ML20083L765
| ML20083L765 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/20/1982 |
| From: | GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20079G498 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-83-243, FOIA-83-A-18 NUDOCS 8208310181 | |
| Download: ML20083L765 (36) | |
Text
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' 9W.LWilecx EXHIBIT A TMI-1 Once Through Steam Generator Repair Safety Inalysis e
XA Copy Has Been Sent to PDR o!!!!g, y.-.--
Babcock &Wik: cot EXHIBIT B Descrietien e' MateMal Ace 11 cable Criteria TMI-l Once Through ' Steam Generator Safety b, i:, d&e Analysis Section 3.1.4 Tube Preload Secticn 4.0 Comoarisen of Kinetic Joint with Design Basis
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Section 5.1.1 Repair Process Se: tion 5.2.1.1 Preliminary Leak and Axial Lead Tests Paragrachs in:
Results Pullout Loacs Section 5.2.3 Induced Strain Tests Paragraohs in:
Preliminary Results anc Final Ac:ectance Criteria Se:: ion 5.2.4 Ligamen: Distortion
.Section 5.3.3 Crack Change and Resicue Cleaning Tests Paragraphs in:
Test Description Results Figure 1 Effect of After Hits en 20/10-6" Ex:ansion Pulleut Un:orroced Block & Tubes Figure 2 Effect of After Hits on 20/11.-6" Expansion ?ullout Correced Block & Tubes Figure 3 Effect of Tube Yield en Pullout Lead 20/14-6' Expansien G
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1 Dil-1 ONCE THROUGH STEAM GENERATOR REPAIR SATETY ANALYSIS I
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l ATTACEMENT TO 5211-82-200 DATED AUGUST 20, 1982 l
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1 ABSTRACT Analysis and testing of the OTSG repair program proposed for TMI-1 has been conducted. Comparison of the kinetic j oint with the design basis, the expansion qualification program, the effects of the repair on the OTSC, and the environmental impact were examined.
It was concluded that the successful completion cf the qualification program vill demonstrate that the repaired joint meets all design bases of the original joint.
Rasults of this program vill be recessary to support a later evaluation of return' of the plant to service.
With respect to the current evaluation, it was concluded that the repair process itself neither increases the probability or consequences of an accident nor creates the possibility of an unanalyzed accident.
No Technical Specification changes are er uired to repair the plant in the current shutdown condition.
Perf ormance of repair activities will not adversely affect the re'mainder of the plant, and vill have minimal environmental impact.
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TAB 12 0F CONTENTS TOPIC PAGE
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1 2.0 EEPAIR PROGRAM OVERVIEW 2
3.0 OTSG DESIGN BASIS 3
4.0 COMPARISON OF KINETIC JOINT WITH DESIGN BASIS 7
5.0 REPAIR QUALITICATION PROGRAM 11 6.0 ETTECTS OF REPAIR 21 6.1 Chemical Impurities 21 6.2 OTSC Structure 22 6.3 Adjacent Previously Expanded Tubes 22 6.4 Adjacent Previously Plugged Tubes 22 6.5 Reactor Coolant System 23 7.0 ENVIRONMENTM. IMPACT AND ALARA 23 7.1 Man-Rem / Estimates 23 24 7.2 ALARA 7.3 Environmental Considerations 25 7.4 Safe landling of Explosives On-Site 26 7.5 Detonation Noise Hazard 31 32 8.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE AND QUALITY CONTROL 3:
9.0 CONCLUSION
S 33 10.
EETERENCES FIGURES Tigure 1 Effect of After Hits - Uncorroded 31ock (PROPRIETARY)
Pigure 2 Effect of After Hits-Corroded Stock (PROPRIETARY)
Figure 3 Effect of Tube Yield on Pullout Load (PROPRIETARY)
Tigure 4 Quantity and Distsace Table for Unbarricaded Magazines.
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l 1.0 inn 0 DUCTION l.1 Purpose The purpose of this report is to set forth the analysis of safety considerations in the proposed TMI-1 OTSC tube repair process, including a verification that the kinetic repair meets original design base s, and that neither repair or repair activities vill have an adverse effect on the remainder of the plant.
Other safety considerations involved in returning TMI-1 to operation with the repaired OTSG's will be covered in a supplemental report.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 A large number of DiI-1 OTSC cubes in each of the two OTSC's have been found to have through-wall circumferential cracks within the upper 16 inches of the upper tubesheeet.
Relatively fewer tubes have similar cracks below this level. Le details of the failure analysis are contained in referenne 1.
1.2.2 A repair program has been proposed in ubich tubes with cracks in the upper 16 inches of the upper tubesheet vill be explosively expanded, sealing off the cracks and tubes with cracks below that level vill be plugg ed.
An overview of the explosive repair process is provided in section 2.0 of this re port.
The plugging repai.r process is one which has been used before on this and other plants and thus that process itself requires no further saf aty analysis.
Le effect of plugging on plant safety la included in the later report.
1.3 Sunusary of Principal Results 1.3.1 The kinetic joint produced by the explosive expansion meets or exceeds the design basis properties of the original tube to tubesheet joint.
1.3.2 The explosive expansion process is to be qualified with regard to:
1.3.2.1 The contaminant concentrating ef fect of crevice dryout priot to expansion.
1.3.2.2 Chemical residue produced.
- 1. 3.2.3 Leak tightness.
1.3.2.4 Lead carrying ability of the kinetic joint.
1.3.2.5 Residual stress lift in repaired joint.
1.3.3 The effects of the repair on the OTSC are to be tested with regard to:
1.3.3.1 Introduction of chemical impurities.,.
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1.3.3.2 Effect on the OrSC structure.
1.3.3.3 Effect on adjacent previously expanded tubes.
1.3.3.4 Effect on adjacent previously plugged tubes.
1.3.4' The environmental impact of the repair has been found to be satisfactory with regard to the following areas :
1.3.4.1 Effluent Impacts 1.3.4.2 Man-Rem exposure 1.3.4.3 Explosive hazard 1.3.4.4 Noise 1.4 Conclusion It was concluded that the repaired joint meets sti design bases of the original joint and that neither the repair process nor the jcine itself increases the probability or consequences of an accident or creates the probability of an unanalyzed accident.
Further, it was concluded that the perforsmance of the repair does not adversely affect the remainder of the plant, and that environmental impact is minimal.
Since the repair is being performed in cold shutdown, with the steam generators not required for use in decay heat removal, no technical specification change is ne ce ssary to pe&_it work in the steam generators.
2.0 REPAIR PROGRAM OVERVIEW i
2.1 Introduction The OTSC tubes and the tube-to-tubesheet welds are portions of the primary system pressure boundary. The tubes are subjected to varying axial loads which may be transmitted through the weld to the tubesheet. 1NI-1 CTSG tube examinations have revealed a large number of tubes with defects within the upper tubesheet.
The repair approach I
is to establish in those tubes where it is possible, a new primary I
system pressure boundary below these de f ec ts.
This boundary will provide a seal against leakage between the tube and shell sides of the OTSC.
A kinetic expansion of the tube within the tubesheet will be the approach used to 'effect this repair.
This repair will provide a load carrying essentially leak-tight joint below known defects.
2.2 Kinetic Tube Expansion The process steps which are involved with this repair have the objective of providing a new pressure boundary below known defects through kinetic (explosive) expansion of the tube within the tubes he e t.
Preliminary testing indicates that a ce rtain r.inimum ;
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length is necessary between the lowest defect and the bottom of the expansion to serve as the new pressure boundary.
The specific geometry of the repair and the details of kinetic charge size and detonation process are proprietary inf ormation.
Section 5.0 of this report outlines the repair process qualification program and contains these detsils.
References 2 and 3 provide the charge sizing basis.
2.3 Steps / Sequences The 'DiI-l CTSC repair process is as follows.
Step Description 1
T1ush the secondary side tube to upper tubesheet crevice.
2 He at crevice to drive out moisture (vsporize water).
3 Einetically expand tubes 4
Clean debris from kinetic expansion 2.4 Performance Specifications Performance Specifications formally establish the perfermance requirements of tube to tubesheet repair and outline a qualification program which will provide assurance of the technical adequacy of the repair process.
Ref erence 4 sets forth applicable performance specifications,
3.0 OTSC DgSICN BASIS l
l The tube and tubesheet form a portion of the primary system pressure boundary.
