ML20080H049
| ML20080H049 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 09/02/1983 |
| From: | Lear G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20079F427 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-84-35 NUDOCS 8309200478 | |
| Download: ML20080H049 (76) | |
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UNITEC STATES 7
3g),(j)I NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIUN o
wAsmNGTON, D. C. 20555 k* CiW SEP 2 1983 Docket Nos.: ~50-400/401 MEMORANDUM FOR: George Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch - 3 Division of Licensing 4
THRU:
dy James Knight, Assistant Director for Components and Structures Engineering Division of Engineering FROM:
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-George Lear, Chief Structural and Geotechnical Engineering Branch Division of Engineering
SUBJECT:
FINAL 5AFETY EVALUATION REPORT - GE0 TECHNICAL ENGINEERING Plant Name: Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Applicant: Carolina Power and Light (CP&L)
Licensing Stage: OL Docket Numbers: 50-400/401 Responsible Branch:
LB-3, B. Buckley, LPM Review Status: Continuing
References:
Shearon Harris FSAR through Amendment' 9, dated August 18, 1983 The enclosure to this memorandum is the geotechnical engineering input for inclusion in the Shenron Harris Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2. Safety
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Evaluation Report (SER), and is based on our review of the applicant's FSAR through Amendment 9, dated August 18, 1983.
l The geotechnica.1 reviewer for the project, Jacob Philip, visited the Shearon Harris Power Plant Site on April 12 through 14,1984(Reference l
6ofenclosure). He was accompanied by Lyman Heller, Section Leader and Owen Thompson, Geotechnical Engineer, Geotechnical Engineering Section, SGEB. The staff audited CPSL's geotechnical engineering related construction documents and resolved most of the open items: identified in the draft SER of November 9,1982 in' discussions with CP&L'and their consultants, Ebasco Engineers. On April 26, 1983, CP&L docketed their response to most of the open items as Amendment 5 to the Shearon Harris FSAR. Subsequent discussion by Jacob Philip with CP&L clarified and resolved any remaining issues, with one exception, the stability of a 400 foot long retaining wall mentioned in Section 2.5.4 of the enclosure, The retaining wall is to'be constructed along the west side of the Units 1 and 2 structures. The excavations for the cancelled Units 3 and 4 are
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2-SEP 2 1$3 George Knighton then to be backfilled against the wal.1. The staff believes.th'at the stability of the retaining wall should F9. reviewed as a Category 1 structure because a postulated failure ci the wall could affect the
. safety of the adjacent Category 1 fuel handling building.
In dis-cussions with CP&L, the staff was told that CP&L plans to demonstrate that a failure of the retaining wall would not impact the safe shutdown capabilitics of the fuel handling building and that the issue would be addressed in a forthcoming amendment to the FSAR. The staff's assess-ment of CP&L's analysis will be provided in a supplement to the SER.
In FSAR Section 1.8, CP&L has stated that future monitori.ng of the dams, dike and channels at the site will comply with the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.127 " Inspection of Water Control Structures Associated with Nuc: ear Power Plants", Rev.1, March 1978. The staff, as discussed in Sections 2.5.6.7 and 2.5.6.9 of the SER requires that CP&L's compliance be included in the technical specifications for the-plant start-up operations and throughout the life of the plant.
George
. Lear, Chief Structural and Geotechnical Engineering Branch Division of Engineering
Enclosure:
As stated' cc:
R. Vollmer G. Lear R. Jackson L. Heller P. T. Kuo M. Fliegel R. Gonzales S. Kim J. Philip
- 0. Thompson N. Wagner.
O. Parr e
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 2.5.4 Stability of Subsurface Materials and Foundations 2.5.4.1 Site Conditions 2.5.4.1.1 Site and Plant Description 2.5.4.1.2 Site Investigations 2.5.4.1.3 Properties of Subsurface Materials 2.5.4.1.4 Groundwater Conditions 2.5.4.2 Excavation and Backfill 2.5.4.3 Foundation Stability 2.5.4.3.1 Static Loading 2.5.4.3.2 Dynamic Loading 2.5.4.4 Liquifaction Potential 2.5.4.5 Lateral Loads 2.5.4.6 Instrumentation 2.5.4.7 Conclusion 2.5.5 Stability of Slopes 2.5.6 Embankment and Dams 2.5.6.1 General Description 2.5.6.1.1 Main Dam 2.5.6.1.2 Auxilisry Dam 2.5.6.1.3 Auxiliary Separating Dike 2.5.6.1.4 Auxiliary Reservoir Channel 2.5.6.1.5 Emergency Service Water Intake Channel 2.5.6.1.6 Emergency Service Water Discharge Channel 2.5.6.2 Foundation Condi'tions 2.5.6.2.1 Exploration 2.5.6.2.2 Foundation Materials 2.5.6.2.3 Foundation Treatment.
2.5.6.3 Dams, Dike and Channel Materials and Construction 2.5.6.3.1 Rockfill and Random Rockfill 2.5.6.3.2 Filter Materials 2.5.6.3.3 Core Materials 2.5.6.3.4 Rip Rap 2.5.6.3.5 Channels 2.5.6.3.6 Summary of Dams,. Dike and Channel Materials-and Construction 2.5.6.4 Stability of Category I Dams 2.5.6.5 Channel Stability Analysis 2.5.6.6 Seepage Control 2.5.6.7 Instrumentation 2.5.6.8 Conclusion.
2.5.6.9 Technical Specifications k
Subject:
Final Safety Evaluation Report - Geotechnical Engineering Plant Name: Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
. Docket No.: 50-400/401 Responsible Branch: LB-3 Prepared by:
J. Philip, Geotechnical Engineer, Structural and Geotechnical Engineering Branch, DE The following sections sunnarize the staff's geotechnical engineering ),
review of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 (SHNPP as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) through Amendment Number 9 dated Au materials and foundations (gust 18, 1983. The stability of subsurface FSAR Section 2.5.4), the stability of slopes (FSAR Section 2.5.5), and embankments and dams (FSAR Secti'on 2.5.6) have been evaluated in accordance with the criteria outlined in 10 CFR Parts 50 and 100, Regulatory Guide 1.70 Revision 3 Regulatory Guides 1.132, 1.138, 1.127, and the current Standard Review Plan (SRP), NUREG-0800 dated July 1981, Sections 2.5.4 and 2.5.5.
2.5.4 Stability of Subsurface Materials and Foundations The reismic Category I structures, systems, and components (SSC) for Units 1 and 2 that were reviewed for foundations stability are listed in FSAR Table 3.2.1-1.
Units 3 and 4 which were originally proposed, have been cancelled. The excavation for these units is to be backfilled against a retaining wall, approximately 400 ft. long, along the west side of the Units 1 and 2 structures.
The seismic Category I SSC that were reviewed are as follows:
- containment buildings
- auxiliary buildings
- fuel handling buildings
- waste processing buildings
- tank buildings (housing the refueling water storage tank, the reactor make-up tank and the condensate storage tank)
- diesel generator building
- diesel fuel oil storage building
- Emer ency Service Water (ESW) structures, pipelines and channels
- auxi iary dam, separating dike and channel
.- main dam
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The staff will review the 400 foot long retaining wall as a seismic Category I structure because a postulated failure of the retainin wall could affect the safety of the adjacent seismic Category I fuel h ndling j
l building. The stability analysis of the retaining wall has not been reviewed by the staff; the staff's evaluation of the analysis will be addressed in a supplement to the SER.
The staff's evaluation of the geotechnical engineering aspects of the foundations for the main powerblock structures, the ESW screen structure, intake structure and pipelines and the ESW discharge structure and pipe-lines are discussed in the following parts' of Se:: tion N
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. 2.5.4 of the SER. The dams, dike and channels are discussed in Section 2.5.6 of the SER.
2.5.4.1 Site Conditions, 2.5.4.1.1 Site and Plant Description 1
General Description The.SHNPP site is located ab~out 16 miles southwest of Raleigh, North Carolina, in the southeast corner of Chatham County. The plant is built on a peninsula between Tom Jack Creek and Thomas Creek (see SER Figure 2.6). These creeks flow into Buckhorn Creek which itself empties into
- the Cape Fear River about 7 miles southeast of the plant.
a.
Plant Cooling Water About 4.5 miles south of the plant the main dam was constructed across Buckhorn Creek. The main dam impounds water for nonnal plant cooling
' purposes. Emergency cooling water for safe shutdown of the plant is impounded by the auxiliary dam built across Tom Jack Creek, as shown on SER Figure 2.6.
The auxiliary dam is also referred to as the west auxiliary dam in the FSAR. Both the main and auxiliary dams are seismic Category 1 Structures.
Normal cooling water is taken from the main reservoir via the cooling tower make-up water intake channel (SER Figure 2.6). This channel is not seismic Category I and has not been reviewed by the geotechnical engineering staff.
Emergency cooling water for safe shutdown' of'the plant is 'obtained from the auxiliary reservoir via the ESW intake channel (SER Figure 2.6) and is pumped from the ESW screen structure and the intake structure to the plant via the ESW intake pipelines.
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Cooling water from the plant is discharged through.the ESW discharge structure and channel to the auxiliary dam reservoir (SER Figure 2.6).
In order to provide adequate cooling of the emergency water supply, a seismic Category 1 auxiliary separating dike has been constructed. This dike causes plant discharge water to flow longer distances through the auxiliary dam reservoir channel and along the west side of the auxiliary dam reservoir (SER Figure 2.6), thereby allowing greater time for cooling.
Normal water level in the auxiliary dam reservoir is 250 ft above mean sea level (E1. 250)'; r.ormal water level in the. main dam reservoir is at E1. 220 feet.
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Structures Original grade in the main plant area ranged from about E1. 275 to about E1. 250. Final grade around the plant is El. 260.
The bottom of excavation for the various powerblock structures generally ranged from E1. '179 to El. 234. The bottom of excavation for the other safety-related structures as shown on FSAR Figure 2.5E-10, were as follows:
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ESW screen structure E1. 218 to E1. 226.
ESW intake structure E1. 182 to E1. 184 ESW discharge structure: E1. 232 to E1. 235 Diesel fuel oil storage building:
E1. 234 to E1. 238 Diesel generator building:
E1. 239 to E1. 246 All the structures discussed above are supported on sound' rock.
(See Section 2.5.4.1.3 of the SER for the definition of sound and weathered rock.)
c.
Pipelines The ESW intake pipeline is about 1100 ft. long, running north from the ESW intake structure to the main powerblock (tank building). The bottom of the 30-inch diameter pipes are at E1. 250. The original grade along the pipeline alignment ranged from about El. 270 near the powerblock to about El. 250 near the ESW intake structure, but was a:; ic.w as E1. 235 at a location about 100 ft. north of the ESW intake structure.Therefore, the pipes are supported on as much as 15 ft, of compacted random fill in some areas.
(see SER Section 2.5.4.2 for definition cf random fill)
In other areas, the pipes are supported on undisturbed (medium dense clayey silt to sandy silt) residual soils that are only about 8 ft.
thick over weathered rock.
The ESW discharge pipeline is about 700 ft. long, running north from the main powerblock to the ESW discharge structure. The bottom of the 30 inch diameter pipes are at El. 250. The original grade along the pipeline alignment ranged frnm E1. 270 near the ESW dischr.rge structure and near the powerblock, to a low of about El. 243 for a distance of about 100 ft. north of the powerblock. Therefore, a short section of the ESW discharge pipeline is supported on as much as 8 ft. of compacted random fill while most of the pipeline is supported on unuisturbed (medium dense clayey silts to sandy silt) residual soils.
2.5.4.1.2 Site Investigations Subsurface investigations for the SHNPP site included about 1250 borings of which more than 280 were in the main powerblock area, and more than 400 were in the vicinity of the dams and channels.
Field work included Standard Penetration Tests (SPT) and sampling in' soil in accordance with ASTM D-1586; diamond drill cores were taken in rock that qendrally was l
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. encountered at depths less than 30 ft. below ground surface.. Relatively undisturbed 3 inch diameter samples and 25 lb. bag samples of soil were also obtained..The soil and rock samples were used for laboratory testing to establish static and dynamic engineering properties of the foundation and embankment materials.
Additi'nal information on the subsurface soil conditions at'the site was o
obtained from trenches, totalling over 12,000 linear ft., in the power block, main dam and auxiliary dam areas. The trenches were excavated by backhoe to. depths of generally 2 to 10 ft. deep, and as deep as 15 ft.
where diabasa (intrusions of fine to medium grained dikes in the parent rock)wereencountered.
Geophysical explorations at the site included seismic refraction surveys along 6 seismic lines (5000 linear ft) and along the axes of the main and auxiliary dam and the associated spillways, shear wave velocity surveys along Trench 1 (3400 linear ft) and along the axes of the auxiliary dam and auxiliary reservoir separating dike, and a downhole velocity survey in Boring P-6, located about 400 ft. southwest of Unit I reactor building.
The details of the boring and trenching exploration are provided in FSAR Appendix 2.5-A; the details of the geophysical studies are provided in FSAR Section 2.5.2.5.
The staff has concluded that the applicant has obtained adequate subsurface information at the site in accordance with R.G. 1.132 (" Site Investigations for Foundations of Nuclear Power Pla'nts") to adequately define the subsurface conditions at the site.
Staff review of the site data presented indicates no evidence of zones of solutioning, caverns or highly weathered areas that would allow for subsidence under the anticipated foundation loadings.
2.5.4.1.3 Properties of Subsurface Materials The surficial soils in the plant area are residual soils, generally.less than 10 feet thick, and consist of clayey silt to sandy silt (ML/CL/SC).
SPT values in the residual soils were generally in.the range of 20 blows /ft. with some lower values near ground surface and higher values near the rock surface in weathered rock materials. The properties of the residual soils are discussed in FSAR Section 2.5.6.4.
The applicant used the following properties for compacted residual soils (compacted random fill, see SER Section 2.5.4.2) in the analysis of buried pipes, conduits and manholes. These structures are the only seismic Category 1 structures supported on the compacted residual soil.
unit weight = 135 pcf soils subgrade modulus = 50 psi /in.
compression wave velocity = 1500 ft/sec.
