ML20079Q903

Nonproprietary Rept on Palo Verde Unit 1 Safety Injection Nozzle Thermal Liner

ML20079Q903
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	01/24/1984
From:	ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY
To:
Shared Package
ML17298A763	List: ML20079Q903 ML20079Q915
References
CEN-264(V)-NP, NUDOCS 8402010433
Download: ML20079Q903 (32)

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Document No. CEN-264(V)-NP l REPORT ON PALO V90E UNI. 1 SAFETY INJECTION N0ZZLE THERMAL LINER r

'd Prepared by: COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC.

WINDSOR, CONNECTICUT n

8402010433 840124 ,

PDR ADOCK 05000529 A PDR

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LEGAL NOTICE THIS REFOP"" WAS PREPARED AS AN ACCOUNT OF WORK SPONSORED BY COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC. NEITHER COM8USTION ENGINEERING NOR ANY PERSON ACTING ON ITS BEHALF:

A. MAKES ANY WARRANTY OR REPRESENTATION, EXPRESS OR IMPUED INCLUDING PURPOSE OR THE WARRANTIES OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR MERCHANTA88UTY, WITH RESPECT TO THE ACCURACY, COMPLATENESS, OR USEFULNESS OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS 3

RF. PORT, OR THAT THE USE OF ANY INFORMATION, APPARATUS, METHOD, OR PROCESC OWNED RIGHr$;OR DISCLOSED IN THIS REPORT MAY NOT INFRINGE PRIVATELY

8. ASSUMES ANY UABluTIES WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF,,OR FOR DAMAGES RESULTINu FROM THE USE OF, ANY INFORMATION, APPARATUS, METHOD OR PROCESS DISCLOSED IN THIS REPORT.

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PALO VERDE UNIT 1 i

SAFETY INJECTION N0ZZLE THERMAL LINER 1.0 Introduction Palo Verde Unit 1 system is a 3800 Mwt class, pressurized water System 80 nuclear power plant. Figure 1 is a layout arrangement of the primary ,

components. The hot-leg piping is a 42 inches in diameter and the j cold-leg piping is 30 inches in diameter. The pumps in the coldleg piping are designated 1A, IB, 2A and 2B and, hereinafter, the cold-leg pipe attached to a part1cular pump will carry the same designation.

l There is one safety injection nozzle-in each of the four cold-leg pipes.

The nozzle is a 14 inch, schedule 160, full penetration welded nozzle ,

mounted on an angle 30' from perpendicular to the axis of the pipe as l

shown in Figure 2. The nozzles are lccated near the discharge of the

main coolant pumps (Figure 1) and serve as a conduit for the injection of water into the system for plant cooldown, loss of secondary pressure and loss of coolant accident conditions.

The pumps were operated for cold hydiostatic testing during July -

• September,1982 (Figure 3), and for pre-core hot functional testing during May - July,1983 (Figure 4).

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During the post core HFT inspection on July 19, 1983, the reactor coolant pipe (RCP)'1A and IB discharge piping was entered to look at the thermowells which failed during the HFT. It was noticed that the thermal liner in the safety injection nozzle for the 18 pipe was protruding into the pipe about one-half inch. Also, it was observed that the thermal

• liner was missing from the safety injection nozzle in the 1A pipe. Also, there were gouges in the clad on safety injection nozzle 1A near the nozzle-to-pipe juncture where the positioning pads were located. The missing liner was found in the reactor vessel below the inlet nozzle through which it had passed and wedged between the reactor vessel and the outside of the flow skirt. All other nozzles with thermal liners in the RCS piping were examined and the liners were found to be in place. As a result of the findings an intensive effort was initiated to understand the failure mechanism ar.d develop a course of action to prevent any further occurrence. The intent of this report is to discuss efforts in both of these areas pertaining to the safety injection nozzle liner problem.

l The safety implications of the failure have been evaluated. The tran-sients and the number of cycles originally specified and analyzed were reviewed and were found to be applicable for this plant. An examination

- of the usage factors f or the area of the safety injection nozzle under the liner was performed and the results are listed below:

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a. With the liner in place the limiting uw ge factor is 9.4% of the allowable.

