ML20081K870
| ML20081K870 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 10/28/1983 |
| From: | Rubenstein L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Novak T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20079F427 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-84-35 NUDOCS 8311110263 | |
| Download: ML20081K870 (49) | |
Text
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UNTreD STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Is WASHINGTON. D. C. 20005 00128 W 1
MEMORANDUM FOR: Thomas M. Novak Assistant Director for Licensing, Division of Licensing NRR FROM:
L. S. Rubenstein Ass 1sant Director for Core and Plant Systems, Division cf Systems Integration, NRR
SUBJECT:
SHEAR 0N HARRIS SER UPDATE (DOCKET N05. 50-400/401)
Reference:
Letter from M. A. McDuffie (CP&L) to Harold R. Denton (USNRC) dated Oc+aber 11, 1983 Based upon new infonnation (Reference), we 'have closed out the open items in some sections of our SER forwarded to you by memorandum of September 14, 1983.
The sections which have been closed are:
3.6.1 - Pipe Breaks 9.1.1 - New Fuel Storage 9.1.2 - Spent Fuel Storage 9.1.4 - Light Load Handling System 9.2.1 - Service Water System 9.2.9 - Nonessential Services Chilleo Water System 9.4.5'- Engineered Safety Feature Ventilation System Copies of these updated sections are enclosed.
Note that our review of the new fuel and spent fuel storage areas (SER Sections 9.1.1 and 9.1.2, respectively) includes the feasibility of storing spent BWR and PWR spent fuel from other CP&L plants (Brunswick 1/2 and H. B. Robinson). We anticipate separate licensing will be required by DL for such action.
Ne note that the applicant will be considering the implementation of means to protect safety-related components and spent fuel from damage as a result of lifting and moving heavy loads in accordance with the recomendations of NUREG-0612. " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." We request i
that you adv-ise the Shearon Harris applicant that additional consideration should be given to the control of any heavy load within and cutside of any
Contact:
XA Copy--HoS aeen Sent to PDR M. Nagner X29467
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OCT 2 8 23 sf the buildings on the Shearon Harris site, with special emphasis on the possibility of moving the spent fuel cask outside of the fuel handling i
butidings, e.g., moving spent fuel between Units 1 and 2.
We are awaiting further information from the applicant which will allow us to close out additional open issues. As such inforination is received and as agreed upon in discussion with your PM, we will continue to forward to you updated sections of tNr Shearon Harris SER as soon as acceptable inforination is made available.
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th(. uu d t c
L. S. Au enstein. Assistant Director for Core and Plant Systems l
Division of Systrens Integratior.
Enclosures:
As Stated cc w/ enclosure:
B. Buckley J. Holonich R. Lobel N. Wagner cc w/o enclosure:
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R. Mattson T. Novak G. Knighton O. Parr f
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,ptant 3
o.sien fer meeteetien Aasinne postutated P4mine
_Egilure, in Fluid systems outside centaine.aw
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The design of the facility for providing protection against postulated piping failures outside containment was reviewed in accordance with Section 3.4.1 of NUREG-0800 (SRP).
An, review of'each'of the areas Listed ir.-the " Areas of audit Review" portion of the 3RP section was performed according to the guidelines providet in the " Review Procedures" por-tion of the 3RP section.
Conformance with the acceptance criteric formed'the basis for our evaluation of the design
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of the facility for providing protection against poJtu-l Lated piping failures outside containment with respect to the applicable regulations of 10 CFR 50.
Genocal Destgn Criterion 4, " Environmental and Missile Design Bases," requires that systems and components important to safety be appropriately protected against dynamic effects, J- )_ :f W i including the effects of missiles, pipe f/ aid
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- t h at may result from equipment failures.
In order to meet this eequirement with regard to protection against pipe breaks outside containment, the ecolicant has designed the plant in accordance with the high energy pipe dhes d criteria of A p p e n d i*x B cf Branch Technical. Position (BTP)
ASE 3-1, " Protection Against Postulated Piping Failures in f
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Fluid Syspens Qu'tside Containments" anddsoderate-energy Cede.A 37"A pipedcriteria of Section B.3 of th1s M...,., Compliance with these sections of BTP A38 3-1 is compatible with the tendering date for the Shearon Harris construction application (Juns 3,1971).
These criteria concern failures in high-and mo'derate-eriergy fluid systees.
The applican*
has identified the'high and moderate-energy piping systems 44*
in accordance with these guidelines and has p identified those systems requiring protection from postulated piping failuresg The p" ant design accommodates the effects of postulated pipe breaks in high-energy fluid piping systems outside containment with respect to pipe whip, jet im p,i,n g e m e nt and resulting reactive forces, and environmental effects, and the effects of pcstulated cracks in moderate-energy 1
i fluid systess outside containment with environmental (toc) effects.
...u.kafety-relatedfrs hchd by eng:ms syst Ko gjj,g mWC and components throughout the plantf h physical Wf me%ca separatione enclosur'e in suitabty designed structures or c ompartment s, drainage systesse pipe whip restraintss ecuipment shields, and equipment environmental qualifica-tion.
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=A I-The applicant analyzed high-energy piping systems for the effects of pipe whip, jet impingem.ent, and envi.ronm. ental.
ef'fects on safety-retared systees and structures.
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For moderate energy systems, protection of safety-related systems from the ' jets flooding, and other environmental i
ef fects due to critical.ctacks is incorporated into the
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plant design.
We have reviewed the applicant's analysis and we conclude that the protection provided against pipe i
l failure outsid centainment is in conformance with the E
guidelines of,pra.? ';;:..A N
........., ASB 3-1.
The break exclusion region of the main steam Lines extends from the containment building penetration to the pipe rupture restraint in the auxiliary building
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and includes the main ste.am isolatio.n valves.
The break exclusion region for th'e feedwater Lines extends from the first upstream check valves in the steam tunnel (which is atso in the auxiliary building) to the containment penetrations
.and contains the isolation valves.
ALL of the piping Located within the steam tunnel is designed to the criteria presented in Section 3.6.1 of the Standard Review-Plaki.
No specific pipe breaks are postu-Lated in the mata s eame main smae 74 s. f e.e dg t e r a n d b r a ngstan geQ
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rea st up.o the first isolation valveg Howevers in order to g
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provide an additional Level of assurance of operability of equipment required to achieve and maintain saf e. shutdowd Located within and edjacent to the steam tunnel, the build-ing structure and essential equipment are designed for the environmental conditions (pressures temperature, and flood-ing) that would' result from a cracks equal in area to one cross-sectional pipe area of either the largest majn steam or feedwatje Line.
8 Lowdown of a main steam Line results in a maximum compartment temperature of 317 F and maximum 8
1 pressure of 21 asia.
The maximum floodina from a faited
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feedwater Lines assuedng no flashing, results in a flood 1
water Level.3 ft. above the steam tunnet floor.
The tunnel design includes a penthouse which provides adequate' l
ventitation to prevent overpressurization of t'h',e ' t u n n e l compartment.
Watertight s have been provided to pre-vent spillage of water en:.: any essential equipment out-side of the tunnel boundaries.
Essential equipment within the tunnel is located above the maximum (3 ft. L e v e t. )
attainable flood Level.
The environmental qualification of essential equipment.withir the tunnel to withstand the effects of the worst case break is reviewed in Section 3.11 of this SER.
The plant has the ability to sustain a high energy pipe i
break coincident with a sinste aetive fatture in essentiat,
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systems and retain the capability for safe cold shutdown.
For postulated pipe failuress t,h e,r e su l t in g gnyiron,mentkl l
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effects do not preclude the habitability of the control the accessibility of other areas that have to be rooms l
manned during and following an accidenti and the Loss of function of electric power supplies and controls and instru-l mentation needed to complete a safety act ion.
A detailed discussion of the environmental qualification of safety-l l
l related equipment fs contained in Section 3.11 of this l
SER. " _ " _ _ -.