De original joint consisted of a shop roll expansion and a tube to tubesheet veld. The shop roll was intended to hold the tube in j
tension until it could be welded. he weld was the primary pres ssure boundary and structural attachment although the roll expansion shared some of the load. We joint was designed for a maximum primary pressure of 2500 psia and a maximisi secondary pressure of 1050 psia.
The design temperature was 650*T for the primary side and 600*T for the secondary, The tube and tubesheet meet the primary system pressure boundary t
l requirements, of the ASME Boiler and Pressure vessel Code Section III, 1965 Edition, Summer of 1967 Addenda.
3.1 Lead Summary l
3.1.1 Normal Operation Tube Loads The loads on the steam generator tubes are a result of primary and i
l secondary system pressure and temperature e f fects.
Because of the dif f erent materials, Inconel for the tubes and carbon steel for the shell, overall temperature change as well as temperature diff erence between parta causes load s to be exerted on the tubes. There are only l
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a limited number of transients Wich generate significant tube loads.
The se are listed below with the tube load resulting from eacti. A positive number indicates a tensile load and a negative number ituficates a compressive load.
Transient load, lb s.
3estup from cold shutdown to 8 power
-775 Cooldown from 8 power to cold shutdown 1107 Power change 0 to 15
-525 Power change 15: to 0:
143 Power loading 8 to 100%
-419 Power unloading 100% to 8
- 100 3.1.2 Accident Condition Tube Loads There are three accident conditions Wich cause significant loads on the s team generator tubes ; large break LOCA, nain steam line break, and feedveter line break. De axial loads on the tube are:
Transient Load, lbs.
LOCA 2641 Main Steam Line Break 3140 Teodwater Line Break
-570 Because the arpansion is well within the tubesheet, lateral tube loads have no ef fect and do not need to be considered.
3.1.3 Thermal / Pressure Cycles As was discussed above for normal operating tube loads, there are only a few t r an's ie n t s of interest.
These are the ones which cause significant pressure or tempe r a tur e fluctuations.
The transients which need to be considered are:
No. cf Cycles for Plant Transients Design Life Beatup 240 Cooldown 240 Power change 0 to 15 1440 Power change 15: to 0 1440 Power loading 8 to 100:
48,000 Power unloading 100% tt-8:
48,000 Step load reductions 310 Reactor trips 400 Rapid depressurization 80 After the first fif teen minutes, the rapid depressurization transient goes into normal cooldown and the plant is eventually returned to power via normal heatup.
The tube lo ad results from the normal cooldown/ normal heatup portion of the transient cycle.
Since this cooldown/heatup is already included in the 240 cycles of \\
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. bestup/cooldown, the 80 cycles of rapid depressurization are not additive to them.
There are three types of reactor trip recovery transients, with a total of 400 design cycles.
Of the 400 design cycles, 340 are taken to be recovery from 540*7, 20 to be recovery from 200'7, and 40 to be recovery from 7 0 ' F.
Only the latter two represent significant temperature ranges. These two modes represent a total of 60 cycles.
Since the temperature ranges f or these reactor trips are similar to and bounded by the range for the cocidown transient, these 60 cycles c an be addad to the heacup armi cooldown transient :yeles.
In a lika manner, step load reduction cycles can be added to the power unloading cycles since the temperatdre ranst f or power ' unloading transient bound s that of the step load reduction transient. This results in the following table o' design cycles to be used f or anal sis.
Desitu Transient 1.ife Cycles Beacup 300 Cooldown 300 Power chanae 0: to 15:
1400 Power changs 15 to 0:.
1400 Power loading 8% to J00:
48,310 Power unloading 100 to 8:
48,310 3.1.4 Tube Meload (PROPRIZTARY)
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3.2
_Easidual Stresses The residual stresses in the as-built OTSC are those of appreciable depth within the tube wall, and are caused by roller straightening of the tubes, veld shrinkage, rolling of the tube within the tubesheet, and by preloading of the tube.
All of these residual stresses are
.affected by stress relief due to heat treatment during manufacture of the CTSG.
The residual stresses are essentially the same at the bottom and top tubasheets since the weight of the installed tube is negligible.
During f abrication, it was not felt necessary to measure residual stresses af ter welding to meet CTSG design requirements, so such me asureme n ts we re neither required nor performed.
Best estimate values for the 2MI-1 cubes at ambient tamperature are given below.
TUR RESIDUAL TENSI1Z STRESSES (1)
PSI AT FOUR T.DCATIONS OF Ih*TEREST Location Axial Circumferential Weld BAZ 22,000
-22,000 Roll
-10,000
-22,000 Roll Traasition 26,000(2) 22,000 l
Tube (between tubesheets)
O to 26,000(2)(3) 0 to 22,000 (3)
I (1) The stresses in this table are membrane plus bending at the l
inner surf ace f or the case where the rolled joint is tightly constrained by the tubesheet.
If the rolled tube were loose in the tubesheet then we estimate that circumferential stress in the loose roll area would approch zero and axial stres s in the loose l
roll area would approach about 4000 psi.
Arial stress in the veld BAZ would approach 26,000 poi.
l (2)
This stress includes 4000 psi due to tube preload af ter hest l
treatment. Such preload stresses are expected to be higher for the periphery of the tube bundle than for tubes located in the center of the bundle.
I (3)
Tube stresses between tubesheets are primarily due to the tube straightening manuf acturing process and may vary considerably denending on the location within the tube.
As noted above, the highest residual stresses are in the area of the tube-to-tubesheet j oint, and are higher in the peripheral tubes than in the center of the tube bundle because of the elastic flexibility of the tubesheet.
l 3.3 Beat Transfer Recuirements I !
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The performance of the. steam generator is ' predicted without bene fit of assuming any best transf er from the tubesbeet to the secondary sida.
3.4 Pressure Boundarv Leakage The de sign basis f or s t eam. gene rator tube leakage is to provide gameratort with no detectable leaks at shipment and to control leakage to &n acceptable operating level by aceitoring and repair over the 40 year lifs of the plant. Manuf acturing and operating requirements have been established to assure. acceptable leakage.
The steam generators were shop tested for tube leakage prior to
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s hipme nt to an NSS site. An initial test using helium at 100 psi is made prior to the installations of the steam gscerator hsada.
The helium test was followed by a full ASME code hydrostatic test with the heads installed.
The hydrotes t was done sepatately on the primary (tube) side. and the' secondary (shell) side. The relevant acceptance criteria for both tests was st.ro (no' detectable) leakage.
It is expected during cornal and transient operatioc over 40 year plant life th at some detectable leakage will occur.
Initial leakage is predicted to be very small increasing gradually.
Initial detection is usually by radiation monitoring of the condense r air jet ejection vents.
Leakage can be ce;nfirmed by chemical analysis of the f e edvs t er for boric acid or radioactive iod ine.
Operation of the plant is expected to continue af ter a leak has been detected until a convenient time is reached to shutdown for repair or until a plant technical specification limit is reached arif repair is required.
The design basis for steam generator tube leakage is to provide generators wi th no detectable leaks at shipment but with some expectation of laakage developing over 40 year plant life.
The design is, therefore, c o ns idered to meet the ~ intent of General Design Criterion 14, from 10CT150, Appendix A, i.e.,
"to have an sxtreinely low probability of abnormal leakage, of rapidly propagating f ailure and of groa s ' rupture".
Should un f oreseen factors increase that probability, Technical Specification limits have been set to require plant shutdown and ta pair.
For TMI-1 the Technical Specification limits that. apply directly or indirectly are:
Section 3.1.6 Leakage Section 3.13 Secondary System Activity Section 4.19 OTSC Tube Inservice Inspec tion 4.0 COMPARISON OT KINTTIC JOINT WITE DESIGN 1ASES (PROPRIETARY) l s
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5.0 REPAIX QUA1.IFICATION 5.1 Details of the Repair Process and Oualification Program 5.1.1 Repair Process (PROFE!ITART) 5.1.2 Qualification Program The repair qualification program is described in subsequent sections.
Except whe re noted, all testing has been done on in-stock tubes and tubesheet mockups.
For the manuf ac ture of mockups to be used in qualification testics, three sets of parameters were intended to duplicate or bracket actual s team generat or conditions.
The paramet e rs are material properties,
surface conditioc and geometry.
