ML20206C207

NRC Staff Response to Intervenors Proffered Contentions Re Emergency Planning Exercise Held on 880607-09.* Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20206C207
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	11/08/1988
From:	Reis E NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC)
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
CON-#488-7465 OL-5, NUDOCS 8811160160
Download: ML20206C207 (82)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA '

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD ,

ra .t g# N l' in the Matter of 3 LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY DocketNo.50-322-OL-5[

(EPExercise)-  !

f (Shoreham Nuc! ear Power Station, '

Unit 1)

NRC STAFF RESPONSE TO INTERVEt:0RS' PROFFERED CONTENTIONS RELATING TO THE EMERGENCY  !

PLANNING EXERCISE HELD ON JUNE 7-9, 1988, j i

1. INTRODUCTION Pursuant to the Licensing Board's Memorandum and Order of October 12, 1988 the Intervenors Suffolk County, State of New York, and Town of 3

Southampton, filed proffered contentions relating to the emergency plan-ning exercise for the Shereham facility held on June 7-9, 1988. The NRC Staff's response to the proferred contentions follows.

! II. BACKGROUND On June 7-9, 1988 a FEMA-graded full participation emergency planning exercise was held for the Shorehan fecility. The exercise was conducted

, by LILCO, along with LERO and various government agencies and private r

persons. FEMA, as the Federal government's lead expert on erergency planning, together with numerous other government agencies and private persons, observed and evaluated that exercise, heither Suffolk County nor New York State participated in the exercise. However, the Intervenors were present to observe the exercise first hand while it was occurring.

LILCO voluntarily prcduced for the Interverers the exercise objectives and 88111601600%$22 P,DR ADOCK O P Dti ..-

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2 scenarios, and nearly all of the exercise-day documents (logs, message forms, etc.) written by exercise players in June over three months ago. II ,

On July 13, 1988 LILCO turned over to the Interverors some 33,000 pages l

of exercise related documents covering every document used by tiie participants in the offsite portion of the exercise 2/ FEMA, together with some 68 Federal Evaluators, evaluated the off-site emergency response i functions at the exercise. 3/ FEMA prcrared a Post-Exercise Assessment (PEA) which was provided to Intervenors on September 8, 1988. In addi-tion, in accordance with 44 C.F.R. i 350, a public meeting at the exer- C cise was held at 5 p.m. on June 15, 1988 at the Mediterranean Manor in Patchoque, New York. U

[ FEMA concluded that the exercise demonstrated adequate overall preparedness on the part of LERO personnel, and therefore, based on the

- evaluation of the plan and the exercise FEMA found that there was reasuable assurance that adequate protective actions could be taken to protect the public health and safety. N In response to a FOIA request.

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1/ "LILCO'S RESPONSE TO NRC STAFF'S MOTION FOR SCHEDt!LE OF THE JilNE 1988 EXERCISE" dated September 16, 1988.

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2/ *LILCO'S ANSWER TO INTERVENORS' NOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME" dated October 11, 1988, at 3.

3/

Post Exereire Assersnent, June 7-9, 1988, Exercise Local Emergency Response Organize 'on (LERO), Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, 3

September 2, 196o, (hereinafter PEA) at xi.

i 4/ FEA at xii.

5/ Letter Grant C. Peterson, Associate Director, FEP)., to Victor Stello. Executive Driector for Operations, NRC, dated September 9, 1988.

P f' f FEMA provided very substantial documentation regarding the exercise to the Intervenors on October 14 and 17,1988.

On September 9, 1988 the NRC Staff moved the OL-3 Licensing Board to

! adopt a proposed schedule for possible litigation of the June 7-9, 1988 ,

emergency planning exercise. In the Staff's motion, both Shnreham, CLI-86-11, 23 NRC 577, 581 (1986) and Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-687, 16 NRC 46'O 468-69 (1982), rev'd in part, CLI-83-19, 17 NRC 1041 (1983) were cited as setting the standards with which the Intervenors must comply in order to have a proffered ccntention admitted. 6_/ It is with this factual and legal background that f the staff responds to the exercise Contentions proffered by the Inter-venors on October 24, 1988.

III. ARGUMEN1 r A. NRC Standards Applicable To Proffered Contentions i

In order for Intervenor's proffered contentions relating to the l j emergency pla.nning exercise to be ednitted as matters in controversy in l

this proceeding, they must satisfy tvo standards. First, each conten- y tion must satisfy the Commission's requirement that the besis for each contention be set forth with reasonable specificity. 10 C.F.R. [

i l

i2.714(b). Second, since they are late filed contentions, under the f Comission's decision in Duke Power Comp _any, et al. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-19, 17 NRC 1041 (1983), balancing of j

}

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"NRC STAFF MOTICF F0P SCHEDULE FOR LITIGATION OF THE JUNE 1988 EXERCISE, dated September 9, 19P2. i l

, e l the five factors of 10 C.F.R. ( 7.714(a)(1) must favor admission of the contentions. The time for filing contentions is set forth in 10 C.T.R.

(

l 2.714(b) which provides:

Not later than fifteen (15) days prior to the holding of the special prehearing conference pursuant to 12.75?a, or where no special prehearing conference is held, fifteen (15) days prior to the holding of the first prehearing conference, the peti-tiener shall file a supplement to his petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions which petitioner seeks to have litigated in the ratter, and the bases for each centention set forth with reasonable specificity. A petitioner who fails to file such a supplement whizh satisfies the require-ments of this paragraph with respect to at least one contention will not be pemitted to participate as a party. Additional tire for filing the supplement may be granted based on a balancing of the factors in paragraph (a)(1) of this section.

The proffered contentions on the emergency exercise were filed after the tire frane permitted by 10 C.F.R. ! 2.714(b) and therefore are late contentiens which rust meet the criteria of 10 C.F.R. I 2.714(a)(1)(1-v) hs more fully delineated by the Comission in CLI-83-19 cited supra.

At the outset, in order for proposed contentions to be found admissible, they must fall within the scope of the issues set forth in the Notice of Hearing Initiating the Proceeding, M and corply with the reouirements of 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(b) and applicable Comission case law.

Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-197, 6 AEC 188, 194 (1973), aff'd, BPI v.

Atomic Energy Comission, 502 F.2d a24, 429 (D.C. Cir.1974); Duquesa

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7 Public Service Co. of Indiana, Inc. (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating StafGn, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-316, ~3 hRC 167,170 (1976). See also Comonwealth Edision Coepany (Carroll County Site) ALAB-601, IN, 18, 24 (1950); Portlard General Electric Co. (Tiojan Nuclear Plant).

Al.AB-534, 9 NRC 287, 289, r. 6 (1979).

i

. e Light Co. (Beaver Valle; Power Station, Unit No. 1). ALAB-109, 6 AEC 243,P45(1973).

The purpose of the basis rec,uirements of 10 C.F.R. I 2.714 are (1) to  ;

assure that the contention in question reises a matter appropriate for litigation in a particular proceeding, 8/ (2) to establish a sufficient foundation for the contention to warrant further inquiry into the subject matter addressed by the assertinn and, (3) to put the other parties sufficiently on notice ". . . so that they will know at least generally what they will nave to defend against or oppose." Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-216, 8 AEC 13, 20 (1974). Fron the standpoint of basis, it is unnecessary for the petition to detail the evidence which will be offercd in sLpport of each [

contention. Mississippi Pever & L M t Co. (Grand Gulf huclear Station, 1

Units 1and2),ALAB-130,6AEC423,4?6(1973). Furthermore, in examining the contentions and the bases therefore, a licensing beard ,

should not reach the me its of the contentions. Houston Lighting and I

Power company (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-590, {

11 NRC 540, 548 (1980); Duke power Co. (Amendment to Materials License ,

l 8/ A contention must be rejected where-(a) it constitutes en attack on applicable statutory requirements;

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J (b) it challenges the basic structure of the Comission's regulatory process or ir en attack on the regulations; t

(c) it is nothing more than a generalization regarding the intervenor's views of what applicable policies ought to be; .

(d) it seeks to raise an issue which is not proper for adjudication I

in the proceeding or does not apply to the faiclity in question; er ,

! (e) it seeks to raist ar issue which is not concrete or litigable.  !

Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atenic Power Station. Units 2 l and 30, ALAB-216, 8 AEC 13, 20-21 (1974).  ;

l i

? , t SPM-1773 - Transportation of Spent Fuel From Oconee Nuclear Station for StorageatMcGu!reNuclocrStation),ALAB-528,9NRC146,151(1979);

Peach Bottom, supy , at 20; Grand Gulf, supra at 426. Thus, it is incumbent upon the Intervenors to set forth contentions and bases there-fore which are sufficiently detailed and specific to demonstrate that the issues they purport to raise are admissible.

With regard to late filed cententions, the Comission set forth the appropriate standards in Duke power Company, et al. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Ur:ts 1 and M. CLI-F3-19,17 NRC 1041 (1983). This decision considered the standards to be applied to contentions premised upon inforration contained in licensing-related documents not required to be prepared early enough so as to enable an intervenor to frame contentions in a timely ranner in accord with the provisions of 10 C.F.R. h ?.714(a)(1).

Those standards are:

(i) Good cause, i# any, for failura to file on time.

(ii) The availability of other means whereby the petitioner's interest will be protected.

(iii) The extent to which the petitioner's participation mcy reasonably be expected to assist in developing e sound record.

(iv) The u tent to which the petitioner's interest will t'e represented by existing parties.

(v) The extent to which the petitiov r's participation will broaden the issues er delay the proceeding.

10 C.F.R. 6 P.714(a)(1). Tee Comission also addressed the application of the Appeal Board's three-part test for good cause to contentions that are filed late becau c they depend solely on information contained in

i institutionally unavailable licensing-related documents. El Under that test good cause exists if a contention: 1) is wholly dependent upon the conte nt of a particular document; 2) could not therefore be advanced with any i

degree of specificity (if at all) in advance of the public availability of t

that document; and 3) is tendered with the requisite degree of promptness l once the document comes into existence and is accessible for'public exami-nation. Catawba,17 NRC at 1043-1044 The Commission detemined that (1) l thestandardsin2.714(a)mustbeappliedtoanylate-filedcontentions, and(2)theinstitutii $1 unavailability of a licensing-related document i does not of itself establish good cause for filing a contention late if the infomation, was otherwise available early enough to provide the basis for timely filing of that contention. El M.at1048. I 9/

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The Comission believes that the five factors together are pemitted [

by Section 189a of the Act and are reasonable procedural requirerents t for determining whether to admit contentions that are filed late  !

because they rely solely on infomation contained in licensing-related docunents that were not required to be prepared or submitted early enough to pavide e tasis for the timely forrrulation of conten- {

tions, gLtawba,17 NRC at 1045,1050.

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10 The Comission set cut in its decision the fundamental principles upon which it based its conclusion that Intenerors are required diligently to uncover and apply all publicly available infomation to the prorpt fomulation of contentions. Id. at 1048-1050. In the F.atter now before this Licensing Beard itis crucial that the Interver, ors identify the source of the infomation upcn which the basis of their proffered contentions re:;t. k'ithout this infomatien a Licensing Board would not be able to make a cogent and infomed decision as to the good cause factor for late filing. Many of the Intervenors' proffered Contentions fail to disclose the source of the infomation upon which they are based and therefore also fail to satisfy the Appeal Board's third criterion regarding good cause as set forth in Catawbs, supra, 17 NPC at 1743. The burden is upon the Intervenors to show when they first received infomation upon which their prof'ered cer.tentions are predicated and to derrcnstrate tFit with due diligence, such infomation was not previously availtble.

Failure to do so requires rejection of a prcffered contention.

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, In their filing of proffered contentions dated October 24, 1988, the Intervenors have not addressed the requirements of the Comission's .

regulations as amplified by the Appeal Board and the Cemission as set forth supra. The Staff specifically discussed the fact that the late file l contention criteria would apply in assessing the admissibility of conten-tiens in citing the Catavb_a ALAB-867 in its Potion to set a Schedule for Litiption.

The proffered contentions, coming so late in the proceeding, should be rejected far faelun of the Intervenors to address these Comission requirvents. 10 C.F.R. 5 2.714(a); Duke Power Co. (Perkins Nuclear

Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), ALAB-615, 12 NRC 350, 352 (1980). Moreover, even if the Board should undertake an examination of the criteria for the

admission of late-filed contentions under the standards of 10 C.F.R. 2.714(a), as amplified by Commission and Appeal Board precedent, most, if not all, of these contentions trust be rejected.

As we have indicated, the Appeal Board stated in Duke powe* Co.

! (Catawba Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-687, 16 N

• 460, 469 1

(1982), that good cause exists for filing a late contention if it (1) is I wholly deperdent on the contents of a document (?) could not have been advanced with any specificity prior to availability of that decurent, and j

(3) is promptly tendered once the docuwent is availatile. Although the  !

{ Comission rejected part of ALAB-687, it specifically approved cor.sidera-tion of these factors in judging whether there is good cause for the late filing of a contention. CLI-83-19, 17 NRC at 1045.

FEMA prcvided its Pet t Exercise Assessnrit (PEA) promptly to the Intervenors after it was issued on September 2,1988. Pursuant to the

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Board order of October 12, the Intervenors filed their proffered con- [

tentions an October 24, 1988. This time span of six weeks is, in the i

view of the Staff, reasonably prompt to the extent the gntentions are  !

4 based solely upon new infomation in the PEA not otherwise previously l available through other reans. The filing is not, however, prompt to the j extent it is premised upon infomation which was available to the Inter--

I venors at the time of the exercise or shortly thereaf ter. Thus, the good causa factor only weighs in favor of Intervenors for those contentions l I which are based on the FEMA report.

'i Intervenors and their consultants observed the exercise in June 1988. }

From their face, Cententions 1, 2, 7, and 10 are based on infomatien which was availatle to the Intervenors at the time of exercise. As to the remaining contentions, Intervenors have failed to show that they are j I

premised upon infomation which was not available to them before the issuance of the FEMA PEA. Although the FEMA report is cited in some contentions Intervenors have not indicated that any of them are wholly  !

dependent upon that document or could not have been advanced with any degree of specificity before receivirt the FEMA document. See l l

Philadelphia Electric Co. (Linerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2),  !

t Al.AB-828, 23 NRC 11, ?! (1986). Thus, they have failed to derenstrate l good cause for filing any of the proffered contentions until several [

t months after the erergency exercise ur. der the standard adopted in  !

I catawba, supra. [

The second criterion of i V.714(a)(1)(ii) is the availability of other reans whereby the Intervenors' interests will be protected. These j Intervenors are in the Jnique position of being able to ensure that f

t effective and workable emergency plans are in place for Shoreham by participating in the planning proces.. This fact was recognized by the Commission in the promulgation of 10 C.F.R. 50.47(c)(1) which rnandates the presumt) tion that in an actual emergency state and local governments will use their best efforts to protect the health and safety of the public. Certainly, if the local governments chcase to aid in the planning process, they will de r: ore to ensure the adequacy of those plans than by challengirg an exsrci:le in which the applicant is forced to q

simulate their actiers in the face of their refusal to participate.

The third criterion is the extent to which the Intervenors' participation may reasonably be expected to assist in developing a sound record. In submitting late filed cententions an intervenor is required to specify the issues it in')nds to ec<er, identify its prospective witnesses and sumarire their propee.ed test' mony. Comonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nucitar Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-86-8, 23 hRC 241, 246 (1986); $sistippi Power and Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Statien, Units 1 ano 2), ALAB-704, 16 hRC 1725, .730 (1982). The effectiveness of an interve tor in contributing to the developtrent of a sound record on other issues or in past proceedings is not sufficient to meet this criterion.

Duke Power Co. (Catawba t.uclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAE-813, 22 NRC 59, 85 (1985)t Washington Public Power Supply System (WPS; Nuclear Project No. 3). ALAB-747, 16 NPC 1167, 1177 (1983). Since the Inter-venors have not identified witneises or set.urized testimony, it is plain that the third factor under 10 C.F.R. I 2.714(a) weighs against admissic.

cf the proffered cententions.

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i The fourth criterion is the extent to which Iri:ervenors' interests j will be protected by other existinC parties. Since there are no other parties in this case, this factor weighs in favor of admission. t 1

The fifth criterion of 10 C.F.R. I 2.714(a)(1) is the extent to which  !

J the Intervenors' participation will breaden the issue or delay the  !

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[ licensing) proceeding. There simply is no question that admission of 1 q

the proffered contentions will broaden the issues and delay the completica  !

< of the proceeding, which is the thrust of this factor. The Detroit t

EdisonCompany,etal.(EnricoFermiAtomicPcwerPlant, Unit 2)ALAB-707, j 16 NRC 1760, 1765-1766 (1982). Therefore, this factor weighs against the [

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admissien of the proffered Contentions, f 1

In sum, when balancing the five f actors of 10 C.F.R. ( 2.714 it is clear that only factor I, weighs in favor of admission of Intervenors' i

,preffered contentions relating to the emergency planninn exercise, while )

i f factors 1, 2, 3 and 5 clearly weigh against Intervenors. Thus, all of the  !

contentions should be rejected on that basis alone. However, should any i f

I

of the contentions be found adnissible under 10 C.F.R. I 2.714, they must I

meet the standards regarding a Fundamental Flaw. As the Staff noted in f l its Motion to Set a Schedule dated September 9, 1988, cententions relating i

i to emergency planning exercises must allege that the exercise revealed e l

fundamental flaw in the emergency plan.

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The Connission statd in CLI-86-11 that the litigation of an erergency extrcise wat to be limited to issues which are mettrial to licensing. 23 NRC at 581; m . Union of Concerned Scientists v. NPC, 735 F.0d1437,A447-48(D.C.Cir.1984), cert.denig,469U.!.1132(1985) j ("UCS"). The Commission stated that review ef exercise results is 4

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"restricted to determining if the exercise revealed any deficiencies which preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that protective measures can t and will be taken, i.e., fundamental flaws in the plan." Id. Accord-  !

ingly, the Comission reasored that, "since only fundamental flaws are material licensing issues, the hearing may be restricted to those issues."

Id.

The purpose of litigating contentiens reltting to an emergency i exercise is to determine whether deficiencies alleged by Intervenors were deronstrated which reflect fundarental flaws in the offsite radiological l energency response plans. CLI-86-11, ?3 NRC 577. 581. Such flaws are l distinguishable from minor or ad hoc problems which only reflect defects in the actol state of preparedness on a particular day, rather than l inherent problent in the emergency plan. See, UE , 735 F.2d at 1441, l quoting, 47 Fed. Reg. 30233 (1982). A finding of reasonable assurance ,

that protective udsures can one will be taken under the plan is based, in j part, ou a detemiration of the adequacy and irplementability of the plan, r f

i 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(a)(2); Carolina Power & L.snt Co. (Shearon Harris  !

j Nuclear Power Plant) CLI-86-24, 24 NRC 76.2, 777(1986). This is aise mde clear by the Memorandun of Understanding between the Federal f

):

l En.ergency llanagement Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Ccmission, 50 Fed.

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Reg. 15485 (April 18, 19EE) wnich states:

An irterim finding on preparedness will be based on review of t

currently available plans and joint exercise results and will .

i irclude an assessment as to (1) whetFtr offsite emergency plers  !

are adequate as measured against the standard and criterie of f NUREG-0654/ FEMA RFP-1, and (2) whether the exercise (s) demon- [

strated that there is raaserable assurance that tie plans can be l; irr'rtrented, h

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In limiting litigation of issues arising from emergency planning exer- {

cises, the Comission clearly indicated that the purpose of such exercises j i

is to determine whether the overall finding of reasonable assurance can be j made. CLI-86-13, 24 NRC at 29-30; Shearon Harris, CLI-86-24, 24 NRC at 776-77.

The Comission's regulations at 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(b)(14) provide that 4

periodic exercises are to be conducted to evaluate major emergency I

response capabilities. Part 50, Appendix E, i IV.F., describes the i i

2 purpose of emergency plan exercists as follows ,

Exercises shall test the adequacy of timing and content of i

) implementing procedures and methods, test emergency equipmert  ;

and corrunications networks, test the public notification system  ;

4 and ensure that emergancy organization personnel are familiar  ;

i with their duties. t

! Thus, Appendix E, 6 IV,F. discussos the proper training to maintain  ;

, the response capabilitics of emergency organizations and indicates that (

j proper implementation of the plan is an important consideration in any

[

1' reasonable assurance finding regarding emergency preparedness. l The "fundamental flaw" standard of CLI-86-11 governs the admissi-

! bilivy of the cententions proffered by the Intervenors on October 24, i i L j 1988. Also applicable are the standards for admissibility of emergency l 2 exerci.e contentions stated in the UCS decision. That decision has

- l been interpreted by the licensing board in Carolina rewer & Light Co.

(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Piant), LBP-5F-49, 22 NRC 899, 910 (1985), I i  !

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affirmed, ALAB-043, 24 NRC 200 (1986), to mean that contentions alleging minor or readily correctable problems should be rejected. E Aside from the failure of Intervenors to comply with the late filed contention requirements and with the requirement for specificity and basis of 10 C.F.R. I 2.714 many of the proffered contentions only allege the most minor errors in the exercise, all of which are readily correctable arid thus fail to reasure up to being fundamental flaws. Apart from all other legal requirements, these contentions should be denied. For example, Contention 13B alleges radiation ronitoring was done too quickly and the probe was held too far away. This is a most minor error which is readily correctable. Contention 130 alleges an insufficient number of RS0s were available at hospitals during the exercise. FEMA noted this and recommended 'an additional monitoring person should be availeble." PEA at 100. Similarly Contention 14C alleges that some bus drivers deviated from their assigned routes. However, FEMA found no delays er problems with routes; and recommended that bus drivers be instructed not to deviate from astigned routes. PEA at 111.

Contention 14H alleges raps provided to several bus drivers were inaccurate. FEMA noted that Long Island expressway exit signs did not always agree with maps given to school bus drivers and recommended that the maps be verified. PEA at 111. None of these isolated errors reet the standards for assessing a fundamental flaw in LILCO's effsite en.ergency 11/ Fundamental flaws nay also be corrected thrcuch revisions to an emer-

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gency plan, hcuever, if such matters are lef t uncorrected they me affect the public health and safety to the extent thet protectise necsures previded by the Cernissier's emergency planning rule cannot be taken.

planning. As noted above, the Comission in CLI-80-11 restricted the Licensing Board's review to determining if there were exercise ". . .

deficiencies which preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that protective measures can and will be taken."

The ultimate question is not whether each aspect of regulatory coepliance was affinnatively demonstrated by the exercise. To the contrary, the issue is, notwithstanding expected failures in execution of the plan, whether there it adequate provision in the plan to ccepensate l

for or correct such feilures so as to permit the conclusion that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective reasures can and will be taken to protect the public in the event of an emergency. An applicant is

ret required to show that the exercise, by itself, demonstrates compliaree with each and every regulatory standard. Rather, an eppitcant must show that the exercise teveals no deficiency in the plans which precludes the l overall fi 'ing of reasonable assurance. It is to be roted that TEMA has found that '.he Shorenam exercise does provide reasonable assurance of

! adequate protection of the public health and safety. E In this respect, the standard is analogous to the burden of an l applicant to defeat a quality assurance contention - to deconstrate that notwithst'r.dtng expected def. ts in construction, there is reasonable

)

assurance that the health and safety of the public will be protected.