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l Based on our reviews we conclude that the' applicant has adequately designed and protected areas and systems required for safe plant shutdown f ol L owing postulat ed event s including the combination 61 pipe failure and single active
.k failure and including the effects of moderate-energy pipe J- =
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crack e We -conclude that the olant design meets the require-ments of General Design Criterion 4 and the criteria se:
3YP forth in S n... ^
'... ' : = A SS 3-1 with regard to the protection of safejr-related systems and components from a postulated high ertegy line break and with regard to the protection of safety-related systems and components l
from I
a costulated wederate energy line failure.
We c o n c l ud g+t h a t4erw h< w, lant
" - ;' :1 the p design for the protection of safety-related equipment against dynamic effects associated,with the postulated rupture of piping outs'ide
- containm %ent is accentablejrvjude.-U d. pne design of the facility for
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orotection/against postulated piping failures cutside of containme/
nt meets the acceptance criteria of SR? Section
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l Insqrt 1 The tactic 6t has n addressed the affect of a failure of.a a d rate one ly line in the non sential, services chilled water system on saf ty-ratated systems.
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Ins ert 2 wilh the exception of considering,A'c ck i'n the nonessential sesvices chilled water systes [ With thi exception p
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)ff~wi L L oct res Lution of this issue in a sup (eeent to t'his
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9.1.1 New Fuel SteeWee l
Tha new fust storage facility was reviewed 4.7 accor-dance with Section 9.1.1 of NUKRE-0800 (SF.7).
An audit review of,each of the areas Listed in the " Areas of Review" wortiun of tne SAP sectian was parformed according to the guidelines provided in the " Review
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Procedures" portion of the 3RP section.
Conformance with the acceptance criteria except as noted below formed the basis for our evaluation of the new fuel storage facility with respect te the applicable regu-Lations of 10 CFR Part 50.
The acceptance criteria for the new ' fuel s'torage
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facility require compliance with the guidelines of ANS 57.1, " Design Requirements for Light-Water Reactor Fuel Handling System," and ANS 57.3, " Design Require-ments for New LWR Storage Facilities" as related to prevention of critica Lity and radioactivi.ty releases.
The guidelines contained in the " Review Procedures" were used in Lieu of ANS 57.1 and ANS 57.3.
The new fuel storage facility is located in the fuel handling building.
Although the new fuel is stored dry,d5othe new fuel storage facility is designed to be c
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used as optional wet storage s.cace for spent PWR A
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TO-g fuel.
The storage facility consists of two new fuel pools, one for each unit.
The pools are inter-connected by means of a tran,sfer canal whose Length is that of the fuel handling building.
The two r.ew fuel pools, however, are normaLLy isolated by "remov-ak te gates dMGnd h %5 &c. Q&}Cf [ S'G H A':-
2ach new fuel pool can store 580 PWR fuel assemblies; this constitutes enough fuel for more than three full cores.
The new fuel ic stcred in rack modules of several designs which can be removed and,in,s,talled l
un d e rw a t.o r.
There are separate new fuel pools for l
J each unit.
Nevertheless, the ne'w fuel stora'ge system is designed so that new fuel for either unit may be stored in either new fuel pool, space permitting.
[4WCWV' 7;. ;;..., no failure resulting from sharing of the l
storage area prevents safe shutdown of either or both j
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Therefore, J
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the requirements of General Design Criterion: 5, u
" Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components,"
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are satisfied.
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The fuel handling builc.e,, uh..h houses the facility, is designed to seismic Category I criteria as are the storage racks and pools.
This bsilding is also designed against flooding an'd tornado mi'ssiles (refer to Sections 3.4.1 and 3.5.2, respectively, of this SER for further 1
di s cu s s i o.n).
Thus, the requirements of General Design Criterion 2, " Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," and the guidelines et
,gulatory
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Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification," Position C.1 and the requirements of General Design Criterion 4,
" Environmental and Missile Design Bases," are satisfied.
Th e new f ue'L s t o ra ge f a ci li ty i s not Located in the
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vicinity of any moderate-or high energy Lines or rotating machinery.
Separation from such potential missile sources protects the new fuel from internally generated missiles and the effects of pipe breaks (refer to Sections'3.+.1.1 and 3.6.1 of this SER for further discussion).
Accidental damage *to the new fuel would release rela-tively minor amounts of radioactivity that would be accommodated by the spent fuel pool area ventilation
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system.
Thus, the requirements of General Design
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-.s.s Criterion 61, " Fuel Storage and Handling and Radio-us,-
activity Controt," are satisfied.(for discussion of possible damage to spent fuel stored in new fuel peols s ee Secti ons 9.1.2 and-9.1.4 o f thi s SER).
The app'.icant stated that the new fuel storage racks are desiined so that with fuel of the highest antici-pated enrichment und the pool flooded with unborated water, k,99 wiLL be 0.95 or Less.
If the unborated is replaced by moderators such as foam or water water mist, k,ff wi L L still be 0.95 or less.
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madam, a n i n,te m en d en t evaluation of new fuel reactivity.
under the most aur.teWes riaa f-MP n#W h rL & r4$/ r%.c AG*tadverse conditions in order to 4M urt' Cd M p
%IIii TTie~rWi7tTements of General DesFgn Criterion 62,
" Prev S. f..enfgerr
. _ of Criticality in Fuel Storage and Handling," with regard to criticality as a result of
>rtrV storage of f u e l a s s e m,b,L i e s.
The storage racks can withstand an upli f t force ecual the maximum upkift capability of the scent fuel to bridge crane and are designed to cractuce the inadver-i te.a*f j
sn e. placement of a fuel assembly in other than the e
i prescribed spacing.
Thus, the recuiret.:ents of General
Design Criterion 62 are satisfied with e ;ard to changes in geometry of stored fuel assemblies affecting criticality.
Based on our review, we conclude that the new fual storage f acility is in conformance with the require-I ments of General Design Criteria 2, 4, 5 and 61 as they relate to new fuel protection against natural phenomena,
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missites, shared functicns, and radiation protection and the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position Ibr= orc seenxong e
C.1, relating to seismic classification.
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, f%chny acetsphr&&tomyffrou o+ our nataA&ene ra lw a conclu & H.c 4
4 Design Criterion 62.
Therefore,,the design of the new fuel storage f a ci li ty.desemeset m e e ts. t h e a c c e p t an c e criteria of SRP Section 9.1.1.
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9.1.2
- Spent Fuel Stor' age The spent fuel storage fadility was reviewed in accordance with Section 9.1.2 of NUREG-0800 CSRP).
An audit review of e3ch of the areas Listed in the
" Areas o f Review" portion of the SRP section was I
performed according to the guidelines provided in the
" Review Procedures" portion of the SRP section.
Con-formance with the acceptance criteria,-except as noted below, formed the basis for our evaluation of the spent fuel storage facility with respect to the applicable regulations of 10 CFR Part 50.
l The accentance criteria for the spent fuel storage
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facility include meeting various p'ortions of the guidelines of ANS 57.2e " Design Objectives for Light l
Water Reactor Spent Fuel Storage Facilities at i
Nuclear Power Stations."
The guidelines contained in the " Review Procedures" were used in lieu of ANS 57.2.
Additionally, the acceptance criteria include R egula-tory Gu i d e 1.115, "Pr o t e c t i on Against Low-Trajectory Turbine Missile,s.'"
However, turbine missiles are evaluated separately in Section 3.5.1.3 of thir SER.
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A spent fuel storage facility is provided for each unit.
These pools are'intecconnected by.seans df the usin fuel transfer canal but are normalLy is o(asieraf:4 seism,e Cokp olat edyZskdara[r.
by means of removable gatesA The maxieum storaae capacity of the two spent fuel pools is 3024 PWt irbir) IS assembL,ies jg in excess of 19 fut t PWR cores.
Fuel may be stored in a combination of 6 x 10, 6 x 8, and 7 x 7 PWR rack modules.
The applicant stated
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that rack rearrangement would have no effect on stored fuel criticality.