5.1.2.1 Material Properties TMI-1 tubesheets are SA-508-CI.2 nuclear grade forging s and have.2%
offset yield values from 65.5 KSI to 73.0 KSI. Material used f or the tubesh e e t portion of sockups which is being used for the various qualification tests, is all SA-508-CL2 nuclear grade f orgings and has
.2% offset yield values ranging from 6l. 7 KSI to 70.0 KSI..
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TMI-1 tubes are 53-163, inconel 600 with.2% offset yield streng th values, f rom 41.0 KSI to 64.9 KSI. Testing of 'DiI-1 tubing in areas wktich are not cracked has indicated that the mechanical properties of the metal are unaf f ected by the sulfur contaminant. Measurements of yield and ultimate load s indicate that strength and ductility are compatible with those of other tubes with a similar operating history.
Due to schedule considerations, available in-stock tubing was used in the mockups.
Tubing used for the mockups is S3-16 3, Inconel 600-steam generator tubing with.2% of f se t yield serengthe of 41.5 KSI and 54.7 KSI.
All yield strength values used above are prior to stress relief heat treatment.
Tubing and tubesheet material for mockups for qualification testing have been stress relief heat treaced in a manner to simulate stress relief time at temperature seen by the "J!I-1 steam generators during fabrication.
Preliminary testing has shown that the use of low yield tubing results in the lowest pull.out loads. Therefore, low yield strength tubing (41.4 KSI) is used f or most pullout load test mockups with high yield (54.7 KSI) tubing used in some locations for a comparison to assure that low yield is indeed the worst case.
5.1.2.2 Surface condition The holes in the tubesheets of TEI-1 were gun-drilled; thus, all tubesheet mockups were gun-drilled also.
In cases where the geometry of the test mockup was felt to be more important than precise duplication of surf ace finish, the holes were honed to obtain exact dimensions. Mockups used in the measurement of leak limiting and tube load carrying capabilities have been gun-drilled only.
All sockups used f or tube pullout and leakage testing have been corrosion conditioned to simulate the 'DtI-1 tube and tubesheet oxide layer chemistry and thickness based on five years of operatien.
The thickness of oxide on the upper tubeshaet in the crevice region was not a nd could not be measured without cutting a section of material out of the tubesheet.
It was necessary, therefore to estimate the thickness of the oxide in the TMI-l tubcaheet trevice and to establish conditions that would produce a similar tnickne ss of oxide in the mock-up assembly.
Video tapes of the TMI-1 tubesheet area were viewed by 3W personnel and the surf ace appearance was judged to be typcial of that expected due to exposure in a steam environment. There were no indic a tions of abnormal oxidation.
In addition the surface of tubes pulled from TMI-1 steam generators are very similar with respect to oxid ation, to those of tubes examined in the laboratory from other commercial power plants and model boilers.
The oxide on the steel tubesheet in the upper portion of the upper tubesheet crevice in TMI-l was expected to be mostly magnetite with a very thin surface layer of hematite.
This is the type of oxide __
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produced by the action of steam on iron and mild steel over a broad range of temperatures, pressures, and oxygen activities.
Very similar oxide layers are produced by oxidation of iron and steel in air.
Thus, based on laboratory oxidation data, the tubesheet mockups a simulation of the exposed to air at 1000*T for 20 hrs. to produce oxide in the TMI-1 stems generators tubesheet crevica.
5.1.2.3 Geometry Tubing f or use in the sockups was obtained f r ee s tock sources and therefore the CD of tubing and wall thickness were not controllable dimensions.
The range of possible tube-to-tubesheet gaps by an accumulation of drawing tolerances is.003" -.016" diametral.
Experience with the tubing manuf acturers has shown that the tubing OD consistently is greater than the minimum and that the tubesheet holes generally tend towards the maximum dimensioti, giving an effective maximum diametral gap of.012".
Foster Wheeler experience has shown that a maximum annulus is the case condition for leak and load carry'ng ability. The 10 hole i
worst leak and load test mockups were gun-drilled to produce a diesetral annular gap of.013" for the two haats and lots o f tubing which will be used.
At that point, the maintenance of surf ace finish in the gun-drilled holes was judged to take precedence ever the necessity of producing a.016" gap rud the holes were not honed.
In all cases where pull-out loads and leak rates are measured for use in justifying the repair process, the expansion has been done so as to produce a 6" effective length for the qualification.
In one instance this is accomplished by use of a 2-part tube simulating a 360* through wall crack and in other cases the expansion itself is only 6" long.
Tes es yielding data which may be expansion length dependent such as a full thickness induced' strain tests will be mocked up using tubesheet block and full length expansions.
Again, heat treated,
certified materials with selected yield streng ths will be used for this testing.
Thus control of material properties, surf ace conditions and geometry in the steam generator test mock-ups to match. or envelope actual TMI-1 OTSG conditions provide the basis for the judgment that this model tes ting is representative of the repair expansions in every essential parameter. These geometric parameters include the effective length, duplication of transition zone and diametral configuration.
5.2 Mechanical Tests A series of tests has been used to qualify the kinetic expansion process as producing a joint capable of carrying required load s and providing an essentially leak tight s e al '.
Preliminary tests were performed to establish the parameters for the kinetic expansion.
5.2.1 Laak and Axial 1.oad Tests. ___
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5.2.1.1 Preliminary laak and Axial Load Teses objective Deters.ise the parameters required to produce a load carrying, leak tight expansion.
Test Description Kinetic expansions were testof to determine the maximum axial load condition which would cause the expansion to slip.
After a set of expansion parameters was postulated, leak rate and axial load tests were performed to determine whether the expansion would still appear adequate f or corroded tubesheet, af:ez thermal azzi pressure cycling,
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and af ter adjacent tubes have been expanded.
Acceptance Criteria Anal ys is of the test data derived to date concentrated on the following acceptance criteria:
- Water laak at 1275 psig (Prima.y to Secondary) < 3. 2 x 10-b lb[hr per tube.
- Pullout load consis tently above 31t+0 lb per tube.
- Margin in pullout loads and leak rate to account f or possible deterioration of joint integrity from thermal cycling and for statistical analyt.:.
- Minimize expansion length,
- Minimize longitudinal strain induced in the tube by the expansion o
process.
- Minimize in plane deformatice of the expanded tube block hole and adj acent holes.
Results (PROPRIETAEY)
Pullout Loads (PROPRIITART) t _.,...
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14ak Teating During preliminary testing, Toster Wheeler bubble tested all 6" qualification expansions made with the selected charges using 100 psig primary-to-secondary air pressure.
No indication of tube leakage was noted.
In addition, limited water tests perfor=ed to date on these ex pansions show that a no-leak indication by air bubble tests correlates well with satis f actory water leak tes resul ts.
l Two types of wa ter leak tests were performed on t he s e 6"
qualificatica expansion test expansions.
The first test se t-up us ed a pressure transducer and a th e rmocouple to continuously record water pre s su re anc temperature.
The water leakage rate was then I
calculated using pressure decay af ter an initial curing time.
The effects of water temperature changes on water pres sure were accounted for in the calculations.
In this test, after initial curing, the water pressure varied betweeen 1525 psig and 1473 paig
- ile the water temperature varied tatween 69.3*F and 72.4*T over a 60-hour period.
Calculationa show leakage rate to be essentially zero.
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'Ihe second setup used a pressure gage for water pressure measurement and a mercury thermoneter to read ambient temperature, reasoning that the changes in ambient temperature will correspond to changes in the water te mpe ra ture with a small time lag. After initial I
curing, the water pre s sure varied between 2010 psig and 1790 psig while the ambient camperature varied between 70.5*T and 79'T over 70 hours8.101852e-4 days <br />0.0194 hours <br />1.157407e-4 weeks <br />2.6635e-5 months <br />.
Leak r a te calculations show the upper bound leakage to be approximately 0.8 x 10 -6 lb/hr/ tube.
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5.2.1.2 Leak and Axial Imed Qualification Tests obj ective Predict the leak tightness and confirm the ax ial load carrying capability of the chosen expansion technique, determine an effective method of relating post re pair / in-gene ra t or leak te s ts with the results of laboratory leak tests, shew what effect kinetic expansion will have on adj acent repaired tubes' and determine the ef fect of re-expanding previously expanded tubes.
Test Description
[
Eight ten tube acekups were expanded by the chosen techniques and then tested.
5 Tubes were inserted into 12" high tube blocks from the top and bottom i
meeting two inches below the top of the block.
