ML20077L467

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Objections to Certain Intervenor Revised Emergency Planning Contentions.Objections Include Lack of Basis,Inadequate Specificity,Items Outside Legal Requirements &/Or Failure to Litigate Issue in Phase I.W/Certificate of Svc
ML20077L467
Person / Time
Site: Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date: 08/02/1983
From: Mccleskey K
HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO.
To:
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8308090435
Download: ML20077L467 (90)


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4 r LILCO, August 2, 1983 l

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA '

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ~~ ~

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Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Etc?.llfcu /~ '!

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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322 (OL)

) Emergency Planning (Shoreham Nuc'. ear Power Station, )

Unit 1)

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LILCO's Objec* ions to.Intervdnors'

" Revised Emergency Planning Contentions" On July 26, 1983, the intervenors filed " Revised Emergency Planning Contentions." For the reasons stated below, LILCO ob-jects to certain of the intervenors' contentions.

I.

LILCO's objections to each contention (or part of a con-

.tention) are noted below. As in LILCO's July 8, 1983 objec-

.tions to the intervenors' June 23 emergency planning conten-tions, objections include (1) lack of basis, (2) inadequate specificity, (3) items addressed'in the contentions are outside legal requirements, (4) the issue was or could have been liti-gated in Phase I of the proceeding, and (5) the deficiencies alleged are the result of the' County's own doing, and therefore 8300090435 030002 i PDR ADOCK 05000322 O P DR -.

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4 d f should not be litigated.

.The. definitions of each of these objections are set out in LILCO's July 8 objections to the in-tervenors' " Consolidated Emergency Planning Contentions," and therefore will not be repeated here.

In the July 8 objections, LILCO also objected to many of the contentions because they had not been adequately consoli-l dated and properly organized. While the-intervenors have .

reorganized the contentions, the revised contentions repeat.

many of the shortcomings of the originals. The parties will be required to devote some time prior to, filing the testimony in-order to group the contentions in a manner that makes them eas-ier to litigate.

! Notwithstanding the cumbersome nature of the' revised contentions, LILCO does not object to admission of the conten-tions based solely on'their organization and length. Based upon previous drafting efforts both in Phase I and Phase II, and on various discussions among the parties,.we do not think it would profit to ask the Board to order the intervenors to i

draft the contentions a third time.

-Specific objections to the intervenors' contentions appear below.

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  • II.

Contentions 1 through 10:

LILCO's Lack of Legal Authority The intervenors assert that LILCO is prohibited by law from (1) " directing traffic," (2) " blocking roadways, setting up barriers'in roadways, and channeling traffic," (3) " posting traffic signs on roadways," (4) " removing obstructions from public roadways, including-the towing of private vehicles,'i (5)

" activating sirens and directing the broadcast and contents of emergency broadcast system (EBS) messages,to the public," (6)

" making decisions and official recommendations to the public as to the appropriate actions n'ecessary to protect the public health and safety, including deciding upon protective actions which will be communicated to the public," (7) " making deci-sions and official recommend'ations to the public concerning protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway," (8)

" making _ decisions and official recommendations to the public concerning recovery'and reentry," (9) " dispensing fuel from tank trucks to automobiles along roadsides," (10) " performing law. enforcement functions at the EOC, at relocation centers, and at the EPZ parameter." ,

As previously explained in LILCO's July 8 objections to-the contentions, LILCO objects to these contentions because the. County has created the present situation with respect to e

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LERO's legal authority to take actions, both by refusing to perform these actions and by refusing to authorize LIICO to perform them.

The County should not be allowed to argue that as a result of its own actions, LILCO is unable to adequately respond in an emergency. Therefore, these contentions should not be admitted.

Moreover, the question of legal authority is a' sham issue.

  • If an emergency occurred, it is not credible that the County '

would refuse to participate in the response. Nor would lack of authority prevent drills and exercises, because in a drill one

-does not really do things like direct traffic or make decisions affecting the public health and safety. Since lack of legal authority would prevent neither a response in a real emergency nor a drill, the only true issue is whether adequate prepara-tion for emergency response can be achieved in the absence of County participation. Stated another way, the question is whether it is really feasible to have LILCO do the preparation and then incorporate County personnel once an accident has occurred. However one states the issue, it is a purely factual one.

If the Board does admit the legal authority issues, they will have to await further events before they can be resolved. ,

For example, they may be mooted by the Governor's action after he hears from the Fact Finding Panel he appointed in May.1/

1/ Contentions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 10 also allege that evacuation time estimates are inaccurate. Those portions of the conten-(footnote continued) l

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.c Contentions 11 throuch 14: Command and Control Contention 11 i objection. The intervenors contend that "LILCO employees in command and control positions . . . may experience a con-flict between LILCO's financial and institutional interests and the public's interest, which may substantially hamper their ability to perform the functions assigned to them in a manner that will result in adequate protection of the public." This contention lacks basis and should be denied.

While the intervenors state that "LILCO employees will have a strong incentive to minimize the public's perception of the potential actual danger' involved in a radiological emergen-cy in order to avoid engendering public or LILCO shareholder disapproval of LILCO, or anti-Shoreham sentiment," there is no basis given for this statement. Common sense suggests the op-posite: LILCO employees will have a strong incentive to accu-rately portray the actual or potential danger, to avoid engen-dering public or LILCO shareholder disapproval or anti-Shoreham sentiment that would occur if a utility were not to give accurate information during an emergency. Indeed, LILCO is under a legal duty to give accu' rate information during all phases of the operation of the plant.

(footnote continued) tions-should be consolidated for litigation with the evacuation time estimate issues interspersed throughout the contentions.

Information during an incident at any plant is always given by the utility. The intervenors have not asserted spe-cial facts here that might suggest that LILCO will not respond properly. See, for example, Louisiana Power & Light Company (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC

, slip op. 36-38 (June 2, 1983). In Waterford, the interve-nors sought to cross-examine "two individuals in important offsite emergency planning positions" who the intervenors al-leged had " conflicts of interest arising from family and finan-cial relationships." Slip op. at 36. The,intervenors alleged that "such conflicts have a bearing on whether ' adequate pro-tective measures . . .

will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.'" Slip op. 36-7. The Licensing Board denied this line of questioning. The Appeal Board affirmed, stating that (1) this line' of questioning was outside the scope of the contentions, and (2) even if it were not, the interve-nors "have failed to explain (to us as.well as to the Licensing Board) exactly how the alleged conflicts of interest would im-pair evacuation," Slip op. 38, except to note through counsel that the " pretty heavy decision . . . to evacuate . . . could affect the financial interest of the utility company." Slip op. fn. 39. If the County truly is concerned that LILCO will not respond properly, it can participate in emergency planning and provide government officials to take part in the command and control decisions. And even if.the County does not wish to

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train personnel to respond, the plan provides that the Suffolk County Executive can report during an actual emergency and will be included in emergency response decision-making. Thus, the County's own actions can remedy the alleged deficiency, and the

, intervenors therefore should not be allowed to raise this con-tention.

The intervenors also suggest in this contention that LILCO has failed to institute measures " comparable to those required I by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion 1 for QA/QC personnel" to-ensure the independence of LERO personnel. There is no i

legal requirement that LILCO do so.

Because this contention, lacks basis and is outside the regulations, and because the County is capable of correcting the' alleged deficiency, the contention should not be admitted.

Contention 12 Objection. The intervenors assert that LILCO personnel will be unable to exercise command and control functions be-

'cause they "will not be adequately familiar with the site-specific conditions in Suffolk County." This contention lacks basis because, contrary to the intervenors' assertions, most LERO personnel live in the area'and are familiar with it. In addition, emergency response procedures provide extensive de-L . tail.concerning the emergency response. The contention is really nothing mo'e r than an a'ssertion that people will not be i

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adequately trained. As such, it is redundant of contentions 35 through 44 and therefore should not be admitted.

In addition, as previously noted in LILCO's July 8 ob-jections,lthe contention is not adequately specific. Phrases like "how the various entities, institutions, organizations and the population operate or interact with each other" are quite vague. At the least, the County should list the "other insti-tutions and volunteer organizations" referred to in this con-tention. A similar contention, alleging that " unique local

  • conditions" had not been accounted for, was ruled inadmissible in Phase I as overbroad and inadequately particularized.

Prehearing Conference Order (Phase 1 -- Emergency Planning) 7 (July 27, 1982).

Because this contention lacks basis and specificity and is redundant of contentions 35 through 44, it should not be admit-ted.

, Contention 13 i

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i Obiection. Contention 13 contains two separate issues:

l (1) whether the plan will be implemented as stated by non-LILCO employees directed by LILCO personnel, and (2) whether non-l LILCO employees participating in emergency response will actu-ally respond, given that the plan does not indic' ate they "will E

be indemnified by LILCO for lnjuries they incur or for liabili-ties to third parties which may be incurred during training i

i-drills or exercises, or in responding to an emergency under the command and control of LILCO personnel."

The first issue is merely a restatement of whether there i

exist adequate agreements and training so that non-LILCO per-sonnel will respond in an emergency. The contention is, there-4 fore, redundant of contentions 24 and 35 through 44, and should not be admitted.

As to the second issue, indemnification of personnel,-

there is no legal requirement that emergency response personnel be indemnified for injuries or liabilities; In addition, the

- intervenors' contention lacks basis, because LILCO does plan to indemnify LERO emergency response personnel for injuries or li-abilities incurred in responding to an emergency, or during E training, drills, or exercises. It is not necessary, however, that the plan indicate tha$t such indemnification will be pro-vided. The plan need only provide adequate assurance that training has taken place and that agreements are in place to provide the necessary services. . For these reasons, this con-tention shculd not be admitted.

Contention 14 Objection. The intervenors assert that the plan fails to identify the title of the LILCO officer who will fill the role of director of'LERO. As-indicated in revised page 5 of OPIP 2.1. l~ ( Attachment l) , the tit 1e of the LILCO officer now has

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4 been identified. Therefore, this contention should not be admitted.2/

Contention 15: LILCO's Lack of Credibility Objection.- The intervenors contend that LILCO "is not considered by the public to be a credible source of informa-tion" based on public opinion polls, and that LILCO will be viewed " hostilely as the soure of the problem in the first place, or skeptically because the public will perceive thatfit is not in LILCO's financial interest to disclose all pertinent information" in an emergency. The intervenors further contend

'that this lack of credibility will affect the response of (1) 4

. personnel in support organizations relied on in the plan-(including medical personnel) and select volunteers (contention 15.A), (2) people advised to shelter, who will choose to evacu-ate (contention 15.B), (3) sc'hool authorities, who may not l'

believe or follow information or recommendations provided by LILCO (contention 15.C), and (4) motorists, who will not obey traffic guides or LERO personnel assigned to perform security functions at the EOC, the relocation centers, and the EPZ per-Ameter (contention 15.D). The intervenors contend that as a <

result of the alleged lack of LILCO's credibility, (1) the EBS

( messages will not be effective in providing clear instruction i

i 2/ LILCO notes that at the t,ime the contentions were filed, the County had not yet received Revision 1 to the plan.

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to the public (contention 15.E), (2) LILCO's rumor control point will be ineffective in squelching rumors (contention 15.F), and (3) LILCO's public education program will be disre-garded or discounted (contention 15.G).

As to contention 15.A, the letters of agreement that are required by the NRC guidelines constitute the " assurance that the portions of the LILCO plan involving participation of non-

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LILCO personnel can [and) will be implemented," including offsite accident and dose assesement (contention 15.A.1), the protective action of evacuation being carried out (contention

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15.A.2), and the staffing of relocation centers with the neces-sary services provided (contention 15.A.3). Contention 15.A.

is therefore redundant of contention 24 regarding letters of agreement, and should not be admitted.

