ML20081A761

Program Plan for Detailed Control Room Design Review

ML20081A761
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	02/29/1984
From:	NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:
Shared Package
ML20081A751	List: ML20081A761 NLS8400074, Forwards Program Plan for Detailed Control Room Design Review, Including Proposed Schedule for Implementation, Per NUREG-0737,Suppl 1 Requirements
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 PROC-840229, TAC-51152, NUDOCS 8403060274
Download: ML20081A761 (65)

Text

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NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT COOPER NUCLEAR STATION 1

e PROGRAM PLAN FOR DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW d

FEBRUARY 1984

'I 8403060274 840301 PDR ADOCK 05000298 F PDR

p-IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING CONTENTS OF THIS REPORT Please Read Carefully The only undertakings of General Electric Company respecting informatica in this document are contained in the contract dated August 11, 1983, Purchase Order No. 216258, between Nebraska Public Power District and General Electric Company, and nothing contained in this document shall be construed as changing the contract. The use of this information by anyone other than '

Nebraska Public Power District or for any purpose other than that for which it is intended, is not authorized; and with respect to any unauthorized use, General Electric Company makes no representation or warranty, and assumes no. liability as to the completeness, accuracy, or usefulness of the information contained in this document.'

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o TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1 2.0 OVERVIEW 2 2.1 Purpose 2.2 Objectives ,

2.3 Description of CRDR Activities 2.3.1 Planning Phase 2.3.2 Review Phase 2.3.3 Assessment Phase 2.3.4 Verification and Validation Phase 2.3.5 Reporting Phase 2.3.6 Implementation Phase 2.3.7 Maintenance Phase 3.0 DEFINITIONS 8 4.0 MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING 10 4.1 Review Team Structure 4.1.1 Review Team Leader 4.1.2 Human Factors Scientist (HFS) 4.1.3 Senior Reactor Operator (SR0) 4.1.4 Design Engineer 4.1.5 Operations Supervisor 4.1.6 Supporting Personnel 4.1.6.1 General Electric Program Manager 4.1.6.2 Systems Engineer-Consultant -

4.1.6.3 Instrumentation and Controls Engineer-Consultant

4.1.6.4 Safety and Licensing Engineer-l Consultant 4.2 Review Team Activities t s 4.3 Coordination and Integration with Related Efforts j 4.3.1 Related Efforts 4.3.2 Coordination / Integration 4.4 Review Team Orientation l 5.0 DOCUMENTATION AND DOCUMENT CONTROL 17 l 5.1 Reference Documentation l 5.2 Review Documentation l 5.3 Summary Report l 5.5.1 Review Procedures l 5.3.2 Review Findings 5.3.3 Implementation 5.3.4 Maintenance Phase 6.0 REVIEW PROCEDURES 22 7.0 ASSESSMENT PHASE 23 l 7.1 Enhancements 7.2 Prioritization of HED's 7.2.1 Prioritization Criteria 7.2.2 Priority Ranking i

. 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS ,

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7.3- Corrective Actions and Schedule for Implementation  :

7.3.1 Schedule for Implementation 8.0 VERIFICATION OF DESIGN IMPROVEMENTS 32 9.0 VALIDATION 33 l

iU.0 SCHEDULE . 34

11.0 REFERENCES

35 APPENDICES Appendix A - Resumes of Original BWROG CRS Team Aopendix B - Resumes of Review Team for. Remaining Activities Appendix C - Documentation Forms e

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

After the need to improve the man-machine interface in the control room was widely recognized subsequent to the TMI incident, Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) joined the BWR Owners' Group (BWROG) in an effort focused toward that goal. The BWROG Control Room Survey program was performed at Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) in February 1981. The BWROG Generic Program Plan addressing the

- Planning and Review phases of a Detailed Control Room Design Review (CRDR) was submitted to the NRC by Reference A. The NRC approved the BWROG plan with comments in Reference B, stating that the BWR0G Control Room Survey program is an acceptable approach to the Planning and Review phases of the CRDR. The requirements for conducting a detailed control room design review are included in NUREG 0737 Supplement 1,. Reference C. This program plan submittal describes the plan which NPPD will follow to conduct a CRDR in accordance with the requirements of References B and C.

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2.0 OVERVIEW 2.1 Purpose The purpose of the CRDR is to:

1)' Review and evaluate the control room workspace and procedures / equipment for remote sivutdown, instrumen-tation, controls and other equipment from a human factors ,

engineering viewpoint, taking into account both systems' demands and operator capabilities.

2) To identify, assess and implement control room design enhancements and modifications to correct items which are determined safety related or otherwise substantially impact the potential for operator error, particularly in preventing or coping with emergency situations.

2.2 Objectives The objectives of the CRDR are:

1) To identi fy improvements in the control room / operator interface which have the potential to reduce the probability of error, particularly with regard to pre-venting or coping with accident situations.

2) To evaluate any identified problems, establish relative priorities and corrective action plans according to specific evaluation criteria.

3) To verify that each selected design improvement will provide the necessary correction and can be introduced in the control room without creating any unacceptable human engineering discrepancies because of significant contri-bution to increased risk, unreviewed safety questions or

situations in which a temporary reduction in safety could occur.

4) To coordinate improvements with changes resulting from other human factors / emergency respor6e improvements.

2.3 Description of CRDR Activities To achieve the objectives of the CRDR, a number of activities will be completed. A flowchart showing the interrelationships of the CRDR activities is presented in Figure 1.

The CRDR has bean split inta seven phases:

o Planning o Review o Assessment o Verification and Validation o Reporting o Implementation o Maintenance A brief synopsis of these activites follows:

2.3.1 Planning Phase The planning phase commenced with the establishment of the BWROG Control Room Improvements Committee in January 1980. The planning phase was described in detail in Reference A. The planning for outstanding activities is detailed in this plan.

2.3.2 Review Phase The review phase consists of a control room survey conducted by a multidisciplinary team to compare the

characteristics of the control room with appropriate human engineering design guidelines, an operating experience review (including documentation and operator interviews) and function / task analysis for emergency operating procedures. The review phase and the entire CRDR for Cooper Nuclear Station are being performed in accordance with the BWROG methodology. The original survey described above was performed in February 1981.

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The remaining activities i n. this phase consist of completing the BWROG checklist supplement, updating the operating experience review and performing function and task analysis for the emergency operating procedures.

The r sults of the task analysis will bc compared with the in-place inventory of controls and displays in the control room to assure that the control room supports the E;nergency Operating ~

Procedures- (E0P's) or identify  ;

missing displays or controls.

2.3.3 Assessment Phase t

During the assessment phase, identified discrepancies will be evaluated with regard to their probability for causing operator error and the potential impact of the error on safe plant operation. A categorization according to priority category will be performed.

Corrective action plans will be established for all significant discrepancies. Consideration will be given to correction by enhancement, design modifications, procedure and training improvements and the capabilities of other emergency response improvements, e.g. Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS),

i The resulting corrective action plans will be 1

integrated and correlated with the other NUREG 0737 Supplement 1 emergency response improvement actions.

2.3.4 Verification and Validation Phase 1

During the verification and validation phase, it will be l verified that the proposed corrective action plans can be j accomplished without creating other problems and that the l

functions allocated to the control room operators can be effectively accomplished. I 2.3.5 Reporting Phase After comple ting the verification / validation phase, a l summary report of the CRDR will be prepared and submitted to the NRC. The summary report will include.a discussion of any changes made in the program execution, if any, '

from the program plan, summarize the human engineering ,

discrepancies identified, outline proposed control room changes and present the schedule for implementation. The report will also provide a sumary justification for human engineering discrepancies with safety signifi-l .

cance if left uncorrected or partially corrected.-

l 2.3.6 Implementation Phase l The implementation phase will be the actual accom-plishment of the control room improvements according to i the schedule.

2.3.7 Maintenance Phase The maintenance phase consists of the continuing d

attention given to human factors engineering in the control room with regard to procedures, modifications and review of unusual events.

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Figure 1 CRDR ACTIVITIES

1. PLANNING DEVELOPMENT OF BWROG PHASE CONTROL ROOM SURVEY NRC REVIEW AND APPROVAL BWROG PLAN GENERIC LETTER 83-18 PLANTSPECIFICl PROGRAM PLAN l

2. REVIEW BWROG CRS PHASE PERFORMANCE SUPPLEMENTAL CRS PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST SUPPLEMENT, UPDATE OPERATING EXPERIENCE REVIEW

AND TASK ANALYSIS I

HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES HED

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3. ASSESSMENT EVALUATE, PRIORITIZE  :

PHASE AND ESTABLISH l CORRECTIVE ACTION PLANS CONSIDER OTHER IMPROVE-

4. VERIFICATION ENSURE PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS MENT AND VALIDATION ARE EFFECTIVE AND WON'T ACTIONS CREATE NEW PROBLEMS 4 '

5. REPORTING ISSUE

SUMMARY

PHASE REPORT l

6. IMPLEMENTATION ACCOMPLISH PHASE IMPROVEMENTS l

7. MAINTENANCE CONTINUING PHASE HFE PROGRAM

3.0 DEFINITIONS Emergency Operation Procedures (E0P's) - Plant procedures directing the operator actions necessary to mitigate the consequences of transients and accidents that cause plant parameters to exceed reactor protection setpoints, engineered safety feature setpoints, or oth'er appropriate technical limits.

Emergency Procedures Guidelines (EPG's) - Guidelines developed from 4 system analysis of transients and accidents that provide sound technical bases for plant-specific E0P's.

Function (Subfunction) - A kind of activity (or a static role) performed by one or more system constituents (people, mechanisms, structures) to contribute to a larger activity or goal state.

