Corrosion Testing of Transi'

• as.

Obj ect To perform accelerated stress corrosion cracking tests on expanded tube /tubesheet mockups.

The mockups were tested in 10% sodium hydroxide (NaOH) at constant potential and destructively examined for stress corrosion cracking (SCC) due to residual stresses fro =

the repair expansion process.

From previous testing of stressed Alloy 600 performed at B&W's Alliance Researach Ccnter (ARC), five days of exposure at constant potential in 10% NaOH is equivalent to approximately 8,5 years of testing in PWR secondary side water at 650*F. Three tube /tubesheet mockup specimens were tested.

Test Materials 1.

Alloy 600 cube kinetically expanded in an Alloy 600 mockup tubesheet.

2.

Alloy 600 cube kinetically expanded plus a hard roll in the kinetically expanded region.

3.

Alloy 600 cube kinetically expanded plus a hard roll overlapping the expanded transition area.

Tesc Environment 1.

10 NaOH at 550*F with a constant potential o f,190 Mv vs. Nickel (Ni) applied to the specimen.

F.

Test Method

~

+

1.'

Prepared and cleaned the tube / r.ubasheet mockup spe'aimen s.

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.y 1

2.

Ex pos'ad the specimens in an ' Alloy 600 lined two ;;allon

(

stati: autoclave for up ' to 500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br />.

Removed and inspected tha specimens for indications 3.

t of SCC.

+

4 Results' s

The results of this test are not available at this time.

Since this is a comparison test there are no acceptance criteria.

If the comparison shows the expanded joint to be inferior to a st ndard joint, further evaluation vill be required.

5.2.2.2.2.

Besidual Stress Measuremente

~

t obj ective,.

To measure the actual residual stress in 8, samples to determine post-kinetic expansion tube stresses in the transition area at the bottom of the ' expansion and at a second point near the middle of the expansion. ','

Test Method ans Cri.terion Eight. samples'._ were examined using x-ray defraction to determine residual tube stress in the test expansion.

Both hard rolled and kine tically expanded tubes ' vere examined, using both high and low yield strength' materials.

Results

~

The results 'of this ' test are not yet available.

The goal for this test will be that the residual tensile stress in the tube shall not excee4 "45f of yieli streng th.

The actual residual stress t

measured ' vill-be utilized in coqiunction with the results from the accelerate.d *ccerosion tests described in 5. 2. 2. 2.1 t e as se s s the

'adequcy of'.the new joint. "l

3

~

5. 2. 3 Induced Sc.*ain Tests

-Objective s

To determine the ef fects of the axpusion on the tub e-t o-t ub e sh e e t welds, and the tube length, and to determine the strain stored in the ex pansion.

5

.g**

n Test Description I

Tubes with collars simulating the tensile axial restraint of the wel

• h

____1._.-__

O I

g the top wero exp:ndcd over a 6" icagth cad the dispicecacnt cr. each at e nd of the tube ' caused by the expansion was measured.

In

addition, the change in total length of the expansion when released from the tubesheet constraint was noted.

Preliminary Results and Final Accept..sce Criterion (PRO PitIETARY )

5.2.4 Ligament Distortion (PROPRIETARY) s.

E

5. 2. 5 Inununol Testing Object To determine the effects of immunol coating on an explosive expansion.

l Test Description i

Expansions were done in freestanding tubes, prepared identically except tha t one se t of tubes was precoated with i=nunel and the other was not.

The tube diameters were measured be f ore and after the expans ions.

Results 4

em

- D

20 There were no signific. ant differences in the expansion.

5.3 Chemical Testing 5.3.1 Residse Test

/

Objective De t ermine the amount' and ty pe of explosive residue that should be expect (4 to remain in the stava generator af ter all tube repairs are complaced.

Identify a satisf actory. cleaning method, if needed, to reduce contaminants to acceptable primary system water chemistry levels.

Test Description Residue tests performed to date include four types of test.

These r

tests ars:

36" of detonation cord culy in a 36" long mostly closed tube,

s a ten inch expansion in a 48 inch tube.

testinr, in an OTSC.

testing in conjunction with crack change test in actul.vaples of 7.MI-1 tubing.

Results 4 -

f The results of these tests and analysis of the debris provide the following data:

i

- The chemical compositico and shounts of the residue are acceptable from the etaniyoint of contamination.

The. caed to clean following expansion is being p

evaluated.

l

\\

The use of ordnance transfer cord minimizes the amount of debris inj the upper head.

Techniques for cleanup of the the res idue from the tubes and tubesheet 3

af ter kinetic expansion have been examined.

Precoating the surfaces with immunol permits cleaning with felt ' plugs and a water rinse.

1 5.3.2.

crevice contaminant concentration Tests Obj ec tive Determine the concentrating ef fects that dry out before expansion has on crevice contamination and on the contaminants Nhich caused the cracking. r

.- 9 f

/

^

21 Test Description A limited number of tubes in the TMI-1 OTSC were heated and dried locally prior to beginning the overall 0750 d rying process.

These tubes we re he a t ed then allowed to cool and examined by eddy current techniques for any new cracking or changes in previously identified crac king.

Results No significant changes in ECT resi:1 te were identified.

I 5.3.3 Crack Change and Residue cleaning Tests obj ec tive De termine the effect of kinetic expansion on existing cracks, examine the effect of cleaning prior to expansion on po s t-expansion cleanability.

Test Description (PROPRIETARY)

Results (PROPRIETARY) l l

i I

6.

ETTECTS OF REPAIR The f ollowing effects of the kinetic expansion process are to be evaluated.

