Text

Proposed TS Change 95-05,deleting Component List
	ML20082E587
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	04/06/1995
From:	; TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20082E561	List: ML20082E555; ML20082E587;
References
	NUDOCS 9504110271
	Download: ML20082E587 (49)
	v • d • e

'* ' ' '

Q

' ' ~

',.; ,Ha n hN .

ENCLOSURE 1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 o (TVA-SQN-TS-95-05) 3 LIST OF AFFECTED PAGES Unit 1 UNIT 2 1-2 1-2 3/4 6-1 3/4 6-1 <

3/4 6-2 3/4 6 -

3/4 6-4 3/4 6-4 3/4 6-5 3/4 6-5 i 3/4 6-6 3/4 6-6 ,

3/4 6-6a 3/4 6-6a-3/4 6-17 3/4 6-17 3/4 6-18 3/4 6-18 3/4 6-19 3/4 6-19 3/4 6-20' 3/4 6-20 3/4 6-21 3/4 6-21 3/4 6-22 3/4 6-22 3/4 6-23 3/4 6-23 3/4 8-15' 3/4 8-16 3/4 8-16 3/4 8-17 3/4 8-17 3/4 8-18 U 3/4 8-18 3/4 8-19 3/4 8 3/4 8 B3/4 6-2 B3/4 6-2 B3/4 6-3 B3/4 6-3 i

9504110271'950406 "1

+,p,-~int . ADOCK 05000327:

PDR

%s

y 7 m ,

,- - . . .-~ ~ -- -- . ,

ff.x _

DEFINITIONS- l

- +

~'m ,

,i # CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST ,

l

/ al.61 A. CHANNEL' FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be-

- a .- Analog channels-- the injection' of a simulated signal into'the channel -

~

h jz yt as' close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including l

alarm and/or trip functions.

M2 .b.. Bistable channels - the injection of a simulated signal;into the .

W'

'2-sensor to verify 0PERABILITY including alarm and/or-trip functions.

~

R145 -

, Jv j c. Digital channels:- the injection 'of a simulated ' signal into .the - N channelias close' to the sensor. input to the process racks as

- }) Lpracticable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip -*

3- -functions.

fL CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY 1.7 - CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. shall exist when:

l :

1 0 a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are .'

.. - either:

1) Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment. automatic- '

]s ' *>-. isolation valve system, or ,

2) Closed by manual valves, blind fla s, or deactivated automatig ;

valves secured in their closed positions, exceptfgs trovMed Ml 1

,\: 7 - 8(c. .

'l pad}e 3 A-2 Afl Specification 3.6.3.

b. All equipment hatches are closed and sealed.

(_.

~

)~ -

Each air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification-3 . 6 '.1. 3 , .

4.

RiuW j

d. The containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification :

.Q:\

r a .a 3 () - 4.6.1.1.c, l e

F id e. The-sealing mechansim associated with each' penetration (e.g., welds,- l 2

bellows, or 0-rings) is: OPERABLE, and. -

(- .

. f. Secondary containment bypass leakage is within the limits of Specification 3.6.1.2.

CONTROLLED LEAKAGE 1.8 CONTROLLED LEAKAGE shall be that seal water flow supplied to the reactor

coolant l pump seals. ;

i CORE ALTERATION

-1.9 CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement or manipulation of any component' within the reactor pressure vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATION shall not preclude completion of.-

movement of a component to a safe conservative position.

CORE OPERATING LIMIT REPORT 1.10 The CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR) is the unit-specific document R159 that provides core operating' limits for the current operating reload cycle.

These cycle-specific core operating limits shall be determined for each reload cycle in accordance with Specification 6.9.1.14. Unit operation within these operating limits .is addressed in individual specifications.

.SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 2 Amendment No. 12,71,130,141,155, 176 February 10. 1994

e n, .

U:,y,' , m ' '

\;

N i3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT k

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY' 1 . LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION I 3.6.1.1 ~ Primary ' CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

)3} ' ' APPLICABILITY: . MODES 1, 2, 3 and.4.

d ACTION:.

f ':Without one hourprimary or be in atCONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, least HOT STANDBY within therestore next 6 CONTAINMENT-INTEGRITY hours and in COLD with g

Q SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

) ' SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

$ f'I

%t

'a. At least once per 31 days-by verifying that'all penetrations

not-capable of-being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation R16 valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are Ij closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automat _ic valves

g. ) secured in their positions, exce yprpvidedgn TaJWe 3f 2A X j, Specification 3.6.3.

k By vebfying that each containment air lock is in compliance with the R134-

' {g requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.

c. Perform required visual examinations and leakage rate _ testing at P.

[dM 3-j t in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, as modified by approved exemptions. The maximum allowable leakage rate, L , is 0.25% of R180 L T w- I containment air weight per day at the calculated p,eak containment' pressure P,,12 psig.

i

Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are .

located inside the annulus or containment or the main steam valve vaults and are l locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations R19'S

'shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.

SEQUOYAH . UNIT 1 3/4 6-1 Amendment No. 12, 130,. 176, 191 November 22, 1994

" CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS R180 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BYPASS LEAKAGE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION R180 3.6.1.2 Secondary Containment bypass leakage rates shall be limited to a combined bypass lea _kage rate of less than_ or equal to 0.25 L, for all penetrationsptienMfied An Ta(le J.6-1/aslsecondary containment BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS TO TH AUXII.IARY BUILDI1G when pressurized to P,.

TMr AAE APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. - - -

ACTION:

With the combined bypass leakage rate exceeding 0.25 L for BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHSTOTHEAUXILIARYBUILDING,restorethecombinedbypassleakageratefrom BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING to less than or equal to within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 0.25 and inL, COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

{

l SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 6-2 Amendment No. 12, 71, 176 February 10, 1994

"'^

.;f '. l, -

{ .

K{"g; ~ g- '

R180f e- ,

's

, 3 i i e

Y h .

Press 3/4 M'/ Tnou.9 s 3[4 6- L

^

J Nh)sfa96(ntentionally deleted ;*

R 0

)

February 10, 1994 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 6-4 Amendment No. 12, 71, 101, 130, ,

176 o

p - .

jf' g %7 .]( -

g' m TABLE 3.6-1. ~

2 BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS IO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING g SECONDARY CONIAINMENI BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS s=

PENETRATION DESCRIPTION RELEASE LOCATION E _.

p X-2A ersonnel Lock Auxiliary Area g X-2B P onnel Lock Auxiliary Area' Fuel ransfer Tube Auxiliary Area X-3 x X-15 Letdown Auxiliary Area X-23 Postaccid Sampling, Hot Leg 3. Auxiliary Are X-25A Pressurizer (D g Sample Auxiliary a X-250 Pressurizer LiqW d Sample !Auxilia Area X-26B Control Air ~ Auxil' ry Area -- c Au ' iary Area X-27C ILRT X-29 CCS xiliary Area X-30 Accumulator Fill Auxiliary Area y X-34 Control Air- Auxiliary Area- g~

X-35 CCS Auxiliary Area a

? X-39A N2 to Accumulators Auxiliary Area r-a R75 m X-39B N2 to Pressurizer Relief Tank Auxiliary Area '

X-400 Hydrogen' Purge AuxiIiary Area N' X-41 Normal RB Sump Auxiliary Area X-42 Primary Water- Auxiliary Area X-44 RCP Seal Water Injection er urn Auxiliary Area- I X-45 RC Drain. Tank iliary Area X-46 RC Drain Tank Aux iary Area X-47A Glycol Auxili Area X-47B Glycol Auxiliar rea-f X-50A CCSl Auxiliary A

"[ X-50B CCS Auxiliary Area

%gg X-51 Fire Pr ection- Auxiliary Area u X-52 - CCS- RCP Oil Cooler Auxiliary Area 0;[ X-56 '

E . Auxiliary Area so X-57 CW Auxiliary Area-X-58 ERCW Auxiliary Area

~

U X-59

ERCW Auxiliary Area X-60 ERCW . Auxiliary Area-U X-61 ERCW Auxiliary Area X-62 ERCW- Auxiliary Area X-6 -

ERCW Auxiliary Area

\

. . . . ~ . - - - - - . s

7

.4 TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued) rn BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING

$ SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS 5

x e PENETRA N DESCRIPTION RELEASE LOCATION c-5

X-64 A/C Chilled Water (ERCW) Auxiliary Area X-65 A/C Chilled Water (ERCW) Auxiliary Area X-66 C Chilled Water (ERCW) Auxiliary A a X-67 A hilled Water (ERCW) Auxiliar rea X-68 ERCW Auxili y Area X-69 ERCW Aux' iary Area X-70 ERCW iliary Area X-71 ERCW Auxiliary Area X-72 ERCW Auxiliary Area X-73 ERCW Auxiliary Area X-74 ERCW Auxiliary Area w X-75 ERCW Auxiliary Area t) 1 X-76 Service Air Auxiliary Area y m X-77 Demineralized Water Auxiliary Area A E X-78 Fire Protection Auxiliary Area 1 3 X-82 Fuel Pool Auxiliary Area I X-83 Fuel Pool Auxiliary Area X-84A Pressurizer Relief T Gas Sample Auxiliary Area X-85A Excess Letdown He xchanger Auxiliary Area X-90 . Control Air uxiliary Area X-91 Postaccident ampling, Hot Leg 1 iliary Area X-92A,B Hydrogen lyzer Auxi "ary Area lR94 X-93 Accumul or Sample Auxilia Area RE X-94A,B,C Radi ion Sample Auxiliary ea g$ X-95A,B,C R iation Sample Auxiliary Ar lR94 ie X-96C ot Leg Sample Auxiliary Area "Z X-98 ILRT Auxiliary Area

" X-99 -

Hydrogen Analyzer Auxiliary Area R94 F X-100 Hydrogen Analyzer Auxiliary Area G^ X-101 Postaccident Sampling, Containment Auxiliary Area gd .X-103 Postaccident Sampling, Liquid Discharge Auxiliary Area to Containment (iD

r g

e.

x

'g -c. .