Function / Functional Analysis - The examination of system goals to

, determine what functions they require. . Also, examination of the required functions with respect to available manpower, technology and other resources, to determine how the functions may be al-located and executed.

Function Allocation - The distribution of functions among the human and automated constituents of a system.

'4uman Factors Engineering (HFE) - The science of optimizing the performance of human beings, especially in industry. More nar-rowly, the science of design of equipment for efficient use by hunan beings (also known as bioengineering, biotechnology, engineering psychology, ergonomics, and human factors engineering).

Human Engineering Concern (HEC) - An item designated by a CRDR tean member as a potential HED.

e Human Engineering Discrepancy (HED) - A characteristic of the existing control room that does not comply with the human engineer-ing criteria used in the control room survey.

System (Subsystem) -

An organization of interdependent human-equipment constituents that work together in a patterned manner to accomplish some purpose.

System Function Analysis - The determination of system functions required to meet system goals.

Task (Subtask) - A specific action, performed by a single system constituent, person or equipment, that contributes to the accom-plishment of a function. -

Task Analysis - A procedure used to delineate which specific actions must take. place to accomplish system functions. In the CRDR context, task analysis is used to determine the individual tasks that must be completed to allow the proper execution of the E0P's. This verification activity checks the control room match to the E0P's.

Validation - The process of determining whether the control room operating crew can effectively perform their functions given the control room instrumentation and controls, procedures, and training. In the CRDR context, validation implies a dynamic performance evaluation.

Verification - The process of determining whether instrumentation, controls, and other equipment are available to meet the specific requirements of the emergency tasks performed by operators. The control room survey and task analysis are verification activities, checking the control room match to the human operator.

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4.0 MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING The -ultimate responsibility for the Cooper CRDR will reside with the NPPD Manager, Nuclear Operations Division. The day-to-day conduct of the review will be the responsibility of the CRDR review team. The original control room survey was led by the BWROG Control Room survey team. Appendix A contains the resumes of the BWROG survey team. Remaining CRDR activities will be managed by the review team leader. The review team leader will report progress on the CRDR to the Manager, Nuclear Operations Division on a monthly basis. This will provide the necessary management attention to ensure that the CRDR objectives are met and that the efforts are integrated with overall emergency response improvements. The CRDR team will require ' interaction with other organizations within NPPD. The review team leader will have the authority to assure freedom of the CRDR team operation. Areas which will be included are:

o Access to information (records, documents, plans, procedures, drawings,etc.). i o Access to all required facilities.

o Access to any personnel with useful or necessary information.

o Access to support services.

o Freedom to document dissenting opinions.

4.1 Review Team Structure The review team is a multidisciplined team of individuals with the wide range of skills necessary to perform the design review. The review team, consisting of members from the NPPD, General Electric Company and their human factors consultant

will include the following personnel:

o Review Team Leader o Human Factors Scientist o Senior Reactor Operator o Design Engineer o Operations Supervisor 4.1.1 Review Team Leader The review team has the review team leader as its key person. This individual provides the adminis-trative and technical direction for the project and has responsibility for the project. Access to information, facilities and individuals providing useful or necessary input to the team is coordinated by the review team leader. Because of'the detailed knowledge of Cooper Nuclear Station systems and methods, this individual provides a cohesive force .

for the various NPPD department personnel and vendor organizations involved with this project. Plant operations personnel provide input to the review p . ,

team through daily contact with the review team leader.

It will be the responsibility of the review team leader to resolve differences in human factors opinions on methodology, technique, review findings, assessment, and HED corrective actions that dissent ,

with the majority opinion of the CRDR Review Team.

The review team leader will be assisted in the performance of his function by the General Electric program manager. -

4.1.2 Human Factors Scientist (HFS)

The human factors scientist (a GE subcontractor),

will work closely with the review team throughout each phase of the control room review and share with the team the human factors technical leadership of the entire CRDR project. The human factors scientist will coordinate all activities from a human factors perspective and verify that task performance quality is maintained at a level necessary for a valid and comprehensive review.

4.1.3 Senior Reactor Operator (SRO)

At least one SR0 from NPPD will serve as a member of s the core review. team. The SR0 will assist in identifying operator tasks and will serve as the review team expert on the operational constraints for manipulations of plant systems.

4.1.4 Design Engineer The design engineer is a General Electric engineer who will assist in the identification of plant system design goals and functions and will serve as the review team expert on the factors affecting the design decisions at the plant. The design engineer will provide input to the review team during the analysis of functions and tasks for any plant systems and during the assessment, implementation, and effectiveness phases of the CRDR. The design engineer also will assist in completing the check-list supplement and performing the task analysis of emergency operating procedures.

4.1.5 Operations Supervisor The operations Supervisor will serve as a member of

the review team providing assistance to the Review Team Leader in coordinating activities with Cooper Nuclear Station personnel, procedures and facilities. He also w:ll provide input based upon his own operational experience.

4.1.6 Supporting Personnel, In addition to the personnel described in articles 4.1.1-4.1.5, the support of additional personnel shall be utilized as necessary. The support will include the following personnel.

4.1.6.1 General Electric Program Manager The GE program manager serves as a technical and administrative advisor to the team leader. He provides administra-tive direction to the GE and Human Factors ,

personnel assigned to the task and (oordinates the assignment of other deneral Electric resources as required.

4.1.6.2 Syscems Engineer-Consultant The s" stems engineer-consultant, a GE engineer, will review the CRDR findings and provide advice to the team on systems engineering issues and the resolution of HED's from the standpoint of integration with other emergency response improve-ments.

4.1.6.3 Instrumentation and Controls Engineer -

Consultant The I&C consultant, a GE engineer, will provide advice to the team on I&C issues during the assessment of HED's and the development of design improvement plans.

,l 4.1.6.4 Safety and Licensing Engineer - Consultant ,

The safety and licensing consultant, a GE engineer, will provide advice to the team on safety / licensing issues throughout the process. This includes review and concur-rence with the Program Plan and Summary Reports.

4.2 Review Team Activities The initial development of methodology for the review was performed under the BWR Owners' Group as discussed in Refer-ence A. The methodology for the assessa nt of HED's described in this plan was developed by the review team. The review team participated with NPPD management in establishing the overall plan and schedule for the CRDR. The review team will perform the outstanding activities and integrate all action items. The review team will be responsible for the prepara-tion of all reports related to the CRDR and ensure that appropriate reports are submitted to NPPD management for review and approval.

4.3 Coordination and Integration with Related Efforts 4.3.1 Related Efforts The CRDR process proceeds simultaneously with a

number of other related efforts, including:

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a. Provision of the following new instrumentation and facilities:

1) Safety parameter display system

2) Emergency response facilities

3) Post-accident monitoring instrumentation

4) Bypassed and inoperable status indication system

b. Updating emergency operating procedures

c. Changes in requirements for training and staffing 4.3.2 Coordination / Integration The coordination of CRDR activities and the inte-gration with related activities is the responsibil-ity of the team leader. To ensure that such coor-dination takes place, the team leader will be a member of the NPPD Station Operating Review Committee (SORC) that routinely oversees all ongoing wor.k on emergency response facilities and the control room.

r 4.4 Review Team Orientation The initial BWROG review team received their orientation by attending a BWR Owners' Group Control Room Survey Workshop on October 8-15, 1980. Topics covered included control room design review objectives, human factor principles, BWR Owners' checklist, operating experience review, task analysis and simulator survey performance exercises. A familiarization with the control room panels was performed when the survey

,0 comenced. A second BWR Owners' Group Control Room Survey Workshop was held on October 18-20, 1983. Topics covered included human factors principles, NUREG 0737 Supplement 1, NRC' Generic Letter 83-18, BWROG Control Room Survey development and methodology, checklist supplement, operating experience review update, task analysis on emergency operating procedures and simulator performance exercises on the checklist supplement and task analysis.

Members of the review team attended the most recent workshop as noted on their resumes in Appendix B. A brief orientation with the plant will be held when the performance of this I

checklist supplement commences. The close coordination between the plant and consultant personnel on the team will allow any additional orientation needs which may arise to be met on an as-needed basis.

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5.0 DOCUMENTATION AND DOCUMENT CONTROL 5.1 Reference Documentation

^ The following documents have been identified as possible reference material. As the review progresses, additional references may be identified.

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o Cooper Nuclear. Station Updated Safety Analysis Report o BWR Owners' Group Control Room Survey Program o BWR Owners' Group Emergency Procedure Guidelines o Cooper Nuclear Station Emergency Operating Procedures o NRC Regulatory Guides.(e.g. 1.97 and 1.47) o NRC guidance documents (e.g. NUREG 0700) o Cooper Nuclear Station training documents o Control room drawings o Systems descriptions -

o Piping and instrumentation diagrams o Annunciator arrangement drawings o BWROG Control Room Survey Summary Report

'. o Human Factors Design Information o Licensee Event Reports o Operator training manuals o Cooper Nuclear Station administrative procedures 5.2 Review Documentation Throughout the review process, documents will be processed to record data, analyses and findings. Whenever practical and appropriate, standard forms will be developed and used. The bulk of the documentation generated by the review process will be necessary to do the following:

o Document the criteria used for each review activity o Record the results of the survey, operating experience

O review and systems review o Compile HED's and associated data for review and assess-ment In order to facilitate systematizing and recording control room design review activities, several standard forms have been developed. These forms, which appear as samples in Appendix C, are: ,

q Operator Interview Form o Human Engineering Discrepancy o Task Analysis Data Sheet o Memo of Consultation Any or all of these forms may be revised based on the experi-ence gained during the CRDR.

Any photograph used to support an HED record will be assigned a number traceable to that record.