See, Union Electric Co. (Callaway Plant. Unit 1), ALAB-NO,18 NRC 343, 346 (1983). Similarly, it is not reasonable to hinge the pronting of a I

11/ Letter deted September 9,1980 free Peterson, FEMA to Stello, NRC, cited supra, l

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license on error-free exercises, because only exercise deficiencies (or breakdowns) which reveal fundamental flaws in the plan would preclude an i overall showing that adequate protective measures can and will be taken.

See, id. I3/ ,

Pursuant 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(a)(2), FEMA's findings in regard to a state er local offsite emergency plan ' constitute a rebuttable presumption on questions of adequacy and implementation capability" of the plan. FEMA defines Deficiencies. Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs), and Areas t I

e<ecorrended for Improvement (AXFIs) as follows:

1.4 EVALUATION CRITERIA l The exercise evaluations presented in Sec. 2 of this report  :

are based on applicable planning standards and evaluation ,

criteria set forth in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1. Interim i

. Supp. 1, November 1987. For the purpose of exercise assessment.

FEMA uses evaluation method to apply the NUREG-0654 criteria. [

FEMA classifies exercise inadequacies as Deficicacies or Areas  !

Requiring Corrective Actions, peficiencies are demonstrated and i

, observed inadequacies that would cause a finding that off-site i emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable l assurance that appropriate reasurer can be taken to protect the  !

health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a  ;

nuclear power facility in the event of radiological energency, i Because of the po*.ential impact of Deficiencies on emergency '

preparedness, they must be corrected promptly through appropri-ate remedial actions, including remedial exercises, drills, or other actions. Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) are demonstrated and observed inadequacies of performance, and although their correction is required, they are not considered, by themselves, to adversely impart pJblic health and safety. An  ;

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13 Construction quality assurance litip tion, for example, must estab-i lish that any breakdown in QA procedures is not of sufficient  ;

dimensions to raise legitimate doubt as to the overall integrity of j the facility and its safety-related components. Callaway, supra.  ;

i "A demonstration of a pervasive failure to carry out the cuality [>

! assurance program might well stand in the way of the receisite safety l

finding." -Id. at 346. Similarly, in energency exercise litigation, 1 6 pervasive failure to cerry out en emergency pinning program ir

! the exercise might preclude a finding of reasorable assurance that r I proteethe measures can and will be taken in an eme*gency. j l f h

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ARCA which is not corrected in future exercises may be reclassi- L fied as a deficiency. In addition to these inadequacies. FEMA  ;

identifies Areas Recommended for Improverent (ARFIs), which are l problem areas observed during an exercise that are rot con- i sidered to adversely impact public health and safety. While not  !

required, correction of these would enhance an organi.tation's level of emergency preparedness. [PEAat10] ,

While the terminology of a FEMA deficiency is very similar to the  ;

definition of a fundamental flaw, a FEMA deficiency is not ecu1 valent to a  !

fundamenth law. First, the Conrtissien has defined a "fundamental flaw" as a matter which preclude:; a finding of reasenable assurance while a FEMA t deficiency is an inadequaev that would cause a finding that preparednest [

t was not adequate.

Here FEMA found that the 1988 exercise did not reveal any ,

"deficiency" in the plan. This Li',ansing Board must now determine whether  !

the exercise nonetheless revealed a "fundamental flaw" in the Plan. Only {

contentions which allege facts indicating that the exercise showed "funda-mental flaws" precluding a finding of reasonable assurance that protective measures can and will be taken car te admitted for litigation, See !

CLI-86-11, 21 NRC at 581.

In short, for cententions on the enercency plat.ning exercite to be l

considered for litigation in this proceeding, under the Commission's l decision in Catawba, CLI-83-10, balancing of the five factors for j late-filed contentions s-t forth in T.714(a) aust weigh in favor of their ,

t admission. Fach conttntion must also meet the standards in 2.714(b)  ;

regardinn sufficient basis and reatenable specificity. In this regard, f

the contention must be limited to the bases actually pled. They cannet be "cenditionally' admitted in hopes o' further fleshing ther cut during discovery. Ca tawba, supra.

Finally, the cententions trust also r:cet the l t

i L .

18 -

standards set forth in CLi-86-11 regarding whether they allege a " u nde-nental flaw" which would preclude a reasonable assurance finding that adequate protective actions can and will be taken to protect the public health and safety.

The full text of each centention is set forth and addressed by the Staff seriatum. Since the Staff believes that all of the contentions should be rejected upon a balancing of the five criteria for admission of late-filed contentions in 10 C.F.R. $ 2.714(a)(1), that argument will not be repeated in each separate respunse. El Instead, the Staff's individual responses will focus only on other objections to the proffered Contentions.

Contention 1: Scope of the Exercise. The Exercise did not comp 1v with applicable regulatory recuirerents, including 10 CFR 16 50.47(a)('1) and (b)(14), and 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix E, i IV.F (particularly i IV.F.1 thereof), in that critical eierrents of preparedness were omitted from or insufficiently tested during the Exercise. Appendix F, i IV.F.1, provides in relevant part:

A full participation exercise */ which tests as much of the_

licensee. State and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation shall be conducted for each site . . . . This exercise shall . . . .

include participation by each State and local government within the plume exposure pathway EPZ and each State within the ingestion exposure pathway Ep2. . . .

• /' Full partibpation' when used in conjunction with emergency ptcparedness exercises for a particular site reans appropriate cffsite local and State authcrities and licensee personnel physically and actively take part in testing their integrated capability to adequately assess

~

14/ Nevertheless, the Staff has pointed out those contentions which are obviously based en facts known to the Intervenors at the tire of tFc actual exercite. For those cententions in particultr, it is clear that good cause for filing them so late is not present.

A 7

l and respond to an accident at a comercial nuclear power .

plant. ' Full participation' includes testing the major  !

j observable portions of the ensite and offsite emercency plans and mobiTization of State, local and licensee  ;

personnel and other rescurces in sufficient numbers to

, verify the craability te respond to the accident j scenario. Uir,phasis added.)

Appendix E, i IV.T. also provides:

Exert. lsce icM test the adequacy of timing and content of implemer .. irocedutes and methods, test emergancy equipment and comunit. '-'s networks, test the public notificttion system, and enst. thet emergency organization personnel are 1 1

i familiar with their duties. L (Fcotnoteomitted). l Notwithstanding tnsie regulatory requirenents, the Esercise omitted i in whole or in part najor observable pertions of LILC0's Plant Aere was a failure in whole or in part to verify various response capabilitles, a failure to test as much of the Plan as was reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation, a failure to test much of the public notification system, a failure to test much of the LERO communications ne+ work, a failure to test tne tining and content of many implementing procedures and riethods, and a failure to ensure that emergency l organization personnel were familiar with their duties. Accordingly, the Exercise results are insufficient to support a finding of reasonable i assurance that adequate protective reasures can and will be taken in the y event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham, as required by 10 CFR l [

l 50.47(a)(1), or a finding that the Exercise complied with regultery l requirements for licensing Shoreham above E% power. Such defic M cies in t

) the secpe of the Exercise are all the more significant given the fact that

( similar deficiancies were cited in LBP-87-32, ALAB-900, and the Appeal Ecerd's unpublished Mercrandun dated May 25, 1988. [

' The Exercise elements which currently can be identified as having .

be. omitted, untested or unverified, in whole or in part, and which t

requn 3 a ruling that the Exercise faned to comply with regulatory

requires 'ts are as follows

:

A. The LILCO public notification system was insufficiently tested, t J

There was no adequate testing or evaluation of LILCO's siren systen and no l test broadcast of an emergency broadcast system ("EBS") message. i Furtherriere, there was no test of the EB! raoio network upon which LILC0 i i places prime reliance in its Plar. The radio station which is reported to ,

have participated to a limited extent in the Exercise -- WPLP -- had, j prior to the Exercise, withdrawn fra LILC0's EB3 and thus, whatever  !

"testing" occurred with respect to WPLP was not pertinent to LiLCO's Plan, i The ESS network, including LILCO's purported lead EBS station --WCBS --

I an id tetain students residinn within the l 4

EPZ at the end of the school dt.y. OPIP 3.6.1 at 31a. During the  !

Exercise, there was a need for these Pldn provisions to be implemented i and, iMeeo, there even was an EBS message (Eb5 No. 7) which purported to  :

addrtss this situation. Nevertheless, LILCO did not attempt to contact any of these schools either before or during the Exercise and ncne of f these schools or their personnel participated in the Exercise, i Acccrdingly, there was no testing of the ability of these schools or LERO  :

to implement these Plan provisions, there was no testing of a major  !

obse e le portion of LILCO's Plan, and LILCO failed te test as much of  ;

its ilan os was reasonably achievable without mandatory public  ;

particir" ion.  :

D. LILCO's Plan calls for school children fror the EPZ to be  !

evacJted to relocation caters et the Nassau County Coliseum and the '

Nassau County Community Collegs. Plan at 4.?-1. In fact, during the l Exercise, LILC0 pretended that there was such an evacuation. Further, i LILC0 also pretended that many of the children attending school cutside j the FPZ but who reside with'n the EPZ were relocated late on Day I te those Nassau County freilities. Nevertheless, those critical facilities t were not activated, staffed, testeri, or evaluated durirg the Exercise. l This is anothcr example of a failure to test integrated response f I

i l

I

1 . .

1 1

- capabilities, the omission of a major observable portion of LILCO's Plan, I l

l and the failure to test as much of LILCO's Plan as was reasonably j achievable without mandatory sublic participation, i E. LILCO's plan for scicol evecuation, under which LILCO-employed

drivers are responsible for evacuating all or portions of the EP2 school children, was inadequately tested during the Exercise. See, e.g., FEMA GM  !

EV-2. For example, only one school participated with LIECD, even though i LILCO's school plan requires there to be close integration of Lf",0 and [

i school personnel; only three actual LERO buses arrived at the Briarcliff l Elementary school; there was no demonstratien during the Exercise of hew ,

i school children and other bus passengers would be directed after disembarking buses (FEMA Report at 113); and only 30 LERO school bus l drivers (out of 613) actually were dispatched to a bus yard (and this i "demonstration" was problem-ridden, since some bus yards did not even have  ;

i the LERO bexes containing driver assionment packets). Thus, these drivers  :

could not be dispatched and there could be no "test" of their response j

capabilities. Further, there was no demonstration cf how buses coming {

j from potentially centaminated zones would be directed upon arriving at i relocation or reception centers, or hew potentially centaninated school i children wculd be monitored and decontaminated if necessary. There was also no demonstration cf how LILCO would provide adult supervision on .

I evacuating the school buses.

I F. LILCO's Plan for evacuation of special fecility residents (adult j hores, nursing hones, and hospitals) was inadequately tested during the i i Exercise. There are 39 such facilities within the Shoreham EPZ, .

! ordinarily housing approximately 2,697 residents. OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 2.  !

! The LILCO Plan provides that at the time of a General Emergency, assuming i i the issuance of an evacuation protective action recommendation LERO l would dispatch ambulances and arbulettes to many of these health care '

j facilities within affected zones to transport residents to receptier l

tespitals or other appropriate facilities. OPIP 3.6.5. During the 4 Exercise, however, nore of these facilities perticipated in the Exercise; i I

l indeed, none of these facilities was so much as contacted by LILCO or FEPA during the Exercise. l In addition, the purported demonstration of transportation l l capabilities -- i.e., the use of ambulences and ambulettes or mini-buses i l te effect evacuation -- provided no meaningful data. Only 13 such t i

vehicles (six ambulances and seven ambulettes) reportedly partfeipated in 1 the Exercise, and only a portion of these vehicles perticipated in any I demonstration of the implementation of protective actions for special ,

Further, there was no reaningful interaction between LILCO i

1 facilities.

and the ambulance companies relied upon by LI'.00, between those arbulance  !

companies and the special facilities to which they were supposed to (

- report, or between those ambulance companies and the special facilities i

outside the EPZ to which the anhulance companies were supposed to pretend i

to evacuate residents and personnel. The Licensing Peard and the Appeal  !

Board faulted LILCO for failing to demonstrate such interaction in the .

! 1986 exercise. ALAB-900, slip, op at 40; LBP-87-?.", 26 MC at 500-01. l 1 LILC0's failure to do so again in 1988 reficcts a continued f ailure te l satisfy 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix E. 5 IV.F.1.  :

1 G. LILCO failed to test its capability to implemert evacuation of  !

I the homebound disehled population residirs within the EPZ. The L!LCO Plan i

l l

l

• T"--2------g*r- T--99-tm

o .

l L

I provides that at the tire of a General Emergency, the homebound disabled i are to be transported via ambulance or ambulette to reception hospitals. .

OPIP 3.6.5. To demonstrate this, LERO is reported to have dispatched one l ambulance to Zone C end one anbulance to Zone B to simulate the evacuation ,

of the homebound disabled. No actual person was transported, however.

Moreover, the dispatch of only two vehicles failed to demonstrate any actual capability to evacuate this segment of the EPZ population. Thus, the testing was far too limitt.d to comply with Appendix E requirerents.

See ALAB900, slip op at 40-43.

"' ~

H. The LILCO Plan relies on numercus hospitals, nursing homes, and similar facilities outside the EPZ for relocation services and necessary health care for special fa:ility evacuees. These reception hospitals are to be selected at the time of the emergency. OPIP 3.6.5 Atts. 5 and 16.

Those facilities, however, did not participate in the Exercise and LERO demonstrated nn capability to implement such selection. Further, the LILCO Plan fails to include agreements for such facilities. The omission of these facilities from the Exercise constitutes non-compliance with Appendix E.

I. Only one ambulance was dispatched to test LILCO's ability to transport irdured and centaminated victims. (Again, no "victim" was actually transported.) And, only one radiatien safety officer was present during LILCO's medical drills designed to demonstrate LILCO's ability to care for injured contaninated victics. FEMA Report at 99. As a result, the test of these portions of LILCO s Plan (OPIP 4.2.2) was too limited to comply with Appendix E.

J. The LILCO Plan calls for the use of congregate care centers for evacuees from a Shorehan cmergency. These centers are to be staffed by the American Red Cross. Plan at P.2-9. During the 1986 exercise, two centers were activated, and the American Red Cross participated. During the 1988 Exercise, however, no congregate care centers were activated, re Red Crcss personnel participated, and no testing of precedures or comuni-cations was effected. FEMA Report at M. These omissions demonstrate non-compliarce with Argendix E.

K. Procedures for public education and the dissemination of infermation to the public er a periodic basis, as set forth in OPIP 3.8.1 of ti'e LILCO Plan, and a demonstration of the adequacy of public edbeation materials, were onitted fren the Exercise. Nevertheless, LERO EES messages continually referred to these materials. These omissions deconstrate non-ccmpliuice with Appendix E. The onissions are of even greater concern in light of the fact that on Jure 16, 1988, only shortly after the Exercise, LILCO's draft public education brochure was determined by FEFA to be of questionable utility and effectiveness.

L. The LILCO Plan provides that special pcpulation evacuees are to be transported to LILC0's Brentwood facility for monitoring or to the reception facility's nuclear medicine or radiology departrent or to LERO staging areas. See OPIP 3.6.5 at 5, Sa, 9 and 12. Procedures related to the radiological 7cnitoring and decontarination of evacuees from special facilities were excluded frcm the Exercise, despite the fact that the Exercise scenario created a r(ed for these functions te be perforced.

These crissions demonstrate ren-conpliance with Ar;rcrdix E.

M. LILCr's Plan relies upon the participation of other entities, including the Long h4rd Railroad, the FAA, the ll.S. Departnent of

O e l l

23 -

agriculture, and the U.S. Department of Commerce. Plan at 2.2-1 thru 2.2-10. None of these entities participated in the Exercise, despite the fact that the Exercise scenario called for interacticn with these ,

entities. FEMA Report at vii. 10. These omissions are further evidence I i of the failure to comply with Appendix E. L i

N. The Exercise scenario resulted in radiation releases of  !

sufficient severity to require protective action reconwendations ( PARS") '

in the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ, including portions of southern Connecticut. Despite this fact.'there was no testing of the capability to i implement ingestion pathway protective actions in the Connecticut portion of the ingestion pathway EPZ. This failure was contrary to the reoutre-ments of Appendix E. See ALAB-900, slip op, at 0; LBP-87-32, 26 NRC at 3

498-99.

0. Although LILCO relies upon some 42 bus companies for implementa- l J tion of the protective action of evacuation of the general, school and j

! special populations (OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 3a), an insufficient number of these  ;

corpanies participated in the Exercise to demonstrate the ability to implement evacuation, and there was no testing of non-participatine  ;

) companies to deterinine their availability.

P. The LILCO Plan relies upon local ambulance corpanies to provice j ambulances to evacuate special facilitias, such as hospitals and nursing j

homes. However, only a few of the many companies iclied upon by LILCO j participated in the Exercise, end there was no testing of non- l

participating companies to detertwine their availability. In addition. l l participation of those ambulance conpanies taking part in the Exercise was f i limited to providing 13 vehicles (7 ambulances and 6 ambulettes). The i j

LILC0 Plan provides that ambulance companics will provide 193 vehicles.

OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 6. The provision of 13 vehicles does not demonstrate the

' capability to mobilize 103 ambulances and ambulettes. l Q. The Exercise failed to test sufficiently the communications i network described in LILCO's Plan. The LILCO Plan r, alls for corrunica- l i tiers between LERO and: schenis inside and outside the CPZ; school reception canters; hospitals inside and oute t- ine EPZ; adult and i l

nursing hores inside and cutside the EPZ; LER0's lead EBS station; other

radio stations; congregate care centers; the American Red Crnss; the Long  !

Island Railroad; the FAA; other federal government entities; and other [

i organizations. See Plan, Fig. 3.4.1. These many aspects of the LILCO/ l LEP,0 ccmunications network were omitted in whole or in substantial part l from the Exercise.

I' I

RESPONSE

I intervenors have made no showing that contentien 1 should be admitted I under the late-filed criteria set out in 10 C.F.R. I ?.714(a). Since the l Intervenors were aware of the scope cf the exercise at the tire it was f I

ccnducted, this contentior could have been filed irrediately thereafter. l l

I I i i i

I f

i i

i

Intervencrs need not have awaited issuance of the FEMA report. At this time, it cannot be admitted for litigation. See Catawba, CLI-83-19. E Further, this contention without its bases, es well as all succeeding contentions, is too vague and general to put parties on notice of what to I

litigate. Thus, the Staff also opposes admission of this contention en additional grounds, except to the extent it is premised on the facts alleged in bases B and E, and bases A. F, G. I, 0 and D to the limited extent set cut below. To the extent basis A deals with the adequacy of the EBS systen in the LILCO plan, it hes already been found adecuate in LBP-88-24, and cannot be relitigated here. The Staff has no separate objection to the admission of basis F to the extent it alleges thct the evacuation of special fecility residents was inadequately testad.

However, litigation should not encompass the cuestion of whether there was any "meaningful interaction" between LILCO, the ambulance conpanies used, and the special facilities serviced. Intervenors' allegation concerning that issue is overly vague and fails to place the parties on notice of what would be litigated in the proceeding, t

The Staff also objects +o the admission of bases G and I except to the extent they allege that LILCO did not adequately test its ability to evacuate the homebound disabled population or to evacuati. or care for injured and contaminated victims. The allegation that no indi-vidual was actually transported durino the exercise should be rejected, however, because 10 C.F.R. Part 50. Appendix E. IV.F.1 explicitly states

~

15/ The Staff, in its sutrission of September 9,19P8, calling for a schedule for litigation of the June 198P exercise specifically roted the applicability of Catawba to late-filed certentions such as thest.

that public participation is not recuired in emergency exercises.

Similarly, the Staff also objects to the admission of bases 0 and P to the except to the extent that they allege that an insufficient number of bus and ambulance compan!es participated in the exercise. Hcwever, as there is no conceivable reason or way for LILCO to test the availability of non-participating ccepanies. Theportionsofbases0andPEhichreferto such companies should therefore be rejected.

The Staff also opposes admission of bases C, D and H since they are based or the false assumption that the exercise must demenstrate LILCO's ability to implement protective actions outside the EPZ. Under 10 C.F.P.,

50.47(b)(10),thelicenseeisonlyret,uiredtodevelopprotectiveactions for the EPZ in the offsite emergency plan, and under 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, 5 IV.F.1, tae licensee reed only test the ma, tor observable portions of that plan. Additional?y, the allegation in basis H that LILCO's plan does not include agreements with relocation facilities outside the EPZ raises a planning issue which should not be considered during litigation of the exercise. Basis K should t'so be rejected because it raises a planning issue, not a matter which was tested by the emergency exercise.

The Staff further opposet admission of this contention to the extent that it is prenised on the facts alleged in bases J and M. There is no regulatory requirement that any federal governmental entity participate in emergency exercises. Thus, the fact that reither the F.A.A., the U.S.

Department of Agriculture nor the U.S. Department cf Concerce participated doet not reflect any flaw in the exercise. Additierelly,10 C.F.F. 50.47, Appendix E, i IV.F.6 provides that involverent of state and local gcvern-

g --- - - - - -

rents is not required to the extent thet they refuse to participate and

! $ IV,F.1 provides that the licensee must test cnly those portions of the ,

emergency plan which are reasonably echievable. Since tne State of Connecticut, the American Red Cross and the congregate care facilities designated by LILCO refused to participete in the 1988 exercise, their ,

lack of participation does not reflect any flaw in the scope of the i exercise. As to the Long Island Railroad, Intervenors have not identified any role of that entity which woulu constitute a major observable eierent  !

I of LILCO's plan which must be tested.

The Staff also opposes adnission of this contentior to the extent that it is prerised on the allegations contained in basis L on the ground that Intervenors do not cite an emission which reflects a flaw in the scope of the exercise. As the FEPA report specifies at page 112, the exercise did test LER0's ability to monitor and decontaminate erergency f j

l workers. Since Intervenors provide no reason for concluding that the procedures would be any different for other individuals, such as evacuees l from special facilities, the basis is not adequately specific and Inter-l venors have not raised a legitincte issue for litigation. The allegations i

l contained in basis Q should also be rejected as they are unsupported and '

overly vague. Intervenors previde absolutely no reason for concluding that LILCO's communicatior. network was rot sufficiently tested by the l exercise. [

(

Contention 2: The Evercise's false Prenises and Assur>tions. The  ;

Exercise was prenised on the concept that in an emergenc .ERO personnel (

would interact with p rsonnel frem various revernnents (y, Suffolk Ccerty, j

?!ew York State, Nassau County, State of Connecticuti in particular stys, I including approving EPS ressages, authorizing LERO personnel to take i, varicus actiers (like sacrding sirers, broadcasting EBS ressages, settire

up traffic control points), and even delepeting to LER0 the permission and/or authority necessar," for the implementation of various aspects of LILCO's Pian. FEMA also assumed that various rescurces of the governmerts would be provided at various tires during the Exercise (such as New York State ingestion pathway teams). However, neither the FEMA Report, FEMA '

control cell docunents, nor any other materials relating to the Exercise provide a factual basis for FEMA's assumptions. Indeed, some of those assumptions (such es authorizing LERO to direct traffic) involve actions which would be illegal for the governments to authorize, and which the affceted governrents have stated clearly would never occur. The LILCO Plan discusses LER0's ability to interface with affected governments. See Plan at 1.4-2 thru 1.4-2c; OP]P 3.1.1. Att. 10. Such interface capabilT-ties are required by NUREG 0054 Rev. 1. Supp. 1, i 11.A.I.b. A "test" of such interface capabilities ceuld only be valid and probative if the i i

actions and cerduct assumec en behalf ef the affected governrents havs a basis in reality. As FEMA's assurptions have no such bacit -- and indeed frequenti," are contradicted by law and fact -- the Exercist results provide no basis for a fir. ding that LILCO could interface prcperly with j

- government personnel.