~~

I'.' '

v.

E TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued) .

BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING.

8 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS s

x PENETRATION DESCRIPTION RELEASE LOCATION E ij Q X-106 Postaccident Sampling,' Air Discharge Auxiliary Area-

r. to Containment

X-108 Ma enance Penetration Auxiliary Are X-109 Mainte nce Penetration Auxiliary A a '

X-114 Ice Cond er Auxiliar rea X-115' Ice Condens Auxili y. Area gth4

... X-116A Postaccident ling, Containment- Aux ary Area

,- Air Sample T

g

? %

)

3> a

- a

~ e co .

O

.U 0 .

8 O

._ _ :- _ ._ ._.I.: Q

, . . ~ . . ~ - - .- . ,

'} c .,-

CO!CA! ?.NE!.~ ' SYSTE'*S f peg 6 ro saJ M4# ~~ ' ' 09^ D '

i

' e

- D'* gg CPittA CLG

Y 3 /4. 6. 3 CONTAI?ME :T T SOLATIO : VALVES j J s%. f ,

LIMITING CONDITIC:: FOR CPERAT*0N -

3.6.3hT(e on* in .nt ;s at' n 1- s pe 'f 7pdlh,h MI)(

lfPEJAydB :.t is la 'on .im s a sw in able . 6 -jV. I APPLICABIL:TY: MOOES 1. 2,.3 and 4.

' )g*xt;fr* - c ooWA rnevs~T ' VAc uuk kguG / ScL A na~J VA Wh) -

4 ACTION: ,

t. ore of the isola . n valve (s) hpfcifie / Se iofs . Bj,' C/f

a. With cne or 1Anf D A tyougy D./7 oVTaMe y,6- A inoperable, c.alncain at leasc one ';

isolation valve OPERABLE :.n each aYf ected penetration that is open and either:

1. Restore the' inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , or ,

2. solate each af fected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isclation position. or =

3. Isol' ate each af fected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flance, or

4. Se in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b. With one or = ore containment vacuum relief isolation valve (s) Km6cMipd 111 pagriops D.J tyourn/D.J A Tajerle 3<6-M incperable, the valve (s) must be recurneo to CPERA3* I status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , or be in at least HOT _ STAND 31_

Q within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following gb me-ho nte / v 3f'tEd ofo c A rv oH 3. O,4 % ^) e r W W.

fo eovt.S tom S of C, ^ 7).fic

^ ^

SURVEILLANCE R e demo stra .d

_4 .G.3.1 lThe d oolatio valve he specifd.d in 7 va e to se ice af e 3.6 ' shall r mai nance rep r or

,ASPEP E pr4 r to r wurnin ont ;

rep ceme . work ' perf med on e valv or its ssocia d act tor, '

o powe* circui* by pe- ormanca of a cy .ing tes and v rifica on o# isol ,. ion

, * */ [ , -

4 j%iver72Ariou p ow PA rH (s') o n y t.% M"! sol ATED ,

VN OC2 AD M *N'S DCATWA $ 0N~~f0'Y

IM ToCAf**ITT*KM T L x - n -

4 3/4 6-17 Amendment No. 12 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 March 25, 1982 l

I

.)

e.

' :: .t ; 1 .,~, ,

,- m CONTAINHENT SYSTEMS' ..

i.

[,

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) m ro n roc C*55'&

4.6.3.1 Each isolation valve l#ecif#ed irVfablv3.6dshall be demonstrated i

.0PERABLE during the COLD. 5HUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at 1 east once per 18 months. R16

~

by:

a. Verifying that on a Phase'A containment' isolation test signal,' each Phase A-isolation".Vilve actuates to its isolation position,

~

b. Verifying that on a Phase B containment ' isolation test signal, each.

Phase B isolation valve actuates to its isolation position. .,l

,i

c. Verifying that on a Containment Ventilation, isolation. test. signal, each-Containment Ventilation ' Isolation valve actuates to its' isolation -

position.

d. . Verifying that on a high contai'nment pressure isolation test signal,- R85' -

each Containment Vacuum Relief Valve actuates to its isolation position. -

e. Verifying that en a Safety Injection test signal that the Normal R105 w

Charging Isolation valve actuates to its -is(ola c.m m * .. ***fV"*]

4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each power operated or automaticVvalveM Rh!MQ lMbM Xf/21shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to ;

Specification 4.0.5.

R124 i

t SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 6-18 Amendment No. 12, 81, 101, 120.

July 5, 1989 I

l 1

2 + t . p...

A q ,

A g TABLE 3.6-2 f

.o g CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES g _

VALVE ER FUNCTION MAXIMUM' ISOLATION TIME' econds)

E ^

p A. P "A" ISOLATION r E

1. 1-7 2.

F FCV- 4 SG Blow Dn-SG Blow Dn 10* b. ~ '

R41; 10

3. FCV SG Blow Dn

4.

5.

FCV-1-32 Deleted SG Blow Dn .10* d i

6. Deleted a16

(

7. Deleted 5:

8 10.

8.

9.

Deleted.

FCV-26-240 FCV-26-243 Fi re Protection isol.

Protection isol.

20 20 f

~f>

i(

3o

11. FSV-30-134 Cntet dg Press Trans 4*- g

? Sense e 3 -w g 12. FSV-30-135 Cntat Bldg Sense Line ss ans r

("

4* cD g74 a

13. FCV-31C-222 CW-Inst Roo

14. FCV-31C-223 CW-Inst Ir Clrs

- 10*

10*

?

15. FCV-31C-224 CW-In Room Cirs 10*

s

16. FCV-31C-225 CW- st Room Clrs 10*

-h A

17. FCV-31C-229 -Inst Room Clrs. 10*' " A

$E 18. FCV-31C-230 CW-Inst Room Clrs 10* $ '

@ 19. FCV-31C-231 CW-Inst Room Clrs 10*~ .

x 20. CW-Inst Room Cirs g FCV-31C-232- 10*' A

'-o

$ 21.

22.

FSV-43-2 FSV-43-3' Sample Przr Steam Space Sample Przr Steam Space-10*

10* ( w h5 23.

24.

FSV FSV- -12

~

Sample Przr Liquid Sample Przr Liquid

~*

~

\ M R149.

D

~

25. F 22 Sample RC Outlet Hdrs 10 ? I

26. SV-43-23 Sample RC Outlet Hdrs- 10* $

"~

5 2 FSV-43-34 Accum Sample- 5*

8 FSV-43-35 Accum Sample . 5*-

% . FSV-43-55 SG Blow Dn Sample Line 10*

. w r +s--r- ti-wm's m 4 - m. v-,m- ei V=n--* em w-' sPeh--e-e -t er --m se --ha e r* e -et+y- a- e v , - - .

, TABLE 3.6-2-(Continued) m j CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES Y

x \

e : VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (Seconds) e .

A P SE "A" ISOLATION (Cont.)

] .

- 30. F 58 SG Blow Dn Sample Line 10*

31. FSV- -61 SG Blow Dn Sample Line 10* R149

32. FSV SG Blow Dn Sample Line 10*

33. FSV-43-75 Boron Analyzer *

34. FSV-43-77 Boron Analyzer 5*

35. FCV-61-96 Gylcol Inlet to Floor Cooler 30*

36. FCV-61-97 Gylcol Inlet to Floor Cooler 30*

37. FCV-61-110 Gylcol Outlet to Floor Cooler 30*

38. FCV-61-122 30*

39. FCV-61-191 Ic(colOutlettoFloorCooler e U ndenser - Gylcol In 30*

40. FCV-61-192 Ice Con nser - Gylcol In 30*

R

41. FCV-61-193 Ice Conden. r - Gylcol 30*

42. FCV-61-194 Ice Condenser Gylco Out 30*

T 43. FCV-62-61 RCP Seals 10 a 44. FCV-62-63 RCP Seals 10 R74

45. FCV-62-72 Letdown Line 10*#,- .

46. FCV-62-73 Letdown L 10*#

47. FCV-62-74 Letdow ine. 10*#

1 og 48. FCV-62-77 Letd n Line 20 Rm 49. FCV-63-23 A um to Hold Up Tank 10*

g6 50. FCV-63-64 SN2to Accum 10*

34 51. FCV-63-71 Accum to Hold Up Tank 10*

o$ 52. TCV-63-84 .Accum to Hold Up Tank 10*

z 53. FCV-68-305 WDS N2 to PRT-P 54. FCV-68-307 PRT to Gas Analyzer 10*

55. FCV-68-30 PRT to Gas. Analyzer 10*

O 56. FCV CCS from Excess Lt Dn Hx 10*

57. FCV- -143 CCS to Excess Lt Dn Hx 60*

M 58. F 9 RCDT Pump Disch 10*

59. FCV-77-10 RCDT Pump Disch 10* 182 M 60. FCV-77 18 RCDT and PRT to V H 10*

7 +

y

,.,_. - . . , _ , , - . - , , n; , . . ,

g _ _w 40 .