6.1 Possible Introduction of Chemical Impurities The specification for OTSC Tube repair addresses the issue of impurities in the system.

It specifies tha t the inside of the steac generator will not be exposed to materials containing more than 250 y_ -, -,,. - - - - * - - - -

tr-

-*--e"*=+

""*~"*^-"##

ppa sulfur and 250 ppe total chlorides and fluorides, and specified detectable amounts of low melting point metals. A material control program with quality controls is in place and will be required to function throughout the repair to confirm that material is not introd uced in sid e th e steam generator without assurance that its constituents are known and acceptable.

The residue remaining following kinetic expansion has been identified quantitatively and qualitatively by Auger and other techniques, and found to meet the specification acceptance criterion.

The kinetic expansion residue test in the repair qualficiation program was used to determine the amount and type of explosive residue that expected to remain in the steam generator after all tubes repairs are co=pleted (Paragraph 5.3).

Further, the materials selected for precoat and cleaning of the tubes also meat materials control requirements.

we

1. ae 4

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4 I

e 6

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33

• 6. 2 Possible Effects on OTSC Structure It has been postulated that the kinetic expansion may, because of the large number of tubes involved, have significant ef fects on the steam i

generator as a structure as well as on the individual tubes.

For individual expansion, evaluation o f the tubesheet ligaments has j

shown no significant ef fects of expansion.

However, it has also been i

postulated that with multiple kinetic expansions there could be a shock wave rein f o rc ement such that the sequence of explosions or the length of the primer cord should be controlled to insure that the tubesheet is not overstressed.

The concern is that the shock wave may travel at about the tpeed of sound through the material, and if adjacent tubes explode in a manner such that their. shock wave reinforces shock waves from other tube s, there could be a condition where the tubesheet is overstressed.

Foster Wheeler has kinetically expanded over 2000 feedwater heaters and expanded as many as 5000 cubes in a heater in one detonation and have never experienced any visible tubesheet overstressing problems.

At THI-1 the plan is to expand simultaneously a maximum of only 132 tubes plus any misfires from the previous shot.

No visible damage was noted on the tubasheet or velds during the full scale testing at Mt.

Vernon.

Strain gauge and pressure pulse data from Mt. Vernon taken for a 132 tube expansion showed no residual static strain, and a peak loading of 33,400 psi at 200 H I immediately adj acent to an end tube, which is about half of yield.

Similar data taken for an 80 tube shot can be used to extrapolate acceptability of simultaneous expansion of a 132 tube row and the very limited number of misfires from the previous row.

6.3 Possible Effects on Adjacent Previously Exnanded Tubes This concern is addressed in paragraph 5.2.1.

6.4 Possible Effects on Adjacent Previously Plugged Tubes The TMI once through Steam Generators have tubes that have been taken out of service by four dif ferent procedures.

A question ha.s been raised as to tne effect the planned kinetic expansion may have on these plugged tubes.

The four procedures that have been used are:

Explosively welded plugs.

l Welded plugs - plugs welded to the tube ends or tubesheet at the top of the upper tubesheet.

Hydraulic expanded tubes sealed with a welded plug - tubes that l have been stabilized by expansion after a short section of the tube within the tubesheet was re=ov ed. The tubes were than taken out of service by installing a welded plug in the tubesheet openings.

Mechanically rolled plugs.

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. ~ _,

--.i-x,-r--

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24

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• B&W has examined the effect of kinetic expansion on the first three procedures and has come to the conclusion that the expansion will not affect their mechanical integrity or leak tightness.

Tests of the kinetic expansion in steam generator model test blocks l

with conditions simulating those noted in the THI-l steam generators show that the kinetic expansion does not produce any signi f icant 3

permanent.tubesheet ligament deformation.

This leads'to the conclusion that plugged tubes adjacent to kinetic expansion will not be altered by changes in the tubesheet ligament, since no significant permanent change is noted.

During additional tests on an actual OTSG S&W examined, by dye penetrant tests, the tube-to-tubesheet welds and tubes'heet ligaments of the kinetically expanded tubes and the tube-to tubesheet welds adjacent to expanded tubes and have not seen any degradation.

Thirdly, the extensive laboratory and field experience of B&W with explosive plugging in operating steam generators indicates that damage to plugged tubes due to detonation in adjacent tubes does not occur.

Tests were performed on qualification blocks with rolled plugs in placa and explosive expansions of all adjacent tube locations.

Leak rate and axial load tes ts were done to verify that the rolled plugs continued to meet the acceptance criteria to which they were originally qualified for use.

Results of testing are not yet avallable.

l i

It is also noted that a pre-operational pos t-kinetic expansion pressuru test of each generator vill be made to verify the integrity of the primary to secondary pressure boundary thus providing added assurance that the plugged tubes with through-wall cracking remain sealed.

6.5 Effects en Reactor Coolant System The repair process will have no effect on the remainder of the reactor coolant sy s t em.

he repair is being performed with the unit in cold s h u t d o wn, with the. steam generators not required for decay heat remov al.

He steam generators vill be isolated frem the remainder of the reaccer coolant systems by temporary plugs, which vill prevent any contact with explosive debris, etc. prior to return of the generator to a clean condition.

7.0 ENVIRONMENTA1. IMPACT and ALARA 7.1 Man-Rem Estimates The projected man-Een exposures for the repair of the Once Through Steam Generators (OTSC) are estimated to be 308 man-rem.

Indivicual {

activities for the repair phase are presented ir. Table 1 along with exposures.