As to 15.B, 15.C and 15.D, those contentions imply that LILCO cannot show adequate emergency planning unless it proves that the public will follow protective _ action recommendations and will be protected nevertheless if they do not. LILCO ob-jects to this contention as going beyond the emergency planning regulations. LILCO will do all it can to assure clear, accurate, concise, consistent information is given to the pub-lic, but it is not obligated to guarantee that the public will t act in accordance with recommendations. Therefore, these con-tentions should not be admitted.

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As to contention 15.E, the sample messages for the emer-gency broadcasting system to the public during an emergency are the subject of a separate contention. To the extent that these mescages are challenged by the intervenors, they can be liti-gated in the contentions discussing EBS messages, and therefore this contention is redundant and should be deleted.

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As to contention 15.F, the way in which the rumor control point will be operated is described in the plan. If the inter-venors have particular problems with the way the rumor control point will be handled by LERO, they should , state their diffi-culties with the program. The intervenors give no basis for the notion that LILCO employees cannot perform rumor contrel.

Therefore, this contention should not be admitted. As to con-tention 15.G, the content of the public' education materials is discussed in contentions 16 through 21, and therefore this con-tention is redundant and should be deleted.

In addition, as to each of the subparts of contention 15, the intervenors are challenging that LILCO personnel cannot do the activities listed, because of the nature of LILCO as a cor-porate entity and not a government. LILCO is completing these i

tasks because the County, the entity that one would naturally look to for response, is refusing to participate in emergency planning. Because the alleged deficiencies listed are the re-sult of the County's own actions, the intervenors should not be alowed to litigate these issues. Additionally, as previously t

stated, it is inconceivable that during an actual emergency the County (or the State) would not respond. Consequently, the in-formation provided to the public during an emergency and the tasks that the intervenors say will not be sufficiently imple-mented due to LILCO's being the key source of information will in large part be done in fact by a government during an emer-gency. As a result, these issues are not real problems and the ~

Board and parties should not use resources in litigating them.

For these reasons, contention 15 in its entirety should not be admitted.

Contentions 16 through 21:

Public Education and Information Contention 16 Objection. The intervenors allege.that the " content of LILdO's public information brochure is misleading and incom-plete" because (1) it " erroneously states (at page 3) that all leaks of radioactive material will be h' eld inside the contain-ment building" (16.A), (2) "LILCO'cannot guarantee" that

~"offsite workers will be in place to help the public" (16.B),

(3) "it implies that sheltering will offer complete or adequate

. prot ection" (16.C), (4) it implies "that a bus or automobile will provide effective protection from radiological exposures" (16.D), (5) "the brochure does not discuss adequately the i

health consequences of exposure to low-level radiation" (16.E),

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(6) it "does.not inform the public that LILCO itself, in the form of LERO, will be issuing all information and protective action recommendations" (16.F), (6) the brochure does not tell those outside the EPZ that "they ma} be exposed to levels of radiation in excess of EPA's Protective Action Guide and that protective action may be required outside the EPZ," nor does it give specific instruction to people on the east end of Long Is--

land (16.G), (7) it inaccurately " states that the public wi;11 be notified in advance of any actual danger" (16.H), (8) it does not inform the public to report for monitoring and decontamination after an accident (16.I) and (9) it is missing certain details listed in NUREG-0654 (16.J).

The County, if it were participating in emergency plan-ning, would have control over the content of the public educa-tion brochure (within thb bounds of legal requirements and rea-son). The LERO brochure is not written as the intervenors would wish because the County will not participate in emergency planning. Thus, the deficiency complained of is a result of the County's own actions, and the intervenors should not be al-lowed to raise any contentions on the content of the broc'hure (except to allege as they have in 16.J that details suggested in NUREG-0654 are not included).

In addition, 16.B is redundant of the contentions that it cross-cites and therefore should be deleted; 16.E and 16.F, to s s the' extent that the " deficiencies" emphasize what the l

4 intervenors. view as the negative aspects of emergency planning, would require LILCO to take action outside of and contrary to

'the spirit of the emergency planning regulations, and therefore should not be admitted. As to 16.G, LILCO is not required to distribute the brochure to households outside the 10-mile EPZ;-

therefore this portion of the contention is outside the regula-

-tions and should not be admitted.3/ As to 16.I, there is no -

legal requirement that emergency planning provide monitoring and decontamination for the population at large following an evacuation, and therefore the information sought to be included is outside the regulations.

Finally, contentions 16.A through 16.I are inappropriate for litigation in this proceeding. First, the primary purpose 4

of the public education brochure is-"to prepare people to turn on their radio and television stations" upon hearing the si-rens. Louisiana Power and Light Company (Waterford Steam Elec-tric Station, Unit 3), 17 NRC , slip op. 14'(May 26, 1983)

(Partial Initial Decision).

[T]he-brochure is not intended to motivate individuals to either evacuate or to follow certain procedures. Because a situation-specific' emergency might necessitate a re-sponse other than evacuation or require that procedures be followed which differ from 3/ In fact, however, the plan does state that persons located outside the 10-mile zone will be receiving certain public in-formation and public' education materials relative to their lo-cation to the lO-mile EPZ. '

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those set forth in the brochure, it would be dangerous, in advance of an emergency, to motivate the public to evacuate or to follow specific procedures when an actual emergency occurs.

Id. And second, while some Boards have.in the past looked into the details of emergency planning public education brochures, we think a better use of this Board's resources would be to limit the inquiry to whether items listed in NUREd-0654 are in-'

cluded in the brochure. ,

For these reasons, contentions 16.A through 16.I should '

not be admitted. The remaining section 16.J should become the entire contention 16.

Contention 17 No objection.

Contention 18 Objection. The intervenors assert that (1) "LILCO post-ers, telephone book inserts and EBS messages do not tell the reader what zone he is in" and (2) "even if people know the i

prescribed evacuation routes for the zone in which they live, the plan does not ensure that if such people are visiting other ones they will be able to determine

. . . (which route to l

take] from that one."

LILCO is not required under emergency planning regulations i

to tell each household which zone it is in. People can discern which zone they are in by looking.at the maps they are given

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and determining where they are located on the map. In addition, the intervenors do not suggest how one might " ensure" that people visiting in adjacent zones know which way to evacu-ate. Common sense suggests that those people will consult with family or friends, will examine brochures or telephone book maps, or will listen to the radio for information.

This contention lacks basis and seeks relief outside the -

legal requirements. It should not be admitted.

contention 19 Objection. The intervenors contest the language of the sample EBS Broadcast Messages. The information in the sample EBS Broadcast Messages would be included by the County were it participating in emergency planning. Because it is refusing to do so, the intervenors should not be allowed to complain of the message content. In additio'n, the sample messages in the plan are the same ones used by utilities throughout New York State.

Therefore, this contention should not be admitted.

Contention 20 No objection.

Contention 21 ,

objection. The intervenors assert that the educational materials provided by LERO to the public are inadequate because (1) they will not be read or, understood by school children e

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  • o' (21.A), (2) the illiterate, the blind or the severely vision impaired are incapable of reading them (21.B), and (3) they are not written in Spanish (21.C).

As to 21.A, there is,no legal requirement that public edu-cation materials be understood by school children and therefore this contention is outside of the scope of the regulations and should not be admitted. As to 21.B, there is no' requirement that Braille-encrypted materials be distributed. Therefore, this portion of the contention should not be admitted. As to 21.C, the revised public education brochure indicates in Spanish that those people who speak only Spanish should send back a card and will be sent a public information brochure written in Spanish. Thus, that portion of the contention lacks basis. For these reasons, contentions 21.A and 21.B should not be admitted, and the*only por. tion of 21.C which should remain is the notion that Spanish speaking people will not understand EBS messages beca?se they are not broadcast in Spanish.

Contentien 22: Inadequacy' of LILCO's Proposed 10-Mile Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone ("EPZ")

Objection.

In contention 22 the intervenors contend that the approximately4/ 10-mile plume exposure pathway emergency 4/ The 10-mile EPZ is not, of course, simply a circle 10 miles in radius, as the maps in the evacuation plan will show.

The zone corresponds roughly to a 10-mile circle, but the exact boundaries, drawn originally by planners in the Suffolk County (footnote continued)

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., 7 planning zone (EPZ) is inadequate. The four subparts of the

' contention set out four theories why the EPZ is inadequate. As

.we shall show below, contentions 22.A, B, and C are inadmissi-

~ble because they1 challenge the~NRC regulations, in particular l,

10 C.F.R.

I 50.47(c)(2). Only 22.D is admissible.

i i Contention 22.A Contention 22.A allege's,that an EPZ of approximately 20 miles, instead of-10, is justified because of the conseque$ce analysis performed by the County's consultants. This analysis began with the draft probabilistic risk analysis (PRA)

. performed by LILCO's consultant Science Applications, Inc., and applied the CRAC2 statistical consequence analysis code to cal-culate the probabilities of receiving certain doses of radia-tion at varying' distances from the plant, given a serious acci-dent.

Contention 22.A challenges 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(c)(2), which provides: ,

Generally, the plume' exposure pathway EPZ F

). for nuclear power glants shall consist of an

' area about 10 miles (16 km) in

-radius . . . .

The exact size and configu-i ration of the'EPZs surrounding a particular

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nuclear-power reactor shall be determined in (footnote continued)

Planning Department,.were based on easily identifiable roadways

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i or political boundaries.to which affected individuals could re-E late. See Shoreham' Nuclear Power Station Offsite Radiological

_EmergencyyResponse~ Plan for Suffolk County I-2 (Oct. 1982)..

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relation to local emergency response needs ,

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s such conditions as demography, topography,

  • j, land' cha *:acteristics , access routes, and ju-c risdi~t.onal boundaries. The size of the EPZs also may be determined on a case-by-case basis for gas-cooled nuclear reactors and for reactors with an authorized power level less than 250 MW thermal.,

The Board has already ruled twice in this proceeding that Lthe type of probabilistic risk analysis that the~ County wants to use to establish the EPZ boundaries should not be litigated.

First, the Board ruled out SOC Contentions 1 and 2, deeming

, 'them to ask "for a totally new probabilistic accident risk and consequences analysis to determine on a clean slate (as if the rule did.not exist) what zones should be established for the i

plume exposure pathway and ingestion pathway EPZ's." Long d

Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),

LBP-82-19, 15 NRC 601,'618 (1982).5/ Second, the Board ruled,

'N - that it saw no reason to litigate LILCO's PRA unless LILCO at-s tempted to rely on it in its testimony. Prehearing Conference Order-(Phase I - Emergency Planning), slip op..20 (July 27, 1982) (unpublished). More recently, the Board characterized

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.the County'siattempts to develop an EPZ from scratch as

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5/ This dismissal was without prejudice to contentions that adjustments must be made to the approximate 10 and 50 mile EPZs due to "particular local conditions within the flexibility per-mitted by the regulationsn" 15 NRC at 618. It also did not preclude a contention about persons to the earst of the EPZ

$ choosing to. evacuate through the EPZ. Id. 618-19.

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i In March 1982, this Board dismissed, as a challenge to the regulations, two SOC con-tentions alleging that the plume exposure pathway and ingestion pathway EPZs should be established, ab initio, based on a new probabilistic risk assessment and conse-quence analysis which should be done for 3 Shoreham. We stated that we would consider proposed contentions that adjustments to the 10-mile EPZ would be necee.sary based on those-factors enumerated in 50.47(c)(2). We also stated that we would consider whether persons outside of and to the east of an ap- -

proximate 10-mile EPZ would choose to evacu-ate and would do so by entering the EPZ, and

. whether that would require planning for a larger EPZ. See " Memorandum and Order Confirming Rulings Made at the Conference of Parties", LBP-82-19, 15 NRC 601, 618 (1982).