1W 44

. TABLE 3. 6 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES ,

VALVE . ER FUNCTION MAXIMUM' ISOLATION TIME (S ~ onds)

A. PHAS "A" ISOLATION .' (Cont . )

61. F 19 RCDT and PRT to V H- 10*

62. FCV-7 20 N to RCDT '10*

63. FCV 7 Floor Sump Pump Disch 1

64. FCV-77-12 Floor Sump Pump Disch 0*

65. FCV-81-12 Primary Water Makeup 10*

B. PHASE "B" ISOLATION

1. FCV-32-81 Control Air Supply 10

2. FCV-32-103 Control Air Supply 10

3. FCV-32-111 Control Air Supply 10

4. FCV-67-83 ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs 60* g.

5. FCV-67-87 ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs 60* .v

6. FCV-67-88 CW - LWR.Cmpt Clrs 60* b.

7. FCV-67-89 - LWR Cmpt Clr 70* > -

8. FCV-67-90 ER - LWR Cmpt C s 70*

9. FCV-67-91 ERCW - WR Cmpt- 1rs- 60*

10. FCV-67-95 ERCW - L Clrs 60*

11. FCV-67-96 ERCW - LWR t Clrs- 60*

12. FCV-67-99 ERCW - L t.Clrs 60*

13. FCV-67-103 ERCW - Cmp Clrs 60*

14. FCV-67-104. ERCW LWR Cmpt - rs 60*

15. FCV-67-105 ER - LWR Cmpt'Cl '70*-

16. FCV-67-106 r - LWR Cmpt Clrs -- 7 0 *

17. FCV-67-107 RCW -LWR Cmpt Clrs 60*

18. FCV-67-111 ERCW -LWR Cmpt Clrs_ 60*

19. FCV-67-112- ERCW - LWR Cmpt Clrs 60*

20. FCV-67-130 ERCW _

- Up Cmpt Clrs 60*

21. FCV-67-131- ERCW -~Up Cmpt Clrs; 60*-

22. FCV-67-133 ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs 60*

23. FCV-67-134 ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs 60*

24. FCV-67-138 ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs 60*

y-x N. -

May=11, 1990 SEQ YAH -' UNIT 1 3/4 6-21 Amendment Nos..70,178, 82,- 40 Ni

m - .

~ / -

, p;g -

.g

. . ,.y.. _, , ;$

1 . c s .' ' _ - ~ r r

2 a, . . , .

~

TABLE 3.6-2 (Continued). [$

.+.;

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES -

VALVE NUMBER FUNCTION MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME I conds) .q; .

m _

B. PHASE "B" LATION (Cont.)

25. FCV-67-13 ERCW - Up'Cmpt Clrs

.60*

26. - FCV-67-141 ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs 27 FCV-67-142 .ERCW .Up Cmpt Clrs 60*-

28. FCV-67-295 .ERCW -'Up Cmpt Clrs 60*-

29. FCV-67-296 ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs. 60*..

30. FCV-67-297 ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs 60*

31. FCV-67-298 ERCW - Up Cmpt Clrs- -60*

32. FCV-70-87 RCP Thermal Barrier Ret- 60:

33. FCV-70-89 CCS from RCP Oil Coolers 60

34. FCV-70-90 P Thermal' Barrier Ret 60

35. FCV-70-92 CC from RCP Oil Cool s- 60 .-

36. FCV-70-134 To R Thermal Barr* rs 60' -

37. FCV-70-140 CCS to P Oil C ers. 60 i

38. FCV-70-141' CCS to RC Oil oolers- 65 k-C. PHASE "A" CONTAINMENT VENT ISOLATION-

1. FCV-30-7 ' Upper ompt Purge r Supply _ 4*-

2. FCV-30-8 Up Compt Purge Ai upply ~ 4*-

3. FCV-30-9 per Compt. Purge Air ply. ~

4*

4. FCV-30-10 Upper ~ Compt-Purge Air Sup 4*

5. FCV-30-14 Lower Compt Purge' Air Suppl 4*

6. . FCV-30-15 . Lower Compt' Purge Air Supply ^ 4*_ ,

7. FCV-30-16 _. Lower Compt Purge. Air-Supply 4*- .

8. FCV-30-17 Lower Compt Purge' Air Supply. 4*

9. FCV-30-19 Inst Room Purge Air Supply- 4*'

10. ' FCV-30-20 Inst. Room Purge Air Supply . ~4*

11. FCV-30-37 -Lower Compt Pressure: Relief- *

12. FCV-30-40 Lower Compt Pressure Relief f4 September 9,'1988-3/4 6-22l SEQUOYAH -~ UNIT.l'. - Amendment'Nos..41~,-81) 86:

c - D 7 en we- Wfe _ew .e wrw w e y y p. a, q yya--- y w y, w. y _,.qn .y w y

~

=9

+:

TABLE 3.6-2 (Continued) ..

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES VALVE N"i ER FUNCTION MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME ( conds)

N C. PHASE "A NTAINMENT VENT ISOLATION (Cont.)

13. FCV-3 0 Upper Compt Purge Air Exh 4*

14. FCV-30-5 Upper Compt Purge' Air Exh

15. FCV-30-52 Upper Compt Purge Air Exh 4*

16. FCV-30-53 Upper Compt Purge Air Exh 4*

17. FCV-30-56 Lower Compt Purge Air Exh 4*

18. FCV-30-57 Lower Compt Purge Air Exh 4*

19. FCV-30-58 . Inst Room Purge Air Exh 4*

20. FCV-30-59 nst Room Purge Air Exh 4*

21. FCV-90-107 mt Bldg LWR Compt Air Mon 5*

22. FCV-90-108 Cnt Bldg LWR Compt Air Mon 5* g 23.

24.

FCV-90-109 FCV-90-110 Cntmt Cntmt B1 dg LWR Compt Air Mo LWR Compt Air n 5*

5*

g r.

25. FCV-90-111 Cntmt Bldg WR Compt Mon 5* h

26. FCV-90-113 Cntmt Bldg U Compt ir Mon 5*

27. FCV-90-114 Cntmt Bldg UPR .

Air Mon 5*

28. FCV-90-115 Cntmt Bldg UPR . t Air Mon 5*

29. FCV-90-116 Cntmt Bldg UP Comp ir Mon 5*

30. FCV-90-117 Cntmt Bldg R Compt Mon 5*

D. OTHER

1. FCV-30-46 Va Relief Isolation Valve 25

2. FCV-30-47 cuum Relief Isolation Valve 25

3. FCV-30-48 acuum Relief Isolation Valve 25

4.30-571 Vacuum Relief Valve **

5.30-572 Vacuum Relief Valves **

6.30-573 Vacuum Relief Valves **

7. FCV-62-90 Normal Charging Isolation Valve 12

Provisions of LCO .0.4 are not applicable if valve is secured in its isolated position wit power removed and leakage limits Specification 4.6.1.1.c are satisfied. For purge valves, leakage limits er surveillance Requirement .6.1.9.3 must also be satisfied.

Provisi s of LCO 3.0.4 are not applicable if valve is secured in its isolated position with power r oved and eith FCV-62-73 or FCV-62-74 is maintained operable.

- acuum relief valves perform a containment isolation function. The maximum isolation time is not applicab to these normally closed self-acting valves.