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25 Table 1 Man-Rem Exposures for OTSC Repairs Crevice drying 20 Manual tube marking (to identify longer expansion or misfires) 10 Precoat tubes 20

]

In generator testing 10 Process Expansion

. Insert installation 70 Insert removal 120

[

Debris removal 5

Tube /Tubesheet/ Dome cleaning (assumes remote tooling) 51 (manual estimate - 110) ~

Closeout Inspection 2

Total 308 l

The above esticates are based on time and motion studies done in an actual OTSG at 56W's Mt. Vernon test facility.

The radiation fields below have been measured at TMI-1.

Credit. was taken in making e s timates for local shielding to reduce exposure rates by about 25%.

Table 2 Radia. tion Fields at IMI-1 Location Exposure Rate Upper and Iower heads 1.3 R/hr Manway 0.13 R/hr Tent 0.01 R/hr Low Zone 0.001 R/hr The e s tima t ed total exposure for the repair itself, from crevice drying through cleanup, is calculated to be 308 man-rem (367 man-res if remote cleaning is not possible).

7.2 ALARA e

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=

.,_______x.__-.--_n__

m.--.a

Repair work in the generators will be done in accordance with ALARA guidelines a nd a11 required radiation protection practices.

Tne techniques and procedures to be used were developed to minimize exposures in the generator.

Extensive training of repair personnel will be done in OTSC mock-ups to maximize efficiency during the repair operation.

Where possible remotely operated equipment and video systems have been, and will continue to be used to minimize time spent in radiation fields.

Personnel working in the OTSG upper head will wear respiratory equipment.

Airborne activity will be limited to that area by use of a ventilation system drawing air from the upper head through HEPA filters, and exhausting it in the containment.

All expansions will be done with the OTSC manway covered.

Te s t in g has been done on n full

(

scale OTSC to verify that the ventilation system will be able to I

accomodate the pressure pulse from the explosion. Further testing has shown that gases from the explosive process are dissipated within 2-3 minutes, allowing the manway to be reopened with no ef f ec ts on the containment environment.

7.3 Environmental Considerations 7.3.1 Liquid Weste The only liquid releases to the environment from the repair phase were assumed to be the discharge of the current A and 3 OTSG liquid inventories to the Susquehanna River via the turbine building sump and

.,[

Industrial Waste Treatment Facility (IWTS).

Discharge of the A and 3 steam generators and associated steam lines occurred on May 13 and May 17, 1982, respectively.

Each release involve 17,000 gallons of water discharged through the turbine building sump of the Industrial Vaste Treatment System (IWTS), then to the discharge line leading. to the Susquehanna River.

"he waste stream was mixed with 30,000 GPM of Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) blowdown.

The isotopic breakdown of the O'TSG were as follows:

"A" Steam Generator Cs-134 - 1.5E-6 uCi/cc CS-137 - 3.5E-6,uci/ec "B"

Steam Generator Cs-134 - 7.5E-7 uCi/cc Cs-137 - 6.0E-6 uCi/cc Dilution from the MDCT was 3.0E4 GPM with a Susquehanna River ficw of 2.0E7 GPM.

Calculated maximum hypothetiaal exposures due to these effluents are presented in Tables 3 and 4.

es em enemm e

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27 TABLE 3 Maximum Hypothetical Individual Doses Due to A CISC Liquid Effluents Whole Body Organ (arem)

(arem)

Adult 3.8E-5 5.4E-5 (liver)

Teen 2.2E-5 5.5E-5 (liver)

Child 8.3E-6 4.9E-5 (liver)

Infant 1.4E-12 1.7E-9 (liver)

TABLE 4 Maximum Hypothetical Individual Doses Due to B OTSG Liquid Effluents Whole Body Organ (area)

(arem)

Adult 4.6E-5 6.8E-5 (liver)

Teen 2.6I-5 7.1E-5 (liver)

Child 9.9E-6 6.3E-5 (liver)

Infant 1.6 E-12 2.2E-9 (liver)

The NRC limits are 3 mrem whole body and 10 mrem to any orgae.

The total dose contribution to the whole body of the maximum hypothetical individual (adult) was 0.003% of the limit.

T. S.

limits require processing cf liquid vaste streams vben projected =onthly doses due to radioactive liquids exceed.06 mrem whole body.

This dose represents

.15% of that monthly guideline, and ves a smal' contribution compared to those from the radvaste systems.

The eat product of Immunol usage will 'be approxi=ately 3500 gallons of mildly radioactive liquid consisting of Immunol, wa ter, d us t ing byproducc from the tube expansion process, and minute levels of radioactive contamination.

This liquid will be collected and solidified in cement by the existing TMI-1 solidification system.

Methods are being reviewed to determine if~ more efficient means exist for processing this waste.

7.3.2 Caseous waste No offsite releases of gaseous products are anticipated due to the repair process.

7.3.3 Solid waste Solid waste to be produced includes used expansion inserts,fcit i

O v

y

25~

cleaning plugs, and clothing.

No solid waste of a high level of g

contamination is an ticipa ted.

The volumes and levels of solid waste are compatible with the environmental impact statement.

7.4 Safe Handling of Explosive On-Site 7.4.1 Description of Explosive Insert Assembly The tube expansion device consists of a two part assembly.

The energy source is supplied by primacord which is imbedded in the polyethylene insert.

Each insert is detonated by means of a booster /T1.X cord assembly.

The TLX cord is a low energy ordnance transfer cord which contains the explosive HMX.

This low energy transfer cord is 25 f eet in leng th a nd is capable of transferring sufficier.t energy to ignite the booster which in turn contains sufficient energy to detonate the primacord.