The point wh e re the two tubes meet, therefore, represents a 360* through wall crack. The two tube assemblies were then explosively expande to a depth of 8" d
from the top providing 6" of seal below the simulaen crack.
All blocks were thermally cycled as follows :
38 cycles 70*T to 610 *T to 70 *T 1 cycle 610 *T to 400 *T in tan mine.
One block was then exposed to a series of load cycles.
he se vs 100 cycles 780 lbs. compression to 1110 lbs. tension
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180 cycles 635 lbs. compression to 175 lbs, tension 6000 cycles 510 lbs. compression to 125 lbs. compression Cycles selected correspons to the 5 years qualificatioc period.
Most leak tes ts were performed using demineralized water at 70*T pressurized on the primary side at 1275 psi differential pressure.
one block of ten expanded tubes was tested at 70*F with 275 psi pre s su re on the secondary side.
Another test was made using 2500 psi l.
at 70*F on the crimary side. Finally, one leak te s t was done at 1275
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psi and 70 *T on the primary side on a block with tubes tc.: had been i i affected by expanding one an additional time, simulating a reexpansion I
due to a mis fire.
In addition to the water leak tests, one bubble cert was done at 70*T using 125 psi Nitrogen pressure on the secondary side.
Following cycling and leak testing described above, all tubes were examin ed to determine pullout loads.
Tubes in one additional block l
were pulled without any conditioning to provide baseline data I
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Results of these tes ts will be provided later.
Acceptance criteria require that a statistical evaluation of the results show a 992 confidence level that 992 of all tubes expanded will have a pullout load of 3140 lbs and the mean leakage rate will be less than 3.2 x 10-6._
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- 5. 2.2' Minimizing Residual Stress 5.2.2.1 Preliminary Residual Stress Limitations Object To determine' the expansion parsneters which would lead to a smooth transition area, thus minimizing residual stresses.
Test Description A number of insert shapes were evaluated to detemine which provided a snooth transition of 1/8" - 1/4".
Results A 30' chamfer en the cube end was found to provide a satisfsetory trans ition.
5.2.2.2 Residual stress Ivaluation 5.2.2.2.1 Corrosien Testing of Transitions.
Obj ect To perf orm accalerated stress corrosion cracking tests on expanded tube /tubesheet mockups.
The mockups were te s t ed in 102 sodium hydroxide (NaOH) at cons tant potential and destructively examined for stress corrosion cracking (SCC) due to residual stresses from the repair expansico process.
From previous testing of stressed Alloy 600 performed at B&W's A11i4nce Researach Center (ARC), five days of exposure at constant potential in 102 NaOH is equivalent to approximately 8.5 years of testing in PWR secondary side water at 650*F. Three tube / tubesheet mockup specimens were tested.
Test Materials 1.
Alloy 600 cube kinetically expanded in an Alloy 600 mockup tubesheet.
2.
Alloy 600 tube kinetically expanded plus a hard roll in the kinetically expanded region.
3.
Alloy 600 cube kinetically expanded plus a hard roll overlapping the expended transition area.
Test Environment 1.
102 MaOE at 550*F vich a constant potential of +190 My vs. Nickel (Ni) applied to the specimen.
Test Method -
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1.
Prepared and cleaned the tube / tubesheet mockup specimens.
2.
Expos ed the specimens in an Alloy 600 lined two gallon static autoclave for up to 500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br />.
3.
Removed and inspected the specimens for indications of SCO.
Results The results of this test are not available at this time.
Since this is a comparison test there are no acceptance criteris.
If the comparison shows the expanded j oint to be inferior to a standard joint, further evaluation will be required.
3.2.2.2.2.
Residual Stress Measurements Objective To measure the actual residual stress in 8 samples to deter =ine post-kinetic expansion tube stresses in the transition ares at the bottom of the expansion and at a second point near the middle of the expansion.
Test Method and Criterion Eight samples were examined using x-ray diffraction to determine residual tube stress in the test ex pans ion. 3oth hard rolled and kinetically ecpanded tubes were examined, using both high and low yield strength materials.
Results The results of this test are not yet available. The goal for this test will be that the e.sidual stress in the tube shall not exceed 45% of yield strength.
Failure to meet this goal would require a reevaluation of the joint shape selected.
- 5. 2. 3 Induced Strain Tests Objective To determine the ef f ec ts o f the expansion on the tube-to-cubesheet welds, and the tube length, and to determine the strain scored in the expansion.
Test Descriptioc Tubes with collars simulating the tensile axial restraint of the veld at the top were expanded over a 6" length and the displacement at each end of the tube caused by the expansion was measured.
In additien, the change in total length of the expansion when re le a s ed from the tubesheet constraint was noted.
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t Prolizinary Estulta and Final Accepttaco critorica (PROPRIITARY) e 5. 2'. 4 1,igament Distortion (PtortIrrAn) 5.3 chemical and corrosion Testing 5.3.1 Residue Test Objective De t ermine the amount and t ype of explosive re s id ue that should be expected to remain in the steam generator af ter all tube re pair s are completed.
Identify a satis f ac tory cleaning method, if needed, to red uce contaminants to acceptable primary aystem water chemistry levels.
Test Description Re s id ue tests performed to date include four types of test.
These tests are :
- 36" of detonating cord only in a 36" long mostly closed tube.
- a ten inch expansion in a 48 inch cube. -. -
g
-w
- t cting in an CT5G.
- testing in conjunction with crack change test in actual samples of THI-1 tubing.
Rasults The results of these tes es and analysis of the debris provide the
~
following data; The chemical composition and amounts of the residue are acceptable from the standpoint of contamination.
The need to clean following expansion is being evaluated.
The use of ordnance transfer cord minimizes the amount of debris in the upper head.
Techniques f or cleanup of the tubes af ter kinetic expansion are being examined. Methods being considered include felt plug tube cleaning with and without solvents and water flushing.
Final selection of a cleaning method and cleanness criteria has not yet been made.
5.3.2.
crevice containant concentration Tests Objective Determine the concentrating effects that dry out before expansion has on crevice contamination and related changes in corrosive characteristics of the containanta.
Test Description A limited number of tubes in the MI-1 CTSG will be heated and dried i
locally prior to beginning tre overall OTSG drying process.
These tubes will be heated then t.11oved to cool and examined by eddy current techniques for any new cracking or changes in previously identified cracking.
Basults Results will be available at a later d ate.
Should any significant changes in ECT results be identified, the repair and clean-up program will need to be re-evaluated.
5.3.3 Crack Change and Residue Cleaning Tests Obj ective Dete rmine the effect of kinetic expansion on existing cracks, examine the effect of cleaning prior to expansion on po s t-expansion cleanability.
Test Description (PROPRIETARY) l,
O
Essults (FRDPLIETARY) 6.0 EFFECTS OF REPAIR The f ollowing ef fects of the kinetic expasion process a re to be evaluated.
6.1 Possible Introduction of Chemical Impurities The specification for OTSC Tube repair addresses the issue of impurities in the system.
It specifies that the inside of the steam generator will not be ex pos ed to materials containing more than 250 ppa sulfur and 250 ppa total chlorides and fluorides, and specified detectable amounts of lov melting point metals. A material control a
program with quality controls is in place and vill be required to function throughout the repair to confirm that material is not introduced in-ide the steam generator without assurance that ita cons ti tue n ts are known and acceptable.
The residue remaining l
following kinetic expansion has been id en ti fied quantitatively and qualitatively by Auger and other techniques, and found to meet the specification acceptance criterion.
The kine tic expansion residue l
test in the repair qualficiati~ n program was used to determine the o
amount and type of explosive residue that expected to remain in the l
steam generator af ter all tubes repairs are completed (Paragraph 5.3).
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6.2 Possible Effects on OTSG Structure It has been postulated that the kinetic expansion may, because of the large number of tubes involved, have significant effects on the steam generator as a structure as well as on the individual tubes.
For individual expension, evaluation of the tubesbeet ligaments has shown no significant effects of expansion.
However, it has' also been postulated that with multiple kinetic expansions there could be a
shock wave reinf orcement such that the sequence of explosions or the length of the primer cord should be controlled to insure that the tubesheet is not overstressed. The concern is that the shock wave may travel at about the speed of sound through the material, and if adjacent tubes explode in a manner such that their shock wave
~
reinforces shock waves from other tubes, there could be a condition where the tubesheet is overstressed.