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b. With the liner missing and the support groove in the "as is condition" the limiting usage factor is 60% of the allowable in the raised portion of the explansion groove (see Figure 7 thermal sleeve explansion groove and Figure 5).

c. With the explansion groove blended, the limiting usage factor is 34%

of the allowable. .

Therefore, with the explansion lands blended, the limiting usage factor under the liner has increased to 34% of the allowable without the liner a: compared to 9.4% with the liner.

If the liner had become dislodged in service, the usage factor would have increased to 60% of the allowable, however even at this value the nozzle is acceptable for use for its full 40 year design life.

The safety injection nozzle is located down stream of the pump (see Figure 1) and upstream of the reactor vessel. The potential for core flow blockage has been examined and it has been concluded that the dis-lodged liner would not lead to flow blockage. The liner would be J

prevented from entering the core region hy the *eactor flow skirt and

. would remain trapped between the flow baffle and the reactor vessel shell as found in Palo Verde I.

It has been a Combustion Engineering design practice to install a thermal liner in nozzles which could experience rapid te,perature changis (ther-mal shock) during the life of the plant. In some instances, this was

.done without regard to the necessity for a liner, but as an additional assurance of adequate " protection" for the nozzle. Therefore, the original calculations which justified the fatigue life of the safety injection nozzles included the nozzle liner. No calculations were made at that time to determine if the liner was actually required for the fatigue evaluation of the nozzles to be satisfactory.

As will be discussed in more detail in this report, subsequent fatigue evaluation of the safety injection nozzle without the liner indicates the fatigue life is well in excess of the~specified requirements.

Other nuclear steam supply systems designed by Combustion Engineering

.have a safety injection nozzle and liner design similar to that described above. There are significar.t oifferences in primary coolant pump design and in fluid flow rates. Generally, the puro impeller blade passing

! frequencies and fluid flow rates for the other plants are less than for

! the System 80 plants. Thc significance of this will be discussed in l

another section of this report.

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! 2.0 Summary

• When the safety injection nozzle liner at the 1A coolant pipe was dis-covered missing, an intensive effort was begun (1) to determine why this

occurred, (2) to determine the effect on the safety injection nozzle, and (3) to determine if a similar condition existed in other safety injection l nozzles. Initial inspection of the explansion groove in the nozzle clad

1 suggested either improper groove design or improper fabrication. Later,

- the liner was found in-the reactor vessel against the flow skirt below the 1A inlet nozzle. The recovered thermal liner IA was sent to C-E Chattanooga Metallurgy Laboratory for further examinaticin which revealed an inside explansion groove area corresponding to what would be expected from a properly made joint. However, the outside explanded and ccntering pad areas (see Figure 11) showed very definite signs of wear corre-sponding to the plaster molds made of the nozzle inside surface (Figure 7). -From this evidence it was concluded that the nozzle groove had been correctly machined, the liner had been explanded properly into place, and

that the liner had vibrated and worn the nozzle clad so as to become

! loose and eventually exit the nozzle.

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l l To prevent loosening of the safety in'jection nozzle liners at other locations, the liners were removed. Any damage done to the nozzle cladding was repaired and operational suitability-verified by non-destructive examination. The explansion ridge in the clad was also removed and the surface examined. No base metal was e, osed.

l The above solution to the problem has been verified by analysis. The

! maximum cumulative usage factor in the part of the nozzle that is protected by the liner when it is in place is calculated to be .094.

The usage factor at this location without the liner is .34. The .34 usa tor would allow three times the number of transients that are listed in the RC piping specification. The specific nozzle transients are listed in Figure 17. Another location, namely the explansion groove, i

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ic~ calculated to have a cumulative usage factor of .60 ir. its "as is" configuration in which a stress concentrat ion factor is used. If this surface is machined smooth so that a stress concentration factor would not be present, the usage factor at this location would be .16. Thus, the largest usage factor in the area that was behind the liner will be

.34 when the liner is not present.

The usage factor in the safe end portion of the nozzle, w5fch is not protected by the therdbl liner, is 0.6(1) . Therefore, the absence of the liner will not change the operating capability of the nozzle.