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5-Thesitecontainstwoprincipalgeologicformationsseparatelibythe Jonesboro Fault, located about.3 miles-south of the plant and about 1/2 mile north of the main dam. North of the fault the bedrock consists of Triassic sedimentary rocks that have no direct geologic relationship to the pre-Triassic i the main dam site)gneous and metamorphic rocks south of the fault (at-
.The Triassic rocks'are well consolidated gently dipping.siltstones and sandstones with beds ranging in thickness from less than-1 inch to a maximum of 20 feet. The depth of weathering ranges from 5 to 10 feet. Layering in the rock strikes-N5*
15' E and dips 9' to 17' to the southeast. Joints are irregularly spaced at intervals of a few feet and are mostly vertical. A description of.the pre-Triassic rocks is presented in Section 2.5.6 of the SER. Additional discussion of the site geology is provided in Section 2.5.1 of the SER.
In excavations, weathered rock was considered to be material that could not be removed on a production basis by the blade of a D-8 tractor or equivalent. Suitable or sound rock was considered to be material that could not be removed on a production basis by a single ripper on a D-8 tractor or equivalent.
The sound rock is generally dense and massive as indicated by good recovery of cores-(generally in excess of 80%) and high rock quality designation (RQD) values that averaged 92.7% below E1. 235. The static engineering properties of the sound rock were determined from laboratory tests. The following average properties of sound rock were determined from the testing program.
dry density = 1631b/cu ft unconfined compressive strength = 8148 psi (1173 ksf) angle of internal friction (9) = 45 degrees cohesion (c) = 2400 psi Poisson's ratio = 0.24 (from laboratory unconfined compression tests)'
6 Young's modulus = 1.69 x 10 psi (from laboratory unconfined compressiontests)
The Young's modulus used for calculating the static settlement of the plant structures was based on a conservative RQD of 75%. From Refgrence5,theresultingYoung'smodulusforaRQDof75%is6.8 X10 psi.
The dynamic engineering properties of the residual soils, weathered rock and sound rock were determined primarily from the geophysical explora-tions with some confirmation of property values by laboratory compression wave velocity. testing. The average properties are:
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.35 The a'pplicant's observations, inspections and tests during construction revealed no significant differences in subsurface materials from the conditions assumed for design. The laboratory testing program is in
. accordance with R.G. 1.138 " Laboratory Investigation of Soils for Engineering Analysis and Design of Nuclear Power Plants." Therefore, the staff has concluded that the applicant has adequately investigated and analyzed the subsurface conditions at the site and has established appropriate subsurface material properties for foundation design.
2.5.4.1.4 Groundwater Conditions The design ground water level for the plant structu'res is E1. 251.
The groundwater levels in the plant area were observed in the borings for site exploration and in piezometers that had been monitored for a number of years.
Observed groundwater le' els ranged from E1. 240 to E1.
v 272 but the higher levels are believed to have recorded perched water table from water trapped in fractures in the bedrock. During foundation excavation some seepage occurred from the rock joints; the relatively small. quantity of water was handled by intermittent pumping from sumps.
Backfill around the plant structures is relatively impenneable soil.
(permeability coefficient less than 10~6. cm/sec) selected to prevent high piezometric levels against the structures if high water levels were maintained in the main reservoir. With the cancellation of Units 3 and
. 4, the normal pool level in the main reservoir is E1. 220; the previously anticipated.nonnal pool level was E1. 250. The auxiliary reservoir normal pond level is El. 250 but groundwater flow will be i
toward the main reservoir (see SER Figure 2.6). Since the plant lies about 300 ft from the auxiliary reservoir and the backfill arounc the plant is relatively impervious, the groundwater level at the plant will be below the design groundwater level' of E1. 251' Piezometric levels measured near the plant structures after filling of the auxiliary reservoir-(FSAR Fig.2.4.13-2) confinns that the groundwater levels are below the design groundwater level. Further discussion about groundwater is presented in Section 2.4 of the SER.
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7 2.5.4.2 Excavation'and Backfill In 1974 the site was leveled to fic 1 grade of El. 260 by excavating high areas and filling low areas. Low areas were raised to final plant grade by placing and compacting random fill material consisting of residual soil and broken rock materials. The applicant classified the.
random fill into five categories ranging from all-soil (clayey silt and
. silty clay) to mostly-rock material (siltstone up to 21 inches in size).
The finer grained soils were compacted in 8" lifts by a sheepsfoot roller to 95% of the maximum Standard Proctor Density (ASTM D-698); the coarser materials consisting primarily of broken rock were placed in 24" lift thicknesses and compacted by six passes of a 40,000 pound vibratory roller based on the results of a test fill program.
Field test results of* random fill used for support of the Category 1 pipes and conduits (Reference 1) show that the compaction requirements were met.
After leveling the site to plant grade, the excavation proceedeo using bulldozers and scrapers. The excavation was completed to final grade by controlled blasting in successive lifts.
Front end loaders placed the broken rock into trucks for removal up an access ramp.
i The plant excavation had a maximum lateral extent of approximately 925 feet in the north-south direction ana 990 feet in the east-west direction.' Floor elevations for the various levels within the excavation range from E1. 234 for the shallowest part to E1. 179 for the deepest level.(The bottom elevation of the mat foundations for the various structures range from E1. 180 to E1. 235) The side slopes of the excavation were 1: 1(Horizontal: Vertical) in the overburden soil and 1/4:1 in rock.
Exposed rock surfaces were cleaned, geologically mapped and then protected by slush grouting or shotcreting.
Backfill (residual soil without rock fragments) around the powerblock stnJetures referred to as select fill was required to be fine-grained, clayey and silty soils (generally over 70% passing US# 200 sieve and a plasticity index ranging from 0 to 9)) that would have low permeability as discussed in Section 2.b.4.1.4 above. The backfill around structures was compacted to the specified 95 percent of Standard Proctor maximum dry density (ASTM D-698) at a moisture content within 4% of the optimum moisture content (Reference 1). The perme material is low (coefficient less than 10-gbility of the backfill cm/sec). Sumaries of field test dats (Reference 1) confinn that the backfill meets specifications for material type and compaction.
The staff expressed concken that the clay backfill (around structures)
' that supports seismic Category I pipes would allow differential settlements that could result in exces2ive pipe stresses near areas where pipe would be rigidly supported e.g., on the rigid wall of the building and on sound rock at the edges of the excavations. The
_ applicant elected to mitigate this concern by replacing the clay J
backfill with lean concrete at locations beneath seismic Category I.
pipes where this difference in foundation rigidity exists. The staff found this solution to be acceptable.
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2.5.4.3 Foundation Stability 2.5.4.3.1 Static Loading The calculated maximum static foundation stresses to be applied range from about 4 to 10 ksf for the seismic Category I structures. The applicant has calculated the factor of safety for bearing capacity to be 28, and the mgximum settlement to be 0.42 inches based on a Youngs modulus of 6.8 X 10 psi. This settlement is considered to be predomi-nantly elastic compressicn of the bedrock that will occur during con-struction. The. settlements measured to date (Reference 1). are less than 0.42 inches. The staff concurs in the applicant's assessment that there is an adequate factor of safety against bearing capacity failure and that mar.imum total and differential settlements will be less than 1/2 inch.
2.5.4'.3.2 Dynamic Loading The design SSE has a maximum horizontal acceleration of 0.15g at foundation level. The corresponding acceleration level for the OBE is 0.075g.
Further discussion of the design earthquake is presented in Section 2.5.2 of the SER..
The seismic Category I structures are supported on s a.-! rock and the structure response to dynamic loading was analyzed u::
- -ha lumped mass-spring method. The spring constants were calcult from the geophysical investigation results (shear and compress w. wave velocities) using standard engineering equations (FSAR Table 2.5.4-8).
For the seismic Category I pipelines and manholes that are soil supported,.the acceleraticns used for the design of these structures were obtained by the computer program SHAKE. The acceleration (SSE) was input at the top of weathered rock. The input soil and rock properties were obtained from field geophysical measurements and laboratcry testing and has been discussed previously in Section 2.5.4.1.3 of the SER. The staff's evaluation of the dynamic structural analyses is discussed in Section 3 of the SER. The staff concludes that the applicant adopted i
appropriate soil and rock properties in.the. dynamic analysis of structures and pipelines to assure their safety during the.SSE.
2.5.4.4 Liquefaction Potential The plant structures are supported on bedrock, therefore. 1'iquefaction is not a problem. Some safety-related pipes and conduits are supported on undisturbed residual soils and compacted fill soils. These materials are various combinations of cohesive, silty clay, to clayey silt soils, and weathered rock. These materials are not susceptible to liquefaction. Thus, we concur in the' applicant's conclusion that liquefaction is not.a potential hazard for the plant structures and associated pipelines and conduits.
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2.5.4.5 Lateral Loads 1
The below-ground walls of structures were designed for full at rest pressure daveloped by the compacted backfill using a coefficient of earth pressure of 0.7.
Dynamic lataral earth pressures were calculated using two methods.
In the first method, used for a number of subsurface walls, soil strains were determined from the arithmetic sum of wall movements (calculated in the dynamic structural analyses) and the free-field soil moveinent. The lateral pressures were then calculated using the laboratory detennined pressure-strain relationships for the silty clay backfill.
In the second method used for some subsurface walls, a passive coefficient of 3.0 was assigned for the backfill, while a coefficient of 2.03 was used for backfill for that part of the wall
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below rock. The resulting soil pressures by the two methods, for different Category I walls are illustrated in Reference 2.
Pressure due to groundwater was considered for the depths below the design j
hydrostatic level (EL. 251). Based on the review of the lateral pressure analysis, the staff has concluded that the applicant has used l
acceptable state-of-the-art procedures.
2.5.4.6 Instrumentation During construction, measurements were taken on monuments to record vertical movements of structures. Groundwater levels were also recorded. The applicant plans to continue monitoring of the groundwater levels, on a ' weekly basis, until the start of plant operations. At that time, the frequency of monitoring' of groundwater levels will be reevaluated. Since the plant structures a're founded on sound rock, and the predicted (and actual) settlements are less than 1/2 inch, the applicant plans to discontinue monitoring vertical movements of the structures at the start of plant operations.
2.5.4.7 Conclusion Based on the applicant's design criteria and on the results of the applicant's investigations, laboratory and field tests, and analyses, the staff has concluded that the site and plant foundations are adequate i
to support the seismic Category I structures, pipelines and conduits at i
the Shearon Harris site. The staff concludes that the geotechnical engineering related site and plant foundation efforts of the applicant rr.eet the requirements of Regulatory Guides pertinent to Section 2.5.4 of the NUREG-0800 and are, therefore, acceptable.-
2.5.5 Stability of Slopes here are no natural slopes at the site that could affect the safety of. ~
the plant. Man-made slopes for dams, dike and channels are discussed in Section 2.5.6 of the SER.
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2.5.6 Emoankments and Dams 2.5.6.1 General Description A functional description of dams, dike and channels at the SHNPP site is pro.vided in Section 2.5.4.1 of the SER. The staff's evaluation of the seismic Category 1 dams, dike and channels is provided in the following sections.
2.5.6.1.1 Main Dam The main dam is a rockfill dem approximately 1550 ft. long' at the crest (E1. 260), with a maximum height of about 108 ft. and a crest width of 25 ft. The dam is constructed with a central impervious core, 10 ft.
wide at the top, w(fine and coarse) pes.
ith 1:2 side slo The core is protected by two 8 ft. wide filters on both upstream and downstream faces'. The rock fill shall of the dam has slopes of 2:1 (upstream and downstream) that are protected by a 4 ft. layer of oversized rock (greater thea 22 inch size) on the entire downstream slope and below El.
2M on the apstream slope. Rip-rap above El. 200 has been placed on the upstream slope. A cross-section of the main dam is shown.in SER Figure 2.5.6.1-1.
The normal water level in the main reservoir (E1. 220) is maintained by two uncontrolled ogee spillways, each 25 ft. wide, that are cut into bedrock on the west (right) abutment of the dam. The spillways are lined with concrete that is secured by rock anchors,.
i 2.5.6.1.2 Auxiliary Dam
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l The auxiliary (dam is a random rockfill dam approximately 4060 ft. long at the crest El. 260), with a maximum height of about 73 ft., and a crest width of 20 ft. The dam is constructed with a centr'al impervious core, 10 ft. wide at the top, with 1:1 side slopes. The core is protected by 12 ft. wide silty sand transition zones on both upstream and downstream faces. The random rockfill shell of the dam has slopes of'2.5:1 (upstre.am and downstream) that are protected by a 4 ft. layer of rip-rap over a 1 ft. layer of bedding. The rip-rap covers the entire downstream face and above E1. 235 on the upstream face. The downstream shell is provided with two horizontal drainage blankets (crushed rock backfill,' GP, maximum size 3") each 3 ft thick, that are connected to the transition zone -- one at E1. 214 and one at E1. 230. Additionally, a 3 ft. thick drainage layer, 200 ft. ~ wide, is provided under the downstream shell in each of two areas where pre-existing creeks were located. A cross-section of the auxiliary dam is shown in SER Figure f
2.5.6.1-2.
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The normal water level in the' auxiliary reservoir (E1. 250) is maintained by an uncontrolled ogee spillway,170 ft w-ide, that is cut into rock on the west (right) abutment of the dam. The spillway is lined with concrete.
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2.5.6.1.3 Auxiliary Separating Dike The auxiliary separating dike is a random rockfill embankment approximately 1200 ft. long at the crest (E1. 255), with a maxiganum height of about 55 ft. and a crest width of 20 ft. The embankment is constructed with a central impervious core, 10 ft, wide at the top, with 1:10 side slopes. The random rockfill shell has slopes of 2.5:1 (both sides). There are no filters within the embankment but the finer rockfill material was graded toward the impervious core. A cross-section of the auxiliary separating dike is shown in SER Figure
- 2. 5. 6.1-P..
2.5.6.1.4 Auxiliary Reservoir Channel The auxiliary reservoir channel (also identified in the FSAR as the west auxiliary channel) is about 1570 ft. long and 140 ft. wide at the invert (E1.'235). The. side slopes are 2:1 in soil and 1:4 in rock. The original grades along the auxiliary reservoir channel alignment ranged from about E1. 235 to E1. 265 and the channel was constructed entirely by excavation of soil,and rock materials as shown on FSAR Figure 2.5.6-6.