February 10, 1994 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 6-23 Amendment Nos. 37, 70, 82, 101, 176

PAmq eo EAW '88 /a ss oc. intx o ta i r- H 6Ac a cou r-mie/t.,4 e IT. 'd e_t tie,,w c. A e4 5.r4 A rf W ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS c v2 c.u. . r 3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION R46 3.8.3.1 M ntainment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices

'lsp(ciprey1njpproJ#iatyp1per i,pfyt dc3,itinjj shall be OPERABLE. % -

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and ru seers or re se r,e -scrwic a cn cas Ex e uu ou was t cueLw r-s t=e a w *' d G MD 'M ACTION: 1 pga w e.we,em n mm pr ,c, e,g,, a y S L6e rn. e- m Pte.%~ rot A-n o~ acst48 star "4 With one or more of the containmen pen rati conauctor UVercurrent protective- R46 devices t sn(cin4d inAppropyiate/tnany ins 1.rucJoorxl inoperable:

a. Restore the protective device (s) to OPERABLE status or de-energize the circuit (s) by tripping the associated backup circuit breaker within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and verify the backup circuit breaker to be tripped at least once per 7 days thereafter; the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable to overcurrent devices in circuits which have their backup circuit breakers tripped, or

. b. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.3.1 All containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices R46 ltpegifiefin gpproppiate DTant )hstrtpftioryq shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: I

a. At least once per 18 months:

1. For at least one 6.9 kV reactor coolant pump circuit, such that all reactor coolant pump circuits are demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 72 months, by performance of:

(a) A CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the associated protective relays specified in appropriate plant instructions, and fild (b) An integrated system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system and verifying that each relay and associated circuit breakers and control circuits function as designed.

fils e

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 8-15 Amendment No. 42, 110 April 3, 1989

~

i ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS.

Is SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) !

(c) For each circuit breaker found inoperable during these functional. f46 tests, an additional representative sample of at least 1 of the "

circuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be functionally i tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested.

9 lR114 .

i

2. .By selecting and functionally testing a representative sample of at -

least 10% of each type of lower voltage circuit breakers. Circuit breakers selected for functional testing shall be selected on a Ril4 -

rotating basis. The functional test shall consist of injecting a current input at.the specified setpoint to each selected circuit breaker and verifying that each circuit breaker functions as designed. Circuit breakers.found inoperable during functional testing shall be restored to OPERABLE status prior to resuming operation. For each circuit breaker found inoperable during these functional tests an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all the circuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested.

3. By selecting and verifying a representative sample of. each type of-fuse on a rotating basis. Verification will be accomplished as 3114 described by SR 4.8.3.1.a.3.a. Each representative sample of fuses- .,.

.shall include at least 10% of.all fuses of that type.I A co ete (

lpi ting y al1 __

neditiedinAcordancfeth in apgopriate prant i tructiops/

's fu Jes to De '

feauirpeent wiLVbe main .

Fu;es found inoperable during verification shall be replaced with OPERABLE fuses prior to resuming operation. For each fuse found inoperable during verification, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all fuses of that type shall be functionally tested until no.more failures are found or all fuses of that type have been functionally tested.

(a) A fuse verification and maintenance program will~ be maintained to ensure that:

1. The proper size and type of fuse is installed,

2. The fuse shows no sign of deterioration, and

3. The fuse connections are tight and clean.

b. At least once per 60 months by subjecting each circuit breaker to an inspection and preventive maintenance in accordance withlacrprp6riareA IDJWi pfruc t Mns bgedAl manu f acturer 's recommenda tions. Rll4 pgoucoudt.s /2nktMQ teJ Co es 7+r' Cf'o u " W *4 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 8-16 Amendment No. 4R 110 (Corrected page) ,

A-AO- %

April 3, 1989

. +

ELECTRICAL' POWER SYSTEMS MOTOR OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTICd LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.3.2 The thermal overload protection devices, integral with the motor R37 starter, of each valve LPisteEin Mble A.8-/2 h 1 be OPERABLE.

Ca mo w ss eer sysrrm APPLICABILITY: Whenever the motor opera n aive is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

With one or more of the thermal overload protection devices inoperable, declare g37 the affected valve (s) inoperable and apply the ACTION Statement to the affected valve (s).

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.3.2 The above required thermal overload protection devices shall be "3 -

demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 18 months by the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRA-TION of a representative sample of at least 25% of all thermal overload devices which are not bypassed, such that each non-bypassed device is calibrated at least once per 6 years.

b. At least once per 18 months, by the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the bypass circuitry for those thermal overload devices R132 which are normally in force during plant operation and bypassed under accident conditions.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 8-17 Amendment No. 33,80, 128 November 1, 1989

i j

L: '

w , ,s . .i

--TA8LE'3.8-2 MOTOR OPERATED VALVES-THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION -,

Valv No; Function

.1-FCV-1 5 Sta Supply to Aux FWP turbine' L1-FCV R65 Sta Supply to Aux FWP turbine.

FCV-1-1 ,Sta Supp y to Aux FWP turbine 1-FCV-1-18 Sta Supp y to Aux FWP. turbine :

1-FCV-1-51 TDAFW Pump Trip and Throttle Valve ** R132 1-FCV-62-138- Safe Shutdown Redundancy (CVCS) 1-FCV-63-1 ECCS Operation 1-FCV-63-3 SI Pump Mini-flow <

1-FCV-63 SI Pump Mini-flow ,

i 1-FCV-63-5 CS Flow Path 1-FCV-63-6 E S Operation .i 1-FCV-63-7 ECC. Operation 1-FCV-63-8 ECCS low Path 1-FCV-63-11 ECCS F h Path '

/LN2.-

1-FCV-63-22 ECCS F1 Path ~

1-FCV-63-47 Train Iso tion ,

1-FCV-63-48 Train Isola ion rtsd!Wff M 1-FCV-63-72 ECCS Flow Pa from Cont. S 1-FCV-63-73 ECCS Flow Path from Cont. S [4(45 8'/8 l 1-FCV-63-93 ECCS Cooldown F Path. 5 1-FCV-63-94 ECCS Cooldown Flo Path . g-/ 7 1-FCV-63-152 ECCS Recirc edFrdNM]

1-FCV-63-153 1-FCV-63-156 ECCS Recirc GKLA W . Y .

-ECCS Flow Path >

1-FCV-63-157 ECCS Flow Path 1-FCV-63-172 ECCS Flow Path 1-FCV-63-175. SI Pump Mini-f1 1-FCV-67-123 CSS Ht Ex Supp y 1 1-FCV-67-124 CSS Ht Ex Di harge 1-FCV-67-125 CSS Ht Ex 5 pply

'l-FCV-67-126 CSS Ht Ex ischarge 1-FCV-67-146 CCW Ht Throttling

, 0-FCV-67-205* Turb 8 g Hdr Isolation

0-FCV-67-208* Turb dg Hdr Isolation 1-FCV-68-332 Pre urizer PORV Block Valve R84

1-FCV-68-333 P ssurizer PORV Block Valve 0-FCV-70-1* PCS Hx Throttle '

0-FCV-70-11* SFPCS Hx Throttle-1-FCV-70-153 RHR Hx Outlet Isolation

.1-FCV-70-156 RHR Hx Outlet Isolation ,

0-FCV-70-1938 SFPCS Hdr Isolation R65 1 0-FCV-70-1948 SFPCS Ndr Isolation- !

0-FCV-70-19 SFPCS Ndr Isolation 0-FCV

SFPCS.Hdr Isolation '

0-FCV-70 06* CDWE Isolation

C n for Units 1 and 2

}* assed under accident conditions il {

>EQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 8-18 Amendment No. 33,61,84 12 i November 1, 1989

ll N

l 7-DrtLrr.rr ]

i> TABLE 3.8-2 (Continued)

MOTOR OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION I Valv No. Function 1-FCV- -207* CDWE Throttle R132 2-FCV-70 07* CDWE. Throttle 0-FCV 8* CDWE Isolation 1-FCV-72-20 Cont. Spray Pump Suction 1-FCV-72-21 Cont. Spray Pump Suction 1-FCV-72-22 Cont. Spray Pump Suction 1-FCV-72-23 . Cont. Spray Pump Suction 1-FCV-72-40 RHR Cont. Spray Isol.

1-FCV-72-41 RHR Cont. Spray Isol.

1-FCV-74-1 en for Normal Plant Cooldown 1-FCV-74-2 0 n for Normal Plant Cooldown R65 1-FCV-74-3 EC Operation 1-FCV-74-21 ECCS peration 1-FCV-74-33 ECCS eration 1-FCV-74-35 ECCS Op ation i

Commo for Units 1 and 2 QUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 8-19 Amendment No. 33,61,80, 1 8 November 1, 1989

3/4.6 ' CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS gg fM64M BASES

)

leakage paths to the auxiliary building is provided'in (K6/1 . Restricting the leakage through the' bypass leakage pathsLiti T/blg A.5-I to 0.25 L, provides assurance that the leakage fraction assumptions used in the evaluation of site ;

boundary radiation doses remain valid.

3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS i The limitations on closure and leak rate for the containment air locks i are required to meet the restrictions on CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and containment i leak rate. Surveillance testing of the air lock seals provide assurance that- -

the overall air lock leakage will not become excessive due to seal damage during the intervals between air lock leakage tests.

3/4.6.1.4 INTERNAL' PRESSURE .

~

The limitations on containment internal pressure ensure that-1) the containment structure is prevented from exceeding its design negative pressure differential with respect to the annulus atmosphere of 0.5 psig and 2) the containment peak pressure does not exceed the maximum allowable internal 3g pressure of 12 psig during LOCA conditions.