5.3 Summary Report After completion of the Verification and Validation Phase, a summary report of the results of the CRDR will be prepared and submitted to the NRC. The report will summarize the review process, referencing this program plan providing material which updates or revises the plan.

5.3.1 Review Procedures With regard to the actual accomplishment of the plan, the summary report will include the following topics:

o Operating Experience Review

- Types and time periods of records reviewed Operator survey procedures Summarize experience of operators interviewed Sample interview questionnaire o System Function Review and Task Analysis Reference the approved Emergency Procedures Guidelines which are the basis for the emergency procedures used in the task analysis

- Charts or list of major systems and subsystems and their major components

- Task descriptions organized by system

- Identification of any instrumentation or controls shown needed to support operator functions in, the emergency operating procedures which are not located in the, i

control room

!  ; o Control Room Survey  ; p i

- Summarize survey procedures

- Provide sample survey forms o Verification and Validation l

i Sunnarize the verification and validation proced9res used 5.3.2 Review Findings This section will be organized by the chapter heading in the BWROG checklist:

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o Panel Layout and Design o Instrumentation and Hardware o Annunciators o Computers o Procedures o Control Room Environment o Maintenance and Surveillance o Training and Manning Additionally, special attention will be given to the findings from function and task analysis, operating experience review, task performance verification and operating crew function validation.

Each report section will include a description of all identified HED's and the proposed (or implement-ed) corrective action. The assessment process used to identify and select. design solutions will be summarized. Where necessary for interpretation of the report, appropriate sketches or photographs will be provided. For HED's which are found to be important to safety, solutions which only partially ,

correct the problem or decisions not to correct the HED's will be justified including the assessments i

providing the basis for such decisions.

5.3.3 Implementation This section will summarize the schedule for imple-menting the design solutions which were described in the " Review Findings" section of the summary report.

As noted in 5.3.2, where corrective actions have already been completed, that will be noted under

" Findings" and those solutions will not be repeated in this section. If there are areas which are not fully documented with regard to outstanding actions,

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it is possible that an addendum to the summary report may be issued. Such plans will be included

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in this section.

5.3.4 Maintenance Phase This section will describe the follow-up program for verification that implemented improvements are ,

effective on an operational basis. Additionally, the NPPD plans for a continuing HFE program at Cooper Nuclear Station will be described.

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6.0 REVIEW PROCEDURES The procedures which are being used for the review were transmitted to the NRC by Reference A and approved by the NRC in Reference B.

The entire CRDR for Cooper Nuclear Station is -being perfonned according to the BWROG Program Plan.

One of the comments in Reference B was that the plant-specific program plan should document the number and extent of plant person-nel par.ticipation. As shown in the resumes included in Appendices A and B i plant personnel are members of the Review Team for remaining activities. A licensed reactor operator assisted the original survey team in the accomplishment of the checklist.

Reactor operator members of the review team will aid in performance of the checklist supplement and E0P task analysis.

With regard to the operating experience review, a total of seven licensed reactor operators were interviewed.

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7.0 ASSESSMENT PHASE During the assessment phase, all the identified HED's will be analyzed as to their effects on operator perfonnance and safe plant operation. Discrepancies will be prioritized according to the combined criteria of the likelihood of operator error and the resulting safety consequences. Some HED's will be selected for correction by enhancement, without undergoing prioritization relative .to their safety ccnsequences. For. all the HED's recommended for modi fication , design corrections will be recommended, and schedu'les of implementation will be developed based on the priorities and integration with other NUREG 0737 Supplement 1 emergency response improvement actions. Figure 2 shows the assessment process for the HED's.

7.1 Enhancements Many identified HED's resulted from minor deviations frcm, human engineering principles and require simple corrections.

Examples of. such corrections include panel labeling and swapping of like components, and component improvements to the panel. controls and indicators. Mo,re specifically, enhance-ments involve a number of techniques that involve' surface improvements such as demarcation lines, shading and mimics.

! Guidelines in selecting these HED's for correction by enhance-l ment will be derived from the review team's own experience in addition to the background information listed in EPRI report

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NP-2411 " Human Engineering Guide for Enhancing Nuclear Control Rooms", (Reference D). Placing the HED's in the category of " Enhancements" implies that corrective actions and implementation will be prompt.

These HED's selected for enhancement do not require priori-tization relative to safety consequences. However, these enhancements will be considered in the overall program of HED assessment, verification and schedule of implementation, and

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their effect on other control roem corrections will be evalu-ated.

7.2 Prioritization of HED's All the HED's identified for modification (all those not in the enhancement category) will be analyzed and ranked as to the degree of impact on plant safety and the likelihood of occurrence of such impact. The followint ractors constitute the basis for the prioritization of the HED's:

- Impact on safe plant operation resulting from the degra-dation of operator performance due to the HED

- Function and classification according to safety of the HED-related component / system

- The potential for human error as influenced by the HED

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?.1 Prioritizction Crjteria Considering the above factors, NUREG 0801 (Reference E), and the CRDR evaluation methods developed by the BWROG (Reference F), two criteria have been fonnulated to envelop the HED's safety consequences and the likelihood of human error. The criteria are:

A. Safety Classification This ' criteria is a measure of the safety consequences of the HED. The impact of the HED on safe plant operation as influenced by operator-related actions during emergencies, is taken as the primary measure. Any HED which 1

affects safe plant operation will be classified Safety Related as determined by the judgment of the review team. For those HED's where the impact on plant safety cannot be established, a secondary measure dealing with the examination of the HED-related system classificaticn will be used. An HED associated with a component belonging to a BWR safety-related system such as ECCS, ATWS, etc. will be ranked as Safety Related, independent of the analysis for the HED effect on plant safe operation.

B. Error Potential The likelihood for human error is classified as documented or having potential for occurrence.

The LER's and operator interviews will be used to determine if there has been a documented error as a result of the HED. The potential.

for error due to the HED will be determined by the CRDR team, guided by the survey results of

22 BWR control room design reviews (Reference '

F).

7.2.2 Priority Ranking Based on the above criteria, each HED will undergo a prioritization test according to the flow ' chart of Figure 3. The resulting priority matrix is given in Figure 4, and a sumary of the HED's prioritization is given below.

Priority I - .;fety Related

- Documented and/or High Potential Error

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Priority.II - Safety Related

- Low Potential Error Priority III - Not Safety Related

- - Documented and/or High Potential Error Priority IV - Not Safety Related ,

Low Potential Error The HED's will be further examined for their cumula-tive or interactive effects. If such effects are found, they will be upgraded accordingly.

7.3 Corrective Actions and Schedule for Implementation Corrective actions will be developed to bring the HED's into agreement with acceptable human factors guidelines or to counteract their effects. The specific corrective actions chosen may be enhancements, design modifications, improved training,' revised procedures, or any cembination of the above.

The review team will develop the corrective actions.

References to be used will include NUREG 0700 (Reference G),

EPRI NP2411. and other Human Engineering guidelines. The following factors will be used in the assignment of the corrective actions.

- Priority rating

- Cost. effectiveness

- Extent of correction: Enhancement vs. modification

- Operator performance / retraining

- Potential for creating new errors

- Integration with other control room improvement programs:

SPDS, R.G. 1.97, E0P's, etc.

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Sufficient detail regarding the corrective action will be developed by the CRDR team to provide adequate guidelines for its subsequent implementation action.

7.3.1 Schedule for Implementation An implementation schedule shall be assigned to each HED corrective action according to the classifica-tion of the HED's into enhancemc=t; or modifications and according to the prioritization of the modifica-tions noted in Section 7.2. The corrective action assignments to be used are as follows:

Schedule for HED's Assignment Implementation Enhancements A Prompt, 1st Refueling

& Priority I Priority II B Near-term, 2nd Refueling Priority III C Medium-term, 3rd Refueling Priority IV D Optional, Left to Utility Any practical constraints on scheduling of modif-ications will be considered separately from the determination of the HED's significance and priority. If such constraints as equipment availability or design lead time conflict with the assignment designation, that designation may be changed to the next approprirte one. Conversely, if the magnitude of the modification of a low level

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priority HED is relatively small such as the addi-tion of demarcation lines or labels, the assignment of that HED may be upgraded. In all such cases where a change in assignment is made, the change and e the reason for doing it and the evaluation of the impact will be documented on the HED report form.

Following the submittal of the CRDR sumary report, any change in schedule of implementation and the reasons for the change will be submitted to the NRC

_as a supplement to the summary report.

e Figure 2 HED'S ASSESSMENT i

IDENTIFIED HED'S

'r ASSESSMENT PHASE PANELS ENHANCEMENTS' MODIFICATIONS

. , i CONTROLS

& PRIORITIZATION INDICATORS ESTABLISH CORRECTIVE ACTIONS n

INTEGRATE WITH OTHER IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS 9" IDENTIFIED Prioritization of HED's HED o

DOES IT -

NO OPERATOR

AFFECT PLANT RELATED ACTIONS SAFE OPERATION?

IS IT NO ASSOCIATED WITH SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT? YES YES n y NOT SAFETY SAFETY RELATED RELATED IS IT A IS IT A

' DOCUMENTED DOCUMENTED AND/0R AND/0R A HIGH POTENTIAL A HIGH POTENTIAL NO NO ERROR? ERROR?

o 1r PRIORITY PRIORITY II IV YES YES

'r U PRIORITY PRIORITY III I I

Figure'4 o HED PRIORITIZATION MATRIX ERROR P0TENTIAL DOCUMENTED & HIGH LOW POTENTIAL POTENTIAL ERROR ERROR

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5 m I .

II C

e 5 C eS 5e IV ,

yg III .