4 PESPONS_E The Staff opposes edmissici of this contention on the ground that it l is an attack on the regulations. The assumptiers cited by the Inter-verors are randated by 10 C.F.R. 50.47(c), which was recently upheld in Corrorwealth of Massachusetts v. Nuclear Reculatory Ccmission, 856 F.?d 378 (1st Cir. 1980). Under that regulation, the NRC is required to recognize the reality that state and local government officials will exercise their best ef' orts to protect the public health and safety in the i event o' a radiological emergency. In carrying out their responsibilities in this respect, those officials must necessarily interface with LERO, as

! well as supply resources and authorize certain LERO activities. Further, good cause for the untinely subr.issien of this contentior. Fees not exist since it ceuld have been subnitte before the erergency exercise, i i r

Contention :: T' e FEMA Feport's Unf curded Conclusions. FEMA has

' concluded that the Exercise results perrit FEMA to make a reasonabic

, assurance findirg. See 10 CFR ! 50.47(a)(2), in licht of the many fur.darcntel fleks inTILCO's Plan reve t. led by the Exercise, wHrh are I

explained in greater detail in the contentions below, this conclusion is i groundless and should be given no weigtt i by the Board. In particular,  ;

, FEMA has overlooked, or ignored, many serious problems experienceo by l

LILC0 in its attempts to inplement its Plan, and has inappropriately ninimized the significance of the problems that were identified.

i FEMA was aware, or should have been aware, of virtually every problem l set forth in the contentions below. A fair, balanced assessment by FEMA .

would therefore have resulted in a finding that fundamental flaws dontinue i 1 to exist in LILCO's Plan. Instead, however, FEMA chose to ignore f.lLCO's l 1 inability to implement its Plar, as demonstrated during the Exercise.

• This conclusion is strongly supportei by scrutiny of the FEMA Report, as ,

i well as the FEMA control cell locs completed by FEttA evaluetors during the  !

i Exercise. Those logs reveal that FEF A was well aware of the deficiercies  ;

that were demonstrated during the Exercise, but chose to downplay those portions of the Exercise which would tot support a reasonable assurarce l finding. In addition. FEPA chose to ignore serious limitations on the scope of the Exercise.

Discovery and further proceedings will likely reveal many more {

instances of FEt:A's failure to accord ebserved prcblem areas the weight  !

they deserve. Yet, even a prelindrery listir.g of some problems minimind [

by FEMA makes clear that FEMA's Report and any FEMA reasonable assurance .

j findirg are entitled to no weight. The following list, combined with the d

nunerous other examples set forth in the contentions below, are indicati te i

of FEMA's noncritical approach to its assessrent uf the LILCO Exercise.  ;

A. LILCO failed to develop and issue prompt ingestion PARS. Ever i FEMA agrees that ingestion pt.thway PARS "were very slow to be developed.' t FEMA Report at 51. Ir actuality, the delay in issuing ingestion pathway t Pars was over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Althcugh LILCO had sufficiert scenario infoma- i tion available on the rorning of Day 2 of the Exercise (and, indeed, even socner; see Contentien 11) to issue PARS for the 10-50 mile ingestion pathway area, such PAPS were not conveyed to the public until 12:50 p.m.  ;

on Day 3. The ability to prerptly advise the public of PARS is of [

critical importance to public health are safety. LILCO's failure to do so [

should have resulted in a findire that the LILCO Plan is flawed, thus t precluding any finding of reasonable assurance. Instead, FFPA concluded [

that, as a result of LILCO's delay, EOC Objective 29 and BPO Objective 29 i were "partially net." FEMA Report at 51. There was no justificetion for !

this FEPA conclusion. [

B. The Exercise results demonstrated that FEMA's EBS ressages were [

woefully inadequate. See Contention 6. Many were so poorly constructed as to be ineffective. See FEMA Report at 45; Contention 6. Others contaired incorrect data about the nature of the release for extended .

periods of tire. See FEt'A Report e.t 45; Contention 6. Sinilar problems,  !

when revealed during the 1986 Shorehan exercise, were found by the Board (

in LBP-00-2 to constitute a fundamental flaw in LILC0's Plan. 27 f:PC at t 170-172. LILCO experienced the san Linds of problers durirg the 1988  !

Exercise, randating the conclusion that LILCO's Plan centinues to be l fundamentally flawed. Indeed, if EPS ressages are so ineffective that t some listcrers will ret stay tuned (FEMA Report at 45), it is clear that  :

the public will not be protected. But, consistent with its uncritical  !

approach to the 1988 Exercise, FEMA found "reasonable assurarce" -- even  !

t

l j in the fact of these obvious prchlems. Under such circurstances, this FEMA finding is entitled to no weight.  !

C. FEMA also ignored LILCO's failed atterpt to demonstrate its j alert and notification capability. Fifty-seven cf the 89 LILCO sirens i failed to sound as planned during the Exercise. See Contention 5. This  !

notification failure has serious implications for safety. It is cleer (

j that LILCO intended to test its sirens during the Exercise, and that this  !

intention was kncwn to and agreed upon by FEMA. Yet, long after the 6 1 sirers failed to sound FEtiA pretended that this failure had never ,

I occurred and even fcund that the notification objective (EOC Objective 12) )

l was met. There was, and is, no basis for such a conclusion.

! D. A review of the FEMA control cell logs reveals that FEMA l

evaluators present in the control cell during the Exercise documented many r problems occurring during the course of the Exercise, particularly in the i

area of LILCO's demonstration of the capability to interface with the ,

government "officials" simulated by FEMA. See Contention a. Yet, the FEMA Report is devoid even of hints of such problems. See FEttA Report et j j 49, 55 (finding interface objectives to be met).

E. F HA failed to give appronriate weight to recurrent problems.  !

3 .

. FEMA's cwn 911 dance counsels that ARCAs that reoccur in subsecuent '

exercises ma, appropriately be reclassified as a Deficiency. FEMA Report l at 10. Although at least five ARCAs from 1986 occurred again in the 1908 f Exercise (FEMA Report at 107-110), FEMA did not reclassify those ARCAs as i i Deficiencies or even so much as (iscuss the possibility of doing so. i j Other e,:emples atound, but at the foregoing makes clear, FEMA has [

engaged in a ese-sided, incomplete, and inaccurate assesseent of the -

4 Exercise results. Accordingly, FEMA's findings and conclusions, as set i forth in the FEMA Report, rust be rejected.

! r<ESPONSE 4 i l The Staff opposes edmissinn of this contention on the ground that it j 1

{

is merely an ettack on FEt'A and therefore does rot raise any litigable j issue in this proceedirC. Although Intervencrs wish to conduct discovery 4 and further proceedinas into the question of whether FEMA chose to ionore  !

c  ;

. or downplay exercise problens, this is not en appropriate subject for l litigation before this Board. As the Cemission stated in Lon? !sland I i

Lightine Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-11. 23 NRC  !

577, 581 (1986), only center.tiens which plead that the excrcise demon- l-i strated fundarental flaws in LILC0's erergency plan may be admitted. {

l I

n .. - --, . - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - , .

r Contention 4: Fundamental Flaws Relating to LILCO's Interface with State and Local Governments l l

Ono of the objectives of the Exercise was to- I

[d]emonstrate the capability of utility off-site response organization personnel to interface with nonparticipating state and local governments through their rebilization anu .

provision of advice and assistance. l t

EOC Objective 37, FEMA Report at 13. Because neither Suffolk County, the  !

State of New York, Nassau County, nor the Sta of Connecticut partici-  !

i pated in the Exercise, the participatien of those governments was '

"simulated" through the use of FEMA controllers who played the roles of I various State and Coenty officials. FEMA Report at 8-9. The Exercise  !

revealed, however, that LILCO is incapable of "interfacing" pronptly and i effectively with State and local governnents. LERO personnel, in contact i with simulated "officials," consistertly provided inaccurate or confusing information, did not know pertinent infomation that they were asked I about, contacted the wrcng "goverrrents" for infomation, and were untimely in their contacts with the simulated governmental "officials", i These consistent "interface" prolilems censtitute a furdamental flaw in  !

LILCO's Plan, as that Plan relies on the atsumption that State and local governnents would use their best efforts and follow the LILCO Plan in an l actual Shoreham emergency. See 10 CFR i 50.47(c)(1)(iii)(B); Plar, at [

1.4-2 thru 1.4-2c; OPIP 3.1.1 Att. 10, Assumin; the validity of that assurption for the sake of argument only, and assuming again for the sake of argument, that the conduct of the  ;

l government sinulators (i.e., the FEMA controllers) had a basis in reality j (see Contention 2), such participation in and adherence to the LILCO Plan ,

l 1s impossible if LILCO is unable to interface effectively with the t governments that it assumes will participate in the implementatter o' its i Plan. Accordingly, LILC0 has failed to demonstrate that it has satisfied i EOC Objective 37, and that its Plan comports with 10 CFR 16 50,47(b)(1) l l and (3), 10 CFR l 50.47(c)(1)(iii)(B), and NUREG-0654, Pev. 1. Sup. 1 il ,

!!.A. E and F. The failure to satisfy these regulatory requiremnts j

precludes a finding of reasorable assurance that adeouate prettetive measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency  ;

at Shoreham, as required by 10 CFR i 50.47(a)(1), and requires a finding that LILCO's Plan is fundamentally flawed. Examples of LILCO's failure to ,

demonstrate its ability to interface with State and local governments i follow: .

A. LILCO was untir:ely in keepirig simulated "officials" informed cf i the status of the emergency. For instance, while the emergency was [

upgraded to an Alert at 5:40 a.m. on Day 1, the State cf New York was not i infortned of that fact until over an hcur later at 6:43 a.m. In fact, ,

LILCO's untireliness prompted a LILC0 apology to the simulated "Governor" i on Day 1 for its delays. Similarly, a FDtA controller complair.ed that LERO was very slow in forwarding prtinent dose rate estir.ites to the i sirulated Suffolk Court) Eealth Cemissioner.

5. When LILCO activated its pronpt notification systen on Day 1, 57  !

of the syster's 89 sirers failed te scend. Their activatier was necessary l i

4 0 to alert residents to tune to the ERS and receive the PARS contained in EBS No. 2, including evacuation of r. ore than half of the EPZ. Despite the potential significance of the siren failure. LERO failed to convey notict of this situation to the goverrrents.

C. FEMA controller logs indicate that the information provided to the simulated government "officials" was often wrong, confusing or unhelpful. For instance:

1. LILCO knew or should have known by noen on Day I that EPZ plumeexposureprotectiveactionguideline("PAG") limits were predicted to be exceeded. FEMA Report at 45. LILCO never so infomed the simulated government "officials" on Day 1. Indeed, to the contrary, the State of New York was infomed about 1:30 p.r. on Day 1 that LERO would tell the public that the doses that might bc received were comparable to a chest x-ray.

On Day 2. LILCO advised the New York State control cell that it d ' Jt expect any irgestion-related problems and was confirmire the absere of suc1 problems in order to acsure the public. Such advice to New York State was not accurate, based upon available s > i at that tire. FEMA Report at 51. ,

3. LERO gave the simulated gevernment "officials" confusing infomatior about the protective action it was recomeending for senool children ("early dismissal") at approxinately 6:00 a.n. en Day 1, even though a FEMA ccrtroller noted that such a recommendation was inappropri-ate since school was not yet in session.

l 4. One government "official" nnted that the LERO Health l Coordinator was "not much help" in passing along critical information I about the emergency.

I

5. Another government "official" noted LILCO,s confusion regarding the information which LERO was providino cencerning the status of protective actions for the Rocky Point School District. (This same "official" noted LER0's contentious attitude in dealing with the "governments.")

6. A LERO representative calling one government "of*icial" incorrectly told the "officic1" that Zone G was sheltering when it was not.

7. The sinulated Suffolk County Executive was given contradictory inforration by a LEP.0 representative regarding the statut of access control around evacuated areas.

8. LERO representatives demonstrated confusion regarding what protective actions were recommerdad for schools outside the EPZ, and how a

I parents wert supposed to reunite with children attending schools outside the EPZ, but who live within the EPZ.

9. Still other LERO rrrresentatives identified the Alert stage as having been reached at 6:13 a.m. of Day 1 (the time of the first EBS message), rather than at 5:40 a.r.

D. Many LERO representetives calling simulated goverment "officials" had difficulty conveyino pertinent information. Certroller logs complain specifically that LILCO employees who called simulated

• of ficials" did not est with whoni they were speaking, dic r.ot identify s,ho they were, conveyed very general or "sague, nondescript" information, ard gave incomplete information. Indeed, one FEPA certroller noted that a LERO representativt erpeared *very shool ur" when atterpting to rcreend to

questions. LERO representetives in contact with a simulated Suffolk County "officiel" were also unable to convey how many rescue and fire vehicles were needed for hospital evacuation purposes.

E. LERO workers also called simulated government "officials" for infomation that was actually in the Plan and should have been known to the LERO callers. For instance, many LERO workers called a simulated "official" for addresses of certain schools. As the "official" noted, <

those addresses are located in the LILCO Plan. Sec ODIP 3.6.5 Att. 3.

F. LERO werkers contacted the wrong simulated government to attempt to obtain inferration. For instance, the LERO Evacuation Coordinator called a simulated "official" of the State of New York to detemine whether there were any impediments on the roads in Suffolk County. As the "official" comented, the proper simulated government to have called was Suffolk County.

G. As events developed. LILCO sometimes failed to "interface" at all, choosi.4 instead to make key decisions without "goverrnent" concurrerce. For instance, LERO ranagerent infomed the FEttA controller simulating a New York State "official" that the ingestion PAP had been extended to 50 miles after the decision was made. Thus, LEPO rr.anagement failed to consult with the simulated New York State "official" cod failed to seek New York State cerrurrence prior to the issuance of the decister.

, such bproper practice led a FEMA controller to conclude that there existed "a problem of lack of coordination with (the) State of New York."

similarly, although LEPO traffic control inforred a simulated New York State "official" that access control would not begin until the State I concurred in the access corstrol plan, this was not the case. Prior to transmission of State approval or disapproval, access control was implerrented on the perineter of Zenes 0, P S. M and N.

H. Foreover, wten governnental approval was requested by LERO, it was often requested prenaturely. Thus, LERO expected simulated government "efficials" to agree to actions without having before t.'em dll infomation required to make such cecisions. This prorpted a FEMA controller simulating a Suffolk County "official" to state thet "LERO should clarify what they whnt and when they can deploy" before seeking Suffolk County approval, I. LERO's inability to interface prorptly and efficiently with covemaent "of ficials" resulted in delays in getting PARS onto the air waves. The PAR tt the Site Area Emergency ("St.F") level was delayed from approximately 7:33 a.m., wit.n the SAE was declared at the LERO EOC, until approximately 8:CE a.m., when EBS No. 2 was broadcast. This meant that although the SAE has an autceatic ("immediate") PAR of placing animals within two miles of Shereham on stored feed, there was a delay of more than 30 minutes in getting the PAR to the public. See FEMA Peport at 39 a0; EBS No. 2; OPIP 3.0.C. at i 5.1.1.1.b. It appears that it took LERO until 8:03 e.n. to obtain the "approval" of Suffolk Ccunty to issue the PAR.

Similarly, there was a delay in the initial evacuation and sheltering retification te the public from approximately 9:34 a.n., when the General Energency was deciered, until 10:26 a.m., when the puMic was noti'ied.

See FEMA Report at 39 30. Indeed, even though a General Erergency recuires an "imediate recorrendation to place rilk anirols within 10 r.iles on stored feed" (OPIP 3.'. 6 ! 5.1.* .1.c), tH s reconrendetion v3s 1

O .

not conveyed to the public until after 10:26 a.m. on Day 1 Thus, frorn 9:34 a.m. until 10:26 a.m., an incorrect PAR was being con. eyed to the public via EBS No. 2. LILCO experienced similar delays with many other EBS messages as well. See Contention 6 belew, where similar matters are discussed. To the exteiit that LILCO may claim that these delays resulted in whole or in part from the need to obtain governmental approvals, the delays demonstrate that LILCO is incapable of effecting prompt and effee-tive interface vith government officials and that such delays tave the potential to impact public health and safety severely, indeed, the delays experienes. during the Exercise meant that the public would not have been advised to take protective actions as promptly as otherwise night have been the case and, accordingly, right have resulted in persons not being alerted to harmful radiction dangers until a later time.

REjf0NSE E

Intervenors have made no shewing that this contention should be adnitted under the criteria for late filed cententions in 10 C.F.R.

l 2.714(a). Although the contentier. cites the FEMA Report in a few instsnees. Intervenors have rot shown that they could not have filed this l

contention withcut awaitirg that repert. SEe Catawba, CLI-83-19.

l The Staf' also opposes admissien of this contention as t'eing too broad and general, except to the extent it is precised on the facts alleged in bases A and D and bases C1. C2. C6 and C9. The remaining sub-parts of basis C should be rejected. Cases C3, C4. C5. C7 and C8 are all vague in that they fail to include any specific instaneet in which LERO provided incorrect infomation, but only make generalized and unsupported allegations. Further, they raise only ad hee prcblems which do not rise to the level of a fundsmental flaw.

Pases E. F. G and H should also be rejected because the oreblens cited by Interverors are cbviously niner, and therefore are r.et irdicathe of any fundarental flaw in the LILCO ecorgency plan. Pasis ' sheuld also be rejected en the ground that Irittrvenors base not alltstt' eny nexu:

between LEP0't ability to interface with goverrsent "officials" and ary

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ i

delay which occurred in broadcasting PAP's. The fact that such delays occurred does not, in itself, provide a basis for concluding that LERO did not communicate effectively with the contrn1 cell, .,d Intervenors provide no basis for their allegation that delays were caused by poor comunication on the part of LEPO.

Contention 5: Fundamental Flaws Relating to Notification to <

alert NRC regulctions the public require that of an accident an applicant promptly. dtmonstrate 10 CFR the ability ll 50.47(b)(5) ard (7);

10 CFP part 50, Appendix E, 6 !Y.D.3; and NUREG-0654 H !!.E.4-6. Fer  ;

example, under the NRC's regulations, LERO is required to notify tre public of the need for protective actions within 15 ninutes of the time ,

that LERO authorities are notified by the plant (i.e., usually by +he i Emergency Operaticns Facility ("EOF") in the case of Shoreham) of the need  ;

for protective actions. See also LBP-85 12, 21 NRC 644, 757-59. Such a prompt notification capabTTTty is crucial to an adequate erergency '

response; without it, the public hicht remain ignorant of tbc emergency for some period of tire, thus deltying or precluding the public from taking apprcpriate protective actions.

The Exercise revealed that LILCO is incapable of inplementing prerpt netification to the public. Specifically, a failure in LILCO's siren system and other Exercise results discussed below demonstrated that LILCO does not have a reliable means to notify the general public, or to keep the public infomed of changes in the status of a Shoreham emergency in a tinely ranner. Moreover, LILf0 personnel failed to exercise good judgment in the face of unexpected events, and special procedures to notify the deaf proved , be ineffective. Thus, LILCO did not satisfy EOC Objectives 12 and 18, 5A Objective 18 and FA Objective 18 and demonstrated that it cannet r.eet the foregoing NDC regulations. These failures represent fundamental flavr in LILCO's Plan.

Exarples of the ways in which LILCO failed to demonstrate an ability to provide prompt notificatien are set forth below.

A. LILCO has developed a so-called "prompt notification system

• censistirs of 69 sirens located within the EPZ. According to LILCO's  !

M an, the sirens, when triggered, are supposed to alert the reblic to tune to LILCO's EBS for official information. Pl.n at 3.3-4; OPIP 3.3.4 at 2.  !

On Day 1 of the Exercise LILC0 activated the sirens to att(ept to test LILCO's public alerting capabilities, as required by 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E, i IV.F. That effort failec dismally, however, wher 57 of the 89 L!LCO sirens failed to function. In the event of a reel energency, such a failure would rean that a substantial majority of EPZ residents would rot receisc prompt netification of an accidert cr cf the P/h which  ;

are reccmended te be taken. Absent such netification, there can te ro i l

likelibccd that the FAPs can be irrlemented, thus threatening the public's ,

Fealth and sa'ety.

l l

t

T

. 35 - '

B. In an emergency situaticr., if sirens were to fail. LILCO's Plan provides for backup notificaticn to the public via use of route alert drivers. OPIP 3.3.4 at 5 and Att. 3. On Day 1 of the Exercise, when 57 ,

sirens failed. LILCO personnel failed to exercise good judgment or to  :

follow the Plan in the face of that unexpected situation. The siran failure was not conrunicated to other LERO personnel or to the media or to '

the "governments;" no route alert drivers were activated or sent out, and j no other actions were taken to attempt to res sor.d to the siren failures, thus underscoring the fact that LILCO cannot se relied upon to provide prompt netification to the public as required by NRC regulations.  :

i C. The Exercise demenstrated that, even aside from siren failures, '

LILCO is incapable of complying with regulatory requirements for promptly notifying the public of energency conditions requiring protective actions.

] Sone exampics are:

1 1. The LER0 E0C declared an Alert at 5:49 a.m. on Day 1, a '

i conditien (given the time of day) which reovired a PAR to cancel scho^ls.

OPIP 3.6.1 at 31a. LERO fatied to notify the public, however, ur.til 6:13 j a.m. on Day 1, when EBS No. I was "broadcast."  !

2. The EOF advised the LER0 E0C of conditions mendating e Site '

i Area Energency at approxirately 7:30 a.m. on Day 1. FEP.A Report at 30 e Thus, by aprroxinctely 7:45 a.m. on Day 1. LEPO should have notified the l

'l public of t b Site Area Emergency and also should have advised the public l of the protective er iona to put dairy animals on stored feed. Instead, however LERO waited until 8:08 a.m., when EBS No. ? was "broadcast " to accomplish this notification.

3. The EOF notified the LERO EOC of the existence of a General l

Emergency and the need for evacuation and shelterirg at approximatelv 9:34 1 a.m. on Day 1. That recomendation was received by the LERO EOC no later j than 9:37 a.m. on Day 1. See FEMA Report at 40. The declaration of l

General E;rersency required an irrediate PAR to eFpand the dairy animal IIR ,

i already being "broadcast" in EB5 ho. 1. The public, however, was not i notified of any new PARS until at least 10:25 a.m. on Day 1, when EBS No, i j

3 was "broadcast." The r.ot'fication at 10:26 a.m. was not only untimely, i

it was inadequate, since it did not provide any PAP regarding what persons

should do if they decided not to esacuate. This PAR was rot provided l until EBS No. 10 was broadcast" at 11:35 a.n. on Day 2, a delay of over l

) 24 hcurs, i

, 4 At 1,1:00 a.m. on Day 1, the EOC ano the EOF wer.* rotified [

1 that a release of radiation had begun. FEMA Report at 39. The public was j

not notified of this increased safety risk and of the resultint l recomendation that evacutes from af fected zones should go to receptfor  ;

centers until EBS No, a was issued one hour and 11 minutes later, at 12:11 j p.m.  ;

D. The LILCO Plan provides special n.eans for notification of the i deaf. Specifically, route elert drivers are assiered to drive designated l routes within the EP7 and to notify deaf people livfog along those routes (

of an emergency. OPIP 3.3.4 at 6, 7. There were several instances. l

. however, in which route alert drivers were unable to identify the homes of i tre ceaf or fir.d the router that they were supposed to drive. See FEFA  !