Foster Wheeler has kinetically expanded over 2000 feedwater heaters and expande:1 as many as 5000 tubes in a beater in one detonation.
They report that they have never experienced any tubesheet overstressing, problems and do not believe this is of concern since the plan is to er.pand only 100 to 200 cubes simultaneously for the TMI-l Steam Generator repair.
It must be noted al so that the cord for tubes to be expanded simulataneously is bundled to be approximately the same length, so that adj acent candles explode together rather than sequentially along the row.
6.3 Possible Iffects on Adjacent Previously Exnanded Tubes This concern is addressed in paragraph 5.2.1.
6.4 Possible Effects on Adjacent Previously Plugged Tubes The TMI once thorugh Steam Generators have tubes that have been taken out of service by four dif ferent procedures.
A. question has been raised as to the effect the planned kinetic expansion may have on these plugged tubes. The four procedures that have been used are :
Explosively welded plugs.
TIC welded plugs - plugs welded to the tube end s or tubesheet at the top of the upper tubesheet.
Hydraulic expanded tubes sealed with a TIC welded plug - tubes that have been stabilized by expansion af ter a short section of the tube within the tubesbeet was removed.
The tubes were then taken out of service by installing a welded plug in the tubesheet o pening s.
. Mechanically rolled plugs.
3W has examined the effect of kinetic expansion on the first three.
.. ~
procedures and has cosa to the conclusion that the expansion will not affect their mechanical integrity or leak tightness.
~
Tests of the kinetic expansion in steam generator nodel test blocks with conditions simulating those noted in the DiI-l steam generators show that the kinetic expansion does not produce an'y significant permanent tubesheet ligament deformation.
This leads to the conclusion that plugged tubes adjacent to
~
kinetic expension will not be altered by changes in the tubesheet ligament, since no significant permanent change is noted.
During additional tests on as actual OTSG B&W examined. by dye penetrant tests, the tube-+tubesheet welds and tubesheet ligaments of the kinetically expanded i.-
tubes and tne tube-to tubesheet velds adj acent to expanded tubes and have not
- , i-ewn any degrwiation.-
Thirdly, the extensive laboratory and field experience of B&W with explosive plugging in operating steam generators indicates that damage to plugged tubes due to detonation in adjacent tubes does not occur.
Tests were perf ormed on qualification blocks with rolled plugs in place and explosive expansions of all adjacent tube locations. Leak rate and axial load tests were done to verify that the rolled plugs continued to meet the acceptant 2 criteria to which they were originally qualified for use.
Results of testing are not yet available. Failure to meet the acceptance criteria would result in a reevaluation of the conticaed use of rolled plugs.
It is also noted that a pre-operational post-kinetic expansion pressure test of each generator will be made to verify the integrity of the primary to secondary pressure boundary thus providing added assurance that the plugged tubes with through-vall cracking remain sealed.
6.5 Effects on Reactor Coolant System The repair process will have no effect on the remainder of the reactor coolant system. The repair is being performed with the unit in cold shutdown, with the steam generators not required for decay heat removal. The steam generators will be isolated from the remainder of the reactor coolant systems by te=porary plugs, which will prevent any contact with explosive debr*t, e tc. prior to return of the generator to a clean condition.
7.0 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT and ALARA 7.1 Man-Rem Estimates The projected nan-rem exposures for the explosive repair of the Once Through Stea= Generators (OTSG) are esti=ated to be 268 man--rem.
In-dividual activities for the repair phase are presented in Table 1 along with exposures.....
.p.u n gar.-
Table 1 Man-Rea Exposures for OTSG Repairs Cravice drying 20 Nanual tube marking (to identify longer expansion or misfires) 10 In generator testing 10 Process Expansion Insert installation 70 Insert removal 100 Debris removal 5
Tube /Tubesheet/ Dome cleaning (assumes remota tooling) 51 (manual estimate - 110)
Closecut Inspection 2
Total 268 The above estimates are based on time and motion studies done in an actual OTSG at R&W's Mt. Vernon test facility.
The radiation fields below have been measured at TMI-1.
Credit was takan in making estimates for local shielding to reduce exposure rates by about 25%.
l l
Table 2 Radiation Fields at DtI-l Location Exposure Rate Upper and lower heads 1.3 R/hr Hanway 0.13 R/hr Tenc 0.01 R/hr Low Zone 0.001 R/hr The e s timat ed total exposure for the repair itself, f rom crevice drying through cleanup, is calculated to be 268 man-rem (327 man-rem if remota cleaning is not pos sible ).
7.2 ALARA 1
Repair work in the generators vill be done in accordance with ALARA guidelines and all required radiation protection practices.
The j
techniques and procedures to be used were developed to minimize j
exposures in the generator. Extensive training of repair personnel i
vill be done in OISG mock-ups to maximize ef ficiency during tlw repair I
operation.
Where practical, remotely operated equipment and video
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systema have been, and will continue to be used to minimize time spent in radiation fields.
Personnel working in the OTSG upper head will wer re spiratory equipment.
Airborne activity will be limited to that area by use of a ventilation systes drawing air from the upper head through HIPA filters, and exhausting it in the containment All expansions will be done with the CTSG manway covered.
Testing has been done on a full scale OTSG to verify that the ventilation system will be able to accomodata the pressure pulse from the explosion. Further testing has shown that gases from the explosive process are dissipated within 2-3 minutes, allowing the aanway to be reopened with no ef fects on the containment environment.
- .. q-
.'7. 3 Environmental Considerations r ::
7.3.1 Liquid Wasta The only liquid releases to the environment from the repair phase were assumed to be the discharge of the current A and 3 OTSC liquid inventories to the Susquehanna River via the turbine building sump and Industrial Waste Treatment Facility (IWTS).
Discharge of the A and B steam generators and associated steam lines occurred on May 13 and May 17, 1982, respectively.
Each release involve 17,000 gallons of water discharged th r o u g h the turbine building sump of the Industrial Waste Treatment System (IVIS), then to the discharge line leading to the Susquehanna River. The vaste stream was mixed with 30,000 GPM of Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDOT) blowdown.
The isotopic breakdown of the OTSG were as follows :
"A" Steam Generator Cs-134 - 1.5E-6 uci/cc CS-137 - 3.5E-6 uCi/cc "3"
. Steam Generator Cs-134 - 7.5E-7 uCi/cc Cs-137 - 6.0E-6 uCi/ cc Dilution fr a the MDGT was 3.0E4 CPM with a Susquehanna River flow of 2.0E7 CFM.
Calculated maximum hypothetical exposures due to these affluents sra presented in Tables 3 and 4.
TAE1Z 3 Maximum Hypothetical Individual Doses Due to A CTSG Liquid Effluents Whole Body organ )
...i.i.
- .i.4 4
gn,me,,
e4em_-aid.r.
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(ares)
(ares)
Adult 3.8E-5 5.4E-5 (liver)
Teen 2.2E-5 5.5E-5 (liver)
Child 8.3E-6 4.9E-5 (liver)
Infant 1.41-12 1.7E-9 (liver)
TABIZ 4 Maximum Hypothetical Individual Doses Due to B OTSG Liquid Effluents Whole Body Organ 7
(ares)
(ares)
Adult 4.6E-5 6.8E-5 (liver)
Teen 2.6E-5 7.1E-5 (liver) 9.9E-6 6.3I-5 (liver)
Child Infant 1.6 E-12 2.2E-9 (liver)
The NRC limits are 3 mees whole body and 10 mram to any organ.
The total dose contribution to the whole body of the maximian hypothetical individual (adult) was 0.003 of the limit.
T.
S.
limits require processing of liquid wasta streams when projected monthly doses due to radioactive liquids exceed.06 area whole body. This dose represents
.15% of that monthly guideline, and was a small contribution compared to those from the radweste systems.
l 7.3.2 Gaseous waste No of fsite releases of gaseous products are anticipated due to the j
repair process.
7.3.3 Solid waste Solid waste to be produced includes used expansion inserts and clothing.
No solid waste of a high level of contamination is anticipated.
The volumes and levels of solid vasta are compatible with the environmental impact statement.
7.4.
Safe Ear / ling of Explosive on-site 7.4.1 Description of Explosive Insert Assembly The tube expansion device consists of a two-part as sembly.
The energy source is supplied by primacord which is imbedded in the polyethylene inse rt.