3/4.6.1.5 AIR TEMPERATURE ,

The limitations on containment average air temperature ensure that 1) the '

containment air mass is limited to an initial mass sufficiently low to prevent i BR s exceeding the maximum allowable internal pressure during LOCA conditions and 'i

2) the ambient air temperature does not exceed that temperature allowable for the continuous duty rating specified for equipment and instrumentation located !

within containment.

The containment pressure transient is sensitive to the initially contained -

air mass during a LOCA. The contained air mass increases with decreasing temperature. The lower temperature limits of 100*F for the lower compartment, l 85'F for the upper compartment, and 60*F when less than or equal to 5% of RATED '

THERMAL POWER will limit the peak pressure to an acceptable value.- The upper gg temperature limit influences the peak accident temperature slightly during a-LOCA; however, this limit is based primarily upon equipment protection and anticipated operating conditions. Both the upper and lower temperature limits ;

are consistent with the parameters used in the accident analyses. ,

3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT VESSEL STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment ]

steel vessel will be maintained comparable to the original design standards '

for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to ensure that BR the vessel will withstand the maximum pressure of 12 psig in the event of a LOCA. A visual inspection in conjunction with Type A leakage tests is sufficient to demonstrate this capability, ii SEQUOYAH - UNIT I B 3/4 6-2 Amendment No. 102, 127, 176 February 10, 1994

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES i l

3/4.6.1.8 EMERGENCY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM (EGTS)

The OPERABILITY of the EGTS cleanup subsystem ensures that during LOCA conditions, containment vessel leakage into the annulus will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber trains prior to discharge to FP '

the atmosphere. This requirement is necessary to meet the assumptions used in the accident analyses and limit the site boundary radiation doses to within i the limits of 10 CFR 100 during LOCA conditions. Cumulative operation of the system with the heaters on for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months over a 31 day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the absorbers and HEPA filters. ANSI N510-1975 3113 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.

3/4.6.1.9 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM Use of the containment purge lines is restricted to only one pair (one supply line and one exhaust line) of purge system lines at a time to ensure that the site boundary dose guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event of a loss of coolant accident during purging operations. The analysis of this accident assumed purging through the largest pair of lines (a 24 inch inlet line and a 24 inch outlet line), a pre-existing iodine spike in the reactor coolant and four second valve closure times.

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SUBSYSTEMS

~

R154 The OPERABILITY of the containment spray subsystems ensures that contain-

_e ment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.6.2.2 CONTAINMENT COOLING FANS The OPERABILITY of the lower containment vent coolers ensures that ade- R71 quate heat removal capacity is available to provide long-term cooling following a non-LOCA event. Postaccident use of these coolers ensures containment tem-peratures remain within environmental qualification limits for all safety-related equipment required to remain functional.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES Thy /valvp[ idepififfed jfi Tjdl/3.g-2/re/ogaipdenJ/ispfatfor1/vafveUsd ht efinep per40 CFV50/LThe opbrability of ltJ1esticorttairiment isolation valves ensures tha't the 'contai~nment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the contain- R1d ment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment. Containment isolation l within the time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive mate-rial to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a loss of coolant accident.

Additional valves have been identified as barrier valves, which in addition to the containment isolation valves discussed above, are a part of the accident monitoring instrumentation in Technical Specification 3/4.3.3.7 and 1

' T are designated as Category 1 in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.97,

~.) Revision 2, " Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to ;

Assess Plant Conditio lowing an Accident," December 1980. l SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 MIN 3/4 6-3 Amendment No. 67, 114, 150 159 July 9, 1992 !

l

nr

.~

3-p C INSERT A k-The opening ~ of penetration flow path (s) on an intermittent basis under administrative control includes the following considerations:- . .

(1) stationing an operator :who is in constant communication'with the e

control room,-at the valve controls, (2) instructing.the operator to close these valves in an accident situation, and.(3) assuring that the environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment. LFor valves with controls located'in the contro11 room,-these-conditions can be satisfied by including a specific reference'to closing ,

the particular valves in the emergency procedures, since communication .;

and environmental factors are not affected because of the location of the valve controls. ,

v 1

I L

t

)

y

,- 1 l E, ;, H 4 .

s DEFINITIONS.

CHANNEL' FUNCTIONAL TEST R63 1.6 'A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be:

? i a.- Analog channels - the injection of a~ simulated signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including i

% o alarm and/or trip functions. j b 'b . Bistable channels - the injection of. a simulated signal into the . l sensor to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

f f. 1 J

T c. Dig' ital channels - the injection of a simulated signal-into the chan-

.nel as close to the sensor input to the process racks as practicable al32

)

~

y- to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

}

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY R63

.1. 7 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

)

a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either: .

g 1) Capable of.being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic '

PJ - isolation valve system, or y, 2) Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or' deactivated automatic !

1t te . [ valves secured in their closed positions, excep apr prpv1apa 1pl-IJabM 34-24MSpecification 3.6.3.

-l T' )r

~

b. All equipment hatches are closed and sealed,

c. Each air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification R3 3.6.1.3,

, kI 4

d. The containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specifica-tien 4.6.1.1.c, R167-j4 e. The sealing mechansim associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, f _

g1 bellows, or 0-rings) is OPERABLE, and A f. Secondary containment bypass leakage is.within the limits of Speci- 1 fication 3.6.1.2.

R63 CONTROLLED LEAKAGE . ,

1.8 CONTROLLED LEAKAGE shall be that seal water flow supplied to the reactor .

coolant pump seals.

. CORE ALTERATION R63 1.9 CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement or manipulation of any component :

within.the reactor pressure vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATION shall not preclude completion.of.

movement of a component to a safe conservative position. ,

CORE OPERATING LIMIT REPORT 1.10 The CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR) is the unit-specific document R146 r that provides core operating limits for the current operating reload cycle.

These cycle-specific core operating limits shall be determined for each reload cycle in accordance with Specification 6.9.1.14. Unit operation within these operating limits is addressed in individual specifications.

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 1-2 Amendment No. 63,117,132,146, 167 February 10, 1994

,3e = . _ .

a 3/4.6' CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

' 3 /4.6.1- PRIMARY CONTAINMENT i CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY-t i t LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION' ,

, ' 3.6.1.1- Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained. ;

[

APPLICABILITY: ; MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

4: .

(1,3kWithoutprimaryCONTAINMENTINTEGRITY,restoreCONTAINMENTINTEGRITYwithin .

';$ * - one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD

SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . '

f

- g_ l SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS ya

( 4.6.1.1' Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ~shall be demonstrated:

j a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations

not i

a capable:of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are s j} - closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves s

'g secured in their positions, exce [pt Drovidef in TAleg.6-Vof Snecification 3.6.3.

4k b. By verifying that each containment air lock is in compliance with the . requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3.

3117 l g

4 c. Perform required visual examinations and leakage rate testing at Pa R167 in accordance with 10 CFR 50,-Appendix J, as modified by approved !

t.1 exemptions. The maximum allowable leakage rate, L , is 0.25% of 3

? ~

containment air weight per day at the calculated p,eak containment g

,y_jf.

g pressure P.,12 psig.

f i

f

Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are ;

located inside the annulus or containment or the main steam valve vaults and are l

. locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations R183 l shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that such verification ;

need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.

r SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 6-1 Amendment No. . 117, 167, 183 November 22, 1994

1 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS R167 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BYPASS LEAKAGE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION R167 3.6.1.2 Secondary Containment bypass leakage rates shall be limited to a combined bypass leakage rate of less than.or equal to 0.25 L, for all 6enpffiedAn TaJb e 3.6/1481 secondary containment BYPASS LEAKAGE penetrationsp' PATHS TO THE AUXILIARY BUIMING when s pres' urized to P,.

L - ,

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. 7mr- 4,e e ACTION:

With the combined bypass leakage rate exceeding 0.25 L for BYPASS LEAXAGE PATHSTOTHEAUXILIARYBUILDING,restorethecombinedbypassleakageratefrom BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS TO THE AUX!LIARY BUILDING to less than or equal to 0.25 L within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLDSHUTDOWNwithinthefollowing30 hours.

1 t

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 6-2 Amendment No. 63, 167 February 10, 1994 l

r=;- - a ,

4 l, .T - pcj i

'yf ; 1 -.;

>s t'e 4

-([ l_ l s.- .

(

,.s..

b P

k r

O#8 T

[Y rMeokk4' ? / --6 ( - ,

)

jA%/pjesp]fntentionally deleted - .

t i

11

~I I

+'

1 i

~

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 6-4 Amendment No. 63,90,104,117,126, 167 February 10. 1994'

m:

., \

m TABLE 3.6-1 2 BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING g SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS 1

PENETRATION DESCRIPTION RELEASE LOCATION E .

p X-2A- Personnel Lock Auxiliary Area y X-28' Personnel Lock Auxiliary Area X-3 uel Transfer Tube Auxiliary Area X-15* Le own Auxiliary Are X-23r Posta ident Sampling, Hot Leg 3 Auxiliary ea X-25A* Pressuri Gas Sample Auxilia Area X-250 Pressurizer iquid Sample Auxi 'ary Area X-26Be Control Air iliary Area X-27C* ILRT uxiliary Area X-29 CCS Auxiliary Area X-30 Accumulator Fill Auxiliary Area X-34 Control Air T) m Auxiliary Area iN

} X-35 CCS Auxiliary Area r R63

, X-39A- N2 to Accumulators Auxiliary Area A J, X-39B' N2 to Pressurizer Relie ank Auxiliary Area X-40D' Hydrogen Purge Auxiliary Area k'

X-41 Normal RB Sump Auxiliary Area X-42 Primary Water iliary Area.