During the repair process it is anticipated that a multiple number of inserts will be detonated at one time.

To initiate

[

this detonation, the T1.X cords are connected into a manifold and set off by means of a blasting cap outside of the te=c which connec ts to the steam generator manway.

7.4.2 Safety of Individual Components There are four sources of explosives which are involved in this process:

the PETN (Pentaerythritoltetranitrate) in the insert; the DDNP (Diazodinitrophenol) in the booster; the HMX (Her Maj esty's Explosive) in the loy energy ordnance transfer cord; and the blasting cap.

Each type of explosive has had a long histon of reliable use in the industry.

The PETN, DONP and HMX are very stable explosives and are assembled in such a way that no sympathetic detonation is possible.

' Ibis permits the assembled inserts to be shipped as Class C devices.

The blasting caps used, to detonate the inserts are separated from the repair device until needed for use.

7.4.3 Utilization of Explosives on-Site The procedures to be followed when receiving, storing, transporting, and detonating the inserts for the IMI-1 steam generator repair will comply with Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Title 25 Rules and l

Regulations; Part 1 Depart =ent of Environmental Resources; Subpart D.

Environmental Health and Safety; Article IV. Oc cu p a t io na l Health and Safety; Chapter 210, Use of Explosives ; and Cha p te r 211, Storage, Handling, and Use of Explosives; as implemented and modified by the formal Blast Plan approved by The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

(Re f.13).

7.4.3.1 Personnel Pennsylvania law requires that:

(a)

No person shall detonate explosives in blasting operations unless ne has given satisfactory evidence to his employer that he has had practical experience in the handling and use of explosives under conditions existing at the site of the proposed

'O

g blasting operations, is qualified to parform the duties of Blaster at said site and has a Blas te r 's License.

A licensed blaster shall be in charge of, and responsible for the preparation of, and the firing of, any blast.

The blast shall be fired only by the licensed blaster in charge. When more than one licensed blaster is engaged in the preparation for blast, the operations management shall designate the licensed blaster in charge.

The licensed blaster in charge may authorize a laborer or other person not qualified to perf orm general blasting operations, to load and unload explosives, prepare explosives for use in blasting, transport explosives at or near a job site, charge explosives into drill holes, tamp or to otherwise prepare explosives for detonation, and set fuses and detonating wires.

However, all of the above duties shall be performed only under the direct supervision and direction and in the presence of said licensed blaster in charge who shall be responsible for the conduct of the persons acting under his direction.

(b)

No person shall be petuitted to detonate explosives unless another person is present within calling dis tauce and able and ready to render assistance in the event of accident or injury.

(c)

An employer may designate a reasonable number of his employees who are at least eighteen years of age as " Blaster Learners". However, not more than six such learners shall be assigned to one licensed blaster. The learners shall work under the direct supervision and direction and in the pre senc e of said licensed blaster who shall be experienced in the use and handling of explosives at the job site.

Foster Wheeler and/or B&W personnel trained as licensed blasters direct all explosive handling and will perform all detonations in accordance with the above regulations as modified by the Blast Plan.

l 7.4.3.2 Receiving A received explosive will be icgged in by the person or persons designated and it shall be his responsibility to verify the quantity r

and condition o.f the materials received.

An u p-t o-date running

}

inventory will be' maintained at all times. The keys to the storage magazines will be held by this person and/or site security personnel only.

7.4.3.3 Storage 7.4.3.3.1 License I

Every person storing or in possessien of explosives shall be required to have a license for each nagazine used for the storage of such explosives.

License shall be issued by the Department upon receipt of information showing cocpliance with the provisions of these regulations.

Licenses shall be kept posted conspicuously in or about the j

30 magazine for which issued.

Licenses shall expire annually on the thirty-first. day of December and shall be renewed upon* payment of the required fee.

7.4.3.3.2 Magazines Pennsylvania State approved magazines will be required.

These magazines are used for limited quantity storage of explosives not to exceed 200 lbs. of explosives or 5,000 blasting caps.

(200 lbs, of explosives is approximately equal to 40,000 charges of the size used at TMI.)

Magazines will be located outside the containment as discussed below.

Storage within the containment structure will be on an as-needed basis with inserts supplied from the storage magazines by laborers.

Each blaster will bring with him at the start of each shift the number of detonators required for that shift.

A lockable day box vill be used in the containment building for these detonators.

7.4.3.3.3 Location of Magazines No explosives shall be kept or stored within the Commonwealth unless the following rules and regulations are ce= plied with, nor shall any explosives be stored in this Commonwealth other than in magazines of approved type as hereaf ter provided.

Magazines in which more than fif ty (50) pounds of explosives are I

kept and stored, must be detached from other structures. M.agazines where more than five thousand (5,000) pounds of explosives are kept or stored must be located at least two hundred (200) feet from any other magazines. Magazines where quantities of explosives over twenty-five thousand (25,000) pounds are kept and stored, must have an increase over two hundred (200) feet, of two and two thirds

)

(2-2/3) feet for each,1000 pounds of explosives in excess of twenty-five thousand (25,000) pounds stored. Provided, that the sai6 :

distances between magazines may be disregarded where the toca quantitystoredinsaidmagazines,consideredasawhole, comp %es with the quantity and distance tables as given in Paragraph 3.

In all cases, the quantity of exposives contained in cap magazines shall govern in regard to spacing said cap magazines from the magazines containing other explosives, but under no circumstances shall a magazine containing blasting caps be within a distance less than one hundred (100 feet), not barricaded, or fifty (50) feet, barricaded, from any magazine other than cap =agazine.

k'here magazines are protected by natural or efficient barricades, the distance above specified may be reduced one-half. No blast-ing caps or other detonating or fulminating caps or detonators shall be kept-or stored in any magazines in which other explosives are kept or stored.