Each insert is detonated by means of a booster /T',I cord assembly.
The TLI cord is a low energy ordnance transfer cord which centains the explosive 100t.
This low energy crsosfer cord is 25 feet in le ng th a nd is capable of transferring sufficiene energy to ignite the. booster which in turn contains sufficient ene rgy to de tonat e the j
primacord.
During the repair process it is anticipated that a l
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multiple number of inserts, approx 1:nately 132, will be detonated at one time.
To initiate this detonation, the TLI cords are connected into a manifold and set off.by means of a blas ting cap outside of the tant which surrounds
'the steam generator aanway.
7.4.2 Safety of Individual Components There are four sources of explosives which are involved in this Process:
the PETN (Pennaerythricoltetranitrate) in the insert; the DDNP (Diazodicitrophenol) in the booster; the HMI (Her Maj esty's Explosive) in the low energy ordnance transfer cord; and the blasting cap.
Each type of explosive has had a long history of reliable use in the industry.
The PETN, DONP and EMI are very stable explosives and are assembled in such a way that no sympathetic detonation is possible. This permits the assembled inserts to be shipped as Class C devices.
The blasting caps used to detonate the inserts are separated from the repair device until needed for use.
7.4.3 Utilization of Explosives On-Site The procedures to be followed when receiving, storing, tr ans por ting,
and detonating the inserts f or the TMI-1 steam generator repair, will be in strict accordance with Coasonwealth of Pennsylvania Title 25.
Rules, and Regulations, Part 1. Department of Environmental Resources,
Subpart D. Environmental Health and Safety, Article IV. Occupational Health and Saf ety, Chapter 210. Use of Exlosives and Chapter 211.
Storage, Handling, and Use of Explosives.
In the following, specific sections of the above state law, applicable to this program, are abstracted fron completeness.
7.4.3.1 Personnel Pennsylvania law requires that:
(a)
No person shall detonate explosives in blasting operations unless he has given satisf actory evidence to his employer that he has had practical experience in the handling and use of explosives under conditions existing at the site of cne proposed blasting operations, is qualified to perform the duties of Blaster at said site and has a Blaster's License.
A licensed j
blaster s ha ll be in charge of, and responsible for the preparation of, and the firing of, any blast. The blast shall be fired only by the licensed blaster in charge. Wen more than one licensed blaster is engaged in the preparation for blas t, the l
operations management shall designate the licensed blaster in l
charge. The licensed blaster in charge may authorize a laborer qualified to perf orn general blas ting or other person not j
operations, to load ard unload explosives, prepare explosives for use in blasting, transport explosives at or near a job site,
i l
charge explosives into drill holes, tamp or to otherwise prepare l
explosives f or detonation, and set fuses and detonating wires.
However,all of the above duties shall be performed only under the t
direct supervision and direction and in the presence of said licensed blaster in charge who shall be responsible for the.
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conduct of the persons seting under his direction.
(b)
No person shall be permitted to detonate explosives unless another person is present within calling dis cance and able and ready to render assistance in the event of accident or injury.
(c)
An employer may designate a re as onable number of his employees who are at least eighteen years of age as "31 aster Imarners". Bowever, n ot more than six such learners shall be assigned to one licensed blaster.
The learners shall work under the direct supervision and directico and in the presence of said licensed blaster who shall be experienced in the use and handling of explosives at the jc,b site.
~
Foster Wheeler personnel trained as liceusd blasters will perform all detonations at TMI-1 in accordance with the above reguistions.
7.4.3.2 Bactiving A received explosive will be logged in by the pe r son or pe rs ons designated and it shall be his responsibility to verify the quantity and condition of the materials received.
An up-to-date running inventory will be maintained at all times.
"he keys to the storage magazines will be held by this person and site security personnel only.
7.4.3.3 Storage 7.4. 3.3.1 License Pennsylvania law further requires that:
Every person s toring or in possession of explosives shall be required to have a license for each magazine used for the storage of such explosives.
License shall be issued by the Department upon receipt of information sho win g compliance with the provisions of these regulations.
Licenses shall be kept posted conspicuously in or about the magazine for which issued.
Licenses shall expire annually on the thirty-first day of December and shall be renewed upon payme7t of l
the required fee.
7.4.3.3.2 Magazines Two Class B magazines will be ry sired.
The class B magazines are known as Industrial Storage Magazines. These magazines are used for limited quantity storage of explosives not to exceed 200 1he. of explosives or 5,000 blasting caps.
(200 lbs. of explosives is approximately equal to 40,000 charges of the size used at TMI.)
These magazines will either be purchased or rented and placed and licensed at the THI-1 site.
They will be located outside the containment as discussed in paragraph 7.4.3.3.3 below. J
.~.
m
l Storage within the containment structure vill be on an as-needed s
basis with inserta supplied from the storage magarines by laborers.
Thus, the imamber of candle inserts in the containment is limited by p roced ure.
As s tat ed previously, the inserts will not detonate sympathetically and cannot be detonated without a detonator.
Fire will not cause detonatica of inserts.
Each b' laster will bring with him at the start of each shift the number of detonators required for that shift. A lockable day box vill be used in the containment building for these detonators.
Detonators will thus be s tored in a manner to prevent damage to safety related equipment in the unlikely event of inadvertant detonation.
l 7.4.3.3.3 I4 cation of Magazines Pennsylvania law requires that:
No explosives shall be kept or stored within the Commonwealth unless the following rules and regulations are complied with, nor shall any explosives be stored in this Commocwealth other than in magazines of approved type as hereaf ter provided.
Magazines in which more than fif ty (50) pounds of explosives are kept and stored, unst be detached from other structuras.
Magazines where more th an five thous and (5,000) pounds of explosives are kept or stored must be located a lasst two hundred (200) feet from any other magazines. Magazines where quantities of explosives over twenty-five thousand (25,000) pounds aru kept are stored, must have an increase over two hundred (200) feet, of two and two thirds (2-2/3) of twenty-five thousand (25,000)
Pounds stored.
Provid ed, that the said distances between magazines may be disregarded where the total quantity stored in said magazines, considered as a whole, complies with the quantity and distance tables as given in Paragraph 3.
In all cases, the quantity of explosives contained in cap msgazines shall govern in reg a rd to spacing said cap magazines from magazines containing other explosives, but under no circumstances shall a magazine containing blasting caps be within a less distance than one hundred (100 feet), not barricaded, or fifty (50) feet, barricaded, from any magazine other than cap magazine. Where magazines are protected by natural or ef ficient barricades, the dis t ance above specified may be reduced one-half.
No blasting caps or other detonating or fulminating caps or detonators shall be kept or stored in any magazines in which other explosives are kapt or stored.
Magazines in which explosives aru kept or stored must be located at distances from buildings, railroads and highways in conformity with the following quantity and distance table (see Chart I).
Whenever the buildings, railroad or highway to be protected is ef f ectually screened from the f actory building or magazine where explosives are had, kept or stored either by natural fe atures of.
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the ground or by ef ficient articial barricades of such height that any otraight line drawn frces the top of any side wall of the factory building or magazine to any part of the building to be protected vil pass through.such intervening natural or efficient artifical barricades.and any straight line drawn from the top of any side wall of the factory building or magazine to any point twelve (12) feet above the center of the railroad or highway to j
be protected, will pass through such natural, or efficient artifical barricades, the applicable distance in the quantity and distance tables may be reduced one-half.
No quantity in excess of three hundred thousand (300,000) pounds or in the <:ase of blasting cape, no number in excess of twenty million (20,000,000) caps shall be stored in any factory building l
or magazine.
factory building or while being used, no Excepting only at a
person shall have keep cr s tore explosives at any place within this Commonwealth unless such explosives are completely enclosed or encased in tight metallic, wooden, or fiber containers, and except while being transported or used or in the custody of a common carrier awaiting shipment, or pending delivery during the time permitted by Federal Law, explosives shall be kept in a magazine.
No person having explosives in his possession or control,- shall under any circumstances permit or alloy any grsins or particles to be or remain on the outside or about the containers in which such explosives are held. All containers in which explosives are held shall be plainly marked with the oene of the explosives contained therein.
l Storage at ' DEI will be in ecepliance with regulatory requirements.
7.4.3.5 Explosive Insert Loading into the Tubes l
The explosive inserts will be removed from their packages and assembled into the bolders in groups of 17 by explosive handlers.
l Ihis work will be done under the supervision of the licensed blaster and in accordance with all applicable Pennsylvania State regulations.