X-44 RCP Seal W r Injection Return Auxi "ary Area X RC Drai ank Auxilia Area X-46 RC D n Tank Auxiliary ea X-47A' G col Auxiliary Are X-478- lycol Auxiliary Area X-50A' CCS Auxiliary Area p X-50B' -CCS Auxiliary Area wg X-51 Fire Protection Auxiliary Area

-g X-52' -

CCS to RCP Oil Cooler Auxiliary Area

?g X-56. ERCW Auxiliary Area g X-57. ERCW Auxiliary Area sp .

~~

m TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING g SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BYPASS LEAKAGE-PATHS z

PENETRA N DESCRIPTION RELEASE LOCATION C

3 X-58: ERCW Auxiliary Area y: X-59 ERCW Auxiliary Area X-60: ERCW Auxiliary Area-X-61' ERCW Auxiliary Ar

- X-62' CW Auxiliary ea-X-63* ER .

Auxili Area '

X-64. A/C C

led kater (ERCW) Aux' ary Area X-65s A/C Chil l Water (ERCW) iliary Area C-66 A/C Chilled ter (ERCW) Auxiliary Area-X-67 A/C Chilled Wa (ERCW) Auxiliary Area X-68: ERCW Auxiliary Area

-X ERCW Auxiliary A n - R R

X-70, ERCW Auxiliary i X-71 ERCW Auxiliary Area 3 i

X-72. ERCW Auxiliary Area M X-73, ERCW Auxiliary Area

- X ERCW Auxiliary Area X-75 ERCW Auxiliary Area-X Service Air Auxiliary Area X-775 Deminera ~ ed Water iliary Area.

X Fire P tection Auxi 'ary Area X-82 Fu Pool Auxilia Area X-83* el Pool R65l Auxiliary ea X-84Aa Pressurizer Relief Tank Gas Sample Auxiliary Are

> X-85Ai Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Auxiliary Area X-90 Control Air Auxiliary Area gg {E X-91 Postaccident Sampling, Hot' Leg 1 Auxiliary Area- n6 "2

. .G a I

l ?U

if

.]-

TABLE 3.6-1 (Continued)

Ei BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING y SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BYPASS LEAKAGE PATHS Y

z -

e PENETRA MN DESCRIPTION RELEASE LOCATION C a i'i X-92A Hydrogen Analyzer Auxiliary Ar ,lR79.

" X-93',B Accumulator Sample Auxiliary ea X-94A,B,C Radiation Sample Auxilia- Area X-95A,B,C Radiation Sample Auxil* ry Area lR79 l

X-96C Hot Leg Sample Au fary Area X-98 RT xiliary Area X-99 Hy gen Analyzer Auxiliary Area R79 X-100 Hydro Analyzer _

Auxiliary Area -

X-101 Postacci nt Sampling, Containment Auxiliary Area X-103 Postaccide Sampling, Liquid Auxiliary Area R63 Discharge t Containment -

X-106 Postaccident S ing, Air Discharge to Con inment Auxiliary Area gg R

X-108 Maintenance Penetrat on Auxiliary Area r X-109 Maintenance Penetrati Auxiliary Area R131 g i X-114 Ice Condenser Auxiliary Area t F '

X-115 Ice Condenser -

Auxiliary Area R63 b X-116A Postaccident Spapling, Auxiliary Area Containee ( Air Sample N

it c "

co

& N

~

ee '

e.C ,0 e

a w

% . - . = - ._ , . , _ _ . _ _ _ _ _m _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . .

CONTAItNEf.~ sysTr'.~ c;

/ff?CH C647ArNMA T* / SQL ATiM VIALV!I 3 /4.6. 3 CONTAI!ME!!T ISOLATION VALVES Sg4tL. /36 ON/2Adt et . N-A e LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION .

3.6.)}The onta 4 .. ment sola nv ves dei 'ed in 4 age [6- /shafi b(l -

ith *,olat' n ti _s as ahown T le 3. - 2.[

lOPERABL do^> N'd " # # #

APPLICABILIH : MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. 'EXCdAF

' ACTION:

I SO 'M' a.

With one or more of the isolati on valve (s hIndiffed tr[Secyfor/ A,M, N i

fapd D,X tpfou;K D.yot Tablp/3.67 2] inoperable, maintain at least one.

isolation val .'e OPERABLE in each af f ected penetration tha t is open and either:

1. Restore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ,'or

2. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position,. or

3. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at least one closed manual valve.or blind flange, or

4. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the ner.t 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

With one or more containment vacuum relief isolation valve (s) isAckfied i<fj iseptiony D. Vthro6ch If. 3 of T/bleA . 6-E inoperable , the valve (s) must be b.

returned to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the ner.t 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the f ollowing p

9 30_ hours.

Of* Cf4*C itC/C M2*d 3. Os .// Do N or* s9t# f'-f o

. 77/4" / Ostfo Vl5/0H 3 ^ ^ '

SURVEILbuiCE REQUIRbMENTS 4.d . 3.bfThe i ation v ves spe ied in le 3. 6f 'l shall e demor trated repair r E pri to ret ning the alve to rvice a /' er main nance tor, c . trol A repPE cemen" work is erformed n the va e or ice associa- d act o" power ircuit perfo.. ce of a oteling t t and v _ifica- 'on of - olati .

,ime.

/ /' .

ftVrH (C) p?t i$4 iSoL Pl~K D Y fis Mrte Mo.J f&o w i~raanirrrwr wa am. n,~ , s ra nrwa - eivr,eo s.

~ ~

SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 6-17

& y l '

. >e '

E' ', ( CONT AINMENT'~ SYSTEMS

+ .

45'URVEILLANCEREOUIREMENTS(Continued)

,- .a Wrm ric.to-r eer _

l .CT.f,I-F.ach isolation valvelscicif4d WTabV' .64lsh'all 3 be demonstrated.-

.0PERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at'least once per 18 J ,

month. oy:

~

a. Verifying that on a Phase A containment isolation test signal, each

' Phase A isolation, valve actuates:to its isolation position.

d

b. Verifying that on a Phase B containment -isolation test signal, each' Phase B isolation valve actuates to itsuisolation position.-

e c. Verifying that on a Containment Ventilation isolation test signal, each Containment: Ventilation Isolation valve actuates to its-isolation position. i

d. Verifying that' on a'high 'c ontainment pressure isolation test signal, R72-each Containment- Vacuum Relief Valve actuates to its isolation position.

e. Verifying that on a Safety Injection test. signal that the Normal 90 Charging Isolation valve actuates to_its 4.6.3.3 Ine isolation time of each power operated or automatictvalve @d3 l}6bl( 3/6-2ishall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to ,,

_ Specification 4.0.5. g R109 I

a e

f 3/4 6-18 Amendment No.'72, 90, 104, 109 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 July 5, 1989 cd

7 . . - -- - ,

y+m w ~ _ 3

~

i .

~ '

u, TABLE 3.6 E .

8 CONTAINNENT ISOLATION VALVES 5lE

VALVE NUPEE FUNCTION MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIE (Se s)