Magazines in which explosives are kept or stored cust be located at distances from buildings, railroads and highways in cenformity with the following quantity and distance table (see Figure 4).

___m.

-N

31 Whenever the buildings, railroad or highway to be protected is ef f ec tually screened from the factory building or magazine where l

explosives are had, kept or stored either by natural features of the ground or by ef ficient artificial barricades of such height that any straight line drawn from the top of any side wall of the factory building or magazine to any part of the building to be protected vil pass through auch intervening natural or efficient artifical barricades and any straight line drawn from the top of any side wall of the factory building or magazine to any point twelve (12) feet above the center of the railroad or highway to be protected, will pass through such natural, or ef ficient artifical barricades, the applicable distance in the quantity and distance tables may be reduced one-hal f,.

No quantity in excess of three hundred thousand (300,000) pound s or in the case of blasting caps, no number in excess of twenty million (20,000,000) caps shall be stored in any factory building or magazine.

Excepting only at a f actory building or while being used, no person shall have keep or score explosives at any place within this Commonwealth unless such explosives are completely enclosed or encased in tight metallic, wooden, or fiber containers, and

~

except while being transported or used or in the custody of a common carrier awaiting shipment, or pending delivery during the time permitted by Federal Law, explosives shall be kept in a mag azine.

No person having explosives in his possession or control, shall under any circumstances permit or alloy any grains or particles to be or remain on the outside or about the containers in which such explosives are held.

All containers in which explosives are held shall be plainly marked with the name of the exposives contained' therein.

Explosives will be stored in compliance with Pennsylvania State Law as modified by the blast plan.

7.4.3.5 Explosive Insert Leading into the Tubes The ex plo sive inserts will be removed f rom their packages and assembled into the holders in groups of 17 by explosive handlers.

This work will be done under the supervision of the licensed blaster and in accordance with all applicable Pennsylvania State reg ula t ions.

The loaded holders will then be passed into cent area for assembly into the generator tubes by the workers entering the generator.

In some instances, the inserts will be handled without the use of holders.

7.4.3.6 Firing Af ter the charges are in the generator and the ordnance cord ends brought outside the tent and the manway covers replaced, all personnel will be removed from the imm edi a t e vicinity of the generator.

The licensed blaster will collect the ordnance cord.s into a single bundle.

The blaster will then check for s t r a.y electrical currents using a blasting =ulti=eter.

If all is clear

__.a__~_

- - - - ~ -

32 he will connect 'the detonator to the ordnance cord bundle ends and place the cap and cord ends into a esp surpressant box.

The bisster will then move to his firing station, check to assure all personnel are removed from the generator, sound the alarm and detonate the charges.

Af ter firing, the blaster will ascertain if there were i

misfires.

The pre s ence of mis fired cha rges does not esuse a personnel safety concern as this explosive will noc " hang fire" and self-detonate later.

It is important, however, to know the location of misfires so the af fected tubes will not be missed in the repair 7

process.

Misfired inserts will be removed by the jumpers and placed in a storage receptacle for later disposition.

7.5 Detonation Noise Hazard Noise level readings were taken during 36, 80 and 132 simultaneous deconscions in the full scale steam generator at B&W's Mt. Vernon Indiana works.

These readings were taken outside the generator at about the mid point of its vertical height and an estimated 30 feet from the vertical center line.

The upper and lower heads were in place and the lower head cold leg openings were covered with plywood.

About a 1" gap existed between the steam generator shell and the lower head.

Maximum readings of 90-95 decibels were obtained.

No significant dif ference in decibel level among the 36, 80 and 132 shots was noted.

The noise appeared. to travel down through the generator out the opening s in the bottom head and then resound upward from the pit

~

below.

It is judged on the basis of these tests that noise levels for the TMI-1 steam generator repair vill be at acceptable levels.

It is expected that an added conservatism for the actual repair process will exist due to the bottom. head being firmly attached to the shell and the cold leg piping being in place.

This should muffle the noise noted in the Mt. Vernon tests lowering the decibel level significantly.

9 4

O l

m

33 s

.. o 8.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE AND QUALITY CONTROL All activities throughout the repair qualification and the repair itself have been and will continue to be in accordance with the TMI-1 Quality Assurance Plan.

Materials for use in the repair and in the repair qualification were or will be prepared in accordance with approved procedures by qualified personnel.

QA/QC monitoring has been and will be maintained throughout.

Actual repairs will likewise be made according to procedure, by qualified personnel, with controlling procedures in place to verify that all tubes to be ' expanded were expanded, and that any misfires or special longer expansions are adequately identified for follow up activities.

i

9.0 CONCLUSION

S The following conclusions have been drawn frem the safety evaluation presented.

9.1 The kinetic joint meets or exceeds the design bases of the original joint based on a qulification program including:

9.1.1 Load carrying capabilities 9.1.2 Leak tightness 9.1.3 Tube preload 9.1.4 Minimization of residual stresses 9.2 The ef fects of the' repair are not adverse when evaluated with regard to:

9.2.1 Introduction of chemical residue.

9.2.2 Reactivation of cracking due to drying.

9.2.3 Effect on OTSG Structure 9.2.4 Effect on previously expanded tubes 9.2.5 Effect on previously plugged tubes.

9.3 The environmental impact has been found satit *actory with respect to:

9.3.1 Effluent impacts 9.3.2 Man-rem exposure 9.3.3 Explosive hazard j

- - ~

s-9.3.4 Noise Based on the above conclusions, it can be stated that the repair process does not increase the probability or consequences of an I

accident taking place, or create the possibility of an unanalyzed accident.