The spent fuel pnots may also be used for the storage of SWR fuel - the 7 x 7 PWR fuel storage modul'es may be i n t e r c h a n g e.d w i t t,i 11 x 11 SWR fuet storage modules since both
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cover the same floor area.
The PWR racks have a center-l
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to center distance of 10.5 inches between cells while
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the SWR inedes*cks have a center-to-center distance of ra s
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6.25A PWR fuel assemblies cannot be inserted into
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j BWR r a c k m od u l e s ' b stt* S WR fuel assembt.ies can be
- L,, j inserted into PWR rack Info a t WA rockedule smaa',ck, I n t r o d u c t i o n 3
of a SWR fuel assemblyd howevers wiLL result in a sub-critical array 'o f fuel assemplies wjth.X 40.95.
has = ',
" = umiM.4 &Nevide The applicantA--
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- Mufficient inforssationrap/*4del
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- to permit the staff to make an independent e v a l...it i on -
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of spent fuel pool reactivity under the most adverse
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conditions, in o.-der to comply fully with the require-sents of General Design Criterion 62, " Prevention of Criticality. in Fuel Storage and Handling."
The structure housing the spent fuel storage facility (the' fuel handling building) is designed to seismic Category I criteria as are the storage racks, pool Liners, gates, canals and storage pools.
The building is also designed against flooding and tornado missiles (refer to Sections 3.4.1 and 3.5.2 of this SER).
We conclude that the requirements of General Dr. sign Criterion.2r " Design Bases for Protect Jn [ gainst i
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Natural Phenomena," and th Positf'o'ns C.1 and C.2.a of Regulatory Guide 1.13e " Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis," Position C.1 o f R egula tory Guide 1.29,
" Seismic Design Classification," Positions C.1, C.2 and C.3 of Regulatory Guide 1.117, " Tornado Design Classification," are satisfied for the spent fuel storage facility.
The spent fuel storage facility is not located in the vicinity of any nigh energy lines or rotating machinery.
There*orer physical protection by oeans et
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separation is utilized to p.otect the spent fuel from internally)(generated missiles and the ef fects of pipe breaks trefer to Sections 3.5.1.1 and 3.6.1 of tinis SER).
Thus ~the requirements of General Design Cri-terion 4, " Environmental and Missile Design Bas,es,"
the guidelines of Position C.2 of Regulatory and i
Guid s 1.13 are sati s fied.
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The shared portion of the facility ha,s suf*fi"c'ient redundans*y of services and is of seismic Categor; Quality, Group C design, so that an accident i n o e. e unit with loss of offsite power wilL not impair its ability to safely store the spent fuel.
This satis-fios the requirements of General Design Criterion 5,
" Sharing of Structu.res, Systems, and Components."
The racks can withstand the impact of a dropped fuel assembly without unacceptable damage to the fuel and can withstand the maximum uplift forces exerted by the spent fuel bridge crane.
In addition, loads greater than a fuel assembly are not carried over
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I spent fust in compliance with the guidelines of l
Position C.5.c of Regulatory Guide 1.13[&Nr J&ffent 4*/*
and 9.t.S ew k.ssu ssion o+poheMe of. spew / M '" Y4 f
d ww dud 49W d AkW'.C ofetMstnip 4 # w f**
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@ The fuel handling bujlding has a ventitation system f,,g g ),.
(the spent fuel pool area ventitation system)
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to Limit the potential release of radioactivity in the event of an accident (see Section 9.4.2 of this SER l
for a discussion of the spent fuel pool area venti-Lation system) in accordance with the guidelines of Position C.4 of Regulatory Guide 1.13.
In this way the spent fuel storage facility complies with the 1
I requirements of Regulatory Guide 61s " Fu e l. S.t.o r a g e and Handt.ing and Radioactivity Control."
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Control room and Local alarms are provided to alert the ope,rator to high and low pool watre level, and high tamperature in the fuel pool.
The fuel handling building has a radiation monitoring system.
These features satisfy the requirements of General Design criterion 63, " Monitoring Fuel and Waste Storage."
Based on our reviews we conclude that the spent fuel storage facility is in conformance with the require-ments of General Design criteria 2, 4,
5, 61, and 63
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as they relate to protection o*
spant fuel against natural phenomena, missiles, e...ironmental effects, the facility's shared fun cthlon s, radiation protaction, i
and. performance mon 12oring, and the guidelines of i
l Ragulatory Guides 1.13, Positions C.1, C.3 and C.4, 1.29, Positions C.1 and C.2, and 1.117, Positions C.1 through C.3, relating to the facility's design, seismic classification, and protection ajainst Iras tem ntiff'w h tornado missiles.
The applicaat meM provide further information so that we may make an independent evaluation of compliance of the egent fuel storage facility with requirements of General Oev.ign w
senc/de. Mdf M C r i t e r i on-62) spent f u e l s t o r a g e f a c i li t y ata= mar-g
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the acceptance criteria of SRP Se,ct' ion 9.1.2.
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9.1.4 Fuel Handtina System (Licht Lead Handling System)
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The portic.: of the fuel handling system related to the -
handling of Light Loads was reviewed in accordance with Section 9.1.4 of NUREG-0800 CSRP).
An audit review of 3ach of the areas listed in the " Areas of Review" por-tion of the SR* sect' ion ~was performed according to the
~
guidelines provided in th'e " Review Procedur~es" porzion of the SRP segtion.
Conformance with the acceptance. criteria, except as noted below, formed the basis for our evaluation of the fuel handling system with respect to the applicable
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regulations of 10 CFR 50.
The acceptance criterfs for the fuel handling system AP/O includes meeting the guidelines of Ace 57.1, "D.esign
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Requirements for LWR Fuel Handling Systems."
The for+ en e4 MP Se.* guideline s mn9 in Lieu ofa.g.d contained in the " Review Procedures",n ere used w
rg,f 1-57.1.
The fuel handling system provices the means of transport-ing and handling new'and spent fuel.
The system consists of the equipment necessary to facilitate the pericdic refueling of the reactor and includes the manipulator craner spent fuel bridge craner new fuel eLevatoro ~he fuel transfer systems and associated handling tools and devices.
The handling of fuel during refueling is controlled by a series of intertocks to assure that fuel $ handling pro-[-
cedures are maintained.
The design assures that no k
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assem6 Lies within the spent f ue l s'te r'a g e *a r e's l'ncluding Loading the spent fuel racks and the spent fuel cask.
The sonorait hoist has access to aLL spent fuel and new fuel pools and to aLL interconnectin transfer canals A
De. ed8tl tM SSM% $ '
,The spent fuel bridge crene witt not drop it= 1.oad nor Au wiLL it Leave the rails as a consequence of ths SSE.
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The new fuel elevator is used to Lower.new fueliassemblies (one at a time) to the bottom of the fuel storage area s.
where they are transported by the spent fuel bridge crane l
to tha storage racks.
The entire system is housed within the fuel handling i
building and reactor building (containment) which are seis-mic Category Is flood and tornado protecteo structures (refer te Cactions 3.4.1 and 3.5.2 of this SER).
Although
. fuel handling system components are not required to function following an SSE, critical components of the fuel handling
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system are designed to seismic Category I standards so that they will not fail in a manner which results in unaccept-able consequences such as fuel damage or damage to safety-related equipment.
The spent fuel bridge' crane which travels over the spent fuel storage racks as described
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-py WW above is designed to seismic Category I c'quirements.
The e
design thus satisfies the requirements of General Design Criterion 2, " Design Bases for Protection AgainstsNatural Phenomenas" by compliance $sith the guidelines of Position C.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.13, "sponi: Fuel Storage Facility.
Design Basis," and Positions C.1 and C.2 of Regula"ory Guide 1.29e "* '
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Each un.+ has its e E_..,; ';- separate equipment within each containment and
~~
d Rec hancihm 4 Net, r e si e s:.
separate fuel transfer conveyor systems e fuel nandling system is common to both units within the common fuel fr44ai-b handling buildingA F conclude that sharing of the common st ruc ture s, 1}yst ems and component s b etwe'en units is accept-i abl'e and meets the reqQirements of General Design Criterion 5, "sharieg of Structures, Systems and Components."