It appears that the County's assumption of the necessity for evacuation planning for a 20-mile radius EPZ is based largely on its own ad hoc assessment of radiological risk.

It therefore appear's to constitute the very challenge to the Commission's regulations which we would not permit in litigation be-fore.us. ,

Memorandum and Order DenyihgfSuffolk County's Motion to Termi-4 N

? nate the Shoreham Operating License Proceeding, LBP-83-22, 17 NRC __, slip op. 45 n.27 (Apr. 20, 1983).

The Board's decisions in this proceeding are supported by

.the history of the regulation. The 10-mile EPZ is based on the work of an NRC-EPA Task Force documented in NUREG-0396, " Plan-ning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants" (Dec. 1978).6/ As NUREG-0654 points out, 6/ BoththeNRCandEPAhav)formallyendorsedtheconcepts

~!- in NUREG-0396. 44 Fed. Reg. 75,168' col. 2 (Dec. 19, 1979),

\? citing 44 Fed. Reg. 61,123 (Oct. 28, 1979).

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"[t]he most important guidance in the Report [i.e., NUREG-0396) for planning officials is the definition of the area over which planning for predeterminined actions should be carried out."

NUREG-0654 at 7. The whole point of NUREG-0396 was to recom-mend a generic area in which to plan, so as to produce more uniform planning from site to site:

This report introduces the concept of gener-ic Emergency Planning Zones . . . . Appli-cation of the Task Force guidance should re-sult in the development of more uniform -

emergency plans from site to site but should not result in a large incremental increase in the resources required . * . . .

. . . [T]he concept of a generic area in which to plan has received general accep-tance by the variety of groups commenting on drafts of this report. . . .

. . . After reviewing the potential conse-quences associated with these types of acci-dents, it was the concensus [ sic] of the Task Force that emergency plans could be based upon a generic distance out to which predetermined actions would provide dose l

savings for any such accidents. Beyond this generic distance it was concluded that ac-tions could be taken on an ad hoc basis using the same considerations that went into the initial action determinations.

. . . The establishment of Emergency Plan-

! ning Zones of about 10 miles for the plume exposure pathway and about 50 miles for the ingestion pathway is sufficient to scope the areas in which planning for the initiation of predetermined protective action is warranted for any given nuclear power plant.

NUREG-0396 at i, ii, 15$6, 24 (emphasis in original). The l

23-Task Force used information in the Reactor Safety Study (a probabilistic risk analysis like that relied on by Suffolk County) and found that it confirmed the wisdom of a generic distance:

The results derived from the RSS-based work served to confirm the Task Force judgment that offsite planning for a generic distance around nuclear power plants is prudent and useful.

NUREG-0396 at 6 n. The Task Force said that the " precise'i size and shape of the EPZ would be left to the judgment of the plan-ner, based on a number of factors that do'not include site-specific probabilistic risk analyses:

It is expected that judgment of the planner will be used in determining the precise size and shape of the EPZs considering local con-ditions such as , demography, topography and land use characteristics, access routes, ju-risdictional boundaries, and arrangements with the nuclear facility operator for noti-fication and response assistance.

NUREG-0396 at 14.

Oth'er NRC boards have decided this same issue consistently with NUREG-0396 and the Board's decisions in this case. In San l

l Onofre the Licensing Board rejected a contention that the plume

- EPZ must be based on site-specific studies.7/ Southern l

7/- Similarly, in response to an argument that emergency plans must be tested by cost-benefit analysis, the Appeal Board said this:

(footnote continued) f 8 e n ,y ,-

e , - g-g w ..-. g, --n---- .,,. r- ,,..3 , - , . .

+ , , _

California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-82-39, 15 NRC 1163,,1178 (1982). The Board said that the NRC regulation would clearly allow leeway for a mile or two in either direction, based on local factors.

But it equally clearly precludes a plume EPZ radius of, say, 20 or more miles.

Id. 1181 (footnote omitted).8/

(footnote continued)

[W)e are of the view, at least preliminarily, that the emergency planning rule itself already accounts for whatever cost / benefit analysis might be necessary.

As the applicants rightly remark, "[t]he emergency planning zone concept (in the Commission's rules!already) takes into ac-count the broad range of radiological acci-dents and dose consequences to the public from such accidents." It need not be reanalyzed in each individual' proceeding.

Southern California Edison Co (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-680, 16 NRC 127, 132 (1982)

(footnote omitted).

8/ .In a footnote the Board said that 20-mile EPZ's in one di-rection, or longer, might be appropriate'in some areas based, for example, on prevailing wind conditions, but would require a variance in the rule pursuant to 10 CFR $ 2.758. 15 NRC at 1181 n.14. To the same effect, boards have said that the " pre-cise" bounds of the EPZ are to be determined by local condi-tions. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-680, 16 NRC 127, 131 (1982).

- - - . . - , , _ , m, - - , -

The Seabrook Board rejected a contention about setting l EPZs with these words: I l

There is no regulatory requirement in sup-port of, and hence no basis for, NECNP's bald assertion that beyond design basis ac-cidents must be considered by Applicants in establishing the EPZs. In fact, such con-sideration is inherent in and obviated by the Commission's delineation of the bounds of the plume exposure pathway EPZ. ,

Memorandum and Order, Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) (Nov. 17, 1982) (unpub-lished).

In Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diab'lo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-70, 16 NRC 756 (1982), the Licensing Board found that the State EPZs (a " Basic" EPZ of about 15 miles and an " Extended" EPZ extending 35 miles in the predominant wind direction) were sufficiently different from the-Federal requirements to be beyond the jurisdictional au-thority of the Board. Id. 802.

In Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Sta-tion, Unit No. 1), LBP-81-59, 14 NRC 1211 (1981), the Licensing Board considered a contention that if the licensee relied on 20-mile evacuation plans to overcome an inadequacy in the EPZ boundary drawn by the State, the 20-mile plans must be demon-strated to be adequate. The Board said that the state "or local jurisdictions are free to develop plans going beycnd the requirements set'forth in 10 CFR Part 50. As discussed above,

.r- - . - - . . -. ---- ,

howeveri the Board'has no responsibility to either review any

.such plans or determine their adequacy." Id. 1559.

4 In Indian Point the Commission asked the Licensing Board to address whether the high population density near the two

. plants is a local condition that affects the exact size and configuration of the EPZ. But the Commission expressly noted that the "EPZ is to be about 10 miles." Even in the Indian 4

Point proceeding, where the Commission permitted challenge.s_ to certain of its regulations, it did not contemplate a challenge -

to 10 CFR $ 50.47(c)(2). Consolidated Edison Co. of New York

> s (Indian Point, Units 2 and 3), CLI-82-15, 16 NRC 27, 36 (1982).

That the EPZ is not to be determined anew in individual cases is borne out also by the regulation's treatment of gas-cooled and small reactors. The emergency planning regulation says-that the size of EPZs may be determined on a case-by-case basis "for gas-cooled reactors and for reactors with an autho-rized power level less than 250 MW thermal." 10 CFR S 50.47(c)(2) (1983). This exception would not have been nec-l essary if the Commission had meant that EPZ's may be determined on a case-by-case basis for any reactor.

The County has added one new idea to contention 22.A since r

-the July 7 version, which was designated SC 5.A. This idea is that where a utility, as opposed to a local government, imple -

ments an offsite plan, there is no assurance that an emergency response could be' extended-beyond the 10-mile EPZ ad hoc in I

4 4

- ---------grrew'-'" - - - - - * - - ~ + - + er---r' -T-*-

--7'" "'M

s ..

those extremely rare cases where such would be necessary. What the intervenors have done since the July 7 version of 22.A is to expand the contention to include the fourth, as well as the first three, of the considerations on which the 10-mile EPZ is based.

4 The-four considerations are summarized at page 12 of NUREG-0654. The first three all have to do with the likelihood '

of receiving certain doses of radiation at certain distances from the plant. This is the stuff of the County's consequence analysis, of July 7 contention SC 5.A, and of July 26 conten-tion 22.A. The fourth consideration is qualitative rather than quantitative:

d. detailed planning within 10 miles would provide a substantial base for expansion of response efforts in the event that this proved necessary.

NUREG-0654 at 12; see also 45 Fed. Reg. 55,406 col. 2 (Aug. 19, 1980).9/

Because-the County did not in its July 7 contentions raise this point, it ought not be allowed to raise it now. But even if it is considered as part of the contention, the contention 9/ "The concept of the regulation is that there should be core planning with sufficient planning flexibility to develop a reasonable "ad hoc" response to those very serious low proba -

bility accidents which could affect the general public."

Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2~& 3), CLI-83-lO, 17 NRC , slip op. 8 (1983).

b e w , , y.. . ,.-.,,,7 e-7,.- -., -- ,n.-,.,,-..-,e- e...-, -. . - , - - , - - - , - = -

.-+-5

90  %

4 is still inadmissible. The additional language attacks one of the bases of.the generic distance determination that the NRC has made and thus attacks the regulation.10/

In short, there are two clear signs .that contention 22.A is an impermissible challenge to 10 CFR $ 50.47(c)(2). First, 20 miles is not "about" 10 miles. Second, the analysis the in-tervenors would use to set the 20-mile EPZ is the same type of analysis that was used to set the generic EPZ size in the regu-lation. Consequently, contention 22.A should not be admitted.

Contention 22.B >

Contention 22.B (formerly Southampton 1) again asserts that planning must take place beyond 10 miles. The reasons given are a variety of factors that are also covered in other contentions, such as population, road network, " shadow phenome-non," and weather:

10/ In addition to what has been'said above, there is a policy consideration that the Board may wish to take into accouAt in deciding the admissibility of contention 22.A. The County's consequence analysis is based on a preliminary draft of a PRA that LILCO undertook on its own initiative. (LILCO was concerned that improper premature conclusions might be drawn from the draft, but the Board found that delaying discovery on

[ the PRA would delay the litigation unacceptably. Confirmatory Order Granting Intervenors'~ Motion to Compel Deposition and Production of Draft PRA from LILCO 2 (Mar. 30, 1982).) The policy consideration is simply this: if intervenors are to be l allowed to use an applicant's PRA, particularly an incomplete l PRA, to reopen the generic question of EPZ size, then there l

will be a considerable disincentive to perform PRA's.

1 .

l, , _ _ ... _ , , _ _ ...- -- -,_ . -- -

29-

1. seasonal increase in population
2. -transient, dispersed seasonal population
3. road network inadequate to handle sea-sonal population
4. two main roads that pass through or close to the EPZ
5. spontaneous evacuation from east of the EPZ-
6. no Suffolk County participation to han-die the seasonal population (the conten-tion throws in here the point discussed -

above about the ability to expand re-sponse efforts beyond 10 miles ad hoc)

7. Shelter Island east of the EPZ
8. flooding and snow storms east of the EPZ The contention presents"a number of reasons why voluntary evacuation from outside the 10-mile EPZ to the east would be difficult. The contention.does not appear to allege that the overreaction outside the 10-mile EPZ would affect evacuation efforts inside the EPZ, which is the type of contention the l Board appears to have intended by these words in its Memorandum

( and Order of March 15, 1982:

[O]ur ruling does not preclude a contention that because of the geography'of Long Is-

land, evacuation planning within an approxi-mate 10 mile EPZ may not be adequate because of the impacts of persons outside and to the east of the EPZ choosing to evacuate and having to do so by coming through the EPZ.