3.0 Inspection and Examinations The initial examination of the clad surface in nozzle IA revealed that the explansion grocve was non-existent f' or about 1/3 of the circumference and greatly reduced for the remaining portion. Diameters on appropriate surfaces were measured at several circu.nferential locations and compared to drawing requirements as shown on Figure 5. This indicated that either the groove had been machined incorrectly or that it had been worn significantly. Pad height measurements taken at the same time (dimension "D" on Figure 5) did not completely agree with the diameter measurements

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even though some reduction of groove length was again indicated.

(1) This was previously reported to the staff incorrectly as .32.

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To further verify the explansion groove dimensions in safety injection nozzle-1A, a set of molds tere made in areas where a groove could be seen. Examination of these molds showed a severe reduction in groove depth more in agreement with the diameter measurements taken previously.

Molds were taken of impressions in the nozzle clad that were caused by one of the centering pads on the liner. It appeared from the inden-tations that the liner had vibrated at its original location while turning slowly. At some time, the liner slipped out cf the nozzle about 1" and lodged there while vibrating and rotating slowly again (Figure 6).

Finally, the liner slipped out of the nozzle cc.npletely and was eventu-ally fcund in the reactor vessel under the 1A pipe inlet location.

8 An inspection of the three (3) remaining safety injection nozzles at the f

site showed that the liners were still in place, but the 2A liner was protruding about 1/2" into the primary pipe (Figure 8). Eventually, this liner as well as the others were removed exposing indentations in the

' nozzle clad very similar to those found under liner IA with definite, but

reduced, evidence of rotation (Figures 9 and 10). All indentatinns were acid-etched to cf.eck for exposed base metal, but none was found. Repairs were made by blending the worn areas and machining out the explansion groove area flush with surrounding surfaces. A liquid penetrant inspection was done on finished surfaces to identify any indications that might have been uncovered during the rework. No weld repair was required.

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One end of the cylinder is cut on a 30 degree angle to conform to the nozzle-to-pipe juncture. The liner is held in place in the nozzle by explansion into a specially prepared groove in the clad on the nozzle inside diameter. The groove is approximately 0.1 inch deep. Also, three equally spaced tabs on the liner near the nozzle-to-pipe juncture tend to limit lateral movement of the liner. Figures 1 and 12 show the liner details and the liner installed in the nozzle.

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The cantilever length significantly influences the natural frequency and 4

the " leverage" that forces can exert upon the liner.

By reviewing the operating history and the design of the liner, a failure mechanism can be developed to explain the post Core Hot Functional Testing findings. The following conditions were found:

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1. The liner in the safety injection nozzle in the 1A pipe was missing.

2. The liner in the safety injection nozzle in the 2A pipe protruded

-into the main pipe between 1/2 inch and 1 inch. (This was found to result fron rotation of the liner.)

3. The liners in the safety injection nozzles in the IS and 28 pipes were apparently in the proper position.

1 By observing the operating history provided on Figure 4, a pattern is evident which suggests a reason for the liner problem. The following table contains data from Figure 4.

l, Total RC Pump Time @ Maximum Liner L Liner Run Time, Hrs Flow Rate

• Condition l

1A 1136 528 Missing 1

2A 1041 137 Rotated 128 986 81 Acceptable IB 686 77 Acceptable l, The data suggests some correlation between liner condition and total run l time and a fairly strong correlation between liner condition and the time at a high flow rate.

• The maximum flow rate in a cold leg (>137%) occurs when only one of

two pumps in a steam generator loop is operating. See Figure 1 for RCS loop configuration, i

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11-The failure mechanism is further substantiated by the indentations observed in the nozzle clad at the liner tab iccations. Figure 6 shows photographs of the clad surface in nozzle 1A. .Apparently, the iiner vibrated against the nozzle wall and then dropped a short distance where both vibration and rotation within the explansion groove occurred. As the liner rotated, more of the liner end protruded into the fluid flowing in the main pipe. Ever increasing flow induced forces impacted the liner and w-3s magnified by the cantilevered design. Eventually, the combination of vibration and flow load caused the liner to " lose its grip" at the explansion groove and fall into the main pipe.