Since the repair will be performed with the unit in cold shutdown and the steam generators not required for heat removal, no technical specification change is necessary to perform the repair work.

Further,it can be concluded that the performance of the repair does not adversely af fect the remainder of the plant and that the environnental impact is minimal.

10.0 REFERENCES

1.

TMI-1 OTSG Failure Analysia Baport - July 1982 GPUN TDR-341 2.

Progress Report on Prequalification Charge Sizing for TMI-1 Steam Generator Tube Expansions, June 23, 1982, Foster Wheeler Development Corporation #9-69-5049.

3.

TMI-1 Prequalification Charge Sizing Status Report on 19/14-6" Expansion, Foster Wheeler Development Corp. 7/8/82.

GPUN ' ocument No. SP 1101-22-006, "TMI-1 OTSG Repair" Revision 2, 4.

D 6/11/82.

5.

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III 1965 Edition-Sumner of 1967 Addenda.

6.

S p e ci fic a t ion for Steam Generator, Contract No. 620-0005 for Metropolitan Edison Company, Thre,e Mile Island (TMI-1), CS 3-33 /N SS 5, April 1971.

7.

Regulatory Guide 8.8,. Rev 3, June 1978.

8.

TMI-1 Final Safety Analysis Report Docket No. 50-189 oper. License No. DPR-50.

9.

Title 10 Code of Federal Regulation Part 50 Appendix A, " General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants".

10.

Determination of Mininum Required Tube Wall Thickness for 17"'FA Once Through Steam Generators, BAW 10146, October 1980.

11.

Title 10 Code of Federal Regulation Part 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation.

12.

B&W 04-3873-00 Field Change Authorization for Kinetic Tube Expansion.

13.

TMI-1 Kinetic Blast Plan Expansion.

e..

___--_m___._-.-_.____-.m._m

FIGURE 4 7

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L Chart I.

QUANTITY'AND DISTANCE TABLE FOR UNBARRICADED MACAZINES Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Quantity that may be kept or stored from nearest building, highways or railrosd Distance Distsnee Distance from from from Blasting and electric nearest nearest nearest blasting caps Other explosives buliding rsilway highway Number Nurnber not Pounds Pounds not (fect)

(feet)

(feet) over over over over 1.000 5.000 30 20 10 5.000 10.000 60 40 20 10.000 20.000 120 70 35 20.000 25.000 50 145 90 45 25.000 50.000 50 100 240 140 70 50.000 100.000 100 200 360 220 1IO 100.000 150.000 200 300 520 310 150 150.000 200.000 300 4 00 640 380 190 200.000 250.000 400 500 720 430 220 250.000 300.000 500 600 800 480 240 300.000 350.000 600 700 860 320 260 350.000 400.000 700 800 920 350 280 400.000 450.000 -

800 900 980 590 300 450.000 500.000 900 1.000 1.000 510 310 500.000 750.000 1.000 IJ00 1.060 640 320 750.000 1.000.000 1.500 2.000 1.200 720 360 1.000.000 IJ00.000 2.000 3.000 1.300 780 390 IJ00.000 2,000.000 3.000 4.000 1.420 850 420 2.000.000 2.500.000 4.000 5,000 1.500 900 450 2J00.000 3.000.000 5.000 6.000 1.560 910 470 3.000.000 3.500'000 6.000 7.000 1.610 970 490 3J00.000 4.000.000 7.000

• 8.000 1.660 1.000 500 9.000.000 4.500.000 8.000 9.000 1.700 1.020 510 4.500.000 5.000.000 9.000 10.000 1.74 0 1.040 520 5.000.000 7.500.000 30.000 L 000 1.780 1.070 330 7.500.000 10.000.000 15.000 20.000 1.950 1.170 580 lu.v00.000 12.500.000 20.000 25.000 2.llo 1.270 630 12.500.000 15.000.000 25.000 30.000 2.260 1.360 680 15.000.000 17.500.000 30.000 35.000 2.410 1.450 720 17.500.000 20.000.000 35.000 40.000 2J50 IJ30 760 40.000 45.000 2.680 1.610 800 45.000 50.000 2.800 1.680 810 30.000 35.000 2.920 1.750 880 55.000 60.000 3.030 1.820 910 60.000 65.000 3.130 1.880 910 65.000 70.000 3.220 1.940 970 70.000 75.000 3.310 1.790 1.000 75.000 80.000 3J90 2.040 1.020 80.000 85.000 3.460 2.080 1.040 85.000 90.000 3.520 2.120 1.060 90.000 95.000 3.580 2.150 1.080 95.000 100.000 3.363 2.180 1.090 100.000 125.000 3.670 2.200 1.110 125.000 150.000 3.800 2.280 1.140 150.000 175.000 3.930 2.360 1.180 175.000 200.000 4.060 2.440 1.220 200.000 225.000 4.190 2.520 1.260 225.000 250.000 4.310 2.590 1.300 250.000 275.000 4.430 2.660 1.340 275,000 300.000 4.550 2.730 IJ80

~~

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GPU Nuclear Corporation ga 100 Interpace Parkway

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E Parsiccani. New Jersey 07054 201 263 6500 TELux 136 482 Writer's Direct Dial Numoer-December 10, 1982 5211-82-284 Office of Nuclaer Reactor Regulation Attn:

D. G. Eisenhut Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Coc:cission Washington, DC 20555 Dear Sir Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1)

Operating License No. DPR-50 Docket No. 50-289 TMI-l OTSGs t

Enclosed is our Safety Evaluation for the return of TMI-1 to service after repair of the steam generators. Final plans for steam generator and reactor coolant system cleanup and results of post-repair testing will be addressed later.