2.5.6.1.5 Emergency Service Water Intake Channel The emergency service water (ESW) intake channel is about 3580 ft. long and 50 ft. wide at the invert (E1. 238). The side slopes are 2:1 in soil and 1:4 in rock. The original grade along the ESW-intake channel alignment ranged from about El. 238 to E1. 270. Most of the intake channel construction required removal of s' oil and rock (cut) but some compacted fill was required in the channel base and sides near the ESW Screen Structure, as shown on FSAR Figure 2.5.6-7.
2.5.6.1 6 Emergency Service Water Discharge-Channel The ESW discharge channel is about 2170 ft. long and 50 ft. to 80 ft.
wide at the invert (El. 240). The side slopes are 2:1 in soil and 1:4 in' rock. The original grade along the discharge channel alignment ranged from about El. 250 to El. 275. The discharge channel consisted entirely of soil and rock excavation ~without the need for fill, as shown on FSAR Figure 2.5.6-8.
J 2.5.6.2 Foundation Conditions 2.5.6.2.1 Exploration The applicant's explorations to detamine subsurface conditions at the SHNPP site are discussed in Section 2.5.4.1 of the SER. The areas investigated included the foundations for dams, dike, channel alignments and borrow areas, a.s described in FSAR Section 2.5.6.2.
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(Reference FSAR Figures.2.5.6-4 and 2.5.6-5) l
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. 2.5.6.2.2 Foundation Materials In general, the subsurface conditions at the SHNPP site consist of a layer of residual soil (see Section 2.5.4.1.3) generally less than 10 ft. thick overlying weathered rock and sound rock. Some recent alluvium found in valleys was removed in preparing dam foundations.. In excavations, weathered rock was considered to be material that could not be removed, on a production basis, by the blade of a 0-8 tractor or equivalent. Sound rock was considered to be material that could not be removed on a production basis, by a single ripper on a D-8 tractor or equivalent.
At the sein dam site (south 'of the Jonesboro fault) the pre-Triassic igneous and metamorphic rock consist of granite and gneisses with interlayered schists. The predominant foliation strikes approximately N55'E and dips 3df to 60' northwest.
In the auxiliar separating dike areas (north of the Jonesboro fault) y dem and auxiliary the Triassic sedimentary rock (discussed in SER Section 2.5.4.1.3) consists of gently dipping sandstone and siltstone.
Because the rocks at the SHNPP site are jointed and fractured, the foundations for the main and auxiliary dams were grouted to reduce seepage losses from the reservoirs. The auxiliary separating dike foundation was not grouted because there is no head differential across the dike -- its purpose is to direct ~ water flow within the auxiliary reservoir.
The shell of the main dam is founded on weathered' rock, while the impervious core extends to sound rock to form a cut-off trench. The downstream fine filter also extends to sound rock. ~ The auxiliary dam was constructed similarly, i.e., the shell' is founded on weathered rock and core cut-off trench extends to sound rock. The auxiliary separating dike foundation consists of some firm cla~yey residual soil (SPT blow count 20 to refusal) although most of the excavation to prepare the foundation extended to weathered rock.
The auxiliary reservoir, including the auxiliary reservoir channel and ESW intake channels were constructed by excavating into hard residual soils (SPT blow. count greater than 20) or rock-(weathered and/or sound).
. The ESW discharge channel was predominantly cut through rock (weathered and/orsound).
2.5.6.2.3 Foundation Treatment Sound rock exposed in the cut-off trench excavations for th'e main dam and auxiliary dem was cleaned by compressed air or water, and geologically mapped. Details of the mapping procedures are detailed in FSAR Sections 2.5.6.2.1.2.2 and 2.5.6.2.2.2.1.
The cleaned rock surfaces were slush grouted and steep' slopes were modified by dental concrete.
Grouting from the b'ottom.of the cut-off trenches for the main dam and auxiliary dam was done in two phases. Consolidation grouting extended e
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to a depth of,20 ft. with grout holes on 10 ft. centers. This was followed by curtain grouting to a depth of, about 50 ft.
Primary curtain grout holes were spaced at 40 ft. centers, with secondary curtain grout holes split-spacing the primary holes. The grout holes were pressure-tested and filled with neat cement in at least three stages.
The grouting procedures are described in FSAR Section'2.5E.
Ebasco specifications CAR-SH-CH-11 for grouting are included in FSAR Section 2.5I.
The grout "take" (bags of cement grout pumped into each grout hole) was gene; ally low; average grout takes were: main dam, consolidation grouting = 0.02 bags /ft., curtain grouting = 0.03 bags /ft., auxiliary dam, consolidation grouting = 0.07 bags /ft., curtain grouting = 0.06 l
bags /ft. Additional holes were drilled and grouted in areas where the grout take was high. Check holes were drilled periodically to verify the acceptability of the grouting.
Tne staff observed the grouting operations during site visits and based on our observations at the site and a review of the applicant's sumary of grouting operations, we have concluded that the rock below the cut-off trenches at.the main and auxiliary dams has been properly grouted.
Procedures similar to that for the sound rock (except grouting) were followed in the preparation of the weathered rock surfaces in the foundation areas of the main and auxiliary dam, as well as the weathered rock and residual soil surfaces in the foundation area of the auxiliary separating dike. At the staff's request during construction, the in-place density of the residual soils was determined and then the residual soils were proof-rolled by a loaded scraper. Documentation in Reference 1 attests that percent compaction greater than 97% Standard
. Maximum Proctor density was achieved.
Soft soils were removed as directed by the field engineer. The staff observed some of these operations.during construction and, based on a review of the applicant's documents, we have concluded that the foundations for the main and i
auxiliary dams and for the auxiliary separating dike were properly prepared.
Along the ESW intake channel alignment,'the applicant removed the more-penneable silty sand soils (to minimize seepage from the channel) and replaced it by controlled compacted fill (similar to the backfill around the plant structures) wnen the channel was constructed in 1978.
Summaries of test results (Reference 1) show that the fill along the ESW intake channel alignment met specifications.
2.5.6.3 Embankment Materials and Construction 2.5.6.3.1 Rockfill and Random Rockfill The rockfill material for the shell of the main dam was obtained from the spillway excavation and a quarry located upstream from the left g
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. (east) abutment, designated as Area A cn FSAR Figure 2.5F-12. The random rockfill. for the shell of the auxiliary dam and auxiliary separating dike was obtained from excavations for the main plant structures and the channals.
The ro'ckfill was specified to be 22 inches maximum size with a minimum 75% of particles larger than 1/4 inch. The random rockfill was required to be also 22 inches maximum size with a minimum 75% of particles larger than US #10 sieve size. Both materials were required to have an in-place dry den greaterthan10-gitygreaterthan130pcfandapermeabili.tycoefficient cm/sec. The design shear strength parameter was specified to be 30'.
The rockfill was brought to the fill surface from the stockpile at the quarry or from the spillway excavation by haul trucks and end dumped. A D-8 dozer spread the materials to a 24 inch lift thickness. Over sized rocks (greater than 22 inches) were pushed to the exterior of the dam shell forming a 4 feet protective layer (see SER Sections 2.5.6.1.1 and 2.5.6.1.2) for the rock fill shell. The layers of rockfill were then compacted using vibratory m11ers of not less than 40,000. pounds to dry densities exceeding 130 pcf at about 5% moisture contents. The field test results sunnarized in FSAR Section 2. 5F confirm that the specified densities were achieved.
Large. scale (15 inch diameter) triaxial tests conducted by the U.S. Army Core of Engineers (FSAR Appendix 2.5H) confirmed th,e shear strength (for stability analysis) and permeability values for the random and modified random rockfill. The test results indicat'ed a shear strength parameter 3
of 9 = 40' and permeanility coefficients, of greater than 10 cm/sec.
Although no durability tests were conducted for the rockfill, test results (FSAR Appendix 2.5H) indicate that there was. negligible breakdown of the rock after field compaction. The dynamic properties of the rockfill (strain dapendent shear modulus ~and damping ratio) was selected from published literature (see Reference 4).
2.5.6.3.2 Filter Materials The filter materials were obtained from off site sources. The
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specifications required filter materials to be very well, graded, coarse cohesionless matericls, meeting the specifications shown in'FSAR Section 2.51. The gradation cnaracteristics of the filters are:
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(Main Dam)
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3"86-100 100 95-100 l
1.5" 66-88 82-100 50-90' 3/4" 20-60 1/2" 100 45-68 60-90 3/8"96-100 40-62 5-30 No 4 83-100 30-48 45-75 0-15 No 8
- 70-93 18-38 35-65 l
l No 40 30-54 0-21 10-40 l
l No 100 10-32 0-25 No 200 0-13 0-15 L
The filters were placed by hand or with a D-6 dozer and spreader box in lifts not greater than 16 inches thick and compacted parallel to the dam i
axis, by vibratory rollers of 40,000 pound minimum dynamic force to at l
l 1 east 75% relative density (ASTM D-2049).. A minimum relative density of l
80% was required above El. 220 for the upstream coarse filter and the l
transition filter. The compaction procedu'res had been determined in test fills early in dam construction.
The sunnary of field test results (FSAR Section 2.5F and Reference 1) show that the in-place filters meet the gradation and field density specifications. The staff checked and found that the as-placed filters meet filter' criteria (Reference 7) for the protection of the main dam and auxiliary dam materials.
The static and dynamic properties of the filter materials were selected on the basis of published data on compacted granular materials. FSAR Tables 2.50-30 and 2-5D-31 show the properties ~ assigned to the filtec materials. ' The strain dependent shear modulus and damping ratios for the filter materials ~ were taken from Reference 4.
An angle of internal friction (9) ranging between 35 to 38 degrees was assigned to the materials.
In the CP-SER the staff reviewed and concurred with the applicant's choice of properties for the filter materials.
2.5.6.3.3 Core Materials Borrow material for the impervious core of the main dam was to be obtained from Area M.
This area was found to be unsuitable and Area W
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. was used (see FSAR Figure 2.5F-10 for borrow area locations within the mainreservoir). The applicant perfomed extensive laboratory tests on Material M and. Material W to establish their design properties. The tests included compaction (ASTM 0-698 and 0-1557), permeability, static triaxial (unconsolidated-undrained, and consolidated drained), cyclic triaxial, and cyclic torsion tests. The test results (static and dynamic properties) are repor?.ad in FSAR Section 2.50.10 an:1 Section 2.5F. The results for Material M were previously reviewed by the staff and found to be reasonable as reported in the CP-SER.
l The auxiliary dam and auxiliary separating dike cores were constructed with material from Area Z.
This material was tested in the same way as the Material M and Material W. The test results are reported in FSAR Section 2.5C. They were previously reviewed by the staff and found to be reasonable as reported in the CP-SER.
~
The core materials (FSAR Section 2.51) were required to be fige-grained soils (CL) having low permeability (coefficient less than 10- cm/sec).
The specified gradation required at least 40% of the core material to be finer than #200 sieve and to have a plasticity index greater than 10.
The soil was placed by dump trucks and spread by front end loaders or a D-6 dozer in lifts not exceeding 8 inches and compacted by sheepsfoot rollers, to at least 97% of the Standard Proctor Maximum dry density (ASTM D-698) and within 25 of the optimum moisture content. Based on a review during construction of additional tests by the applicant, the staff approved moisture control in the range of -1% + 3% of optimum for core construction above El. 225.
The results of field testing in FSAR Section 2.5F and Reference 1 and a review of the applicant's documents during the site audit (Reference 6) show that the specifications were met for impermeable core construction.
2.5.6.3.4 Rip-Rap The specifications for rip-rap, rovided in FSAR SEction 2.51, required three types of rip-rap: Type A 48 inches to 28 inches), Type B (24 inches to 10 inches) and Type C 16 inches to 6 inches). The suitability of the rip-rap was confirmed by the Los Angeles abrasion test (ASTM C131) and the sodium sulphate soundness. test (ASTM C-88).
During the staff site audit conducted in April 1983, the' staff observed 3
the rip-rap placed in the main and auxiliary dam and concluded that the rip rap appeared to be stable.
2.5.6.3.5 Channels The properties of undisturbed in-situ residual soil used in the stability analysis of the auxiliary reservoir channel and the properties of the compacted fill materials used in the stability analysis of the ESW intake channel were detemined from laboratory triaxial tests (FSAR, Appendix 2K). Samples were not obtained from the ESW discharge channel, as this channel was predo'minantly cut through rock. The material O
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_ 17 properties that the &pplicant used for. design are tabulated in FSAR
.Section 2.5.6.5.5.3.
Based on the review of the triaxial test data (FSAR, Appendix 2K)thestaffconcurswiththeapplicant'schoiceof soil parameters.
The applicant has submitted a summary of tast results (Reference 1)that show that the compacted fill alon
.according to the specifications (g th'e ESW intake channel was compacted greater than 95% Standard Proctor Maximum dry density).
2.5.6.3.6 Summary of Dams, Dike and Channel Materials and Construction l
In general, the staff finds that the embankment materials and cohstruction have met specifications and thus validate the design assumptions. The staff concludes that the applicant has adequately investigated the materials of construction in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.138. " Laboratory Investigations of Soil for Engineering Analysis and Design of Nuclear Power Plants". The staff agrees that the applicant has established appropriate material properties for the stability analysis of the dams, dike and channels at the SHNPP.
2.5.6.4 Stability of Category I Dams The Category I dass have been designed for a factor of safety of 1.5 under static conditions, 1.2 for simultaneous OBE and 100-year return period floodlevel, and 1.1 for simultaneous SSE and 25 year return period floodlevel.
The slip circle method was used to analyze' the stability of the main dam, the auxiliary dam; the auxiliary separating dike and the channels under static and pseudo-static conditions; the finite element method
' was used for seismic conditions. The abutment areas of the auxiliary dam were analyzed by the sliding wedge method. The material properties used in the analyses are tabulated in FSAR section 2.5.6.5.5.