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8.0 VERIFICATION OF DESIGN IMPROVEMENTS The modified control room instrumentation and controls design will be evaluated to assure that the selected design improvements, both individually and collectively, adequately correct their respective discrepancies and do not create other safety problems. The veri-fication will be accomplished by performing the following:

1. Comparison of the modified control room design with the control room human factors design conventions document. ,

2. Comparison of the modified control room design with the instrumentation and controls requirements identified during the control room survey and tssk analysis.

3. Comparison of the modified control room design with approved project design criteria (e.g. , electrical separation crite-ria).

An HED verification form will be used for this review. HED solutions that are found inadequate will be reassessed, and solutions will be revised to meet the criteria.

9.0 VALIDATION Validatica of HED fixes will be done by means of an appropriate mockup study. The extent of this mockup will depend on the nature of the HED. For example, two-dimensional mockups may suffice for many enhancements.

The final validation of all emergency response improvements will 2

be either simulator exercises and/or control room walkthrough/

talkthrough exercises. Any potential HED's resulting from the validation process will be processed as described in Section 7.0, Assessment Phase.

Additional details regarding the validation' program will be included in the sumary report.

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10.0 SCHEDULE It is planned to perfonn the checklist supplement, update the operating experience review and complete the function and task analysis by May 15, 1984. The assessment of HED's and the verification and validation phases will then comence. The summary report will be submitted to the NRC by July 30, 1984.

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11.0 REFERENCES

A. BWR Owners' Group Letter BWROG 83-51 from W. J. Armstrong to V. A. Moore, dated August 25, 1981.

B. NRC Generic Letter 83-18, NRC Staff Review of the BWR Owners' Group Control Room Survey Program, dated April 19, 1983.

C. NRC Generic Letter No. 82-33, ' Supplement i to NUREG 0737, Requirements for Emergency Response Capabili ty, December 17, 1982.

D. " Human Engineering Guide for Enhancing Nuclear Control Rooms",

EPRI Report No. NP-2411, May 1982.

E. " Evaluation Criteria for Detailed Control Room Design Review",

NUREG 0801, Draft Report, October 1981. .

F. "BWR Owners' Group Control Room Design Review Program, Summary Report", General Electric Report No. NEDC-30285, October 1983.

'f G. " Guidelines for Control Room Design Reviews", NdREG 0700, September 1981. September 1981.

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Appendix A Resumes of original BWROG CRS team.

J. Gebert, Iowa Electric Light and Power Co. (Team Leader)

0. Anderson, Detroit Edison Co.

D. Tennant, Georgia Power Co.

J. Tolson, Public Service Co. of Oklahoma R. Christianson, General Electric Co.

K. Ross, General Electric Co.

P. Nicholson, Human Factors Consultant, MIT Group T. Sherid,an, Human Factors Consultant, MIT Group p

1

Resure of -

John H. Gebert PERSONAL INFORMATION Born: September 27, 1929

- Boone, Iowa EDUCATION Associate of Science Degree Boone Junior College Electricial Engineering Ir.ternational Correspondent School EMPLOYMENT HISTORY 3/49 - 1/57 Estimator and Construction Superintendent, Lippert Brothers Construction Company 1/57 - 8/63 Power Plant Employee, Iowa Electric Light and Power Company 8/63 - 5/69 Production and Substation Superintendent, Iowa Electric and Power Company 5/69 - 5/71 Engineering Department, Iowa Electric Light and Power Company 5/71 - 3/74 Electrical anc !echanical Maintenance Suoervisor DAEC

' ' . ::::iarc; i;;1ri-ter.d+ i;

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.AEC 3/d0 - Present Senior Electrical Engineer Iowa Electric Light and Power Company CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW

• BWR Owners Group Control Room Survey Workshop, Morris, IL

• Team Leader for BWR Owners Group Control Room Survey at the Duane Arnold Energy Center Nuclear Plant

• Team Leader for BWR Owners Group Control Room Survey at the FERMI-2 Nuclear Power Plant

CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW (cont.)

• Team Leader for BWR Owners Group Control Room Survey at the Cooper Nuclear Power Plant

• Team Member for BWR Owners Group Control Room Survey at the Hatch Nuclear Pcwer Plant

• Team Hember for BWR Owners Group Control Room Survey at the Moticello Nuclear Power Plant

• Committee Member of INP0 NUTAC Control Room Design Review Committee 6

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Orric M. And2rsen P.E.

Senior Controls Engineer BSEE - University of Minnesota Post.-Craduate Studies - University of Michigan University of Detroit Wayne State University University of Wisconsin Registered Professional Engineer State of Michigan Engineering Experience 15 years experiente in various engineering departnents responsible for the engineering 6 design of power plants, specifically the instrumentation, control systems, and the control room panels. This includes seven fossil-fired power plants and one nuclear power plant.

Industry-Wide Publications (Co-Author)

ISA Paper " Human Factors Engineering of Detroit Edison

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Belle River Power Plant Control Center" IEEE 420 " Design and Qualification of Class 1E Control Boards. Panels, and Ra:k, Useu i t. ';uc.u r Power Generating Stations" IEEE 566 " Design of Display and Control Facilities for Central Control Rooms of Nuclear Generating Stations" IEEE 567 " Criteria for the Design of the Control Room Complex tor a Nuclear Power Generating Station" IEEE 803 " Unique Identification in Power Plants and Related racilities - Principles and De finitions" IEEE 803A " Unique Identification in Power Plants and Related Facilities - Component Function Identifiers" IEEE 8 04 " Unique Identification in Power Plants and Related Facilities - Implementation" IEEE 805 " System Identification in Nuclear Power Plants.

and Related Facilities" IEEE 806 " System Identification in Fossil-Fired Power Plants and Related Facilities" O

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HFE Experienca Member of the engineering team for the control room design of seven fossil-fired power plants and on Nuclear' Power Plant.

Member of the BWR Owner's Group Control Room audit team for Nebraska Public Power Cooper Nuclear Station.

Attendee of University of Michigan's summer conference on " Human Factors Engineering."

Co-Author ISA Paper " Human Factors Engineering of Detroit Edison Belle River Power Plant Control Center" Working Group Member & Co-Author IEEE 420 " Design and Qualification of Class IE Control i Boards, Panels, and Racks Used in Nuclear Power Generating Stations" IEEE 566 " Design of Display and Control Facilities for Central Control Rooms of Nuclear Generating Stations" IEEE 567 " Criteria for The Design of the Control Room Complex for a Nuclear Power Generating. Station" i

0

' David V. Tennant Power Supply Engineering Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 18th floor, 333 Piedmont Avenua Atlanta, Georgia 30302 Work Phone: (404) 526-7198 EDUCATION: 1970-1972 Indian River Community College, Fort Pierce, Florida - AA degree 1972-1976 Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, Florida - BSME degree - Mechanical Engineering REGISTRATION: Georgia Professional Engineer, No. 14152 PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATION: A) American Society of Mechanical Engineers B) Co-authored a paper about control system philosophy for power plant water discharge. This paper'was presented at the ISA (Instrument Society of America) symposium held in Chicago, 11. during May, 1980.

C) I am presently a member of the ISA (Instrument Society of America) team concerned with Human Factors Engineering in Fossil Power Plants. The purpose of this team is to derive acceptable HFE standards for the power industry.

, , 6 WORK EXPERIENCE: 1977-Present Georgia Power Co., P. O. Box 4545, Atlanta, CA 30302 Spent first two years working in the piping section on a variety of projects. Transferred to Instruments and Controls in 1979. Supervisor: Mr. W. Holland, Assistant Section Supervising Engineer. I am currently employed as a Senior Design Engineer in the Power Supply Engineering & Services Department. My duties include:

cost estimates, writing specifications, instrumentation applications & control systems, engineering calculations, coordination of projects, material selection, supervising draftsmen, ergonomics, evaluating contract bids, proposals, and visiting plant sites to check on construction progress.

David V. Tennant Resume Page 2 Specific Projects to date:

A) Participated in control room surveys of nuclear power plants with emphasis on Human Factors engineering. This was an effort sponsored by several utiliti,es and involved nuclear power plants all over the country. I was able to increase my participation by attending several seminars on ergonomics and to work with several well known experts from The Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

B) Had the opportunity to review the control consoles of a coal fired power plant with respect to Human Factors con-siderations. Many suggestions I offered were implemented.

C) Spent several months at the Hatch Nuclear Plant during a scheduled outage. I was responsible for implementing design changes and writing and conducting pre-op tests.

D) Responsible for sizing and procurring control valves and instrumentation for power plant control systems.

E) I was the lead engineer in charge of coordinating a computer retrofit job at two large coal fired power plants.

F) Presently, I am the lead engineer in charge of a boiler control,s retrofit of a coal fired power plant. In addition to coordination, scheduling, and technical review, I expect to have an integral part in the layout and design of the existing control consoles.

6/76-7/77 Piper Aircraft Corp., Vero Beach, Florida 32960.

Supervisor: Mr. George Johnson. I worked as an Industrial Engineering Analyst. Duties included cost estimates, plant layouts, production assembly methods, assisting production engineers with stress calculations, assembly set-ups.

PERSONAL: Born: Gloucester, England August 8, 1952 Weight: 165 pounds Height: 6'0" Health: Excellent Marital Status: Single

_ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ . A

BRIEF RESLHE OF JAMES TOLSON SUPERVISOR, ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS TRANSOK. INC.

Education BSEE, Le Tourneau College, Longview, Texas, 1976.

Courses taken since graduation include:

Human Factors En;ineering in "ov-r Plant "Jesign, P.v?. 0 arst:5n. T.:?,

Plant Design and Fundamentals, and various instrumentsti.n and cos ut -:

courses.

U.S. Navy - Electronics and Nuclear Power Schools.