Figure 8 shows photographs of the liner in nozzle 2A which has experienced some rotation. This is evidenced by the fact that the liner does not conform to the pipe surface, but protrudes into the pipe, There were other factors which may contribute significantly to the mode of failure. The fundamental pump rotational frequency is about 20 cycles per second. Since the pumps have six blades, the blade passing frequency would be about 120 cps. If the natural frequency of the nozzle liner is sufficiently close to either of these frequencies or other harmonics, a resonant or near resonant condition could result which could cause liner failure. A finite element analysis was made to determine the natural frequency of the liner.

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5.0 Design Verification ,

l Two analyses were performed to demonstrate the acceptability of operating the primary piping and safety injection systems without a thermal liner  ;

and explansion groove in the safety injection nozzle. Since the purpose l l of the liner is to protect the nozzle from large thermal gradients I l (stresses), the analyses performed are (1) a thermal analysis to evaluate the new thermal gradient conditions in the nozzle and (2) a structural l

l stress analysis to incorporate the results of the thermal analysis into 1

the primary plus secondary stress and fatigue stress evaluations. These l- two analyses are " Thermal Analysis of Safety Injection Nozzle Without l Thermal Liner" and " Fatigue Analysis of the Safety Injection flozzle With-

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out a Thernal Liner". It was not necessary to include a re-evaluation of j the nozzle safe end in these analyses because the thermal liner did not l offer protection in that area of the nozzle.

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Using analytical criteria of the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Section III Article NB3000 and the assumed transients in Figure 17, the results are summarized below.

Figure 13 shows the different places in the nozzle where stresses were

~ calculated, Figure 14 shows the resulting range of stress and Figure 15 shows the corresponding fatigue usage factorII)ateachlocation. Note that the highest fatigue usage factor is at location D in the clad and is 0.34. This is only about one-third of the ASME Code,Section III allowable fatigue usage factor of 1.0 and is less than the 0.6 usage factor in the safe end. Therefore, removing the thermal liners will not adversely affect the operating capability of the safety injection nozzles or the primary coolant system.

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t (1) The usage factor is a cumulative measurement of fatigue damage to the nozzle resulting from specified transients (ratio of anticipated number I of cycles + allowable number of cycles, with a limit of one).

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SYSTEM 80 IDEllTIFICATJ0fl AllD LOCATI0ff 0F SAFETY INJECTION N0ZZLES Ill REACTOR COOLANT PIPlilG E

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I 15 FIGURE 2 SYSTEM 80 LOCATION OF S I.S. N0ZZLES l

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, FIGURE 3 16 HISTORY OF PUMP OPERATI0il DURING COLD HYDK0 TEST! fig AT ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY PVNGS UNIT #1 JULY - SEPTEMBER, 1982 DESCRIPTION RCP 1A RCP IB RCP 2A RCP 23 y TOTAL STARTS 10 36 31 12 CotD STARTS 10 36 31 12

• ~ STARTS WITH THREE OTHER PUMPS ,,

RUNNING 0 0 0 0-STARTS WITH TWO OTHER PUMPS '

RUNNING 0 0 0 0 STARTS WITH CNE OTHER PUMP RUNNING 1 3/12* 15/24' 7 STARTS WITH NO CTHER PUMPS RUNN!!!G S 33/24* 16/7' 5 RUN I!ME - hours (TOTAL) 11 18 Two PUMPS, ONE STEAMGENERATCR 11 13 (TWO PUMPS OTHER STEAM GFNERATOR) 0 0 0 0 ORE PUMP, ONE STEAM GENERATOR (IWO PUMPS OTHER STEAM GENERATcR) O C 0 0 Ons PUMP, ONE STEAM GENERATOR (QNE PUMP OTHER STEAM GENERATCR). 5 10 4 10 0:;E PUMP, ONE STEAM GENERATCR (No PUMPS OTHER STEAM GENERATCR) 6 8 7 3

'9 STARTS WERE :0T SEQUENCE !DENTIFIED.

IriFORMATION CBTAlf;E3 FRCM CCNTROL ROOM OPERATORS LCG SUFPLEME!;T 3Y CE-KS3 lag.

C::.s -!S :EFitiE AS LESS THAN 300 F.

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' HISTORY OF PUMP AT OPERATION DURING' HOT FUNCTION ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE C0f1PANY PVNGS UNIT #1 MAY - JULY, 1983 DESCRIPTION RCP 1A RCP IB RCP 2A RCP 23 STARTS _.

TOTAL 16 18 COLD

• 15 18 11 9

-WITH THREE OTHER PUMPS RUNNING 10 10 0 8 WITH TWO OTHER PUMPS RUNNING 1 0 2 4 MITH ONE OTHER PUMP RUNNING 1 10 1 0 WITH NO OTHER PUMPS RUNNING 8 5 13 6 5 3 RUN Tire - HOURS

. TOTAL 1136 686

.. TOTAL COLD 1041 986 332 132 COLD TO FIRST HEAT UP 234 181 178 132 81 51 ONE PUP.P COLD 58 26 On: PUMP, ONE STEAM GENERATOR 0.1 0 (flo PUMPS OTHER STEAM GENERATOR)*69 27 2 1 DiiE PUMP, ONE STEAM GENERATOR (OnE PUMP, OTHER STEAM GENERATOR) *

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404 0 80 30 TWO PUMPS, ONE STEAM GE:iERATOR

-(No pumps, OTHER STEAM GEllERATOR) 0 0 2

! 2 Ta'0 PU *SS, OtiE STEAM GENERATOR (OnE PUMP, OTHER STEAM GENERATOR) 111 111

' 404 404 T,:0 PUMPS, ONE STEAM GENERATOR (Two Pur:PS, OTHER STEAM GENERATOR) 498 498 498 498 l

'P:.03 GREATER THAn 137S 520 77 137 81

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l THERf1AL LINER EXPLANSION GROOVE h

THERMAL LINER EXPLANSION RIDGE

_ _ - - - - - - - - - -- - , , - . _ _ , . . __ _.__,A- , -_ s,a ;a u- 2e ma m2 .- m , W ., wi-21 FfGURE 8 4

2A THERMAL LINER PARTIAL ROTATION OF LINER IN THE N0ZZLE 4

i ~ , *g+ -.. :

[ *E ~ ~

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I 1

P a j is .

Ar ,, >.-

% . .T . ,

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i

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m

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.kC top L- Tx -

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., 23 m

FIGURE 10

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C 075 Y~-415 SKETCH Ma b t FR7H A Rua5st !S c." TH E ,

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24 FIGURE 11 SAFETY INJECTION N0ZZLE THERMAL L1kER

.E o

,g O

e S

e

d 25 FIGURE 12 O

e 1

)

SAFETY INJECTION N0ZZLE -

l

/

/

' LIfiER INSTALLED FLUSH

.[ WITH I.D. OF PIPE I

e

26 FIGURE 13 I SAFETY INJECTI0tl N0ZZLE SIGNIFICANT RESULTS Critical Locations Results hre presented at the locatirans shown N}onet.c cearcesrrIC o

_..__ . X . . . . . . . _ .

~

.a_. . - .

. \p

\ E I \ IA j

Ga To G, P:ac Cea-cei:4C In the following tables, "INSIDE" and "OUTSIDE" refer to the inside and outside surfaces of the base metal and " CLAD" refers to the inside or wetted surface of the clad.

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9  %

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+

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27 FIGURE 14 SAFETY INJECTION N0ZZLES e

e e

f G

e S

U6 O

, ., _ , , . ,,,,_ym...-.._ , _ , _ , ,, _.. - , ., ._, , . . , , , , , , ....,_, , .. , , ,

28 FIGURE'15 SAFETY INJECTION N0ZZi.E r

e e

8 l

l l

l l

l n

(

i i e P'

t i

- -r, y , . , . . 7 -e- - -

.,, m. , , cy , p _ y-..--7y ,.m,,,_--_,,_e---._.r.., ,- .,, ,,- . - , ,,wm_,.m

29 l FIGURE 16 l I 1A THERMAL LINER

.W I,'^ . i l ..

,g.

G:.;.s gny f'

CENTERING PAD CRACKS 4 -

M = a l

. v. , ,M ,

l LARGE TEAR 1 I

i l l

_ mmewee w w-~ ~

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30 FIGURE 17 SAFETY INJECTION N0ZZLE

< t i

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e.

m g - , , - - , , -w-yv g-,--~n,,, -

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