The static and pseudo-static stability of the dams, dike and channel slopes was determined by the computer program LEASE - 1 that utilizes the simplified Bishop slip circle method. LEASE - 1 is designed to perform stability analysis of slopes by the method of slices. The failure surfaces were assumed to be circular arcs. This is a valid assumption for slopes underlain by fim stratum (Reference 3). The computer program locates the radius that has a minimum factor of safety at each of a specified set of trial centers.
l The factors considered in the static stability analyses include:
(1) Properties of soil on the failure surface at the base of the slice including unit weight, cohesion and angle of internal friction (2) Reservoir water levels and piezometric data.
l (3) The acceleration due to an earthquake was input as an additional l
static load in the pseudo-static analysis.
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' The results of the static and pseudo-static analysis for the. main dam, auxiliary dam and auxiliary separating dike are presented in FSAR Figures 2.5.6-18 through 2.5.6-22.
The finite element procedure used in evaluating the seismic stability of the Ca.tegory I dams consisted of the following steps:
a)
Determination of the response of the dam-foundation system to the rock accelerations, including the evaluation of the induced shear stresses at various locations throughout the dam and the foundation material.
b)
Representation of the irregular cycles of shear stresses induced in the dam-foundation system by an equivalent number of uniform cycles of shear stresses.
c)
' Determination of the static stresses existing in the dam-foundation system (prior to the rock accelerations).
d)
Determination of the cyclic ghear stresses required to cause strains greater than 5 X 10-in the material for conditions representative of those existing in the dam-foundation system by means of appropriate ' cyclic load test on representative specimens of the materials or by correlation with data for similar materials e)
Evaluation of the seismic stability of the dams by compari shear stress required to cause strain greater than'5 X 10"gg the with the equivalent shear stresses induced by the rock accelerations (stress ratio).
The procedures used and the results of th~e dynamic analysis of the Category 1 dans is detailed in FSAR Appendix 2D. The minimum values of computed stress ratio for the maximum cross-sections of th'e Category I dams are shown below:
1.
Main Dam Zone No. of cycles 5 cycles.
10 cycles LTri 1.79 1.57 Fine Filters 1.73 1.55 Coarse Filters 1.22 1.20 Rockfill Shell 1.51 1.35 2.
Auxiliary Dam No. of cycles Zone 5 cycles 10 cycles Core 1.43 1.26-Filters 1.33 l'.19 Rockfill t
Shell 1.56 1.38 W
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y-3.
Auxiliary Reservoir Separa' ting Dike No. of cycles Zone T6W 5 cycles 10 cycles 1.1 1.5-Rockfill Shell 1.9 1.7 The staff's evaluation of the applicant's stability analyses (static and dynamic) for the math dam, auxiliary dam, and auxiliary separating dike is presented in the CP-SER and Supplements No.-1, 2 and 3.
These documents include the staff's evaluation of additional dynamic analyses of the dams and dike. The staff concluded that the static and seismic stability analyses included in the PSAR are acceptable for the design of the main dam, the auxiliary dam and the auxiliary separating dike (CP-SER Supplement No.1, Section 3.6).-
During construction, the source of borrow material for th'e core of the main dam was changed from Area M to Area W.
The applicant performed i
tests on Material W so that the actual properties could be compared.with the design properties. The results are presented in FSAR Section 2.5F.1.9.
They show that Material'W contains more silt and clay than Material M, but the strength tasts show that the actual core material has higher shear strength than was assumed for design. Additionally, the test results show that the shear modulus and cyclic strength are o
[~
within the ranges asr :d in the original design. Based on a review of the information provi._
in the FSAR we have concluded that the core material properties m. for stability analyses are representative of '
the actual core material placed in the main dam.
l The core material for the auxiliary dam and the auxiliary separating dike was obtained from Area I, and the stability analyses for these two-structures were based on Material Z properties. However, during construction the applicant requested approval to increase the moisture i
content to.the range of 1% dry of optimum to 3% wet o.f optimum.
(The originally specified range was within 2% of optimum). The staff reviewed this change during construction and found it acceptable, based on laboratory tests conducted at the higher moisture contents. The results are presented in FSAR Section 2.5F.2.6.2.
The rockfill material placed in the main dam shell was finer than was l
l assumed for design.- The mean particle size of the rockfill ranged from 70 mm to 80 mm whereas the originally planned mean particle size was about 240 mm.
Because the design properties were estimated from published data assuming a mean particle size of 75 mm and because the large scale triaxial tests confirmed the assumed shear strength of the rockfill, we have concluded that the properties of the rockfill in the main dam are appropriately represented by the design values.
The mean particle cize of the random rockfill in the auxiliary dam and auxiliary separating dike was about 20 nun compared with a design 9
em m
e
assumption of 30 nm.. iiowever, the design was based on the conservative assumption that the random rockfill properties would be similar to the fine-grained core materials at low confining pressures and intermediate between core materials and clean granular rockfill (mean particle size cf 30 sm) at higher confining pressures. Based on a review of the applicant's submittals, we have concluded that the properties of the l
random rockfill are appropriately represented by the design values'.
-2.5.6.5' Channel Stabil'ity Analyses During construction, and at the staff' suggestion, the applicant removed some random fill for the ESW intake channel and replaced it by controlled, compacted fill. The staff also requested the applicant to. provide in the FSAR stability analyses of channels. The analysis results, presented in FSAR Figures 2.5.6-23 through 25 show that the minimum factors of safety as identified in SER Section 2.5.6.4 exceed the design values. Furthermore, tha staff believes the calculations are conservative because the strength parameters were developed from tests on soil compacted to a moisture content 4% wet of optimum moisture content whereas the fill was actually placed within 2% of optimum moisture content (Reference 1). Higher moisture contents generally give lower shear strengths and therefore, more cor.servative design values.
The stability analysis gave the following minimum factors of safety.
r-ESW Channel ESW Channel Auxiliary Reservoir "fil1" section
" cut" section channel End of construction
'3.9 2.7 2.7
. Static t.ong Term 1.5 2.4 2.4 Pseudo Static 1.6 1.5 1.5 Rapid Drawdown 1.7 1.5 1.5 These minimum factors of safety assure that the channel slopes will remain stable under all anticipated loading conditions.
2.5.6.6 Seepage Control Seepage through the dams is restricted by the impenneable clay cores.
The compacted silty clay corg material that has a permeability 7
coefficient of less than 10'gible amount.cm/sec is expected to reduce seepage through the dams to a negle The filters will permit the core material to remain stable during rapid changes in reservoir levels and during earthquakes.
7 The clay cores extend to sound rock'in the cut-off trenches. The top of
.the rock was cleaned and-slush grouted to provide a seal between the clay core and the rock. This seal'will prevent seepage along the core / rock interface.
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l The rock beneath the dams was grouted to depths of about 50 ft. below the base of the main and auxiliary dams. The auxiliary sepa' ating dike r
foundation was difference acro.not grouted because there will be no water level ss the dike. As described in SER Section 2.5.6.2.3, we have concluded that the foundatiors of the main and auxiliary dam were properly grouted. Therefore, we have concluded that seepage through the rock beneath the dams will be minimal and will not affect the safety of I
the dams.
l 5
1 The applicant has submitted seepage monitoring data for the main dam l
(Reference 2). The data was developed from the time of reservoir filling'in December,1980. The plots indicate minimal seepage through the. dam (3 gallons per minute average).
2.5.6.7 Instrumentation
. The applicant reports in the FSAR (Section 2.5.6.8) that the instrumentation for dams includes:
- Main dam: settlement monuments, piezometers and seepage monitors
- Auxiliary dam: settlement monuments and piezometers
- Auxiliary separating dike: settlement monuments The applicant has submitted plots showing the settlements and piezometer readings to date (Reference 2). The plots indicate that the dams are functioning as expected in_the design. Settlements recorded to date fcr the two dams ase and dike"ln gligible. The piezometers responded normally to the filling of the reservoirs and are steady at this time.
The applicant has stated (FSAR SEction 1.8) that future monitoring of the dams dike and channels will comply with the provisions of Regulatory l
Guide 1.127 " Inspection of Water Control Structures Associated with Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 1, March 1978. During the staff site visit and audit to the SHNPP in April 1983, the staff was told that the applicant has an ongoing inspection program that is in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.127. The staff requires that applicant compliance with this Regulatory Guide be included in the technical specifications for the plant start-up operations and throughout the life of the plant.
A statement for the technical specifica' ions is included in Section t
2.5.6.9 of the SER.
2.5.6.8 Conclusions Based on the applicant's design crit' aria and construction reports and on the results of the applicant's investigations, laboratory and field tests, and analysen, the staff has concluded that the applicant has met the requirements of Regulatory Guide NUREG-0800.. In the staff opinion the main and auxiliary dam, the auxiliary separating dike, the auxiliary reservoir channel, the ESW intake channel and the ESW discharge channel are stable and will remain stable during static and dynamic loading.
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The communication system is designed to provide reliable f A, '
l intraplant and interplant (or plant-to offsite) rf, /
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ecomunications under both normal plant operation and accident-c0nditions.
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9.5.2.1 Intrastant Systems The intraplant communications systems provide sufficient oquipment of various types so that the plant has adequate ccamunications t.o star't up, continue safe operation, or safely shut d o wn.
The intraplant systems include:
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E s z. 2 Is4, sari /f/Ari/'d cr%A) dwrio/rera/m gsAm The design basis for interplant communications is to provide dependable communications for reliable operation.
The-interplant communication systems include:
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The scope of review included assessment of the number and types of 'sommunication systems provided assessment and adequacy o'f the power sources end verification of functional capability of the communications system under aLL conditions of operation.
ThebashsforacceptanceintheTtaffreviewwasconformance of the design criteria and bases and design of the installed communication systems to the acceptance criteria in Section II of the Standard Review Plan 9.5.2.
Other basis for acceptance was conf ormance to industry standards, and the ability of the systems to provide ef f ective communications from diverse means within Clinton Unit 1 during normal and emergency conditions under maximum potential noise levels.
1 Based on our reviews we conclude that the installed
.;kearon Nefth communication systems at G ;..;... L..:; i conform to the above cited standards, criteria and design bases, they can perform Jo n __ nU_ __ _ _ _ __
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The scope of the review of the Lighting system for 54garo77 M frfs included assessment of aLL components necessary to provide adequate Lighting during both normal and emergency
' operating conditions, the adequacy of the power sources f or the normal and emergency Lighting systems, and. verification of functional capability of the Lighting system under aLL conditions of operation.