Experience U.S. Navy (Six Years)

Title:

Electronics Technician (ETI (SS))

Qualified Reactor Operator on nuclear submarine power plants. Performed various levels of operation, supervision, and maintenance during submarine operation and overhaul. Installed field changes to reactor pancis to improve

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operator interface.

Public Survice Cenpany of Oklahoma (Five One-Half Years)

- ;: '. : t r : n t in.t J- .::ci Er.;ineer, Black Fc:: Project .

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.u zu n11b t 11c ies includud s pecif .a: ion re.. i r. a'.a .ie8 2.;- .u:~ r ilan~ f r saveral plant control and protection systens including the =ain con::cl room (SUCLENET 1000).

Participated in control room reviews at Fermi II and Cooper Power Stations and the Black Fox Simulator to insure an acceptable man machine interface was provided.

Assisted in writing and reviewing NRC licensing submittals for several pose TM1 issues and participated in conceptual design of an Emergency Response Information System.

Briof Resi:m2 of Jcmso Tolson Page Two Transok, Inc.

Title:

Senior Engineer (One One-Half Years)

Worked as Design Engineer on a SCADA system used to control and collect data on a 2,500 mile natural gas transmission gathering system including installation of remote terminals and metering modifications. Also designed lighting systems, valve controls, compressor trip schemes and control panels.

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j , .J.s sp :en fr,m :he fir transricters t:1 ene find tc the master com;uters.

Revision of the CRT fo;=ats for improved operator interface is in progress.

Also responsible for an 800 MHZ radio system used to communicate between the dispatch center and 130 field personnel.

Professional Organizations: IEEE, ISA, ENTELEC e

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RESUME ROBERT C. CHRISTIANSON l

EDUCATION, DEGREES, LICENSES University of Illinois, Chemical Engineering, B.S.1951 Registered Professional Engineer - Nuclear, California 1977 AEC Operator Licenses - Dresden I Nuclear Power Station

- VBWR Test Reactor

- KRB Nuclear Power Station WORK EXPERIENCE (All with General Electric Compnay) 8/79 to Nuclear Services Department, San Jose, California Present Principal Engineer, Field Services

- Engineering consulting services in various assigned areas including department quality audits, control room survey program, TMI Site assistance, EPRI disturbance analysis system development, etc.

i 11/74-8/79 BWR Projects Department, San Jose, California Manager, Plant Startuo and Test

. Managerial responsibility for the subsection with the assigned function of startup and testing of 'all BWR nuclear power plants encompassing all site disciplines.

Subsection consisted of 80-100 engineers.

1/68-11/74 APED-Field Engineering, San Jose. California Manager,Startup Test Ooerations Managerial responsibility for the unit with the assigned function of the startup and testing of the Department's nuclear power plants. Unit consisted of approximately 50 graduate engineers or equivalent.

5/67-1/68 APED-Field Engineering San Jose California Principal Plant Test Engineer Responsible for tne development of preoperational and startup tests, power operating programs and procedure preparation.

6/65-5/67 APED-Field Engineering, KR3 Site, Germany Operations Superintendent Responsible for the overall operational and technical content and canpletion of the startup of the KRB Nuclear Power Station through turnover.

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4 Robert C. Christianson - Resume Page 2 5/ 64-6/ 65 APED-Power Plant Project, San Jose, Californie '

Warranty Engineer Handle department contracts with specified reactors following turnover, with responsibilities for warranty claims, complaints and engineering assistance.

8/63-5/64 APED-Field Engineering, San Jose, California Field Service Engineer Provided field service liaison between site operations and San Jose components in Reactor Operations and Engineering.

Provided consultation services at the NPR site to the NPR management during activation of the NPR reactor for 6 months.

10/62-8/63 APED-Field Engineering, JPDR Site, Japan

+ Manager, Site Operations Responsible for all site activities and personnel during final

- stages of construction and testing prior .to initial operation of the JPDR Nuclear Power Plant. Also had full responsibility for canpletion and customer turnover of the Philippine OPR.

) 12/61-10/62 APED-Power Plant Projects, San Jose, California Project Engineer Coordinated the various engineering design, manufacturing and

. purchasing components responsible for completion of the JPDR Nuclear Power Plant, j 7/60-12/61 APED-Field Engineering, KAHL Site, Germany

- Shift Startuo Superintendent

> Full shift responsibility for all activities during the startup testing of the KAHL-VAX Nuclear Power Station.

6/59-7/60 APED-Field Engineering. Dresden Site, Illinois Shift Startup Superintendent Full shift responsibility for all activities during the startup testing of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station.

AEC licensed operator.

1/59-6/59 APED-VBUR, Vallecitos Labs, California VBWR Plant Engineer Responsible for the planning, installation and evaluation of equipment and processes for improved operation of the VBWR Reactor. AEC licensed operator.

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e Robert C. Christianson - Resume ,

Page 3 7/57-1/59 HAP 0-IPO, Richland, Washington Reactor Analyst Responsible for production optimization, coordination of all maintenance and operation planning. Preparation of all schedules , budgets, etc.

9/52-7/57 HAPO-IPO, Richland, Washington Reactor Operations Supervisor Progression of supervisory positions of increasing responsibility in the operation and maintenance of Hanford Production Reactors.

6/51-9/52 HAPO-IPO, Richland, Washington Rotational Trainee Assignments in Reactor Process Engineering and Reactor Operations at the Hanford Production Reactors.

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g RESUME Name: Kenneth C. Ross Position: Program Manager Company: General Electric ,

Experience includes nine years in the nuclear industry-four years as an instructor in the U.S. Navy nuclear power program, two years as an instructor for General Electric Company, and three years as a program manager for General Electric Company.

SRO License. Certified by NRC to teach all phases of 4WR operation.

General Electric program manager for BWROC Control Room Survey Program. Provided program management support for eighteen BWR control room design reviews. Principle author of nine control room design review susumary' reports, co-author of

.k additional seven.' Developed, organized..and presented BWROC Control Room Survey Program Workshop. Attended MIT suaner seminar en human factors engineering and INPO workshop on control room evaluations. Co-author of training appendices to BWROC EPG's.

- Short Resu=o Paul J. Nicholson Box 74 I MIT Branch P.O.

-( Cambridge, Mt 02139 (617)253-3885 P. J. Nicholson is currently an independent consultant serving the nuclear power industry in the areas of instrumenta-tion and control and related topics. Twenty three years of '

professional experience include 12 years in the aerospace electronic industry and the remainder in nuclear research and advanced reactor instrumentation and dynamics. For the past l four years, while principal scientist at the C.S. Draper Lab, he has been guest lecturer in the MIT Nuclear Engineering e Department, associate lead investigator for the MIT Advanced Reactor Control Project, and supervisor for a number of nuclear engineering graduate thesis projects. He has been nominated for the position of Visiting Scientist at MIT for the 1980-81 academic year.

From 1958-65 he held positions of increasing responsibility st Raytheon Company, managing edvanced aerospace electric pro-jacts in air defense, radar and signal processing. Granted . .

t academic leave during 1965-69 he joined an experimenta? high energy physics research group at the Rutherford Laboratory at z

' Harwell, U.K., accepting responsiblity for all electric j ( instrumentation fer the H7 experiment, one of the first success-ful large scale computer controlled experiments. He was also responsible for control room design displays, data storage .

E and retriceal aspects. While in the U.K. he completed studies -

for a Ph.D. degree at the Imperial College in London and was appointed undergraduate physics tutor. .

I Returning'to Raytheon he was named manager for Advanced Development, Aerospace Systems with responsibility for the USAF F

fault tolerant computer program and airborne multiplexing systems.

he was t meaber of the SAE-2K multiplexing comnittee. Latsr at GTE Sylvania he was responsible for Air Force Satellite.communi-

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cations, the joint services computer controlled small switch j board and DCA worldwide digital voice modem development.

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- From 1974-1980 st C.S. Draper Lab, he was senior project t scientist and principal investigator for advanced reactor a instrumentation and control and reactor modeling studies for the DOE fusion program ,and the EPRI Fusion-Fission Hybrid Kinetics Study. He also collaborated with Combustion Engineering I

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in the Disturbance Analysis System (DAS) Study and interacted

.(' with the nuclear utilities, and industry and the NRC in areas of LWR power plant IEC. Recently he was invited to lecture in the MIT Summer Course on Man-Machine. Interfacing in Nuclear Power.

He is a member of the AIAA Terrestrial Energy Technical Committee, served on the IEEE/NRC Smart Instrumentation panel, and is a censultant to the Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation. He is author of several publications in the reactor IEC field.

Prior to his post graduate studies in the U.K., Mr. Nichol-son obtained a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from MIT and an M.A. in physics from Boston University.

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Summary Resume of Thomas B. Sheridan Thomas B. Sheridan was born in Cincinnati, Ohio, Dec. 23, 1929. He attended Purdue University (B.S.1951) and, af ter two years in military service .

(Aeromedical Laboratory, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio) attended the University of California, Los Angeles (M.S.1954) and M.I.T. (Sc.D.1959) .

His program at M.I.T. was interdepartmental between systems engineering and psychology, with one year spent in cross-registration at Harvard University.

For most of his career, Dr. Sheridan has remained at M.I.T. , where until recently he was Professor of Mechanical Engineering and is now Professor of Engineering and Applied Psychology. He heads the Man-Machine Systems Labora-tory and for many years has taught a graduate course in man-machine systema as well as control and design courses. He helped develop a new interdepart-mental graduate degree program in Technology and Policy, and presently is '

responsible for the core Seminars in Technology and Policy for that program. -

He has served as visiting faculty member at the University of California, Berkeley, Stanford University, and the Technical University of Delf t, Netherlands.