Memorandum and Order Confirming Rulings Made at the Conference of Parties (Regarding Remainihg Objections to Admissibility of

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. . , _ , -._w , - -- .,--- , _ ..-

l Contentions and Establishment of Hearing Schedule), LBP-82-19, 15 NRC 601, 618-19 (1982). Instead, the basis of the conten-tion seems to be that because of the conditions outside the 10-mile EPZ, ad hoc expansion of efforts beyond 10 miles would be impossible. This is a. direct challenge to the NUREG-0396 judg-ment that a 10-mile EPZ would allow for such as hoc expansion of effort and therefore a challenge to the regulation. .

If on the other hand contention 22.B is raising an issue other than the ag hoc expansion of efforts issue, its concerns would seem to be covered by other contentions. See, for exam-

~

ple, contention 23 (shadow phenomenon), SOC contention 97 (bad weather), and contention 65.B (traffic congestion). Contention 22.B simply reformulates these same issues as a question of EPZ size.

In short, to the extent, contention 22.B alleges that peo-ple beyond 10 miles may be endangered and should be incorpo-rated into the EPZ, it challenges the reasoning of NUREG-0396 and the regulation. To the extent the contention alleges that people outside the EPZ, while not really endangered, may overreact and hinder the evacuation of, people in the EPZ who really are threatened, the issue is not really one of expanding the EPZ but rather of considering the effect of external events on people in the 10-mile EPZ. To the extent the contention says that because of external events the 10-mile zone does not allow ad hoc expa'nsion of-res'ponse efforts, the contention n, -

,,-----.-v-. , - . - - - - - - ,

again challenges the reasoning of NUREG-0396 and the regulation.

Thus, because contention 22.B challenges the regulations,

'and because the concerns it expresses can be litigated under other contentions, it should not be admitted.

Contention 22.C ,

Contention 22.C, which contends that the EPZ should be ex-panded because of the " shadow phenomenon," is inadmissible 'for ,

the same reasons as contentions 22.A and 22.B. That is, to the extent it proposes to increase the EPZ sizh, it is a challenge

.to the regulation. To the extent it contends the shadow phe-nomenon will make matters wo~rse inside the lO-mile EPZ, it is redundant of contention 23 on the shadow phenomenon.

' Contention 22.D No objection.

Contention 23: The Evacuation Shadow Phenomenon Contention 23.A Objection. This contention implies that LILCO cannot show adequate emergency planning unless it proves that either everyone will obey a sheltering recommendation or that people who do not obey will be protected nevertheless. LILCO objects to this conte'ntion as going beyond the emergency planning regu-lations. LILCO will do all it can to assure clear, accurate, w * - . ~ -

-y,,- * , - - . ,

concise, consistent information is broadcast to the public; it is not obliged to guarantee that no one will act contrary to the protective action recommendations announced to the.public.

Therefore this contention is beyond the legal requirements for emergency planning and should not be admitted.

Contention 23.B Objection. LILCO objects to this contention for the same reasons as stated in contention 23.A. If this contention is admitted, it should be consolidated with contention 23.A. They-appear to be identical except that 23.B postulates an initial -

announcement that no one need take protective actions, and 23.A postulates an initial announcement that some people should shelter.

Contention 23.C ,

Objection. The cross-reference table submitted by the County with the intervenors' revised emergency contention indi-cates that 23.C was formerly contention 60. The thrust of the old SC 60 is that "given the existing wind conditions on Long Island," LILCO should be required to " evacuate no less than the entire EPZ for a radius of 5 to 7 miles around the plant."

LILCO objected to this contention as a challenge to the methods used to make protective action recommendations, which was an issue capable of being litigated in Phase I. The County has s

rewritten the contention to' state that "the plan is unrealistic

in expecting to evacuate only certain zones within LILCO's 10-mile EPZ without expecting residents of the bordering zones and probably other zones as well, to evacuate." But the con-tention does not state why this is a problem. If the conten-tion is meant to suggest that voluntary evacuations such as those described in contention 23.C will affect evacuation time estimates, the contention is redundant of 23.D and therefore -

should not be admitted. If the intervenors wish to litigate some other issue, the contention fails for inadequate specif-icity, because one cannot determine what issue the intervenors wish to litigate. Consequently, contention 23.C should not be admitted.

Contention 23.D No objection.

Contention 23.E Objection. The intervenors contend that two of the three relocation centers designated in the plan are too close to the Shoreham site. The portion of this contention that states "many evacuees who need relocation ser. vices will not use the relo, cation centers proposed by LILCO because they will observe a large number of voluntary evacuees from the area near the centers leaving the area" should not be admitted. While an offsite plan must include relocation centers for those people requiring them, it is not a egal requirement that people be

t.

34-encouraged to use relocation centers. Accordingly, the third sentence of this contention should not be admitted.

Contention 23.F Objection. The intervenors contend that local relocation centers will be insufficient to provide for the number of evacuees that will require them. As previously noted in ,

LILCO's July 8 objections at 47, the intervenors should specify the number of evacuees it thinks would require shelter in a re-location center, assuming evacuation of the 10-mile EPZ, and detail why the relocation centers provided 'in the plan will be insufficient given that number of evacuees. Therefore, this contention should not be admitted because it lacks specificity.

Contention 23.G Objection. The'intervenors allege that (1) relocation centers will not be staffed properly because personnel relied upon by LILCO to respond are likely to be among voluntary evacuees who leave the area around the relocation centers, and (2) timely staffing of the centers will be impeded by traffic congestion resulting from evacuation. The notion.that reloca-l tion centers will not be adequately staffed because personnel will voluntarily evacuate is either a problem of lack of agree-ments, in which' case 23.G is redundant of contention 24, or of

, role conflict, in which case 23.G is redundant of contention s

25. In either case, this contention should not be admitted.

e w _ , , _ _ - - - n e - - - - , m , .g , -r w-r,.-- - ---

-am ,,

i Contention 23.H Objection. The intervenors allege that LILCO " fails to provide adequate measures that the EPZ perimeter to control ac-cess to evacuated areas. . . . As a result, evacuees . . . may cross the EPZ perimeter . . . and receive health threatening radiation doses." Suffolk County (1) refuses to participate in emergency planning and provide Suffolk County policemen to pro-vide access control at the EPZ perimeter and prohibit people from entering the evacuated EPZ, and (2) objects to LILCO -

providing traffic guides at the perimeter of the EPZ in conten-tion 10 because LILCO allegedly lacks the legal authority to do so. The County should not be allowed to complain that the ac-b tions it refuses to take and eishes to prohibit LILCO from tak-ing are going to cause harm to the public. This contention should not be admitted.

Contention 24: LILCO's Lack of Agreements with Organizations and Personnel Relied Upon in the Plan Ob'ection.

j The intervenors allege in Contention 24 that certain letters of agreement are deficient. LILCO objects to footnote 7 in this contention (page 56). This footnote sug-gests that if letters of agreement are provided, that "the con-tentions as applied to [ entities with letters of agreement]

would not necessarily become moot," and that "this contention will be modified" to reflect letters of agreement. The

.y, -- - . , - . - - - - - - , . . - - - , - - -- - . . - - - - - . - - - - - . - - - - - - + - . e-- -, - - - - - -

t intervenors cannot simply assign to themselves the opportunity for-amending contentions that are being litigated. If the subparts of contention-24.mean anything more than that letters of agreement do not exist with the listed organizations, the intervenors should state precisely what issues they are seeking to litigate. Should LILCO provide letters of agreement with the organizations listed, these contentions would be the sub-ject of a summary disposition motion based on the letters. . Any new contentions the County might raise after reviewing the let-ters must meet the standards for raising issues out of time based on new information. Therefore, footnote 7'should not be admitted as part of contention 24. ,

Contention 24.A

~*

Objection. -The.intervenors contend that LILCO has no

- agreements indicating that the listed organizations will "fol-low LILCO's command and control directive." LILCO objects to this contention to the extent that it suggests that agreements t

from outside organizations must specifically note that organi-zations promise to follow "LILCO's command and control directive." There is no legal requirement that t.his language be included in letters of agreem'ent.

Contention'24.B Objection. The intervenors contend that the plan lacks a letter of agreement with "BNL, FRMAP, or BNL employees." This y sv- - - - c- , - -- g -c.-- - --y,-- rg -- m-, awe--c -i e

l i

contention lacks basis. LILCO has a letter of agreement with the Department of Energy to provide employees to perform the services required. See Attachment 2. Consequently, this con-tention should not be admi:ted.

Contention 24.C objection.

The intervenors complain that Suffolk County .

has no agreement with "Suffolk County or any other entity" to provide "dul'y authorized officers" to faciliate traffic flow during an evacuation. First, the LERO organization does pro-vide personnel to facilitate traffic flow.* To the extent that this contention refuses to acknowledge the ability or authority of LERO personnel to perform ~these functions, it is redundant of contentions 1 through 10 challenging LERO's legal authority, and therefore should not be admitted. Second, Suffolk County has refused to allow police to participate in emergency plan-ning. The intervenors should not be allowed to litigate a con-tention that claims that the plan is deficient because the County refuses to enter an agreement. Third, it is inconceiv-able that in an emergency, the Ccunty police would not partici-pate, and therefore contention 24.C raises no real issue. For these reasons, 24.C should not be admitted.

Contention 24.D No objection.

Contention 24.E Objection. Contrary to the intervenors' contention, NUREG-0654 II.C.4 does not require that LILCO obtain agreements with school districts for implementing their early dismissal

. programs in the event of an emergency. Therefore, this conten-tion is outside the legal requirements and should be denied.

Contention 24.F No objection.

Contention 24.G Objection. The intervenors contend that LILCO has no let-ters of agreement with local rescue services to provide suffi-cient ambulances for an evacuation. The portion of this con-tention that states "in addition, there is no assurance ambu-lances will be available t'o transport contaminated injured per-sons, or persons injured during an evacuation to hospitals for treatment, as'is required by 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(12)"

l should not-be admitted. Under the Commission's decision in l Southern California Edison Company (San Onofre Nuclear l Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17.NRC , slip op. 2 (April 4, 1983), and in the regulations cited by the l

County, there is no legal requirement that additional medical l

facilities and. equipment be provided for the first aid capabil-l ity, or transportation of contaminated, injured persons in the l general -'ublic. Slip op. 11. Special arrangements for I

l l _

39-contaminated injured persons onsite are sufficient initially to accomodate members of.the public because "the number of indi-viduals both onsite and offsite who may become contaminated and injured is expected to be very few." Id. The emergency plan-ning regulations address "(1) those who become injured and are-also contaminated, and (2) those who may be exposed to danger-ous levels of radiation," id. 13, and do not extend to " persons injured.during an evacuation." Therefore, the portion of 24.G quoted above should not be admitted.

Contention 24.H ,

No objection.

Contention 24.I No objection.

Contention 24.J Objection. The intervenors contend that LILCO lacks let-ters of agreement with certain nursery schools, hospitals, rest

[

homes, _and special facilities. Each of these institutions will be evacuated by LERO if the appropriate administrator within the institution chooses to accept LERO help in evacuating.

[ Contrary to the language of the, contention, the plan does not "rel[y] upon" these institutions "to perform several functions necessary to a successful evacuation." The 10 CFR and NUREG sections cited by the County.zin support of this contention do

- --- e .- r v- , - -w-- e , w

not require that LILCO obtain agreements from these institutions stating that they will evacuate,-any more than it requires agreements from the general public. NUREG-0654 II.C.4 states only that " appropriate letters of agreement" identify  :

and support " nuclear and other facilities, organizations, or individuals which can be relied upon in an emergency to provide assistance." The organizations listed in 24.J are receiving

  • assistance, not.providing it. This contention should not be admitted because it is outside the legal ~ requirements for emer-gency planning.

Contention 24.K

- Objection. The portion -of this contention that states -

"there is also no assurance that contaminated injured persons, or persons injured during the evacuation, will be transported

~

to hospitals for treatment as required by 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(12)" should not be admitted. As discussed in response

! to Contention 24.G, above, under the Commission's decision in Southern California Edison Company'(San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 NRC , slip j op. 2 (April 4, 1983) and the regulations cited by the County, I ,

there is no legal requirement that. additional medical facili-l ties, equipment, and transportation be provided for the general public. If this portion of the contention is admitted, it t

should be consolidated with the identical statement in 24.G.

i I

I l

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Contention 24.L No objection.

Contention 24.M Objection. The intervenors allege that LILCO must obtain the letters of agreement with the school bus drivers who imple-ment the schools' early dismissal plans. There is no legal re- .

quirement that LILCO obtain agreements with bus drivers.

Louisiana Power and Light Company (Waterford Steam Electric Station), Order (Nov. 3, 1982), slip op. 71, and Memorandum and Order (Dec. 14, 1982), slip op. 3-7. Therefore, this conten-tion is outside the legal requirements for emergency planning and should not be admitted.

Contention 24.N No objection.

Contention 24.0 Objection. The intervenors allege that because the County is unwilling to provide Suffolk County Community College for I

use as a relocation center, the LERO plan is deficient. If the County thinks that LILCO has an insufficient number of reloca-tion centers, it should offer the Suffolk County Community Col-lege for use as a relocation center. The County should not be

allowed to litigate this issue since it is the County's own ac-l tion that is causing the alleged deficiency. Therefore, this contention should not be admitted.

r l

1 .

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s .

s Contention 24.P Objection. Contrary to the contention, LILCO has a letter of agreement with the American Red Cross. See Attachment 3.

Therefore, this contention is without basis and should not be admitted.

Contention 24.0 Objection. The intervenors allege that the plan lacks agreements with " local law enforcement agencies to provide'se-curity in evacuated areas." While LILCO's plan does not rely upon local authorities to implement it, the plan does assume that local authorities will continue tc function in their day-to-day, non-emergency capacities. In addition, it is incon-ceivable that in an actual emergency the County would not re-spond. Therefore, this contention lacks basis and should not be litigated. ,

Contention 24.R .

Objection. The intervenors assert that LILCO is required to have an agreement with the State of Connecticut to implement emergency planning for the portions of the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ that are in Connecticut. Contrary to the conten-tion, there is no legal requirement that the 50-mile ingestion pathway EPZ be administered by the local emergency plan. Rath-er, this area is addressed by the State. See NUREG-0654 II.J.11. New York' State provides for the 50-mile ingestion

,-. _-r,-<,--.- , . - . - -

pathway EPZ in its plan at Part III-43.5.Q. Therefore, this a

contention should not be admitted.

Contention 24.S No objection.

Contention 24.T Objection. The intervenors allege that the plan lacks an agreement with the U.S. Coast Guard to provide public notifica-tion on the Long Island Sound. The Phase I settlement entitled

" Resolution of Suffolk County Contention EP 3 -- Federal Re-sources" (Attachment 4 to these objections) addresses the Coast ~

Guard's role in emergency planning. See also Phase I Conten-tion EP 11.C, discussing notifi ation of the Coast Guard by commercial phone. The Phase I settlement " Resolution of Suffolk County Contention EPel(A) -- Effect of Weather on Si-rens" (Attachment 5) indicates that initial notification of the i public was a Phase I issue; the LILCO onsite plan relies upon the Coast Guard for initial notification. The issue of notifi-

! cation by the Coast Guard was capable of being litigated in l

l Phase I, and therefore should not be admitted as a Phase II l

issue. In addition, Revision 1 to the plan includes an agree-ment with the Coast Guard. See Attachment 6. As a result, l this contention'is without basis and should not be admitted.

1

+

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Contention 24.U Objection. This contention asserts that the plan must provide agreements with FEMA and DOE to serve on the Recovery Action Committee during recovery and reentry. First, there is no legal requirement that recovery and reentry provisions in-clude agreements with specific agencies providing for individu-als to participate. In addition, were there to be an accident at Shoreham requiring recovery and reentry actions, it is in-conceivable that the appropriate state, local and federal officials would not participate. See the objections to conten-tions 84 through 91, below. Consequently, this contention should not be admitted.

Contention 25: Role Conflict of Emergency Workers Contentions 25.A through 25.F No objection.

SC Contention 26: Notification of Emergency Response Personnel Contention 26.A No objection.

Contention 26.B Objection. .The intervenors contend that " commercial tele-phones are subject to overload, or may be out of service in the event of an emergency," and therefore LILCO's reliance on com-mercial lines for'communicatibn is misplaced. The issue of use

e  !

of commercial telephone lines to contact emergency wo.rkers was  !

capable of being litigated in Phase I of the emergency planning proceeding, and therefore should not be admitted as a Phase II issue. In Phase I Contentions EP 11.A, 11.B, and 11.C, inter-venors alleged that reliance on telephone lines "does not take into account (1) power outage, (2) sabotage, and (3) overload"

~

(EP' 11.A); that "the telephone communication network is vulner- '

able to extreme weather conditions" (EP 11.B); and that " lines will become-overloaded in an emergency, thus preventing commu-

~

nication.with these vital offsite organizations [ hospitals, Coast Guard, and DOE]" (EP ll.C). The fact that'LERO is now performing offsite functions.because the County has refused to do so does not change the nature of the commercial telephone lines being used or their susceptibility to overload or bad weather. The intervenors Are precluded from raising these Phase I issues.

Contention 26.C No objection.ll/

Contention 26.D i-No objection.

-11/ Since the intervenors have removed all reference to com-mercial telephone lines from this contention (see the previously-filed contention 80), the Phase I objection to this contention no longer applies.

~

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Contention 26.E No objection.

Contention 27 No objection.

Contention 28 Objection.

Although FEMA has cited it as a deficiency in

'its findings, NUREG-0654 II.F.1.C does not require radio or dedicated telephone links to federal agencies. Therefore, this contention should not be admitted.

Contention 29 No objection.

Contention 30 No objection.

  • Contention 31 s

No objection.

! Contention 32 Objection. The intervenors allege.that direct communica--

tions among the EOC and emergency response personnel has not been established. This contention should-not be admitted be-cause there is no legal requirement that direct communications exist between the EOC and emergency response personnel. There-fore, the contenti'on lacks spe'cificity and should not be admitted.

i l

t

Contention 33 Objection.

Communications between the Shoreham facility and DOE fie'id men.itoring teams is not required. This informa-tion would~be relayed via the EOC. Therefore, this contention should~not"be admitted.

Contention 34 -

Objection. The intervenors allege, in essence, that there must be direct communications between the EOC and the emergency -

, response personnel. This contention should not be admitted be-cause there is no legal requirement that ' direct communications among the EOC and emergency response personnel be established.

1 -

.i

t. Contentions 35 through 44:

l Training of Emergency Workers Objection. LILCO objec;ts to all the training contentions

\'

(35 through 44) as lacking basis, because the LERO training ma-terials'.have not yet been developed and the County has not yet i

reviewed them. The County should be required to state its pre-cise training contentions, if any, within one week of being provided with a complete set of the training materials.

In addition, LILCO has spe,cific objections'to the follow-ing training contentions:

Contention 36.D Objection. ' Contrary.to^'the intervenors' contention, it is l

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, 3 - - -

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not a legal requirement that lesson plans and specific training objectives be set forth in the offsite plan. Therefore, this contention should not be admitted.

t Contention 39.A '

  1. b': .

Objection. Title 10 CFR $ 50.47(b)(15), 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E.4.F, and NUREG-0654 11.0.1 do not require that LILCO ,

4 make satisfactory completion of emergency response training a prerequisite to the hiring of personnel. The portion of the plan cited by the~intervenors in support of their contention

/

(OPIP 5.1.1 at 2)~ accomplishes what the cohtention seeks, which is that LILCO demonstrate "that all personnel [will be] trained in their designated emergency response organization positions."

, Therefore, this contention should not be admitted.

Contention 42 ,

Obj ction. Contrary to the intervenors' contentions, 10 CFR $$ 50.47(a)(1)(b)(15), 10 CFR Part.50 Appendix E.4.F, and NUREG-0654 II.O.1 do not' require emergency response personnel to be residents of the County in which they are responding.

Nor do these guidelines and regulations require that emergency response personnel have "a sense of the territorial impera-l tive." This contention should not be admitted as outside NRC regulations.

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~49-Contention 43

Objection. The intervenors contend that emergency workers "may be unable to deal promptly with, and make correct deci-sions concerning, unexpected situations or contingencies" be-

, . cause "they will not be familiar".with Long Island. First, this contention appears to.be identical to contention 12, suggesting that emergency personnel will not be sufficiently '

familiar with the EPZ to perform their jobs properly. The r,e-fore, it is redundant and should not be admitted. Second, the I County has not yet reviewed the LERO training materials (be-cause the materials are not yet complete), and s~o cannot iden-tify precisely what areas seem to be missing from the training _

that would result in emergency response personnel not knowing their surroundings and not being able to respond. And because most of the LERO eme'rgency' response personnel live on Long Is-I land, there is no basis for the statement that they are "unfa-i-

miliar with,'and may not have a concerted interested in, the area of the emergency." Therefore, the contention lacks basis, e

'In addition, the contention is not adequately specific.

-Phrases like " school and other facility locations, surisdic-tional limits of emergency and volunteer organizativa and

. their. capabilities," and the " internal workings of the communi-ties in the EPZ" are quite vague.

For these reasons, this contention should not be admitted.

s s 4 .

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Contention 44 No objection.

. Contentions 45 through 51:

Accident and Dose Assessment and Projection Contentions 45 and 46 Objection. The County suggests in these contentions that the DOE personnel to be provided under the FRMAP program must be identified specifically. DOE will respond in an emergency .

at Shoreham pursuant to the letter of agreement between DOE and LILCO to provide such services (Attachment >2). It is unneces-sary that DOE designate now the names of people who might re-spend in the event of an emergency that may take place years hence or that may never happen. Consequently, this contention should not be admitted. .

Contention 47 Objection. The intervenors allege that "the information on fission product releases to be used by BNL personnel in mak-ing offsite dose projections" is inadequate because it "is lim-ited to noble gases and iodines." The.intervenors' Phase I Conte.ntion EP 14 alleged that "LILCO's plan fails to provide reasonable assurance that adequate methods, systems, and equip-ment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential off-site consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use."

To the extent that DOE person $el use the same information as

- - . - . _ , - , . , - - . . , - - -n. ,,n. . ,

51-LILCO field teams, this contention could have been litigated in Phase I and should not be admitted.

Contention 48 Objection.

This contention lacks basis. OPIP 3.5.1, p. 4 in Revision 1 to the plan indicates'that an RM-14 rather than an RO-2A will be used in offsite radiation surveys. See At- ,

tachment 7. The RM-14 is sufficiently sensitive to provide accurate low-level radiation measurements.

Therefore, this ,

contention should not be admitted.

Contention 49 No obiection.

Contention 50 No objection.

Contention 51 No obiection.

Contention 52: Emergency Operations Center Obiection. This contention lacks basis. The plan at 4.1-4 provides that an EOC will be located at the LILCO Brentwood Operations Center. The EOC is being established by LILCO in accordance with the facility design provided in the plan.

Until such time as the County has reason to believe that LILCO will not or has not properly established an EOC, this e

y e . - . , . - - , , , - . . - . - -

contention has no basis and therefore should not be admitted.

The contention is not saved by the footnote stating that "if LILCO ever establishes an EOC, the intervenors may have specif-ic contentions regarding its adequacy." If the intervenors find that they have contentions later about the EOC, they must meet the requirements for raising issues out of time based on new information. They cannot simply hold the place'for a con- '

tention that may or may not exist in the future. This cont.en-tion should not be admitted.12/

Contention 53: Security During a

  • Radiological Emergency Objection.

This contention should not be admitted. Part A of the contention states that because there will be no secu-rity by local law enforcement agencies as assumed in the plan, the' plan is deficient. Fi r' st , there is no legal requirement that security be provided within an evacuated area. Second, the deficiency complained of in this contention is a result of the County's own actions because the County can provide access control around evacuated areas if it chooses. Therefore, the contention should not be admitted.

Part B should not be admitted, because contrary to the Cour.ty's assertions, there is no legal requirement for 12/ The intervenors attempted to raise a similar contention on the Technical Support Center (TSC) in the Phase I proceeding.

It was not admitted by the Board. " Supplemental Prehearing Conference Order" 63-64 (September 7, 1982).

- . . , , . , -m.- - _ . ._

providing security at fuel allocation points, staging areas for emergency response personnel, and transfer points for evacuees.

In addition, if the County believes that security is required in these areas, the County can remedy the deficiency complained of by providing security if it wishes to do so. Accordingly, this contention should not be admitted.

Contention 54: Medical and Public Health Support.

Objection. For the reasons stated in response to conen- t tions 24.0 and 24.K, this contention should not be admitted.

Contentions 55 through 59:

Notification to the Public.

Contention 55 No objection.

Contention 56 No objection.

Contention 57 Ob3ection. The intervenors contend that (1) the tone alert radios will not provide special facilities.with addition-al time; (2) the EBS signal may originate from a radio station other than WALK, and will not activate the tone alerts; and (3)

" WALK does not broadcast on its AM frequency 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day."

Part 1 is outside the legal requirements; part 2 lacks basis s s because the intervenors have not stated why signals from other y e r --. ..-w-r c- '~ v - -- ---r

stations would not activate the tone alerts; and part 3 lacks basis because WALK radio has access to AM frequency 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day. See Attachment 8. Therefore, this contention should not be admitted.

Contention 58 No objection. -

Contention 59 -

Objection. For the reasons stated above in response to contention 24.T, this contention dealing with notification of

, the public by the U.S. Coast Guard should not be admitted.

Contentions 60 throua'h 83: Protective Actions Contention 60 No objection. '

Contention 61 LILCO has no objection to parts B, C, D and E of this con-tention.

LILCO objects to parts A, F (which should be consolidated with A), G, H, and I. The intervenors contend in parts A and F through I that in some cases, sheltering will result in health-threatening radiation doses to the public. These contentions should not be admitted because (1) there is no indication that where evacuation i's feasible ahd would result in lower doses,

, . . , , n- ,--

55-LILCO would order sheltering instead of evacuation, and (2) if sheltering is the only feasible protective action given the circumstances of a particular accident, a recommendation to shelter would constitute adequate protective measures.

Contention 62 Objection. There is no requirement that the general pub- ,

lic be monitored after sheltering from a passing plume. Conse-quently, this contention alleging the contrary should not be admitted.

Contention 63 ,

No objection.

Contention 64 Objection. The thrus,t of this contention is that "given the existing wind conditions'on Long Island" LILCO should be required to " evacuate at least a radius of 5 to 7 miles around the plant." This contention is really a challenge to the meth-ods used to make protective action recommendations. As such it was capable of being litigated in Phase I. In Phase I, the County submitted written testimony on Contention EP 4 on " pro-tective actions" and EP 14 on " accident assessment and dose as-sessment models." See Direct Testimony of Fred C. Finlayson (October 12, 1982); Direct Testimony of Gregory C. Minor '

(October 12, 1982). For example, Dr. Finlayson testified that n- ---vr , --,n, . .,,,,,n g, , - w. - - - - - -

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"[c]hanges in wind direction over time and distance will frequently cause the plume trajectory to deviate from a straight line." Direct Testimony of Fred C. Finlayson (October 12, 1982). Therefore, this contention should not be admitted for litigation in Phase II.

Contention 65: Evacuation Time Estimates .

Contention 65.A No objection.

Contention 65.B ,

No objection.

Contention 65.C No objection.

Contention 65.D No objection.

Contention 65.E No objection.

Contention 65.F No objection.

Contention 65.G Objection. The evacuation time analysis identified in Ap-pendix 4 of NUREG-0654 has.besn included in the plan. See e

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Attachment 9. Therefore, this contention lacks-basis and should not be admitted. ~

Contention 65.H Objection. This contention alleging inadequacies in the use of route spotters should not be admitted. Part 1 lacks specificity because the intervenors have not stated the number ,

of route spotters it thinks is required to cover the evacuation routes. Part 2 alleging that " motorists will not defer to LERO vehicles operating without police sirens or flashers" is an al-leged deficiency created by the County by its refusal to allow policemen to participate in emergency planning. If the County believes that policemen are ~ required for route spotters, the County can remedy the deficiency by providing policemen. Con-sequently, this contention,should not be admitted.

Contention 66: Removal of Obstacles from the Roadway and Provisions for Fuel Contention 66.A i

l Objection. The intervenors contend that LILCO lacks the appropriate number of tow trucks "to remove all potential road obstructions." This contention is not adequately specific be-l cause the intervenors have not defined what in their view would be an " adequate number of tow trucks." Consequently, the first I sentence of this contention should not be admitted.

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I Contention 66.B No objection.

Contention 66.C Objection. The intervenors contend that the plan "makes no provision for the evacuation of persons whose cars break down or are in accidents." Common sense suggests that those .

persons would simply ride with other evacuees. Consequently, this contention should not be admitted.

Contention 66.D ,

Objection. NUREG-0654 Section 2.J.10.K does not require snow removal. Therefore, th,is contention should not be admit-ted.

Contention 66.E .

Objection. This conten ion should not be admitted be-cause, contrary to the contention, (1) the LILCO fuel trucks are equipped to pump fuel into automobiles and the intervenors have no. basis for contending otherwise; and (2) the emergency planning regulations do not require that LILCO provide " fire protection equipment, such as is found on gasoline pumps and trucks designed for refueling aircraft."

Contention 66.F No objection. .

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f f SG 59-Contention 67: Evacuation of Persons without Access to Automobiles Contention 67.A No objection.

Contention 67.B No objection.

Contention 67.C No objection.

Contention 67.D No objection.

Contentions 68 through 71:

Evacuation of School Children.

Contention 68 ,

No objection.

Contention 69.A objection. The portiens of this contention (1) dealing with information that must be provided to schools to make a de-cision regarding early dismissal, and (2) alleging that LILCO must provide indemnification for school authorities, request relief not required by emergency planning regulations and therefore should not be admitted.

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r-Contention 69.B No objection.

Contention 69.C No objection.

Contention 69.D No objection.

Contention 69.E No, objection.

Contention 70 No objection.

Contention 71.A Objection. The portion of this contention dealing with indemnification of school authorities should not be admitted.

There is no legal requirement that LILCO provide such indemni-fication.

Contention 71.B No objection.

Contention 72: Evacuation'of People in Special Facilities No objectihn.

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l Contention 73: Handicapped People at Home '

Contention 73.A No objection.

Contention 73.B Objection. Part 2 of this contention should not be admit-ted because the intervenors' statement that the plan must pro- .

vide for assisting handicapped individuals with packing and no-tifying relatives is beyond the regulations. For these rea-sons, these portions of the contention should not be admitted.

Contention 74 through 77: Relocation Centers Contention 74 Objection. The portion of this contention that alleges that evacuees will refuse to use the relocation centers "be-cause they will perceive those centers as being too close to the plant" should not be admitted. While an offsite plan must include relocation centers for those people needing them, it is not a legal requirement that people be encouraged to use relo-cation centers.

Contention 75 Objection. The intervenors assert that the LILCO plan is deficient because the plan has not provided the number of evacuees who may require shelter and has not demonstrated that the facilities provided in-the plan have adequate space and

equipment to care for that number of people. The intervenors' contention lacks basis and should not be admitted. The inter-venors have given no reason to think that the number of reloca-tion centers provided in the LERO plan is insufficient.

Contention 76 Objection.

Contrary to the contention, there is no legal ,

requirement that monitoring or decontamination be provided for evacuees who leavs the EPZ but choose not to go to relocat' ion '

, centers. Therefore, this contention should not be admitted.

Contention 77 No objection.

Contention 78 through 83:

Food, Milk, Water and Livestock Control Objection.

These conte'ntions assert that certain items pertaining to the 50-mile ingestion pathway EPZ must be-includ-ed in the offsite emergency plan. Contrary to the contentions, there is no requirement that the 50-mile ingestion pathway EPZ be administered by a local emergency plan. Rather, this area is-addressed by the State. NUREG-0654 II.J.11. ~New York State provides for the 50-mile ingestion pathway EPZ in its plan at Part III-43.-5.Q. Therefore, these contentions should not be admitted. In addition, LILCO has a specific objection to the following contention: .

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2 Contention 79 Objection. This contention is essentially the same as contention 24.R discussing protective actions for Connecticut.

The contentions should be consolidated.

Contentions 84 through 91: Recovery and Reentry.

Objection. Title 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(13) requires that the local offsite response plan established that " general

-plans for recovery and reentry are developed." The detailed

~

plans of the sort the intervenors suggest in contentions 84 through 91 are not required by the regulations. These conten-tions, therefore, should not be admitted. Specific objections are noted to certain of the" contentions as follows:

Contention 84 Objection. The intervenors allege that LILCO has not identified "a non-utility entity with necessary authority which has agreed to undertake the initiationcof the recovery and re-entry processes." It is inconcei.vable that, following an emer-l gency at Shoreham of the magnitude that would require recovery i

and reentry, the Federal, State and local authorities would not be involved in that process. This contention is without basis

.and should be denied.

i I

Contention 86 Objection. The detailed information regarding when operations are necessary and who will decide to go forward is another way of stating that a non-utility entity with necessary authority has not been identified in the plan. This contention is redundant of contention 84 and should be consolidated if the recovery and reentry contentions are admitted.

  • Contention 87 Objection. Title 10 CFR 5 50.47(b)(13) requiring " general plans for recovery and reentry" does not anticipate that indi-viduals from FEMA and DOE will be identified by name, title or qualification. It is inconceivable that appropriately quali-fied individuals from those agencies would not be provided to serve on the Recovery Action Committee should recovery follow-ing an accident at Shoreham be necessary. Finally, the sugges-tion that personnel and equipment required for recovery and re-entry activities must be shown to be available to LILCO is without merit. As previously stated, it is inconceivable that local, State and Federal authorities would not serve in the re-covery and reentry response following an accident'. This con-tention should not be admitted.,

Contention 92: State Emergency Plan No objection.

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Cententions 93 through 96: Loss of Offsite Power Contention 93 Objection. Contrary to the contention, 10 CFR

$ 50.47(b)(8) and NUREG-0654 II.H do not require that LILCO (1) supply backup power to the EOC; (2) provide an alternate loca-tion for the EOC in the event of loss of offsite power; or (3) establish backup power supplies for staging areas, bus transfer points, receiving hospitals, or relocation centers. Therefore, this contention is outside the legal requirements and should not be admitted. ,

Contention 94 Obiection. There is n6 legal requirement that backup power be provided for the LILCO Customer Service Office.

Therefore, part A of this. contention should not be litigated.

In addition, part B of this contention is redundant of conten-tion 93.A and, if admitted, should be consolidated.

Contention 95.A objection. The adequacy of the sirens for providing imme-diate alert to the public is a contention that was capable of being litigated during the Phase I emergency planning proceed-ing under EP 1, which listed inadequacies in the prompt notifi-cation system, including the effects of weather and loss of power on the sirens. Therefore, 95.A should not be admitted as a Phase II contention.

i

Contention 95.B Objection.