Peport at 75. In an actual emergercy, these fcilures wculd have resulted  !

in substantial nurbers of deaf people failing to receive prompt rotifi- L catter cf the emergercy, thus threatenir:0 tFeir health and safety, b t

4 0

RESPONSE

The NRC Staff objects to admission of this contention and all of its bases. Primarily Intervenors do not reet the standards in 10 C.F.R.

I?.714(a). They have not established they did not knew of the matters herein the day of the exercise. See Catawba, supra.

Further, Basis A would only be admissible under Contention 1 to the extent it alleges the exercise was inadequate in scope because sounding of the sirens (to be sit.ilated during the exercise according to the scenario, see FE!'.A report at 32) should have been actually tested. Interverors have not alleged performance problems given the exercise scenario, but werely assert that the sirens did not function during the exercise. In feet, Contertion 1.A specially asserts there was no adequate testirg er evalua-tion of the siren system. Thus, whether the strens actually sounded or malfunctioned is not relevant to the exercise and cannot form the founda-tion for a contention on the exercise of the plan.

Fasis B is also inadmissible as the scenario called for sinulation of the sirens and simulated failure of only two of them. The scenario did not involve route alert drivers nor did it necessitete any need to respond to siren failures. Thus, Intervenors have again failed to allege ary fur.derental flaw was demonstrated by the exercise.

Basis C alleges that the exercise deconstrated LILCO did not cceply with regulatery requirererts for notifying the public. Hewever, Inter.

venors misread the refulations in statino the 15 minutes stens from the.

declaration of an Emergerey Action Level. In fact, the 15 minutes sters from the tire a decision is made te notify the public. See 10 CFR 50 Appendix E. IV.D.3. In each instance cited by Interverors, this standard

vas met, as shown in Tables 1.2 and 1.3 in the FEMA report. Thus, there is no basis for the assertion that the regulation was not met.

Basis D regarding notification of the deaf is premised upon problems observed by FEMA. However, FEMA specifically characterized those problems as minor. On their face, the problems FEMA identified att clearly ad hoc and minor perfomance errors which do not reflect any fundaNntal flaw in the plan, especially in light of the fact that the Licensing Board has already ruled that delay in notificatien of the deaf does not subject them to any special hazard. FEMA Repert at 75 queting 21 NRC 644, 853-854 (1985).

l Contention 6: EBS Massages. The LILCO Plan provides for the dissemination of emergency informatien to the public through messages broadcast over an emergency broadcast system ("EBS"). Plan at 3.8-6 thru 3.8-81 OPIP 3.8.1, 5 5.2; OPIP 3.8.?. In LBP-88-2, the Licensino Peard determined that the February 1986 exercise revealed fundamental flaws in certain aspects of LILCO's Plan for the dissemination of clear, accurate and timely public inferration. In particular, the Board found that LILCO's EBS tessages were frequently inconsistent and confusing. 27 FF.C at 170-72.

The results of the Exercise demonstrate that L!tro has failed to correct this fundamental flaw in its Plan and that ado,tional EBS-related fundamental flavs exist. LILCO personnel repeatedly "broadcast" EBS nessages that were confusing, inaccurate, inconsistent, untimely, poorly organtzed and/or too long to be effective. Therefore, the LILCO Plan is fundarentally flawed in that it cannot be implemented effectively by LERO personnel, and fails to comply with 10 CFR l 50.47(b)(6) and NUREG-0654 il

!!.E and F. Further, the numerous defects in LILCO's EB0 messages create a strong likelthcod that the rublic will not view LILCO as a credible source of emerger.cy information, makirg it less likely that the PARS and other information conveyed in the EBS messages will be believed or relied u pon. See Contertien 9. The following exarples illustrate N ov of the flews concerning LILCO's EBS messages that were demonstrated during the  ;

Exercise.

A. The EBS nessages contained incorrect information. For example:

1. EB5 hos. 4, 5, 6, and 7. "broadcast" betwen 12:11 p.m. and 5:52 p.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, stated that only small doses of radiation vere projected at the Shcreham site tcundary ard that these doses would be below EFA guidelines fer doses requiring protective actions. However, at the tire EBS Nos. 4-7 were being "broadcast" -- a pericd covering ainest six teurs during which theuser.cs of EPZ residents

were suppcsed to be evacuating -- the projected radiation deses beyond the Shorehan site boundary were in excess of the EPA's guidelines for protective actions. FEMA Report at 65. LER0's EBS messages were inaccurate and could have cenvinced persons that there was no imediate danger or that the EPS ressages could be ignored -- i.e., that the recorrended protective action of evacuation was rerely a precaution --

thus resulting in persons remaining in zones of potential danger and receiving greater radiation doses.

2. EBS No. 2. "broadcast" at 8:08 a.m. on Day 1. not only contained incerrect information, but also sought te minimize the seriousness of the potential ingestion pathway hazerd. Thus. EBS No. 2 recommended placing nilk-producing anirals within two miles of Shoreham on stored feed. LILCO stated it was issuing that recorrrendation because it was "required" to do so by "HRC regulations." This statement was s'cIlowed by the assertion:

This dees not rean that a release of radiation has occurred.

This does not mean that a release of radiation will cccur.

These statements tended to understate the possible seriousness of the developirg accident, at the precise time when it was important to i establish LILCO's credibility with the public. The message suggests that l LILCO was issuing the dairy aninal PAP because it was forced to do so by a "regulatien," rather than because the PAR was a prudent ster in atterpting l to avoid hamful radiation expcsure. Further, LILCO's initial statement

) is urtrue: there is no NRC regulation that required LERO at 8:08 a.m. to recomend putting nilk-prcducing aninals on stored feed. That is a requirerent of LILCO's Plan. OPIP 3.6.6, ! 5.1.1.1.b. Similar inaccu-rate statements cencerning alleged recuirements of NRC regulations were contained in EBS Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 15 and 16. Acccrdingly, inaccurate EBS assertions were broadcast throughout the three-day Exercise.

3. EBS No. I was issued at 6:13 a.m. on Day 1, a tine prior tc the opening of any schools, and prior to the tire school buses began picking up children. The LILCO Plan t'.us called fer a PAD that school be canceled. 0F'? 3.f.1 at 31a. Nevertheless, contrary to the Plan ord contrary to good Judgreent and common sense. LERO reccerended that schools should "irrediately cancel classes or irplement their early disnissal lanst " (Emphasis added.) The possibility of schools implpenting ently sm Osal, rather than simply canceling classes, was an li.;orrect instructica, having the potential to cause confusion and concern, not to mentien increased risks of exposure to radiation, because it irplied that children should first be sent to school.

LILCO's error in EBS No. I was all the rore serious because LILCO failed te correct the error. EBS he. I was rebroadcast everv 15 minutes until EBS Nc. ? was issued at approxinately 8:00 a.m. Shortly after EBS

00. 1 had been "broadcast" the first tire, a FEMA controller advised LILC0 that its notice to dismiss the schools early was inappropriate, given the early hcur of the day, hevertheless, LERO personnel dit ret correct the error.

!t shnuld be further notte that as EES No. I was beirg "broadcast" after 7:CC a.n., the retification to "cancel

• classes becare inepriicable.

Dy that hour, most schools in the 10-mile EPZ would have commenced the process of picking up students and, accordingly, the appropriate protective action veuld have been early disnissal. It was not until ECS No. 2 was "broadcast" at 8:08 a.m. that the school cancellation s ecomendation was deleted, however.

4. EBS No. 10A was "breadcast" at 3:35 p.m. on Day 2. It l stated, among other things, as follcws:

l Pesidents beyond the 10-mile ENrgency Plannino Zone do not

) need to take any protective action as a consecuence of the

! incident on June 7, 1988, at the Shoreham Nuclear Power l

Station. Residents beyond the 10-mile. Emergency Planning Zone I have not been exposed to contamination in excess of the guidelines established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and New York State for protective action. In particular, residents east of the 10-mile zone are not required tu take any protective actice whatsoever. This conclusion is the result of aethe sampling by Federal, State and County survey teams throughout the area.

1 The foregoing information was inaccurate, detronstrating LER0's inability to convey proper PARS to the public, the failure to assimilate infomation from diverse sources within LERO, and inadequate interface with the "governnents." Among other inaccuracies were the followirg:

(a) As ef no later than early on Day 2 of the Exercise (and probably eerlier; see Contention 11), sufficient data existed to justify ingestion PARS in the 10-50 mile zone. FEMA Report at $1. In fact, a Field Monitoring Data Log from Day 1 indicated Beta readirgs in excers of 400 cpm above backgrcund, a threshold under LILCO's Plan (OP!P 3.6.6. I 5.2.2) for ingestion actions.

(b) At approximately 1:00 p.m. on Day 2 of the Exereire, the New York State control cell had been advised by LERO that there were "hot spots" east of the plant.

(c) At 2:15 p.m. on Day 2 of the Exerci u , the LERO Director and DOE advised the New Ycrk State control cell via conference call that "het spots' had been identified 13 miles east of the plant with measurtments above the EPA PAGs.

In view of the foregoing, it was wrong for LERO to have advised, via EEi ressages en Day 2, that persons cutside the 10-mile EP2 t( the east of the plant were not required to take any protective action whatsoever.

This error went uncorrected until EBS No. 17 was "broadcast" at 12:52 p.m.

on Day 3 of the Exercit.e.

5. EBS No. 16. "broadcast" at noen en Day 3 of the Exercise, asserted that persons cutside the 10 nile EPZ reeded to take no action because radiation doses, if any, were below the EPA guidelires. Prior te that EBS, at 10:40 a.m. on Day 3, the hew York State control cell had been advised that LERO had fctsd milk sanp1 exceeding the PARS for infants in Riverhead, New York, and Ircations furtns. east. Further, the advice in EBS No. 26 that perscrs outside the 10-mile EPZ needed te take no actier was inconsistent with other portions of that EBS ressage. In fact, para-graph 8 cf EBS No.16 advised the public that animals located east of tre rillian Flcyd Perkway retc'ed tc be put on stored feed. This "advice" was

l 1 . .

[

i

' i' 40 -

j i l

i not lirited to the 10-mile EP2 and suggested that persons outside the EPZ  !

should have been advised to take action. Accordingly, EBS No. 16 was not  :

l> only inaccurate, it also was internally inconsistent and confusing.  !

j 6. Incorrect inferration was included in EBS No. 4, which was i a "broadcast" at 12:11 p.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise. That message reported i i that as of 11:46 a.m., children from the Rocky Point Public School l l District were en route to the liassau County Coliseum. In fact, however,  !

at the tire EBS No. 4 was "broadcast," LERO was aware that those children I were being redirected to Hicksville for monitoring and possible l 4 decontsminatien. This erroneous infnrration was repeated in EBS No. 5,  ;

"broadcast" at 1:00 p.m. on Day 1. An attempt was made by LERO to update  ;

this ' nfomatien in EBS No. 6 by tacking the infomation concerning the [

monitoring and possible decontamiration of the Rocky Point school children j '

onto that ressage. The updated inferration, however, was located quite a some distance (2 pages) from the repeated misinformation. This situation j was net clarified until EBS ho. 7 was issued at 5:R p.m. on Day 1.  !

i R. The LERO EBS messages did not disseminate irportart ir. formation to the public in a tirely fashion. For example:  :

1. Beginning at 10:26 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, and  !

q continuing tver 15 minutes therea'ter until 12:11 p.m. on Day 1. EBS No. 3 i was "broadcast." That EBS message stated, among other things, that there  !

was a possibility of fuel damage which could result in a significant  ;

radiatien release to persons dowrwind of the plant. It further advised l that the release of radiation into the air could begin in aprroximately I two hours. By 11:00 a.m., hovrver, LERO personnel knew that a release of  !

j radiation from Shoreham had begun. Notwithstanding this knowledge, EBS  !

a No. 3 continued to be "broadcast," and thus, the public was incorrectly i "advised" that a release wculd not occur for two hours when, in fact, the [

1 release was already occurring, i

2. It was not until EBS No. 4. "broadcast" initially at 12:11 f l-p.n. on Dry 1 of the Exercise, that LERO "advised" persons from the evacuated zeres to go to LILCO reception centers. This advice was untinely. LERO logs indierte that as of 11:12 a.m., 59 minutes earlier, LERO had already developed a list of the zones that needed to be ,

instructed to go to reception cenurs. LERO failed, however, to arrnd EBS i fio. 3 in a tirely manner to advise persons of the need to report to (

reception centers. Instead, LERO waited almost an hour, until EBS No. 4 1 was "broadcast " to issue that advice, j When LERO did issue EPS No. 4 ttereby advisire persons in particuler r

' renes to go to the receptien centers, its advice was confusing. EBS No, a stated that persons should go to reception centers "[t]o be certain that f I there is little or no hazard " Evacuees were not told the nature of the  !

i hazard (possible centamination), what would happen at reception centers.

i (nonitoring to detect centaminaticn and, if necessary, decontaminatten),

or given other infomation to explain why they should follow this J recorrended action. EBS Nos. 5 and 6 also were deficient in this regard.

1 It was not until EE! to. 7 was "broadcast" at 5:52 p.m. on Day 1 that r

! persons were advised that they wculd be ronitored and (if needed) i I decontarinated at reception certers. (

l LEF0's confusire and untirely instruction in ERS Nos. 4-0 could tave t i cauted persons to delay goirg to receptien centers fcr monitoring and l

deconterination. Irdeed, es late as 2

50 p w. on Day 1 of the Exercire. (

1 i

, f

. . l i

y . 4] -

LILCO personnel noted that a substantial nurber of people who were j supposed to go to reception centers were not doino so. Nevertheless, this j natter was not addressed in an EBS message until 5:52 p.m., some three t i bours later, when EBS No. 7 was "broadcast." r

3. As of 10:26 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, persons in Zones  !

, A-J. O P, and S were reconnended to evacuate. Notwithstanding this i

! reconnendation, LILC0 knew thet some portion of the population in those  ;

f zones would nevertheless choose to remain at home. Indeed, on Day 1 LER0  !

I advised the FEMA control cell that $1 of the people advised to evacuate f i had chosen not to do so. Thus, LILCO knew or should have known that it l

needed to caution these persons about how they could protect themselves t 1 (i.e., via shelterino). LILCO failed to do so, however, until Day 2 of l t F Ixercise, when EBS No. 10 was "broadcast." ,

4 LILCO did not advise the public of the PAR for dairy  !

j animals within two miles of the Shoreham plant until EBS No. ? was  !

1 "broadcast" at 8:08 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise - almost 40 minutes l 7

after a Site Area Emergency had been declared. During this time EPS No.  ;

j 1 was teing "broadcast" every 15 minutes. That message contained no dairy  !

! animal PAR. LILC0 thus failed to follow its Plan, which recuires that

• j this dairy anirral PAR be an "irrediate reconnendation" after a Site Area -

, Emergency is declared. See OP!P 3.6.6, 4 5.1.1.1.b. '

LILCO's delay in issuing the dairy animal PAR could have been all the more confusing, because media at the ENC were advised of the Site Ares ,

! Erergency shortly after 7:30 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, and would  ;

i certainly have begun disseminating that infonnation while EBS No. I was still being "broadcast," Moreover, a similar delay was involved in expanding the two mile dairy aniral PAR to 10 miles, when a General

! Emergency was eventually ceclared or. Day 1.

J 5. At approxirately 11:46 a n. on Day 1 of the Exercise, a .

l decision was made to transport children who live within the EPZ, but i

attend school outside the EPZ, to the Nassau Coliseum at the end of the i day if their parents had not picked them up. The FEMA control cell was i f told several times that this information would be placed in an EBS  !

j ressage, but the control cell was ret even asked to approve an EBS message  !

i until 4:31 p.m. on Day 1, and this infomatter did not appear in an EBS

! message until 5:52 p.m., when ERS No. 7 was issued. It was untimely for

! LILCO to have weited until 5:5? p.m. to have made known its decision to  ;

j transpert these school children to the Nassau Coliseur, particularly since I i schools cisr.iss around 3:00 p.m. Mureover, between the tire of LILCO's I decision to tre %e children and the issuance of EBS No. 7, three  :

were issued. All these messages rrentioned sore

) EBS messages (N schcol matters; none mentioned LILCO's decision regarding EPZ-resident seh dren attending school outside of the EPZ, which had been made at . ..r.

1 6. EBS ho. 7 also was misleading and confusing in that it i advised parents with children attending schools outside the EPZ, but i

) residing within the EPZ, to pick up those children "at their schools in l j accordance with protective actier plans of the iridividual schools," while, [

< in the next sentence, it acvised that such children already had been l transrerted to the hassau Coliseum. EBS No. 8, which was "broadcast" on L Day 2 of the Exercise, repeated this misleading rressage.

I i

i  !

7. The LERO Coordinator of Public Information was notified at 12:12 p.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise of the need tn issue an EBS message informing the public o' a traffic impediment in Coram at Granny Pead.

l This infonnation was not disseminated until EBS No. 5, which was issued at t

, 1:08 p.m. Thus, there was a delay of alnest one hour in conveying this '

I infomation to the public, even though the infonnation concerning the l impediment of Granny Road was the only change from EBS No. 4

8. LERO informed the State of New York control cell at 10:51 a.m. on Day 3 of the Exercise that LERO managerent had decided to extend ingestion PARS for milk-producing animals on stored feed to 50 miles.

1 Nevertheless, LERO did not promptly amend its prior EBS ressage and ERS No.16 subsequently issued at noon on Day 3. did not make clear that ar ingestion PAR had been extended to 50 miles for milk-producing animals.

. 9. As of 12:05 p.m. on Day 3 of the Exercise, the New York l State cortrol cell was advised that milk ard vegetables east of the FPZ  :

I micht be contaminated. Despite this information, EBS No. 16 was not promptly amended to reflect such data. Further, EBS No. 17, which was i

issued at 12:50 p.m., did nnt report this information accurately. Whereas the advice to the New York State control cell stated broadly that milt erd '

vegetables east of the EP7 night be contaminated. EPS No.17 defined the l l area of potential centamination much more narrowly. .

I 10. A road impediment at Sheep Pasture Road was reported to the  !

EOC at 11:28 a.m in Day 1 of the Exercise. Such advice ss not conveyed i to the public, hs.<ever, until EES No. 4 was "broadcast

• at 12:11 p.m. en Day 1. Similarly, approxirately one hour elapsed between the time that l

the EOC became aware of a traffic irpediment blocking Granny Road ard the

, issuance of EBS No. 5, which advised evacuees to aveld this area. Such l untimely notification of impedinents could lead to substantial delays in  !

the evacuation of residerts from affected zones, thereby increasing their risk of radiation exposure.

C.

organized. The LERO Indeed, EBSof messages many were too the EBS messages lon.1 were 4-5 and they pages longwere poorly(single '

spaced), requiring many minttes just to read them over the EBS. Due to their excessive length, the public might not have listened to the entire message. This could have resulted in listeners missing rertinent inf o nna tion. FEFA Report at 45.

Concerns resulting from the excessive length of tte FRS messages were compounded by the fact that the ressages were rcorly organized. leading to

'urther confusion and ineffectiveress. An important function of EBS l nessages is to provide the public with new infomation about the circurs  ;

stances surrounding the u ergency. LILCO personeel, however, usually  !

inserted new infomatien in the middle or toward the end of the messages, j rtther than at the begir.ning, where it should have appeared. FEMA Report (

at 45. Thus, if persons storred listening because of the excessive length (

of the ressages, they likely would have missed any new ar.d important  ;

infonration which was being conveyed. Exarples of p,oblems in the I organization arc structure of the LERO EBS messages are set forth below. '

1. EBS No. 5 exemplifies LILCO's "cut 6nd paste" approach to l structuring EFF ressaces. The additier of infonration abcut e traffic i i irredirent on Granny Road was the only change from E95 No. 4 This rew r l infomation, however, was relegated to tre bottom of page 3. towards the end o' the message. This same trocedure was followed in EPS No. 6 where ,

- 43 o j information about the fourth traffic impediment was arided -- egain, toward i the end of the mes3dge. ,

2. LERO personnel revised EBS messages in a trechanical manrer.  :

rather than exercising sound jt.dgment and having a clear understanding of l the coatext of new information that was being inserted into existing EBS  :

1 messages. When inserting new information, LERO personnel failed to  !

i determine whether the surrounding text of the message being revised I

! required redification so that the newly-inserted infomation would not be  !

confusing or contradictory. For instance, on page 3 of EBS No. 10, issued l 3

at 11:35 a.m. on Day 2 of the Exercise, people outside the,10-mile EPZ j i were told that they did not need to take any prot 9ctive action. That  !

j staten nt was immediately followed, however, by the statement, "Make sure  !

that before you leave your home or business, you have closed all windows  !

l and doors . . . . [y]ou could be away for several days." This confusing L i and conflicting information was not corrected until EBS No.15 was isss ad  !

, at 10:05 a.m. on Day 3 of the Exercise.  !

2 Similarly. EPS No.16 contained cumulative inforr.ation that would (

l have confused the public. At one point on page 4 for example, the public  !

' was advised that doses outside the 10-mile EPZ were below levels requiring i l protective actions. At cnother point on the same page, it was stated that i J

"[11nparticular, residents east of the 10-mile zone are not required to  !

take any protection [ sic 1 action whatsoever." This second entry suggested  !

! that persons in other areas were not as well protected and perhaps sheuld l l have taken protective action, t 1 3. Careless erganization of the EBS ressages also was (

1 reflected in EB5 ho. 3. "broadcast" at 10:26 a.m. on Day 1 of the i Exer,:ise. On page 2. lister.ers "within the 10-mile emergency planning ,

) rone" were told to refer to their brochures in order to detemine the zone i in which they live. Then, af ter a page-and-a-half of newly inserted ,

recorcendations, a description of the 10-mile rene was given. This poor

organization continues in EBS Nos. 4. 5, 6, 7. 8 and 10.

l 4 Another indi:atien of the poor organization of LILCO's EBS messages was the failure to rention, until the end of the EBS messages. f tha t emergene) information is contained in local telephone books. As FEW  !

i noted:  :

)

Eecause experience has shown that rnany people do not retain ,

! erergency beetlets, telephone books ray be the only source of  :

such inferration at sone homes and offices. EBS inessages [

should explain as close to their becinning as possible that i emergency infomation is provided in their telephone book.

f FE R Report at 45 Similerly, the messages neglected to tell listeners I that LILCO's Customar Relations District Offices and Custoner Call Foerds l could be telephoned if additieral inforration were needed or questions i regarding the erergency arose. But see Contention 8. I

5. In EFS No. 8. issued at 9:06 a.m. on Day 2 of the Exercise.  !

LILCO issued its first ingestion pathway "precaution" (except for autoettic dairy ar.iral adviscries originally issued early on Day M. The L!LCO *precautien" in ERS No. 8 stated:

l I

f 44 -  !