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asaw, assoa,g aan ess,11,-<, n- /siao4 aradad/e d de in7isia/haiyei.y se /gAJg sp4m, de a,s,shesa/sns7%s6/e,/Jafin paa4 aeL are irpuireo/ deben Ass s / si/e pae, andavaihhiAf cy' ensde'puser A de a:,n ibsem, avp s vi da < s u,p y o e Ap/i1od de ers&/,0c>,, wdieA ad/ d m s m + \\ q e The basis for acceptance in our review was conformance of the design bases and criteria, and design of the lighting systems and necessary auxiliary supporting systems to the occeptance criteria in Section II of Standard Review Plan 9.5.3. Other basis for acceptance was conformance to industry standards, and the ability to provide effective in a t L areas of.$4tortrn /kstrs4 ^ under alL Lighting .. ; f i'.: n-L... r cenditions of operations. \\ Based on our review, we conct de the various Lighting .5 breton rus MV systems orovided at 2: " M aredin conformance with the above cited standards, criteria design basis, they can pe#" /M V perform their design func, tion, and are thereforedacceptable. o.9_4 Emeegenew B4eest Ennine Fust 041 Steense and Tennefer Evetem 9.5.4.1 Emereenev Dienst Eneine Auxitimev Runneet Evetene (General) Thore are two emergency diesel generators.imer g e= r c//i / [ d Shectrem $rris 6 and each diesel engine has the following cuxtLiary systems which are addressed in detail in the SER soctions indicated: 1. Fuel oil storage and transfer system (section 9.5.4.2) 2. Cooling water system (section 9.5.5), e t P l 3. Starting system (s'oction 9.5. ), 4. Lubrication system (sect ion 9.5.7), and i 5. Combustion sie intake and exhaust system (section L 9.5.8) This section of the SER applies to aLL of the above systems. The diesel generator and its auxiliary support systems, ^ _ are -housed in a seismic Category i diesel generator building structure which provides protection from the effects of tornadoes, tornado missiles and floods. The buried portions of the fuel oil storage and transfer system are also protected from { s tornados, tornado missiles and floods. Therefore, the requirements of General Design Criterion 2, " Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomenar" General Design -Criterion 4, " Environmental and Missile besign Basis," and the recommen,dations and guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.115, " Prot e ct ion Aga inst Low-Trajectory Turbine Missiles," ~ and Regulatory Guide 1.117, " Tornado Design Classification," cro met. Protection f rom the eff ects of tornadoes, tornado cissiles and floods are evaluated in section 3.0 of this rep 3rt. d $.$O 8 0/ s N $ 7, $$ W /l f a mfd-m4 s66 As a6 w wa 4/ d L&w Aanaiu,,y 'su. a dee n seana dea d de -udeae d m' ->/~~L g zpmf aeep1 p i 11A a &JJ- ji k6 kBj /?tob f/*eW'eS fro d C CYr Cr71 ////C$iff3) Yd hse l t los f 5/b, y ov7 $ dun /er syshin,.exee,or' d de da/si//?#hws,whe4 o<e so/ drnaof assde pio/a 4d There A<e, exee,oAu nhof #e reyiresiend f feara/.4 sip ds' Ana. 2 and4, and /Ae \\ reeenunriidaAms ondp/a'anee o,/ A /ad,y Suide su/4 are. y med 7%e oNre/da/o////shnes are oberste/Anerik See b7? ?So /2 /kk $$$. There ere dr dasa/,$e/s/.ch, ape da4 ash aii#a. /7Sj ?? f d ffC7As-50db h SGyhd off h d2,00e/ d .werym4 ;4 de same oh,6 a ha os/4 /A; l he, one Andyvnde's 4/ A obse/pearahrs M and 24 whi/e 4/ 4 oksa/yarahr.s se ande.e.e egyhed/sm fbe0lk/f k* k k//VYfj h re ib Q. $fd72k lCo?rpldk //Waendo/de/sindnasJr.ga4m & esed sheafyne,a6, 9 a sgoarafe pwn,o roar > a /he da/shra eshusbre - he&a6;hnfa f0/fS 70 t GoW k&ar f.S s n) A Seek [\\9 s S/gld ifGre lbc//6 it!5tih fke fGSS /)kv'e $&rs /20 em dese7 a<adz. Is aro&, feyoeed, rA Ass / p h/YQO/Il6 Sy C b tr?S d e t & d CNert 4 -//Akle !?k hit
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&dra e, "sAary ,/s4wLees sp f dNYJe,Jasip* f h a, a,, d &,. ~ 4. i are ins / The diesel engine and its engine mounted and separately skid mounted portions of the auxiliary support systems piping and components normaLLy furnished with the diesel generator package are designed to seismic Category 1 -~ \\ requirements and f ollow the guidelines of the Diesel Engine Manufacturers Association (DEMA) standards. The dieset cngir.e, and its mounted auxiliary support systems piping and componentr, conform to the requirements of IEEE Standard 387-1977, "St andard C?it eria f or' Diesel-Gene rat or Unit s Applied as Standby Power Supplies for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," which endorses the Diesel Engine Manufacturers Association (DEMA) standard and guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.9, " Selection, Design and Qualification of.Dieset-Generator Units Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Plants. The diesel engine and its cuxiliary support systems meet the quality control requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B. The quality assurance program is e. valuated in section 17.0 of this report. k Odo m o /a kC n f o bskebb/ Qb.s e/JFA7kl rYd7n ctyycr.2k:. &a ades/s, sn is eAcAldeynsanda.asceL/w/xs sde/lg y de obse/parada (e.,,aw//ary teS&a /
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/) sw dee / o y s s e o % c,e 4, 2.) c h s p y ennJ den a,y a d reo&/aihn sys4es, sa,s's) af:p ad/Seaher,y'g/a obse/ feseradi em& dame / i >6sa m /s Asa/pse,a6 useA ws/AcMcw yera scris i.suhsp ms 06seri,odens, gsAin >>draeth, y 4 xd iss,w s / a,70 % g eri y y <,a n n. Is a06+6, ae sp,ahrs ad eene saw44 ;6xine - ok/ - ~ ~. e - /h Url 4//7lf/* Idf /AWMYaff 9#hnV /7 d$r7k b O'?S f/Mrd L 0 as we//as,/df4/woydc77 /06we/ymzzd Abre ma s&dv s fkt dy//,7#A*/7k h /trMf hefref#fGj.?#fd $77 69? Y erJOr7//4fRJ/Y/20?J'y6 f/tth?/Q 477 fh hsef // $377 f f L 6tSJ Sfea,wJa4 nesAa,a/ina wAmu pscr>>e/ g Ct W r// db7?.: /tAcb3??/fVMV/CZ C,0ffG/ E~.19 <(2//f /2TL*/Yd ffdN7/ }h Y / SfSbM/Sj,G/YYts? kH' f /7/G/// d'VX/bd/ C/, liv?? /ModC) C Vf fs h G u f o d f l;//i*S Of7l fM b *S h /b f0&?/ ,ff f wif he a>>de/eddj #e ofnef em,g-a4 voiadz. es;4e f N/C D' / f p>~.wriire/dwo:Wis ofwe/pera4..aaeAsaisee w# frkd/fa k) bef/f0}/l2'AS ff0Y/$/077S 4//ffbe f.%b /c-dran?wg frp/dsemes/,se,sarme/ os s p,0ys-eyihm,t'>4 woch, 7/w,xsy. er.ssoyi w/#a. Except for' sensors and other equipment that must be directly mounted on the engine and associated piping, the centrols and monitoring instrumentation are installed on o-free standing floor sounted panel separate from the engine skids, and Located in a vibration free floor area. .r/rer e Adrer/s ~ Proventive maintenance at S**NsuK goes beyond the normal I reutine adjustments, servicing and repair of components chan a malfunction occurs. h)pse/ g/ppya& djif//e,Sek/ck'o /)] fk,p/Gr7fd b& S/5) Al /Ub 4//Y d O ff! O Q'DG f eM,/* Material-history records will be maintained on the diesel generators, and the operating history of the diesel type will be obtained from the manufacturer. An overall goal of the preventive maintenance program will be the identification and c rrection of the root causes of malfunctions. l l .. ~. l /t/ l i All maintenance on the emergence disael generator will be followed by a v rified lineup and a post-maintenance test in accordance with the curve 111ance requirements of Technical Specifications. Tho applicant wiLL perform preoperational and startup tests of the diesel engine auxilary support systems in accordance eith recommendations and guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.68, " Initial Test Programs for Water Cooled Reactor Power Plants." Tho adequacy of the test program is evaluated in section 14.1 of this. report. The design of the diesel engine auxiliary support systems cro evaluated with respect to the recommendations and Suidelines of Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1, " Protection Ago t n st Postulated Piping Fiatures in Fluid System Piping Out side Cont ainment,"and MEB 3-1, "Postulat ed B reak and Leckage Locations in Fluid System Piping Outside Containment." EvcLustion of protection against dynamic effects associated eith the postulated pipe system f ailures is covered in Section 3.6 of this report. Tho adequacy of the fire protection for the emergency diesel gonorator and associated auxiliary support systems with respect to the recommendations and guidelines of Branch Tochnical Position CMEB 9.5-1, " Guidelines f or Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants," is evaluated in section 9.5.1 of this report. if* ~~ The designs of the diesel generator auxiliary support systems otso have been evaluated with respect to the recommendations of NUREG/CR-0660 " Enhancement of Onsite Emergency Diesel Scnerator Reliability." This report made specific recommendations on increasing the reliability of nuclear power plant emergency diesel generators.- Information requests scncerning t_hese recommendations were transmitted to the applicant during the review-process. The applicant. responded h,y /*19hr*C"*C! in DNF amendments to the FSAR stating how they meet or wilL =- coet the recommendations of NUREG/CA-0660. Wo h. ave reviewed these responses and have determined that the applicant's conformance to the recommendations is as foLLows: t Recommendation Ignfermance SER Section l yes 1. Moisture in Air Starting -assw4v4 9.5.6 System 2. Dust and Dirt in D/G Room Yas 9.5.4.1 3. Turbocharger Gear Drive fws*wr NM 9.5.4.1 Problem,, 4. Parsonnel Training Yes 9.5.4.1 5. Automatic Pretube -mes:e64 WS 9.5.7 6. Testings Test Loading and ?=r-t=i-yd,5 9.5.4.1 Pre.ent ive Maintenance 7. Improve the Identification Yes 9.5.4.1 ~ ic of Root Cause of Failures 8. D/G Ventilation and Yes 9.5.8 Combustion Air Systems
- 9. -
Fuel Storage and Handling -Y e. 9.5.4.2 10. High Temperature 9.5.4.1 . Insulation for Generator 11. Engine Cooling Water Yes 9.5.5 12. Concrete Dust Controt Yes 9.5.4.1 13. Vibration of Instruments Yes 9.5.4.1
- Explicit conformance is considered unnecesary by the staff in view of the equivalent provided by the design, margin, and qualification testing requirements that are normally applied to emergency standby diesel generators.
f On the basis of our review we have concluded that the design of the d i e s e l g e n e r a t o r a n d i t s a u x i l i a ry s y s t e m s wdddmetsembrM4. j in conf ormance with recommenations of NUREG/CR-0660 f or i cnhancement of dieset" generator reliability and the related NRC guidelines and criteria. We therefore conclude that this witL provide reasonable assurance of dieset generator retjability through the design Life of the plant. h l I 9.4.5.2 Emwenenev Dietet Enaine Fuel Oil Storace and Transfer System The design function of the emergency diesel engine fuel oil storage and transfer system is to provide a separate and if ~ independent fuel oil supply train for each diesel generator, cnd t o permit operation of the diesel generator at engineered safety feature Load requirements for a minimum of seven days without replenishmen of fuel. The system is designed to meet the requirement,s of General Design Criteria CGDC) 2,4,5 cnd 17. The meeting of the requirements of GDC 2, 4, and 5 is discussed in Section 9.5.4.1 o'f this SER. Thor.e are two emergency diesel generators g e vo// & sksen.4ms... Each diesel engine fuel oit r7; r r.:r.... _. _..... apavir storage and transfer system consists of a det gallon day tcnk sufficient to power the diesel engine at rated Load for 6pproximately hours, a diesel fuel oil storage tank CD,, ::. --...- _,...,--.._, n.,-,w. -u.--a ' ^ sufficient to power the dioset engine at maximum continuous Load conditions for kehn aev.en-days, an ac motor driven transf er pump powered f rom l tho associated diesel and the associated piping, valves, instrumentation and controls. Each diesel engine fuel oil storage and transfer system is independent and physically separated 1.'on the other systems supplying the redundant diesel generatorsy ejecep [ ds a d I />, .S;.c he, 711/, above. Afr eug a efe' feiture within any one of the systems uiLL affect only the associated diesel generator. Therefore, the requirements for General Design Criterion 17, " Electric Power Systems," _ as related to the capability of the fuel oil system to meet i. 1V Gnldo77,76t::?;w/7b l/ hS /2!'fG/7eS l 2k k Ne f/,6W]2 4l0/fShef ar7l /Dr/skr Sfskr72; V,0 k Se ok'se fg/Nd sh4e, da dsyred, Ahnea As{adA4/<h sesdasce a6ss s fepainvnend. 74 sA#Jas ao# ams.recfier,g/ d,oiov/de &Asn/les - aAs-a reya &d de 9yJean f lk' $ bears:?/ hir/s f 4 abovd refW/Yearfsnl. ?/$e 3/ ?? dybdar? /b1S DJ &f~ f l G orr p l9 k bhe s b fi m fr.*C. zre s4# /s,<Aa acus adwe aGs,j,, y' aa 4/o// ~ /Og d Or! l 7 lfd/?J Sfsk m as fy arl$ merWe k dCAT
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SechCn5 fffc//ffs/fr1k /S nol den *h$bo h/$u.nlldcvkt?WG $/3 /772kr arrW ftpk 7hk. k//b/ /5 a Sc)gp///s?fnh /t~ V/d2<r 4 7%.s;er. The engine mounted ~~ pTpTng and components, from the engine block to'the engine interface, are considered part of the engine assembly and are seismically qualified to Category 1 requirements as part of the diesel engine-package. This piping and the associated components, such as valves, f abricated headers, fabricated special fittings, and the like are designed, manufactured, and inspected in accordance with the guidelines and requirements'of ANSI Standard 831.1 " Code for Pressure Piping," ANSI N45.2 " Quality Assurai.ce Program Requirements f or Nuclear Facilities and 10 CFR 50 Appendix 8. The engine mounted fuel oil' piping and associated components are intentionally over designed (subjected to' Low working st re s s e s') for the application, and thereby resulting in high operational reliability. The design of the - engine mounted fuel oil piping and components to the cited .~.. o it dGsign philosophy and standards is considered equivalent to a system designed to ASME Section III Class 3 requirements cith regard to system functional operability and inservice roliabiLity. $ac fd/f /f des fke 5 fefd are def,Gro L*f S ido,n. dred possds, andare srnswleea' d he infavafaMe A rerdo 'de shrop/e lands in /he orm//6;kao/As dm opra/lm