E A. FHASE "A" I TION -

Z m 1. FCV-1-7 SG Blow Dn 10* - -

2. FCV-1-14 SG Blow Dn a R29- --

3. FCV-1-25 SG Blow Dn 10* _m

4. FCV-1-32 SG' Blow Dn 10*' E

5. DELETED )' j a.J g i g' , ,

6. DELETED -t-o-

Safe Shutdown Redundancy (CVCS) R115 g .
2-FCV-62-138 2-FCV-63-1 ECCS Operation 2-FCV-63-3 SI Pump Mini-flow 2-FCV-63-4 I Pump Mini-flow 2-FCV-63-5 E 5 Flow Path 2-FCV-63-6 EC Operation 2-FCV-63-7 ECCS peration 2-FCV-63-8 ECCS ow Path 2-FCV-63-11 ECCS F1 w Path 2-FCV-63-22 ECCS Flo Path 2-FCV-63-47 Train Iso tion fpp 2-FCV-63-48 Train Isola ion e RS3 2-FCV-63-72 ECCS Flow Pa from Cont. Sum 2-FCV-63-73 ECCS Flow Path from Cont. S p 2-FCV-63-93 ECCS Cooldown F w Path 2-FCV-63-94 ECCS Cooldown F1 Path 2-FCV-63-152 ECCS Recirc g,55 //<f 8-/ 5' r/f@up//
2-FCV-63-153 ECCS Recirc 2-FCV-63-156 ECCS Flow Path gp p f g jayga no a c'yj 2-FCV-63-157 ECCS Flow Path i 2-FCV-63-172 ECCS Flow Path PCWFG D 2-FCV-63-175 SI Pump Mini-flo -
2 J 2-FCV-67-123 CSS Ht Ex Supp 2-FCV-67-124 CSS Ht Ex Dis arge 2-FCV-67-125 CSS Ht Ex 5 ply 2-FCV-67-126 CSS Ht Ex scharge ;
2-FCV-67-146 CCW Ht E hrottling 0-FCV-67-205* Turb B1 Hdr Isolation 0-FCV-67-208* Turb B dg Hdr Isolation !
2-FCV-68-332 Pres rizer PORV Block Valve !
2-FCV-68-333 Pre surizer PORV Block Valve R71 0-FCV-70-1* SF CS Hx Throttle i 0-FCV-70-11" PCS Hx Throttle 2-FCV-70-153 RHR Hx Outlet Isolation >
2-FCV-70-156 RHR Hx Outlet Isolation i 0-FCV-70-193* SFPCS Hdr Isolation 0-FCV-70-194* SFPCS Hdr Isolation '
R53 i 0-FCV-70-197* SFPCS Hdr Isolation '
0-FCV-70-19 SFPCS Hdr Isolation
- 0-FCV-70-2
CDWE Isolation i
1-FCV 07* COWE Throttle -
2-FCV-7 207* CDWE Throttle Ril5 I
mmon for Units 1 and 2
Bypassed under accident conditions .
R 5l EQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 8-19 Amendment No. 25,53,71, '
5 November 1, 1989 N
+
= . - - - -
O, !
-?, \ { pgss.rtt. ; '
TABLE 3.8-2 (Continued). ;
MOTOR OPERATED VALVES THERMAL 0VERLOAD' PROTECTION
-. (.
~ Valve . Function .
0-FCV 08* CDWE' Isolation: i 2-FCV-72-2 Cont.1 Spray Pump Suction
2-FCV-72-21 Cont. Spray Pump' Suction :
2-FCV-72 Cont. Spray Pump Suction.
2-FCV-72-23 1 Cont. Spray Pump Suction 2-FCV-72-40. RHR Cont Spray Isol.
2-FCV-72-41 :RHR Cont. Spray Isol.
2-FCV-74 pen'for. Normal Plant'Cooldown 2-FCV-74-2 en for Normal Plant Cooldown: .
2-FCV-74 EC S Operation 2-FCV-74-21 ECC Operation 2-FCV-74-33 ECCS eration' >
2-FCV-74-35' ECCS 0 ration .
,)
R53 0 i
.i
.- dih.h.
A q l
'i r
t i
}
Common ~f Units 1 and 2 g.
5%U0YAH-UNIT 2 3/4 8-20 Amendment No. 25,53,71' :
7
/ August 16, 1988
\ !
i f N l l
l I- -- .s
3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS p p puceou M S-BASES -
\ - -
P leakage paths to the auxiliary' building is' provided inW61/3(64. Restricting the leakage through the bypass leakage pathsgryTa)Te/y6-J to 0.25 L, provides assurance that the leakage fraction assumptions used in the evaluation of site boundary radiation doses remain valid.
3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS i
The limitations on closure and leak rate for the containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and containment leak rate. Surveillance testing of the air lock seals provide assurance that ,
the overall air lock leakage will not become excessive due to seal damage during the intervals between air lock leakage tests.
E4.6.1.4 INTERNAL PRESSURE The limitations on containment internal pressure ensure that 1) the containment structure is prevented from exceeding (,s design negative pressure differential with respect to the annulus atmospher e of 0.5 psig and 2) the containment peak pressure does not exceed the maximum allowable internal BR pressure of 12 psig during LOCA conditions.
3/4.6.1.5 AIR TEMPERATURE The limitations on containment average air temperature ensure that 1) the ,
cantainment air mass is limited to an initial mass sufficiently low to prevent BR exceeding the maximum allowable internal pressure during LOCA conditions and 3
2) the ambient air temperature does not exceed that temperature allowable for )
he continuous duty rating specified for equipment and instrumentation located within containment. l The containment pressure transient is sensitive to the initially contained air mass during a LOCA. The contained air mass increases with decreasing temperature. The lower temperature limits of 100*F for the lower compartment, BR 85'F for the upper compartment, and 60*F when less than or equal to 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER will limit the peak pressure to an acceptable value. The upper temperature limit influences the peak accident temperature slightly during a LOCA; however, this limit is based primarily upon equipment protection and anticipated operating conditions. Both the upper and lower temperature limits are consistent with the parameters used in the accident analyses.
3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT VESSEL STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment steel vessel will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to ensure that sa the vessel will withstand the maximum pressure of 12 psig in the event of a LOCA. A visual inspection in conjunction with Type A leakage tests is sufficient to demonstrate this capability.
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-2 Amendment No. 91, 139, 167 February 10, 1994 l
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
. BASES 3/4.6.1.8 EMERGENCY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM (EGTS)
The OPERABILITY of the EGTS cleanup subsystem ensures that during LOCA conditions, containment vessel leakage into the annulus will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber trains prior to discharge to the atmosphere. This requirement is necessary to meet the assumptions used in the accident analyses and limit the site boundary radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR 100 during LOCA conditions. Cumulative operation of the system with the heaters on for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months over a 31 day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the absorbers and HEPA filters. ANSI N510-1975 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.
3/4.6.1.9 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM Use of the containment purge lines is restricted to only one pair (one supply line and one exhaust line) of purge system lines at a time to ensure that the site boundary dose guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event of a loss of coolant accident during purging operations. The analysis of this accident assumed purging through the largest pair of lines (a 24 inch inlet line and a 24 inch outlet line), a pre-existing iodine spike in the reactor coolant and four second valve closure times.
3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SUBSYSTEMS ni40 The OPERABILITY of the containment spray subsystems ensures that contain-ment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.
3/4.6.2.2 CONTAINMENT COOLING FANS The OPERABILITY of the lower containment vent coolers ensures that ade-quate heat removal capacity is available to provide long-term cooling following R59 a non-LOCA event. Postaccident use of these coolers ensures containment tem-peratures remain within environmental qualification limits for all safety-related equipment required to remain functional, 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES
~Daxr6 //Th/valy6s %ent/f.Md M Ta#Te M6-2/re/c/ndMmentAso1Afion/valy6s pfl Mfef4nal peV10 4FR 50. I The operability of Ith/sricontainment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside
, environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the contain- R149 ment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment. Containment isolation within the time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive mate-rial to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a loss of coolant accident.
Additional valves have been identified as barrier valves, which in addition to the containment isolation valves discussed above, are a part of the accident monitoring instrumentation in Technical Specification 3/4.3.3.7 and T are designated as Category 1 in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.S7,
,/ Revision 2, " Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1980.
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 M ## 4 6-3 Amendment No. 59, 140 149 July 9, 1992
- t ,
qt _
c(c t 14- -
11
,I
-INSERT AL J
.c1 .
6
~
' , The ' opening' of penetration flow path (s) Lon: an -intermittent basisf under .; ~
s
' administrative controliincludes'the.following considerations:: .
~(1)Lstationing'an. operator, who is in~ constant. communication with the
'contro1(room. at.the valve controls,f(2) instructing the operator'to; ;
> close:these' valves in an accident ~ situation,'and (3)l assuring that.;.the; t
environmental conditions'will:not preclude access to closeLthe valves'and ;
ithat this action' willl prevent the release: of radioactivity outside' the!
containment. For' valves with controls located in the control room, these. ,
conditions--can be satisfied by including al specific reference ~to. closing ;
the.particular valvesJin the emergency procedures, since' communication .;
and environmental factors'are not affected because'of the location of the ,j valve controls.
e I
-i R
i i
i I
I
?
i h
5 4"
- .- y- -
' hi
=_; . ;g, -
y s ENCLOSURE 2- r PROPOSED TECHNICAL' SPECIFICATION.(TS) CHANGE ;
L:' '
O !
-SEQUOYAH. NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 ,
DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 (TVA-SQN-TS-95-05) i DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION FOR DELETION OF-COMPONENT TABLES ,
P t
=.
t
'I r
i 8
f
)
, ;;4, . nT Description of Channe TVA proposes to modify;the'Sequoyah' Nuclear-Plant (SQN) Units 1 and 2
Technica1' Specifications (TSs) by deleting the component. tables from TS'3.6.1, " Primary Containment"; TS 3.6.3, " Containment Isolation Valves"; ,
and TS.3.8.3.2, " Motor Operated Valve Thermal Overload Protection." ;
j Generic Letter (GL) 91-08, " Removal of Component Lists From Technical .
Specification," provides guidance and justification for the' removal.of-
.these component tables. ;
~