Food in homes or stores in the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone l which was frozen, refrigerated or securely .nackaged prior to the incident is safe to consume except for foods that may have naturally spoiled. As a preca'ation pending further analysis, fruits and vegetables locally grown and from gardens stored prior to the incident should be avoided. In addition, as a i precaution, however, all fruit and vegetables stored inside l prior to the incident should he washed before consumptiott, j There are no restrictioat on water.  ;

i This notice is unclesr on its face. The first sentence discussed the .

10-mile EPZ, but she remainder of the message -- the portion where  !

specific actions were reconw4aded - did not state specifically whether it [

applied to the entire 10.m11e EPZ, to part of it, or to a larger area. i This precaution was all the more confusing because the imediately prior i paragraph discussed the specific zones which were recomended 'a be f sheltered, while the following paragraph discussed the specific zones to  ;

be evacuated. This "precaution " in short, was inserted in an i inappropriate location in EB$ No. A. I Moreover, the message was inconsistent. Specifically, the second l sentence advised persons to avoid fruits and vegetables stored prior to  !

the incident, while the third sentence rerely recom ended washing such food prior to consumption. Similar confusing statements were contained in ,

EBS Nos. 10, 15, 16 and 17 j D. LILCO's EBS enessaoes lacked significant details and were i otherwise confusing and vague.

1. LILCO's EBS messages did not provida clear infomation regarding protective actions for special facility residents. For exanple.  !

EBS Nos. 3 and 4 toth recomended evacuation for certain zones of the EPZ i ar.d sheltering for other zcnes. The EPS ressages did not mention, l however, whether resident *. of special facilities tr. or near the EPZ were  ;

to comply with those general recomendations, or whether there were  !

special recomendations relatine to those persons. This failure of ,

LILC0's EBS messages to clearly convey to all affected members of the 1 oublic the PARS being recocinended represents a continuation of LILC0's  :

inability to exercise good judgment and to comunicate clear, precise, and (

anambigueus infomation to the public. [

?. No EBS message during the Exercise informed the public that  ;

the Long Island Pailroad had agreed to alter service to and from the EPZ. l Thus, the pubite was not infomed that a potential reans of evacuating the t EPZ was not available. J

3. EPS No. 2 urged persons in Zones A E to put milk producing  ;

animals en stored feed. The messace never stated, however, where Zones A-E were, or even their approximate locat*on. Rather, persons were j directed to refer to their brochures for ' help [to.1 understand future j messages" (emphasis added). The ERS ressage did not indicate that the i brochure would help in understanding that message, except to state that [

the brochure contained zone infomation, f 4 In EBS No. ?. LERO recomended that all zones in j the 10-mile EPZ eithtr shelter or evacuate. LILCO then stated:

, l I

i i l

! i i i

If you are not within planning zones A. P. C. D. E. F. G. H.

I J. O. P and S or planning zones K. L. M. N. O and R. there is no reason to either shelter or evacuate. If yoc are outside the 10-mile emergency planning zone, there is no reason to take any action. ,

The clear implication of this message was that there are zones within the IO mile EPZ other than those which were listed. As this is not the case, the staterent made was misleading and confusing.

Moreover, the above statement from EBS No. 3 was followed by a similarly misleading statement:

We are required by NRC regulations to recomend that all milk producirg Animals in the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone snould be moved into shelters and placed on stored feed. This does rot mean there is any danger from radiation in renes that have not been reconrended to shelter or evacuate.

(Erphasisadded.) As noted, all zones had already been mentiened. Sim16ar confusing information was contained in EBS Nos. 4. 5. 6. and 7.

5. The Exercise demonstrated that LILCO is incapable of ,

providing preept notification of e ergency conditions to residents of l special facilities (adult homet nursing homes, and hospitals). EBS No.

3 was issued at 10:26 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise. That EBS ressage specifically mentioned the needs of homebound individuals. The message did not mention at all what protective actions, if any, were recocrended for residents of special facilities. Indeed it did not even indicate that LERO personnel would attempt to contact special facilities (other than via EBS messages) in order to advise the'n of whit particular  ;

protective actiers would o' might be recomended for those special  ;

facilities. ,

6. EBS No. 3 also advised persors ir certain specifiec zeres I to evacuate. There was no direction in that message that persons from .

those evacanted zones should report to reception centers for any purpose, t Nevertheless, in paragraph 5 there was discussion of the locations of, and t ways to reach, the reception centers. There was no statement in the EBS I message, however, describing the purpose reception centers serve or why any person should attempt to reach these reception centers. There also ,

was not any discussion of the fact that at the reception center, people ir, '

need of shelter would be directed to congregate care centers.

7. Also in EES No. 3 persons in Zene t were told to evacuate in one sentence and to shelter in a later senterce in the same paragraph.

8. On page 1 of EBS No. 4. "broadcast" at !?: 11 p.n. on Day 1 of the Exercise, irreconcileble inforr.ation was juxtaposed. First. the message stated that a "general emergency eendition . . . indicates . . . ,

fuel core damage, which could result in a significant radiatice dose to l

people dcwnwind." (Erphasis added.) The rext sentence then defined small 1 doses as "doses below the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's guide-lines requiriae protective actions." Tbc r,essage no t stated that protective actions were, nevertheless, being recorrended "as a precau-tion." The follcwing paragraph ther reported that the plant was r contiauing to release radiation (and that this had been occurrinq since l

l

l l

l 11:00 a.m.), but, that only small doses were projected "at the cite l boundary " Aside from the fact that this information was incorrect (FEMA [

Report at 45), these conflicting messages, inserted at the beginning of i EBS No. 4, would likely have caused the average listener to conclude that  !

the people "in charge" did not in fact know what was happening. As a i result, reconnendations made by LERO would likely have been ignored. j

9. EBS No.10, broadcast at 11:35 a.m. on Day 2 of the -

Exercise, stated that persons outside Zones bJ. O P and S "do not need {

to take any action . . . ." Later in the sate message, however, it was stated that all persons in the EPZ were to taie precautions regarding locally grown fruits and vegetables and that all milk-producing animals l within the EP2 were tc be placed on stored feed. Clearly, the r,essace was  !

internally inconsistent. EBS Nos. 15 and 16 o3 Day 3 containe1 similar j inconsistencies.

10 EBS No. 15, broadcast at 10:05 a.m. on b y 3 of the 5 Exercise, included a shelterino recommendatien for milk producing anir.:'s j in Connecticut, while stating that ne protective actions needed to be i taken by resicents outside the 10-mile zone. This inconsistent t information was alco included in EBS No. 16, issued at 12:00 p.m. (

11. EBS No.16. "Leoadcast" at 12:00 noon on Day 3. stated j that persons located more than 10 miles frem Shoreham needed to take ro ,

action due to radiation deses. Thereafter, however, the same message stated that livestock at "all locations east of the William Floyd Parkway (

on lcng Island should be moved into shelters and placed on stored feed." [

This inconsistency continued in EBS No. 17, which was "broadcast" at 12:50 i p.m. on Day 3. l

12. EBS No.17, broadcast at 12:50 p.m. on Day 3 of the i Exercise, contained further inconsistencies. It stated (page 1) that t there were radiation reasurements above ingestion PAR levels outside the  !

EP2, requiring special action related to local produce. At page 4 j

} however, it stated (in two places) that persons outside the EPZ needed to i l

take no action because dnses were below PAR levels. It also stated (page j 4 5) that persons within the 10-mile EPZ were to exercise care in censuming i l local produce, implying that persons outside the 10-mile EPZ should have [

I had no concerns.  ;

13. EBS No.17 was ar exception to LILCO's general practice of l insertin EP! No. 17

[

i (page 1)g contained new informatic the initial s teward irgestionthe end ofPAR.

pathway an EBSBut ressage.

LILCO did i nothing to highlight to the listenirg public that this constituted a new l FAR. Indeed, it confused the situation. EBS No. 17 advised that the FDA '

Protective Action Guidelines had been exceeced in the following area:

This area is beunded by the Long Ishnd Sound on the north, ,-

Route 75 on the south, Wading River - Manorville P.oad on the  !

west and Aldrich Lane on the east.

The message then went on to state that with respect to the ingestien PAR, "all locally growr. fresh produce and leafy vegetables stored in the open should be wished, brusted, scrubbed or peeled te remove surface conterina-tien." This ressage was confusing ard unclear in ruitiple respects, I including the followiro:

{

t t

b

_ _ . _ ._ __..__.____-.______.a

(a) In contrast to other messages (and other pori; ions of EBS No. 17) the precise EPZ zones were not identified.

(b) The massage did not specify whether only produce and vegetables grown in the area where FDA dose rates had been exceeded or "all locally grown" produce had to be treated.

RESPONSE

The Intervenors had the material set out in Contention 6 long before the FEMA Report was issued, and it could have been filed months ago. A weighing of the factors in 10 C.F.R 6 2.714(a) will not permit it to be admitted now. See Catawba _, supra.

The NRC Staff further objects to contention 6 as too broad and general, except to the extent it is limited to basis A, which alleges the EBS messages relayed incorrect information, and basis B, which alleges the messages were unti aly.

However, Basis C which complains that the the messages were too long, and Basis 0, which complains they were not detailed enogh, would appear mutually exclusive and do nt.t raise an exercise issea but a planning issue. Both of these bases speculate upon the possible response of the public (it might stop listening and various details in the messages might be misunderstood by the public). To the extent these bases raise questions about the content of the messages, this is a planning issue the$ was fully litigated previously (see 21 NRC 644, 690, 698) and does not present a litigable issue in connection with the exercise. Thus, this basis should not be admitted.

Contention 7

Emergency News Center. The Exercise demonstrated fundamental flaws in the LILCO Plan because* LILC0 was unable to provide timely, accurate, consistent, non-confusing, and non-misleading inforra-tion to the nN rredia at the Frergency News Center ("ENC"); LILCO's news briefings did not ensure public and media confidence; and LILC0 did net prevent misinformation ar.d did net respond adecuately to the media's

questions. LILCO thus failed to demonstrate that it could implement its Plan adequately or effectively. See Plan at 3.8-4 thru 3.8-5 and 3.8-8; OPIP 2.8.1.

The Plan provides, in pertinent part, that: "[alll public information personnel will confer on a regular basis to ensure that accurate and consistent emergency information is being shared and discussed." Plan at 3.8-4. Under the LILCO Plon, news briefings at the ENC are to serve three purposes:

o to provide accurate information on a timely basis o to ensure public and redia confidence o to prevent misinformation and rumors Plan at 3.8-5. Sioilarly, press conferences are to "provide up-to-date information, respond to any rumor received, and answer any question 3 the media may have." Plan at 3.8-8. Moreover, according to 0 PIP 3.8.1, the LERO Coordinator of Public Information is to "[c]onfer with the Director of Local Response . . . and the Public Infonnation Staff at the ENC on a regular basis to maintain consistent infonnation content;" and "obtain up-to-date information regarding [the] offsite emergency response" prior to preparing press releases.

The 1986 exercise revealed fundamental flaws in numerous aspects of LILCO's ENC scheme. LRP-88-2, 27 NRC at 149-67. As the examples in subparts A-H below reveal t those flaws remain and, in fact, the Exercise revealed the existence of new flaws. Thus, during the Exercise, LILCO was incapable of complying with the LILCO plan and OPIPs, and LILCO did not provide the media and public with accurate and timely information. LILCO also failed to satisfy ENC Objectives 13 and 14. Accordingly, the Exercise demonstrated that the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed because it cannot be implemented by LILC0 and fails to comply with 10 CFP $6 50.47(b)(6) and (7) and NUREG-0654 il II.G.2-4.

Exercise results which individually and collectively demonstrate these LILCO failures and fundamental flaws in the LILC0 Plan, and therefore preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adeouate protective reasures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, include the following:

A. The organization and management of !ILC0/LERO public infomation operations and the interface of LILC0/LERO witn the media was inadequate and ineffective, and the LILC0/LER0 spokespersons who presided at the news briefings were not sufficiently skilled ani qualified in media relations to perform effectively. Fcr example:

1. The Emergency News Manager announced that news conferences would be started at particular times, but such conferences were repeatedly not held on schedule. For example, the first, third, fourth, fifth, and seventh press briefings on Day 1 of the Exercise were each convened leter than the Emergency News Menager had announced.

2. On repeated occasions, the L;LCO/LERO spokespersons jousted with reporters, did not respond to reporters' requests, did not accept reporters' constructive criticisms, and did not provide clear, consistent, i and accurate information. For example, at the 11:?0 a.m. news briefing en

o .

Day 2 of the Exercise, in response to a reporter's complaint about the length of EBS messages, LERO's spokesperson steply defended the messages, and without considering the merits of the complaint said the messages were "very carefully prepared" and were "what peop!e want." LILCO's spokes-person said the format had been approved by the NRC "after litigation."

At the same news briefing, a reporter complained that LILCO had failed to provide two items of information and a map that had been promised to

' reporters. And, at the fourth briefing on Day 1, the spokespersons did not know whether the Coast Guard had been contacted end would not address other matters related to the offsite emergency response. The LERO spokesperson did not even attend this briefing until the very end.

3. Between news conferences, LILCO did not post knowledgeable spokespersons at the ENC to maintain liaison with reporters and respond to their follow-up questions. Only a technical advisor was made available.

In a real emergenc;, there would be large numbers of media representatives with varying degrees of knowledge about what was happening, and there would be constant turnover among the media representatives at the ENC. In such circumstances, LILCO would have to make a sufficient number of knowledgeable spokespersons avbilable to deal with the needs of both the print and electronic media. LILCO did not demonstrate the capability to do so during the Exercise.

Also, in a real emergency, news reports would be generated by -

countless sources and communicated to reporters at the ENC. There would be misinformation as well as accurate information 6mong the media corps. .

The failure of LILCO to provide continuibo, knowledgeable information, or to offer to meet continually with the meora at the ENC, would cause confusion and prevent the ENC from operating effectively. An example of the confusion caused by not posting LILC0/LERO spokespersons between news briefings during the Exercise was demonstrated following the third news briefing. After this briefing, the wind shifted, but reporters did rot learn of this fact until nearly an hour later, at the fourth news briefing. Also, inconsistercies between the posted news releases EBS messages being aired, and news briefings wculd cause confusion and the spread of misinformation. ,

P. The ENC was activated at 7:16 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, nearly three hours after the 4:36 a.n. report of the Unusual Event and more than one-and-one-half hours after LILCO had declared an Alert. The first LILC0/LERO press conference was held at 8:15 a.m., 35 minutes after LILCO News Release Nc. 4 was issued reporting that a Site Area Emergency was declared and seven minutes after an EBS "broadcast" had declared such an emergency at 8:08 a.m. The first news briefing should have been held more promptly after activating the ENC. In a real emergency, reporters would converge upon the ENC within rroments after learnino about a Shoreham emergency. Local radio and TV stations would dispatch their crews to the l ENC as early as possible, and norinal broadcasts would be preenpted.

National Tv morning news shows would include the early deveioptrents in their live coverage. In an actual emergency, if the inedia had to wait from 7:16 a.in. until 8:15 a.m. before LILCO held a news briefing, confusion, speculation, misinformation, and rumors among the redia and

public would have resulted. This wes particularly likely because the only news release posted at the ENC before the 8

15 a.m. news conference was  :

I the out-of-date LERO Release No. 1, which announced an Alert condition, ,

-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , = - - - - - , - - . . - , - - - .

-- - -- =,- -

rather than the Site Area Emergency that had been in existence since 7:31 a.m.; and because at 8:08 a.m. LERO "broadcast" by EBS the declaration of a Site Area Emergency while repo.ters at the ENC had still not been informed of it.

C. While LILC0 assumes that it would be able to set the agenda and control press briefings, this would not be the case in a real emergency, if LILCO personnel were to conduct themselves as they did during the E::ercise . Because the news releases laoged far behind the actual state of ,

events during the Exercise, and because LILCO did not provide liaison with the ' redia between briefings, the media would have possessed misinformation

, regarding what was occurring. The LILC0/LERO spokespersons therefore would have been largely forced to spend much time correcting misinforma-tion, and would not have been in a position to focus on presenting clear and concise information.

D. LERO EBS messaces were assumed to be repeated every 15 minutes during the Exercise. During the 15 minute intervening times, however, other information -- sometimes conflicting -- was being issued to the public by LILCO through news releases, press briefings, and media interviews. An actual Shoreham accident also would be the subject of live radio and TV reports, interviews, and speculation among experts and laypersons as to what was happening and the impiteations of the onooing events. The result would be confusion and speculation caused by conflicts between the EBS messages and live radio and TV reports. LILC0 did not take effective actions during the Exercise to prevent such conflicts and to assure that accurate and complete information was given to the media and public; LILCO's acticns instead exacerbated the problem because those actions actually contributed to the misinformation being disseminated.

E. Following the February 1986 exercise, the Board cencluded that a fundamental flaw existed in LILCO's Plan because LILCO had failed to disseminate timely information to the news tredia at the ENC. 27 NRC at 157. An "integral part" of that fundamental flaw was the failure to pruvide EBS ressages promptly to the news media, thus creating the potential for information broadcast by the media to conflict with "official" EBS messages. Id. The June 1988 Exercise revealed that this fundamental flaw still exists. Once acain, LILCO personnel were untimely in posting EBS messages for the news media at the ENC. Examples supporting the existence of this continuing fundarrental flaw are as follows:

1. Although LILCO released EBS No. I declaring an Alert at 6:13 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, and the ENC was activated at 7:20 a.u.

on that same day, EBS No. I was nct posted at the ENC until 7:51 a.m.,

which was 20 rninutes after LILCO had declared . Site Area Emergency.

Thus, when posted EBS No. I was already obsolete.

2. News Release No. 3, which contained the EBS message anr uncing the declaration of a General Emergency, was issued by LERO at 10:e6 a.m, nearly one hour after the General Emergency was declared.

3. The ENC did not receive EBS No. 5 from the EOC until 1:f2 p.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, which was after EBS No. 6 was "broadcast" at 1:40 p.e.

4. One hour and 15 minutes elapsed from the downgrading of the erergency classificatien to the Alert stage (at 9:30 a.m. on Day 3) un+.11 the distribution of EPS No. 15, arr.ouncing that fact, at the ENC.

A

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5. One hour and 10 minutes elapsed between the "broadcast" of EBS No.16 at 12:00 p.m. on Day 3 of the Exercise until the distribution of the message itself at the ENC at 1:10 p.m.

F. In a real emergency, the untimelir.ess of LER0's EBS messages (as discussed in Contention 6) would create major confusion for the media and the listening and viewing public. For example, during the period from 6:13 a.c. to 8:07 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, when LERO was announcing only the existence of an Alert at Shoreham, the media at the ENC would have presumably learned of LILCO News Release No. 4, which was issued at 7:40 a.m. and announced the existence of a Site Area Emergency. And, at 8:02 a.m., LILC0 issued News Release No. 5, which stated that the plant "remains in a Site Area Emergency." Thus, news accounts emanating from the ENC during the 15-minute intervals between EBS broadcasts would have relied on the news releases and would have reported that a Site Area Emergency existed. In conflict with this, however, LILCO's EBS broadcasts would have been announcing every 15 minutes that only an Alert existed.

Confusion, alarm and speculation would have resulted; LILCO's purported credibility would have been undermined. Moreover, as another example, the public was not infomed of the General Emergency by EBS until 10:20 a.m.,

58 minutes after the General Emergency had been declared. The public was told every 15 minutes during this 58-minute period that a Site Area Emergency -- which did not threaten offsite releases -- was the condition at Shoreham, while in fact the most severe accident classification existed. This false information would have misled the public into believing that a less serious accident condition existed than actually was the case. Such false inforration would have undermined LILC0's credibili-ty, bred hostility toward LILCO, and discouraged the public from following LILCO's recomendations or taking LILC0's statements at face value.

G. During the Exercise, there was inadeouate and ineffective coordination between LILC0 and LERO. This contributed to LILCO beine unable to provide timely and accurate information to the media and public.

For example, there were repeated time delays and irconsistencies among LERO news releases, LILCO news releases, ENC press briefings, and the transmission of information to LILCO's District Offices and Call Boards.

Moreover, at one news briefing, no LERO representative even showed up, and i the reporters' questions concerning offsite response matters could not be answered.

H. The "ENC Log" for Day 1 states, "Sirens sounded at 10:22" and

"(Real sirens were sounded)". The ENC legged the "real sirens" because their attempted sounding was a part of LILCO's plan for the Exercise. Ut the 89 sirens activated, only 57 actually sounded. LILCO, however, did not disclose this fact to media representatives at the ENC. Instead, LILCO pretended that only two sirens failed and told this to the media and public. This demonstrated a failure of LILCO to transmit accurate and timely information.

RESPONSE

1 Intervenors were present at the ENC. They vere obviously aware of i

the matters set forth in contention 7 at the tire of exercise. Thus, no i

. ,p Ry ,

4 good cause exists for filing of the contention at this time and a

'i' balancing of the factors under 10 C.F.R. 5 2.714(a) weighs against its admission.

The Staff also objects to this contention concerning operations at the emergency news center as being too broad and general, except as limited to basis E, which alleges the EBS messages were not posted timely for the news media at the ENC.

The allegations contained in basis A, concerning the performance of the LERO spokesperson, even if taken to be true, at most would constitute a minor, ad hoc perforrance error which in itself is not evidence of a fundamental flaw. The matters in Contention B dealing with the time to open the ENC was previously litigated and rejected. 27 NRC at 153.

Bases B, C, D and F which speculate on the projected behavior of the news personnel during a real emergency has no nexus to the exercise. None of these bases should be admitted. Basis G is too general to notify the parties of what to litigate. Basis H is inadmissible for the same reason as basis SB; LER0's performance can only be evaluated on the basis of the

~

exercise scenario.

Contention 8: Rumor Control. Under LILC0's Plan, the rumor control function has an important role in responding to an emergency. Absent prompt and accurate response to rumors, inconsistent and conflicting data can become public, making it difficult er impossible to convince people to comply with recomended protective actions.

According to the LILC0 Plan, ill an emergency the public is expected i to call LILCO Customer Relations District Offices and Custoner Call Boards to obtain information and ask questions. Plan at 3.8-5; OPIP .

3 . 8.1. The Plan provides, under the heading "Correcting Misinfortration,"

that "LILC0 personnel at these locations will be provided with updated press releases. If they cannot answer the inquiry they will call the ENC where a coordinated rumor control point will be manned by representatives from LERO and the Utility." Plan at 3.8-5.

4 .

The Exercise results, however, demonstrated that LILCO is incapable of dealing with rumors or responding to inquiries from the public during an emergency. During the Exercise, LILCO employees from several LILCO District Offices and Call Boards responded to simulated inquiries from the public. As demonstrated by the examples set forth below, however, such responses demonstrated LILC0's inability to dispel rumors, to correct misinformation, to provide necessary and accurate information to the public, to provide such information in a timely manner, or to provide consistent, coordinated, and nonconflicting information to the public.

Thus, LILCO failed to comply with 10 CFR ll 50.47(b)(6) and (7), and NUREG-0654 i II.G.4. LILC0 also failed to exercise good judgment in handling rumors and failed to comply with the previsions of its own Plan, or to satisfy ENC Objective 15 and DO Objective 15. Accordingly, the Plan is fundamentally flawed and the Exercise results preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an accident, as required by 10 CFR 9 50.47(a)(1).