The loaded holders will then be passed into cent ares for assembly into the generator tubes by assigned personnel.
- 7. 4. 3. 6 Firing After the charges are in the generator and the ordnance cord ends brought outside the tent and the aanway covers replaced, all personnel vill be remov ed from the immediate vicinity of the generator.
The licensed blaster will collect the ordnance cords into a single bundle.
The blas ter will the n ch e c k for stray electrical currents using a blasting galvanometer.
If all is clear he will connect the detonator to the ordnance cord bundle ends and place the cap and cord ' ends into a cap surpressant box.
The blaster will then move to his firing station, check to assure all personnel are removed from the generator, sound the alarm and detonate the charges. After firing, the blaster will ascertain if there were
-M-
rbsfires. The presence of misfired charges does not cause a personnel safety concern as this explosive vill not " hang fire" and self-detonate later.
It is important, however, to know the location of misfires so the affected tubes will not be missed in the repair process. Misfired inserts -will be-removed by the assigned personnel and pisced in a storage receptacle for later disposition.
7.5 Detonation Noise Hazard Noise level readings were* taken during 36, 80 and 132 simultaceous detonations in the full scale steam generator at B&W's Mt. Vernon Indiana works.
These readings were taken outside the generator at about the mid point of its vertical height and an es timated 30 f eet
~~
~
from the vertical center line.
The upper and lower heads were in place and the lower head cold leg openings were covered with plywood.
About a 1" gap existed between the stem generator shall aod the lower head.
Maximum readings of 90-95 decibels were obtained.
No significant differs >nce in decibel level among the 36, 80 and 132 shots was noted.
The noise appeared to travel down through the generator out the opening s in the bottom head and then re sound upward from the pit below.
It is judged on the basis of these tests th at no i.s e levels for the TEI-1 steam generator repair will be at acceptable levels.
It is expected that an added conservatism for the actual repair process will exist c ue to the bottom head being firmly attached to the shell and the cold les piping being in place.
This should muffle the noise noted in the Mt.
Vernon te s ts lowering the decibel level significantly.
. ^
L'2 2L'lO_2'"-
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wn=
e, 8.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE AND QUALITY CONTROL All activities throughout the repair qualification atzi the repair itself have been and will continue to be in accordance with the THI-1 Quality Assurance Plan.
Materials for use in the repair and in the repair qualification are being prepared in accordance with approved procedures by qualified personnel.
QA/QC :sonitoring is maintained throughout.
Actual repairs vill likewise be made according to procedure, by qualified personnel, with controlling procedures in place to verify that all tubes ec, he expanded were expanded, and that any misfires or special longer expansions are adequately identified for follow up activities.
9.0 CONCLUSION
S The f ollowing conclusions have been drawn fram the safety evaluation presented.
9.1 The kinetic,ioint meets or exe.eeds the design bases of the original joint based on a qulification program including:
9.1.1 Load carrying capabilities 9.1.2 14ak tightness 9.1.3 Tube preload 9.1.4 Minimization of residual stresses 9.2 The ef f ects of the repair are not adverse when evaluated with regard to:
9.2.1 Introduction of chemical residue.
9.2.2 Beactivation of cracking due to drying.
9.2.3 Effect on OTSC Structure 9.2.4 Effect on previously expanded tubes 9.2.5 Effect on previously plugged tubes.
9.3 'Ihe environmental impact has been found satisf.setory with respect to:
9.3.1 Effluent impacts 9.3.2 Man-rem exposure 9.3.3 Txplosive hazard.
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9.3.4 Moise.
Based on the above conct.:sions, it can be stated that naither the repair process me the repaired joint increase the probability or consequences of an accident taking place, or create the possibility of an unanalyzed accident.
Since the repair will be performed with the unit in cold shutdown and the staan generators not required for heat removal, no technical specification change is necessary to perform the repair work.
Further,it can be concluded that the performance of the repair does not adversely af fect the remainder of the plant and that the envit onnental impact is minimal.
10.0 ltETERENCES
~
1.
'DtI-1 OTSG Failure Analysis Report - July 1982 GPUN TDR-341 2.
Progress Report on Prequalification Charge Sizing for TMI-1 Steam Generator Tnbe Expansions, June 23, 1982, Foster Wheeler Development Corporation 99-69-5049.
3.
TMI-1 Prequalification Charge Sizing Status Report on 19/14-6" Expansion, Foster Wheeler Development Corp. 7/8/82.
4.
GPUN Document No. SP 1101-22-006, "TMI-l OTSG Repair" Revisica 2, S/11/82.
5.
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III 1965 Edition-Sunamer of 1%7 Addenda.
6.
S pe cific a ti on f or Steam Generator, Contract No. 620-0005 for Metropolitan Edison Company, Three Mile Island (TMI-1), CS3-33/NSS5, April 1971.
7.
Regulatory Guide 8.8, Rev 3, June 1978.
8.
TMI-1 Final Safety Analyth Report Docket No. 50-189 Oper. License No. DPR-50.
9.
Title 10 Code of Federal Regulation Part 50 Appendix A, " General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants".
l 10.
Determination of Minimus Required Tube Wall Thickness for 177FA l
Once Through Steam Generators, BAW 10146, October 1980.
I 11.
Title 10 Code-of Tederal Regulation Part 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation.
. l l
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71GURE 4 Chart 1.
QUANTITY AND DISTANCE TABLE FOR UNBARRICADED MAGAZINES Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Quar:tity that may be kept or stored from nearest buildin5. highways or railroad Distance Distance Distance from from from Blasting and electric nearest nenrest nearest blasting caps Other explosives building railway highway Number Number not Founds Pounds not (feet)
(feet)
(feet) over over over over 1.000 5.000 30 20 10 3.000 10.000 60 40 20 10400 20.000 120 70 35
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20.000 25.000 50 145 90 45 25.000 50,000 50 100 240 140 7C 50.000 100.000 100 200 360 220 110 100.000 150.000 200 300 520 310 150 t
150.000 200.000 300 400 640 380 190 200,000 250.000 400 500 720-4 30 220 250.000 300.000 500 600 800 480 240 200.000 330.000 600 700 860
$20 260 350.000 400.000 700 800 920 550 280 400.000 450.000 -
800 900 980 590 300 t
450.000 500A00 900 1.000 1.000 610 310
$00.000 750.000 1.000 1.500 1.060 640 320 750.000 1.000.000 1J00 2.000 1.200 720 360 1.000.000 IJ00.000 2.000 3.000 1.300 780 390
!J00.000 2.000.000 3.000 4.000 1.420 850 420 2.000.000 2J00.000 4.000 3,000 1.500 90n 450 2J00.000 3 400.000 5.000 6.000 1.56 0 910 470 3 400.000 3.500.000 6.000 7,000 1.610 970 490 3J00.000 4.000400 7,000 8.000 1.660 1.000 500
- 000.000 4.500.000 8.000 9.000 1.700 1.020 510 4.500.000 5.000A00 9.000 10.000 1.740 1.040 320 1
5.000.000 7.500.000 10.000 15.000 1.780 1.070 530 7.500.000 10.000.000 15.000 20.000 1.950 1.170 550 lu.uc' '40 12.500.000 20.000 25.000 2.110 1.270 630 12.500.000 15.000.000 25.000 30.000 2.260 1.360 680 15.000 400 17.500.000 30.000 35.000
- 410 1.450 720 17.500.000 20400h00 35.000 40.000 2.350 1.530 760 40.000 45.000 2.630 1410 800 45.000 50.000 2J00 1.680 810 50.000
$5,000 2J20 1.750 880 55.000 60.000 3.030 1.820 910 t
60.000 65.000 3.130 1.880 910 65.000 70.000 3.220 1.940 970 70.000 75.000 3.310 1.990 1.000 75.000 80.000 3.390 2.040 1.020 80.000 85.000 3.460 2.080 1.040 l
85.000 90.000 3.520 2.120 1.060 90.000 95.000 3.580 2.150 1.080 l
95.000 100.000 3.363 2.180 1.090 1
100.000 125.000 3470 2.200 1.110 125.000 150.000 3.800 2.280 1.140 150.000 175.000 3.930 2.360 1.180 175.000 200.000 4.060 2.440 1.220 200.000 225.000 4.190 2.520 1.260 225.000 250.000 4.310 2.590 1.300 250.000 275.000 4.430 2.660 1.340 275.000 300.000 4.550 2.730 1.380 i
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e Midd.etown. Pennsylvania 17057 717 944-7621 TELEX 84 2386 Writer's Direct Osal Numcer:
January 20, 1983 5211-83-020 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations Attn: John F. Stol::
Operating Reactors Branch No. 4 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Com=ission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Sir:
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1)
Operating License No. DPR-50 Docket No. 50-289 OTSG Repair Kinetic Expansion Technical Report l
l GPUN-TDR-007/BAW-1760 (Proprietary) i l
The subject report is attached for your information. We request that portions of this report be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a)(4) since it contains proprietary information. An affidavit in accord-ance with 10 CFR 2.790(b)(1) and (4) is attached to support this request for withholding.