Present plans provide for a separate safety evaluation to be made of the effects of chemical cleaning prior to proceeding with the process.

The results of post-repair testing will be available on site.

The safety evaluation enclosed reflects internal GPU evaluation, and preliminary comments, questions and concerns raised by the independent Third Party Review (TPR) group. Further meetings with the TPR are to be held in the future.

GPUN will address any further issues identified by the TPR and will keep you informed regarding the group's concerns.

The SER covers the testing and analysis which shaped our conclusions, and the comprehensive precritical and posteritical test program pinnned to confirm them.

The proposed startup program begins with testing and hydrostatic tests, followed by a period of hot precritical operation during which the steam generators will be subjected to both routine conditions and test transients selected to place proof loads on the tubes. Following return to service of the plant, an inservice inspection program is planned for the steam generator tubes to monitor for any unanticipated defect growth or initiation.

Finally, a long term laboratory corrosien test program, leading operation by several months, is also underway to simulate the planned future operational enviroc=ent for the OTSG.

Ot.r work has brought us to the following conclusions:

1.

We have suf ficient understanding of the f ailure mechanism to assure safe operation and have taken steps to prevent its recurrence or reinitiation.

2.

Our inspection techniques have been adequate to find and characteri::e relevant damage in these steam generators and the remainder of the react _or coolant system.

iw v A4 A c '

/h 2O 2 4.~ i t

PDR ADOCK 05000289 f

P PDR

.uon is a sues.ciary of tne General Puche Unlit.es Corporaticn

i Mr. D. G. Eicsnhut-5211-82-284 3.

Our kinetic expansion repair technique is adequate to remove from service all significant defects above 8" above the lower face of the upper tube sheet. The repair creates a new tube-to-tubesheet joint balow this point which meets the licensing basis of the original joint, and removes the degraded portions of tubing from the primary system pressure bouadary.

4.

The number and distribution of tubes plugged is such that the perf ormance of the steam generator remain within the licensed basis during normal, transient, aad accident conditions.

5.

All tubing remaining in service has been examined and found to have no defects of a size which would propagate to failure due to normal operational vibration or loading, or to transient or accident loads.

6.

Neither :he performance of the kinetic expansion and plugging repairs, nor the oparation of the repaired steam generators will have a detrimental effect on the remainder of the plant or on the environment.

These items have in turn led us to conclude that when the repairs are completed the steam generator will once again be operable as part of the primary pressure boundary within the licensed basis.

Further, the repaired steam generator will not have introduced the possibility of an unanalyzed accident or increased the probability of an analyzed accident.

We are aware of your desire to examine our work in this area, and will continue to supply you with updated information as it becomes availabla.

Our future work is proceeding with targets as follows:

Early January complete kinetic expansion Mid-February complete post-repair cleanu' Late February complete tube end milling Early March complete plugging Mid-March coinplete cold testing Late March complete RCS H202 cleaning Late April complete hot, precritical testing Please note that the enclosed document contains information which is considered proprietary.

We request that it be protected from public disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790.

If you have any questions or need any further information, please contact us.

Sincerely, f.

P. R. Clark Executive Vice President PRC:MJG: dis Enclosure

\\

s Babcock &Wilcox AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES H.

TAYLOR A.

My name is James H.

Taylor.

I am Manager of Licensing in the Nuclear Power Generation Division of Babcock & Wilcox, and as such I am authorized to exe* ute, this Affidavit.

c B.

I am familiar with the criteria aDplied by BaDcock & Wilcox to de-termine whether certain informaticn of Babcock & Wilcox is proprietary and I am familiar witn the procedures estaolisned witnin Babcock & Wilcox, particularly the Nuclear Power Generation Division (NPGD), to ensure the proper application of these criteria.

C.

In determining whether a Babcock & Wilcox document is to be classi-fied as proprietary information, an initial determination is made by the unit manager who is responsible for originating the document as to whether it. falls within the criteria set forth in Paragraph D hereof.

If the information falls within any one of these criteria, it is classified as proprietary by the originating unit manager.

' This initial determination is reviewed by the cogni: ant section manager.

If the document is designated as proprietary, it is re-viewed again by Licensing personnel'and other management within NPGD as designated by the Manager of Licensing to assure that the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR Section 2.790 are met.

D.

The following information is provided to demonstrate that the pro-visions of 10 CFR Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations have been considered:

(i)

The information has been held in confidence by the Babcock &

Wilcox Company.

Copies of the document are clearly ~ identified as proprietary.

In addition, whenever Babcock & Wilcox transmits the information to a customer, customer's agent, potential customcr or regulatory agency, the transmittal re-quests the recipient to hold the information as proprietary.

Also, in order to strictly limit any potential or actual customer's use of proprietary i n f o rma ti on, the folicwing PDR ADOCK 05000289 P

PDR

Babcock &M5lcox AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES H. TAYLOR (Cont'd) provision is inclLded in all proposals submitted by Babcock

& Wilcox, and an applicable version of the proprietary provision is included in all of Babcock & Wilcox's contracts:

" purchaser may retain Company's Procosal for use in connection with any contract resulting tnerefrom, and, for that purpose, make such cocies thereof as may be necessary.