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eranes w# da es,oaAoSg A,ahan/As sfa4d# fAsuy z #e mem 4 7e. The ap arada14.on s 4. 74.s,-a/aH~a/a - andwoua sa,4 use de drsadS/n/ss/Ve ptsheled ni/hwrs) 7 r$ & #hgyi ~ d' Arn do m asiaIs&chdes4-~4hm one e aste pas /raAsu as ym/ bes. 4// dis., /&s aeeyheA/e. ai $$ $ h$ f$ kh fh ff$i kl l l $& prewn/ s//enng op o/sedinen/a/ /4 dwh4/Amdnn; rede4. Anseyurn/g/ a de ewn/gkr 4/m dne/ para >L g a/lm &,d a,egairesin/ 4 <aM, i;&Mkpsah/e %p<he up, soAmenk de kh Ai%s adieA,16 forn, me/d o s p/ag /Ae Asns#< pap sushm.:Asnur.s andeaase ina/4,a/e. afe.se/pme<A faihre.s..Zi respmse d /k s4Ad a-nn-ns, v rk apidean/ /ns 344d /k/ /kre a a&ra/e 4/ A /,c o4y spr 4sn a/sunmain ps/sa/Jo/Ax/s, 4/ red <.n asuMar-,,,<oae oAL 79., fdue/pos,a6 o p ra sen. afik d>nen /Ja /mAsamb%4% a a 9, 0 9 5 e Q to f$e( oi /,4reint \\ 4 aIssipdd the, ~Y & sea sus as)aese,sa. 6,iy e 9,, se s 7s ss 7% d w - As da'as'/, ansa, de/seen /he ^ drage' Ands.ad>% olasa/penera$ dobls;,L'Tb Mx s MyP:ss p& L w.; 4 a /4,rdaA/oy acBAma/ynodsa,, Z syyo,fo, prods 4,i. 74,oaZ y as,ap #~.de y s6a a diA A A obse/p droad lea,s andon, the 4 Au.aode, saved g , ode, 40 :o4 y,a roa enda y ade sopp{y ad ee/ urn Alies s 647,/z. Se sei has eeweess adoaf /Ah adspi,w //A m - .,1 an esendof sc.cA as a -de/aos/c diop drn ce }{., redroadm, couAf Jmz1oz,end, & da/ Awes g,, sawy bre l rfe cireolad aa/$,4?res oSrag cc 2) \\ cm-se san / af%g% 9,se as wide #e /,a/Asnsde bes, /kreJ saasi a /oss oy'su, aper /ana' pd/Are {'the s/sia ne,ss. z
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/ds<w/<Ane. ?' . V The appha,if Ac Jeen asA-ed's)4/n 4sa y <<.psrue, de y/ a,,//as saAni/ k sor4ee aes< den /G:e. -wA d,y), ano' /de a/sixu ayaddi/g poy! Me semdieedcoure/e ercunAny ande,mae. In sos?,mp 'de apphead pas //lw a da/ a sur-Aee aw den /w sof q';M 'sa'vage de Ne/sifpiiy, ano/ de eiya/aSnj m4,y f ' //a/ /a'// ode p 4 /fe seisaid evenf, Ak,dyp,ec/udnp ' an arrosik, sy/ de ear /A sypn/t.ade de ide/aildus,Ar de oyheanr4 7.-s,ame a,,da,a/ ,a y mp/ / 1 i..~ ,.. & s4#a revuan$s_. 1,2 m as s. ~ e st fke $>bf5 /t't/id</) FAM*!t'r/ IMC 69MCS/lt bC Sif dr7/pkr
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7 f -The design of the emergency' diesel engine fuel oil storage cnd transfer system conforms to ANSI-N195, " Fuel Oil Systems for Standby Diesel Generators " ' 4/cey/ //2. $d Ybsv/ 9/t'a s.* A) da/oi/6,isAr, amp; eseAcn s/ raser,2)oy<</h., Asa ds'-- aa 04 6,A, ~ds) p,wo,a &#, oha/aAn~.n ots/<- y 47od//4,s. fie rhes, sri /Ams dsgo od/ges a sonp4x hoc 6r, d<aine, a/ aa A nsAr p,p sw hm a A-u p e dp6 drame, wi/A pres.wca J/Arenda/ss,m a., senaen&d in aszmer & a,pAmi/da6 A/ /he sm/n.14 me,i.6 a-nse,mdea/g si;yad, &aa<ipss adyn/e de/A a6se/ 90% pay, ada,&ed d pnerade repiremend even ashan asi#a /6e a4nn, In /he. ants / case. see,xno, da shmer <av/dpA d</4 pass aApa4 Ae/a/de aw/wh~ /Ae ?,,a, a,be, law &A eaf A red /h; de a d s d' An Anh. 6/ Mis a as a' Ae a da AdA-asa, L de ad m/e de/d de day /s<id,de +Lesf&ne/ y p/ raser adre/o,n </ 4 se, wee Je% gala hk,< h arahe gaiana. 74,e Mk sA a de oQ 6,A Aa( s merve was e->somad &sas'en /kisi &.s4 4saneWes.A/ 4 /ha sisipA< s/meer ky As 6,on /4/rb je 63 as, apx4 e N fi,ok d a alsA dsy, pa avsz s-se.r, ans'A /Aen 4 a 8sesrp44/e. 7k s/mran /Ams o6sgo ate.s oofAc/ude n over/h, /Ine de6n de o&g 67A and de da/s/c4,afe AsAas ern-iddm arzswc ra-s&#a ~~sd //a/a sw///w/lm si /de dasisde pep wridoAs eso/a' mo//a, & pin, &ky A sk/s#,7%A x n ~~ a12 L /_e<=y de d2 y 42//h efdt$ /7l'E'S y 36 lb S f5elP)Cfr/Js, f 4 Olf i*tser ib25 f/'dViYd $h tfS Ye efo/fher!Skr b qs e,n sorn/ro/s. 7s.s4#As renewea'da a >4&4-YS/ dr7lds7?ckdhs f *rt /$ 0 CA2k /t' Oriejll,0c//fr p !? do?/ b e/S 0 7s l Ots kic M bes sw,9/t'ek/le Q/fr 3ff t naMns4m evasiy /LJy as Acc,ihdaJoa. fa,ede,, ais, & s4 Al $rser anchdes A/ Me yshm adsgn,wnctiy~d / dofJarsg as ove&ilaa, a aesap4Me. 7A ss/m /dtra AME(6 den 95.4.) cloe.s iro/emdin -pwvlc 4ksILn O,derssure Yfkre/7kYabt?ns dr? Ob,o/r/ kefo/Vk/krs Os rmrene,74da, /Merwec.Za dheossas and Afe s4 /4 /he yphan/ das mdes4d &/ &#ermrda/ a/a,ms ere pswdad The s4 # Eh? aseep4Ma, suipe t dt77 /rbher? hfdh7b/fs hltse a/htt//s G/1e /)/ed//o l /b M- - The fuet oit quality and tests wiLL conform with the guidelines of I Regulatory Guide 1.137, " Fuel Oil Systems f or Standby Diesel Generators," Position C.2.a through C.2.h. l The scope of review of the diesel engine fuel oil storage and transfer system included Layout drawings, piping and l-instrumentation diagrams, and descriptive information in section 9.5.4 of the FS AR for the system and auxiliary support systems essential to. its operation. The t tsis f or acceptance in our review was conf ormance of the design criteria and bases and design of the diesel Gngi'e fuel oil storage and transfer system to the require-n e t3 conts of General Design Criterion 17 with respect to redundancy and physical independence, the guidance of the . cited regulatory guides, and the recommendations on NUREG/ CR-0660. and-industry codes and standards. M;e sMm 4;r/a5 grydadf/ m acead.we and&&<d'Awow A% 7.S.f. Based on our review, we conclude that the emergency diesel engine fuel oil storage and transf er system meets the i r requirements of-General Design criteria 2,4,3 and 17, meets the guidance of the cited Regulatory Guides, it can perform its design safety function and meets the recommendations of NUREG/CR-0660 and industry codes and standards, and is therefore acceptable [g ggg g 9.5.5 Emeraency Diesel Enaine t;oolina Water System The design function of the emergency diesel engine cooling unter system is to maintain the temperature of the diesel engine within a safe operating range under aLL Load conditions cnd to maintain the engine coolant preheated during standby conditions to improve starting reliability. The system is designed to meet the requirements of-General Design Criteria ~.:..~.. ... ~ 2, 4, 5, 17, 44, 45 and 46. The meeting of the requirements of GDC 2, 4, and 5 is discussed in Section 9.5.4.1 of this SER. The emergency ande p00 diesel engine cooling water system is a closed Loop system and cools the cylinder Liners, cylinder s */ + hocds, Lube oil soolers, and the turbocharger combustion air of ter cooler. The major components of this system for each diosel engine includes turbocnarger air aftercooters, jacket. unter cocter, engine driven jacket water coolant pumpp, ami _Sktkf'P',hW*".h, N - t a Lube oil cooler, an electric c=orsion heat er, a. thermostatic 3 way valves required instrumentation. controls and alarms, and the associated piping and valves to connect the equipment. When the dieset angine is operating, the heat generated is rejected to the e,verf#nt $ =-__ __.... Tervice wat er system by means of the j acket water 1 scoLer. During operation of the diesel engine, tempe'rature regulation of the diesel engine coolant is accomplished automatically through the action of a temperature sensing three-way thornostatic val've. When the engine is idle, the engine f?CIef 6cht/hr kye,alOt2. As /?aRJks??fl4ld,f0 tsX/s?ab i so y op a,, ehhn a?-m-AA b Aa% rfra%<. 4hp. werm prp eoribuo f asw/ ales ha4/wa4r l / & enhy aade sg sd',cy/egi>e 4goe,ai&/e m peaahap aprake ~d'u G m, d e,e Jg s n abse h Gr?chy f/ N7d $ rb /t*$bAI/// h <bl*.SelQ/Gt /// 4, 6/ pier 4/e a sw <edadad,a,A /w a hng ~b fd 0f4 f rort We b N/7p7ra The diesel generator is capable of operating futty Loaded eht eithout secondary cooling for a minimum of any minu t e s. i n t h e eng in e and.SAsec{oge-Sufficient water is contained 1,_._ s' l went to absorb the heat generated during this period. T h i s t i m e i s i n ex c e s s o f t h e t i m e n e e d e d t o ammeanse pre V/Me
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~ :. to the diesels in the event of a Loss of offsite power. Alarms have been provided to cnchte the control room operator to monitor the diesel renerator cooling while the unit is in tr-1 '.__ "- 1H-dww operation. Th e re a re t wo ea e r ge n c y irw> emes:30MB diesel generators 1or cate.Jy c,fn/[M Sbeeeen lkevrfs T ' ^-- and each has a physically separate and independent cooling water system. Therefore the requirements. of General Design Criteria 17, " Electric Power System," and 44, " Cooling Water Fystem," as related to redundancy and V -single failure criterip are met. The diesel engine ooting water system piping and components up to the diesel engine interface, including auxiliary skid ceunted piping are designed to seismic Category I, ASME Section III, Class 3 (Quality Group C) requirements and ocot the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.26 "Guality ~ ) Grcup Ciassifications and Standards for Water, Steam, 1 cnd Radioactive Waste Containing Components of Nuclear Peuer Plants," and Regulatory Guide 1.29 " Seismic Design Classification." The engine mounted piping and components, f rca the engine block to the engine interf ace, are considered part of the engine assembly and are seismically qualified to Category I_ requirements as part of the diesel engine package. 8 4 This piping and the associated conconents, such as valves, fcbricated headers, fabricated special fittings, and the kVd n*/7 Qakt el ktt b'Je/engthe I/&7abf ssgri deue.s,hebds; sieshamaa// pirsw,9 dew & wd.a-assar, sdeed Aa4, wa' Ld d he ne/wisik de s/re.sses a s. p<<mifed & sser &daed a/, "dod Adesm Apg.* The yendr s 9optsved es/4e prog.am ceedA amyndm aM fx omwjdedie f skafqines andoiyines7sush/ /.h /M Q 1sned &//k kt FCf/Yensenb 5 f/f/ 077 l 4k77/If4*//es? /Oggg g g g g, The engine mounted cooling water piping and associated components are intention 6Lly over designed (subjected to Low working stresses) for the application, cnd thereby resulting in high operational reliability. The dosign of the engine mounted ecoLing water piping and components to the cited design philosophy and standards is censidered equivalent to a system designed to ASME Section III class 3 requirements with regard to system functional Operability and' inservice reliability. The diesel engine cooling water system conforms with Regulatory Guide 1.9, position C.7, a s it relates to cngine cooling water protective interlocks. The dieset 93nerator system protective interlocks are discussed in section 8.3 of this report. The diesel engine cooling water system has provisions to permit periodic inspection and functicnal testing during standby and normat modes of power plant operation as required by General Design Criterien 43, " Inspection of I Cooling Water system" and General Criterion 46, " Testing of Cooling Water System." Tho scope of review of the emergency diesel engine cooling coter system included Layout drawings, piping and instrumentation diagrams, and descriptive information in ,I section 9.5.5 of the FSAR for the system and auxiliary support systems essential to its operation. Tho basis for the a'cceptance in our review was confor=ance of the design criteria and bases and design of the diesel ongine cooling water system to the General Design Criteria 17 and 44 with respect to redundancy and physica'. independence, General Design Criteria 45 and 46 with respect to inspection and tostability of the systems the guidance of the cited Rogulatory Guides, and the recommendations of NUREG/CR-0660, cnd industry codes snd standards, and the ability of the system to. maintain stable diesel engine cooling water b g5 #7 Nd5 /#VdMe//5 teoperature under aLL Load conditions. eesomkee wM s6 dad feriw/6, fu 80 sed on our review, we conclude that the emergency diesel engine cooling water system meets the requirements of General Design Criteria 2, 4, 5, 17, 44, 45 and 46 meets the guidance of the cited Regulatory Guides, it can perform its design safety function and meets the recommendations t lof NUREG/CR-0660 and industry codes and standards, and is thorefore acceptable. t.1r 0.5.6 Emeraenev Diesel Ennine Startina Systeen Tho design function of the emergency diesel engine starting system is to provide a reliable method for automatically ~ l starting each diesel generator such that the rated frequency l Cnd voltage is achieved and the unit is ready to accept required Loads within 10 seconds. The system is designed to coet the requirements of General Design Criteria 2, 4, 5 i and 17. The meeting of the requirements of GDC 2, 4, and 5 is discussed in section 9.5.4'.1 of this SER.. Thore are two emergency M diesel generators for 4/ fdearum /dFm J Sessammendim4e-4. Each diesel generator has an independent I and redundant air starting system consisting of two separate futL capacity air starting subsystems each with sufficient cir capacity to provide a minimum of five consecutive cold e r.g in e st a rt s. Ead egs64 MpMd eh 44e e e4 m e St/Is.ckn? A nav Y //o f d h o f S G h/ /s lNe oSr s&Igsb/n r$ g Sdr/ [t d4#[W ///#, Redundancy in the starting system is pyff.- I provided by two emergency diesel generators so that a calfunction or failure in one system does not impair the cbility of the other system to start its diesel engine. This meets the requirements of General Design Criteria 17, " Electric Power Systems." Each subsystem includes an air. compressor, a re c e i ve r tenair, l intake air filters, starting valves,' g g.g f instrumentation, controls, alarms and the associated piping I to connect the equipment. Alarms annunciate on the local panel and in the main control room to enable the operato_rs_, s9 to monitor the air pressure of the diesel generator starting air system. $desh O/PShf 42/bSfSkv77 /h?cfc/obs a 3/L*dGr?f /,04 a/V dr'ger ayahk l, psvrofnj air ws/h a. de'cyom f - fs /~cd' O kT/cct;W) f h u rs,ar d fysb/7 j ffa'SC/s12