Th e a pp'. i c ant states that permanent mechanical stops have at es=&v' been orovided to prevent the scent fuel eask nandling crane (capaci*v 150 tons) from -
fonj'-
C tere
- = -..
dW-t the cask ;
't
.. ov e r (IMh d4 +4F W
Vwg,. ammonier, s p e n t fuel stbrage pool 5 or over the new fuel storage pool in the southern part of the FHS.
M M48" h
%lis: Fuel Funellns urli n:4 be requires, s i m w 1 %,ous k ee r scr+h uruts L odelds en,
+ % (-ud h=<,el b a*; s c4 s %,+es no+ i,squ,d 4., n.,,+, go.te. 4-cews i er,b e c
= cid in s a r-<
(
P icm+ s h+d o m. TT,ere.bev, Lae
. {
t I.is e rt 1 The applicant has shown that the removable barrier between the l
spent ? Jet cask pool and the northern new fuel storage pool j
wilL not damage spent fuel or safety-related equipment in a seismic event, thus complying with the guidelines of Position C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.29, "Sefsmic Design Classification."
Insert 3 The applicant noted that the operat*onal height te whien the burnable poison rod assembly (BPRA) tost had to be lifted over the spent fuel pool caused it to acquire a kinetic energy of 6677 ft. Lbs in contrast to the kinetic energy acquir d by e l
spent fuel assembly and its handling fixture, 4961 ft. Lbs.
The aoolicant analyzed the fuel damage resulting from a dropped 9PRA tool and concluded that this damage was substantialLy less than that assumed in the design basis fuel handling accident which assumes that atL the fuel pins in one spent fuel assembly are damaged waen a spent fuel assembty is dropped into the spent fuel pool.
O
~
.~
7)
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= T
{
C
$ u.H&r, The appLt: ant st a t,ed 7
,t h a t ' t h e l'i,s i't switches pes <ent*t the cask crane from getting closer than 15 feet from the' north edge and 10 feet 6 inches 'com the east edge of the new fuel storage at the no.-th end of the FHS (the cask pool and crane are west 6f the north new fuel pool).
In additions the cask handling operation is under adnHnistra--
tive control.
There is also a removable barrier between l
l the cask pool and, Nnorthern new fuel pool which is intended
~
to prevent the spent fuel cask from falling into the new fuel pool in the event it is dropped.
This complies with the guidelines of Position C.3 of Regulatory Guide 1.13.
.t..
Further discussion regarding protection of spent fuel and safsty-related equipment against damage by heav/ Loadse
(
such as the spent fuel caske is provided in Sect 3cn 9.1.5 of this SER.
wes acKed h!Wth The applicant M.
that Light loads (.those that
.r seign Lerss than a fuet** assembly plus handling fixture) wilL not be raised high enough so that a light load drop wilL result in greater fuel damage than that assueec for a ktshandlia; fuel assently and scol when crop;ed frem the height to which the fuel tssetnoly is ncemally cr,ised during t W5g& * *
- - +
the handling operation.
Thuse wpcon'el'ude that th.
require'-
~
' r, :
C.'. -
. # 1.
"
- L.
i
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...e
- , ~~~' _
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ment s of General D.esign Crit eria 61., "Fuet. Storage *and
(
Handling and Radioactivity Controle" and 62, " Prevention of Criticality in Fuel Storage and Handlings" areJuus l
satisfied.
Dased on our reviews wc conclude that the Light Losd-handling system is in conformance with the guidelines of Regulatory Guides 1.13e Positions C.1, C.3, and 1.29, Positions C.1 apd,C.2s yith r,e,spect to over,hea,d crant g
,. w ruoucoalg. car 7rcr /'
interlockse seismic qualitygand the requirements of General hG5 Design Criterion 2 and 5.
he applicant w provicdfurther in f o rm a t i oc,%"risM to assure compliajet with a n d 6 2 h: r g s e r * ~ Qthe Suel handling General Design criteria.61 use system *
- meet 5,the acceptance criteria of SRP Section 9.1. 4.[s*eM " ' ' [ e c#
- N '
,,1 S'E i a F1 Q u;;.
,w e.< m a t_x.
$M tk k h
d 1,eA4 !cq ds 5%er- "<cn r
a, p ed e m
= 9.q ', at5 etC M C C V T a cu el c ss em 1
LO S t.r
- a mt "'[,.go u id*Y C 55"CS F*: ? W
'"* 9 V be$ n ei. e I ( m+ clo c'* 3 < SP'r* N9 i 00 5 a %g r e.1 at-c d '9 ' ' F rimer* i n c seis em c.
e.o sci i n ceder +o corrfN 9ulI9 w,fh4he m ele.hnts os (b i+ ion c.s oF Re3w%rt 1
L m e!< l.sq, i
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. = - = - - - - -
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9.2.1 Service Water Svstem (Station Service Water Svstem)
The rvice ter stem was reviewed in accordance with section 9.2.1 of NUREG-0800 (SRP).
An audit review of each of-the areas Listed in the " Areas of Review" portion of the SRP section was per form *ed according to the guidelines provided in the " Review Procedures" portion of the SRP section.
Conformanew l
.m__
t -
i er w i t h t h e a c c e p t a n c e c r i t e r i ayf' owe'd 't"n 'e*o'aTis*fTr_f,O, ourevaluationofthe!hrvice/aterSystemwith l
to the applicable regulations of 10 CFR respect Part 50.
p-Jlc L
The Ser. ice Water System (SWS) pe.r. forms both safety v
and nonsafety functions supplying cooling water to the plant from the ultimate heat sink.
During atL normal operations, each plant unit is furnished cooling water from its nonseismic Category I main
- 'coling tower (the ultimate heat circulating water c
sink during norma t operations).
During emergency i
ocerations cooling water is s0oplied frem the seismic u dsmcgte.d...
Category I auxiliary reservoir (the heat sin 4
nersess a
*-" with the4 ;.. --; Category I main 1
reservoir as the backup source.
The ultimate heat t
6
- 4 o
.+kp['*9\\ltk/
((//g%g[j
$th C
IMAGE EVALUATION f
k//77 f/
TEST TARGET (MT-3) g
+$+
< %+
l.0 lf 2 2 n= m p=1 Em j,l
{' l!E U8 1.25[i.4 g
150mm 4
6"
- 4 g4*+4 4
%f *////?
- %y'?
5/////
\\
$'/'
~$9
'o d%
l'k[h
//j k / / '
IMAGE EVALUATION kg%+'*
- %f,((g 5
7/'
TEST TARGET (MT-3) 1.0 Ea M e U 2 g 2.2 b U2 l,l
{'
lILM l.8 1.25 l.4 1.6 4
150mm 4
6" s#a)g
.e;(#'%
8 a\\ ec
/,ft>(ib <p)#
v 9
4 O
4$6
~. - -- -
-v1-.
\\
I sink is furthe*r discussed L J.-.. in Section 9.2.5 of this SER.
\\
l The $Ws for each, unit servies two trains of safety-related equ'ipment.
These trains include the compo-l nent cooling water heat exchangerse containment fan cooler's, reactor auxiliary building HVAC ch*Llers dieselkgeneratorcoolerse i
emergency service water intakestructurefancoolers,dieselhenerator building fan cooters and the charging pump oil coolers.
Nonessential components in the waste processing and turbine buildings are also,g,o.oled by the SWS..
(
When operating in the normal modes water is drawn from the main cooling tower basin by one of two 100%
capacity nonseismic Category I normal service water
- M r-, @_and pumped to a header supplying nonsafety-4 related loads in the turbine and waste processing buildings and safety-related Loads in the reactor auxiliary buildi'ng.
Heated water fccc these buildings is returned to the main' circulating water lines, d Yod % ~eb 4kes s len 43 m to the main cooling towers.
Isolation of the A
s nonsafety-related portions of the normal system from 1
)
,,,.,,,.---..<--,..-n
=Rh y 4 4y Wevs:./ wahr y &
p the seismic Category:Istadfe.ty related pactions 6s automatic and is activated upon Loss of flow from both nc,rmal service bater pumps.