Any proprietary information concerning Company's or its Suppliers' products or manufacturing processes which is so designated by Company or its Suppliers and disclosed to Purchaser incident to the performance of such contract shall remain the property of Company or its Suppliers and is disclosed in confi-dence, and Purchaser shall not publish or otherwise disclose it to others without the written approval of Company, and no rights, implied or otherwise, are granted to produce or have produced any products or to practice or cause to be practiced any manufacturing processes covered thereby.

Notwithstanding the above, Purchaser may provide the NRC or any other regulatory agency with any such pro-prietary information as the NRC or such other agency may require; provided, however, that purchaser shall first give Company written notice of such proposed disclosure and Company shall have the right to amend such proprietary information so as to make it non-pi o-prietary.

In the event that Company cannot amend such proprietary i nf o rma ti o n, Purchaser shall, prior to disclosing such information, use its best efforts to obtain a commi traent from NRC or such other agency to have such inf:r : tion withhaid '"c-

ublic -

n.

(2)

.. : :. =:.u k = 4.:.,c.....y

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s BabcockaWilcox AFFIDAVIT 57 2427.. TAYLOR (Cont'd)

Company shall be given the right to participate in p'ursuit of such confidential treatment."

(ii) The following criteria are customarily apolied by Baccock Wilcox in a rational decision process to determine wnether ne information should be classified as proprietary.

Information may be classified as proprietary if one or more of the follouing

.c r.i.te r-i4 a.re-mm -

a.

Information reveals cost or price information, commercial strategies, production capabilities, or budget levels of Babcock & Wilcox, its customers or suppliers, b.

The information reveals data or material concerning Babcock

& Wilcox research or development plans or programs of present or potential competitive advantage to Babcock &

Wilcox.

c.

The use of the 'information by a competitar_ wou14 decrease his expenditures, in time or resources, in designing, producing or marketing a similar product.

d.

The information consists of test data or other similar data concerning a process, method or component, the application or which results in a competitive advantage to Babcock &

Wilcox.

e.

The information ' revealsspecial aspects of' a process, method ~,

component or the like, the exclusive use of which results.in a competitive advantage to Babcock & Wilcox.

f.

The information contains ideas for which patent protection may be sought.

(3)

..r..-

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P.WcN -T+d : tC.'.TLj---

=

Babcock &VAlcox AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES H.

TAYLOR (Cont'd)

The document (s). listed on Exhibit "A",

which is attached hereto l

and made a part hereof, has been evaluated in accordance with 1

(

normal Babcock & Wilcox procedures with respect to classification and has been found to contain information which falls within one or more. of the cri teria enumerated above.

Exhibi t "B",

which is attached hereto and made a part hereof, specifically i d e.n ti fi e s the criteria applicable to the document (s) listed in Exhi bi t " A".

(iii) The document (s) listed in Exhibit "A", which has been made avail-able to the Unitcd States Nuclear Regulatory Commission was made available in confidence with a request that the document (s) and the information contained therein be withheld from public disclosure.

(iv) The information is not available in the open literature and to the best of our knowledge is not known by Combustion Engineering, EXXON, General Electric, Westinghouse or other current or potential domestic or foreign competitors of B&W.

(v) Specific information with regard to whether public disclosure of the information is likely to cause harm to the competitive position of Babcock & Wilcox, taking into account the value of the information to Babcock & Wilcox; the amount of effort or money expended by Babcock & Wilcox developing the information; and the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly duplicated by others is given in Exhibit "B".

E.

I have personally reviewed the document (s) listed on Exhibit "A"

and have found that it i s ' considered prop'rietary by Babcock' & 'Wilc~ox because it contains information which falls within one or more of the criteria enumerated in Paragraph 0, and it is information which is customarily held in. confidence and protected as proprietary in-formation by Babcock & Wilcox.

This report comprises information utilized by Ba: cock & Wilcox in its business which afford Babcock

'..'1 1 :0- :n - :ortunity 'to obtain a competitive advantage over (4)

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..-~.--~~:::------------~.------

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o Babcock &Wilcox those'who may wish to know or use the information contained in the document (s).

7 T

4

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,Q $.

/

e JAMES H.

TA'YLOR State of Virginia)

)

55.

Lynch o u rg City of Lynchburg)

James H. Taylor, being duly sworn, on his oath deposes and says that he is the person who subscribec his name to the foregoing state-ment, and that the matters and facts set forth in the statement are true.

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w /tX&* W #89 W

~

JAMES H.

TAYLOR

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Subscribed and sworn before me this

._S day o d ome/.,)982.

m}n.-

V A&

Notary Public in tid for the City

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of Lynenburg, State of Virginia My Commission Expires O I M 6 4_3./ M 3 (5) e

,b y ;-

Babcock'&Wilcox Exhibit A

" Assessment of TMI-l Plant Safety for P.eturn to Service After Steam Generator Repair", GPUN Topical Repcrt 008, Rev. O, Nov. 30, 1982.

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Babcock &Wilcox Exhibit B Descriotion of Material Aeolicable Criteria

" Assessment of TMI-l Plant B, C, D & E Safety for Return to Service

~

After Steam Generator Repair" GPUN Topical Report No. 008, Re,v. O, November 30, 1982 Portions as noted below Fig. 1-4 Page 23, 24 Section III-D and page 25 paragraph lined in margin Page 32 Section V A2 Page 33, 34 & 35 Section V B Page 35 Section V C la Page 36

" " lb Page 37 & 38 Section V C Ic Page 39 Section V C ld, e Page 39-40 Section V C 2 Page 40 Section V C 2b Page 43 Section VI A Page 44, 45 & 46 Section VI c I

--