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QS d il oesyred'if audinha re nemhcn fdie dwers si oncr //XJN7 of 4b;nS/Cb/7 &ctll lrg Q/h $d R&lrferp erkoaane4-G wi/Je mowdedas. a oa& wes.we i senSog dm de& /Ae ecm,aressor or>d' 7'de /vc#Neri The engine mounted piping and components, from the engine block to the engine interface, are considered part of the engine assembly and are seismically qualified to Category I requirements as part of the diesel engine package. his piping and the associated components such as valves, fabricated headers, fabricated special fittings, and the 5o tj 4iYe be&? d/M 80! Yt' O US8fe/7 Off b/&?h l S/f? Sf/d'$fd*$/fMk/ MCb4/7/Y,0/2*SSWt*pl (k / 07/ Se/lr/7?/h? /Ydd0ll S, On$ r? W k Skt M // Y L* Jtts t's as prisinL! gy syst s4,da/d asu/, "esda dr &ssure j //?f. & Verlobr5 Of,Or*oW QAfQdfrog/ttin C/ Sed /b e,igwira7% am!/ 7%e /in/sude/ ore yda'se/engareS ond i R]8 s9MG// d ,0/f/
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G}fb Y& refwh*//7er7kJ lO $f A 50; A,0,C W)l/X 0. ?//N CV/ i ' //Je /?xv/tried 4/'/~ S7br7 nf f$7/ff Ot?Ql 4/ associated components are intentionally over designed (subjected to Low working stresses) for the application, and thereby resulting in high operational reliability. The design of the engine mounted air starting piping and I components to the cited design philosophy and standards is considered equivalent to a system designed to ASME Section III Class 3 requirements with regard to system functional operability and inservice reliability. The diesel generator air starting system conforms with Regulatory Guide 1.9, position C.7, as it relates to diesel engine air starting system protective interlocks. The diesel generator system protective interlocks are discussed in section 8.3 of this report. The scope of review of the emergency diesel engine starting system included layout drawings, piping and instrumentation diagrams, and descriptive information in section 9.5.6 of the FSAR for the system and auxiliary support systems 1r I The basis for acceptance in our review was conformance of tho design criteria and bases and design of the dieset ongine air starting system to the requirements of General Design Criterion 17 with respect to redundancy and physical independence, the guidance of the cited Regulatory Guides, tho additional guidance in Se.ction II of Standard Review PLcn 9.5.6 and the recommendations of NUREG'/CR-0660, and industry codes and standards, and the ability of the system to start the diesel generator within a specified time period. Besed on our review, we conclude that the emergency diesel Gngine air starting system meets the requirements of Generat Design Criteria 2, 4, 5 a," '7, meets the guidance %f the cited Regulatory Guides ar . indard Review Plan 9.5.6, it can perform its design sa fety function and meets the recommendations of NUREG/CR-0660 and industry codes snd stendards, and 's therefore acceptable. _0.527 Emernenev Diesel Ennine Lubricatina Oil S v a t e;g_ The design safety function of the emergency diesel engine Lubricating oil system is to provide a supply of filtered Lubrication oil to the various moving parts of the diesel ongine including piston and b' earings. The system is designed to meet the requirements of General Design Criteria 2, 4, 5 and 17. The meeting of the requirements of GDC 2, 4, and 5 is discussed in Section 9.5.4.1 of this SER. ~ j r l /Yd 41%. 4V??,?4tf77dr)b eaci$Chdse-8/]7Me ibrA32 Sg5 /Ecfy & 0 72 of /4%9 r/Y & ? f /77f / d /7?O Ch'IWr! W/ SG "f/ a dije o//ggredr, a. Wep seempmp., s$aewrs onal ddes s sn e6dic desAr, edspiyi schs,a-a'A'sLeohsn. Alarms and protective devices, a,e, provided to enable the control room operator to monitor tho diesel generator Lube oil system during standby, stcrtup or 1'n operation. [,gg yg/gg jd.M
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&/ embu k't/7f4 Grc freWael feYtr7f 46t497bett$d fro /es/277?S,a 02 k l p Rh a7N kid 43C7/segtA*/10f4 mat 3 w/ /kdCCW* Tho emergency diesel engine Lubrication oil s,ystem is an integral part of the diesel engine and thus meets the _roquirements of General Design Criterion 17, uith regards to oystem independence and single failure criteria. OrR)7 o i*se/dnfme offrx2h07?,4 ar }Me d / esse a6s a,4 ria nyt dp h d re,.s a / p/,sme,c. # e h u z z s n 4 d,/ve n a a n k,g 4 /sa a / s prova/e/a,x,afe/ nim rWe misie o,'/vapaw;o. The avino,4 p u m p s /a, /s ano'p,4ms de Aedn- />Me s< yow adw pornp // sysdw7,o wore dr' ops dapede4~rised dy.aA .d46es;de afwe/geneaide. /3 A >ffe $4mhy moo 4, an bC,sa-r,. /&a /<< a Ma c&se/qse sany /, /nAsu D e o d %,,a 6 afgyrsx&indf so s, anda non a% Je<p aoremp o Ck<vbks denkW/bde os/dlrorjt / 7We 6nfsoee2e. Avr.dwms ads /S* i _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ^ - - - - - - - - ~ ~ - - 3) The diesel engine Lubrication oil system piping and components up to the diesel engine interf ace, including auxiliary skid cgunted piping are designed to seismic Category Is ASME section III, Class 3 (Quality Group C) requirements and meet the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.26 " Quality Group l CLessifications and Standards for Water, Steam r and Rcdioactive Waste Containing Components of Nuclear Power PLcnts," and Regulatory Guide 1.29 " Seismic Design CLossification." The engine mounted piping and components, ~ frc's the engine block to the engine interfaces are considered part of the engine assembly and are seismically qualified to Category I requirements es part of the diesel engine r acckage. This piping and associated components, such as valves, fabricated headers, fabricated special fittings, and the bbe, shapt* been d/?a ed Se cbi'.Se/ef//78 Vencht e /gn.c bes:eS, /n//ueb sk%ba/7/L*W,1,p/t* Cure, $frsn& Md Sd/C/n/h bick/edd / bob, 4rld W k le 4A*// M// YU1 N$e. .shesces a perind4/ Jg b/w S4ndard' A.Lu,' 't&de $ A sw,e A;en.' & wnct,k am,oved'9&/qc,0,yn med kJ lb7.; fund /M R//'k b #A2//2 dk/ts d ETlyh?fS &^ 1 ~Aff//28 /MG/?bl,0f/}b y /sem co Ap/2da /d 477W 4%77)dkvr7f's7 /$ /n derr)YJ/$97M& wWA de segukerreb 7d e 1 . ~&fArld /?Ml;/n th W !b?'/t?d C/l.3gsk7r)f/f//? & associated components are i intentionally over designed (subject'to Low working st resse s) for the application, and thereby resulting in high operational reliability. The design of the engine mounted Lubricating oil piping and components to the cited d 3 dosign philosophy and standards is considered equivalent to a system designed to ASME Socion III Class 3 requirements uith regard to system functional operability and inservice roL1 ability. Tho dieset generator Lubricating oil system conforms with ~ Retstatory Guide 1.9, position C.7, as it relates to diesel cngine Lubrication system protective interlocks. The diesel generator system protective interlocks are discussed in soction 8.3 of this report. . The scope of review of the diesel generator Lubricating oil system incluced piping and inst rument ation diagrams, and descriptive information in section 9.5.7 of the FSAR for the system and auxiliary support systems essential to its operation. The basis for acceptance in our review was conformance of the design criteria and bases and design of the diesel engine Lubricating oil system tu the requirements of General Design. Criteria 17 with respect to redundancy and physical independence, the guidance of the cited Regulatory Guides, the additional guidance in Section II of Standard Review Plan 9.5.7 and the recommendations of NUREG/CR-0660 and industry codes and standards. Based on our review, we conclude that the emergency diesel cngine Lubricating oil system meets the requirements of Gon$ rat Design criteria 2, 4, 5 and 17, meet s the guidance of the cited Regulatory Guides and Standard Review Plan a - 9.5.7, it can perform its design safety. function and meets the recommendations of NUREG/CR-0660 and industry codes cnd standards, and is therefore acceptable. 95R Emereenev B4 emet Ene4ne enehuntien A4e intak. and Erhaunt tvatem The design function of the emergency diesel engine combustion air intake and exhaust system is to supply filtered air for scabustion to the engine and to dispose of the engi.ne cahaust to atmosphere. A separate source of combustion air for each diesel engine is taken from the diesel generator building air intakes through an air filters intake silencers turbo-charger compressor and combustion air aftercooters. The path of tho exhaust gas discharge is through the turbo-charger, cxhaust silencer and exhaust ducting to the outside of the building. This meets tne requirement of General Design Criterion 17, " Electric Pose ~r Systems' with regard to E system independence, redundancy and single failure criteria. l The exhaust system is separate from the air intake system to reduce the possibility of contamination of the intake air uith recirculated exhaust gases. The Location of the air intake structures and design precludes the intake of fire I oxtinguishing agent s and other noxious gases and dust and other deleterious material that would effect diesel generator cperation.k p-l The diesel generator combustion air intake and exhaust system scnforms with Regulatory Guide 1.9, position C.7, as it rotates to diesel engine combustion air intake and exhaust system protective interlocks. The diesel generator system protective interlocks are discussed in section 8.3 of this vaport. l The diesel engine combustion air intake system piping and ~ ~ ~ ~ ac/dmg Hre aa.atda "LL, cesponents p to the diesel engine interface, ^~^ in! st/tricer, ar>:so r L r are designed to seismic Category N I, ASME Section III, Class 3 (Quality Group C) requirements cnd meet the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.26 / " Quality Group Classifications and Standards for Water, I/ Stess, and Radioactive Waste Containing Components of Nuclear Power Plants," and Regulatory Guide 1.29 " Seismic j a.$,ma/ed ad Ashs'- rawo%ca wie ;ses. s x .~ a sse/cyi-a s,,, a xp w,, a -.s., a, s .I,as,sorav,ec nyw:remm4 f saQ d4ss d'pp.og. K4e co Seisoisa dal I, The awide,dmasy xrd4e ppmLex & /z s4 gor,, Am.s 4,,n<s, epa, swfa 4 a.,d is .e<yme snes ed'ppi eg /mpse vmo6, A dbs g and'mipmm4 Aare kn am/ ped'h /Je oke y in e, achamdapercore / Amin g an / w wie. sie uodig' Asok, and',dwnd AraGa he aie//asA6x de sfresses as p,,ni/Ad' & sesz s6oL d'aw, "dde d dessore Ap>y " The reodes ps/xp/og/snpines o,w'gmaram s an M #s m ordedn y ala'sa ass,idsp' py ans'a2panm4 a,o up/me w a /A,m dJmmL&KA 1 W l ) i YG $/d: d/? //16. dp7,77 3 C?? c2/Y / dl' d d?k 43Ms SyS 774) Cb/ / 6/f/7)d 47200r)f ,69 ?// G7Wdry/) b ,/WC - -intentionally over designed (subjected to Low working i stresses) f or the applications and thereby resulting in high operational reliability. The design of the engine ccunted air intake and exhaust piping and components to the cited design philosophy and standards is considered oquivalent to a system design to ASME Section III class 3 rog.uirements with regard to system functional operability cnd inservice reliability. Tho scope of review of the diesel generator intake and omhaust system included Layout drawings, piping and instrumentation diagrams, and descriptive information in section 9.5.8 of the FSAR for the system and auxiliary support systems essential to its operation. The basis f or the acceptance in our review was conf ormance of the design criteria and design of the diesel engine air { intake and exhaust system to the General Design Criterion 17 with respect to redundancy and physical independence, .the guidance of the cited Regulatory Guides, the additional f Guidance in Section II of Standard Review Plan 9.5.8, and -the recommendations of NURES/CR-0660, and industry codes and standards, and the ability of the system to provide j sufficient combustion air and re' ease of exhaust gases to L cnable the emergency diesel generator to perform on demans. 3Y W ' Based on our review we conclude that the emergency diesel I n a ongine intake and exhaust system meets the, requirements of l i scneral Design Criteria 2, 4, 5 and 17, meets the guidance j I of the cited Regulatory Guides, it can perform its design sofety function and meets the recommendations of 14UREG/CR-I I D660 and industry codes and standards, and is therefore 1 Occeptable. j l 1, e I k l, 37 I 10.0 STEAM AND POWER fdNVERETON MYSTfm 10.1 Summary Descrietion The steam and power conversion system is designed to utilize steam generated in h kWe.S / /A*fd 7.5 $d p,es:s< gas'a4, resc& ~d to generate electric power in the turbine generator. After the steam passes through the high and Low pressure turbines, the main condensers deaerate the condensate and transfer the . rejected Feat to the closed cycle circulating water system /AaYorw/dro Nearby ;6ser-ehich uses a^P to dissipate the rej ected heat to the atmosphere. The condensate is reheated and returned as .c4mm Ars. a f oed wa t e r t o t.h e The entire system is designed for the maximum expected energy from the nuclear steam supply system. A turbine bypass system is provided to discharge directly to the condenser up to 35% of the main steam flok around the turbine during transient conditions. This bypass capacity, eNer' U/h h db/?03ffr/C. //,74;?Sg.Skrnj / .wAhvm/ 4 adhs4,,d a mfo pseradz Aadepv dm wdheo/ 6pynag & /eacde. 