This activation involves sequencing-of isolation valve operation and WW)V" emergency service water pump startup.
Cooling water 4
es 08 Shock cl ea-l s% pump.
44
~
tnis hignme f
s s: art 30 flow Long during seconds after a safe'ty injection signal; full flow i s e s t ab l i s h edp s e c o ndg ".....N 84TW snj:e e-hgy 70 4*he de:-
-t ut.
17 o p e r a t i o.2 m s.g r-M, inns " Mt safety-related equipment p u e t'o l'e*
4 durationf CIE n e loS S.
When operating in the emergency mode, cooting wa:er is drawn from the auxiliary reservoice through the emergency service water intake channels emergency service water intake screening structure, emergency service water and ccoling tower makeup water intake structure and one of two 100 percent capacity emer-i gency service wate,r, pumps.
ALL of these structures cnd equipment are seismic Category I.
As a backups the emergency service water pump can be aligned to
\\
1
\\
draw cooling water from the nonseismic Category I cooling tower makeup. water intake channel which is fed from the main reservoir.
This alignment is neade by manual remote switching of' electrically
(
Coe h rd ux2 t er-
l
?
- . -e9-interlocked valves so that only one set of vatvos is open at one time.. Af;er cooling 'the 'redondant' t ra' ins of safety-related equipment in the reactor auxiliary M tiJ buildings the,ffr7 water is returned to the emergency
~
service water discharge cha6nel and thence to the auxiliary resarvoir and ultimately over it: 3pittway i
to the main reservoir.
Nonessential Loads in the turbine and waste processing buildings are not cooled in the emergency operating mode.
No t's that while the emergency service water pumps are submerged the motors are located above the highest water Level in order to prevent damage to the motors.
There is no interconnec-
' between units except in the
{
nnemat ultimate' heat si-ree section 9.2.5 of this SER for review of thegbLtimate heat sin k). Th e ent i re normal cooling tower portion of the ultimate heat sink is isolated in the emergency mode (when the a ux i l i a ry reservoir is used) and edequate compartmentalization of 1
'Uses the common ultirantheat' sink structures is provided* the i
a n
requirements of General Design Criterion 5, " Sharing of Structuress Systesse and Componentr," are satisfied.
The system is housed in seidaic Category I, fLcod and tornado protected structures (refer to Sections 3.4.1 and 3.5.2 of this SER).
The redundant service water Lines routed between the reactor auxiliary k
1
~
70-g building and the emergency service water and cooling tower askeup intake structure are buried below the saximum missile penetrating depth.
The systee itself is designed to s'eisTeic Category I, Guality Group C' requirements.
Thus, the requirements of Gener.at Design Criterion 2, " Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," and the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification,"
i
- ~
Positions C.1 and C.2, are satisfied.
L 8*SI% f04"I(4ay
.5CA)S The design of the 0...:..
O,;;:- described A
above assures that systemfunctionisnot,(c'st assuming"a single active component failure coincident with a loss of offsite power.
The applicant has i
provided sufficient inf ormation to assure that the Lo f = ^, O * / W D =_a System is capable of transferring heat f
Loads from safety-related components to a heat sink under aLL modes o$ operation and that nonsafety-related components and subsystems can be isolated so that the system safety function say be effected.
-Therefore, we conclude that General Design Criterion 44, " Cooling Water," is satisfied.
-M-The normal service water pumps are normaLLy alternated in operation while the emergency service. water pumps are normally inoperative.
The availability of the emergency portion of the SMS must kg assured by periodic functional tests and inspectio etineated in the The sys(cem design slant Technical Specificationsyg-incorporates provisions for accessibility to permJe inservice. inspection as required.
Thus, the requirements of General Design Criteria 45, " Inspection of Cooling Water System," are sati fie M:
'7 Is~ F w... r u ' - '
2,.4 for General Design Criterion 46, " Testing of Cooling Water Systense"
-4 4.
i Based on the above, we conclude that theeme'rd'encySWS seets the requirements of General Design criteria 2, 5, 44 and 45, with respect to the system's protection against natural phenomena, sharing of systems, capability for transferring the required heat loads, inservice
- inspection and the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.29, Positions C.1 and C.2",*with res to the system's
/NSC U,pect seismic classification M
" - - - --+
e p.,
.m s.w
.u.
r______
_y..:-__
7_2 _
e.
The SWS e u
__2 meet $the requirements of SRP Section 9.2.1.
ear 4P"L" reeer* --- '
a.
... s s snaue
..ea......
- a M
I.
,,,, +,,,,,,,,,., -
,.n
-,.-.-~n,.-,-.,_
em,,,,
,-m n,,,,,,...,,,,, _
..>-,w,-
. In se rt 2 The applicant has provided Technical Specifications which do not include periodic testing of the safety-related portion of the SWS as a unit witn aLL valves operating to isolateg nonsafety-related loads from safety-related loads and: having two emergency service water pump trains start to serve the' safety-related loads upon a suitable initiating signal.
The applicant must include such a surveillance test requirement in the Technical Specifications, to be performed every 18 months during shutdown in order to satisfy the requirements of Insert 3 The staff wiLL review the Technical Specifications to assure that surveittance testing includes periodic initiation of both ESW trains in order to have the ESW system compty with the require-ments of General Design Criteria 46.
Pending the review of the final Shearon Harris Technical Specifications, we find the service water system to be acceptacle.
l l
l l
l l
I-i
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f 2 fo-(
9.2.9 Nonessential Services Chitled Water System The nonessential services chilled water system was reviewed in sccordance with Section 9.2.2 of NUREG-0300 (SRP).
An audit review o'f each of the aress
~
Listed in the " Areas of Review" portion of the SRP section was performed according to the guidelines provided in the Revi ew Procedures" portion of the SRP section.
Conformance with the acceptance criteria
~ ~ ~
formed the basis for our evatustion of the nonessential service chitled water system with respect to the apoticab.Le regulations of 10 CFR Part 50.
The nonerEential services chitled water system (N E S C'A S )
is designed to provide cooling.ater to air handling units for the f uel handling building air conditio.Een3 system (see Section 9.4.2 of this SER for a de ailed dis:ussion of this system) and fer tne waste ;cc:esting areas ventilation syrtem (see Section 9.4.3 cf tais SER for a oetaileo discussien of this system).
The NES:WS consi'sts of two 50" water c h.i t L e r s in series each containing a eccler and condenser.
Cooling water to the condenser section of each chilter is su;ptied
=
j
~~
~ " '
i
~
- T D.--
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by the service water system (described in Section 9.2.1 of this SER).
The system contains an expansion tank to accommodate volume changes and to permit water addition, a chernical addition tank (for manual addition
~
of chemicals used to prevent corrosion and scale buildup), two chilled water pumps in parattel (one operating, one on standby) and associated piping.
The NESCWS is not required to operate te mitigate accidents nor is it required to shut the olant down.
Therefore, the provisions of Generst Oesign C.-i t e r i o n 5, " Sharing of Structures, Systems and Cc=ccb' ens,"
General' Design Criterion 44, " Cooling Water," General Design Criterion 45, "Insoection of Cooling Wate.-
Syste=," and General. Design Criterien 46, "Tes-ing of Cooling Water System," are net a:plicable, e.
n.......
C f.
'; :/ :'-
/
Pod-'-a
" ' - %,.w....f-"Id etr'p2% "t e tstrO=s%r
/
Classifica-ism " in e-da-m_se.e 12.LLy...tu aach-j ents of,G'eneral Design
/,
criterion 2, ":esign Sass,s fy v.'
Prote:t.icn Against Natural Phenomena."
f"t =,u t r c;
-This/...%
i s
l C, C ro.
In c
s h,o w i n g that f 9 '_ q :
' - NESCWS pipeline will no:
g esukt in reduced 14nctioning of any,/ safety-relateo
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,e
.m,
.e,.