Dr. Sheridan's research has been on mathematical models of human operator and socio-economic systems, on man-computer interaction in supervising robotic systems, and on technology for group decision-making. He is author, with W. R. Ferrell, of Man-Machine Systems: Information, Control and Decision Models of Human Performance, M.I.T. Press. 19?s!~and co-editof of a'1976 Plenum Press book, Monitoring Behavior and Supervisory Control.

1~

He has been active in the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers, was formerly editor of the IEEE Transactions on Man-Machine Fystems, is past president of the IEEE System Man and Cybernetics Society, and served as Chair-man of the IEEE Committee on Technology Forecasting and Assessment. He is also a Fellow of the Human Factors Society, and in 1977 received their Paul M. Fitts Award for contributions to education. He is listed in American Man ar.d Women

of Science and Who's Who in the East. ,

Dr. Sheridan has served on the Accident Prevention and Injury Control Study Sections of the National Institutes of Health, the NASA Life Sciences Advisory Committee, the NSF Autouation Research Council, the NASA Study group on Robotics the OTA Task Force en Appropriate Technology, and the NSF Advisory Committee on Applied Physical, Mathematical and Biological Sciences.

His industrial consulting activities have included: The General Motors Corp.

(auto safety); General Electric Co. (telemanipulators); C. S. Draper Laboratory (design of astronaut interface for Apollo guidance system, industrial robots);

Biodynamics, Inc. (biomedical and human factors); Public Broadcast Service (TV audience feedback); National Bureau of Standards (industrial robots); Group _ .

Dialog Systems, Inc. (group meeting and decision technology); Babcock and Wilcox Co., (industrial instrumentation); Lockheed and General Physics Corporations and Electric Power Research Institute (man-machinc aspects of nuclear reactor safety).

Dr. Sheridan is narried and has four children.

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t Appendix B Resumes of Review Team for remaining activities.

A. Review Team K. R. Wire, Review Team Leader, Cooper Nuclear Station R. L. Brune, Human Factor Scientist o M. Weinstein, Human Factor Scientist M. 'M. Aburomia, Design Engineer, General Electric R. Gardner, Senior Reactor.0perator, Cooper Nuclear Station R. Brungardt, Operations Supervisor, Cooper Nuclear Station B. Supporting Individy,als G. R. Mullee, Program Managerg General Electric P. D. Knecht, Jr., System Engineer-Consultant, General Electric L. W. Chamberlain, I&C Engineer-Assessment & Implementation, General Electric j D. B. Bitter, Safety & Licensing Engineer, General Electric e

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RESUME KEITH R. WIRE B.S. Chemistry / Math - University of Missouri, 1967 Navy Nuclear Power School - Bainbridge, MD, 1963 Navy Nuclear Power Training Unit - Ballston Spa, NY (Enlisted), 1964 Navy Nuclear Power School - Bainbridge, MD, 1968 Navy Nuclear Power Training Unit - Windsor, CT (Commissioned Officer),1969 Engineer Officer School - New London, CT, 1974 BWR Theory and Operations, Hot License Training - Cooper Nuclear Station,1982 SRO Licensed - October, 1982 June 1983 - Present Operations Manager - Cooper Nuclear Station Jan. 1982 - June 1983 Operations Supervisor - Cooper Nuclear Station Dec. 1980 - Jan. 1982 Executive Officer, USS Pargo (SSN650)

Commander, United States Navy Responsible for all shipboard routines and training.

June 1978 - Dec. 1980 Executive Officer, Navy Nuclear Power Training Unit (and PXO/PCO Course), Windsor, CT Responsible for annually training 400 new officers and enlisted personnel for hands on operation of a prototype nuclear plant (SIC)

June 1975 - June, 1978 Engineer Officer, USS Lafayette (SSBN616)

Responsible for reactor operations, maintenance and

. nuclear training.

Nov. 1961 - June, 1975 A series of educational, training, supervisory, and management positions in the Navy Nuclear Power Program.

Gained familiarity with all technical disciplines related to nuclear power. Eight years experience in direct supervision of reactor control manipulations as Engineering Officer of the Watch. (E00W) w

. - - - - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . l

Robert L. Brune, Ph.D.

Senior Human Factors Scientist, Project Manager Dr. Brune has almost 25 years of experience in human factors. His ex-perience includes human factors engineering of equipment and equipment systems and the design and development of operating and maintenance pro-cedures and training materials.

After rtceiving'his Ph.D. in Industrial Psychology from Purdue University in 1958, he worked for Lockheed Missiles and Space Company until 1970 as a huma*n factors engineer in their Fleet Ballistic Missile System programs.

In 1970 he joined Xyzyx Infomation Corporation to manage the design and development of operating and mainterance procedures and training materials.

He resigned in 1977 to start his own firm, HPT Inc.

While at Lockheed, Dr. Brune worked directly with the engineering groups responsible for the design of the Polaris and Poseidon missiles, reentry systems, and ground support systems. He perfomed human reliability analyses of complex systems for the purpose of formulating specific hardware design inputs. He expanded the application 'of human factors engineering orinciples

.to protect the reentry systems from intentional damage as well as the unin-tentional damage which could be inflicted by personnel . This application imposed more severe requirements on " sailor-proofing" the design of the reentry systems than would have been the case if only routine handling and inspection operations had to be considered.

While at Xyzyx, Dr. Brune designed and installed the procedures development process currently us.ed by the Department of Energy for preparing procedures for the radioactive waste processing operations on the Hanford Reservation and at the Idaho National Energy Laboratory. He wrote all of the manuals required to transfer the procedures develcpment techvology and trained chemical engineers, chemical process engineers, and nuclear engineers to perfom task analysis to support the procedures development process. Al so ,

in conjunction with this program, he designed a matrix approach for iden-tifying the interrelationships among operating precedures and between

operating procedures and administrative procedures. This process is di-rectly applicable to the analysis of NPP procedures for identifying inter-relationships from which the Procedures Network description can be derived.

At HPT Inc. Dr. Brune has designed, managed, and implemented human factors studies dealing with human error analysis and the design of equipment and procedures. He has performed human engineering evaluations of control rowns, evaluated operability and maintainability of plant equipment, in-cluding human performance in radioactive environments, and evaluated a variety of procedures for various applications.

Brief descriptions of the projects relevant to the nuclear power industry in which Dr. Brune has participated are presented in the attached Annotated ,

Listing of Related Organizational Projects. During the course of studies to develop checklists for evaluating procedures used in nuclear power plants (NPPs), he made extensive visits to many NPPs. He interviewed oper-ators and maintainers, and performed detailed analyses of emergency, main-tenance, test, and calibration procedures, tagging systems and administra-ive control processes. He has analyzed almost 2000 Licensee Event Reports (LERs) describing maintainer and operator performance deviations. As a result, he is familiar with the human actions involved in the broadest spectrum of nuclear power plant operations and the equipment characteris-tics and other performance shaping factors associated with clant operations.

Dr. Brune participated in the peer review study of the Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Emohasis on Nuclear Power Plant Acolications, NUREG/CR-1278, which is intended for use by persons performing probabilistic risk assessment studies in the nuclear power industry. He recently ccmpleted a one-year project working with members of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) to prepare industry guidelines for fonnatting the new generation of symptom-oriented emergency operating procedures derived from the emergency procedure technical guidelines (EPGs) developed by the NSSS vendors. He has also recently completed a human factors evaluation of a graphics display system developed by the Boiling Water Reactor Owners' Group (BWROG) in which HPT collected performance and opinion data from 31 reactor operators.

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Meyer Weinstein, Ph.D.

Senior Human Factors Scientist Dr. Weinstein has over 25 years of experience in human factors. His ex-perience includes human factors engineering of equipment and equipment sys-tems, human reliability-analysis and assessment, and the design, development, and evaluation of operating procedures and training materials.

After receiving his Ph.D. in Experimental Psychology from Ohio State Univer-sity in 1955, he joined the Aero Medical Laboratory, Wright Air Developmnt Laboratory, where he conductec' research on crew performance during high speed, low altitude (tarrain avoidance) flight. He also performed onerations and human error analyses of new aircraft weapon systems.

In 1957, Dr. Weinstein joined the North American Aviation Company at Colum-bus, Ohio where he was responsible for the cockpit layout of the A3J and T2J aircraft. He joined Lockheed Missiles and Space Company in 1958 and remained there until joining HPT Inc. in 1977.

While at Lockheed, he progressed through increasingly responsible positions from Human Factors Engineer to Human Factors Staff Engineer. In addition to human factors engineering, he ,became experienced in the following associ-ated areas: Maintainability Engineering, System Engineering, Training, In-formation Processing, Personnel Safety, and Employee Motivation. Dr. Wein-stein served as a permanent member of the Lockheed Engineering Safety Panel and in this position he performed human reliability analysis and evaluated system reliability analyses for complex advanced weapon systems.

After joining HPT Inc. in 1977, Dr. Weinstein has continued to play a key role in the application of human factors methodologies to the solution of job-related perfornance problems. His work includes designing and per-fonning studies to evaluate maintenance, test, calibration, and operating procedures used in radioactive wasta processing operations and nuclear power plant operations. He has studied procedures development and imole-mentation processes used in these industries, including procedures vali-dation and revision processes and has assisted clients to increase the

effectiveness of these processes.