The untimeliness and inadequacy of LILCO's responses are of particular concern because the same problems arose during the 1986 Shoreham exercise. While the Board found that the problems existing at that time did not rise to the level of a fundamental flaw (see LBP-88-2, 27 NRC at 162-66), the fact that such problems continue to exist demonstrates that LILCO is incapable of: (1) correcting such problems; (2) providing timely and accurate information to dispel rumors; or (3) training its personnel to promptly and accurately respond to public inquiries. Therefore, LILC0's centinuing inability to implement effective rumor control provisions of its Plan rises to the level of a fundamental flaw. In addition, LILCO's untimeliness and inadequate responses to rumors constitute a fundamental flaw because the problems contravene the standard established by the Board in LBP-88-2, when it stated:

We agree with the Staff that Rumor Control personnel should have basic information on radiation, the plant, the EPZ, and the protective action recorrr.endations readily at hand.

27 NRC at 164, n.43. As demonstrated below, LILCO's rumor control response did not meet this requirement, thereby demonstrating a furda-nental flaw in LILC0's Plan.

A. During the Exercise, LILCO personnel were unable to provide prompt responses to simulated inquiries seeking information about "radiation, the plant, the EPZ, and the protective action reconnendations" which the Board has previously found should be "readily at hand." 27 NRC at n.43. Instead, responses were generally delayed by more than 30 mi , and frecuently longer. In the following examples, more prNrpt a could and should have been forthcoming.

1. An inquiry whether to leave a particular area was received b limore operator at 6:35 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise; a response wt ..;t relayed to the caller until 8:01 a.m.

2. An inquiry about conditions at Shoreham was received at the Hewlett District Office at 6:49 a.m. on Day 1: a response was not relayed to the caller until 7:59 a.m.

i

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3. An inquiry about conditions at Shoreham was received at the Huntington facility at 7:25 a.m. on Day 1; a response was not relayed to the caller until 8:00 a.m.

4 A "customer" heard fire trucks going towards the plant and inquired as to the condition of the plant; his call was raceived at the Roslyn facility at 7:34 a.m. on Day 1; a response was not relayed to the caller until 8:35 a.m.

5. A caller asked the Hicksville District Office at 8:09 a.m.

on Day I where pets could be left once the owners left home; a response was not relayed to the caller until 9:35 a.m.

6. An inquiry from a new employee of the Shoreham plant about plant conditions was received by a Roslyn operator at 8:55 a.m. on Day 1; a response was not relayed to the caller until 10:11 a.m.

7. The Roslyn District Office received a call at 11:30 a.m. on Day 1 asking whether the accident at Shoreham was "another Three Mile Island"; a response was not relayed to the caller until 12:40 p.m.

8. An inquiry as to possible danger to unborn children was received by the Port Jefferson District Office at 9:38 a.m. on Day 1; the caller did not receive an answer until 10:58 a.m.

9. The Hewlett District Office, in particular, was consistently untimely in responding to even simple inquiries. The LILCO Plan instructs District Office /Ca11 board operators to answer questions they receive if the appropriate infomation is available to them. If this information is not available, they are instructed to forward the question to their supervisor, who is then to send the inquiry to the ENC for an answer. OPIP 3.8.1; EPIP 4-4, 5 5.2.1. The Hewlett operators, however, failed to follow this procedure. Instead of forwarding incuiries they were unable to answer promptly to the ENC, they retained the inquiries for long periods of time (often up to an hour or more), and then answered the questions. In light nf the absence of ENC involvement, there was no justification for these delays.

B. During the Exercise, rumor control personnel were unable to provide satisfactory and reasonable advice or infonnation to simulated public inquiries. Instead, such personnel frequently provided inaccurate or insufficient information or demonstrated poor judgment in responding.

For example:

1. At 7:20 a.m. on Day 1, the Riverhead District Office received a call from a customr in Zone "S" who wanted to know if she should evacuate. She wa not infomed about the status of plant conditions at Shoreham, the status of the emergency or the current PAR, even though LBP-88-2 requires rumor control operators to have such informatfor, readily at hand. Rather, she was told simply to "listen to your Emergency Broadcast Radio." The same response, again without elaboration, was apparently given to a 7:40 a.m. caller inquiring about the cordition of the plant.

P. At 8:12 a.m. on Day 1, a Hewlett Ca11 board operator described the status of the plant as "Alert." A Site Area Emergency had been in effect, however, since 7:31 a.m.

3. At 10:35 a.m. on Day 1, e Pewlett Ca11 board operator informed a customer that travel to Brookhaven Laboratory would be safe since no raoiation had been released. This advice derr,onstrated poor fudgment. Indeed, only r.ine minutes earlier, LILCO had issued an EBS

o .

ressage callir.g for evacuation of an area including Brookhaven Laboretory.

Brookhaven !aboratory is situated very close to the Shoreham plant and thus, perseas traveling to that facility would be closer to danger in the event of a possible release, t

4. At 11:30 a.m. on Day 1, a Patchogue operator informed a caller that there had not been a release of radiation. That information was plainly wrong, as a release had comenced at 11:00 a.m.

5. At 12:36 p.m. on Day 3, Port Jefferson received a call from a customer in Zone J who wanted to know why he had not heard any sirens in .

his area. First, the operator told him that Zone J was supposed to '

evacuate, and then told him that they would call him back to give him the infonnation he requested about the sirens. Uiie hour later, at 1:53 p.m.s  !

the customer was informed that the sirens in his area would be checked Gt  !

a later date. This response showed bad judgment. The caller should N ye been told to evacuate and not given the suggestion that it was safe 'co wait for a return telephone call one hour later. 4 The fabylon District Office received a call with the samt inquiry at 12:40 p.m. Again, one hour later (at 1:49 p.m.), the customer was told the sirens would be checked later. This time, however, there was not even any mention of the fact that the customer should have evecuated.

RESPONSE

It is not showr. that the Intervenors learned of the matters in contention 9 shortly before it was filed. No good cause is shown for its admission now. A balancing of factors in 10 C.F.R. I 2.71a(a) shoul( lead r

to its rejection. Further, the staff objects to this contention reoarding rumor control limited to the bases given, so that the parties know what is to be litigated. Taken individually, the allegations relate to perfomance  ;

errors by individuals which are not of themselves evidence of a fundrental flaw. However, taken together, it is possible to argue that such perfonnance j errors could impact the public response and thus this contention shculd be

, admitted for hearing.

i l

Contention 9: The Public Would Refect LILCO's Flawed ERS Messanes i as a Prinary Source of Infomation. The LILCO Plan is premised on h e 3ssumption that timely, clear, authoritative and unambiguous EBS messages w!11 he the primary neans by which the public will be informed of an ac:ident and given reconr'endations as to what protective actions are advisable. In Contei tions 6-8 dove, the bases for such an assumption are ,

dcn.cnstrated te be false.

l 1 i

'i 1

The facts set forth in support of the foregoing contentions also establish a further fundamental flaw in LILCO's Plan. LILC0 assumes that EBS messager will be broadcast in a timely manner and thus will constitute the primary source of emergency information to the public. The Exercise revealed that, far from being a primary source of information, LILCO's EBS messaces lagged far behind actual events, and far behind the media.

For example, the Site Area Emergency was declared at the EOC at 7:33 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise. The LERO EBS message conveying of this information was not broadcast until 8:10 a.m.; prior to that time EBS No.

1, containing much different infomation, was LER0's official comunication to the public. The news media at the ENC, however, knew i soon after 7:33 a.m. that a Site Area Emergency had been declared. It is inevitable that the media would imediately have begun to comunicate this information to the public -- long before EBS No. 2 was broadcast at 8:08 a.m. -- and thus the media would have been conveying information incorsistent with the information in the official LERO comunication (EBS No. 1). Therefore, contrary to the basic assumption of the LILCO Plan, EBS No. 2 would have been issued after conflicting information (news media reports vs. EBS No. 1) had been broadcast for some time. As a result. EB!

No. 2, when issued, would have been viewed as a belated attempt by LILCO to provide information that the news media had already published. The LER0 EBS simply would not have been viewed as an authoritative source of information.

This same pattern existed throughout the Exercise. The LERO EBS messages were consistently slow in beino issued, resulting in the media havingaccesstoand(intherealworld)brcadcastinginformation substantially before the broadcast of EBS messages. In each case, the media's broadcasts would inevitably conflict to some degree with LERC's existing EBS message, which would still be the "current" LERO official announcement. This reflects a fundamental flaw in LILCO's Plan: the assumption that LERO EBS messages would be viewed as the first line, authoritative statement issued regarding accident matters is without basis. Those messages would be so delayed that the public would choose to rely on the media for inferration.

RESPONSE

Contention 9 merely recites the allegations set forth in contentions 6 through 8 and presents no separate issue for litigation. To the extent it seeks to raise other matters, it does not put parties on notice of what is to be litigated. Therefore this contention should be rejected as repetitive and not separately admitted for hearing based on Intervenor's speculation that the public will re.iect LILCO's EBS messages.

Contention 10: Evacuation Shadow Phenomenon. In its Partial Initial Decision on Shoreham emergency planning issues, the Licensing Board ruled with respect to the evacuation shadow phenomenon that:

The Board's finding on this contention strongly depends on there baing clear non-conflicting notice and instructions to the public at the time of an accident. If for any reason confused or conflictirg information was disseminated at the time of an Occident the Board accepts that a large excess evacuation on Long Island could materialize.

LBP-85-12, 21 f.RC 644, 670 (1985). In issuing its opinion on the results of the February 1986 exercise, this Board accepted that pronouncement as the law of the case. Finding that LILCO had in fact issued confusing and conflicting information during the exercise, this Board reasoned as follows:

That finding brings the PID's conclusion that an excess evacuation could occur into play. In such an event, a controlled evacuation, which is required by the Plan, probably could not be achieved. Thus, we conclude that a fundamental flaw was demonstrated.

LBP-88-2, 27 NRC at 173 (footnote omitted).

As demonstrated by the Governments' contentions concerning LILC0's inability to convey clear, timely, accurate and concise information to the see e.g., Contentions 4-8),

public, the Exercise confirms that a large evacuation s (hadow is likely to occur in the media, and government "officicis"

, the event of an actual Shoreham accident. LILCO's Plan, however, does not

. account for such a large evacuation shadow and LERO's ability to handle such conditions was not tested during the Exercise. Indeed, LERO assumed during the Exercise that there was no evacuation shadow. Accordingly, the fundamental flaw found by this Board in LBP-88-2 continues to exist, clearly precluding a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be implemented in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham, as required by 10 CFR f 50.47(a)(1).

] RESPONSE <

Contention 10 regarding evacuation shadow phenomenon should not be admitted. At the outset, it is premised upon matters which were known to the Intervenors at the time of the exercise. Thus, there is no good cause  :

for the late filing and balancing of the good cause factor in 10 C.F.R.

$ 2.714(a)(1) clearly weighs against admission. Admission of this con-tention should be denied for the edditional reason that this issue has ,

f previously been extensively heard in this proceeding, and to the extent [

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it alleges that the LILCO Plan does not account for evacuation shadow phenomenon, it ignores the Board findings in the initial PID. (See 21 NRC 644, 791-794 where the 3oard directs the Plan to incorporate the results of sensitivity analyses concerning shadow phenomenon.) Also, to the extent the contention complains that a scenario involving a shadow evacuation was not tested, there is no requirement to test every scenario possible in ene exercise. This contention should be rejected since the mere speculation that shadow evacuation might occur does not show any nexus to flaws in the exercise and raises no litigable issue in this phase of the proceeding.

Contention 11: Iraestion Pathway PARS. The Exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in LILCO's Flan in that LERO f ailed to recommend timely and appropriate protective actions relatirg to the ingestion pathway.

LILCO thus demonstrated a failure to comply with 10 CFR ll 50.47(b)(6)(7),

(9), and (10), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 9 IV.F.1, and NUREG-0654, if II.F G 1 and J.11. The bases for this contention are discussed in subparts A-E below.

LILCO reconvended ingestien PARS for the first tire on Day 3 of the Exercise. FEMA found that LILCO was untirely in issuing ingestien PARS at that time; according to FEMA, such PARS should have been issued no later than Day 2. FEMA Report at 51. As demonstrated below, however, ingestion pathway PARS should actually Faye been issued on Day 1. At any rate.

LILCO's untimely issuance of ingestien PARS compels a finding that LILCO failed to comply with *.he foregoing regulatory standards and failed to satisfy EOC Objectives 3, 4,13, 29, 30, and 37. This fundamental flaw in LILC0's Plan precludes a findirg that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham, as required by 10 CFR l 50.47(a)(1). Before setting forth the specific bases for this contention, certain background facts warrant discussion.

At approximately 7:33 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, LERO declared a Site Area Emergency, resulting in an automatic ingestion pathway PAR to place dairy animals within two miles of the Shoreham plart on stored feed.

FEMA Repnrt at 39-40; OPIP 3.6.6, 6 5.1.1.1.b. This advisory was "broadcast" to the public in EBS No. 2, at 8:08 a.m. FEMA Report at 40.

The LILC0 Plan requires the PAR for dairy animals to be increased to 10 miles in the event that a General Emergency is declared (OPIP 3.6.6, 5 5.1.1.1.c) and, accordirt ly, the public was "advised" of this increased ingestion PAR at 10:26 a.m. on Day 1 via EBS No. 3. FEMA Report at 40.

At the sane time, LERO decided to evacuate persons from Zones A-J, 0, P, and ? end to shelter persont in Zones K, L. M, N, Q, and R. I d_ .

I On Day 1, LILCO predicted that EPA PAG levels for the plume EPZ would be exceeded during the "accident." Indeed, no later than 12:11 p.m. on Day 1, when EBS No. 4 was issued, LILC0 pro.iected radiation doses beyond the Shureham site boundary in excess of EPA PAGs reoutring protective actions. FEMA Report at 45. Such a prediction of plume EPZ doses in excess of the PAGs continued at least until 5:52 p.m. on Day 1, when EBS No. 7 was issued. Id.

LILCO's predictTons were confirmed by actual field measurements taken on Day 1. Field monitoring data logs reveal that there were large readings of Beta radiation taken between 5:00 p.m. and 5:35 p.m. at locations between seven and 10 miles east of the Shoreham plant. Thus.

HP-270 survey instrument showed readings of 50,000 cpm with the Bets window open and 7200 cpn with the Beta window closed. These high readings indicated the strong presence of Beta radiation -- most likely iodine. At the same time, smear samples of the deposited material were showing readings of 470 to 2100 cpm, indicating the presence of particulate deposition at each of the measurement locations between seven and 10 miles east of the plant. Readings of this magnitude at 10 miles from the plant indicate that iodine and particulate contamination beyond 10 miles was almost a certainty.

Furthermore, while normal weather conditions were assumed during Day 1 of the Exercise, rain was assumed to have fallen between Day 1 and Day

2. FEMA Report at 30-31. This assumption &garding rain increased the likelihood of the need for ingestion PARS because rain can lead to increased levels of surface centamination and may require protective actions at greate!r distances or increased restrictions on the food chain.

Other assumptions also were made to increase the need for ingestion PARS.

See FEMA Report at 30-31.

Except for the auto'atic ingestion pathway PARS for dairy animals referenced above, it was not until EBS No.17 was "broadcast" on Day 3 y at 12:50 p.m., that LILCO issued a further ingestion pathway PAR. With these facts as background, the bases for this contention include the following:

A. LitCO's failure to issue ingestion pathway PARS until 12:50 p.m.

on Day 3 of the Exercise was untimely. Under the cenditions present during the Exercise, it was incuebent upon LERO personnel to develop and issue ingestion pathway PARS to the public at a much earlier time. LILCO personnel knew by approximately noon on Day 1 that at least portions of the 10-m11e EPZ were predicted to have radiation levels in excess of the PAGs for plume exposure protective actions. FEMA Report at 45. Further, actual field readings taken on Day 1 indicated Beta readings greater than 400 cpm, far beyond the plant. Under LILC0's Plan, such readings required ingestion pathway PARS to be issued, especially since the readings indi-

, cated the presence of particulates. OPIP 3.6.6 t 5.2.2.

In addition, cerditions existing on Day 2 further indicated a need to issue PARS for the ingestion EPZ. FEMA Report at 51. Indeed, as reported in FEMA control cell documents, by the afternoon of Day 2, LERO knew that there were "hot spots" and that the FDA PAGs had been exceeded 13 miles east of the plant. Nevertheless, LILCO faileo to develop any ingestion PARS on Day 1 or Day 2. Thus, it is clear that LILCO was untirely in the developeent and issuance of irgestion PARS, resulting in a condition whereby the public faced increased radiation risk due to the lack of PARS.

B. LILCO not only failed to develop and broadcast ingestion PARS prior to the issuance of EBS No.17 at 12:50 p.m. oq Day 3 of the ,

Exercise, but it also failcd even to alert persons more than 10 miles from Shoreham of the potential for ingestion risks, thus demonstrating a failure to exercise the "sound judgment" (OPIP 3.6.6, i 1) that is essential on ingestion matters. Indeed, LILCO's EBS messages conveyed virtually no ingestion pathway concern or awareness for persons beyond 10 miles from Shoreham prior to Day 3. For example. EBS No. 8. "broadcast" i early on Day 2, stated that persons mere than 10 miles frem Shoreham have  ;

"no reason to take any action" ber mse radiation "beyond the 10-mile Eurgency Planning Zone will be be:cw the U.S. Environmental Protection (Emphasis Agency)'s added. guidelines EBS for doses No.10, issued requiring at 11:30 protective a.m. on Day 2. EBS action."

No.10A issued at 3:35 p.m. on Day 2, and EBS Nos.15 and 16 issued on Day 3, contained similar statements. LILC0 had no basis to make such categorical  ;

assertions; indeed, data available to LILCO indicated ingestion zone PAGs  ;

had been exceeded on Day 2. FEMA Report at 51. At a minimum, given the scriousress of the accident postulated, persons more than 10 miles from Shoreham should have been told to use caution -- e.g., washing local j vegetables very carefully. And, LILCO should have corrected the erroneous and misleading statements contained in EBS messages issued throughout the '

Exercise. Instead, LILCO, exercising poor judgment and reflecting bad training, told the public beyond 10 miles from Shoreham to exercise no

, caution at all.

l C. LILC0 EBS ressages improperly sought to minimize the likelihood 4 of any ingestion hazard. For example, EBS No. 2 recorrended placing 1

animals within two miles of Shoreham on stored feed. LILCO said it was i naking that recomendation because it was "recuired" to do so by "NRC 1

regulations." The statement then was followed by the assertion:

This does not mean that a release of radiation has occurred.

This does not mean that a release of radiation will occur.

These statements tended to understate the possible seriousness of the  !

developing accident, to imply that LILCO was making the PAR only because l i of a regulaticn and not because of any potential health hazard, and to L I

reflect LER0's failure to exercise sound judgment regarding ingestion l matters. OP!P 3.6.6, i 1. Similar misleading statements were contained

- in EBS No. 3 issutd at 10:55 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, and in virtually all later ressages (see EBS Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, and 16).

LILCO's minimization of the potential hazard to tM public continued '

in EBS No. 17. At that point (Day 3, 12:50 p.m.), LILT 0 finally issued 4

an ingestion PAR in response to radiation levels above the PAGs outside i the 10-mile EPZ. Yet, even then, LILCO's PAP was issued only "as a

, precaution," again minimizing the potential harm to the public.  !

D. Despite the fact that Zones A-J, G. P, and S had been directed l to evacuate at 10:26 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, despite knowing by  :

l noon nn Day 1 that portions of those zones were predicted to have j radiatico readings in excess of plume EPZ PAG levels, despite knowing that j j readings far in excess of 400 cpn had been measured within the EP7, and  ;

despite knowing that some persons within those zones would not evacuate i despite beirg urged to do so LILC0 never specifically advised such ,

L

[

l i

persons to take any ingestion pathway precautions (such as care concerning drinking water, washing local vegetables, closing windows and doors, [

etc.), except for the advisory to place dairy animals on stored feed. '

Indeed, even when an ingestion PAR finally was issued on Day 3 (EDS No.

17), it was not clear whether it applied to those specific zones which had  ;

previously been advised to evacuate. As persons in these zones were in an  !

area where exposure to radiatinn was likely, and particularly since the areas tast of Shoreham have a high concentration of agriculture  :

activities, it was essential that detailed ingestion advice be developed and pr'..vided to this population. . j E. The LERO E0F recommended a Site Area Emergency at 7:31 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercice and the LERO EOC accepted that recomendation at  :

7:33 a.m. on Day 1. FEMA Report at 39. It was not until 8:08 a.m. on Day i 1, however, that the LERO EOC issued to the public the automatic protec- i tive action (OPIP 3.6.6, 6 5.1.1.1.b) to place dairy animals within two miles of Shoreham on stored feed. FEMA Report at 40. LILCO thus demon-  !

strated a fundamental flew in its decisionmaking capability by failing to }

take prompt action to recomend sheltering dairy animals within two miles of Shoreham. Since this was an automatic protective action that shculd  !

have taken no "thinking" in order to implement it, LERO personnel should i have imediately made that protective action recommendation to the public  !

as soon as the Site Area Emergency was declared. Similar unjustified  !

delays were evidenced at the General Emergency level, when LILC0 failed to i' recomend promptly the expansion of the dairy advisory to 10 miles, as required by CPIP 3.6.6, 6 5.1.1.1.c. l r

t U According to the FEMA Report, this PAR on Day 3 was actually, with f the time leap of the scenario, assumed to be made on June 27, 20 days  !

after the accident started. FEMA Report at 26. However, EDS ho. 17 is i dated June 10, which would indicate that perhaps the time leap referenced  :

in the FEMA Report had not taken place. T.his matter will need to be  !

pursued in discovery. l RESPONSE  ;

t No good cause is shown for the late filing of Contention 11. The Intervenor s have not establishco that they did not know of the matters }

therein until the FEMA Report was issus.d. A balance of tne factors in 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(a) requires that the contention be rejected. (

Further, basis E, which alleges that LERO personnel should have broadcast a protective action recomendation prior to seeking approval of f that recomendation, is cicarly at odds with the scheme contorplated I

o 62 -

in the regulations and followed in the scenario of the exercise. See 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, i IV.D.3 and FEMA Report at 44.

It should also be noted that Intervenors at places have confused "ingestion pathway" with "plume exposure pathway" in this contention and this confusion should be clarifieu, particularly in relation to basis D.

Contention 12: Plume Exposure Pathway PARS. The Exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILC0 Plan in that LERO personnel were untimely in making PARS for the plume exposure pathway, made ina (9)ppropriate and (10) andrecomendations HUREG-0654 i II.FinGviolation and J.10, of 10 to failed CFR ll 50.4Hb)(6)(7),

amend energency broadcasts containir.g PARS in a timely manner, and failed to satisfy E0C Objective 18. Thus, the Exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and uill be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR l 50.47(a)(1). The bases for this contention include the following:

A. On Day 1 of the Exercise, ;he EOF recomended at 9:34 a.m. that particular zones in the plume exposure EPZ be evacuated and that particu-lar zones in that EPZ be sheltered. This recomendation was received by the LERO E0C at 9:4 a.m. Nonetheless, it was not until 10:20 a.m. that tne LERO EOC decided to accept these recommendations and it was not until 10:26 a.m. that the public was notified of these crucial recomendations.

FEMA Report at 40. There was no justification for this delay in the critical decisionmaking process related to plume exposure pathway PARS.

See Contention 5. A similar unjustified delay with respect to LILCO's Eclaration of a Site Area Emergency PAR also occurred. See Contention 5.