,.,e
.-n-
-lM -
Yt* d //h CQ M b N.S Vffi b f l & q M cjf,'
& l'*k f di fft C/6t*fff kill nrt F-aas!. bd}q.
M 4
WE.S cWS
~
h Adttce 7*/f/ Seosc/towkj tef Spfofy -
gfa /-(M system to an unacceptable safety level in the event of hsbb an SSE, o
eri h
e single failure MAG
t$t M(*
4t?ll M 6' 0 llrk '/teJr 6 2 of f re.fg k ty' t;cid /.29
- $f/Snt/C
.$lfJf $$$/$/Cd //dk. Y/Pt*k ?( W 73 -- -'-
4,-.eeing, w.
- - -*-- ~ ' - - -
Mf 9f t"t NESCWS * ::
.: the recuire gtf Js dCr PJhs ble.s = e n t s o f "G e n e r a l
.-m Design Criterion 27 The NESCWS -......_ ; '.,
cos p./473 tut /.a the criteria of SRP Section 9.2.2.
reea' 2-2--
e
- De e
(
=D 1
9 e
e e
i
== ] T6 9.4.5 Enaine, ed safetv Featu-- v.a-4 seinn sv e -4 WQL -
~
The engineered safety tu f e a t u r e v e n t,i t a t,i on s y s : e agpay' r 'e {t e w e d j
in acecedance with Section 9.4.5 of'NUREG-0800 (SR?).
An audit review of each o,f the areas listed in the " Areas of Review" portion of the 3RP section was performed according to the guidel(nes providad in the " Review Procedures" por--
t ion of the SRP Oection.
Conforman.ce with the acceptance criteria fccmee the basis for our evaluation of the engineteed safety feature ventitation systemJ w.th respect to the appli:able regulations of 10 CFR Part 50.
Thsse engineered safety featurey ventilation syste:X dis-cussed in this SER section provide 5 ventilation to :he '
rea::or auxilia.y building (RAS) switengear rocas, the RAS electrical equipment prote::fon r: me the [uel oil transfer puncheuses diesel generator building and the emergency service water intake structure.
The RA* E S.:
equipment cooling and spent fuel po:L pas: ec:m ven fla-tien systems a e discussed in Se c-i:n s 9.4.3 and 9.4.2,
.esce::iveLye of this S E R..
The systems ciscussed in
- his section (9.4.5) c / the SER a.e net required c.-
centeel of.eteases of racicactive ma erists Oc :Se envir:r-ments and
- 5us, ns rec 0irements Of General Design Crite.-ion 60, " Control, of Releases of Radica::ive Materials to the Envirenments" and the guideline's of Regulatory o
~
~
- ' $ $ 1 *
~
Guides 1.52, " Design, Testing, and Maintenance criteria for Atmosphere Cleanup System Air ffLtration and Adsors tion Units of Light-Vater-Ccoled Nuclear Power Plantss" Position C.2 and 1.140, " Design, Testing and Maintenance Criteria for Normal Ventilation Exhaust System Air Filt rat ion and Adsorpt io~n Un it s o f f.ight 'Jstt e-Coc t ed Nuclear Power Plants," P6sitions C.1 and C.2, are to:
appticabLe.
t.L.%
-riene.4 tne ESF ven-itation systems discussed in this SER h e7'" '
- Ji% %- ec.e s.een og.
section areAshared between units,C-- :::
.c a Sinor m-_
. _ i_
.. e.
.-...,-....__,...y in e.rface at{GCc 15 obfCt/Ste W ca:la W
-he computte r o o w af Ybt.s 4.
A...-..;-
its fet-g'.'gg/ s L L ventilation systems are housed in ccamon structurese
<J they have adequate compartmentalization to pr:tsct redun-dant trains,' Therefores General Design Criterion 5,
" Sharing of Structures, Systems and Components," is not applicable.
Two seismic Catege y I, tuality Group C, RAS s w i t : h g e n.-
room ventilation systen are provided for each unit, with ea:n system secvicing ventilation for is assi;ne: safety-related swit:hgear.
Each ventilation system has an I
=:enden: air cer:itien'ng train censistin; cf a missile-l l
l protected air in:aker tornado dancer, medium efdicien:y l
e e
I l
l l
1 t
o
-ith filters electric heating colle two 100 percent redundant chitled water coating coils conneciad.in series.and.two$
100 percent redundant centrifugal sumpty fans arranged i r.
parattel.
Each fan is provided with a motorized inte:
damper and a gravity discharge damper to prevent air
~ irculating.thr u-h the idle fan.
Air is drawn from outsider mixed with recycled airjthen is supplied ;c the areas served through a sheetmetal ductwork distributien system.
ALL air is ultimately exhausted by two 100 percen:
redundant exhaust fans.
Each fan is provided with a
+
- ~ ~
gravity discharge damper to prevent mir recirculation thecugh the idle fan.
Air is dis:harged te the a:meschere thecugh a missile protected tornado dammar.
Sufficient air wilL be exhausted from each battery recs of the switchgsar roca areas to prevent the accumulation of combustihte concentra:icns of hycrogen.
In additien c battery rooms the RAS switchgear ventilation system be M @ S
- n c! U t n ' l q h n ca r
s e r v e s t h e f,9 6'/) e l e c t r i c a l equipmen: recmsi d.:.
- e n t e s '.
recase switchgear rooms, auxiliary cen:rcl panel ar.d
- shLe vau;: areas.
The RAE swit:h; ear *roca ve-tilatien system is succliec with Class 15 electrical power.
Chitled wcter fer the cooling coils is supplied from the essential services chitled water system.
The system interfaces with the
,a
-p%~
nonsafety-relatodi nonseismic Category Is cable vault smoke purge subsystem.
A,dequate isolation ts pr.ovtded to prev nt loss of function of the safety-related pertion and ne single active failure will prevent the system frem pec-viding adequate ventitation to aLL safety-related ecoms.
Indication of matfunction is provided by annormal flewrate
~
. alarms in the control room.
The system is housed in the seismic Catescry I, flood and tornade protected reactor auxiliary building (refer to
~ ~ ~
Section 3.4.? and 3.5.2 cf this SER).
Thus, the reqQire-ments of General Design Criteria 2 ard 4 with res;e:t :c scotection agains natural phenomena anc as: uran:e :f proper operating environment for essential equidment, and the guideli.ies of Regulatory Guide 1.29, Pcsitiens C.1 and C.2r with re:pect to seismic classifica:icn are met.
Since there is a separate system for esch unit, Gea. erst Design criterien 5, " Sharing of structures, ifstems and Components," is net a:si.icable.
6EEFV1) we0 eon -WN 6 "
The RAE e '. e c t r i c a ' easionen: Or te::ica ra:o it seismic Cstegory.I, Ouality Greus C anc =r: vide: v e. : i '. s t i : n 1:r i
the communi:ation r'o e m,
l process ISO and sctid state i
protection roomo computer rooms protection an c:ntrol equipment room and several personnel areas not required 7.
W */; J.'.:
A ml 9C =
., ew,-
to be safety-related.
The computer room which/is nonsafety-W S S-A.T I
/
is served, M :r-Q';7 retatede
~..-
(., T h e, nonsafety-related personnel acess are heated with ncesafety-related heaters.
Failure cf this nonscismic Category I e,cp q.g,,,
dessnnot. affect the capability for c safe shutdown.
l The RAS electrical equipment p.otecticn r::s ventiLatinn i
system is a sinste syst em per unit with 100 per:ent redun-dant supply and exhaust subsystems.
Each suppty su= system i
consists of a motor *:ed inte: dampeer medium effien:y
- * ". filter, chilled water cooling coil, supply fan, gravity y
damner and electri: heating coil and a sheet metal due:-
work cistribution system.
The su=pty subsystees are T-connected to a co= mon missile pre te::ed cur side' a i.-
ake with tornadc danger and two motorized butterfly is:
- n valves in series.
f The exhaust system censists of tue 100 per:en cacaci y
're:undant fins.