Contrary to the contention, WALK has backup power. See Attachment 8. This contention lacks basis and should not be admitted.

Contention 95.C Objection. The adequacy of the tone alert system to pro- ,

vide timely warning to the population was the subject of Phase I Contention EP 1.B, in which the intervenors alleged that "LILCO has not adequately demonstrated that in the event of a loss of power to all or part of the system,* it could provide timely warning to the population" through sirens and tone alerts. As contention 95.C points out, WALK activates the tone alerts. Thus, the issue raised in 95.C regarding the ability to activate tone alerts was capable of being litigated in Phase I, and should not be admitted in Phase II.

In addition, this contention lacks basis because contrary to the contention, WALK radio has backup power. 'See Attachment'8.

Contention 95.D Objection. For the reasons stated.in response to conten-tion 95.C, this contention was capable of being litigated in Phase I and should not now'be litigated in Phase II. There-fore, it should not be admitted.

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Contention 95.E Objection. NUREG-0654 II.G.3 and 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(7) do not require backup power for the emergency news center or a backup news center. Therefore, this contention should not be admitted.

Contention 96 .

Objection. This contention should not be admitted because there is no legal requirement that the facilities listed in the '

i contention have backup power supplies, or that LILCO provide backup power to the firms and facilities referenced.

Contention 97: Bad Weather Contention 97.A l Objection. The intervenors allege that prompt notifica-l i

tion to the public will be impeded by bad weather. In Phase I, the intervenors alleged in contention EP 1.A that "LILCO has i failed to demonstrate that the siren coverage will not be 1

constricted significantly during weather conditions such as

. rain, snow and fog . . . high winds, and thunderstorms." This contention was settled. See Attachment'5. Therefore, 97.A was capable of being litigated in Phase I and should not be admit-ted in Phase II. In addition, the issue of backup power to the siren system should not be admitted because it is also a Phase I issue, as explained in response to contention 95.C.

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Contention 97.B Objection. While it is true as stated by SOC that 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(lO) states that a local plan "must designate a range of protective actions appropriate to a variety of circum-stances" there is no requirement that evacuation be recommended during a heavy snowfall. Therefore, this contention should not be admitted. In addition, there is no basis for the assumption-made by SOC in this contention that evacuation would be ordered in a heavy snowfall. It is unlikely that such an evacuation would be ordered because of the feasibility of evacuating dur-ing that kind of weather. Accordingly, this contention should not be admitted.

Respectfully submitted, By: )4 t k. .

~

/2 W.\ Taylgr 'Reveley', ( III James N. Christman i

Kathy E. B. McCleskey Hunton & Williams Post Office Box 1535 l 707 East Main Street

! Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: August 2, 1983 8

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_ _ _ ___ ,-m- - - * " ' - " ' ~ - ^ ^

ATTACHMENT 1 l

4 1 i

1 1

OPIP 2.1.1

(~ Page 5 of 68 Attachment 2 Page 1 of 60 POSITION DEFINITIONS Emergency Position: Director of Local Response Activation Level: Unusual Event through General Emergency -

Response Location: Local EOC Responsible to: LILCO

, Responsibilities: a. Overall direction of the response activ-

~

ities of the LERO.

b. Decision to notify the general public.
c. Decision to implement protective actions for the general public.
d. Identification and acquisition of addi-(~- .

tional federal resources.

e e. P'oviding r updated information to state and local officials.

f. Authorizing LERO personnel radiation exposures in excess of the PAGs.

Representative Titles of Individuals -

Designated to Fill This Position: LILCO Vice Pres.ident - Transmission and Distribution LILCO Vice President - Operations a..

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ATTACHMENT 2 Department of Energy Brookhaven Area Office ,

Upton, New York 11973 May 5. 1982 ,

Mr. William T. Renz, Environmental Scientist '

Nuclear Engineering Department Long Island Lighting Company 175 East Old Country Road Hicksville, NY 11801 4

Dear Mr. Renz:

SUBJECT:

RADIOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE Since you are located in our Region, the Brookhaven Area Office is charged with the responsibility'for providing radiological assistance in the event of an emergency. Such assistance can be requested at all times by

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calling 516-282-2200 and asking for radiological assistance, indicating the nature of the incident, the location, and how to contact authorities to .

coordinate our response. ,

The Department of Energy (DOE) will respond to requests for radiological assistance from licenswes, Federal, State, and local agencies, private organi-sations, or individuals involved in or cognizant of an incident believed to involve source, by-product, or special nuclear materials as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or other ionizing radiation sources.

Unless the DOE or a DOE contractor is responsible for the activity, ionizing radiation source, or radioactive material involved in an incident, DOE radiological assistance will be limited to advice and emergency action essential for the control of the issnediate hazards to health and sarety.

Radiological emergency assistance will be terminated as sioon as the emergency situation is under control. Therefore, responsibility for post-incident recovery, including further action for the protection of individuals and the public health and safety, should be assumed by the appropriate responsible Federal, State or local government, or private authority as soon as the emergency conditions are stabilized.

If you have any furthur questions or desire further information, feel free to contact me.' -

Sincerely.

0 .

m David Schweller Area Manager cc: L. J. Dea)

L. Cohen APP-B-1

ATTACEMENT 3 I l 1

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  1. a#E rmwammrM - i LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY L m _ __. o.8 na cast oto counvar moao . micusviLLt. wtw vona nooi - I h IMal Numiber a

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June 24, 1983 l

I Mrs. Patricia Nocher Executive Director American Red Cross 475 East Main Street

  • Patchogue, NY 11772

, Letter of Understanding Between LILCO and the American Red Cross

Dear Mrs. Noc)3er:

This letter confirms recent discussions regarding the role of the American Red Cross as determined by Charter of the U.S.

Congress during an emergency at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. It is our understanding that in response to a radio-logical emergency at Shoreham, the Red Cross will fulfill its usual emergency response functions, including setting up and operating relocation centers for the public.

! Even though LERO personnel sill handle radiological monitoring and decontamination assignments; to assure preparedness in an actual emergency, the Red Cross should also participate as appropriate in training, drills, and exercises.

Many thanks for your continued contributions to the emergency planning effort.

Sincerely, Charles A. Daverio i- , Emergency Preparedness

_ Cpordinator EDR/kv ~

4 APP-B-9 R

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ATTACH;1ENT 4 i

October 12, 1982 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )- -

)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) . Docket No. 50-322 '('OL)

) (Emergency Planning -

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) Proceeding)

Unit 1) )

RESOLUTION OF SUFFOLK COUNTY CONTENTION EP G -- FEDERAL RESOURCES

( THIS AGREEMENT by and among Long Island Lighting l

Company ("LILCO"), ~he t Nu'elear Regulatory Commission Staff

(" Staff"), Suffolk County ("SC"), the'Shoreham Opponents ,

Coalition (" SOC"), and the North Shore Committee ("NSC") (here-inafter collectively the " Parties") resolves Suffolk County Contention EP 3 in accordance with the terms stated below, sub-ject to the approval of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

(" Licensing Board"). ,

. Suffolk County Contention EP 3 concerns whether the Shoreham Emergency Plan ("LILCO Plan" or " Plan") adequately incorporates Federal Resources that can be made available to I respond at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station in the event of a radiological emergency. Suffolk County has contended that the l 3 .

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I provision for utilization of Federal resources is not clearly set forth in the LILCO Plan.

By this Resolution agreement, LILCO agrees to respond to the County's concerns by amending the fif th paragraph of Section 5.3 of the Plan (page 5-8) to read as follows:

1 A brief description of Federal agencies' available for assistance is presented below:

U.S. Department of Energy The U.S. Department of Energy operates the Federal Radiological Monitbring and Assessment Plan (FRMAP) from its Northeast .

regional area office, located at the Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL).

The FRMAP, which specializes in radiation safety and medicine, will provide assistance to the Nuclear Facility Operator, the State or County upon request. This assistance is available twenty-four (24) hours a day by calling the contact phona number listed in the

Due to the close proximity of BNL in relation to the Shoreham plant i-t is anticipated that the response time will be immediate.

An agreement letter which addresses this assistance is contained in Appendix B.

A copy of the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan is appended to this plan. ,

U.S. Coast Guard

-During a radiation incident which could have offsite consequences, the U.S. Coast Guard will assist by maintaining traffic control on the Long Island Sound in the proximity of the Shoreham Nuclear. Power Station. Assistance is available twenty- l l l

I four (24) hours a day by calling the contact phone number listed in the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures. It is anticipated that the U.S. Coast Guard's maximum response time will be four (4) hours. An agreement letter which addresses this assistance is contained in Appendix B.

U.S. NRC The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requires notification in accordance with regulatory and license requirements. Initial notification to the -

NRC shall be within:one hour of declaration of an emergency by use of the Emergency Notification System (ENS),.

During and after a' radiological emergency,
the primary role of the NRC is that of conducting. investigative activities

' associated with the incident and verifying that emergency plans have been implemented g and proper agencies notified. Should the NRC deem it necessary, additional NRC personnel atched to the site to augment will the be twodisp' resident on-site NRC inspectors.

The NRC team, in an advisory capacity, will provide on-site technical response assistance '

including monitoring, assessment, technical control and assessing' radiological hazards to the public. Sufficient space and provisions for the NRC are provided in the TSC, EOF, and the ENC. ,

Based upon LILCO's agreement to amend'the' Plan to read as' set forth, the County finds that SC Contention EP 3 is resolved. As a result, the Parties jointly urge th'c Licensing i

l Board to accept this Resolution to terminate litigation of SC Contention EP 3. . s 4

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Ya C6unsd1 for EB MtiMsk is/&/es

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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY R-s=2L.%Lhis Counsel for ' '

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ATTAC&iENT 5  !

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October 12, 1982 1

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i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t s l

Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board i

,In the Matter of

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LONG ISLAND' LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322 (OL)

, ) (Emergency Planning (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,

) Proceeding)

Unit 1) )  ;

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<NESOLUTIONOFSUFFOLKCOUNTYCONTENTION EP 1(A) -- EFFECT OF WEATHER ON SIRENS t l j 's

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THIS AGREEMENT by and among Long Island Lighting Co:.pany ("LILC.O* )', the Nu61 ear Regulatory Commission Staff '

(" Staff"), Suffolk County ("the County" or "SC"), the Shoreham . '

Opponents Coalitionf(" SOC"), and the North Shore Committee <

("NSC") (hereinafter collectively the " Parties") resolves  ;

Suffolk~ County' Contention EP 1(A) in accordance with the terms  !

stated below, subject to the' approval of the Atomic. Safety and i

' Licensing '

Board (" Licensing. Board"). '

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  • f Suffolk County Contention 1(A) concerns the effects of tj weather on the cound. level of the sirens used to notify the, t 3 public in the event of a 7;adiological emergency at the Shoraham (

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c ( Nuclear Power Station. Suffolk County has contended in E? 1(A) l

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the sirens, and that high winds and thunderstorms may affect the ability of the population to hear the sirens. Such adverse effects on the sirens would impair a critical aspect of the necessary emergency preparedness for responding to a radiolog-ical emergency at Shoreham.

By this Resolution agreement, LILCO has documented to the County's satisfaction, through the attached document from .

Wyle Laboratories, that the effects of extreme weather have been taken into consideration in the design of the sirens used for the prompt notification system for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. As indicated by the attachment to this resolu-tion, LILCO, through its consultant Wyle Laboratories, has

, represented to the County that the siren ranging criteria, that is, loudness of siren with distance, reflects the conservative extremes of weather across the United States. In general, in ,

l' still air, sound is attenuated more in. low humidity than in high humidity. This effect was specifically considered in l developing siren range values for LILCO, by examining local weather conditions (temperature and humidity extremes) for the LILCO system. Additionally, (1) temperature-induced refraction

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of sound, and (2) ground absorption are factors that do not I

i vary widely from one location to another. Thus, conservative

< estimates for these effects were used.

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While it is not possible to predict siren system per-formance under the ultimate extremes in all possible weather scenarios, and while many extreme weather scenarios have a low probability of occurrence, it is likely that thunder would only momentarily mask a single siren, and that heavy snow would not change the siren design range. During snow, siren. sound propa .

gation losses are expected to be comparable to those for normal conditions, and ambient background noise levels are generally _

4 lower, resulting in greater detectability of the siren.

In light of the representations made herein, the County finds that SC Contention EP 1(A) is resolved. As a result, the Parties jointly urge the Licensing Board to accept this resolu-tion to terminate litigation of SC Contention EP 1(A).

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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO ANY l

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WYLE LABORATORIES October I,1982 J/N 39126 4

Mr. Mark Blauer Chairman, Emergency Planning Task Force Long Island Lighting Company 175 East Old Country Road Hicksville, N.Y. I 1801

Reference:

Wyle Research Report WR 82 Final Design of Prompt 4

Notification System for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station

Dear Mr. Blauer:

fr. response to your request for clarification of the environmental considerations '

for the referenced study, we offer the following:

- The estimates of siren levels utilized in design of the Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) prompt notification system are based on a comprehensive i analysis of a large number of siren sound propogation studies throughout the world.

The subsequent siren range design values developed reflect a wide range of environmental, topographic, ground . cover and housing constructions. Thus, the siren design ranges - i.e., siren sound level with distance -reflect conservative

' conditions of rain, snow, temperature, humidity throughout the United States, os.

well as conservative values for outdoor to indoor acoustic attenuation of siren signals.

in general, sound is attenuated more rapidly in dry than in moist air. This effect l

was specifically considered in developing siren range values for LILCO by examin-ing local weather conditions (i.e., temperature and humidity extremes). However, other weather and topography effects in sound propogation, namely wind and temperature-induced refraction of. sound and ' ground absorption, are more significant factors which do not vary widely from one location to another. Thus, conservative estimates for these latter effects were used. Consequently, the siren ranging criteria is conservative for the LILCO design.

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lt is not possible to. predict system performance under the ultimate extremes in o!!

possible weather scenarios which have on extremely low probability of occurrence.

However, in regard to specific weather conditions, thunder would only momentarily mask a siren signal. Pfeovy snow would not change the siren design range since siren sound propagation losses are expected to be comparable to those for normal conditions and ambient' background noise levels are generally lower with snow on the ground resulting in greater detectability of the siren.

l WYLE RESEARCH i

129 Waryland Street, D Segundo. California 90245 213 322 1783 213-678-4251

If you should require further clarification of our siren ranging and siting procedures, please call me.

Very truly yours, WYLE LABORATORIES Wyle Research f

l John R. Stearns Monoger, El Segundo Operations JRS:sig -

cc: Mr. W. Renz, Long Island Lighting Co.

  • Ms. K. McClesky, Hunter & Williams

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& V ATTACm1ENT 6

. , DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  ;,

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 120 Woodward Avenue New Haven, CT 06512

, Tel:(203)773-2464 3440 e

11 July 1983 Mr. William F. Renz Offsite Energency Prepardness Coordinator Long Island Lighting Company .

175 E. Old Country Road Ricksville, New York 11801 -

Re: Coast Guard Response to Radiological ~

Emergencies

Dear Mr. Renz:

This letter will supersede Captain of the Port (C0TP) New Haven's letter of agreement dated November 14, 1978.

Should an emergency arise at Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, COTP New Haven will provide the following response:

a. Marine Traffic Control.
b. Voice safety broadcasts on marine radio frequencies.
c. Vessels for radiation monitoring during marine traffic control patrols.
d. Liasion personnel at LILCO's Emergency Operations Center in Hauppauge

' Long Island.

l To insure the effectiveness of our support and safety of our personnel, the following equipment / training must be'provided by Long Island Lighting Company.

a. Direct Reading and Thermoluminescent dosimeters for all boat crews.
b. Radiation level monitoring devices for each boat.
c. Ongoing reftesher and updated training of Coast Guard personnel in personal safety and use of monitoring devices.

Coast Guard respouse to a declared emergency will be initiated upon notification by Shoreham Nuclear Power Station personnel that the emergency exists. Notifica-tion should be made to the Captain of the Port duty officer at (203)773-2464 or 773_

2400.

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E.W. WIEG Captain, U.S. Coast rd Captain of the Port, New Haven Copy: CCGD3(a)

COTP NY APP-B-8

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. ATTACHMENT 7

  • o l( OPIP 3.5.1 Page 4 of 53 5.3.2 While enroute to the survey point, keep the RO-2A and RM-14 with HP-270 probe on (see equipment operation, Attachments 4 and 5) and begin record-ing periodically any reading on the RM-14 greater than 1200 cpm (1 mR/hr) on the Offsite Radiological Survey Data Sheet, Attachment 2.

Assign a number to any non-fixed points, mark the location on the map, then enter tae point number assigned and the exposure rate on the ORS Data.

Sheet, Attachment 2.

5.3.3 Record any abnormal events or conditions.'.which

. you observe on the Offsite Radiological Survey Data Sheet, Attachment 2.

5.3.4 If plume tracking is no,e required, proceed to Step 5.3.6.

5.3.5 Based on the survey data to be collected as l indicated on the ORS Briefing Form, Attachment 1,

. Item 10, drive from point to point noting and 7

l[ reporting the following:

a. Plume boundaries are described by a dose rate of.1 mR/hr. (This is equivalent to L

approximately 1200 cpm on the RM-14 with HP-270 probe.)

b. Plume centerline is ' described as the point at which the RM 14 with HP-270 probe (open window) reading peaks and begins to decrease.

Return to the peak concentration area.

c. At the plume centerline, report the maximum plume whole body dose rate measured with the RO-2A instrument at 4 feet above the ground and the measurement location to the ESC immediately after measurement (see Attachment 4, @eration of Eberline Model R0-2A) . Mark the location on the map and ORS Data Sheet, Attachment 2.
d. If plume centerline air sampling is required, Attachment 1, Item 10 (2), collect an air sample.using Step 5.3.7.
5.3.6 'At the survey location, perform the following
a. Obtain gamma (closed window of RO-2A) measure-ments at 3 inches and 4 feet above the ground e

Rev. 1 '

, 7/15/83 l -, - - . . - . ,. . - . . . - - - - . - , - . . . . . - - . - . - . - . . . - . . - . . . - . - . - . - .

ATTACHMENT 8

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M_C_O LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY 179 EAST OLD COUNTRY R O A D

  • M I C K S VI L L E, N E W Y O R K 19 8 01 esATTMtw C.CO#pa=0. % CL wuct pe8SsD8ss?

July 20, 1983 Mr. Alan S. Beck President & General Manager Island Broadcasting Company, Inc.

P. O. Box 230 Patchogue, NY 11772

Dear Mr. Beck:

In order to provide for an efficient and timely imple-mentation of prompt notification and instruction for the general public within the ten-mile Emergency planning Zone surrounding the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (SNPS),.the Island Broad-i casting Company, Inc. (WALK) and the Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO), do hereby agree to the following undertakings:

1) WALK will work with LILCO and/or Suffolk County to.

formalize procedures associated with both the prompt notification and emergency information to be given to the general public in the event of an emergency (or emergency planning exercise) at SNPS.

2) WALK will permit the installation of specified communi-cations equipment designed to ensure the prompt trans-mission of information to WALK for dissemination to the public, as well as other equipment deemed necessary by LILCO and/or Suffolk County.
3) WALK will respond to requests from specified and

- mutually agreed upon individuals and/or agencies to activate tone-alert radios associated with the Prompt Notification System, and send prepared instructional /

informational messages over both AM and FM radio air-ways utilized by WALK.'

I . 4) WALK will perform, at its convenience, and after

reasonable prior notification to and approval by WALK, a complete testing of this system at a minimum of 2 once per annum.

j 5) WALK will install, or have installed, and maintain an

- 80 DW AGP for backup generation purposes.

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' APP-B-2 t

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L.ONG CLAND UGHT1NG COMPANY ,

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If the aforementioned meet with your approval, please so indicate by executing a copy of this letter and returning it to the undersigned..

Very truly yours, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY By:

I Read and Agreed this day of 1983 ,

ISLAND BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC.

By: . 'dA-t Alan %ec'k k President and General Manager r

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APP-B-3

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LILCO, August 2, 1983 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE In the Matter of LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY (Shoreham Nucle _ar Power Station, Unit 1)

Docket No. 50-322 (OL)

I hereby certify that copies of LILCO's Objections to Intervenors' " Revised Emergency Planning Contentions" were -

served this date upon the following by first-class mail, post-age prepaid, or (as indicated by one asterisk) by hand, or (as indicated by two asterisks) by Federal Express.

James A. Laurenson, Atomic Safety and Licensing Chairman

  • Board Panel Atomic Safety and Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Board Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20555 Commission East-West Tower, Rm. 402A Bernard M. Bordenick, Esq.*

4350 East-West Hwy. David A. Repka, Esq.

Bethesda, MD 20814 Edwin J. Reis,.Esq.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Dr. Jerry R. Kline* Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing 7735 Old Georgetown Road Board (to mailroom)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Bethesda, MD 20814 Commission East-West Tower, Rm. 427 Herbert H. Brown, Esq.*

4350 East-West Hwy. Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.

Bethesda, MD 20814 Christopher McMurray, Esq.

Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Hill, Dr. M. Stanley Livingston** Christopher & Phillips 1005 Calle Largo 8th Floor, 1900 M Street, N.W.

Sante Fe, New Mexico 87501 Washington, D.C. 20036 Secretary of.the Commission David J. Gilmartin, Esq.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Attn: Patricia A. Dempsey, Esq.

Commission County Attorney Washington, D.Cs 20555 . Suffolk County Department of Law Atomic Safety and Licensing Veterans Memorial Highway Appeal Board Panel Hauppauge, New York 11787 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

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Eleanor L. Frucci, Esq.* Stewart M. Glass, Esq.*

Attorney Regional Counsel Atomic Safety and Licensing Federal Emergency Management Board Panel Agency U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 26 Federal Plaza, Room 1349 Commission New York, New York 10278 East-West Tower, North Tower 4350 East-West Highway Spence W. Perry, Esq.*

Bethesda,~MD 20814 Associate General Counsel Federal Emergency Management Mr. Marc W. Goldsmith Agency -

Energy Research Group 500 C Street, S.W.

4001 Totten Pond Road Room 840 Waltham, Massachusetts 02154 Washington, D.C. 20472 Mr. Jay Dunkleberger Ralph Shapiro, Esq.*

New York State Energy Office Cammer and Shapiro, P.C.

Agency Building 2 9 East s 40th Street Empire State Plaza New York, New York 11901 Albany, New York 12223 Howard L. Blau MHB Technical Associates 217 Newbridge Road 1723 Hamilton Avenue Hicksville, New York 11801 Suite K San Jose, California 95125 Jonathan D. Feinberg, Esq.

New York State James B. Dougherty, Esq.*' Department of Public Service 3045 Porter Street Three Empire State Plaza Washington, D.C. 20008 Albany, New York 12223 Stephen B. Latham, Esq.* Ms. Nora Bredes Twomey, Latham & Shea Executive Coordinator 33 West Second Street Shoreham Opponents' Coalition P.O. Box 398 195 East Main Street Riverhead, New York 11901 Smithtown, New York 11787

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K(thy . B. -McC16skey l

Hunton & Williams

! P.O. Box 1535 I

707 East Main Street '

! Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: August 2, 1983 l

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