Sincerely, f
H. D. Hukill Director, TMI-l HDH: CWS :vj f Attachments cc: J. Van Vliet w/o attachment
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PDR GPU Nuclear Corporation is a sucsidia:y et W Geva' Pucisc Utilities Corporaticn
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f Babcock &Wilcox AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES H.
TAYLOR A.
My name is James H. Tay'.or.
I am Manager of Licensing in the Nuclear Poweri.Seneration Division of Babcock & Wilcox, and as such I am authorized to execute this Affidavit.
s B.
I am familiar with the criteria applied by Babcock & Wilcox to de-termine whether certain information of Babcock & Wilcox is proprietary and I am familiar with the procedures established within Babcock & Wilcox, particularly the Nuclear Power Generation Division (NPGD),_to ensure the proper application of these criteria.
C.
In determining wh' ether a Babcock & Wilcox document is to be classi-fied as proprietary information, an initial determination is made by the unit ma. nager who is responsible for originating the document as to whether it falls within the criteria set forth in Paragraph D hereof.
If the information, falls within any one of these criteria, it is classified as propriet'ary by the originating unit manager.
i This initial determination is reviewed by the cognizant
- section manager.
If the document is designated as proprietary, it is re-viewed again by Licensing p'ersonnel and other management within j
NPGD as-designated by the Manager of Licensing to assure that the regtflatory requirements of 10 CFR Section 2.790 are met.
l 9.
. The following information is provided to demonstrate that the pro-visions of 10 CFR Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations 7
j have been considered:
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(i)
The information has been held 'in confidence by the Babcock &
Wi l c o x _,C omp a ny.
Copies of the document are clearly identified
- as proprietary.
In addition, whenever Babcock & Wilcox transmits the information to a customer, customer's agent, potential customer or regulatory agency, the transmittal re-
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quests the-recipient to hold the information as proprietary.
Also, in order _ to strictly limit any potential or actual customer's use of proprietary information, the following s
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T-l Babcock &MAlcox AFFIDA IT 0,F JAtiES H. TAYLOR (Cont'd)
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Company' shall be given the right to participate in pursuit of such confidential treatment."
(ii) The following criteria are customarily applied by Babcock &
Wilco'x in a rational decision process to detarmine whether the information should be classified as proprietary.
Information may be classified as preprietary if'ane or more of the following criteria tre met.
a.
Information reveals cost or price information, commercial strategies, production capabilities, or budget levels of
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Babcock & Wilcox, its customers or suppliers.
b.
The information reveals data or material concerning Babcock
&~flilcox research or developme.it plans or programs of present or potential competitive adycotage to Babcock &
Wilcox.
c.
The use.of the information by a competitor would decrease his expenditures, in time or resources, in designing, producing or marketing a similar product.
d.
The information consists of test data or other similar data concerning a process, method.or component, the application or which results in a competitive rdvantage to Babcock &
Wi l c o x.-
e.
The information reveals special aspects of a process, method, component o'r the like, the exclusive use of which results.in a competitive advantage to Babcock & Wilcox.
f.
The information contains ideas for which patent protection may be sought.
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Babcock &Wilcox AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES H. TAYLOR (Cont'd)
The document (s) listed on Exhibit "A",
which is attached hereto and made a part hereof, has been evaluated in accordance with normal Babcock & Wilcox procedures with respect to classificatiun and has been found to contain information which f alls within one or more of the criteria enumerated acave.
Exhibit "B",
which is attached hereto and made a part hereof, specifically identifies the criteria applicable to the document (s) listed in Exhibit "A".
(iii) The document (s) listed in Exhibit "A", which has been made avail-able to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission was made available in confioence with a request that the document (s) and the information contained therein be withheld from public disclosure.
(iv) The information is not available in the open literature and to the best of our knowledge is not known by Combustion Engineering, EXXON, General Electric, Westinghouse or other current or potential domestic or foreign competitors of B&W.
(v) Specific information with regard to whether public disclosure of the information is likely to cause harm to the competitive position of Babcock & Wilcox, taking into account the value of the information to Babcock & Wilcox, the amount of effort or money expended by Babcock & Wilcox developing the information; and the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properiv duplicated by others is given in Exhibit "B".
E. I have personally reviewed the document (s) listed on Exhibit "A" and have found that it is considered proprietary by Babcock & Wilcox because it contains information which falls within one or more of f
the criteria enumerated in Paragraoh D, and it is information which is customarily held in confidence and protected as proprietary in-formation by Babcock & Wilcox.
This report comprises information utilized by Babcock & Wilcox in its business which afford Babcdc
& Wilcox an opportunity to obtain a competitive advantage over (4)
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Babcock &Wilcox those who may wish to know or use the information contained in the document (s).
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JAMES'H. TAYLgli State of Virginia)
City of Lynchburg))
55.
Lynchburg James H. Taylor, being duly sworn, on his oath deposes and says that he is the person who subscribed his name to the foregoing state-ment, and that the matters and facts set forth in the statemer.t are true.
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JAMES H.
TAYLO [,
Subscribed and sworn fore me this
/3 day of u m,1983.
W +< A s M
/H Notary Public in and for the City of Lynchburg, State of Virginia My Commission Expires [l Mo#3 /991 (5)
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EXHIBIT A_
"Three Mile Island Unit 1 Once-Through Steam Generator Repair: Kinetic Expension Technical Report" GPUN Topical Report GPUN-TDR-007, November 1982 B&W Topical Report BAW-1760, November 1982 J
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Babcock &MAlcox EXHIBIT B Description of Material Applicable criteria "Three Mile Island Unit 1 D(ii) b, c, d & e once-Through Steam Generator Repair Kinetic Expansion Technical Report" GPUN-TDR-007 November 1982 BAW-1760 November 1982 Portions as noted below:
Pages 1-5 thru l-10 Figures 1-2 and 1-8 thru l-13 Pages 2-1, 2-3 thru 2-5, 2-11 thru 2-13, 2-15 thru 2-18, 2-20, 2-27, 2-29 2-34 thru 2-39, 2-41, 2-45, 2-47 thru 2-49, 2-51, 2-53, 2-54 Table 2-4 Figures 2-2 thru 2-12, 2-14 thru 2-17a, 2-19, 2-45, 2-46, 2-47B thru 2-47f Pages 3-1 and 3-2 Pages 4-2 and 4-3 Page 5-3 Page 6-2
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.2 GPU Nuclear Corporation 5
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s' Micdte. n Pennsylvania 17057 717 944 7621 TELEX 84 2386 Writer's Direc: Dial Number October 5, 1982 5211-82-243 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation j
Attn:
D. G. Eisenhut Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cocnission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Sir:
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1)
Operating License No. DPR-50 Docket No. 50-289 OTSG Tube Repair Program Enclosed please find a copy of Revision 1 t^ the "TMI-1 Steam Generator Repair Safety Evaluation" which was submitted to you on August 20, as a supplement to LER 81-13.
The revisions are minor in nature, and do not affect conclusions previously drawn. They are marked with margin lines.
Due to the proprietary nature of the information contained in this enclosure, it is requested that it be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790'(a)(4.). The af fidavit forwarded with the August 20, 1982 letter is valid and is applicable to the enclosed revision.
Sincerely,
. D.
ukill Director, TMI-l HDH:MJG:vjf
Enclosure:
TMI-l Steam Generator Repair Safety Evaluation, Rev. 1 cc:
R. C. Haynes J. F. Stol:
R. Jacobs
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GPU Nuclear Corecration is a su::siciary of the General Pucoc U';Iit es Corecrabcn
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