Dr. Weinstein has participated in a wide variety of projects associated with the nuclear power industry and the related radioactive waste pro-cessing industry. He has perfomed in-depth analyses of control room and plant auxiliary activities and interviewed many control room oper-ators and plant maintenance personnel. He has perfomed intensive stud-ies of nuclear power plant procedures, analyzing over 300 operations proce-dures including maintenance, test, calibration, nomal operating, and emer-gency operating pr.ocedures. Also, he has analyzed nearly 2000 Licensee '

Event Reports (LERs) to identify and classify perfomance deviations by coer-ators, test, and maintenance personnel . He is well grounded in the human ac- '

tions, equipment characteristics, and other related cerfomance shaping fac-tors likely to be' associated with NPPs. Dr. Weinstein was project manager of a peer review study to evaluate the application of the Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Emohasis on Nuclear Power Plant Acolications, NUREG/CR-1278, to selected accident sequences. He was a member of the human factors study team that perfomed a simulator evaluation of the boiling water reactor owners' group (BWROG) graphics display system (GDS) . The GDS has 19 disolays, ordered in a three-tier hierarchy. The study had the ob-jective of determining the usefulness of the GDS as an aid to reactor oper-ators in managing reactor emergency conditions.

RESUME MONTAZ M. ABUROMIA B.S. Mechanical Engineering - Cairo University 1960 M.S. Mechancial Engineering - University of California 1963 Ph.D. Mechanical Engineering - University of California 1966 Dr. Aburonia is a senior engineer in Plant Performance Engineering at General Electric Nuclear Energy Business Operation. He is responsible for the performance analysis of BTR operating plants. His primary tsak is the o

development of improvement systems that enhance BTR operation and safety. He is currently involved in detailed review and assessment of control room design.

Dr. Aburonia has fourteen years of engineering experience in the nuclear field.

His previons experience at Foster Wheelsr Energy Corporation in New Jersey and at EDS Nuclear Corp. in San Francisco involved various tasks that include:

supporting the design / manufacture of steam generators, subcompartment analysis mader postnisted LOCA, steam and water hammer analysis, and extensive application of thermal / hydraulic nuclear computer codes.

Dr. Abaronia has performed and coordinated several engineering tasks in support of BTR plant operation. These include:

- Transient analysis of BTR's under postniated ATTS conditions

- System relistility evalnation of safety relist valve gatpoint modification

. Selection of BTR shnormal transients for safety parameter display system (SPDS) evaluation

- Sinnlated accident scenarios and operator ir

• mentation of emergency procedure guidelinea 1

- Plant naique load definition for Mark I containment under LOCA conditions

- Power sprate evaluation of BWR/4; heat balance, reactor core coolant hydranlics, reactor internal pressure difference, and operational transients

- Evalnation of the BTR owners group graphic display system at the BWR/6 sOnnlator Dr. Aburonia's experience also includes attending the coarse of Fundamentals of Emman Factors For Engineering and Design at General Electric, and the BWR Owner's Group Control Room Survey Yorkshop, Oct.1983.

s

) RESUME ROBERT BRUNCARDT

'" Robert Brungardt is the Operations Supervisor at Cooper Nuclear Station.

He is responsible for the safe and efficient operation of the station.

Robert Brungardt has twenty three years of conventional and nuclear power plant operating experience at the Sheldon Station /Hallam Nuclear Power Facility and Cooper Nuclear Station. His previous experience was at Allied Chemical Corporation as a steamfitter for four and one half years. The power plant experience consisted of:

Auxiliary Operator at Sheldon Station, Hallam - December 1, 1960 to June 30, 1962.

Assisted in the startup of and operation of the 950 psi boiler and also tr.e water treatment plant. Assisted in the startup of and operated RNPF reactor auxiliaries and radwaste facilities.

Assisted in reactor fuel loading.

Equipment Operator at Sheldon Station, Hallam - July 1, 1962 to January 31, 1964.

) Operated 100 MWe turbine genarator and auxiliaries. Operated HNPF reactor auxiliaries and radwaste facilities. .

Obtai ed Reactor Operator's License - Fabruary 27, 1963 and renewed it in 1965.

Unit Operator at' Sheldon Station, Hallam - February 1, 1964 to May 31, 1969.

Operated the HNPF reactor controls. Assisted in the startup of and operated the controls of an 1800 psi boiler and 130 MWe turbine-generator. Operated the controls of a 1450 psi boiler and 115 MWe turbine-generator. Participated in the RNPF moderator changeout program. Participated in the RNPF decommissioning program.

Shift Supervisor at Cooper Nuclear Station - June 1, 1969 to July 11, 1983.

Received CR0 License in Novemuer 1973. ~

Responsible to the Operations Supervisor for plant startup preparations including the preparation and review of Pre-Operational Test Procedures and Operating Procedures, and syscem pre-operational testing. Responsible for putting the 345 kV switchyard into service and provi;iing initial Quality Assurance surveil-ance for the turbine-generator system. Directly responsible for the activities of four operators. Supervised the water treatment plant and Radwaste operations. Developed, and coordinated the surveillance testing

} program for 101 years. Shift Technical Advisor qualified.

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- Operations Supervisor at Cooper Nuclear Station - July 12, 1983 to present.

Responsible to the Operations Manager. Supervise the activities of fifty five operations personnel. -

Robert Brungardt's experience also includes attending the BWR Owner's Group Control Room Survey Workshop, October 1983.

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1' 's RESUME RICK GARDNER Reactor Operator License - May 1977 Senior Reactor Operator License - May 1978 Shif t Supervisor - May 1982 Shift Technical Advisor Qualified - June 1982 Rick Gardner has 10 years of operations experience,'7 of which are as_a Licensed Reactor Operator. During this' time he has either operated or supervised the operation of reactor controls during normal and transient conditions.

He has participated in the BWROG CRDR at Cooper Nuclear Station and is also involved in EPG/EOP and SPPS development.

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RESUME --

G. Richard Mullee, PE Education BSME, Union College, 1962 Summary of Experience At present, Mr. Mullee is Senior Program Manager, Nuclear Consulting Services, in the Nuclear Services Department of General Electric. Mr. Mullee has 25 years experience in tne nuclear power field. He is currently providing program management and technical assistance in human factors-related projects.

Mr. Mullee has been program manager for the BWR Owners' Group human factors review of control room design. He managed the program for the simulator evaluation of the BWR Owners' Graphics Display System and was one of the principal authors of the recently published report ALO-1019, " Simulator Evaluation of the BWROG Graphics Display System". Previous experience includes diverse assignments at the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, including component and systems design, test and engineering analysis, Shift-Supervisor-Reactor Plant Operations, Training Manager-Reactor Operations, Reactor Plant Manager, Manager-Radiation Engineering Operation, Manager-Operations Support, Manager,-Field Engineering Training, Project Engineer-Advanced Development .

Activity and Manager-Facilities Operation. In several of his engineering and operations management positions, Mr. Mullee has been responsible for imple-menting systems and procedures to improve safe and effective plant operations.

Mr. Mullee is a registered professional engineer in New Y,ork. He is a member of the American Nuclear Society and the Human Factors Society.

Control Room Design Review - Additional Activities o Attended BWROG Control Room Survey Workshop - October 1980 o Attended short course - Effects of Human Performance on Nuclear Plant Operation, University of Wisconsin, March 1981 o Presented paper, " Human Factors Review of BWR Control Rooms", American Nuclear Society Annual Meeting, June 1981 o Participated in IEEE Standards Workshop on Human Factors and Nuclear Safety, August / September 1981 o Participated in "The Man-Machine Interface in Nuclear Power Operations",

an LWR /LM7BR Information Exchange sponsored by U.S. DOE, November 1982 o Planned BWROC Control Room Survey Workshop and presented lecture, October 1983

Peter D. Knecht, Jr.

Job Titlar -

Senior Engineer Educatione M.S. Nuclear Engineering, University of California, Berkeley - 1971 U.S. Navy Nuclear Power School - 1968 8.3. General Engineering (w/ electrical engineering) Stanford Univer-sity - 1967 Polytechnic School, Pasadena, CA - 1963 Lfcanses/Cartiflentionar Prof ession Registration, Nuclear Engineer, Califwnia (NU 1958) '

General Exnerfencer I. General Electric Company (1976 to present) o Progra Manager of post Three Mlle Island' programs including technical direction and administration over probabilistic risk, hydrogen control, decay heat renoval and Mign change activities.

Prepared licensing support documentation fcr the BWR/6 Standard plant and generic proposals fw customer application of NSSS changes. Supported and cocrdinated SWR Owners' Group activities related to post TMI design requirements.

o Program Manager of Post-Accident Monitoring instrumentation

, requirements. Technical activities include assessments of plant designs to justify current designs or to recommend changes, prepar-ation of licensing support documentatlos and development of design Improvements including proposals far appilcation. Activities also Included human f acters evaluation of r__- _

ry Procedure GuldelInes and application of Emergency Response infwmation Systems.

o Directed projecte and subcontracts related to reducing occupational radiation exposure. Conducted acones and unintenance evaluations of all plant radiation areas to determine potential improvements, conducted economic cost / benefit stedies of potential design or pro-cedural improvements, evaluated radiation source term bulldup and related models, and conducted studies of airborne contamination reduction techniques. Developed cost / benefit methodology for present worth evaluation of alternative suposure reducing tech-niques.

Cont'd P. D. Kn:cht .Rcsume Pago 2 i .

2. Nuciear Services Corporatton (1972 to 1976) o Conducted evaluations to determine conrlbutws to reduced capacity f actor or availability in nuclear and fossil fueled pcuer plants.

Developoed assessment program for identifying specific design or management areas needing improvement. Assessed economic trade-of fs of potential Impravmonts.

o Prepared Integrated plant operating and mainianance procedures des-cribing system design and operation, overall plant startup and shutdown, power control, emergency response, and periodic survell-lance.

3. United States Navy (1967 to 1971) o Engineering watch of ficer and division of ficer aboard a nuclear cruiser. Directed dally operation of two PWR propulsion plants and auxillaries. Otracted a 30-man division responsible for maintenance of the main turbines, electrical generators, and ship cooling systems.