10.2 Tuebine-Generator I Tho turbine generator converts steam power into glectrical pausr and has a turbine control and overspeed protection e Je l - system. The design function of the turbine sontrol and overspeed protection system is to control turbine action under aLL normat or abnormal conditions and to assure that o futt Lead turbine trip wiLL not cause the turbine to everspeed beyond acceptable Limits, and to minimize the probability of generation of turbine missi'.es in accordance uith the requirencits of General Design Criterion 4 " Environmental and Missile Design Bases." The turbine control and overspeed protection system is therefore ossential to the overaLL safe operation of.the plant. l The turbine generator is manuf actured by 'gg, gu gg ~ and is a tanden-compound type (single shaft) with one g l double-flow high pressure turbine and two d ible-flow Low pressure turbines. The rotational speed is 1800 rpm and is designed for a gross generator output of 'MWe at a nominal z y<..r plant exhaust pressure ofM inches mercury (absolute). krb//A6 yfnfra / dfuft,JW G// $ a. /U- ///dfr/6 /gsr'aade (MH) sandhys/em. 74 n A wa yshm ikwe ai, eAhonis smla a expoundy / 4, - o p,a A orrb d p /, aban> ra de servo-osdetda, a,A Apreswee y /Adsm4J(A dsa4) gsAs,, a,da A6e ofana%s/noieJ g & & d 6 y y Jern; ,awdm, de&he pef a pse,a4 / sad, dy-eSyn sse9 era 4cru/ mode a4eAd O 'e 0 h e' kt [Id i,b/N bQ1 r s,o Ord kVi-b if fessurf. aoho/va&<s. A Awp,<swee 4,4n.s a,< Af<dwin dar reAoa/s4p ano'rehea/kdropAs. vab.es. Is soui& era /an, 10di ASa cp/ cpm adde /Ae eer,fis/ ands >4rego42AgAjAn press d >a/ws as&&if <as a Kneden spu/sgoaA ;/sw /Ae es.yadin d n Vak<e servo -oe vabrs. I M r.# 4 i 5,di/?e ofers,Oeeolfrobeben ikfrsviid/A ,3 o$,Y,sn(spsans. 5 f 76 04c/rsms &nbs/Ar y/Ja.wMsys4s>,.in adoC&n A o/ke,oarnieh,s, sems 4,Ama red anda//eause /Ae wri/ro/andhidny,e/n radres A' dse. dopnwx4g m% oy#syaA,amsp7Ja rahe.s wi/ rey u 4,Asie.yne'otsps s u -..s en x oa s., sa v, h<n %,;$ndpodeAm 6p., p,s,w4d. doa is /kra ara a mecAanica/ 4,;dg n/ r hsbieJ /,,;o. 7Ae meAanku/ dipwn.os?s ;taf,is, il wd a</cd'a egA/g n a s. s.,e 2 a .a
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'e e,e e W e d /ha />whaua/cn,speedhip. The <Ashre # sysk o,Gsges a yeedphup di f4 4,Ame Armygu Aosep, a. a,r76/ m/maf &7d 6 sknood f dip.sgnad andsshoaidy,a&d & spas /ph-p, a sy>Ea4/ x2 fiaAd. ped,as n,sad hip n hes. My,sxhi yie,a&d-sd eaasa >h. 4 de-esogye, de<<Jg dapin so/eisid g)or,a4/ fp suhaifydoahl resa.ve andsaw The sha,r> whas ie, nam esedas,W iha ow,y d he is rese/ be dea id /he mm shen edes k. s.wme,,4. 7Ae asA&neo/sw, pad &p can de y,a4d~Af,~d Add de siecha.wes/aideheAro/sverp/denp/rm:?1 s erd den au, he dskJode&g 4,Jee gos,aden anVAm. p66. The oss s6 and da anchu .., speed sys4n are edabica/g 44,anchnkda,e,apsna//j spara4d da,ninge q e#ecfene ysk wdhave a p<ssa,a q$.s s4,iu see #d'saA a?A4,. yrAc l an/ hor. Of
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/LJ ~ia w,s) ,ie l woivs<xh a 4,Lu 4p., S f f4 do, press-ra 4,Jiaes, and Asm 2 s4,es ia /Ae & pesswe dehne. i!# shm exbacdm Ams, <xe<i.f /~ n pessure dea 4, M/, m pvidedau# pwer asra/ad renese <weren/ SAnAf sedes Ap<eva/ JasAfa,/sh-dem /Ae r4e/ms4 6Ars /d ffs aan/sy4 i,hise Ap. 4 The aAaehan sham mbes an-fe k aihara ae d&we surprodpode4m.p ns As Jen, as4vah. d4sure dire h u a.es,.6, nw <,, n -, --,a ,'..'4 V ', An inservice inspection program for the main steam stop and centrol valves and reheat valves is provided and includes: (c) dismantling and inspection of at Least one main steam stop valves one main steam control valves and one reheat stop volve, and one reheat intercept valve at every other (powm My sys par mhvak), ud rofueling outages 4(b) exercising and observing at least cnce a' N 1% ne main steam stop and control, reheat -t
- stop, i
cnd intercept valves, and ';) d;i', ; ; ;;;;.; :'"'r oxtraction steam non-return valves. -d ;_ z _ _/ / '/ g __ _ _j/_, /)A nn.esn/ lA h% oAmo m/vn Ao smusdsm a ma= L/u AS e,r. M Jov5iLi.or(4_rfzd//seawainmA odAl >% onAndo /% / Aois.Ad & n-,A.Ad4,An d,>L l'awdm4,Ami:, _ A JAs m 6 E ha. dA mJb Amn/A 'JA-,hdA%A5 xL.,/d' sbe$,/sise o srn/nbruin. N) a bwrinbkn h owra // diAsAe s,a.,w/.enirnso ary l ih Geo kk*n. 7A>ls ~AsA rErio A>!,i,< m/ Asn. An n. iand J h,r A m h Fo / w marbm i.t aed>r-w Abr, Armmm. s/l><hn nrnes/onor> ris)>>$ kni.on* w /A n, Artsede wmd ks see hw,:,,,rnen$ s l U _o,2tm / rsid.uso /Jo 7!)rIshs 10bs >$rbM J$eusrxt,, ar,aYz.\\ ~ sunscho s ALAAM inkA h6,4 4AcA,L NIH6 ' 1,' f-s.L, ia aAm. 4 4,. A L - n,,//-. h 6,, x s,./ - 'd, MAD,L Ja-,,,L.,L AL,%id as,,,,wm,-,d,A',, ;,A' ' 7 Yip agNe$,flafINreperf A rese/afn, )na ce,aw/rmor / f VAss rep.M 1.68, " Initial Test Programs for Water Cooled Power Plants." The adequacy of the test program is evaluated in section 14.1 of this report. The turbine generator system meets the recommendations of Brcnch Technical Positions ASB 3-1, " Protection Against Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems outside Ccntainment" and MEB 3-1, " Postulated Break and Leakage 'Lecations in Fluid Systems outside Containment" 'Evoluation of protection against dynamic effects associated s ) Ll I eith the postulated pipe system failure is covered in'section 3.6 of this report. The scope of review of the turbine generator included descriptive infurmation in section 10.2 of the FSAR, flow charts and diagrams. The basis for acceptance in our review was conformance of the design criteria and bases cnd design of the turbine generator system to General Design Criterion'4 with respect to the prevention of the generation of turbine missiles, the additional guidance in Section II of Standard Review Plan 10.2 and industry codes and stcndards. gesed
- ur review, we conclude that the turbine generator eversp 2d protection system meets the requirements of Gcneral Design Criterion 4c the guidance of Standard Review Plan 10.2, it can perform its designed safety functions, and is therefore acceptablej exoc[ers md/
10.3 Main steam sunnly svatem The function of the main steam supply system is to convey J}L. ymmy ? ) steam from the - 2 water reactor to the high pressure 4 I turbine and other auxiliary equipment for power generation. l Sect ion 10.3.1 evaluates the safety-related portion of the cain st eam system and including the main steam isolation valves (MSIVS). Section 10.3.2 evaluates the non safety related portion of the main steam system downstream of the cain steam isolation valves (MSIVS) up to and including the turbine stop valves. a. db 10.3.2 Main Steam Sunnty System (Downstream of Main Stream Isolation Valves) This portion of the main steam system is not required to offect or support safe shutdown of the reactor. The main steam system is designed to deliver steam f rom the NN [ r.eeeture t o t h e h i g h p r e s s u r e t u r b i n e. The main steam and turbine steam systems provide steam to the ammmasr f eedwater pucp turbiness ,,, e auxiliary steam systems i s t n - j ; ~. -...j... i.s reheaters, feedwater heaters, and 1 turbine bypass system. The main steam system ff he ///C/V o,o d a<d//kril<:dy Als /6.sf.sa irosAt esdasi?//A /Ae /$rb/Nc b/lloh y / $ e:Vkcg/7e l N/d.h rhbr> f, Oe'ss 3 Mykm?stki seismiu &hp lz' The sen s4m sp ?n,apg 4 adis arnsbecwn l he Se/5/?>itt /eshein/ /k dbstfd k 4//s2 A3A / as regoirernen b. In issue nuseer 1 of MUREG-0138 " Staff Discussion of Fifteen Technical Issues Listed in Attachment to November 3,1975 Memorandum from Director NRR to NRR Staff," credit is taken for all val'ves downstream of the main steam isolation valve to limit blowdown of a second steam generator in the event of a staan h) line break on the other steam generator's steam line upstream of the MSIV. h Sh e u r:rn / b n r s // r n // Since W is a ene steam generator. plant, we requested the applicant to show that blowdo x of the second steam generator is minimized given a steam line break on the other. steam generator upstream of the MSIV. The applicant has shown that given the stated condition the maximum s*aam flow througn the coen staam valves will not exceed the total auxiliary feecwater flow capacility of any auxiliary feedwater pump. We find this ac:aotsole. t.... g .= The scope of review of the main steam supply system (between the outermost main ste6m isolation valve and up to and including the turbine stop valves) included descriptive information in section 10.3 of the FSAR, and flow charts and diagrams. The basis'for acceptance in the staff review was conformance of the design criteria and bases and design of coin steam supply sfstem te the acceptance criteria in Section II of Standard Review Plan 10.3. Based on our review, we concluce the main steam supply system between the outermost main steam isolation valve and up to and including the turbine stop valves is in conformance with the above cited criteria and design bases, it can perform its design functions, and is, therefore, acceptable. 1041 Main Condenser The main condenser is designed to function as a heat sink l for the turbine exhaust system, turbine bypass steam, and l other turbine cycle flows, and to receive and collect condensate flows for return to the reactor. The main 7T condenser transfers heat to the circulating water system which 6' CS Q. /JGbYl/tt ff Cob /f7 S wdY WP k MfN dea /d die a4nsphere. The main condenier is not required to effect or support safe shutdown of the reactor or to perf orm in the 'peration of o I reactor. safety features. The main condenser is a single-sheLL j $ m m ___ L _/ m ~ l-Aa &on-5 t... e. lAhdldXkaaJk. //7007 &?/Ye/7ser /k chs#stel QCes deam Am 7% ms hidaie. zw/a40 ase/p / o,a h l We fe f s arn !? ora br' rdlfl SlA;Wrr f& jiffy //dth n/' Soes/ .ph*k=ihed ~eXCee f/?e /9M/4}?str>p7 ?brb///d 7/kf/JJi/ft 43 l//7MrMYCkfff. h #MNr dershSfr /3 bs/fsreW l; $ b b o' l Q //- G r7 l c r{$ f r /? Cr?tir77 b 77 S/ b lt y asses yrent ^ f f //10 V d fke 4fe??br?$Gk Y///W6 lyfra dtrie Vdl dr?. kedg.y>/gevrser /5 Lh.sa<crel/b hkc> > AG f 2 r// faSse c er7> Lya, /, a c'efC-ot%;/Y/f"sc.//f/h he kb'?2 //St r e /ldwakryaA/ wk4 w4/>b/ 4?t sotro.sers af seemsy/stasim /4,,a a pncWad & #a d yas,Gr, f 44, / 4 id?fa y& mobst,4ha/4he shs/id Ace. 6/isG4 a,,da, C&ttWQh u.sakry resso're /d,twyo/l k freS3cire /D fM'* ess p Q///?O bt reoYes tr> //kt 7bke $//fG &c$de7xb/rser k/!e so
- bttkj;%tsb kg t'c??eksiser 7bh1 as//l' k
sk/bl ~ / t' 'a r ha e bi,sa 4, ri- / e $ 4 J r. g The applicant wiLL include pre-operational and startup tests of the main condenser in accordance with recommendations of Rogulatory Guides 1.68, " Initial Test Programs for Water Cooted Reactor Power Plants." The adequacy of the test program is evaluated in secti.on 14.1 of this report. The scope of review of the main condenser included Layout drawings and descriptive information of the condenser in sost ion 10.4.1 of the FSAR.- ..s. ey Tho basis for acceptance in the staff review was conformance of the design criteria and bases and design of the condenser to the acceptance criteria in Section II of Standard Review PLcn 10.4.1 and indust ry standards. Sosed on our review, we conclude that the main condenser is in conformance with the above c8ted criteria and design bases, it can perform its designed fwnstion and is therefore ccceptable. a.r.4_ Edme & pass ssL v v f Md fast Z 77 7 k dr? /N f kd 7k deboe J ass ec7ws4 y < skom 6p 5s4m. y pneuna4a/ sprand vakes swee Ad' 4 de mam ska hu c6m,,,aan de />wn seri06cer.f]/4 mv'c ondakhsp g d,n/jy' it o 7e 4,hme h acs a capaAs ac% y'snp ds%pm &- 4 /Je ea y eaA ~aw xde ibam o gs4,,, la47xsyk,ajsaiadd-<)a e<y,a4/e y%4/s&dSrp a ma hadryeckn ai&/6y,ng h rac&. l ll$ $$E 5 b a?l$ W5 feh$ Dfffa j \\ L/ensersh~s!,n,a) AmAms d s-nh/de Lys,a&<s a de reas 4 p n s?a g &. w w, so / s & a p s p s,,,,y a s n, w' -LM--, de sycAn a ased,d ownhuh see,wG<g s p 4 m pi e.e w e. Me sysh,n A ado osed'4 deay AW 7he 64sefpas.s uak.s a,e remoz,,/ odro$1/2--- t.skLn. A exr 1 /> - n s-ss- ,g,.. ~ .. ^ l ArryhYQ/YffMWe* b Sg.sf6t?1 r/f M b A// Y S C $/b' A W 45r? a de ardf Agh main scrn%serymre. The applicant wiLL include pre-operational and start-up tests of the turbine bypass system in accordance with recommendations.of Regulatory Guide 1.68, " Initial Test Programs for Idater Cooled Reactor Power Plants." The Odequacy of the test program is evaluated in section 14.1 of this report. The turbine bypass system can be tested chile the unit is on Line, and wiLL be tested on a Serrr/- 427311V h /rs.s/s. The turbine bypass system meets the recommendations of Branch Technical Positions ASB 3-1, " Protection Against Piping a Failures in Fluid System Piping Outside Containment and MEB 3-1, " Postulated Brak and Leakage Locations in Fluid System Piping Outisde Containment." Evaluation of protection against dynamic effects associated with the postulated pipe system f ailures is covered in Section 3.6 of this report. The scope of review of the turbine bypass system included drawings, piping and instrumentation diagrams and descriptive i inf ormation of the system in section 10.4.4 of the FS AR. The basis for acceptance in the staff review was conformance of the design criteria and bases and design of the turbine bypass system to the acceptance criteria in Section II of Standard Review Plan 10.4.4 and industry standards. 9
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t .a, ..e,*. P Based on our review, we conclude that the turbine bypass system is in conformance with the above cited criteria and design basess it can perform its designed functions and is, therefore, acceptable. O l t e . - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _}}