Each fan i.e =rovided with a back draf:
i di: charge camper c prevent air reci.culation t h rcugh the N
1 i:' e fan.
The exhausted air is discharged :c the a:mes-U
.s prece 09ecugh a.:issile = rete::ed valve.
D u.- i n ; n=enal Operation, a s m a l L *;c rt i on of cu side air is crawn th.cugn t.9 e system, mixed with a large portion of recy: Led aire and supplied to the served areas through a sheetnetal ductwork d i s t r i b u_t i e n system.
During a LCCA conditten, y kT V ---
4p 11 N ht r
)
\\
{
ho,M3 Alt *cNV ca{ GRt PW Mf*fOCflon V00M
\\
i Ya %+ ton H nts, one n1 each tott.g wi% &ch EENSj
& tu aw re w nd.
pro v, e a a
/... -
. ~.
~~~ I't i-a'E air is recirculated through the system.
The RAD L
electrical equipment prot e ct ion' ro'o.3 s 'ven t ilit i'en sbpply
'and exhaust systems are supplied wich Class 15 sower.
The cooling coils are supplied with :hitled water from the essential services chitled water system.
A nonseismic Category I smoke purge system is actuated to operate the. ele:trical equipoent protection room ventila-tion systen as a once-thr ugh systes utilizing the hormal wA Ais v gle,,j supply and a smoke exhaust system normalLyg.;. :n out efS e
the system.
Adequate is4Lation is provided te preven:
Loss of function of the safety related portion and ne single active failure wiLL prevent safe shutdown of the unit.
Abnormat operation is indicated by a flewrate alarm in the* control room.
The system is hcused in a seismic Categ:ry :s flcod an:
tornado pr:te:tec building (refer :: Sections 3.4.1 and 3.5.2 of this SER).
The cu:sice air intakes and exhsus:s are tornado missite prot'e:ted.
Thasr :he r e q0 i r e.5 en t s of General Design Criteria 2 and a wi th res:e:: ::
=re-ee:icn agains: natural pne9enena and assurance of p.c:er emerating environment fcr essential equipment, and the guidelines of Regulatory G0ide 1.29, Pesitions C.1 and C.2, with respect to seismic classification are met.
Since there is a separate system for each unit, Gene.al Design Criterion Sr " Sharing of Stru::urcs, Sys.ams and Components," is not a:pti abLe.
-tq n The fuel oil transfer pumphouse ve.ntit.ation s. y s t e m c on s i.s t s oftwo10Cdpercent ' capacity, seismic Category I, Quality
~
Group C, exhaust fans in each of two pump rooms se unit.
The fans are provided with gravity dampers to prevent backflow.
Common mir in_take med discharge plenums are used for both unitsi each with two missile protected intake and discharge openings.
Each exhaust system is physically separated from the other systen to assure system capability to meet the single failure criterion.
The exhaust fans of the fuel oil transfer pump room ven:!!a-
. tion system are? powered by Class 1E electrical su; plies.
Cysfens A : ingle failure in the ventitation4can affect only one of the two fuet ott transfer puma rooms in e a ch..un i : and
- he single t,cansfer pump in that room.
Failur s of n:n-seismic Category I equipment wilL not result in damage to the system.
The system operates during normal and emergency conditions.
The elect rical heaters, which are net required for emargencies, are shut d wn u;:n less of offsite power.
1 j
The :ystem is housed in a seismi: Category ft:cd and r
terr.aeo prete:ted building (refer to Secti:ns 3.4.1 and 3.5.2 of this SER).
Thus, the requirements of General Design Criteria 2.and 4 with respect to protectien 9
against natural phenomena and assurance of peccer L
~1%~
operating environment for essential equipmente and the guidelines of Regulatory Guide.1.29, Positions C.1 and $
C.2e with respect to seismic classification, are met.
Since there is a separate system for each unite General t
\\
Design Criterion 5e " Sharing of Structuress Systems and
\\
Components is not a p p l i c~ab L e.
1 The diesel generator building ventitation system is designed to seismic Category Ir Quality Group C requirements.
A
%.t, separate and independent system is used for each cf two
- ~
diesel generator systems per unit.
Each system provides ventitation for its respective diesel generater room, electrical equipment recs, and fuel oil day tank, HVAC equipment rooms and exhaust silencer ccms.
Ypemain
~
supply of outside air (maximum 140,000 efm) is drawn th rough three separate tornado missile pectected ir. akase
- wo sumptying the diesel genera:ce rocar one sumptying the HVAC equipmente electrical ecuipmen* cccm and extsus:
silencer recms with ancther intake succlyin; the fuel o f f.
day tank rocs with a smalL air suscly (1100 c fm).
7.c redundan: 100 percent capacity (6300 cfm each) exhaus:
fans normalLy dischcege air thecugh nissile c.c;te:ed ciesel building ecof ven:s when the d'esel g e n e r a t e.- is not in operation.
During diesel gene. a:ce operat ien a i
second pair o' redundant 100 ' percent capacity (57000 efs,
each) exhaust fansaddj capacity to acccamodate the adc3-tienal bes: Load.
The electrical ecui: ment roce :ortien y
w.
,n n,
-n..
y
~
ND-uses tw6 redundant 100 percent capacity (12,000 cfm each) supply fans inarecirculationmodetoprovide.fil:4rinh and cooling or heating to this room.
With this exception, the diesel generator building ventilation system is once through.
Gravity dampers are used on all three pairs of l
h recundant paratLet. fans To prevent backftow.
Tn5 9.s-i The air intak$
supplying the DG HVAC equipment j[ oms r
(intakes 60C, 64C, 620, 63C) for both units are'at :Le-l vations of 32 fe : above grade, this comply,iss with
/
recommendation: A? and C1 o f NUR EG/CR-0660, "Enh anc emen:
of Onsite Emergency \\CieseL Generator Reliao'.iLity" whien specify that ai.- inta,kes be 20 ft. aseve grade in c.-der s
to protect DG equipment from dust and particiles in the N
air.
At the others.(60A, 61A,'62A, 63A, 60s, 615, 612,
\\
/
and 633) are at levels of 3/and 10 feet above grade.
The applicant agreed (3) to i,n,s. a L L d r y throwaway type filters
/
\\
in the DG roca air in:[k e an\\d to inspect the filters an:
\\
- 20. change then, per.iodicalLyssin res:ense :: Our con:ern
/
I with regard to a, f r intake leveN
,l
~.
The as:Lica : shoulo.as:ure us t h a.,: a l '. DG roes air 1-takes,w'ith intakes below 20 fee: above grade wili te so
/
supplied an: should provide some rea enable schedule for k,
/
pe,r' iodic inscection and replacement in Order to com Ly
/
/with the requirements Of NUREG/cR-0660.
We therefore
~....-.
- g 9.=r-INSERT Reco=mendations A2 and C1 of NUREG/CR-066d, " Enhancement of onsite Emergency Dieset Generator Reliability," recommend)( that ventila-tion air intakes for the diesel generator room be at least 20 feet above gradeland that the air be filtered.
Air ietskes f c.-
HVAC equipment rooms in both units (intakes 60C, 61C, 62C and 63C) are 32 feet above grade.
AtL others (60A, 61A, 62A, 63A, 605, 613, 625) are either three feet above grade (alL A intakes) er 10 fee:
above grade CALL 8 (ntakesI.
The ap;ticant has c6ncitted to *-
on%!*W91. cad h InSPtf Pkgfolkrs 6tc) >vou-H1
/*r #s t'W h
.t.astalt throwaway filters E-
.' '.. :.... :: :: :'7 frufft.:'* 4AA:5HCa f
- ..x-...:y-'~ ' &s/ w / Jet-M '%# dostdfMMA=r rerse.: 41*hr 'bo+fl u te -':
^
- ' : g2
--=
-n-
./b f +e 84,ICf 4kd f'**t! fi<NA A*' 3en3WV m 5-d !! : ! : 'f e !