4. Southern Califania Edison (1967) o Assisted in the design of a'500 KV substation.

Tank-Related Exnertencer

1. Progr a Manager, Post Three-MiIe IsIand Programs o Developed technical descriptions of control system changes on NSS systems, o Developed technical justifications for altornate impienentatton approaches. > .

o Prepared / reviewed lloonsing submittels on Post TNI changes and NRC

" Unresolved Saf ety issues".

2. Progra Manager, Post-Accident Monitring o Developed techntcal justification fw Impiementatton of Rag. Gutde 1.97.

o Prepared licensing submittals for NRC review.

3. Engineer, Nuclear Services Corporation o Developed / reviewed surveillance test procedures.

o Participated in toch spec review and justification to NRC.

C nt'd P. D. Knccht - R;sume Pago 3 o Developed scheduling / tracking system f or survei t lance testing.

o Developed startup checklists including survelllance and tech spec requirenents.

Job Title on Project:

TPE System Engineering (NSSS)

Program Manager O

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. i MINI RESUME FOR L. W. CRAMBERLAIN Upon graduating from Champlain College in Plattsburg, New York in 1952 with a mathematics degree, I entered the U. S. Army for 2 years and taught electronics (computer and radar) .

From April, 1954 to 1969 sy career with GE started and covered such areas as Government radar installation and checkout, Atlas Radio Guidance System test and checkout, downrange Missile Trajectory Measurement System design, installation and testing, Apollo Spacecraf t Acceptance Checkout Equipment system integration, developed requirements, designed, installed, and checked out the equipment, and Manned Orbiting Laboratory chackout systems integration.

When the MOL was cancelled, I lef t GE and went to Honeywell in St.

Petersburg, Florida from 1969 to 1977. At Honeywell my work assignments were on HDC701P Minuteman III replacement computer for the U. S. Air Force in the system interf ace definition and establishing sof tware requirements, the HDC501C Agena Computer designing mod kits and hardware /sof tware analysis, RDC402P Viking Computer which ultimately landed on Mars as part of the Martian landing, conducting all environmental tests, and Space Shuttle electronics control units system definition.

In 1977 I transferred back to CE in Daytona Beach, Florida. For the next 2 years I was involved with the following Nuclear Power Plants -

NNP#2, Clinton, TVA BOP, and Riverbend. The involvement was with regard to designing and building the equipment at the Daytona Beach f acility. I was the system liaison in San Jose and provided all system and hardware resolutions for Florida from California.

In 1980 I. transferred to the Control and Instrument Department in San Jose as the NMPd2 Lead Engineer. As Lead Engineer, I provided technical direction for all NMPd2 system and hardware problems during PGCC testing and sell of f, only to ship in place. Subsequcntly, 2 in-house redesigns as a result of the AE redirection were incorporated and the hardware shipped Febtuary,1983 to the Nine Mile Point site. While on Nine Mile Point 2, I had the responsibility to work with the customer at the system level defining changes, as NMP-2 Lead Engineer.

Once defined, I interpreted the system changes to hardware require-ments for backrow panels, benchboards, and cables, negotiated design shedules, monitored design engineer performance and provided technical direction.

When the hardware design was completed, the design changes were re-viewed for compliance to specifications (i.e., separation, isolation, maintainability, testability and component selection).

4 A _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

In August, 1983 I transferred to my current position of designing the system and hardware for Monticello Appendix R. Alternate Shutdown System. .

This task entails deriving System requirements, generating Electrical Design Specification generating IED/P&ID, generating elementary diagrams and providing inputs to draf ting for panel design.

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9 D. B. BITTER Education:

• Texas A&M Univerity B.S. Biology 1975 College Station, TX (1971-1975)

• BWR/6 Simulator Training Program January 1981 Inola, OK

• Effects of Human Errors on Nuclear March 1981 Power Plant Operations, University of Wisconsin

• Fundamentals of Human Factors May 1982 for Engineering and De' sign

• U.S. Navy 1975-1980 Basic Nuclear Power School Nuclear Prototype Training Experience:

1981-Present Licensing Engineer in Systems Licensing Subsection at GE. Responsibilities have included: PRA, Safety Goals, Human Factors, CR design reviews, Emergency Planning, CR instrumentation.

1976-1980 U.S. Navy; qualified in Submarines. Duties included Electrical Division Officer, Reactor Controls Division Officer and Damage Control Assistant.

i DBB:rm/A10132 10/13/83

b Appendix C Documentation forms:

o Operator Interview Form o Human Engineering Discrepancy o Task Analysis Data Sheet .

o Memo of Consultation 6

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s I.0PERATOR INTERVIEW INTRODUCTION TO QUESTIONAIRE Job Position Years of Experience Commericial Nuclear Fossil Navy Nuclear Date of First License R0 SR0 Education / Degrees

• Age Sex Height Weight In response to a post-TMI NRC requirement, your utility, along with other BWR owners, is conducting an updated control room review to identify and correct design deficiencies in the operator-control room interface to minimize the potential for human error.' This review is performed by a survey team composed of utility representatives, human factor specialists, and General Electric engineers using checklists prepared by the Control Room Improvements Subgroup of the BWR Owners Group.

You are asked to complete the attached questionaire basing your responses on your operational experience and knowledge of your control room and interfacing systems. You may complete this questionaire in the control room if you desire but please do so without discussing your detailed responses with other operators completing this survey. If additional space is needed, the attached Comment Form is to be used.

Following completion, a survey team representative will review your responses with you. Upon completion of all interviews, the survey team will consolidate the information obtained and apply it in their evaluation of your control room for compliance with human factor engineering principles.

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The biographical information requested above will be used in compiling statistics on operating personnel physical characteristics. Current recommendations for panel design are based largely on data obtained from measurements of military personnel; there are few statistics presently available on, for example, the average height and weight of operators.

This survey provides you with a valuable opportunity for applying your knowledge and experience toward improving operating conditions in both your control room and future control room designs. Your honest and forthright opinions are not only welcomed, but needed.

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., I. OPERATOR INTERVIET QUESTIONAIRE

! A. Toald you recommend any changes in the following area:

Al training A2 color coding A3 control room access A4 control panel layout or access A$ communication systems A6 heating or ventilation A7 lishting or moise levels i A8 data recording and los entries AD information flow f

A10 furniture, equipment or workspace All computers A12 other?

a I. pfERATot INTERVIEW QUESTIONAIRE B Are any controls diffien1t to operate?

C Are any controls designed, positioned or labeled in a r,anner that causes risk of inadvertent operation?

D Are any recorders or indicators difficult or confusing to read?

E Are any important indicators located such takt they are difficult to see during normal or emergency operation?

F Do you feel any control room displays are unnecessary, provide animportant information or needlessly clutter the control panels?

O Based on your operational experience, does you control room lack any controls or displays needed in your response to normal or emergency situations?

E Do you consider the annunciator system to be effective in conveying important information to you?

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o I. OP12ATot TNTI2VIEf QUESTIONA W I Do you have any problems locating or using procedures or operational instructions?

J Eave you experienced any problems using or understanding your prosecarest K Is thers a partricular panel which you consider more difficult or confusing to operate than the others?

L General Commments:

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i I OPERATOR INEF/IEW w 4 %-

CMPEffr FORM This form is for use by the operator or irt.orviewer for expanded responses to the Operator Interview questions. When used, each response will be identified by ites ataber en this form and also so noted in the space fo11 cuing the

' applicable questica to assure proper cross-referencing.

Item Res pons e

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HI5 MAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY a

lHEDReport Sheet 1 l Date:

Page _ of _

o Licensee: Plant: Reviewer:

o Plant System: (Reactor Coolant, Reactivity Control Environment, etc.)

o Plant Subsystem: (Pumps, Valves, HVAC Controls, etc.)

o Equipment Item or Topic - Control Board Section (name/ number)

- Control Board Panel (panel ider.tifier)

- Component or Topic Item (e.g., C/D layout, lighting, maintenance procedures, ete ) s o

Human Performance Modality (vision, hearing, decision making, etc.)

o BWROG CRS ID (Applicable Section 5 Subsection) -

HED DESCRIPTION:

HED SERIAL NUMBER: (If used)

1. Description of HED:

PHOTO ID NUMBER:

2. This HED Relates to:

a. Event:

b. Function / Task: .

3. Safety Cons *equences/ Priority Rating:

4 Interaction of HED with other HEDs, systems, events, functions / tasks, etc.

ACTION PROPOSED TO CORRECT HED: CORRECTION SCHEDULE COMMENTS: (This section contains other pertinent explanatory or supplementary information including, identification of HED with applicable steps or substeps of system review)

f G l HED R*ptrt S h *' t Xl I

VERiiFIQi!ON OF CORRECTIVE ACTION:

1. Addresses HED?

2. Meets human factors requirements?

3. Safety censWerations (question not addressed in HED temporarv reduction in safety, increased risk of failure /misoperation):

4 Compeunding effects (nrw HEDs Adverse Combination with ather resolutions):

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5. Negative retraining?

IMPLEMENTATION FOR VALIDATION:

1. METHOD USED

2. SCMEDULE VALIDATION:

1. Method used (Walk / Talk through, checklist, etc.)

I. Validation checklist: '

a. Resolves HED?  ;

b. Meets human factors requirements?

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c. Safety consiJerations?

d. Compounding effects?

e. Megative retraining?

IMPLEMENTATION IN CONTROL ROOM:

1. Plas

2. Schedule 1

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- MD40 0F CONSULTKfION

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' SUBJECT OF CONSULTATION:

', RELATED HEDs:

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i NAME'0F CONSULTANT:

DATE:

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DESCRIPTION:

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4 CONCLUSION:

r INITIATED BY:

Signature Date VERIFIED BY:

Signature Date

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