B. In EBS No. 1, issued at 6:13 a.m. on Day 1 at th D iert stage of the Exercise, LERO recomended that schools within the EPZ implement their early dismissal plans. This PAR was untimely. See Contention 5.

Further, this recomendation was inappropriate ano issued contrary to LILCO Plan provisions. The Plan provides that the canceling of schools is the appropriate recomendation to be issued at the Alert or higher classification level if schools are not in session but will be in a few hours. OP!P 3.6.1. Recognizing early dismissal to be an inappropriate PAR, a FEMA controller simulating a government "official" informed the LERO Director of Local Response that LER0 should instead advise schools not to open. Nevertheless, lek 0 continued to issue the early dismitsal recomendation and simulated the early dismissal of EPZ schools, except the Rocky Point School District. LER0 evan dispelled a "rumor" that children residing within five niles of the Shcrehan plant should remain home, rather than attending school, by issuing a statement that schools should early dismiss (implying that those students should not remain home, but instead, should travel to school and then bcek hre again pursuant to implementation of early dismissal). Such a recommendation cefies logic.

By advising early dismissal rWer than simply recomending sctools not to opch, LERO not only violateo the LILC0 Plan provisions conce"ning

l

. . appropriate school PARS, but also needlessly exposed school children, a segnent of the population particularly sensitive to the harmful effects of radiation, to potential dose exposure.

C. Evacuation for certain zones of the 10-mile EPZ was recomended at 10:26 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise. Yet, despite knowing that some persons would choose not to evacuate and despite being urged to do so, it was not until EBS No.10 was "broadcast," at approximately 11:35 a.m. on Day 2, that LILC0 issued any PAR for persons who were in the evacuating zones who had decided not to evacuate.

D. In EBS No. 4, issued at 12:11 p.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, LER0 advised persons from the evacuated zones to go to LlLCO reception ,

centers. LERO personnel had already determined the need for these persons to report to reception centers one hour earlier, but did not promptly amend EBS No. 3 (which was being broadcast at the time the determination was made) to make that need known to the public. Instead, EBS No. 3 continued to be "broadcast" until 12:1' n.m. There is no justification for the delay in providing this PAR to tne public. In any event, EBS No.

4 was an ineffective PAR because it did not explain why people should go to the reception centers. See Contention 6.

E. LILCO also was untimely in notifying evacuees of the need to avoid a road impediment in the vicinity of Sheep Pasture Road. This impediment had been reported to che E0C at 11:16 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise. Notice of the impediment was not conveyed to the public until EBS No. 4, "broadcast" at 12:11 p.m. on Day 1. Similarly, approximately one hour elapsed between the tirne that the E0C became aware of a traffic impediment blocking Granny Road and the time that EBS No. 5 was issued advising evacuees to avoid that area. Finally, the E0C was notified of an inpediment at Wading River Road and Schultz Road at 12:59 p.m. on Day 1, but the public was not informed of this impediment until EBS No. 6 was issued at 2:40 p.m. Such untimely notification of impediments easily could have caused substantial delays in the evacuation of residents from affected zones, thereby increasing the risk of radiation exposure to this population.

F. The Exercise demonstratec that LILCO is incapable of providing prompt PAks to residents of special facilities (adult homes, nursing homes, and hospitals). EBS No. 3 was issued at 10:26 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise. That EBS message specifically mentioned the needs of homebound individuals. However, the message did not mention at all wh6t protective action, if any, was recortrcnded for residents of special f acilities.

RESPONSE

The Staff objects to admission of contention 12 regarding tie alleged untimely broadcast of protective action reconmendations. These are matters known to the Intervenors at the time of the exercise, and no good ccuse exists to file this contention now.

. . f j

Further, to the extent it duplicates the same issue in Contention 11. 3 Additionally, to the extent this merely duplicates the alleged untimely {

broadcast of EBS messages in Contention 6.B. it should not be separately admitted, but consolidated with Contention 6.B and 11 so as to avoid j repetitive litigation of the same issue. Further, the c ntention is f improper to the extent it deals with the content of emergency messages, f

which was a subject in the Plan litigation.

I Contention 13: Medical Services. The NRC's regulations require that [

an emergency plan ensure that "[a]rrangements are made for medical }

services for contaminated injured individuals." 10 CFR l 50.47(b)(12); see I also NUREG-0654 i II.L This <squirement applies both to onsite workers l and to members of the eneral public who may become both contaminated and injured during a radio ogical emergency. See Guard v. NRC, 753 F.2d 1144  !

(D.C. Cir. 1985). i The Exercise results reveal a fundamental flaw in LILCO's Plan arising from LER0's inability to handle contaminated and injured individuals safely and effectively. The medical drills held at Mid-1sland ,

Hospital and Brunswick Hospital during the Exercise demonstrated numerous ,

errors, incorrect procedures and inadequate training on the part of many ,

of the medical personnel on whom LILC0 relies to provide the specialized treatment which contaminated and injured individuals require. The  !

Exercise results thus revealed that LILC0 failed to satisfy FA Objectives '

i 23 and 24, and that the LILC0 Plan does not comply with the foregoing regulatory requirements. The existence of this fundamental flaw precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can  ;

and will be taken in the event of a Shorehan erergency, as required by 10 '

CFR l 50.47(a)(1). The errors ano other problems which demonstrate the existence of this fundamental flaw include:

A. The only radiation safety officer ("RS0") present at Brunswick Hospital monitored simulatec patients too quickly and often held the l monitoring probe too far from the patients to detect contamination J accurately and effectively. The same improper procedure was used by the l RSO to monitor personnel leaving the emergency room. This improper e technique could result in a failure to detect, and therefore contain, I contamination. FEMA Report at 99.  !

B. Contamination control also was inadequate. For instance, potentially contaminated water pooled in a plastic sheet rather than  !

properly being drained away from the patient, thereby risking recontamina-tion of the patient. The patient was also transferred to a clean gurney l f rom a stretcher without first checking the patient's back and the  !

original stretcher for contamination. Curing the patient exit process, a l gurney was removed from the area without first being monitored. I r.  !

t I

4 .

j addition, windows left open for ventilation could have produced drafts '

which would have spread contarination. FEMA Report at 99. ,

C. LILCO cid not provide for a sufficient number of RS0s to be available at the hospitals, thus delaying the monitoring process and ,

creating the conditions which led to the use of hurried and improper monitoring procedures. In fact, as noted in subpart A above, LILCO provided only one RSO at Brunswick Hospital. This RSO was entrusted with the responsibility of conducting all staff exit procedures, in addition te  !

monitoring patients, hospital staff, and the ambulance and its crew. When i the sole RSO prepared to exit the radiation emergency area of the hospital, he was improperly monitored. FEMA Report at 99. (

D. Since no person assumed the role of an injured and contaminated victim, no person was transported during the LILC0 medical drills, and -

FEMA was unable to evaluate the performance of the ambulance crew. FEMA ,

Report at 98. Thus, it is impossible to conclude that LILCO demonstrated i any ability to arrange transportation of victims of radiological accidents i to medical support facilities, as required by NUREG-0654 6 51.L.4. i E. An ambulance driver sinclating the transport of a contaminited  ;

injured individual to one of the hospitals did not know the location of I the radiation emergency area entrance and, once the entrance was found,  ;

hospital personnel were not present to remove a barrier to the entrance. ,

Accordingly, the patient's treatment was delayed. FEMA Report at 99.

}

RESPONSE (

The Staff objects to Contention 13 as being too broad and general,  !

I and otherwise inadmissible, except as limited to basis C. Further, l Intervonors have not shcwn the contention should be admisted upon a f balancing of the factors in 10 C.F.R. 5 2.714(a).

Basis A concerns an ad hoc instance of one individual holding a probe too far from the person being monitored. Intervenors cite the fella report ,

5 as support for this basis, but FEMA classified this a' . . minor matter, and j i

it could not evidence a fundamental flaw.  ;

Basis B, concerning an area recommended for improvement by FEMA,

(

again raises a matter which is not a fundamental flaw. Basis 0 alleges  !

i that no person alsumed the role of contaminated injured individual. No l

violation of any requirement is alleged and the facts alleged could not evidence a fundamental flaw. Basis E concern; a driver being unf amiliar l l

with the energency entrance to a hospital and the f act that he had to  !

l

s .

l remove a barrier. FEMA stated this was an area for iriprovement only, i

Again this allegation could not reveal a fundaraental flaw in the Plan. l

{

I Contention 14: Schcols. NRC regulations require the i.bility to  !

implement protective actioris' for schools and other "special" populations.  !

See 10 CFR 6 50.47(b)(10); see also, NUREG-0654, 6 J.10 and App. 4 at 4-3. I In ALAB-900, the Appeal Board recognized that school matters constitute a r.ajor portion of LILCO's Plan. ALAB-900, slip op, at 13-16. Thus, for ,

example, the LILCO Plan provides for protective actions to be taken to i safeguard the welfare of the EPZ schools' population in the event of a i radiological emergency at Shorehau. Plan at 4 ?-1; OPIPs 3.6.1, 3.6.5. ,

The Exercise, however, revealed that the L1LC0 Han, as it applies to  :

protection of the school populations is fundatentally flawed. Accord-  !

ingly, LILC0 failed to satisfy FA Objectives 2,18, and 19 and failed to i I

demonstrate that its Plan complies with the foregoing NRC requirements. l The existence of this fundamental flaw in LILCO's Plan for schools ,

i precludes a finoing of reasonable assurance that adequate protective  !

4 measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as  !

required by 10 CFR i 50.47(a)(1). The bases for this contention include j

. the following:

! A. The LILC0 Plan provides for LILCO to provide bus drivers to ,

i assist in the evacuation of the schools in a single wave. OPIP 3.6.4 at  :

1 2b-2d. Thus, after reporting to staging areas LERO bus drivers are l required to report to designated school bus cocpanies where they are provided with assignment packets containing their school assignments, ,

i dosinoters, K1 tablets, emergency worker dose record forms, energency i worker badges, bus lease receipt forms, maps oescribing the credesignated j j routes to the schools, maps describing the routes to the school relocation 1 centers, maps describing the routes to the EWDF, and other documents. [

3 OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 14. According to the LILCO Plar., such assignraent packets '

! are to be stored in "LERO boxes" and either pre-positioned at the school 4 bus companies or delivered to the bus yards by one of the LERO bus drivers

' at the tire of the Shoreham emergency. OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 4. As a practical matter, no evacuation of school children pursusnt to the LILC0  :

Plan can take place without the information and supplies contained in the i

packets. [

! Ouring thi Exercise, however, there were no such packets at many  ;

}

school bus companies and bus yards, thus preventing drivers from carryir.g i out any school-related duties and forcing the LERO school bus drivers to return to their staging areas to await further instructions, in fact, it appears that the bus drivers were not redeployed. In the event of ar.  !

actual radiological emergency at Shoreham, the inability to implement an [

evacuation of schools, or delays ir implementing an evacuation of schools, [

caused by the failure to make school assignreents route information and i dosimetrysuppliesavailabletobusdrivers,wouIdposeaserioushealth  !

and safety risk to the school children within the EPZ. Under such l circurastances, drivers could not be deployed and LILCO's Plan could nr ? be i irplemented. LERO personnel exhibit (d rc ability to deal with this  !

unanticipated situation.  !

i i

B. During the Exercise, LILC0 issued an EBS message at 5:52 p.m. on Day 1 advicing LPZ residents with children attet: ding schools located outside the EPZ that children not retrieved by parents at the schools had been taken to the Nassau County Coliseum "under school supervision".

There are, however, no Plan provisions to handle this contingency. While LILCO simulated that an estimated 11,000 students required transportation, the Plan reveals no pre-planning to assure that buses and drivers are i available to provide such transportation or that these children will be  ;

adequately supervised either while in transit or once relocated. Instead, ,

the Plan provides only that these students are to be retaingd at school at the end of the day. OPIP 3.C.1 at 31a. The Exercise revealed that this is a significant aspect of LILCO's Plan, but it was neither developed before the Exercise, nor implemented during it. .

C. According to the Plan, LILC0 bus drivers are required to drive school children out of the EPZ using pre-designated evacuation routes

, which apparently have been chosen by LILCO to expedite evacuation tints for school children. A significant number of LILCO bus drivers, however, ignored their designated routes and decided to take other routes without prior approval and without notifying LER0 of the unplanned route devio-tion. FEMA Report at 111-12. While there may be instances where deviation from prescribed routes would be appropriate (for instance, to avoid a traffic impediment), failure to .'ollow the prescribed routing scheme in most instances is likely to lead to increased evacuation tines for school children, thereby heightening the threat of increased radiation doses for such children. Further, once "off course," LER0 would no longer be able to trace the route of school buses or control or monitor traffic volumes or monitor the relationship of school evacuation routes to other r evacuation routos. FEMA Report at 111.

D. During the Exercise, LERO simulated the protective action of evacuation of the Rocky Point School District schools. This simulation was fraught with problems. First, between 7:31 a.m. and 10:39 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, no protective action was inplemented for Rocky Point students. Once underway, the simulated evacuation took almost seven haurs to complete, including one-and-one-half hours for the children to travel f rom the Nassau County Coliseum to LILCO's Hicksville f acility. As a FEMA controller noted, this delay wcs excessive. Once at the Coliseum, another 50 rinutes elapsed before parents were informed in EBS No. 7 that their  !

chilcren could ncw be retrieved.

Furthcr, LILCO failed to contact or simulate contact with the Rocky 1 P;, int schools to ascertain whether assistance would be needed to evacuate ,

handicapped students, as required by OPIP 3.6.5, Att.11. Untimely deployraent of school bus drivers also needlessly delayed the evacuation of

. the Rocky Point schools, thereby increasing the tirse students attending

! those schools spent in the EPl. Although school bus drivers were to t report to staging areas by 9:10 c m., bus driver deployment was not cornpleted until over two hours later, at 11:15 a n. FEMA Report at 106.

E. The Exercir,e revealed that not all the school buses which LILC0 1 intends to use to evacuate school children are equipped with two way or

even AM/FM radict. See FEMA Report at 108. Without radios, L!lCO bus drivers would not bc31e to hear any notification r(garding energency conditions while er, route and would be unau re of accidents or other such traf fic iredinents, which could unnecessarily del 3y the evacuation of the 4

I school children and lead to potentially increased radiation doses.

Moreover, should a bus deviate frora its assigned route, LERO would be unable to contact that bus and ascertain its actual location.

F. LILCO also failed to demonstrate how school childrtn taken to relocation centers would be cared for or supervised.

G. In some instances, LERO bus drivers reporting to certain bus yards were told that no buses were available. This demonJtrated that LILC0 cannot rely upon the bus companies to supply buses in the event of an actual emergency at Shoreham.

H. The maps provided to school bus drivers were inaccurate. FEMA Report at 111.

RESP 0 HSE The Intervenors have not established that contention 14 should be admitted upon a balancing of the factors in 10 C.F.R. 5 2.714(a), l'o s t of the matters alleged in the contention do not appear to be matters learned from the FEMA Report. Moreover, the Staff objects to this con-tention as being too broad and general, except as limited to basis D.

Basis A does not allege any performance problems which reflect a fundamental flaw in the plan. No facts are alleged to show that any routes were not run because a driver did not have an assignment packet or that any driver who has o' shoulc have had school-related duties did not receive an assignment pccket.

Basis C concerns may not be admitted because they deal with a planning issue, ie.: the lack of an EBS tressage for parents of children  :

attending school outside of the EPZ. Easis C connot De admitted because it is not alleged that the matters set out in this basis inpacted the public resperse. The Intervenors' statements in the contention are only speculation end do not raise problems which reflect any fundarental flaw i in the plan.

Lasis E nLst be r(jected cs there is r,o requirenent that schor.1 buses have. 2-way, or even AM/FM, radios. Similarly basis F raust be cenied ,

admission as there is no requirenent that it be shown how school children would be cared for or supervised at relocation centers. Further, to the extent there was such a requirement it would be a planning, not an exercise issue.

Basis G must be rejected for a failure to cite a source of facts which would allow the parties to litigate the matter.

Basis H must be rejected because it do'es not allege a lack of maps would impact the public response. Thus no fundamental flaw is alleged.

Contention 15: Traffic Impediments. One of the fundamental flaws found in LlLC0's Plan as a result of the February 1986 eaercise was LILCO's inability to respond to simulated traffic impediments promptly or effectively. See LBP-88-2, 27 NRC at 97-121. Specifically, LILCO's responses to the impediments were untimely, disorganized, and ill-conceived. In the 1988 Exercise, LILCO's ability to respond to such impediments once again was tested; and, once again, LILCO failed the test.

During the Exercisc., LILC0 "road crews" did not respond to certain impedi-ments in a timeh manner and traffic was incorrectly rerouted. Accord-ingly, LILCD f ailed to satisfy FA Ob of compliance with 10 CFR i 50.47(b)jective 20, and demonstrated (10), and NUREG-0654 6 ll.J.10.k. its Thelack continuing existence of this fundamental flaw also precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency, as required by 10 CFR 5 50.47(a)(1). Examples of this continuing fundamental flaw are as follows:

A. As was the case in the February 1986 exercise, the 1988 Exercise demonstrated that LILCO cannot respond to impediments in a tinely manner.

See LBP-88-2, 27 hRC at 115-16. At 12:00 noon on Day 1 of the Exercise, a TUIA controller inserted a free-play message into the Exercise describing a simulated accident in which a large moving van, having struck a utility pole, was lying on its side on Granny Road, blocking all traffic and leaking diesel fuel. LILC0 road crews reported to the wrong intersection, however, and did not reach the proper location until 1:15 p.m. - one hour and 15 minutes af ter the impeciment was first reported. This delay in responding to the impediment demonstrated that LILCO is still incapable of providing a reliable and prompt response to traffic impedinents.

B. The 1986 exercise also demonstrated that LILCO cannot offectively reroute traffic away from an impediment. LBP-88 2, 27 NRC 116-18. This same problem arose acain during the 1988 Exercise with rcspect to crother imped went involving two cutomobiles and a trailer carrying eight horsts. A LILC0 traffic guide was assigned to direct traitic away from the impeciment. He failed to do so, however, eno instead directed traf fic directly towaro the irpediment. See FE!:A Report

j at 89. This confirmed that LILCO continues to be unable to respond o' appropriately to. traffic impediments and that LILCO cannot correct this 6 fundamental flaw in its Plan.

C. LILC0 was also untimely in communicating the existence of ,

certain impediments to the public. See Contention 6.

RESPONSE ,

Again, Intervenors have not established that a balancing of the factors under 10 C.F.R. 6 2.714(a) should lead to admission of. the  ;

contention, See, Catawba _, cupr'a.

Further, the Staff objects to contention 15 as being too broad and ,

general, except as limited to the matt . alleged in the bases A and B of the contention. Although the Intervenors state that dealing with traffic i impediments was found to be a "fundamental flaw" in the 1985 exercise, t

this does not correctly recount the Board's findings. See 27 NRC at 116,

[

118. Basis C is too vague to be admitted into litigation. i i

Contention 16: Access Control. The LILC0 Plan provides that after an evacuation has been completed, personnel will be psii.ionad around the evacuated areas to prevent access to those areas. OPlv 3.10.1 at 3. The Exercise demonstrated that LlLCO's Plan is fundamentally flawed because it does not provide adequate guidance as to where such personnel shou?d be ,

located. As a result, it took many hours af ter the end of the evach3 tion ,

period to prepare and approve an access control plan. In an actual i emergency, such a delay could have serious consequences for the public health and safety, or purposely, since to enter some peop(and possibly contaminated) zones.le might atte!

evacuated During the Exercise, the absence of pre-designated access control points i also led to confusion concerning the Day 2 decision to "unshelter" the portions of the EPZ for which sheltering had been the initial protective action reconcendation, in that such action without adequate control of l access points to evacuated subzones posed risks to the "unsheltering"  !

population. See FEMA Report at 47.

In additTon, when questioned by FEMA evaluators LERO personnel also exhibited a lack of understand hg concerning who should be allowed access >

to evacuated areas and what areas were specifically restricted. LILCO's I failure to provide adequate access control deoonstrates that it did not f satisfy EOC Objective 20 or FA Objective 20, and that its Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR 6 50.47(b)(10). Accordingly, there can be no finding that adequate protective measures can and will be implemented, as required by 10 CFR l 50.47(a)(1).

i RESPONSE  !

The Staff opposes the admission of contention 16 as it is not alleged j that an access control plan did not exist when needed.- The possible consequences to the public health and safety are mere conjecture and must be rejected. Moreover, it has not been shown that a salancing of the (

l factors in 10 C.F.R. I 2.714(a) should lead to the admission of this [

contention.

I Contention 17: honitorino and Decontamination of P o lic and l Emergency Workers. IIRC regulations require the ability ts provide  !

10 CFR  :

monitoring (andNUREG-0654 6 50.47(b) 10); decontamination facilities i ll.J.12. for the The LILC0 public.

Plan provides that l t

persnns from evacuated areas who may have been contaminated will bi advised to report to "reception centers" for monitoring and, if necessary, l decontanination. Plan at 4.2-1; OPIP 4.2.3. Likewise, NRC regulations i require facilities for monitoring and decontaninating emergency workers.  !

10 CFR l 50.47(b)(10); NUREG-0654 5 11.K. For this purpose, LILC0 has t established an Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility ("EWDF"), to  !

which emergency workers must report fallowing completion of their duties.  !

Plan at 3.9-1; OPIP 3.9.2 at 3. l The Exercise, however, revealed that LILC0 is i.ot capable of  ;

providing timely and effective monitoring and decentamination of the public or emergency workers. Rather, as set forth below, LILC0 was untimely in recomending that merbers of the public report to reception centers, and it employed improper monitoring and decontamination j procedures. LILCO's inability to provide adequate n.onitoring and r decontamination services is a fundamental flaw wnich is in violation of the foregoing NRC regulations and fails to satisfy FA Objective and EADF Objective 25. Accydingly, there can be no reasonable assurance that .

ad(quate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Snorcham, as required by 10 CFR 5 50.47(a)(1). l A. As described in Contenti0n 5 above, LILCO failed in EBS Nos. 4-6 to inform members of the evacuating public why they should report to the reception centers until the issuance of EBS Ho, 7, scue seven-and-one-half ,

hours after they were first advised to evacuate. Thus, LlLCO failed to explain that evacuees needeo to be monitored and, if necessary, decontami-nated at the reception centers until EBS ho. 7 was issued at 5:52 p.m. on ,

Day 1. In an actual Shoreham energency, the failure to inform the public i of the reasons for going to the reception centers would likely lead to [

under utilization of the reception centers (as in fact occurred during the j Exercise) and to an increased likelihood that contaminated ~ etchers of the  :

public would not be decontaminated.  ;

B. LCR0 personnel failtd to folicw the Plan and employed incorrtet  !

rwidtoring and decontamination procedures and, as the FEPA Report notec,  !

i

i

\

t i

were inconsistant in their use of contamination control procedures. FEMA  !

Report at 97. These problems existed at all of the LILC0 facilities  !

i designated for monitoring and decontamination. .

1. At the Roslyn reception center, monitoring personnel t touched evacuees with survey probes, thus potentially contaminating the  !

probes. In addition, LERO personnel risked spreading contamination when:

• a potentially contaminated emergency worker orove a clean vehicle away

. from the decontamination center without first being monitored; a tag was  !