- :r !:r: 250:: :W-
~': :;pHe r u a
...d : ! * - a s. g e c '2 ! d c : r ; ',7
.ian onese The intak'es for tra fuet oil' day tanks,in both units (intakes 600, 610, 623 and 620)
~'
are enty 10 feet above tevirkf However, the air intakes for the fuel oil day tank are satisfactory since the equi men 7 in :.. i s area will net be materla t ty affected by dus: or airborne parti:Les.
Therefore, we w.G - 6
- 'h
- s t st, :.,a s,'
w.
4, os s& r,rsvf
>o por s* s s e. r c r. o..c/
i-t W M e cm*~ t'*\\ sy n e. )
ss t As )
.t
- r
'Yf c' s
M *L C C WC C e o. c s. 3 d
' o*')* e r-ne q f or W's. t A st /s C v ?r t' f '
A r. '
Y.4 **
/d r N t ?o.* e l' o%: G ot t a, fs, e y, jf g
(* A e; s
. h y*
A h t.' * - ~
- r.: n.. n.
c.
nr.;
<,a im a.,.
O
'e m
sr->
-we w
--ne-m
--m-s
-~~-,--e w~-,w-w-,,--w=
v-
+
v
-a mmo
~
~
CJ4 -
conclude that the design d455hseet. e e s. thw requirement s -
m of General Design Criterien 17e " Elite t ric Power Syst e'us,"
ama w % $V2m t e & W '4 -rtesm e d & ton % k d 5
with resoect to _.--
au toelinep nuncaic, ucow,
--w.,
h
F%9 R +9 d e f*
'.' En h a n c em e n t of Onsite Emergency Diesel Generater win)
- ta Reliabilityr" x *;.. reg,ardMdust and particulate materials.
Heating for the diesel generator builcing is furnished by nonssismic Cetegory I electric unit heaters which are shut down in emergencies.
Some diesel combustien air Ca maximum of 29,000 cfa) is drawn from the HVAC equip-men: room before the air enters any active equi; ment.
AlL. fans and d&mmers of the ventilatien sveien are sesimit Category Ie Quality Grous C.
The dampers faif..in their safe positio,n on loss of power and the fans ar po. sered from separate emergency (Class 1E) gewer sucaties.
Non-seismi: Category I equipment wilL not fait in a manner that may damage safety-relatet equipment in the even: of i
an SSE.
The diesel genera:ce building ven:itati:n system is ho:. sed in t' e s e is m,i c Category I, fleed sn2 :cenad 1
r::ected diesel generator :uilding (refer :: Se: iers 3.4.1 and 3.3.2 cf this SER).
Thus, the c:eset genera::r l -
building ventilatior system : melfes with 75 9 quid?ti9es of P:sitions C.1 anc C.2 of Regulat=ry Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification and the requirements of Gene.sl Design Criteria 2, " Design Sases for Protecti:n Against Natural Phenomena" and 4, "Envitcnmental and Missile B a s e s. " S tu t. Mf"tlL, s ". Q S t pr*A,I9. Ck lE K d Design t
3 9 ("T e rta j b r bullci t r So,J htrM Er-Mc h u n df Cens r a U tnh l q-h ort c I %,3 n C de :,en B ts "o + 3pphcc:!=b i
+
~ ~..
.n.
an==IO
.#6 The syttTT"does not comply wi*
Recommendation,VA2 and C1,c5 ifuREG/CR-066ihand,theref.e,doesnot me the requirem'e :s
(_/ofGenealDesignCri*rion~17," Ele
/
.rie Power Sys* ms."
i
/
i The emergency service water intake structure ventitation system is des'igned to seismit. Category I, Quality Group C requirements.
It :ensists of separate systems used to ventilate emerg'ency ser-vice water (ESW) intake structure pump rooms and E S'.'
i n t a k e structure electrical equipment rocas.
A separate and independen system is used for each emergency service water intake structura pumn room.
Each system used to ventilate a pu=p roon consists cf one train housed in one pump room (.hich contains one pump).
A se arate and inde:enden: ventilation system is u,se,d for ea:h electrical equipm.ent room (which contains one trainof elo:-
trical equipment).
Thus, there are tuc puns eco: ventitation cystems, and two electrical equipment eco: ventilation systems fer each unit.
Each sump rec = subsystem consists et a missile
=cotected air intake and one "3C percent esca:ity exhaus: fan cis:harging :ncough a gravity Osn=er anc a misule Arc:ec ed i
vent.
Each elec:rical equip =ent room consis s of a missi'.e cc: se ed air intake, filters, heatees, c:cters, an: a su:cly fan.
Air is discharged -hr: ugh a missile pec:e::ec vent.
The single active failure recuiremen; is me 6'y this arrange-ment since a failure wculd a
m D.
O m
.,.__...,__-_-_m
--.,-,-_,c.,y..
-3
.,.-,....-.,_,,_,,m.,
,,,-..y y,-.,_v,.-,-
..,--.,_,9
~
- 19 9 -
result in a failure of one pump or train in a redundan:
i sair.
The fans are powered from sspacate, emergency,'
l (Class *E) power.
ALL active ventitation equipeen: i s seismic Category I, Quality Group C except for the elec-t ric unit heaters which are not required to operate in emergencies.
The emerger.:y service water intake structure electri:al room ventilation system uses recirculation in cold t.2 %?. Y W u....... to aid in heating, while the pump room system o
- ~ ~
i s once-th rough.
The design assures that the system can maintain the room temperatures within Limits during both normal and emergency plan: operati:n in:Luding an SSE, loss of offsite power, and any single actfva failure.
The system is housed in :ne seisnic Category Is fL od and tornado pecte: ed emergency service water intake struc:are (refer :c Se: 4:ns 3.4.1 and 3.5.2 of this SER).
Tnus, the re:uiremen: L cf General Design Criteria 2 and 4 with res;e:: :: protection cgains; natural phencme9s, and assurance of pre;er c:grsting environment fer essen-tial equi: men:, ans :Me guitelines of Regula: cry Guide 1.29, ?csitions C.1 and C.2, with respect to seismic classification, are me:.
Since tnere are separate sy:: ems for each unite General Design Criterien 5, T,
" Sharing Of Structuresi Sfstems and C:spenen s" is net ap:LicabLe.
w
-s,,-
w
w
-~,~w-rn--
!.or
-1 %
Eased on the aboves we conclude that the engineered I's d!349ntd.
safety featureK ventilation syste.rg.a s in conformance Design Criteria 2, W*d s7 o
with the requirenents of General es 4
d *
- they relate to protection against natural ener phenomenag assurance of proper operating envirorment-nor d powkt:, frog -o f clicf> rest ffwfWat poansf desF dd.
for essenti4L equipment,;.-
';c' :. : ; a
$s hcudah* Maf4'n*H QMdtotcAc/sas$ **
the guidelines of Positions C.1 and C.2 of Regulat6cy 4
LM'U seismic classification. f r,.f.,
Guide 1.29 concerning T
lc;r- ; a; ::7t: Vin win iwr U Tr i n iv. e i iew-to-es sem.
verd (4tCes WY
,us that the dissel generator building, complies with m 1r @ h d 4.L C.L t
- cs c A. 0 l
f
-@R 'e c o mm en d a t i o n s fh! a n d 4% o f Nf;R EG / C R-0660, %:e e t%c 3
4 C,$g Tf:a ( DC 5 g?pi ki [-t r sce"i 1~'i.Yg e,- -
3 the reouirements o,.
_ we wits report M L;.r t i on o f t h i s issue in a upplement to this 5 5.3..
~. '
g x e h ce m plIcic.c.e is she1c,,
'g m
,i co n nd d ebe. m m -h % s.e, f-I k Dh kMA kO g
l'e=pe.r,e ch e G S.R f Sed,en q,qp l'IEbdo" y
-.x
.s rt; u :.
weLdM
+4 ! e9 n Pems' &* E<**f bak< re venhla hsu quen ss accipArbAc. @
sy= tem meet s. 14 e occ &ce criMio o,e aga cochtn V4/f a
~.
l
..- -. - - - -.-