For Definition 1.7.a.2, " Containment Integrity," the reference to Table:3.6-2 will be deleted and a phrase added that allows. valves to be opened that are under administrative control.
Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.6.1.1.a will-be revised to delete the reference to Table 3.6-2 and insert a phrase that refers to open valves that are under administrative control.
TS 3.6.1.2 will be revised to delete the reference to Table 3.6-1.
Table 3.6-1 will be deleted.
TS 3.6.3 will be revised to delete all reference to Table 3.6-2. In addition, a footnote will be added to discuss.the' opening of. penetrations intermittently. Because of TS Change 93-04, Revision 2, the' phrase
" except Containment Vacuum Isolation Valve (s)," will be added. Also, Action "c" will be.added to state that TS 3.0.4 does not apply. (Note, for other changes to TS 3.6.3, refer to TS Change 93-04,. Revision 2,-
. submitted to NRC on February.10, 1995.)
-SR 4.6.3.1 will be deleted and the word " DELETED" added.
SRs 4.6.3.2 and 4.6.3.3 will be revised to delete the reference to Table 3.6-2. . SR 4.6.3.2 will have the words." automatic containment" added. Additional wording will'be added to provide agreement with ,
GL 91-08.
Table 3.6-2 will be deleted to include the footnotes. ,
TS 3.8.3.1 will be revised to read: " Primary and backup containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices associated with each containment electrical penetration circuit shall be OPERABLE." Based on !
GL.91-08, the following sentence will be added: "The scope'of these ,
protective devices excludes those circuits for which credible fault- ;
currents would not exceed the electrical penetration design rating."
TS 3.8.3.1 action statement will have the phrase "specified in appropriate' plant instructions" deleted.
SR 4.8.3.1 will have the same phrase deleted as the action statement.
I SR 4.8.3.1.a.3 will have the sentence stating that "A complete listing of all fuses . . ." removed.
l l
L' '
W ~ ^' ~ ^ ^^ ^ ~ ~ ~ " ' '
a lT & l'* ~ ;
Jyy f-g3 m.
c;; ,
w .
,/ 1 or SR 4'.8.3.1.b wil1<have:the. phrase " appropriate: plant instructions based on deleted andl replaced with'." procedures prepared in conjunction. with."
<> TS'3.8.3.2 will be, revised:to delete the' reference to Table-3.8-2 and'
. additional wording is: supplied that agrees with-that provided'in GL 91-08.-
'^
, . Table 3.8-2'will be deleted.- l Section 3/4.6.1.2-of.the bases will'be revised to delete the reference toz
~ Table' 3.6-1 'and the . wording '.' plant procedures'? added.-- ,
1 Theireference'to Table 3.6-2 has been deleted. ~This will'cause the word.
[j "these" to be deleted from the next sentence. A paragraph will be added~ q 7 .to the bases of TS 3/4.6.3 to provide the necessary direction.to :'
administrative 1y control;the opening and. closing of containment penetration flow paths.. .
Renaan for ch= age :
r The removal of component listings from the TS is s'line-item improvement d
-based on industry. efforts and GL 91-08.. By removing these tables, a- ;
Licensing Amendment Request will not be required when'a modification or :
regulatory issue adds or deletes a component. This change'will provide:a resource saving to both TVA and NRC.
By-removing SR 4.6.3.1, the conflict between postmaintenance' testing (PMT) .l of manual and automatic containment isolation valves can'be eliminated. j Justification of r'h nare l l-The proposed changes to the.TS are consistent with the guidance provided in GL 91-08. This guidance provides an acceptable-alternative to identify various~ safety-related. components by.Its unique identification number in various-tables in the TS. The proposed change will delete Tables 3.6-1,
1. - .
3.6-2, and 3.8-2.from the TSs and: relocate'to administratively controlled procedures.
. With the deletion of Table 3.6-2, the. footnotes.will also be deleted. 'On 4 January 24, 1985, NRC issued Amendments 31'and-29:to SQN Units ~1 and 2,--. !
respectively. In this change,'two footnotes were added pertaining'to the ;
TS 3.0.4 exception. One established'a set of valves in the table that applied to this exception.- The second pertained to the operability:
requirement of the letdown orifice valves as it is related to the TS 3.0.4 exception. These exceptions now apply to all containment-isolation.
valves. The increase in.the scope of this exception is' acceptable because ..
it-is consistent with the guidance provided in GL 87-09. The footnote ';
pertaining to the vacuum relief valves may be deleted because TS 3.6.3 now 1 7 applies to all containment isolation valves. 1 SR:4.6.3.1 may be. removed based on the requirement to perform FMT. LPMT q ensures that the equipment meets all SRs prior to restoring equipment to an operable status. The requirement to perform PMT is implicit-in'the ,
definition of "0PERABILITY" and'as such does' not need to be restated .1
. separately in the SR section. This change differs from the guidance of GL 91-08, but is consistent with NUREG 1431.
1 l
% j b{
'l I
As a clarification to SR 4.6.3.2, the word " automatic containment" has been added. The word automatic-is needed to. clarify that SR 4.6.3.2 is only dealing with valves thatLreceive an isolation signal. An additional ;
change is proposed to' revise the GL 91-08 wording of " Locked or sealed..."
to " Penetration flow path (s)..." contained in.the TS 3.6.3 operability qualifier. This change is needed to allow power operated valves to be-intermittently administrative 1y opened. These two changes differ from the. ,
guidance of GL 91-08, but are consistent with NUREG 1431.
A-new paragraph will be added to the basis of TS 3/4.6.3. The' purpose.of this paragraph is to define the conditions necessary to administrative 1y control containment isolation valves. This new paragraph is identical to !
that provided in GL.91-08 except that an additional sentence has been added and the phrase " penetration flow path (s)" is substituted for " locked i or sealed closed containment isolation valves." This new sentence provides additional guidance pertaining to valves with controls in the l control room. As with the valves that have controls external to the control room, these valves will be governed by administrative 1y controlled procedures (i.e., Emergency Operating Procedures [EOPs]). Closure of these valves under the constraints of the E0Ps ensures that the dose rate i remains within the limits of 10 CFR 100. The replacement of " locked or l sealed..." again is consistent with the wording in NUREG 1431. )
Environmental Impact Evaluation The proposed change request does not involve an unreviewed' environmental question because operation of SQN Units 1 and 2 in accordance with this l change would not:
1. Result in a significant increare in any adverse environmental impact previously evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement (FES) as modified by the Staff's testimony to the Atomic Safety and Licensing ,
Board, supplements to the FES, environmental impact appraisals, or l decisions of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.
2. Result in a significant change in effluents or power levels.
3. Result in matters not previously reviewed in the licensing basis for ,
SQN that may have a significant environmental impact. '
I l
)
P
n. .f,-- & 4- b af"-- u 8a.-. .-nh s y 8 *-
t,'
/l . , ;. ,r'Q';
I V 9 Enclosure 3- 4 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION' CHANGE- .
4 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR . PIANT ' UNITS 1. AND . 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328
('IVA-SQN-TS-95-05 )
DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION
, 'i
?
?
I A
l I
l
.L ' '
@l yfs! '
p Significant Hazards Evaluation
. WA has' evaluated the proposed technical' specification (TS) change and'has
- t determined that_ it does not' represent a :significant hazards consideration based'on criteria established in 10 CFR'50.92(c). Operation:of Sequoyah Nuclear: Plant'(SQN)'in accordance with the. proposed amendment will:not:
Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of -i
~
. 1.
an accident previously evaluated.
The' removal of the component listings from the SQN TSs will not create an' increase'in the probability or consequences of any accident-previously evaluated. .Although no longer in the TSs,' the' components' 1
^
listed in Tables 3.6-1, 3.6-2, and 3.8-2 will be contained in-administrative 1y' controlled documents.: This equipment must be. tested at the required intervals and each unit's action statements must'- ,
still be adhered to. :These procedures are revised and approved in- J accordance with requirements of TS Section 6.5.1A. This review process also requires an evaluation based on 10 CFR 50.59 ~
requirements. As indicated in GL 91-08, this is adequate control'for changes to these component lists. ,
2. ' Create the possibility-of a new or different kind of accident from' i any previously analyzed.
The removal of the component lists:from the TSs does not modify U safety-related equipment or systems, nor does it change any 'I safety-related setpoints used to. prevent or mitigate previously >
analyzed accidents. The component-lists are presently. located in separate documents that are subject to the requirements.of- i 10 CFR 50.59. Also, the limiting condition of operation requirements remain in effect'and appropriate actions will be taken'if-any' limits-are exceeded. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create the. ;
possibility of a new or different kind of accident:from any accident !
previously evaluated.
3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The margin of safety is not affected by the removal of the previously discussed component lists from the TS. Appropriate measures presently exist to control the setpoint of the' components listed.
Any changes to these setpoints are controlled by the SQN design change process that is subject to the requirements.of 10 CFR 50.59 in ,
which the reduction of the present margin of safety is addressed.
The proposed amendment continues to require operation within the set values for these components, and appropriate actions to be taken when or if the limits are exceeded. Based on these controls, this amendment will not involve a reduction in a margin of safety.
l 1
l l
l
_ _ _ __

ML20082E587

Text

Navigation menu

Search