2 removed from a bag of contaminated clothing and hatided to a person in the "clean area;" and a monitor placed a pen on a potentially contaminated  !

vehicle and then picked it up. Furthermore, most of the LERO workers at

• Roslyn demonstrated confusion regarding how to read and record thyroid i scans. Finally, there was no female decontamination leader present at l Roslyn to an4wer the numerous questions women had for the decontamination  :

4 leader. [

2. At the Hicksville reception center, workers were observed  :

1 monitoring an individual in the men's clean area with the meter probe  !

j closed, thus risking r.r inaccurate reading. Moreover, a woman was [

decontaminated by shower three times, even though her reading was "clean" }

j after the second shower. Improper procedures also were used when an  ;

i evacuee was told to put a clean foot down on a contaminated step-off pad.  !

Finally, Hicksville workers displayed confusion regarding ;.cper recording  !

i procedures. ,

l 3. At the Bellmore reception center, a contaminated person was  !

j sent into the shower without being instructed in proper decontamination i procedures.  :

j

4. At the EWDF, only about half of the 40 persons that FEMA j observed being monitored by LERO workers were monitored within 10 seconds ,

of the 90 second guideline set forth in OPIP 3.9.2 for such monitoring.

i Honitoring of a substantial number of persont excceded the guideline by  ;

i more than one minute, in addition, in some instances, instrument probes were not covered and could have become contaminated.

RESPONSE i I

The Intervet ors have not shown that this late-filed contentioti [

t should be adnitted under 10 C.F.R. 5 2.714(a). It apparently could have l 1

been filed imeciately af ter the exercise, and did not need await the j FEMA Report. It cannot now be admitte for litigation. See Catawba,

,- CL1-83 19.

3 i The Staff als:, objects to the admission of contention 17 as being too j broad and general. Basis A seeks to fault applicants for failing to tell {

}

the public why they should go to the reception centers. As there is no I l 1

reeuirerent for such an explanation, the lack thereof cannot be a funde-I.  ;

(

I

. l 4

o .

mental flaw. Further it is redundant to Contention 6, basis B2, and l should also be rejected for that reason.

Basis B is a series of ad hoc actions that could not rise to the level of a funcamental flaw. Further, no requirement exists for a female decontamination leader as stated in basis B.I. Nor is it shown or avccred that a '..ader selected on the basis of gender is necessary to answer l

women's nucstions. Similtrly basis 0.2 does not show any fundamental ficw in having a person shower three rather than two tines.

. sis B.4 does not raise a lit. gable issue, as it is not alleged that l the average s.onitoring time ex:ecds the times set forth ir ,11e plan. It is obvious that sone people will be monitored faster or slower tha.)

others.

l l

Contention 18: Equipment and Reception Failures. NRC regulations require that LILC0 demonstrate that provisions exist for prompt comunications between and among euergency personnel and the offsite emergency response organizations. 10 C?R i 50.47(b)(6); HUREG-0654 i l II.F. In an attempt to meet this requirement, LILO0 has issued radios to I its field workers so that they can c municite with personnel managing the emergency response, and has further installed telephones and other such corrcunications equipnent at various f acilities from which an emergency l will be managed. See Plan, b 3.4; OP'.P 3.6.3 ct 3d. The Exercise

! revealed that this corrunications systera is not reliable, as many LILC0 personnel wert unable to corr,unicate with other personnel due to malfuncticning equipnent or other probleus with reception or transmission.

This pattern cf comunications breakdowns constitutes a fundamental ficw, as it would severely impede an adeq'Jate response by Cmergency personnel in the event of an actual emergency at Shoreham. LILCO has therefore failed to Sr.tisfy EOC Objective 4 FA Objective 4 and Bli0 Objective 4, and it has further failed to comply with the foregoing reguletory requirements, thus precluding a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective neasures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham, as required by 10 CFR 6 50.47(a)(1). Examples of those problems during the Exercise were as follows:

A. Sore radios issued to traffic guides dispatched out of the Riverhead and Patchcyve btaging Areas f ailcd to operate, necessitatirg the celivery of replacerent radios. TEMA Report at EB. Another radio used by one of the field teams also f ailed tc cperate properly, b. at 61.

B. Between 11:00 a.m. and 11:20 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, LILC0 lost all radio contact with field workers in the vicinity of Port Jefferson. Heavy static afterward further impeded effective communica-tions and unnecessarily delayed the receipt of the first free-play message and consequently delayed the response to that message. See FEMA Report at 42.

C. LERO field personnel were hampereu in attemp,ing to communicate details of an impediment to the E0C because of inadequate coverage cf the radio signal. See FEMA Report at 16.

D. Perso'nTe'l arriving at the scene of another inpediment were unable to notify the E0C of the impediment, although such communication was attempted three times. See FEM Report at 89.

E. At times, radio traffic on the evacuation support communications frequency was so heavy that no further message traffic could be handled.

This would have had the potential in a real emergency of delaying the transmission and receipt of priority messaaes.

F. The Exercise revealed that not L11 the school buses that LILC0 intends to rely upon in an actual emergency are equipped with radios, thus precluding any communication with school bus drivers in those buses. FEftA ,

Report at 108; see also Contention 14. ,

G. LILCO c3cuments also appear to indicate that the RECS l (dedicated) telephone syscem did nct function properly in some instances. I RESP 0i4SE

The Staff oppose; admission of contention 18. Essentially, only l

ad hoc problems are set forth in the bases. In regard to basis A, the FEMA report states at page 88, and Intervenors concede, that the defective radios were replaced. All the incidents recounted in the bases, taken together, would not shou a "fundamental flaw." Further, basis F should be rejected as a subject for litigation because there is no foundation in the i f

1 regulations er guidance for requiring school buses to be equipped with i

radios, in addition, basis C is overly vague and should be rejecteo as a l t

j generalized allegation which Intervenors have not prentsed on any specific  !

exercise events. (

4 Moreover, intervenors have not established that a balancing of thc factors in 10 C.F.R. l 2.714(a), governing the admission of late-filed contentions, leads to its adnission. l i

l

i 1f Contention 19: Failure to Communicate Information. The Exercise demonstrated that LILCO's Plan is fundamentally flawed in that much of LERO, and personnel working in support of LERO, are unab k to obtain, '

!, identify, process, communicate, and transmit essential ihrormation and data effectively, accurately, appropriately, and on a timely basis as is ,

- necessary to implement the LILC0 Plan. Examples of the repeated failures i of LERO personnel in communicating emergency information and da'a during s che Exercise are enumerated in subparts A-E below. Collectively and i

! individuall they demonstrate LILCO's lack of compliance with 10 CFR i j i50.47(b)(y}andNUREG-06546II.F,repeateaviolationsofLILC0' 6 sown i i procedures, and LILCO's failure to satisry numerous objectives of the  :

j Exercise. These failures preclude a finding of rtcsonable assurance that l l adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a l i radiological emergency at Shoreham, as required by 10 CFR 6 50.47(a)(1).  !

, The Exercise results further demonstrate that the fundamental communica- L l see 27 NRC at I l

tions 110-15)problerus identified have nut in the February been remedied. 1986fundarenta1 The multiple exercise (7 Taws in LILCO's  !

j Plan, and the chronic nature of those flaws, preclude a finding of  !

1 eeasonable assurance that adequate protective neasures can and will be 1 taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency.

l A. The Exercise demonstrated numerous problems with connunications i to, from and among emergency workers at the staging areas. For instance, j wany workers failed to attend briefing sessions, and when briefing

sessions were attended, the briefings were often inadequate. Furthermore, FEMA observed that staging area personnel ignored current information brocleast over the public address system and did not always know the current Emergency Classification Level. FEMA Report et 72. FEMA also observed that one of the stagug areas lacked adequa'.e means for keeping

] personnel posted on current emergency conditions. Id. In additio: ,

staging area personnel neglected to transmit importa5t information up the

, chain of communication to the EOC, such as the fact that school bus

drivers could not be dispatched because of the lack of LERO assignnent

! puckets at the bus yards. See Contention 14.

1 B. ECC personnel duaonstrated difficulty in con nicating important

information to other emergency Mcilities and personnel, especially with I respect to their connunicatios *.ith the CNC which were frequently

untimely and inaccurate. See Contentions 5-9. In a real emergency, the l failure to coruunicate effectively with other energency facilities and personnel would lead to an unccordinated and confusec emergency response.

C. E0C personnel also demonstrated extreme difficulty in processing and communicating tinely, accurate, consistent and concise infortuation to l

the public. See Contention 6-9. Similarly, ENC personnel failed in many i respects in communicating effectively with the media, fiany examples are

found in Contention

. 6-7. LILCO's inability to cormunicate emergency information to the media and to the public effectively and in a timely

]

manner would likely lead, in an actual emergency, to a confused public 2 response, thus increasing the risks of increased doses of radiation to the l public, i D. EOC personnel also displayed their inability to communicate I effectively with simulated governnent "officials." As set forth in Centen-

! tions 4-5. LER0 comunications with such "officials" were frequently J inaccurate, ccnfused, cortr6dictory, disorganized and untitcly. Thus, l

i A_- - - .- - . - - - _-

. - _ - _ - - ~ . _ _ _ - . _ _ - _ _

i LILCO hes not demonstrated the eHlity to keep such "officials" infomed or to call on such government "officials" for assistance, even assuming, for the sake of argument only, that such government officials would assist

> LERO and follow the LILCO Plan in the event of a Shoreham emergency.

E. The Exercise also revealed inadequate concunications between the EOC and field personnel, such as field nonitoring teams, traffic guides and road crews, in that E0C personnel failed to provide those workers with adequate guidance. The lack of guidar:ce was exacerbated by the issuance 4 of inaccurate maps to several categories of workers, including school bus drivers, field monitoring tears, and route spotters. See FEMA Report at

65, 82, 111.

) RESPONSE The Staff opposes admission of late-filed contention 19, as Inter-I venors have not sustair.cd their burden under 10 C.F.R. I 2.714(a) for having it admitted. The matters set out therein were known to them long i before issuance of the FEMA Report.

)

Further, the Staff opposes admission on other grounds except to the l

extent that it is premised upon the facts alleged in basis A. Bases B, C l

1 and D should all be rejected because Interverors have failed to allege any ccnnection between the deficiencies cited in earlier conventions and flaws in LER0's conrunication system. Apart from citing Jarlier contentions in those bases, Intervenors provide no support for alleging that LILCO's concunication system is fundarentally flawed. While other contentions may point out problens in LERO's perfoerr.ance during the exercise, they do net support Intervenors allegation that those problems are the result of ary fundarental flaw in LILCO's communication system. Since the Intervenors have also failed to specify how any of those problems can be attributed to a flav in LILCO's cortcunicatien system in bases B through D, they must be rejected. Basis E must also be rejected as a subject of litigatien in this proceeding since it is rerely a broad generaltration which is not

]l 4 I nremised on any particular exercise events. As such. it does not raise l,

any concrete issue for litigation. l

> Contention 20: Fundamental Flaws in LILCO's Training Program The Exerdse denonstrated that LILCO's Plan is fundamentally flawed

• l in that members, of LERO, as well as personnel from organizations do are h relied upon hp WRO, are unable to carry out the LILCO Plan effective}y 'or e accurately because of inadeouate training.

b UndertheLILCOPlan,L!LCOisresponsibleforthetrainingo,fi.ERO personnel. Training began in 1983 and, since that time, has consisted of classroom instruction, tabletop sessions, drills and exercises. Plan at

>- 5.1-1 thru 5.2-1 and Table 5.1.1; OPIP 5.1.1. LILCO requires all LILCO l members of LERO to participate in its training program on an annual basis.  ;

Plan at 5.1-1 and Table 5.1.1; OPIP 5.1.1 and Att. 1. Further, subsequent to the 1986 exercise, LILCO conducted extensive additional training and  ;

drills. Thus, as of the time of the Exercise. LILCO's LERO personnel had I already undergone as much as five years of training.

The 1986 exercise revealed many fundamental flaws in LILCO's training program. ?7 NRC at 174-212. The 1988 Exercise demonstrated that these '

flaws have not been corrected and that, in fact, new flaws eFist. In light of the large number of trainire deficiencies revealed during the t Exercise. LILCO has failed to comply with 10 CFR i 50.47(b)(14) and (15), l

) NUREG-065A i II.N and 0, and its own Plan and procedures. These training i i program flaws preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate i prctective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham i i emergency, as required by 10 CFR i 50.47(a)(1). i It is impossible to describe at length every instance of a LILCO l training deficiency resealed during the Exercise because they are so (

numerous; virtually every error made by a LILCO player during the Exercise i J involved, to sore degree, a failure of the LILCO training progran to  ;

! prepare personnel adecuately to perfom necessary acticns. Because such i errors are identified elsewhere and tc, avoid needless repetition,

subparts A-I below rely on cross. references to other contentions as ruch as pessible to identify specif i l

which support this contention.g examples of the training deficiencies

. A. The Exercise demonstrated that LERO personnel lack the necessary i training to interface in a timely and effective manner with State and

]

local government officials. LILCO's Plan requires LERO personnel to be capable of such interface. Plan at 2.?-6 thru 2.2-7; OPIP 3.1.1, Att. 10.  ;

Notwithstanding the requirements of LILCO's Plan, however, there were i repeated instances during the Exercise in which LERO personnel did not keep government "officials" informed of critical events and otherwise did not interface proper'y. Exercise events and examples which support this ,

contention subpart are described in Contentions 4-5.

I. . The Exercise demonstrated that the LILCO trtining program hes f rot succe:sfully or ef fectively prepared LEr0 rersonnel te respond i preferly, appropriately, er ef fectively to unanticipated and unrehearsed  ;

situations likely te arise in an emergency. Fxercise actions and events .

, l I I i

s .

- 7 f.o -

which support this contention subpart are described in Contentions 4-8,

• 14-15.

C. The Exercise demonstrated that LILCO's training program has been ineffective in instructing LER0 personnel to follow and irt.plement the LILC0 Plan ano LILC0 procedures, and ti. 'aparting basic knowledge about <

the Plan and information essential to the ability to implement the Plan and procedures. Exercise actions and events which support this contention subpart are described in Contentions 4-8, 11-12, 17, and by the FEMA  !

Report. See E0C ARCAs 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 22, 23, 25; Riverhead ARCAs 1. I 5,; Reception ARCA 1; Medical ARCA 1.

D. The Exercise cemonstrated that the LILC0 training program has ,

not successfully or effectisely trained LERO personnel to communicate necessary data and information, to inquire and obtain such information, or to recognize the need to do so. The Exercise results further demonstrated that LERO persannel lack necessary training to communicate emergency ,

information to the public in a timely, clear and non-confusing nanner.

Exercise events and examples which support this contention subpart are described in Contentions 4-8, 11-12, 19, and in the FEMA Report. See EOC ARCAs 1, 2, and 5.

E. The Exercise cemonstrated that LILCO's training program has not successfully or effectively trained LERO personnel to exercise good judgment or to use comon sense in dealing with situations presenteo during an ea rgency, or in implementing the LILCO Plan and procedures.

Exercise events and examples which support this contention subpart are described in Contentions 4-8, 11-12, 15, 17, and in the FEMA Report. See-E0C ARCAs 1, 3; kiverheac ARCA 2.

F. The Exercise demonstrated thct LILC0's traioing program has not successfully or effectively trained LERO personnel to deal with the media or otherwise provide timely, accurate, consistent and non-conflicting information to the public, through the media or in respunse to rumors, during an emergency. Exercise events and examples which support this contention subpart are described in Contentions 6-7.

G. The Exercise demonstrated that LERO training is deficient in the area of dosimetry, exposure centrol, KI, understanding of radiation terminology, anc related areas. In the 1986 exercise, LILCO cade errors in this area, but thc Licensing Board concluded that these errors did not rite to the level of a fundemental flaw. See 27 NRC at 204-05. A l different conclusion is necessary now. SiEITar errors have been found in  ;

the ISOC Exercise, reaning that LILC0's training, despite the problems  !

identified in LBP-88-2, has been ineffective. Such training deficiencies are serious because public and non-LILCO personnel reited upon to respono to a Shoreham accident (for example, school officials, special facility personnel, and other individuals who are expected by LILC0 to respond on l an ad hoc basis) would seek information on such subjects from LER0 i perEniIel during a real emergency. Since LERO personnel do not understand or know how to use dosimetry equipment and are appartntly unable to comprehend the procedures relating to the use of auch equipment, they would be incapable of responding accurately or effectively to questions cenarning thc:e matters rcised by rerbers of the pullic, or other non-LERO workers expected to respond. Exercise events and exar*ples which support this contention subpart are describeo in Contertion 19 anc in the l

i .

FEMA Report. See EOC ARCAs 4, 6, 7, 22, 23, 25; Riverhead ARCA 5; Reception ARCA 1; Medical ARCAs 1, and 2.

H. The Exercise demonstrated that LERO personnel have been inadequately trained to correct errors or information when new information or data are brought to their ttention. This often contributed to LER0 conveying inaccurate information to the public. Exercise events and

. examples which suppurt this contention subpart are described in Contentions 4-8 M-12.

1. Most non-LERO personnel who are relied upon in LILCO's Plan

, failed to participate in the Exercise. However, those who did participate y, Genonstrateppa41ack of training to ir.plement the Plan. Exercise events

, and examples 4hich support this conte.ntion subpart are described in

, Contention 13 and in the FEMA Report. See E0C ARCAs 4, 6, 7, 22, 23, 25; Medicals ARCA 1, 2, and 3.

5'# References i the subparts to FEMA ARCAs cre to the Table at pages 116-43 of the FEMA Report, where the ARCAs are nunbered and identified by LILCO f acility.

RESPONSE

The Staff opposes admission of this contention for lack of basis, in essence, Intervenors are arguing that every error nace by LERO individuals l during the exercise was due to a funda nental flaw in LILC0's training program. This generalization cannot be supported by logic or comon sense. As this Boaro observed in Long Island Lightine Co. (Shoreham i

huclear Power Station, Unit 1) LBP-88-2, 27 hRC 85, 177 (1988), the standard for evaluating LILCO's training program is whether the perform-ance errers of LERO ir.diciduals during the exercise reflect a systenic problem or pattern of defects. Neverthciess, Intervenors have talled to allege that any pervasive perf ormance problems were deconstrated by the exercise which reflect fundamental deficiencies in LILC0's training progran. Instead, they rerely cross-reference earlier contentions, wnich allege a wide variety of errors, and conclude that the LILC0 training progran is flawed. This does not meet tlc specificit;r or tasis require-nents for acmissible contentichs. To the extent that other contentions

r s> s allege that specific perfernance errors on the part o# LERO derenstrate flaws in other aspects of LILCO's plan they are admissible for the purpose of litigating that issue alone, and may not be considered tte basis for W allegation that LILCO's treining program is flawed absent a shcwing of how those errors represent a systemic problem resulting f rcr a fundarnental problen in LILCO's training program.

Moreover, this contention car.not be admitted, as Intervenors have r.ot established that it meets the criteria for late-filed cortentions ir.

10 C.F.R. I 2.714(e).

Respectfully submitted.

v T heub '8%

Edwin J. Reis Deputy Assistant General Counsel Reactor Licensing Branch Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 8th day of November, 1988 w

J o UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ' M,b. ' ' '

NUCLEAR RiGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE AT0ff!C SAFETY AND LICENSING BOAFD 88 m -9 P 3 :50 In the Matter of ,. 5 .

f ..

LONG ISL/.ND LIGHTING COMPANY Docket No.50-32f'dI.T5Yi Y '

(EFExercise)

(ShorehamNuclearPowerStation.

Unit 1)

,CEPTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies o' "NRC STAFF RESPONSE TO INTERYFNORS' PROFFERED C0t' TENT 10NS RELATING TO THE EMERGE'4CY PLANNING EXERCISE HELD CN JUNE 7-9, 1988" in the above-captiered proceeding have been served on the followirg by deposit in the United States mail, first class or, as indicated by en asterisk, through deposit in the fiuclear Regulatory Comission's internal nail e,y s tem ,

or by hand or express mail as indicated by double asterisk, this 8th day of Noverrber 1988.

John H. Frye III Chairman ** Joel Blau, Esn, Administrative Judge Director, Utility Intervention Atonic Safety ar.c' Licensing Coord Suite 1000 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission 9e Washington Avenue Washington, DC 20555 Albany, NY 12224 Oscar H. Paris ** Fabian G. Palonino, Esq.

Administrative Judge Richard Zahleuter" Atonic Safety and Licensing Board Special Counsel to the Governor U.S. Nuclear Regulatery Corvissicn Executive Chanber Washington, DC 20555 State Capitol Albany, NY 12224 Frederick J. Shon** Jonathen D. Feinberg, Esq.

Administrative Judge New York State Departrent of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Public Service U.S. fiucles.r Regulatory Corrission Three Empire State Plaza Washington, DC 20555 Albany, NY 12223 Philip McIntire W. Taylor Reveley, !!!, Esq.

Federel Emergency f*anagerert Donald P. Irwin, Esq."

Agency Hunton & Williarrs 26 Federal Plaza 707 East Main Street Roer 1349 P.O. Box 1535 New York, NY 10278 Richmond, VA 23212 Cert, ara Necer, Director C. K. Mallory, III, Esc.

Environrental Fealth Cohlitien Hunten & Williars for Safe Living 2000 Pennsylvania Ave., N.Y.

Pcx 9at !uite 9000 Hurtir.gten, NY 117A3 Washir.gton, DC 20006

.h a 2-Stephen B. Latham, Esq.** Dr l'onroe Schreider ,

Twomey, Latham & Shea North Shore Comittee  ;

Attorneys at Law P.O. Box 231 33 West Second Street Wading River, NY 11792 Riverhead, NY 11901 Ms. Nora Bredes Martin Bradley Ashare Esq. Shoreham Opponents Coalition .

Suffolk County Attorney 195 East Main Stree+,  !

H. Lee Dennison Buildire Smithtown, NY 1178'/ l Veteran's Memorial High ay  !

Hauppauge, NY 11788 William R. Cuming, Esq. '

I Office of General Counsel Anthony F. Earley, Jr. Federal Emergency Management .

General Counsel Agency  !

L Long Island Lighting Company 500 C Street. SP 175 East Old County Road Washington, DC 20472  !

Hicksville, NY 11801

~

Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal i Dr. Robert Hoffman Panel (5) >

Long Island Coalition for Safe U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission l I

Living Washington, DC 20555 -

P.O. Box 1355  :

Passapeque, ?!Y 11758 Ator.ic Safety and Licensing Board 1

Panel (1)* .-

Alfred L. Nardel'i, Esq. 11.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission I i:ew iork State Dept. of Law Vashington, DC 20555  !

120 Broadway, Room 3-118  !

t:cw York, NY 10271 Docketing and Service Section*  ;

i Office of the Sr.cretary  !

Herbert H. Brown Esq. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission [

Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.** Washington, DC 20555 ,

Karla J. Letsche Esq. '

Kirk >atrick & Lockhart t Souti Lobby - 9th Floor -

1800 M Street, NW Washingten. DC 20036-5891 i Jey Dunkleberger i

tiew York State Energy  !

, Office [

Agency Building 2 I

Er) ire State Plaza i

Albany, NY 12??3 t

l

~

W A2 4, _ -

Idwin J. Reis 4 l Deputy Assistant General Ceursel  !

Reactor Licensing Branch i i

t I

i

_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _. _ _ . __ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _