ML20196F689

Amended Emergency Planning Contentions Re 880607-09 Shoreham Exercise.*

ML20196F689
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	11/29/1988
From:	Latham S, Mcmurray C, Zahnleuter R KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, NEW YORK, STATE OF, SOUTHAMPTON, NY, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY, TWOMEY, LATHAM & SHEA
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20196F673	List: ML20196F668 ML20196F689
References
ALAB-900, ALAB-903, LBP-87-32, LBP-88-2, OL-5, NUDOCS 8812140068
Download: ML20196F689 (126)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensina Board

)

In the Matter of )

)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5R

) (EP Exercise)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

)

)

v Amended Emeraency Plannino Contentions Relatina to the June 7-9. 1988 Shoreham Exercise November 29, 1988 Filed by: Suffolk County, The State of New York, and The Town of Southampton e

I l Amended Emercency Plannina Contentions Relatina To the June 7-9, 1988 Shoreham Exercise TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Contentions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 I. Contentions 1 - 3: The Scope of the Exercise, the Assumptions Underlying It and FEMA's Evaluation Were Deficient . . . . . 3 Contention 1: Scope of the Exercise . . . . . . . . . 3 Contention 2: The Exercise's False Premises and Assumptions. . . . . . . . 14

, Contention 3: The FEMA Report's Unfounded Conclusions. . . 15

. II. Contention 4: Fundamental Flaws Relating to LILCO's Interface With State and Local Governments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 III. Contention 5: Fundamental Flaws Relating to Notification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 IV. Contentions 6-10: Fundamental Flaws Relating to Public Information . . . . . . . . 34 Contention 6: EBS Messages . . . . . . . 34 Contention 7: Emergency News Center. . . 56 Contention 8: Rumor Control. . . . . . . 67 Contention 9: The Public Would Reject LILCO's Flawed EGS Messages as a Primary Source of Information. . . 73 Contention 10: Evacuation Shadow

, Phenomenon . . . . . . . . 75

.i.

r Pace

. V. Contentions 11-12: Fundamental Flaws Relating to Protective Action Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Contention 11: Ingestion Pathway PARS . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Contention 12: Plume Exposure Pathway PARS . . . . . . . 85 VI. Contentions 13-17: Fundamental Flaws Relating to Implementation of Protective Actions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Contention 13: Medical Services . . . . . 91 Contention 14: Schools. . . . . . . . . . 94 Contention 15: Traffic Impediments. . . . 100 Contention 16: Access Control . . . . . . 103 Contention 17: Monitoring and

. Decontamination of Public and Emergency Workers. . . . . . . . . . 104 VII. Contentions 18-19: Fundamental Flaws Relating to Communications . . . . . . . . . . 108 Contention 18: Equipment and Reception Failures . . . . . . . . . 108 Contention 19: Failure to Communicate Information. . . . . . . . 111 VEII. Contention 20: Fundamental Flaws in LILCO's Training Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 e

m ,

AMENDED EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS RELATING

, TQ_ THE JUNE 7-9, 1988 SHOREHAM EXERCISE INTRODUCTION On February 13, 1986, LILCO held the first exercise of its offsite rediological emergency plan (the "Plan") for Shoreham.

As this Board concluded in LBP-87-32, 26 NRC 479 (1987), a f f'd, ALAB-900, 28 NRC (Sept. 20, 1988), and LBP-88-2, 27 NRC 85 (1988), appeeF-eendkne , rev'd in cart. ALAB-903. 28 NRc (Nov.

10, 1988). remainder of anneal cendina. the results of that exercise revealed that LILCO's Plan was fundamentally flawed in numerous respects. The Board also found that the exercise itself

, was flawed in that it was insufficient in scope and failed to test adequately several crucial aspects of LILCO's Plan.

On June 7-9, 1988, LILCO held a three-day exercise 1/ (the "Exercise") in its second attempt to meet the NRC's exercise requirements. Suffolk County, the State of New York and the Town of F^uthampton (the "Governments") hereby submit their c ions concerning the Exercise. As the contentions demonstrate, the Exercise results again reveal fundamental flaws 1/ The Exercise scenario postulated two leaps in time, so that the third day of the Exercise was postulated to be, at first, the fourth day of the simulated emergency, and later, the twentieth day of the emergency. FEMA Post-Exercise Assessment, June 7-9, 1988 Exercise of the Local Emergency Response Organization (LERO), as specified in the LILCO Off-Site Radiological Emercency Response Plan for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Sept. 2, 1988

. ("FEMA Report") at 25-26. In order to avoid the confusion that might arise by using actual dates, the following contentions refer to June 7 as Day 1; June 8 as Day 2; and June 9 (June 10

. and June 27 in the simulated emergency) as Day 3.

in LILCO's Plan and in the Exercise itself. For example, LILCO

. has once again failed to demonstrate that its Plan meets the objectives by which FEMA evaluated the Exercise, or that LILCO has met the NRC's regulatory requirements. In many instances, LILCO has failed to correct the fundamental flaws that were found to exist as a result of the February 1986 exercise. The Exercise also revealed several additional fundamental flaws in LILCO's Plan. Moreover, analysis of the scope of the Exercise reveals that, once again, LILCO has failed to test and/or FEMA has failed to evaluate many crucial aspects of the Plan, thus resulting in non-compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 5 IV.F.1.

In light of the fundamental flaws which exist in the Plan, and in light of the continued faiJure to test that Plan

- thoroughly, there can be no finding of compliance with regulatory ,

requirements and no finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be implemented in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham. Egg 10 CFR S 50. 47 (a) (1) .

Thus, there is no basis to grant LILCO a license to operate Shoreham above five percent of rated power.

The Board should note that most of the contentions below are followed by a listing of a number of bases for those contentions.

The bases are not individual contentions, but rather must be read as part of the whole contention. In addition, the basen cited should not be construed as exhaustive of all evidence potentially supporting each contention. It has been difficult to identify, W M

in advance of discovery, all potential bases for various

, contentions, particularly because of the difficulty in determining what actually occurred (e.o., separating actual testing / involvement from simulation) during the Exercise. The Governments expect that as discovery proceeds, additional bases will be identified and the facts supporting existing bases will become better refined.

Finally, the contentions have been revised (from those oricinally submitted on October 24, 19981 to reflect ALAB-903.

To assist in review, deleted nortions of the original contentions have been left in this version, with a line drawn _throuah them; new cortiQDs are indicated by double underliniD24.

CONTENTIONS I. Contentions 1-3: The Scope of the Exercise, the Assumptions Underlying It, and FEMA's Evaluation Were Deficient Contention 1: Scoce of the Exercise. The Exercise did not comply with applicable regulatory requirements, including 10 CFR 5 5 50.47 (a) (1) and (b) (14) , and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 5 IV.F (particularly 5 IV.F.1 thereof), in that critical elements of preparedness were omitted from or insufficiently tested during the Exercise. Appendix E, 5 IV.F.1, provides in relevant part:

A full oarticipation exercise */ which tests as much of the licensee. State and local emeroency plans as is rgasonably achievable without mandatory public participation shall be conducted for each site . . . .

This exercise shall . . . . include participation by each State and local government within the plume i

-3 -

1

exposure pathway EPZ and each State within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ. . . .

. 1/' Full participation' when used in conjunction with emergency preparedness exercises for a particular site means appropriate offsite local and State authorities and licensee personnel phy sically and actively take part in testing their integrated capability to adequately asaeas and respond to an accident at a commercial nuclear power plant. 'Eull carticioation' includes testina the maior observable cortions of the onsite and offsite emeraency olans and mobilization of State. local and licensee eersonnel and other resources in sufficient numbers to verify the_cacability to rescond to the accident scenario.

(Emphasis added.)

Appendix E, 5 IV.F, also provides:

Exercises shall test the adequacy of timing and content

. of implementing procedures and methods, test emergency equipment and communications networks, test the public notification system, and ensure that emergency

. organization personnel are familiar with their duties.

(Footnote omitted).

Notwithstanding these regulatory requirements, the Exorcise omitted in whole or in part major observable portions of LILCO's Plan; there was a failure in whole or in part to verify various response capabilities, a failure to test as much of the Plan as was reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation, a failure to test much of the public notification system, a failure to test much of the LERO communications network, a failure to test the timing and content of many implementing procedures and methods, and a failure to ensure that

. emergency organization personnel were familiar with their duties.

-4 -

Accordingly, the Exercise results are insufficient to support a

. finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47 (a) (1) , or a finding that the Exorcise complied with regulatory requirements for licensing Shoreham above 5% power. Such deficiencies in the scope of the Exercise are all the more significant given the fact that similar deficiencies were cited in LBP-87-32, ALAB-9 00, and the Appeal Board's unpublished Memorandum dated May 25, 1988.

The Exercise elements which currently can be identified as having been omitted, untested or unverified, in whole or in part, and which require a ruling that the Exercise failed to comply with regulatory requirements are as follows:

A. The LILCO public notification system was insufficiently

, tested. There was no adequate testing or evaluation of LILCO's siren system and no test broadcast of an emergency broadcast system ("EBS") message. Furthermore, there was no test of the EBS radio network upon which LILCO places prime reliance in its Plan.

The radio station which is reported to have participated to a limited extent in the Exercise -- WPLR -- had, prior to the Exercise, withdrawn from LILCO's EBS and thus, whatever "testing" 1

occurred with respect to WPLR was hot pertinent to LILCO's Plan.

The EBS network, including LILCO's purported lead EBS station --

WCBS -- and that station's personnel, as described and relied upon in Revision 10 of LILCO's Plan (OPIP 3.8.2 at 1) , was not tested during the Exercise, despite the fact that 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 5 IV.F, states specifically that "[e]xercises

. shall . . . . test the public notification system, and ensure that emergency organization personnel are familiar with their duties." These omissions resulted in the failure to test the integrated response capabilities of LERO with the LILCO EBS network, the omission of a major observable portion of LILCO's Plan, and the failure to test as much of the Plan as was reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation.

B. LILCO's Plan for school preparedness was inadequately tested. Only one school district -- the Shoreham-Wading River Central School District -- participated at all in the Exercise, and that participation was extremely limited. In fact, only one elementary school, Briarcliff Road School, with a total school

~

enrollment of 170 students, participated and this participation was limited to the arrival of three LERO buses on the school grounds, and the interview of one school official. There are, however, eight other school districts and 23 private and parochial schools, with approximately 26,302 students, within the 10-mile Shoreham EPZ. These schools did not participate in the Exercise and were not even contacted by LILCO or FEMA during the Exercise. Similarly, personnel from these schools did not participate, and thus there was no testing or evaluation of their response capabilities. Accordingly, there was no testing or verification of the capability to early dismiss, shelter, or evacuate school children. In short, there was no testing of a

, major observable portion of LILCO's Plan, and LILCO failed to 1 -

l I L

' test as much of its Plan as was reasonably achiavable without

. mandatory public participation. In LBP-87-32, 26 NRC at 495-98, this Board found that there was insufficient testing of school preparedness. That finding was recently affirmed by the Appeal Board. A LAB-9 00, slip op. at 33-35. The facts demonstrate that, once again, there was inadequate testing of school preparedness.

Egg FEMA Guidance Memorandum ("GM") EV-2.

C. LILCO's Plan also has provisions concerning schools located outside 6.he EPZ attended by students who reside within the EPZ. For examp.1.e, the Plan provides that, in the event of a Shoreham emergency, sahools located outside the EPZ should retain students residing within the EPZ at the end of the school day.

OPIP 3.6.1 at 31a. During the Exercise, there was a need for these Plan provisions to be implemented and, indeed, there even was an EBS message (EBS No. 7) which purported to address this situation. Nevertheless, LILCO did not attempt to contact any of these schools either before or during the Exercise and nona of these schools or their personnel participated in the Exercise.

Accordingly, there was no testing of the ability of these schools or LERO to implement these Plan provisions, there was no testing of a major observable portion of LILCO's Plan, and LILCO failed I

to test as much of its Plan as was reasonably achievable without l mandatory public participation.

l D. LILCO's Plan calls for school children from the EPZ to be evacuated to relocation centers at the Nassau County Coliseum

. and the Nassau County Community College. Plan at 4.2-1. In i

l L

fact, during the Exercise, LILCC pret4nded that there was such an

, evacuation. Further, LILCO also pretended that many of the children attending school outside the EPZ but who reside within the EPZ were relocated late on Day 1 to those Nassau County facilities. Nevertheless, those critical facilities were not activated, staffed, tested, or evaluated during the Exercise.

This is another example of a failure to test integrated response capabilities, the omission of a major observable portion of LILCO's Plan, and the failure to test as much of LILCO's Plan as was reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation.

E. LILCO's plan for school evacuation, under which LILCO-employed drivers are responsible for evacuating all or portions of the EPZ school children, was inadequately tested during the Exercise. Egg, 12g2, FEMA GM EV-2. For example, only one

. school participated with LILCO, even though LILCO's school plan requires there to be close integration of LERO and school personnel; only three actual LERO buses arrived at the Briarcliff Elementary school; there was no demonstration during the Exercise of how school children and other bus passengers would be directed after disembarking buses (FEMA Report at 113); and only 30 LERO school bus drivers (out of 613) actually were dispatched to a bus yard (and this "demonstration" was problem-ridden, since some bus yards did not even have the LERO boxes containing driver assignmant packets). Thus, these drivers could not be dispatched and there could be no "test" of their response capabilities.

, Further, there was no demonstration of how buses coming from t

potentially contaminate' zones would be directed upon arriving at

. relocation or reception centers, or i.,w potentir.lly contaminated school children would be monitored and decontaminated if necessary. There was also no demonstration of how LILCO would provide adult supervision on evaclating the school buses.

F. LILCO's Plan for evacuation of special facility residents (adult homes, nursing homes, and hospitals) was inadequately tested during the Exercise. There are 39 such facilities within the Shoreham EPZ, ordinarily housing approximately 2,697 residents. OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 2. The LILCO Plan provides that at the time of a General Emergency, assuming the issuance of an evacuation protective action recommendation, LERO vould dispatch ambulances and ambulettes to many of these health care facilities within affected zones to transport

. residents to reception hospitals or other appropriate facilities.

OPIP 3.6.5. During the Exercise, however, none of these facilities participated in the Exercise; indeed, none of these facilities was so much as contacted by LILCO or FEMA during the Exercise.

In addition, the purported demonstration of transportation capabilities -- i.e., the use of ambulances and ambulettes or mini-buses to effect evacuation -- provided no meaningful data.

Only 13 such vehicles (six aabulances and seven ambulettes) reportedly participated in the Exercise, and only a portion of these vehicles participated in any demonstration of the

, implementation of protective actions for special facilities.

l

Further, there was no meaningful interaction between LILCO and

. the ambulance companies relied upon by LILCO, between those ambulance companies and the special facilities to which they were supposed to report, or between those ambulance companies and the special facilities outside the EPZ to which the ambulance companies were supposed to pratand to evacuate residents and personnel. The Licensing Board and the Appeal Board faulted LILCO for failing to demonstrate such interaction in the 1986 exercise. ALAB-900, slip. op. at 40; LBP-87-32, 26 NRC at 500-01. LILCO's failure to do so again in 1988 reflects a continued failure to satisfy 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 5 IV.F.1.

G. LILCO failed to test its capability to implement evacuation of tha homebound disabled population residing within

. the EPZ. The LILCO Plan provides that at the time of a General Emergency, the homebound disabled are to be transported via ambulance or ambulette to reception hospitals. OPIP 3.6.5. To demonstrate this, LERO is reported to have dispatched one ambulance to Zone C and one ambulance to Zone B to simulate the evacuation of the homebound disabled. No actual person was transported, however. Moreover, the dispatch of only two vehicles failed to demonstrate any actual capability to evacuate this segment of the EPZ population. Thus, the testing was far too limited to comply with Appendix E requirements. Egg ALAB-900, slip op. at 40-43.

O

H. The LILCO Plan relies on numerour hospitals, nursing

. homes, and similar facilities outside the EPZ for relocation services and necessary health care for special facility evacuees.

These reception hospitals are to be selected at the time of the emergency. OPIP 3.6.5, Atts. 5 and 16. Those facilities, however, did not participate in the Exercise and LERO demonstrated no capability to implement such selection. Further, the LILCO Plan fails to include agreements for such facilities.

The omission of these faciliti.es from the Exercise censtitutes non-compliance with Appendiv E.

I. Only one ambulance war dispatched to test LILCO's ability to transport injured and contaminated victims. (Again, no "victim" was actually transported.) And, only one radiation safety officer was present during LILCO's medical drills designed

. to demonstrate LILCO's ability to care for injured contaminated victims. FEMA Report at 99. As a result, the test of these portions of LILCO's Plan (OPIP 4.2.2) was too limited to comply with Appendix E.

J. The LILCO Plan calls for the use of congregate care centers for evacuees from a Shoreham emergency. These centers are to be staffed by the American Red Cross. Plan at 2.2-9.

During the 1986 exercise, two centers were activated, and the American Red Cross participated. During the 1988 Exercise, however, no congregate care centers were activated, no Red Cross personnel participated, and no testing of procedures or e

communications was effected. FEMA Report at 11. These omissions

, demonstrate non-compliance with Appendix E.

K. Procedures for public education and the dissemination of information to the public on a periodic basis, as set forth in OPIP 3.8.1 of the LILCO Plan, and a demonstration of the adequacy l

\

of public education materials, were omitted from the Exercise.

Nevertheless, LERO EBS messas;4s continually referred to these materials. These omissions demonstrate non-compliance with Appendix E. The omissions are of even greater concern in light of the fact that on June 16, 1988, only shortly after the Exercise, LILCO's draf t public education brochure was determined by FEMA to be of questionable utility and effectiveness.

L. The LILCO Plan provides that special population evacuees are to be transported to LILCO's Brentwood facility for

. monitoring or to the reception facility's nuclear medicine or radiology department or to LERO staging areas. S.gg OPIP 3.6.5 at 5, Sa, 9 and 12. Procedures related to the radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees from special facilities were excluded from the Exercise, despite the fact that the Exercise scenario created a need for these functions to be performed. These omissions demonstrate non-compliance with Appendix E.

M. LILCO's Plan relies upon the participation of other entities, including the Long Island Railroad, the FAA, the U.S.

Department of Agriculture, and the U.S. Department of Commerce.

Plan at 2.2-1 thru 2.2-10. None of these entities participated 12 -

in the Exercise, despite the fact that the Exercise scenario o called for interaction with these entities. FEMA Report at vii,

10. These omissions are further evidence of the failure to comply with Appendix E.

N. The Exercise scenario resulted in radiation releases of sufficient severity to require protective action recommendations

("PARS") in the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ, including portions of southern Connecticut. Despite this fact, there was no testing of the capability to implement ingestion pathway protective actjans in the Connecticut portion of the ingestion pathway EPZ. This failure was contrary to the requirements of Appendix E. Egg ALAB-900, slip op. at 8; LBP-87-32, 26 NRC at 498-99.

O. Although LILCO relies upon some 42 bus companies for implementation of the protective action of evacuation of the general, school and special populations (OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 3a), an insufficient number of these companies participated in the Exercise to demonstrate the ability to implement evacuation, and there was no testing of non-participating companies to decermine their availability. l P. The LILCO Plan relies upon local ambulanc les to provide ambulances to evacuate special facilities, auch as hospitals and nursing homes. However, only a few of the many companies relied upon by LILCO participated in the Exercise, and there was no testing of non-participating companies to determine

. their availability. In addition, participation of those ambulance companies taking part in the Exercise was limited to

. providing 13 vehicles (7 ambulances and 6 ambulettes). The LILCO Plan provides that ambulance companies will provide 193 vehicles. OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 6. The provision of 13 vehicles does not demonstrate the capability to mobilize 193 ambulances and ambulettes.

Q. The Exercise failed to test sufficiently the communications network described in LILCO's Plan. The LILCO Plan calls for communications between LERO ands schools inside and outside the EPZ1 school reception centers; hospitals inside and outside the EPZ; adult and nursing homes inside and outside the EPZ1 LERC's lead EBS station; other radio stations; congregate care centers; the American Red Cross; the Long Island Railroad; the FAA; other federal government entities; and other

, organizations. Egg Plan, Fig. 3.4.1. These many aspects of the LILCO/LERO communications network were omitted in whole or in substantial part from the Exercise.

Contention 2: The Exercise's False Premises and Assumotions. The Exercise was premised on the concept that in an emergency, LERO personnel would interact with personnel from various governments (Suffolk County, New York State, Nassau County, State of Connecticut) in particular ways, including approving EBS messages, authorizing LERO personnel to take I

various actions (like sounding sirens, broadcasting EBS messages, l

setting up traffic contro2 points), and even delegating to LERO I

_ 14 -

l

the permission and/or authority necessary for the implementation

. of various aspects of LILCO's Plan. FEMA also assumed that various resources of the governments would be provided at various times during the Exercise (such as New York State ingestion pathway teams). However, neither the FEMA Report, FEMA control cell documents, nor any other materials relating to the Exercise provide a factual basis for FEMA's assumptions. Indeed, some of those assumptions (such as authorizing LERO to direct traffic) involve actions which would be illegal for the governments to authorize, and which the affected governments have stated clearly would never occur. The LILCO Plan discusses LERO's ability to interface with affected governments. ERA Plan at 1.4-2 thru 1.4-2c; OPIP 3.1.1, Att. 10. Such interface capabilities are required by NUREG-0654, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, 5 II.A.1.b. A "test" of such interface capabilities could only be valid and probative if the actions and conduct assumed on behalf of the affected governments have a basis in reality. As FEMA's assumptions have no such basis -- and indeed frequently are contradicted by law and fact -- the Exercise results provide no basis for a finding that LILCO could interface properly with government personnel.

Contention 3: The FEMA Reoort's Unfounded Conclusions.

FEMA has concluded that the Exercise results permit FEMA to make a reasonable assurance finding. Egg 10 CFR 5 50.47 (a) (2) . In light of the many fundamental flaws in LILCO's Plan revealed by

, the Exercise, which are explained in greater detail in the

contentions below, this conclusion is groundless and should be given no weight by the Board. In particular, FEMA has overlooked, or ignored, many serious problems experienced by LILCO in its attempts to implement its Plan, and has inappropriatoly minimized the significance of the problems that were identified.

FEMA was aware, or should have been aware, of virtually every problem set forth in the contentions below. A fair, balanced assessment by FEMA would therefore have resulted in a finding that fundamental flaws continue to exist in LILCo's Plan. Instead, however, FEMA chose to ignore LILCO's inability to implement its Plan, as demonstrated during the Exercise. This conclusion is strongly supported by scrutiny of the FEMA Report, as well as the FEMA control cell logs completed by FEMA

, evaluators during the Exercise. Those logs reveal that FEMA was well aware of the deficiencies that were demonstrated during the Exercise, but chose to downplay those portions of the Exercise ,

which would not support a. reasonable assurance finding. In addition, FEMA chose to ignore serious limitations on the scope of the Exercise.

Discovery and further proceedings will likely reveal many more instances of FEMA's failurp to accord observed problem areas the weight they deserve. Yet, even a preliminary listing of some problems minimized by FEhA makes clear that FEMA's Report and any FEMA reasonable assurance finding are entitled to no weight. The following list, combined with the numerous other examples set forth in the contentions below, are indicative of

. FEMA's noncritical approach to its assessment of the LILCO Exercise.

A. LILCO failed to develop and issue prompt ingestion PARS. Even FEMA agreec that ingnstion pathway PARS "wure very slow to be developed." FEMA Report at 51. In actuality, the delay in issuing ingestion pathway PARS was over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Although LILCO had sufficient scenario information available on the morning of Day 2 of the Exerciss (and, indeed, even sooner; Egg Contention 11) to issue PARS for the 10-50 mile ingestion pathway area, such PARS were not conveyed to the public until 12:50 p.m. on Day 3. The ability to promptly advise the public of PARS is of critical importance to public health and safety.

LILCO's failure to do so should have resulted in a finding that

. the LILCO Plan is flawed, thus precluding any finding of reasonable assurance. Instead, FEMA concluded that, as a result of LILCO's delay, EOC Objective 29 and BHO Objective 29 were "partially muc." FEMA Report at 51. There was no justification for this FEMA conclusion.

B. The Exercise results demonstrated that FEMA's EBS messages were woefully inadequate. Egg Contention 6. Many were so poorly constructed as to be ineffective. Egg FEMA Report at 45; Cont.ention 6. Others contained incorrect data about the nature o! the release for extended periods of time. Egg FEMA Report at 45; Contention 6. Similac; problems, when revealed during the 1986 Shoreham exercise, were found by the Board in

. LBP-88-2 to constitute a fundamental flaw in LILCO's Plan.

27 NRC at 170-172. LILCO experienced the same kinds of problems during the 1988 Exercise, mandating the conclusion thtt LILCO's Plan continues to be fundamentally flawed. Indeed, if EBS messages are so ineffective that some listeners will not stay tuned (FEMA Report at 45), it is clear that the public will not be protected. But, consistent with its uncritical approach to the 1988 Exercise, FEMA found "reasonable assurance" -- even in the face of these obvious problems. Under such circumstances, this FEMA finding is entitled to no weight.

C. FEMA alco ignored LILCO's failed attempt to demonstrate its alert and notification capability. Fifty-seven of the 89 LILCO sirens failed to sound as planned during the Exercise. Egg

. Contention 5. This notification failure has serious implications for safety. It is clear that LILCO intended to test its sirens during the Exercise, and that this intention was known to and agreed upon by FEMA. Yet, long after the sirens failed to sound, FEMA pretended that this failure had never occurred and even found that the notification objective (EOC Objective 12) was met. There was, and is, no basis for such a conclusion.

D. A review of the FEMA control cell logs reveals that

^

FEMA evaluators present in the control cell during the Exercise documented many problems occurring during the course of the Exercise, particularly in the area of LILCO's demonstration of the capability to interface with the government "officials"

. sinulated by FEMA. Egg Contention 4. Yet, the FEMA Report is devoid even of hints of such problems. Egg FEMA Report at 49, 55 (findilig interface objectives to be met).

E. FEMA failed to give appropriate weight to recurrent problems. FEMA's own guidance counsels that ARCAs that reoccur in subsequent exercises may appropriately be reclassified as a Deficiency. FEMA Report at 10. Although at least five ARCAs from 1986 occurred again in the 1988 Exercise (FEMA Report at 107-110), FEMA did not reclassify those ARCAs as Deficiencies or even so much as discuss the possibility of doing so.

Other examples abound, but as the foregoing makes clear, FEMA has engaged in a one-sided, incomplete, and inaccurate

assessment of the Exercise results. Accordingly, FEMA's findings and conclusions, as set forth in the FEMA Report, must be I rejected.

II. Contention 4: Fundamental Flaws Relating to LILCO's

! Interface with State and Local Governments i

i For LILCO's Plan to be sugggssfully imolemented, LERO cersonnel must be able to deal effectively with_ggvernmental authorities. For examnle, under LILCO's Plan qqyggnmental authorities must be contacted by LERO corsonnel before PARS can be annrovedt moreover, covernmental accroval is_rgouired for LILCO to overgeme LERO's lack of leaal authority to innlement

. many nortions of LILCO's Plan. The eg_sential_ nature of this 19 -

l l

"interface" function is reflected in the orovisions of LILCO's _

Plan which seek to nrovide a structu~e for a successful "interf ace" between LILCO and the covernmental authorities. See e.a.. Plan at 1.4-2 th ru 1. 4 -2 c ; OPIP 3.1.1. Att. 10.

In orecarina for the Exercise. FEMA reccanized that LERO's phility to interface with covernmental authorities reoresented an essential element of LILCO's Plan. Thus s one of the objectives of the Exercise was to:

(d)emonstrate the capability of utility off-site response organization personnel to interface with nonparticipating state and local governments through their mobilization and provision of advice and assistance.

EOC Objective 37, FEMA Report at 13. Because neither Suffolk County, the State of New York, Nassau County, nor the State of Connecticut participated in the Exercise, the participation of those governments was "simulated" through the use of FEMA controllers who played the roles of various State and County officials. FEMA Report at 8-9. The Exercise revealed, however, that LILCO is incapable of "interfacing" promptly and effectively with State and local governments. LERO personnel, in i contact with simulated "officials,i consistently provid9d inaccurate or confusing information, did not know pertinent information that they were asked about, contacted the wrong "governasnts" for information, and were untimely in their contacts with the simulated governmental "officials". These consistent "interface" problems constitute a fundamental flaw in an essential element of LILCO's Plan, as-bhab-PFan which relies i

20 -

i

on the asetimption that State and local governments would use o their best efforts and follow the LILCO Plan in an actual Shoreham emergency. Egg 10 CFR 5 50.47 (c) (1) (iii) (B) P. Plan-at k r&-P -bh rw -b r&-be r-OPEP-} rk ek r-Abb r-k&v In an actual emercenev.

these eqpblems would have had the notential to_delhv the issuanen gpd innlementation of PARS and would have led.to an uncoordinated resconse.

Assuming the validity of that the Section 50.47 (c) (1) (iiii f Bi_

assumption for the sake of argument only, and assuming ,again for the sake of argument, that the condret of the government simulators (i.e. , the FEMA controllers) had a basis in reality (121 Contention 2), such governmental participation in and adherence to the LILCO Plan is impossible if LILCO is unable to interface effectively with the governments that it assumes will

. participate in the implementation of its Plan. Accordingly, LILCO has failed to demonstrate that it has satisfied EOC Objective 37, and that its Plan comports with 10 CFR 5 5 50.47 (b) (1) and (3), 10 CFR 5 50. 47 (c) (1) (iii) (B) , and NUREG-0654, Rev. 1, Sup. 1 55 II.A, E and F. Sce_also FEMg

}{gggrandum. "Guidanqq_for Realons to Use in Im_o_ l.Cmentin2_lGBEfg, 261dII,HA-Ben-1. Rev._1 % Supplement _i_.with Oualifyinci Exercises."

March _7 1988. The failure to satisfy these regulatory requirements and EOc obiective 37 demonstraten_that titco cannot innlement an essential..elt Ant =of its Planu precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at i

I .

l I l

Shoreham, as required by 10 CFR $ 50.47(a) (1), and requires a

. finding that LILCO's Plan is fundamentally flawed.

FEMA has exnressed the view that LERO cersonnel were successful in,d,emonstratina their ability to interface with nonnarticinatina State and local covernments. FEMA Renort at 49.

FEMA's conclusions, however, cannot be accented. FEMA nrovides only a most aaneralized statement on the subiect and fails to address at all from an interface caranactive any of the avannlem met forth in subnart A - I below, avan thouah many of the e eroblems in those subcarts were identified in FEMA control call documents. In these circumstances, the Board _, egen if it vara to nav some defertDce to FEMA's views, cannot bar the admission of Contention 4. See ALAB-903, slin on, at 12.

The followina examples of A l so demonstrate that LILCO's

! . fakkure-be-demonstraee-kts igability to interface with State and

! local governments febbewt durina the Exergise_Was nervasive and

is not easily correctable. Anv LILCO efforts to cure this flaw will inevitably reauire extensive review of, and modification to, i LILCO's Plan , crocedures and trainina crocram. Indeed, in view l '

l of_the many errors, and the Governments' understandina that therg was extensive drill trainina crior to the__ Exercise LILCO may be incanable of correctina these eroblems, no matter how much effort it exerts. To date, no LILCO corrective actiOD_ plan has been DIRERQ$th.

i l A. LILCO was untimely in keeping simulated "of ficials" informed of the status of the energency. For instance, while the l

l l

- 22 -

emergency was upgra'ded to an Alert at 5:40 a.m. on Day 1, the

. State of New York was not informed of that fact until over an hour later at 6:43 a.m. In fact, LILCO's untimeliness prompted a LILCO apology to the simulated "Governor" on Day 1 for its delays. Similarly, a FEMA controller complained that LERO was very slow in forwarding pertinent dose rate estimates to the simulated Suffolk County Healt!. Commissioner.

B. When LILCO activated its prompt notification system on Day 1, 57 of the system's 89 sirens failed to sound. Their activation was necessary to alert residents to tune to the EBS and receive the PARS contained in EBS No. 2, including evacuation of more than half of the EPZ. Despite the potential significance of the siren failure, LERO failed to convey notice of this situation to the governments.

. C. FEMA controller logs indicate that the information provided to the simulated government "officials" was often wrong, confusing or unhelpful. For instancc:

1. LILCO knew or should have known by noon on Day 1 that EPZ plume exposure protective action guideline ("PAG")

limits were predicted to be exceeded. FEMA Report at 45. LILCO never so informed the simulated government "officials" on Day 1.

Indeed, to the contrar/, the State of New York was informed about 1:30 p.m. on Day 1 that LERO would tell the public that the doses that might be received were comparable to a chest x-ray.

2. On Day 2, LILCO advised the New York State control

. cell that it did not expect any ingestion-related problems and was confirming the absence of such problems in order to assure

, the public. Such advice to New York State was not accurate, based upon available data at that time. FEMA Report at 51.

3. LERO gave the simulated government "officials" confusing information about the protective action it was recommending for school children ("early dismissal") at approximately 6:00 a.m. on Day 1, even though a FEMA controller noted that such a recommendation was inappropriate since school was not yet in session.

4. One government "of ficial" noted that the LERO Health Coordinator was "not much help" in passing along critical information about the emergency.

5. Another government "of ficial" nott d LILCO's

confusion regarding the information which LERO wt.s providing

. concorriing the status of protective actions for he Rocky Point School District. (This same "official" noted LE.O's contentious attitude in dealing with the "governments.")

6. A LERO representative calling one Jovernment "official" incorrectly told the "official" that Z,ne G was sheltering when it was not.

7. The simulated Suffolk Count / Fr'-"*. Ave was given contradictory information by a LERO represer tative regarding the status of access control around evacuated areae.

8. LERO representatives demonstrated confusion l regarding what protective actions were recommended for schools i

outside the EPZ, and how parents were supposed to reunits with children attending schools outside the EPZ, but who live within

, the EPZ.

9. Still other LERO representatives identified the Alert stage as having been reached at 6:13 a.m. of Day 1 (the time of the first ESS message), rather than at 5:40 a.m.

D. Many LERO representatives calling simulated government "officials" had difficulty conveying pertinent information.

Controller logs complain specifically that LILCO employees who called simulated "officials" did not ask with whom they were speaking, did not identify who they were, conveyed very general or "vague, nondescript" information, and gave incomplete information. Indeed, one FEMA controller noted that a LERO representative appeared "very shook up" when attempting to respond to questions. LERO representatives in contact with a

. simulated Suffolk County "official" were also unable to convey how many rescue and fire vehicles were needed for hospital evacuation purposes.

E. LERO workers also called simulated government "officials" for information that was actually in the Plan and should have been known to the LERO callers. For instance, many LERO workers called a simulated "official" for addresses of certain schools. As the "official" noted, these addresses are located in the LILCO Plan. Egg OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 3.

F. LERO workers contacted the wrong simulated government to attempt to obtain information. For instance, the LERO

, Evacuation Coordinator called a simulated "official" of the State of New York to determine whether there were any impediments

. on the roads in Suffolk County. As the "official" commented, the proper simulated government to have called was suffolk County.

G. As events developed, LILCO sometimes failed to "interface" at all, choosing instead to make key decir. ions without "government" concurrence. For instance, LERO management informed the FEMA controller simulating a New York State "official" that the ingestion PAR had been extended to 50 miles after the decision was made. Thus, LERO management failed to consult with the simulated New York State "official" and failed to seek liew York State concurrence prior to the issuance of the decision. Such improper practice led a FEMA controller to conclude that there existed "a problem of lack of coordination with (the) State of New York." Similarly, although LERO traf fic

. control informed a simulated New York State "official" that access control would not begin until the State concurred in the access control plan, this was not the case. Prior to transmission of State approval or disapproval, access control was implemented on the perimeter of Zones 0, P, S , M and N.

H. Moreover, when governmental approval was requested by LERO, it was often requested prematurely. Thus, LERO expected simulated government "officials" to agree to actions without having before them all int 7rmation required to make such decisions. This prompted a 2EMA controller simulating a Suffolk County "official" to state tha?. "LERO should clarify what they I

I i

l want and when they can deploy" before seeking suffolk County a

approval.

I. LERO's inability to interface promptly and efficiently ,

i with government "officials" resulted in delays in getting PARS onto the air waves. The PAR at the Site Area Emergency ("SAE")

level was delayed from approximately 7:33 a.m., when the SAE was declared at the LERO EOC, until approximately 8:08 a.m., when EBS

(

No. 2 was broadcast. This meant that although the SAE has an Lutomatic ("immediate") PAR of placing animals within two miles of Shoreham on stored feed, there was a delay of more than 30 minutes in getting the PAR to the public. Egg FEMA Report at 39-401 EBS No. 2; OPIP 3.6.6, at i 5.1.1.1.b. It appears that it took LERO until 8:03 a.m. to obtain the "approval" of Suffolk County to issue the PAR.

Similarly, there was a delay in the init,ial evacuation and i

sheltering notification to the public from approximately i 9

34 a.m., when the General Emergency was declared, until  !

10:26 a.m., when the public was notified. Egg FEMA Report at 39-40. Indeed, even though a General Emes,ancy requires an "immediate recommendation to place milk animals within 10 miles on stored feed" (OPIP 3.6.6, 5 5.1.1.1.c), this recommendation was not conveyed to the public until after 10:26 a.m. on Day 1.

Thus, from 9:34 a.m. until 10:26 a.m., an incorrect PAR was being conveyed to the public via EBS No. 2. LILCO experienced similar delays with many other EBS messages as well. Egg Contention 6

. below, where similar matters are discussed. To the extent that l

k

LILCO may claim that these delays resulted in whole or in part

. from the need to obtain governmental approvals, the delays demonstrate that LILCO is incapable of effecting prompt and effective interface with government officials and that such delays have the potential to impact public health and safety severely. Indeed, the delays experienced during the Exercise meant that the public would not have been advised to take protective actions as promptly as otherwise might have been the case and, accordingly, might have resulted in persons not being alerted to harmful radiation dangers until a later time.  ;

f 1 1 III. Contention St Fundamental Flaws Relatino to Notification

. NRC regulations require that an applicant demonstrate the  :

ability to alert the public of an accident promptly. 10 CFR {

5 5 50.47 (b) (5) and (7): 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 5 IV.D.3; and NUREG-0654 55 II.E.4-6. For example, under the NRC's regulations, LERO is required to notify the public of the need for protective actions within 15 minutes of the time that LERO ,

authorities are stified by the plant (1x22, usually by the l Emergency Operations Facility ("EOF") in the case of Shoreham) of J the need for protective actions. Egg also LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 'J4 4, 757-59. Such a prompt notificction capability is crucial to an I

adequate emergency response; without it, the public might remain ignorant of the emergency for seme period of time, thus delaying t

or precluding the public from taking appropriate protective actions. Indeed. the Ao_ogal_'Joard has stated _that "folublic

l alert and notification is unauestionably a maior element of m nlannina." ALAB-900, slin on. at 28.

Consistent with the forecoina. LILCO has reccanized the nergg for oromet notification and incorocrated it as an essential element of its Plan. E.c.. Plan at 3.3-4 thru 3.3-6r OPIPs 3.3.4. 3.8.2. The oublic alert and notificatiori_ system is considered to be of such imoortance that it is tested at virtually all erarcises. See FEMA Guidance Memorandum Ex-3.

Obiectives 12-15.

The Exercise revealed, however. that LILCO is incapable of implementing prompt notification to the public. Specifically, a failure in LILCO's siren system and other Exercise results discussed below demonstrated that LILCO does not have a reliable means to notify the general public, or to keep the public

. informed of changes in the status of a Shoreham emergency in a timely manner. Moreover, LILCO personnel failed to exercise good judgment in the face of unexpected events, and special procedures to notify the deaf proved to be ineffective. Thus, LILCo did not satisfy EOC Objectives 12 and 18, SA Objective 18 and FA objective '.8 and demonstrated that it cannot meet the foregoing NRC reanlations. These failures represent fundamental flaws in an essential element of LILCO's Plan.

[gf.A found that LILCO had cerformed satisfactorily on oublic notification matters. E.a. , FEMA Recort at 44, 46. 75. FEMA's rationale orovides no bagia, however. for redection of contention

, 5. First. With res_oggt_to the _Drgblems identified in subcarts A 29 -

and B below. FEMA did not even evaluate the siren failure or the

. iudament for lack thereof) exercised by LERO cersonnel when the sirens failed. Thus, the FEMA Recort orovides no basis even to consider reiection of subearts A and B. Sggond, with resoect to EMh2A13 C. FEMA aaain failed even to discuss _whether the delays J

M d therein constituted a serious failure of cerformance u min. therefore, the FEMA Reoort contains no discussion that apruably miaht be entitled to some deference. Finallv. with ImaDar t to subcart D coilcernina notification _of the deaf. FEMA's conclusion that the Droblems identified during_the Exorcise were dminor" (FEMA Recort at 75) was succorted_by ng_exclanation. Thg reference by FEMA to the 1985 Partial Initial _ Decision is not eersuasive, since the tvoes of orablems demongtrated in the 1988

~

EXgIcise could have delaved Dr.otective_gg.tions for the deaf, Doculation_for much more than__four hourau Examples of the ways in which LILco failed to demonstrate an ability to provide prompt notification are set forth below. Ihgz reveal that the defects in LILCO's oromot nqtifigg iQD 5YatRE are serious and not readily correctable as_thmy_ cover __ diverse

( elements of_the notification _ function, For eXADyle. the failure I of virtually LILCO's_ entire siren __ system was_ indicative of far more than a simole_ mechanical _ breakdown ot_the_ siren system. In a real emeraency. such a wholesalt_failurg__of LILCQ's siram gyntem would have severelv imoacted LILCO's ability to orovide timelv notification to_the_Dublic and the Dublic's recelot of

. PARA _.LILCQ_mu3t, therefore _ demonstrate _that_it has remedied _or_

i 30 -

I can remedy the esulement ana/or trainina defects that led to the co11anse of its oromet notification system.

Given the EE2ER 21 the system's failure durina the Exercise. the efforts recuired to cure those defects -- assumina thav can be cured -- are likelv i

to be extensive. Furthermore. LERO's failure to react accrocriatelv to the siren failures constitutes a systemic deficiency in the failure to teach LFRO corsonnel to use acod I iudament and to rencond to unexoected events, similar to deficiencies that were revealed durina the 1986 exercise (LBP 2. 27 NRC at 178 Jgy 197-2001 and still have not been corrected.

Likewise. LILCO's untingliness in notifying __the_public, and flaws

in notifyina the deaf, if correctable at all, will recuire l substantial review of. and modification to. LERO's notification orocedures and extensive revisions to the LILCO trainina crocram.

. The substantial notification delavs and defects nated below are i'

also likely to result in significant delavs in the _cublic's receire of_PARam

A. LILCO has developed a so-called "prompt notification system" consisting of 89 sirens located within the EPZ.

According to LILCO's Plan, the sirens, when triggered, are l supposed to alert the public to tune to LILCO's EBS for official information. Plan at 3.3-4; OPIP 3.3.4 at 2. On Day 1 of the Exercise, LILCO activated the sirens to attempt to test LILCO's public alerting capabilities, as required by 10 CFR Part 50, i Appendix E, 5 IV.F. That effort failed dismally, however, when I

57 of the 89 LILCO sirens failed to function. In the event of a I

t

real emergency, such a failure would mean that a substantial majority of EPZ residents would not receive prompt notification of an accident or of the PARS which are recommended to be taken.

Absent such notification, there can be no likelihood that the PARS can be implemented, thus threatening the public's health and safety.

B. In an emergency situation, if sirens were to fail, LILCO's Plan provides for backup notification to the public via use of route alert drivers. OPIP 3.3.4 at 5 and Att. 3. On Day 1 of the Exercise, when 57 sirens failed, LILCO personnel failed to exercise good judgment or to follow the Plan in the face of that unexpected situation. The siren failure was not communicated to other LERO personnel or to the media or to the "gov 6rnments;" no route alert drivers were activated or seat out,

[

and no other actions were taken to attempt to respond to the siren failures, thus underscoring the fact that LILCO cannot be relied upon to provide prompt notification to the public as required by NRC regulations.

i C. The Exercise demonstrated that, even aside from siren l

failures, LILCO is incapable of complying with regulatory requirements for promptly notifying the public ef emergency i

conditions requiring protective actions. Some examples are:

1. The LERO EOC declared an Alect at 5:49 a.m. on Day 1, a condition (given the time of day) which required a PAR to cancel schools. OPIP 3.6.1 at 31a. LERO failed to notify the

public, however, until 6:13 a.m. on Day 1, when EBS No. I was "broadcast."

2. The EOF advised the LERO EOC of conditions mt.ndating a Site Area Emergency at approximately 7:30 a.m. on Day

1. FEMA Report at 39. Thus, by approximately 7:45 a.m. on Day 1, LERO should have notified the public of the Site Area Emergency and also should have advised the public of the protective action to put dairy animals on stored feed. Instead, however, LERO waited until 8:08 a.m. , when EBS No. 2 was "broadcast," to accomplish this notification.

3. The EOF notified the LERO EOC of the existence of a General Emergency and the need for evacuation and sheltering at approximately 9:34 a.m. on Day 1. That recommendation was received by the LERO EOC no later than 9:37 a.m. on Day 1.

Egg FEMA Report at 40. The declaration of General Emergency required an immediate PAR to expand the dairy animal PAR already i being "broadcast" in EBS No. 1. The public, howcVer, was not notified of any new PARS until at least 10:26 a.m. on Day 1, when EBS No. 3 was "brocdcast." The notification at 10:26 a.m. tas not only untimely, it was inadequate, since it did not provide any PAR regarding s.1at persons should do if they decided not to evacuate. This PAR was not provided until EBS No. 10 was "broadcast" at 11:35 a.m. on Day 2, a delay of over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

4. At 11:00 a.m. on Day 1, the EOC and the EOF were notified that a release of radiation had begun. FEMA Report at

. 39. The public was not notified of this increased safety risk l

1

.- , --- r--,

l l

and of the resulting recommendation that evacuees from affected j

. zones should go to reception centers until EBS No. 4 was issued one hour and 11 minutes later, at 12:11 p.m.

D. The LILCO Plan provides special means for notification of the deaf. Specifically, route alert drivers are assigned to drive designated routes within the EPZ and to notify deaf people living along those routes of an emergency. OPIP 3.3.4 at 6, 7.

There were several instances, however, in which route alert drivers were unable to identify the homes of the deaf or find the routes that they were supposed to drive. Egg FEMA Report at 75.

In an actual emergency, these failures would have resulted in substantial numbers of deaf people failing to receive prompt notification of the emergency, thus threatening their health and safety.

IV. Contentions 6-10: Fundamental Flaws Relating to Public Information Contention 6: EBS Messaces. An essential element of the LILCO Plan provides for the dissemination of emergency information to the public through messages broadcast over an emergency broadcast system ("EBS"). Plan at 3.8-6 thru 3.8-8; OPIP 3.8.1, 5 5.2: OPIP 3.8.2. The imnortance of adeaunte emeraency information to an effective res_conse is reflected ijn the fact that such information is_recuired b_v NRC reaulations (10 CFR E 50.47(b)(6)r NUREG-0654 E4 II.E_and F) and teattd_recularly by FEMA. See FEMA Guidance Memorandum Ex-3. Obiectives 12 and

13. Indeed, the need for cood Dublic information was one of the

, subiects of this Board's orevious inouiry into LILCO's 1986 exercise. Moreover, the Acceal Board stated recentiv that "rt1hg EBS messaae is an intearal comoonent of the sublig notification system, and ordinarily should be tested in a full __narticinatian exercise." ALAB-900, slio on, at 29. In LBP-88-2, the Licensing Board determined that the February 1986 exercise revealed fundamental flaws in certain aspects of LILCO's Plan for the dissemination of clear, accurate and timely public information.

In particular, the Board found that LILCO's EBS messages were frequently inconsistent and confusing, and that such EBS oroblems were an intgaral cart _of a fundamental _finw in LILCO's P}gg3 27 NRC at 170-72.

The results of the Exercise demonstrate that LILCO has

, failed to correct this fundamental flaw in its Plan and that additional EBS-related fundamental flaws exist. LILCO personnel repeatedly "broadcast" EBS messages that were confusing, l

inaccurate, inconsistent, untimely, poorly organized and/or too l long to be effective. Therefore, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed in that it cannot be implemented effectively by LERO personnel, and fails to comply with 10 CFR E 50.47(b) (6) and NUREG-0654 El II.E and F. The numerous defects in LILCO's EBS messages create a strong likelihood that the public will not view LILCO as a credible source of emergency ,

information, making it less likely that the PARS and other information conveyed in the EBS messages will be believed or t

[

relied upon. Egg Contention 9. Furthermore. LILCO's

. substantial untjmeliness in_issuina EBS messages _is likely to result in delavs in the oublic's receint_of. and resconse to.

PAEa4.

FEMA identified several EBS-related orgblens,__assessina both an "ARCA" and an "ARPI" (Area Recommended for Imorovement). FEMA Recort at 45, 55, 56. FEMA never addressed, however, the vast maiority of the erob_lems listed in subcarts A - D below. Thus, the FEMA Recort in this recard stands as no obstacle to Contention 6f_s admission. Moreover. to the limited extent that FEMA did address the orQblems listed _in contention 6. it orovided ag_gxplanation why thesg,oroblems, when viewed with the many other eroblems_liated in Contention 6. should_not_be considered a fundamental flaw. Indeed. FEMA orovided no rationalg_at all in

. Its Reogrt_for_itg_EBS "crade." Thus. FEMA's views on the EBS oroblems revealed by the_ Exercise do not_c_onstitute_a_bar to admission _of Contention 6.

The following examples illustrate many of the flaws concerning LILCO's EBS messages that were demons' ated during the Exercise. Their sheer number _.demQDitrates_that LILCO's EBS failures are cervasive and not readily correctabig..

Indeed.

LILCO had over__two "CRIs to correct similar flgys found as a, result of the February 1986 exercise. but failed to do so, makina it all tht more clear that _these_ problems _ar.t_not_readily COIIRCtable. Thua,.it__must_he_ conclude 1.that_any_atterats to

, corrget LILCO's continued failure to ingue clear 2_concises accurate and timelv information to the oublic will recuire

, extensive retrainina of LILCO cersonnel and substantial review of, and modifications to. LILCO's Plan and crocedures for issuina InBE JiLSEM A. The EBS messages contained incorrect information. For example:

1. EBS Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7, "broadcast" between 12:11 p.m. and 5:52 p.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, stated that only small doses of radiation werc projected at the Shoreham site boundary and that these doses would be below EPA guidelines for doses requiring protective actions. However, at the time EBS Nos. 4-7 were being "broadcast" -- a period covering almost six hours during which thousands of EPZ residents were supposed to be evacuating -- the projected radiation doses beyond the Shoreham

, site boundary were in excess of the EPA's guidelines for protective actions. FEMA Report at 45. LERO's EBS messages were inaccurate and could have convinced persons that there was no inmediate danger or that the EBS messages could be ignored --

i.e., that the recommended protective action of evacuation was merely a precaution -- thus resulting in persons remaining in zones of potential danger and receiving greater radiation doses.

2. EBS No. 2, "broadcast" at 8:08 a.m. on Day 1, not only contained incorrect information, but also sought to minimize the seriousness of the potential ingestion pathway hazard. Thus, EBS No. 2 recommended placing milk-prtducing animals within two miles of Shoreham on stored feed. LILCO stated it was issuing

- 37 -

that recommendation because it was "required" to do so by "NRC

. regulations." This statement was followed by the assertion:

This does not mean that a release of radiatio: has

• occurred. This does not mean that a release of radiation will occur.

These statements tended to understate the possible seriousness of the developing accident, at the precise time when i'. was important to est ablish LILCO's credibility with the public. The message suggests that LILCO was issuing the dairy animal PAR because it was forced to do so by a "regulation," rather than f because the PAR was a prudent step in attempting to avoid harmful radiation exposure. Purther, LILCO's initial statement is untrue: there is no NRC regulation that required LERO at 8:08 a.m. to recommend putting milk-producing animals on stored feed. That is a requirement of LILCO's Plan. OPIP 3.6.6,

$ 5.1.1.1.b. Similar inaccurate statements concerning alleged requirement 6 of NRC regulations were contained in EBS Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 15, and 16. Accordingly, inaccurate EBS assertions were broadcast throughout the three-day Exercise.

3, EBS No. I was issued at 6:13 a.m. co Day 1, a time prior to the opening rf any schools, and prior to the time  !

school buses began picking up children. The LILCO Plan thus  !

called for a PAR that school be canceled. OPIP 3.6.1 at 31a.

Nevertheless, contrary to the Plan and contrary to good judgment bnd common sense, LERO recommended that schools should "immediately cancel classes or imolement their early dismissal

. clans." (Emphasis added.) The possibility of schools implementing early dismissal, rather than simply canceling

. classes, war an incorrect instruction, having the potential to cause confusion and concern, not to mention increased risks of exposure to radiation, because it implied that children should first be sent to school.

LILCO's error in EBS No. I was all the more serious because LILCO failed to correct the error. EBS Nc. I was rebroadcast every 15 minutes until EBS No. 2 was issued at approximately 8:08 a.m. Shortly after EBS No. 1 had been "broadcast" the first time, a FEMA controller advised LILCO that its notice to dismiss the schools early was inappropriate, given the early hour of the day. Nevertheless, LERO personnel did not correct the error.

It should be further noted that as EBS No. 1 was being "broadcast" after 7:00 a.m., the notification to "cancel" classes

. became inapplicable. By that hour, most schools in the 10-mile EPZ would have commenced tha process of picking up students and, accordingly, the appropriate protective action would have been i

early dismissal. It was not until EBS No. 2 was "broadcast" at 8:08 a.m. that the school cancellation recommendation was deleted, however.

> 4. EBS No. 10A was "broadcast" at 3:35 p.m. on Day 2.

1 It stated, among ather things, as follows:

Residents beyond the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone do not need to take any protective action as a consequence of the incident on June 7, 1988, at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. Residents beyond the 10-mile l Emergency Planning Zone have not been exposed to l contanination in excess of the guidelines established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency end New York State for protective action. In particular, t

residents east of the 10-mile zone are not required to take any protective action whatsoever. This conclusion is the result of active sampling by Federal, State and County survey teams throughout the area.

The foregoing information was inaccurate, demonstrating LERO's inability to convey proper PARS to the public, the failure to assimilate information from diverse sources within LERO, and inadequate interface with the "governments." Among other inaccuracies were the following:

(a) As of no later than early on Day 2 of the Exercise (and probably earlier; 113 Contention 11), sufficient data existed to justify ingestion PARS in the 10-50 mile zone.

j FEMA Report at 51. In fact, a Field Monitoring Data Log from Day 1 indicated Beta readings in excess of 400 cpm above background, j

, a threshold under LILCO's Plan (OPIP 3.6.6, 5 5.2.2) for

]

1 ingestion actions.

(b) At approximately 1:00 p.m. on Day 2 of the

Exercise, the New York State control cell had been advised by 1

3 LERO that there were "hot spots" east of the plant.

(c) At 2:15 p.m. on Day 2 of the Exercise, the I LERO Director and DOE advised the New York State control cell via

, conference call that "hot spots" had been identified 13 miles east of the plant with measurements above the EPA PAGs.

j In view of the foregoing, it was wrong for LERO to have I

adv.ised, via EBS messages on Day 2, that persons outside the 10-mile EPZ to the east of the plant were not required to take i

any protective action whatsoever. This error went uncorrected j -

!e S

I until EBS No. 17 was "broadcast" at 12:52 p.m. on Day 3 of the

. Exercise.

5. EBS No. 16, "broadcast

• at noon on Day 3 of the l 1 Exercise, assarted that persons outside the 10-mile EPZ needed to ,

L

take no action because radiation doses, if any, were below the EPA guidelines. Prior to that EBS, at 10

40 a.m. on Day 3, the New York State control cell had been advised that LERO had found l milk samples exceeding the PAGs for infants in Riverhead, New York, and locations further east. Further, the advice in EBS (

l No. 16 that persons outside the 10-mile EPZ needed to take no t action was inconsistent with other portions of that EBS message.

l l' In fact, paragraph 8 of EBS No. 16 advised the public that j 1

animals located east of the William Floyd Parkway needed to ha

! put on stored feed. This "advice" was not limited to the 10-mile l

! . EPZ and suggested that persons outside the EPZ should have been i 1

j advised to take action. Accordingly, EBS No. 16 was not only )

l t

l inaccurate, it also was internally inconsistent and confusing. )

1 l

6. Incorrect information was included in EBS No. 4,  !

l which was "broade.ast" at 12:11 p.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, ,

J That message reported that as of 11:46 a.m., children from the  !

l Rocky Point Public School District were en route to the Nassau

(

County Coliseum. In fact, however, at the time EBS No. 4 was "broadcast," LERO was aware that those children were being redirected to Hicksville for monitoring and possible decontamination. This erroneous information was repeated in EBS

. No. 5,

• broadcast

• at 1 08 p.m. on Day 1. An attempt was made by i

I i

t

i i

LERO to update this information in EBS No. 6 by tacking the

, information concerning the monitoring and possible decontamination of the Rocky Point school children onto that message. The updated information, however, was located quite some distance (2 pages) from the repeated misinformation. This situation was not clarified until EBS No. 7 was issued at 5:52 p.m. on Day 1.

B. The LERO EBS messages did not disseminate important r information to the public in a timely fashion. For example:  ;

1. Beginning at 10:26 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, and continuing every 15 minutes thereafter until 12:11 p.m. on i Day 1, EBS No. 3 was "broadcast." That EBS message stated, among other things, that th1re was a possibility of fuel damage which could result in a significant radiation release to persons l

, downwind of the plant. It further advised that the release of radiation into the air could begin in anoroximatelv two hours.

I By 11:00 a.m., however, LERO personnel knew that a release of l radiation from Shoreham had begun. Notwithstanding this j i

knowledge, EBS No. 3 continued to be "broadcast," and thus, the l public was incorrectly "advised" that a release would not occur for two hours when, in fact, the release was already occurring.

i

2. It was not until EBS No. 4, "broadcast" initially i at 12:11 p.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, that LERO "advised" ,

1 1

persons from the evacuated zones to go to LILCO reception centers. This advice was untimely. LERO logs indicate that as I

of 11:12 a.m., 59 minutes earlier, LERO had already developed a j W W

list of the zones that needed to be instructed to go to reception

. centers. LERO failed, aowever, to amend EBS No. 3 in a timely manner to advise persons of the need to report to reception centers. Instead, LERO waited almost an hour, until EBS No. 4 was "broadcast," to issue that advice.

When LERO did issue EBS No. 4, thereby advising persons in particular zones to go to the reception centers, its advice was confusing. EBS No. 4 stated that persons should go to reception centers *(tjo be certain that there is little or no haza rd."

Evacuees were not told the nature of the hazard (possible contamination), what would happen at reception centers, (monitoring to detect contamination and, if necessary, decontamination), or given other information to explain why they should follow this recommended action. EBS Nos. 5 and 6 also were deficient in this regard. It was not until EBS No. 7 was

• broadcast" at 5:52 p.m. on Day 1 that persons were advised that they would be monitored and (if needed) decontaminated at reception centers.

LERO's confusing and untimely instruction in EBS Nos. 4-6 could have caused persons to delay going to reception centers for monitoring and decontamination. Indeed, as late as 2:50 p.m. on Day i of the Exercise, LILCO personnel noted that a substantial number of people who were supposed to go to reception centers were not doing so. Nevertheless, this matter was not addressed in an EBS message until 5:52 p.m. , some three hours later, when

. EBS No. 7 was "broadcast. "

3. As of 10:26 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, persons

, in Zones A-J, O, P, and S were recommended to evacuate. Notwith-standing this recommendation, LILCO knew that some portion of the population in those zones would nevertheless choose to remain at home. Indeed, on Day 1 LERO advised the FEMA control cell that 5% of the people advised to evacuate had chosen not to do so.

Thus, LILCO knew or should have known that it needed to caution these persons about how they could protect themselves (1232, via shaltering). LILCO failed to do so, however, until Day 2 of the Exercise, when EBS No. 10 was "broadcast."

j 4. LILCO did not advise the public of the PAk for 4 dairv animals within two miles of the Shoreham plant until EBS j No. 2 was "broadcast

• at 8:08 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise --

j almost 40 minutes after a site Area Emergency had been declared.

j . During this time, EBS No. I was being "broadcast" every 15 j tinutes. That mes= age contained no dairy animal PAR. LILCO t!.',us failed to follow its Plan, which requires that this dairy animal PAR be an "immediate recommendation" after a Site Area Emergency is declared. 133 OPIP 3e6.6, 5 5.1.1.1.b.

3 LILCO's delay in issuing the dairy animal PAR could have l been all the more confusing, because media at the ENC were j advised of the Site Area Emergency shortly after 7:30 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, and would certainly have begun disseminating that information while EBS No. I was still being "broadcast." Moreover, a similar delay was involved in expanding

t the two mile dairy animal PAR to lo miles, when a General

. Emergency was eventually declared on Day 1.

5. At approximately 11:46 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, a decision was made to transport children who live within the EPZ, but attend school outside the EPZ, to the Nassau Coliseum at the and of the day if their parents had not picked them up. The FEMA control cell was told several times that this information would be placed in an EBS message, but the control cell was not even asked to approve an EBS message until 4:31 p.m.

on Day 1, and this information did not appear in an EBS message until 5:52 p.m., when EBS No. 7 was issued. It was untimely for LILCO to have waited u..til 5:52 p.m. to have made known its decision to transport these school children to the Nassau Coliseum, particularly since schools dismiss around 3:00 p.m.

. Moreover, between the time of LILCO's decision to transport the children and the issuance of EBS No. 7, three EBS messages (Nos.

4-6) were issued. All there messages mentioned some school matters; however, none mentioned LILCO's decision regarding EPZ-resident school children attending school outside of the EPZ, which had been made at 11:46 a.m.

6. EBS No. 7 alco was misleading and confusing in that it advised parents with children attending schools outside the EPZ, but residing within the EPZ, to pick up those children "at their schools in accordance with protective action plans of the individual schools," while, in the next sentence, it advised

, that such children already had been transported to the Nassau Coliseum. EBS No. 8, which was "broadcast" on Day 2 of the

. Exercise, repeated this misleading message.

7. The LERO Coordinator of Public Information was notified at 12:12 p.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise of the need to issue an EBS message informing the public of a traffic impediment in Coram at Granny Road. This information was not dissemin ted until EBS No. 5, which was issued at 1:08 p.m. Thus, there was a delay of almost one hour in conveying this information to the public, even though the information concerning the impediment of Granny Road was the only change from EBS No. 4.

8. LERO informed the State of New York control cell at 10:51 a.m. on Day 3 of the Exercise that LERO management had decided to extend ingestion PARS for milk-producing animals on stored feed to 50 miles. Nevertheless, LERO did not promptly

, amend its prior EBS message and EBS No. 16, subsequently issued at noon on Day 3, did not make clear that an ingestion PAR had been extended to 50 miles for milk-producing animals,

9. As of 12:05 p.m. on Day 3 of the Exercise, the New York State control cell was advised that milk and vegetables east of the EPZ might be contaminated. Despite this information, EBS No. 16 was not promptly amended to reflect such data. Further, EBS No. 17, which was issued at 12:50 p.m., did not report this information accurately. Whereas the advice to the New York State control cell stated broadly that milk and vegetables east of the EPZ might be contaminated, EBS No. 17 defined the crea of potential contamination much more narrowly.

10. A road impediment at Sheep Pasture Road was

. reported to the EOC at 11:28 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise. Such advice was not conveyed to the public, however, until EBS No. 4 was "broadcast" at 12:11 p.m. on Day 1. Similarly, approximately one hour elapsed between the time that the EOC became aware of a traffic impediment blocking Granny Road and the issuance of EBS

! No. 5, which advised svacuees to avoid this area. Such untimely l

notification of impediments could lead to substantial delays in the evacuation of residents from affected zones, thereby increasing their risk of radiation exposure.

1 C. The LERO EBS messages were too long and they were poorly organized. Indeed, many of the EBS messages were 4-5 pages long (single spaced), requiring many minutes just to read them over the EBS. Due to their excessive length, the public j . might not have listened to the entire message. This could have resulted in listeners missing pertinent information. FEMA i Report at 45.

Concerns resulting from the excessive length of the EBS messages were compounded by the fact that the messages were poorly organized, leading to further confusion and ineffcetiveners. An important function of EBS messages is to provide the public with new information about the circumstances

{ surrounding the emergency. LILCO personnel, however, usually inserted new information in the middle or toward the end of the messages, rather than at the beginning, where it should have

, appeared. FEMA Report at 45. Thus, if persons stopped listening i

r i

i

i r

i r

i I i because of the excessive length of the messages, they likely l 1

would have missed any new and important information which was  !

being usavoyed. Examples of problems in the organization and (

structure of the LERO EBS messages are set forth below.

i I l 1. EBS No. 5 exemplifies LILCO's "cut and paste

• l approach to structuring EBS messages. The addition of information about a traffic impediment on Granny Road was the [

only change from EBS No. 4. This new information, however, was I relegated to the bottom of page 3, towards the end of the l'

message. This 6ame procedure was followed in EBS No. 6, wb've ,

j informatica about the fourth traffic impediment was addeu --  !

l again, toward the and of the message. l 1 r l 2. LERO personnel revised EBS messages in a l 1

mechanical manner, rather than exercising sound judgment and l . having a clear understanding of the context of new information  !

l .

that was being inserted into existing EBS messages. When j inserting new information, LERO personnel failed to determine  ;

whether the surrounding text of the messaga being revised required modification so that the newly-inserted information 1 would not be confusing or contradictory. For instance, on page 3 of EBS No. 10, issued at 11:35 a.m. on Day 2 of the 2xercise, l people outside the 10-mile EPZ were told that they did not necd

! to take any protective action. That statement was immediately

! followed, however, by the statenant, "Make sure that before you

) leave your home or business, you have closed all windows and I . doors . . . . (y)ou could be away for several days.* This i

i

l l

- . = , - - , - , , ,- .n - . , , - _ _ _ _ , - - - , _ , .

confusing and conflicting information was not corrected until EBS No. 15 was issued at 10:05 a.m. on Day 3 of the Exerciss.

Similarly, EBS No. 16 contained cumulative information it?t would have confused the public. At one point on pags 4, for example, the public was advised that doses outside the 10-mile EPZ were below levels req'liring protective actions. At another point on the same page, it was stated that "(i]n particular, residents east of the 10-mile zone are not required to take any protectior. (sic) action whatsoever." This second entry suggested that persons in other areas were not as well protected and perhaps should have taken protective action.

3. Careless organization of the EBS messages also was reflected in EBS No. 3, "broadcast" at 10:26 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise. On page 2, listeners "within the 10-mile emergency

- planning zone" were told to refer to their brochures in order to determine the zone in which they live. Then, after a page-and-a-half of newly inserted recommendations, a description of the 10-mile zone was given. This poor organization continues in EBS Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10.

4. Another indication of the poor organization of LILCO's EBF messages was the failure to mention, until the end of the EBS messages, that emergency information is contained in local telephone books. As FEMA noted:

Because experience has shown that many people do not retain emergency booklets, telephone books may be the only source of such information at some homes and offices. EBS tausages should explain as close to their

. beginning as possible that emergency information is provided in their telephone book.

i FEMA Report at 45. Similarly, the messages neglected to tell listeners that LILCO's Customer Relations District Offices and Customer Call Boards could be telephoned if additional information were needed or questions regarding the emergency arose. Jhtt; JLig Contention 8.

5. In EBS No. 8, issued at 9:06 a.m. on Day 2 of the Exercise, LILCO issued its first ingestion pathway "precaution" (except for automatic dairy animal advisories originally issued early on Day 1). The LILCO "precaution" in EBS No. 8 stated:

Food in homes or stores in the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone which was frozen, refrigerated or securely packaged prior to the incident is safe to consume except for foods that may have naturally spoiled. As a precaution pending further analysis, fruits and vegetables locally grown and from gardens stored prior to the incident should be avoided. In

. addition, as a precaution, however, all fruit and vegetables stored inside prior to the incident should be washed bafore consumption. There are no

. restrictions on water.

This notice is unclear on its face. The first sentence discussed the 10-mile EPZ, but the remainder of the message -- the portion where specific actions were recommended -- did not state specifically whether it applied to the entire 10-mile EPZ, to part of it, or to a larger area. This precaution was all the more confusing because the immediately prior paragraph discussed the specific zones which were recommended to be sheltered, while the following paragraph discussed the specific zones to be evacuated. This "precaution," in short, was inserted in an inappropriate location in EBS No. 8.

Moreover, the message was inconsistent. Specifically, the second sentence advised persons to avoid fruits and vegetables stored prior to the incident, while the third sentence merely recommended washing such food prior to consumption. Similar confusing statements were contained in EBS Nos. 10, 15, 16, and 17.

D. LILCO's EBS messages lacked significant details and were otherwise confusing and vague.

1. LILCO's EBS messages did nec provide clear information regarding protective actions for special facility residents. For example, EBS Nos. 3 and 4 both recommended evacuation for certain zones of the EPZ and sheltering for other zones. The EBS messages did not mention, however, whether residents of special facilities in or near the EPZ were to comply

. with those general recommendations, or whether there were special recommendations relating to those persons. This failure of LILCO's EBS messages to clearly convey to all affected members of the public the PARS being recommended represents a continuation of LILCO's inability to exercise good judgmant and f4 communicate l clear, precise, and unambiguous .information to the public.

l

2. No EBS message during the Exercise informed the public that the Long Island Railroad had agreed to alter service to and from the EPZ. Thus, the public was not informed that a potential maans of evacuating the EPZ was not available.

3. EBS No. 2 urged persons in Zones A-E to put e

i milk-producing animals on stored feed. The message never stated,

, however, where Zones A-E were, or even their approximate location. Rather, persons were directed to refer to their brochures for "help (to) understand future messages" (emphasis added). The EBS message did not indicate that the brochure would help in understanding that message, except to state that the brochure contained zone information.

4. In EBS No. 3, LERO recommended that all zones in the 10-mile EPZ either shelter or evacuate. LILCO then stated:

If you are not within planning zones A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, 0, P and S or planning zones K. L, M, N, Q and R, there is no reason to either shelter or evacuate. If you are outside the 10-mile emergency planning Lone, there is no reason to take any action.

The clear implication of this message was that there are zones within the 10-mile EPZ other than those which were listed.

As

, this is not the case, the statement made was misleading and confusing.

Moreover, the above statement from EBS No. 3 was followed by a similarly misleading statement:

We are required by NRC regulations to recommend that all milk producing animals in the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone should be moved into shelters and placed on stored feed. This does not mean there is any danger from radiation in zones that have not buen recommended to shelter or evacuate.

(Emphasis added.) As noted, all zones had already been mentioned. Similar confusing information was contained in EBS Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7.

5. The Exercise demonstrated that LILc0 is incapable of providing prompt notification of emergency conditions to l t  :

r-residents of special facilities (adult homes, nursing homes, and C hospitals).

. EBS No. 3 was issued at 10:26 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise. That EBS message specifically mentioned the needs of homebound individuals. The message did not mention at all what protective actions, if any, were recommended for residents of special facilities. Indeed, it did not even indicate that LERO personnel would attempt to contact special facilities (other than via EBS messages) in order to advise them of what particular protective actions would or might be recommended for those special facilities.

6. EBS No. 3 also advised persons in certain specified zones to evacuate. There was no direction in that message that persons from those evacuated zones should report to reception centers for any purpose. Nevertheless, in paragraph 5

. there was discussion of the locations of, and ways to reach, the reception centers. There was no statement in the EBS message, however, describing the purpose reception centers serve or why any person should attempt to reach these reception centers.

There also was not any discussion of the fac* that at the reception center, people in need of shelter would be directed to congregate care centers.

7. Also in EBS No. 3, persons in Zone K were told to evacuate in one sentence and to shelter ir, a later sentence in the same paragraph.

i

8. On page 1 of EBS No. 4, "broadcast" at 12:11 p.m.

on Day 1 of the Exercise, irreconcilable information was 0

i

juxtaposed. First, the message stated that a "general emergency condition . . . indicates . . . fuel core damage, which could result in a sianificant radiation dose to people downwind."

(Emphasis added.) The next sentence then defined small doses as "doses below the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's guidelines requiring protective actions." The message next stated that protective actions were, nevertheless, being recommended "as a precaution." The following paragraph then reported that the plant was continuing to release radiation (and that this had been occurring since 11:00 a.m.), but, that only small doses were projected "at the site boundary." Aside from the fact that this information was incorrect (FEMA Report at 45),

these conflicting messages, inserted at the beginning of EBS No.

4, would likely have caused the average listener to conclude that the people "in charge" did not in fact know what was happening.

As a result, recommendations made by LERO would likely have been ignored.

9. EBS No. 10, broadcast at 11:35 a.m. on Day 2 of the Exercise, stated that persons outside Zones A-J, O, P and S "do not need to take any action . . .

" Later in the same message, however, it was stated that all persons in the EPZ were to take precautions regarding locally grown fruits and vegetables and that all milk-producing animals within the EPZ were to be placed on stored feed. Clearly, the message was internally inconsistent. EBS Nos. 15 and 16 on Day 3 contained similar

, inconsistencies.

10. EBC No. 15, broadcast at 10:05 a.m. on Day 3 of the Exercise, included a sheltering recommendation for milk-producing animals in Connecticut, while s ating that no protective actions needed to be taken by resideits outside the 10-mile zone. This inconsistent information was also included in EBS No. 16, issued at 12:00 p.m.

11. EBS No. 16, "broadcast" at 12:00 noon on Day 3, stated that persons located more than 10 miles from Shoreham needed,to take no action due to radiation doses. Thereafter, however, the same message stated that livestock at "all locations east of the William Floyd Parkway on Long Island should be moved into shelters and placed on stored feed." This inconsistency continund in EBS No. 17, which was "broadcast" at 12:50 p.m. on Day 3.

. 12. EBS No. 17, broadcast at 12:50 p.m. on Day 3 of the Exercise, contained further inconsistencios. It stated (page

1) that there were radiation measurements above ingestion PAR levels outside the EPZ, requiring special action related to local produce. At page 4, however, it stated (in two places) that persons outside the EPZ naeded to take no action because doses were below PAR levels. It also stated (page 5) that persons within the 10-mile EPZ were to exercise care in consuming local produce, implying that persons outside the 10-mile EPZ should have had no concerns.

13. EBS No. 17 was an exception to LILCO's general

, practice of inserting new information toward the end of an EBS 1 i

message. EBS No. 17 (page 1) contained the initial ingestion pathway PAR. But LILCO did nothing to highlight to the listening public that this constitu'.ed a new PAR. Indeed, it confused the situation. EBS No. 17 advised that the FDA Protective Action Guidelines had been exceeded in the following area:

This area is bounded by the Long Island Sound on the north, Route 25 on the south, Wading River - Manorville Road on the west and Aldrich Lane on the east.

The message then went on to state that with respect to the ingestion PAR, "all locally grown fresh produce and leafy vegetables stored '.t. the open should be washed, brushed, scrubbed or peeled to .emove surface contamination." This message was confusing a.id unclear in multiple respects, including the following:

(a) In contrast to other messages (and other portions of EBS No. 17) the precise EPZ zones were not identified.

(b) The message did not specify whether only produce and vegetables grown in the area where FDA dose rates had been exceeded or "all locally grown" produce had to be treated.

Contention 7: Emercency News Center. The Exercise demonstrated fundamental flaws in the LILCO Plan because: LILCo was unable to provide timely, accurate, consistent, non-confusing, and non-misleading information to the news media at the Emergency News Center ("ENC") ; LILCO's news briefings did

. not encore public and media confidence; and LILCO did not l

t

prevent misinformation and did not respond adequately to the

. media's questions. LILCO thus failed to demonstrate that it could implement an essential element of its Plan adequately or effectively. San Plan at 3.8-4 thru 3.8-5 and 3.8-8; OPIP 3.8.1.

The Plan provides, in pertinent part, that: "(a)ll public information personnel will confer on a regular basis to ensure that accurate and consistent emergency information is being shared and discussed." Plan at 3.8-4. Under the LILCO Plan, news briefings at the ENC are to serve three purposes:

o to provide accurate information on a timely basis o to ensure public and media confidence o to prevent misinformation and rumors

, Plan at 3.8-5. Similarly, press conferences are to "provide up-to-date information, respond to any rumor received, and answer d

any questions the media may have." Plan at 3.8-8. Moreover, according to OPIP 3.8.1, the LERO Coordinator of Public Information is to "(c)onfer with the Director of Local Response

. . . and the Public Information Staff at the ENC on a regular basis to maintain consistent information content;" and "obtain up-to-datn information regarding (the) offsite emergency response" prior to preparing press releases.

The Lic0DaiD2_ Board _in LBP-88-2 recognized _that_ clear _ _ and

.timely communicationa_with_the_ media _are_important: "if such

_fclear, accurate and tincivi information is_not orovided__the media vill at best be a neutral influence and at worat dg_trimental to an orderly _rcspoDSe." 27 NRC at._151. In_

addition. FEMA has standard obiectives to test ENC coerations.

. See FEMA Guidance Memorandum EX-3. Obiectives 14. 15. Thus, the operations of the ENC comprise an essential element of LILCO's Plan. and are intended to meet the recuirements of 10 CFR 46 50. 47 (b) (6) and (7) and NUREG-0654 E4 II.G.2-4.

The 1986 exercise revealed fundamental flaws in numerous aspects of LILCO's ENC scheme. LBP-88-2, 27 NRC at 149-67. As the examples in subparts A-H below reveal, those f)aws remain and, in fact, the Exercise revealed the existence of new flaws.

Thus, during the Exercise, LILCO was incapable of complying with the LILCO Plan und OPIPs, and LILCO did not provide the media and public vith accurate and timely information. LILCO also failed to satisfy ENC Objectives 13 and 14. Accordingly, the Exercise demonstrated thLt the this essential element of the LILCO Plan is o fundamentally flawed because it cannot be implemented by LILCO and fails to comply with 10 CFR 5 5 50.47 (b) (6) and (7) and NUREG-0654 55 II.G.2-4. Eurthermore__the subatantial delays in.

Conveying important information as noted in several of the RXaDDies beloL_are likely_to_cause_significant_siglays in_the, Dublic's receipt of. and_resRonse to. PARam FEMA found LILCO's ERC_rerformance to _ ba_ natis.factorL FEMA _

Report _at_SL__EEMAis_ conclusions _in this_ regard d oWaYer mars.

dgYoid of detail, oroviding_no indication of FEMA's_ bases for such a vigv. In earticular. FEMA's discussion _in_ita_ Report, falla__to_ address any of the_ specific _ examples _noted_by tha GOYernments_in_ Contention 7. Thun d he_ matters _act forth in__the.

1 l

l I

FEMA Recort orovide no basis to disrecard the allecations set

. forth by the Governments in Contention 7. Indeed, the Governments' soecific examoles. as set forth in subcarts A - H below. constitute a clear crima facie rebuttal of FEMA's conclusions.

The numerous examoles set forth below also reveal the cervasive nature of LILCO's inability to coerate the ENC effectivelv. In addition, thev demonstrate that any efforts to correct this deficiency will reouire extensive retrainina of ENC nersonnel and substantial review of. and modifications to.

LILCO's Plan and r7QCgdures. Indeed, aiven LILCO's failure to

. correct errors and eroblem areas reggaled durina the 1986_

exercise, it is doubtful that LILCO is even capable of correctina these oroblems.

. Exercise results which individually and collectively demonstrate these LILCO failures and fundamental flaws in the LILCO Plan, and therefore preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, include the following:

A. The organization and management of LILCO/LERO public information operations and the interface of LILCO/LERO with the media was inadequate and ineffective, and the LILCO/LERO spokespersons who presided at the news briefings were not sufficiently skilled and qualified in media relations to perform effectively. For example:

59 -

1. The Emergency News Manager announced that news

. conferences would be started at particular times, but such conferences were repeatedly not held on schedule. For example, the first, third, fourth, fifth, and seventh press briefings on Day 1 of the Exercise were each convened later than the Emergency News Manager had announced.

2. On repeated occasions, the LILCo/LERO spokespersons jousted with reporters, did not respond to reporters' requests, did not accept reporters' constructive criticisms, and did not provide clear, consistent, and accurate information. For example, at the 11:20 a.m. news briefing on Day 2 of the Exercise, in response to a reporter's complaint about the length of EDS messages, LERO's spokesperson simply

~

defended the messages, and without considering the merits of the

. complaint said the messages were "very carefully prepared" and were "what people want." LILCo's spokesperson said the format had been approved by the NRC "after litigation." At the same news briefing, a reporter complained that LILCO had failed to provide two items of information and a map that had been promised to reporters. And, at the fourth briefing on Day 1, the spokespersons did not know whether the Coast Guard had been contacted and would not address other matters related to the offsite emergency response. The LERO spokesperson did not even attend this briefing until the very end.

3. Between news conferences, LILCO did not post knowledgeable spokespersons at the ENC to maintain liaison with 1

I

I reporters and respond to their follow-up questions. Only a technical advisor was made available. in a real emergency, there would be large numbers of media representatives with varying degrees of knowledge about what was happening, and there would be constant turnover among the media representatives at the ENC.

In such circumstances, LILCo would have to make a sufficient number of knowledgeable spokespersons available to deal with the needs of both the print and electronic media. LILCo did not demonstrate the capability to do so during the Exercise.

Also, in a real emergency, news reports would be generated by countless sources and communicated to reporters at the ENC.

There would be misinformation as well as accurate information among the media corps. The failure of LILCO to provide continuing, knowledgeable information, or to offer to meet continually with the media at the ENC, would cause confusion and prevent the ENC from operating effectively. An example of the confusion caused by not posting LILCO/LERO spokespersons between news briefings during the Exercise was demonstrated following the third news briefing. After this briefing, the wind shifted, but reporters did not learn of this fact until nearly an hour later, at the fourth news briefing. Also, inconsistencias between the posted news releases, EBS messages being aired, and news briefings would cause confusion and the spread of misinformation.

B. The ENC was activated at 7:16 a.m. on Day 1 of the i

. Exercise, nearly three hours after the 4:36 a.m. report of the

(

Unusual Event and more than one-and-one-half hours after LILCO had declared an Alert. The first LILCO/LERO press conference was held at 8:15 a.m., 35 minutes after LILCO News Release No. 4 was issued reporting that a Si'a Area Emergency was declared and seven minutes after an EBS "broadcast" had declared such an emergency at 8:08 a.m. The first news briefing should have bsen held more promptly after activating the ENC. In a real emergency, reporters would converge upon the ENC within moments after learning about a Shoreham emergency. Local radio and TV stations would dispatch their crews to the ENC as early as possible, and normal broadcasts would be preompted. National TV morning news shows would include the early developments in their live coverage. In an actual emergency, if the media had to wait from 7:16 a.m. until 8:15 a.m. before LILCO held a news briefing,

. confusion, speculation, misinformation, and rumors among the media and public would have resulted. This was particularly likely because the only news release posted at the ENC before the 8:15 a.m. news conference was the out-of-date LERO Release No. 1, which announced an Alert condition, rather than the Site Area Emergency that had been in existence since 7:31 a.m.; and because at 8:08 a.m. LERO "broadcast" by EBS the declaration of a Site l

Area Emergency while reporters at the ENC had still not been informed of it.

C. While LILCO assumes that it would be able to set the l

agenda and control press briotings, this would not be the case in I

a real emergency, if LILCO personnel were to conduct themselves 62 -

=

as they did during the Exercise. Because the news releases

. lagged far behind the actual state of events during the Exercise, and because LILCO did not provide liaison with the media betwean briefings, the media would have possessed misinformation regarding what was occurring. The LILCO/LERO spokespersons therefore would have been largely forced to spend much time correcting misinformation, and would not have been in a position to focus on presenting clear and concise information.

D. LERO EBS messages were assumed to be repeated every 15 minutes during the Exercise. During the 15 minute intervening times, however, other information -- sometimes conflicting -- was being issued to the public by LILCO through news releases, press briefings, and media interviews. An actual Shoreham accident also would be the subject of live radio and TV reports,

,. interviews, and speculation among experts and laypersons aa to what was happening and tha implications of the ongoing events.

The result would be confusion and speculation caused by conflicts between the EBS messages and live radio and TV reports. LILCO did not take effective actions during the Exercise to prevent such conflicts and to assure that accurate and complete 1

information was given to the media and public; LILCO's actions instead exacerbated the problem because those actions actually contributed to the misinformation being disseminated.

E. Following the February 1986 exercise, the Board concluded that a fundamental flaw existed in LILCO's Plan because LILCO had failed to disseminate timely information to the news media at the ENC. 27 NRC at 157. An "integral part" of that

. fundamental flaw was the failure to provide EBS messages promptly to the news media, thus creating the potential for information O

broadcast by the media to conflict with "official" EBS messages.

Id. The June 1988 Exercise revealed that this fundamental flaw still exists. Once again, LILCO personnel were untimely in posting EBS messages for the news media at the ENC. Examples supporting the existence of this continuing fundamental flaw are as follows:

1. Although LILCO released EBS No. 1 declaring an Alert at 6:13 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, and the ENC was activated at 7:20 a.m. on that same day, EBS No. 1 was not posted at the ENC until 7:51 a.m., which was 20 minutes aft 9r LILCO had declared a Site Area Emergency. Thus, when posted, EBS No. 1 was

. already obsolete.

2. News Release No. 3, which contained the EBS message announcing the declaration of a General Emergency, was issued by LERO at 10:26 a.m, nearly one hour after the General Emergency was declared.

3. The ENC did not receive EBS No. 5 from the EOC until 1:52 p.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, which was after EBS No. 6 was "broadcast" at 1:40 p.m.

4. One hour and 15 minutes elapsed from the down-grading of the emergency classification to the Alert stage (at 9:30 a.m. on Day 3) until the distribution of EBS No. 15, announcing that fact, at the ENC.

5. One hour and 10 minutes elapsed between the

. "broadcast" of EBS No. 16 at 12:00 p.m. on Day 3 of the Exercise until the distribution of the message itself at the ENC at 1:10 p.m.

F. In a real emergency, thet untimeliness of LERO's EBS messages (as discussed in contention 6) would create major confusion for the media and the listening and viewing public.

For example, during the period from 6:13 a.m. to 8:07 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, when 13RO was announcing only the existence of an Alert at Shoreham, the media at the ENC would have presumably learned of LILCO News Release No. 4, which was issued at 7:40 a.m. and announced the existence of a Site Area Emergency. And, at 8:02 a.m., LILCO issued News Release No. 5, which stated that the plant "remains in a Site Area Emergency."

. Thus, news accounts emanating from the ENC during the 15-minute intervals between EBS broadcasts would have relied on the news releases and weuld have reported that a Site Area Emergency existed. In conflict with this, however, LILCO's EBS broadcasts would have been announcing every 15 minutes that only an Alert existed. Confusion, alarm and speculation would have resulted; LILCO's purported credibility would have been undermined.

i Moreover, as another example, the public was not informed of the General Emergency by EBS until 10:26 a.m., 58 minutes after the General Emergency had been declared. The public was told every 15 minutes during this 58-minute period that a Site Area Emergency -- which did not threaten offsite releases -- was the condition at Shoreham, while in fact the most severe accident classification existed. This false information would have misled the public into believing that a less serious acc.ident condition existed than actually was the case. Such false information would have undermined LILCO's credibility, bred hostility toward LILCO, and discouraged the public from following LILCO's recommendations or taking LILC0's statements at face value.

G. During the Exercise, there was inadequate and ineffective coordination between LILCO and LERO. This contributed to LILCO being unable to provide timely and accurate information to the media and public. For example, there were repeated time delays and inconsistencies among LERO news releases, LILCO news releases, ENC press briefings, and the transmission of information to LILCO's District Offices and Call Boards. Moreover, at one news briefing, no LERO representative even showed up, and the reporters' questions concerning offsite response matters could not be answered.

H. The "ENC Log" for Day 1 states, "Sirens sounded at 10:22" and "(Real sirens were sounded)". The ENC logged the "real sirens" because their attempted sounding was a part of LILCO's plan for the Exercise. Of the 89 sirens activated, only 57 actually sounded. LI LCO , however, did not disclose this fact to media representatives at the ENC. Instead, LILCO pretended that only two sirens failed and told this to the media and 4

i 1

public. This demonstrated a failure of LILCO to transmit accurate and timely information.  ;

{lpatentien 8: Rumor Control. Under LILCO's Plan, the rumor control functicn has an important role in responding to an i emergency. Absent prompt and accurate response to rumors, inconsistent and conflicting data can become public, making it difficult or impossible to convince people to comply with recommended protective actions.

According to the LILCO Plan, in an emergency the public is expected to call LILCO Customer Relations District Offices and Customer Call Boards to obtain information and ask questions.

Plan at 3.8-5; OFIP 3 8.1. The Plan providos, under the heading "Correcting Misinformation," that "LILCO personnel at these locations will be provided with updated press releases. If they cannot answer the inquiry they will call the ENC where a coordinated rumor control point will be manned by representatives from LERO and the Utility." Plan at 3.8-5.

The Exercise results, however, demonstrated thet LILCO is inca.pable of dealing with rumors or responding to inquiries from the public during an emergency. During the Exercise, LILCO employees from several LILCO District Offices and Call Boards responded to simulated inquiries from the public. As demonstrated by the examples set forth below, however, such responses demonstrated LILCO's inability to dispel rumors, to

, correct misinformation, to provido necessary and accurate information to the public, to provide such information in a

- timely manner, or to provide consistent, coordinated, and non-conflicting information to the public. Thus, LILCO failed to comply with 10 CFR 55 50.47(b)(6) and (7), and NUREG-0654 5 II.G.4. LILCo also failed to exercise good judgment in handling rumors and failed to comply with the provisions of its own Plan, or to satisfy ENC Objective 15 and DO Objective 15.

Accordingly, the this essential element of LILCO's Plan is fundamentally flawed and the Exercise results preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an accident, as required by 10 CFR 5 50.47 (a) (1) .

The untimeliness and inadequacy of LILCO's responses are of

~

particular concern because the same problems arose during the

. 1986 Shoreham exercise. While the Board found that the problems existing at that time did not rise to the level of a fundamental flaw (agg LBP-88-2, 27 NRC at 162-66), the fact that such problems continue to exist demonstrates that LILCO is incapable of: (1) correcting such problems; (2) providing timely and accurate information to dispel rumors; or (3) training its personnel to promptly and accurately respond to public inquiries.

Therefore, LILCO's continuing inability to implement effective rumor control provisions of its Plan rises to the level of a fundamental flaw. Evan_it.this defect irt LILCO '_ s Plan _kgrg, s o rre c.t@ lema n y_au ch_ efforts _W o ulLr.equir e_c xte n sire _ ret rain i n a

t of LILCO cersonnel and substantial review and revision of LILCO M

, Plan and Drocedures.

In addition, LILCO's untimeliness and inadequate responses to rumors constitute a fundamental flaw because the problems contravene the standard established by the Board in LBP-88-2, when it stated:

We agree with the Staff that Rumor Control personnel should have basic information on radiation, the plant, the EPZ, and the protective action recommandations readily at hand.

27 NRC at 164, n.43. As demonstrated below, LILCO's rumor control response did not meet this requirement, thereby demonstrating a fundamental flaw in LILCO's Plan. Indeed, in a real emeraency. the substantial delavs in handlina_and respondina to rumors would be likely to result in delavino the oublic's recelot and resconse__to PARS. The numerous examoles which follow reveal that this flay,_is_ pervasive and systemic.

FEMA baldlyJ oncluded that "ftlimely and accurate re2DQUERE yere._made by rumor-contIol Dersonnel."

FEM 1LReport at 70. The SXamDies set _fortlL_jn subparts A and. B below directiv contest this FEMA _ conclusion. In reachina its conclusigna, FEMA failed to._dcal with any of_the srecifiC_cXamples, cited __bv the GoYernmenta __Thuamthe_EEMA_Repor.t_ prs 11 des _no_ basis __ucon which the allegatirns_of Contention _B_could,_bc_ disregarded _at_this early_atagc_in the_pr.cceeding. To the_ContrarL_the_cXamDica rais e_s c rl ou s_nu c ati on s_ahout__t h e_co rre ctne ss_o f _EE Mala

! ssnclusions, l

l 69 -

I

A. During the Exercise, LILCO personnel were unable to provide prompt responses to simulated inquiries seeking information about "radiation, the plant, the EPZ, and the protective action recommendations" which the Board has previously found should be "readily at hand." 27 NRC at 164, n.43.

Instead, responses were generally delayed by more than 30 minutes, and frequently longer. In the following examples, more prompt answers could and should have been forthcoming.

1. An inquiry whether to leave a particular area was received by a Bellmore operator at 6:35 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise; a response was not relayed to the caller until 8:01 a.m.

2. An inquiry about conditions at Shoreham was

~

received at the Hewlett District Office at 6:49 a.m. on Day 1; a

. response was not relayed to the caller until 7:59 a.m.

3. An inquiry about conditions at Shoreham was received at the Huntington facility at 7:25 a.m. on Day 1; a response was not relayed to the caller until 8:00 a.m.

4. A "customer" heard fire trucks going towards the plant and inquired as to the condition of the plant; his call was recuived at the Roslyn facility at 7:34 a.m. on Day 1; a response was not relayed to the caller until 8:35 a.m.

5. A caller asked the Hicksville District Office at 8:09 a.m. on Day 1 where pets could be left once the owners left home; a response was not relayed to the caller until 9:35 a.m.

- 70

6. An inquiry from a new employee of the Shoreham

. plant about plant conditions was received by a Roslyn operator at 8:55 a.m. on Day 1; a response was not relayed to the caller until 10:11 a.m.

7. The Roslyn District Office received a call at 11:30 a.m. on Day 1 asking whether the accident at Shoreham was "another Three Mile Island"; a response was not relayed to the  ;

caller until 12:40 p.m.

8. An inquiry as to possible danger to unborn chi'.dren was received by the Port Jefferson District Office at 9:38 a.m. on Day 1; the caller did not receive an answer until 10:58 a.m.

9. The Hewlett District Office, in particular, was consistently untimely in responding to even simple inquiries.

. The LILCO Plan instructs District Office /Callboard operators to answer questions they receive if the appropriate information is available to them. If this information is not available, they are instructed to forward the question to their supervisor, who is then to send the inquiry to the ENC for an answer. OPIP 3.8.1; EPIP 4-4, 5 5.2.1. The Hewlett operators, however, failed to follow this procedure. Instead of forwarding inquiries they l

i were unable to answer promptly to the ENC, they retained the inquiries for long periods of time (often up to an hour or more),

and then answered the questions. In light of the absence of ENC involvement, there was no justification for these delays.

- 71 I

l

B. During the Exercise, rumor control personnel were unable to provide satisfactory and reasonable advice or information to simulated public inquiries. Instead, such personnel frequently provided inaccurate or insufficient information or demonstrated poor judgment in responding. For example:

1. At 7:20 a.m. on Day 1, the Riverhead District Office received a call from a customer in Zone "S" who wanted to know if she should evacuate. She was not inforned about the status of plant conditions at Shoreham, the status of the emergency or the current PAR, even though LBP-88-2 requires rumor control operators to have such information readily at hand.

Rather, she was told simply to "listen to your Emergency Broadcast Radio." The same response, again without elaboration,

. was apparently given to a 7:40 a.m. caller inquiring about the condition of the plant.

2. At 8:12 a.m. on Day 1, a Hewlett Callboard operator described the status of the plant as "Alert." A Site Area Emergency had been in effect, however, since 7:31 a.m.

3. At 10:35 a.m. on Day 1, a Hewlett Callboard operator informed a customer that travel to Brookhaven Laboratory would be safe since no radiation had been released. This advice demonstrated poor judgment. Indeed, only nine minutes earlier, LILCO had issued an EB3 message calling for evacuation of an area including Brookhaven Laboratory. Brookhaven Laboratory is

, situated very close to the Shoreham plant and thus, persons

- 72 -

_m

traveling to that facility would be closer to danger in the event

- of a possible release.

4. At 11:30 a.m. on Day 1, a Patchogue operator informed a caller that there had not been a release of radiation.

That information was plainly wrong, as a release had commenced at 11:00 a.m.

5. At 12:36 p.m. on Day 3, Port Jefferson received a call from a customer in Zone J who wanted to know why he had not heard any sirens in his area. First, the operator told h'a that Zone J was supposed to evacuate, and then told him that they would call him kAgh to give him the information he requested about the sirens. One hour later, at 1:53 p.m., the customer was inrormed that the sirens in his area would be checked at a later date. This response showed bad judgment. The caller should have

. been told to evacuate and not given the suggestion that it was safe to wait for a return telephone call one hour later.

The Babylon District Office received a call with the same inquiry at 12:40 p.m. Again, one hour later (at 1:49 p.m.), the customer was told the sirens would be checked later. This time, however, there was not even any mention of the fact that the customer should have evacuated.

Contention 9: The Public Would Reiect LILCO's Plawed EBS Messaces as a Primary Source of Information. The LILCO Plan is premised on the assumption that timely, clear, authoritative and unambiguous EBS messages will be the primary means by which the

l

. l public will be informed of an accident and given recommendations

, as to what protective actions are advisable. In Contentions 6-8 above, the bases for such an assumption are demonstrated to be false.

The facts set forth in support of the foregoing contentions also establish a further fundamental flaw in LILCO's plan. LILCO assumes, and it is an essential element of LILCO's Plan, that EBS messages will be broadcast in a timely manner and thus will constitute the primary source of emergency information to the public. The Exercise revealed that, far from being a primary source of information, LILCO's EBS messages lagged far behind -

actual events, and far behind the med).a.

For example, the Site Area Emergency was declared at the EOC at 7:33 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise. The LERO EBS message

, conveying of this information was not broadcast until 8:10 a.m.;

prior to that time, EBS No. 1, containing much different information, was LERO's official communication to the public.

The news media at the ENC, however, knew soon after 7:33 a.m.

that a Site Area Emergency had been declared. It is inevitable that the media would immediately have begun to communicate this '

information to the public -- long before EBS No. 2 was broadcast at 8: 08 a.m. -- and thus the media would have been conveying information inconsistent with the information in the official LERO communication (EBS No. 1). Therefore, contrary to the basic '

assumption of the LILCO plan, EBS No. 2 would have been issued after conflicting information (news media reports vs. EBS No. 1)

- 74

had been broadcast for some time. As a result, EBS No. 2, when  :

. issued, would have been viewed as a belated attemr by LILCO to provide information that the news media had already published.

The LERO EBS 71rply would not have been viewed as an authoritative source of information.

This same pattern existed throughout the Exercise. The LERO EBS messages were consistently slow in being issued, resulting in the media having access to and (in the real world) broadcasting information substantially before the broadcast of EBS messages.

In each case, the media's broadcasts would inevitably conflict to some degree with LERO's existing EBS message, which would still be the "current" LERO official announcement. This reflects a  ;

fundamental flaw in LILCO's Plan: the assumption that LERO EBS n.essages would be viewed as the first line, authoritative

. statement issued regarding accident matters is without basis.

Those messages would be so delayed that the public would choose to rely on the media for information. In_a real_energenCY2

_LILCO's_ inability tt;t_conygy_promptaon-cqnflictina information YQulJl.he_1iM_0111_.tD_reEM1.t in._de. lays _in_the _ pub.11e ':s rq_cei1;t of ,

and_resnonse_todARrt_ .for_the_ reasons _ set forth_in_Contcations.

g-8 abpYemthere_is_no_ba. min _to_helievs_that_LILC0_is_ capable of_

go.r rec. ting _tl_lis_flg in_its_ Elan Contention lot. Evacuation Shadow Phenomenon. In its Partial Initial Decision on Shoreham emergency planning issues, 75 -

the Licensing Board ruled with - - tc' to the evacuation shadow

. phenomenon that: '

The Board's finding on this contention strongly depends on there being clear non-conflicting notice and instructions to the public at the time of an accident.

If for any reason confused or conflicting information i was disseminated at the time of an accident the Board accepts that a large excess evacuation on Long Island could materialize.

LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644, 670 (1985). In issuing its opinion on t

the results of the February 1986 exercise, this Board accepted >

d that pronouncement as the law of the case. Finding that LILCC  !

had in fact isaued confusing and conflicting information during  ;

the exercise, this Board reaconed as follows:

That finding brings the PID's conclusion that an excess evacuation could occur into play. In such an event, a controlled evacuation, which is required by the Plan, probably could not be achieved. Thus, we conclude that a fundamental flaw was demonstrated.

, LBP-88-2, 27 NRC at 173 (footnote omitted).

As demonstrated by the Governments' contentions concerning l

LILCO's inability to convey clear, timely, accurate and concise information to the public, the media, and government "officials" l

(ate o.a., contentions 4-8) the ExeJcise confirms that a large evacuation shadow is likely to ecent in tho event of an actual I ,

l Shoreham accident. Under su(q,*1;y" glances -an essential i I

element of LILCO's Plan as exercitad, a contrg(led evacuation.

could not be achieved.- LILCO's Plan, however, does not account for such a large evacuation shadcw and LERO's ability to handle -

such conditions was not tested during the Exercise. Indeed, LERO I

assumed during the Exorcise that there was no evacuation shadow.

4 l

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Given the fset that a similar fla_w was demonstrated in the 1986 ggereise, any LILCO effort to correct this flaw, if it in

_ correctable, will reauire substantial rnvision of LILCO's Plan, and crocedures to take the evacuation shadow chenomenon into ggggggg Accordingly, the fundamental flaw found by this Board in LBP-88-2 continues to exist, clearly precluding a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be implemented in the event of a radiological emergency at cho eham, as required by 10 CFR 5 50.47 (a) (1) .

V. Contentions 11-12: Fundamental Flaws Relating to Protective Action Recomm9ndations C2ptention 11: Incestion Pathway PARG. The Exercise demonst.. rated a fundamental flaw in an essential _elsment of LILC0's Plan in that LERO failed to recommend timely and appropriate protective actions relating to the ingestion pathway.

LILCO thus demonstrated a failure to comply with 10 CFR 5 5 L3.47 (b) (6) (7) , (9), and (10), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 5 IV.F.1, and NUREG-0654, 55 II.F, G.1 and J.11. The bases for i this contention are discussed in subparts A-E below.

LILCO recommended ingestion PAF,s for the first time on Day 3 of the Exercise. FEMA found that LILCO was un imely in i'0"~ ing ingestion PARS at that time; according to FEMA, such PARS

~t- .ld havr "'en issued no later than Day 2. FEMA Report at 51.

.: c celow, however, ingestion pathway PARS should

• - i ,f-)en issued on Day 1. At any rate, LILCO's l

untimely issuance of ingsstion PARS compels a finding that LILCO failed to comply with the foregoing regulatory standards and failed to satisfy EOC Objectives 3, 4, 13, 29, 30, and 37. This fundamental flaw in LILCO's Plan precludes a finding that adequate protective measures can ano will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham, as required by 10 CFR 5 50.47 (a) (1) . Bat' ore setting lorth the specific bases for this I contention, certain background facts warrant discussion.

At approximately 7:33 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, LERO declared a Site Area Emergency, resulting in an automatic ingestion pathway PAR to place dairy animals within two miles of the Shoreham plant on stored feed. FEMA Report at 39-40; OPIP 3.6.6, 5 5.1.1.1.b. This advisory was "broadcast" to the public in EBS No. 2, at 8:08 a.m. FEMA Report at 40. The LILCO Plan

. requires the PAR for dairy animals to be increased to 10 miles in the event that a General Emergency is declared (OPIP 3.6.6, 5 5.1.1.1.c) and, accordingly, the public was "advised" of this increased ingestion PAR at 10:26 a.m. on Day 1 via EBS No. 3.

FEMA Report at 40. At the same time, LERO decided to evacuate persons from Zones A-J, 0, P, and S and to shelter persons in Zones X, L, M, N, Q, and R. Id.

On Day 1, LILCO predicted that EPA PAG 1evels for the plume EPZ would be exceeded during ti.9 "accident." !adeed, no later l than 13:11 p.m. on Day 1, when EBG No. 4 Pas issued, LILCO projected radiation doses beyond che Shoreham site boundary in

, excess of EPA PAGs requiring protactive actions. FEMA Report at 4

t

45. Such a prediction of plume EPZ doses in excess of the PAGs

. continued at least until 5:52 p.m. on Day 1, when EBS No. 7 was issued. Id.

LILCO's predictions were confirmed by actual field measurements taken on Day 1. Field monitoring data logs reveal that there were large readinge of Beta radiation taken between 5:00 p.m. and 5:35 p.m. at locations between seven and 10 miles east of the Shoreham plant. Thus, HP-270 survey instrument showed readings of 50,000 cpm with the Beta window open and 7200 cpm with the Beta window closed. These high readings indicated the strong presence of Beta radiation -- most likely iodine. At the same time, smear samples of the deposited material were chowing readings of 470 to 2100 cpm, indicating the presence of particulate deposition at each of the measurement

. locations between seven and 10 miles east of th a plant. Readings of this magnitude at 10 miles from the plant indicate that iodine and particulate contamination beyond 10 miles was almost a certainty.  ;

Furthermore, while normal seather conditions were e.ssumed during Day 1 of the Exercise, rain was assumed to have fallen between Day 1 and Day 2. FEMA Report at 30-31. This assumption regarding rain increased the likelihood of the need for ingestion PARS because rain can lead to increased levels o' surface contamination and may require protective actions at greater distan=es or increased restrictions on the food chain. Other

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assumptions also were made to increase the need for ingestion

. PARS. S.R.e FEMA Report at 30-31.

Except for the automatic ingestion pathway PARS for dairy animals referenced above, it was not until EBS No. 17 was "broadcast" on Day 3,2/ at 12 50 p.m., that LILCO issued a further ingestion pathway PAR. Wi th -these -f aebs -as -beeleg roundy the -basee -fe r -th he -eentenbien -i nel-ude -the -fel-1-ow ing t The followina numerous examnles of LILCO's inability to issue timalv and aenropriate incestion oathway PARS reveal that this defect in LILCO's Pla,n is__ pervasive and systeg}c. Even if Eggtable. _any such efforts __vould reauire extenaive retrainina of LILCO Dersonnel and substantial rgylgw and revision _of LILCO's Plan and crocedures. Moregyer. the delay 2_nated_below would. In A_rgal emeraency, delav the_public's rec _eipt of_._and resconse

, to, aDoroDriate inceation PARS.

As noted above_. FEMA agreed __that LILCQ_Wa:L untimelv in the inguarice of ingestion PARS. See_ FEMA Report at 51. FEMA cited LILCO with an_ARCA (id. at 55) _ stating _thatl he_ delay from Day 2

.to_. Day 3 in issuina ingestion _ PARS waa_apparently_due_tg a LERO

",ggngggggnt decision to have the doge assenscent staff focus on reentry ajigLrglocation issues._"._. Id. at 51. FIMA_ offers _ng.

reason 4_hoveyfr. why t hiSJroblen_. _ s t anding_alsne,_did_nat 2/ According to the FEMA Report, this PAR on Day 3 was actually, with the time leap of the scenario, anrumed to be made on June 27, 20 days after the accident started. FEMA Report at

26. However, EBS No. 17 is dated June 10, which would indicate that perhaps the time leap referenced in the FEMA Report had not l

taken place. This matter will need to be pursued in discovery, i -

80 -

constitute a fundamental flaw. Indeed, it reoresents a breakdown

. In acod iudoment, trainina and command and control to lanore necessary PAR decisionmakinc in favor of recovery measures.

Further. FEMA has not addressed at all the other bases for Contention 11. These bases underscore that LILCO's incestion pathway decisionmakina was seriousiv flawed and involved far more than the sinale error mentioned at nace 51 of the FEMA Renort.

They also directly pontest the assertion by FEMA (FEMA Reoort at_

51) that IERO's inagstion PARS "were well thought out." FEMA gives no basis for this conclusion. While CQntantion 11 orovides numerous reasons to doubt its_accuracL, In short, notwithstanding anv def.erence that might norma 11v ke alven to FEMA's views _. the Governments have set forth a strona basis for the rebuttal _ of FEMA's conclusions, regardino LILCO's

. incestion oathway PARS issued _during the Exerc.{se.n With this_h ;,: Aground the_ bases for__ Contention 11_ can now be act_forthL A. LILCO's failure to issue ingestion pathway PARS until 12:50 p.m. on Day 3 of the Exercise was untimely. Under the conditions present during the Exercise, it was incumbent upon LERO personnel to develop and issue ingestion pathway PARS to the

{ public at a much earlier time. LILCO personnel knew by approximately noon on Day 1 that at least portions of the 10-mile EPZ were predicted to have radiation levels in excess of the PAGs

. for plume exposure protective actions. FEMA Report at 45.

1 i .

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Further, actual field readings taken on Day 1 indicated Beta readings greater than 400 cpm, far beyond the plant. Under LILCO's Plan, such readings required ingestion pathway PARS to be issued, especially since the readings indicated the presence of particulates. OPIP 3.6.6, 5 5.2.2.

In addition, conditions existing on Day 2 further indicated a need to issue PARS for the ingestion EPZ. FEMA Report at 51.

Indeed, as reported in FEMA control cell documents, by the afternoon of Day 2, LERO know that there were "hot spots" and that the FDA PAGs had been exceeded 13 miles east of the plant.

Nevertheless, LILCO failed to develop any ingestion PARS on Day 1 or Day 2. Thus, it is clear that LILCo was untimely in the development and issuance of ingestion PARS, resulting in a condition whereby the public faced increased radiation riak due to the lack of PARS.

B. LILCO not only failed to develop and broadcast ingestion PARS prior to the issuance of EBS Nu. 17 at 12:50 p.m.

on Day 3 of the Exercise, but it also failed even to alert persons more than 10 miles from Shoreham of the potential for '

ingestion risks, thus demonstrating a failure to exercise the "sound judgment" (OPIP 3.6.6, 5 ) that is essential on ingestion matters. Indeed, LILCO's EBS messages conveyed i virtually no ingestion pathway concern or awareness for persons beyond 10 miles from Shoreham prior to Day 3. For example, EBS

'!o . 8, "broadcast" early on Day 2, sta ' that persons more than

, 10 miles from Shoreham have "no reason to take any action" i

P

because radiation "beyond the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone

. will be below the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's guidelines for doses requiring protective action." (Emphasis added.) EBS No. 10, issued at 11:35 a.m. on Day 2, EBS No. 10A issued at 3:35 p.m. on Day 2, and EBS Nos. 15 and 16 issued on Day 3, contained similar statements. LILCO had no basis to make such categorical assertions; indeed, data available to LILCO indicated ingestion zone PAGs had bien exceeded on Day 2. FEMA Repo*:t at 51. At a minimum, given the seriousness of the accident postulated, persons more than 10 miles from Shoreham should have been told to use caution -- e.a., washing local vegetables very carefully. And, LILCO should have corrected the erroneous and misleading statements contained in EBS messages issued throughout the Exercise. Instead, LILCO, exercising poor

. judgment and reflecting bad training, told the public beyond 10 miles from Shoreham to exercise no caution at all.

C. LILCO IBS messages improperly sought to minimize the likelihood of any ingestion hazard. For example, EBS No. 2 recommended placing animals within two miles of Shoreham on stored feed. LILCO said it was making that recommendation because it was "required" to do so by "NRC regulationb." The statement then was followed by the assertion:

This does not mean that a release of radiation has occurred. This does not mean that a release of radiation will occur.

These statements tended to understate the possible seriousness of the developing accident, to imply that LILCO was making the PAR only because of a regulation and not because of any potential health hazard, and to reflect LERO's failure to exercise sound judgment rtgarding ingention matters. OFIP 3.6.6, i 1. Similar misleading statements were contained in EBS No. 3, issued at 10:55 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, and in virtually all later

, messages (133 EBS Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, and 16).

LILCO's minimization of the potential hazard to the public continued in EBS No. 17. At that point (Day 3, 12:50 p.m.),

LILCO finally issued an ingestion PAR in response to radiation levels above the PAGs outside the 10-mile EP7. Yet, even then, .

LILCO's PAR was issued only "as a precautica," again minimizing i the potential harm to the public.

D. Despite the fact that Zones A-J, 0, P, and S had been directed to evacuate at 10:26 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, despite knowing by noon on Day 1 that portions of those zones were predicted to have radiation readings in excess of plume EPZ PAG levels, despite knowing that readings far in excess of 400 cpm had been measured within the EPZ, and despite knowing that some persons within those zones would not evacuate despite being urged to do so, LILCO never specifically advised such ,

persons to take any ingestion pathway precautions (such as care concerning drinking water, washing local vegetables, closing windows and doors, etc.), except for the advisory to place dairy animals on stored feed. Indeed, even when an inger.tlon PAR  ;

finally was issued on Day 3 (EBS No. 17), it Jas not clear

. whether it applied to those specific zones which had previously been advised to evacuate. As persons in these zones were in an

. area where exposure to radiation was likely, and particularly since the areas east of Shoreham have a high concentration of agriculture activities, it was essential that detailed ingestion advice be developed and provided to this population.

E. The LERO EOF recommended a Site Area Emergency at

! 7:31 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise and the LERO EOC accepted that recommendation at 7:33 a.m. on Day 1. FEMA Report at 39. It was not until 8:08 a.m. on Day 1, however, that the LERO EOC issued to the public the automatic protective action (OPIP 3.6.6, 5 5.1.1.1.b) to place dairy animals within two miles of shoreham on stored feed. FEMA Report at 40. LILCO thus demonstrated a fundamental flaw in its decisionmaking capability by failing to take prompt action to recommend sheltering dairy animals within

. two miles of Shoreham. Since this was an automatic protective action that should have taken no "thinking" in order to l implement it, LERO personnel should have immediately made that protective action recommendation to the public as soon as the I Site Area Emergency was declared. Similar unjustified delays were evidenced at the General Emergency level, when LILCO failed j to recommend promptly the expansion of the dairy advisory to 10 l miles, as required by OPIP 3.6.6, s 5.3.1.1.c.

J Contention 12t Plume Exoosure Pathway PARS. The Exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that LERO j

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)

l

personnel were untimely in making PARS for the plume exposure

. pathway, made inappropriate recommendations in violation of 10 CFR $ $ 50.47 (b) (6) (7) , (9) and (14) and NUREG-0654 $$ II.F, G and J.10, fai!.ed to amend emergency broadcasts containing PARS in a timely manner, and failed to satisfy EOC Objective 18. g reflected by the numerous reaulatory reauirements cited above, and the fact that the issuance of timalv and adecuate PARS was gggelfically made one of the obiectives of the Exercise, it is olain that the ability to issue elume ernosure oathway PARS is an essential element of LILCO's Plan. LILCO's continued. Dervasive and systemic failure to issue such PARS _on a timelv and_ accurate basig_durina the Exercise, demonstrates a fundamental flaw in L_I LCO ' s . Pl an . Thus, the Exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and

. will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR $ 50.47 (a) (1) .

This_ defect in LILCQ's Plan is not_readily_correg_ table. _

I Eather. any efforts _to cure this defect.Will necessarily recuire eXtenaiYe_rg,trainina of LILC0_rersonnel, and subatantial review and_reyision of LILCO's Plan and Jrgggdurei. In a real emeIQenCL_LIlCO's inability _to_ issue _tinely_and accurate PARS.

cr_to_make_ timely _ amendments _to_ PARS._would_have a_ negative e f f e c t_on_the_rublic ' s_ rec e ipt_o L_and _re sp ons e_t o ms uch PAR s .

l ror_exampledhe_. delay in the_eVACuationd.' VisoryJsubrart_A_

k elowLme ant _th at_th e r e_v e re_o nly_ab out_14_minut e s_b et w e e n "b ro adc a st " o f the_ PAR _and_the_radi ati on_r ele as e_ at_11LO D.JL, ni.

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An earlier issuance of the PAR would have increased timo for cersons to evacuate crior to the release.

The, clume ernosure PAR nroblems reflected in Contention 12 cannot be dismissed or disrecarded on the basis of any data in the FEMA Renort. For examnie, subeart A below concerns the delav in issuina the initial evacuation PAR. The FEMA Renort_naver

$ rssges whether this PAR was delaved. civen the d3ta which we u available. Thus, the Renort crovides no bania to reiegt that suboartt Eubpart B concerns LERO's erroneous school _ PAR _early on Dav 1_of_the Exerciseu._The_FI.KA Report is silent on this issue, even though_a FEMA control _lo2_demonatrates that a FEMA _ controller hglityed that LFRO cersonnel had erred. _Similarly, the errors in_ subparts C-F raise matters which FEMA ggagntially lanored in

. its_ Report _ Aggordinalv. the FEMA Recort_provides no_ basis to redect_ Contention 12 o r_a ny_o L_it s_s ubp art a_.__R at h e r . Contention 121s_subparta,_ individually _and_collectivelymnake_a_strono orima "

facle_ rebuttal _of_ff.MA's_conclusiona. requiring _ admission of the sontentioni__JSee_ ALM-90L_ slip opi_at_lL.

The bases for thi-s Contention 12. include the following:

A. On Day 1 of the Exercise, the EOF recommended at 9:34 a.m. that particular zones in the plume exposure EPZ be evacuated and that particular zones in that EPZ be sheltered.

This recommendation was received by the LERO ECC at 9:37 a.m.

Nonetheless, it was not until 10:20 a.m. that the LERO EOC decided to accept these recommendations and it was not until i

87 -

10:26 a.m. that the public was notified of these crucial

. recommandations. FEMA Report at 40. There was no justification for this delay in the critical decisionmaking process relatol to plume exposure pathway PARS. 133 Contention 5. A similar unjustified delay with respect to LILCO's declaration of a Site Area Emergency PAR also occurred. 333 Contention 5.

B. In EBS No. 1, issued at 6:13 a.m. on Day 1 at the Alert stage of the Exercise, LERO recommended that schools within the  ;

l EPZ implement their early dismissal plans. This ?AR was j untimely. ERA Contention 5. Further, this recommendation was inappropriate and issued contrary to LILCO Plan provisions. The l'

Plan provides that the canceling of schools is the appropriate recommendation to be issued at the Alert or higher classification level if schools are not in session but will be in a few hours.

. OPIP 3.6.1. Recognizing early dismissal to be an inappropriate I

PAR, a FEMA controller simulating a government "official" l informed the LERO Director of Local Response that LERO should l instead advise schools not to open. Nevertheless, LERO continued  !

to issue the early dismissal recommendation and simulated the early dismissal of EPZ schools, except the Rocky Point School e I

District. LERO even dispelled a "rumor" that children residing within five miles of the Shoreham plant should remain home, rather than attending school, by issuing a statement that schools l t

should early dismiss (implying that those students should not l 1

remain home, but instead, should travel to school and then back  ;

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,r-, , - - - - - , - - - - - - - - - - - - -------n- - - , - - - - - - - - -

home again pursuant to implementation of early dismissal). Such

. a recommendation defies logic.

By advising early dismissal rather than simply recommending schools not to open, LERO not only violated the LILCO plan provisions concerning appropriate school PARS, but also needlessly exposed school children, a segment of the population particularly sensitive to the harmful effects of radiation, to potential dose exposure. i C. Evacuation for certain zories of the 10-mile EPZ was recommended at 10:26 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise. Yet, despite knowing that some persons would choose not to evacuate and despite being urged to do so, it was not until EBS No. 10 was "broadcast," at approximately 11:35 a.m. on Day 2, that LILCo issued any PAR for persons who were in the evacuating zones who

. had decided not to evacuate. ,

D. In EBS No. 4, issued at 12:11 p.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, LERO advised persons from the evacuated zones to go to  ;

LILCO reception centers. LERO paraonnel had already determined [;

the need for these persons to report to reception centers one hour earlier, but did not promptly amend EBS No. 3 (which was -

being broadcast at the time the determination was made) to make that need known to the public. Instead, EBS No. 3 continued to  ;

be "broadcast" until 12:11 p.m. There is no justification for  !

the delay in providing this PAR to the public. In any event, EBS No. 4 was an ineffective PAR because it did not explain why [

people should go to the reception centers. EAm contention 6. f

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l E. LILCO aise was untimely in notifying evacuees of the need to avoid a road impediment in the vicinity of Sheep Pasture Road. This impediment had been reported to the EOC at 11:28 a.m. j on Day 1 of the Exercise. Notice of the impediment was not conveyed to the public until EBS No. 4, "broadcast" at 12:11 p.m.

on Day 1. Similarly, approximately one hour elapsed between the time that the EOC became aware of a traffic impediment blocking Granny Road and the time that EBS No. 5 was issued advising '

evacuees to avoid that area. Finally, the EOC was notified of an impediment at Wading River Road and Schultz Road at 12:59 p.m. 0; Day 1, but the public was not informed of this impediment until EBS No. 6 was issued at 2:40 p.m. Such untimely notification of impediments easily could have caused substantial delays in the -

evacuation of residents from affected zones, thereby increasing

. the risk of radia.a ion exposure to this population.

F. The Exercist demonstrated that LILCO is incapable of providing prompt PARS to residents of special facilities (adult homes, nursing homes, and hospitals). EBS No. 3 was issued e.t 10:26 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise. That EBS message  ;

specifically mentioned the needs of homebound individuals.

However, the message did not mention at all what protective action, if any, was recommended for residents of special facilities.

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$ VI. Contentions 13-17: Fundamental Flaws Relating to Japlementation of Protect {ye Actions Cantantion 13r Medical Cervices. The NRC's regulations J require that an emergency plan ensure that *(a)rrangements are made for medical services for contaminated injured individuals."

f

10 CFR 5 50.47 (b) (12) ; 333 also NUREG-0654 5 II.L. This requirement applies both to onsite workers and to members of the I general public who may become both contaminated and injured 3

, during a radiological emergency. Egg quard v. NRQ, 753 F.2d 1144 4

! (D.C. Cir. 1985). Zhig resuirement has been incorecrated as an emmential element of LILCO's Plan. Plan at 3.7-1 thru 3.7-2f

) E 4.2.2. _

2 The Exercise results reveal a fundamental flaw in LILCO's i e a

Plan arising from LERO's inability to handle contaminated and

. injured individuals safely and effectively. The medical drills l held at Mid-Island Hospital and Brunswick Hospital during the t

Exercise demonstrated numerous errors, incorrect procedures and inadequate training on the part of many of the medical personnel on whom LILCO relies to provide the specialized treatment which contaminated and injured individuals require.1/ Tho Exercise results thus revealed that LILCO failed to satisfy FA Objectives i

23 and 24, and that the LILCO Plan does not comply with the foregoing regulatory requirements. The existence of this i

l 2/ h-S2LS.of the medigal drills held ,durina the Exg else vas _

go limited that mt is ngt g ible to determine whether,A naryggnva nattern of errors was establ ished. Thjgt however, many arrera demonstrLted durnna the med:. cal r la which were conducted.

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l fundamental flaw precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that

, adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency, as required by 10 CFR $ 50.47 (a) (1) .  ;

Anv attemnt to correct this flaw will reauire extensive .

retrainina of hosoital corsonnel.

A g and three ARFIs were identified by FEMA in conr3ection with the medical drills. FEMA Renort c'- 100-101._

_ FEMA nrovides no discussion as to W g a more severe cateacrv --

t Deficiency -- van not aasygd. _ Based uoan the mu_1ticle errors _

h g lod. however. It must be concluded tnat in a real ggergency, iniurod, contaminated nersons von 1Lgg$entially incur gretter iniury rdue._to inadequate and delayed treatment.

m The FEMA ESJSrt_Qf.f. TIS-.DQ_Da311_tQ_.D,112.,at this eariv stage that the PRI.forrance errors __revEalgd_sigring the ExerCl20 Xere minor _or _

. 90111Y._.CQXr1Ctable. RgQe_r. thoy_rgflgtt_1gndamWntiRLerrors ghich ortcludL any findina that the in4ured. contaminated norsons EQdid_have_receiYM.A5Lggy31LQqtqtg3t &

The errors and other problems which demonstrate the P

existence of this fundamental flaw include:

l A. The only radiation safety officer ("RSO*) present at l l

l Brunswick Hospital monitored simulated patients too quickly and

• l l often held the monitoring proba too far from the patiento to  ;

i detect contamination accurately and Sffectively. The same l improper procedure was used by the RSO to monitor personnel I

leaving the emergency room. This improper technique could result l

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,: in a failure to detect, and therefore contain, contamination.

. FEMA Report at 99.

B. Contamination control also was inadequate. For instance, potentially contaminated water pooled in a plastic sheet rather than properly being drained away from the patient, thereby risking recontamination of the patient. The patient was also transferred to a clean gurney from a stretcher without first checking the patient's back and the original stretcher for contamination. During the patient exit process, a gurney was removed from the area without first being monitored. In addition, windows left open for ventilation could havn produced drafts which would have spread contamination. FEMA Report at 99.

C. LILCO did not provide for a sufficient number of RSos

. to be available at the hospitals, thus delaying the monitoring process and creating the conditions which led to the use of hurried and improper monitoring procedures. In fact, as noted in 4 subpart A above, LILCO provided only one RSO at Brunswick Hospital. This RSO was entrusted with the responsibility of conducting all staff exit procedures, in addition to monitoring

, patients, hospital staff, and the ambulance and its crew. When the sole RSO preta?*d .o 2xit the radiation emergency area of the hospital, he was improperly monitored. FEMA Report at 99.

D. Since no person assumed the role of an injured and contaminated victim, no person was transported during the LILCO medical drills, and FEMA was unable to evaluate the performance 93 -

of the ambulance crew. FEMA Report at 98. Thus, it is

. impossible to conclude that LILCO demonstrated any ability to arrange transportation of victims of radiological accidents to medical support facilities, as required by NUREG-0654 5 II . L. 4.

E. An ambulsnce driver simulating the transport of a contaminated injured individual to one of the hospitals did not know the location of the radiation emergency area entrance and, once the entrance was found, hospital personnel were not present to remove a barrier to the entrance. Accordingly, the patient's

treatment was delayed. FEMA Report at 99.

Contention 14: Schools. NRC regulations require the ability to implement protectivo actions for schools and other "special" populations. Egg 10 CFR $ 50.47 (b) (10) ; gig also,

. NUREG-0654, 5 J.10 and App. 4 at 4-3. In ALAB-900, the Appeal Board recognized that school masters constitute a major portion of LILCO's Plan, AL7B-900, slip op, at 33-16. Thus, fer exarmPhr-the pential element of LILC04g Plan provides for protective actions to be taken to safeguard the welfare of the EPZ schools' population in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham. Plan at 4.2-1; OPIPs 3.6.1, 3.6.5. The Exercise, however, revealed that the LILCO Plan, as it applies to protection of the school populations is fundamentally flawed.

Accordingly, LILCO failed tn satisfy FA objectives 2, 18, and 19 and failed to demonstrai< *

.at its Plan complies with the foregoing NRC requirements. The existence of this fundamental 94 .

flaw in LILCO's Plan for schools precludes a finding of

. reasonable assurance that adequate protective measuras can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47 (a) (1) .

1 The numerous examnles set forth below demonstrate a systemic inability to crotect the_EP2 school noeulation. It is evident that any attemnts ta correct this flaw will recuire both g h 7sive retrainina of LILCO cersonnel and substantial review and rev{gign_g1_LILCO's Ple.n and crocedures. This carticularly la_the_ camp sinee_LILCD..VAs_oD notice of the need_to demonstrate gghool_p m udness and undoubted 1v conducted numerous drills and g_ragtice_ sessions crior to the Exercise. The Exercise revealed. l gvever._.@ t thage efforts have been unsuccessful. makina it cuestionable whether these matt 3rs (with the_consible exceetion

. 21,,4)2Drart. El C,in_bf_CoIIRCtad4.

DMA acoears to be_ satis 11gd that LILCQig_pchorl, preDaredness was_dgmonstrated. FEMA Re_ port at 105-106_, 110-11.

Kovaver, many.of the orgblems set forth in Contention 14 are not ,

M eEged in.the FEMA Recort (subcarts A. B._F and G). For the 9thtISi__theIA,M_no_ indication _why FEMA. loo}dng_at the eroblems.

Aa_a_whole2_f ailed _to_ find _.the_rroblems to_be serlaus& The Governments _alleoc_that_the_rroblems set _forth_in_ Contention it 's_s ub_p arts mt ahe n_c olle ctivelydemons t r ate _that_LILCpig st.:hool_rlan _ cont ains_ multiple _ flaws, _ makino_it_lcros sible_tn conclude _ thatadequateJroteCtive__reasures_tanandaill_be._takenu 95 -

Snacific factual dianutes have thus baan created which ranuira admission of the contantion.

The bases for thke contention li include the following:

A. The LILCO Plan provides for LILCO to provide bus drivers to assist in the evacuation of the schools in a single wave. OPIP 3.6.4 at 2b-2d. Thus, after reporting to staging areau, LERO bus drivers are required to report to designated school bus companies where they are provided with assignment packets containing their school assignments, dosimeters, KI tablets, emergency worker dose record forms, emergency worker badges, bus lease receipt forms, maps describing the predesignated routes to the schools, maps describing the routes to the school relocation centers, maps describing the routes to the EWDF, and other documents. OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 14. According

. to the LILCO Plan, such assignment packets are to be stored in "LERO boxes" and either pre-positioned at the school bus companies or delivered to the bus yards by one of the LERO bus drivers at the time of the Shoreham emergency. OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 4. As a practical matter, no evacuation of school children pursuant to tha LILCO Plan can take place without the information and supplies contained in the packets.

During the Exercise, however, there were no such packets at many school bus companies and bus yards, thus preventing drivers from carrying out any school-related duties and forcing the LERO school bus drivers to return to their staging areas to await

, further instructions. In fact, it appears that the bus drivers were not rc. deployed. In the event of an actual radiological emergency at shoreham, the inability to implement an evacuation of schools, or delays in implementing an evacuation of schools, caused by the failure to make school assignments, route information and dosimetry supplies available to bus drivers, would pose a serious 1salth and safety risk to the school children within the EPZ. Under such circumstances, driv.ars could not be deployed and LILCO's Plan could not be implemented. LERO personnel exhibited no ability to deal with this unanticipated situation.

B. During the Exercise, LILCO issued an EBS message at 5:52 p.m. on Day 1 advising EPZ residents with children attending schools located outside the EPZ that children not retrieved by parents at the schools had been taken to the Nassau County

- Coliseum "under school supervision". There are, however, no Plan provisions to handle this contingency. While LILCO simulated that an estimated 11,000 students required transportation, the Plan reveals no pre-planning to assure that buses and drivers are available to provide auch transportation or that these children will be adequately supervised either while in transit or once relocated. Instead, the Plan provides only that these students are to be retained at school at the end of the day. OPIP 3.6.1 at 31a. The Exercise revealed that this is a significant aspect i

! of LILCO's Plan, but it was neither developed before the Exercise, nor implemented during it.

1 I i 1

l C. According to the Plan, LILCO bus drivers are required to drive school children out of the EPZ using pre-designated evacuation routes which apparently have been chosen by LILCO to expedite evacuation times for school children. A significant number of LILCO bus drivers, however, ignored their designated routes and decided to take other routes without prior approval and without notifying LERO of the unplanned route deviation.

FEMA Report at 111-12. While there may be instances where deviation from prescribed routes would be appropriate (for instance, to avoid a traffic impediment), failure to follow the prescribed routing scheme in most instances is likely to lead to increased evacuation times for school children, thereby heightening the threat of increased radiation doses for such children. Further, once "off course," LERO would no longer be

. able to trace the route of school buses or control or monitor traffic volumes or monitor the relationship of school evacuation routes to other evacuation routes. FEMA Report at 111.

D. During the Exercise, LERO simulated the [.rotective t ; ion of evacuation of the Rocky Point School District schools.

7 is simulation was fraught with problems. First, between 7:31 a.m. and 10:39 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, no protective action was implemented for Rocky Point students. Once underway, the simulated evacuation took almost seven hours to complete, including one-and-one-halt hours for the children to travel from the Massau County Coliseum to LILCO's Hicksville f acility. As a FEMA controller noted, this delay was excessive. Once at the Coliseum, another 50 minutes elapsed before parents were informed

, in EBS No. 7 that their children could now be retrieved. '

rurther, LILCO failed to contact or simulate contact with the Rocky Point schools to ascertain whether assistance would be needed to evacuate handicapped students, as required by OPIP ,

3.6.5, Att. 11. Untimely deployment of school bus drivers also L

needlessly delayed the evacuation of the Rocky Point schools, thereby increasing the time students attending those schools spent in the EPZ. Although school bus drivers were tc report to staging areas by 9:10 a.m., bus driver deployment was not completed until over two hours later, at 31:15 a.m. FEMA Report ,

l at 106. '

E. The Exercise revealed that not all the school buses t

which LILCO intends to use to evacuate school children are

, equipped with two-way or even AM/FM radios. Esa FEMA Report at  !

108. Without radios, LILCO bus drivers would not be able to hear  !

any notification regarding emergency conditions while en route and would be unaware of accidents or other such traffic  !

impediments, which could unnecessarily delay the evacuation of ,

the school children and lead to potentially increased radiation i doses. Moreover, should a bus deviate from its assigned route, j LERO would be unable to contact that bus and ascertain its actual location.

F. LILCO also failed to demonstrate how school children '

taken to relocation centers would be cared for or supervised.

I h

l G. In some instances, LERO bus drivers reporting to

. certain bus yards were told that no buses were available. This demonstrated that LILCO cannot rely upon the bus companies to supply buses in the event of an actual emergency at Shoreham.

H. The maps provided to school bus drivers were inaccurate. FEMA Report at 111.

Contention 15: Traffic Imoediments. The LILCO Plan nrovides that in the e3 ggt an evacuation is__ recommended. evacuees will be advised to follow cre-desicnated routes _g.ut___gf the EP2.

An essential element of LILCO's Plan is to keen traffic flowina alona those routes and to identify and remoYg_Any iroediments_

which miaht occur during__an evacuittion. See_ Plan _at 3.6-6 thru 3 . 6 - 7 t_ OPIP 3.6.3r Argendix A. Howeverm one of the fundamental i

. flaws fcund in LILCO's Plan as a result of the February 1986 exercise was LILCO's inability to respond to simulated traf fic impediments promptly or effectively. Egg LBP-88-2, 27 NRC at 97-121. Spec,'fically, LILCO's responses to the impediments were untimely, disorganized, and ill-conceived.

In the 1988 Exercise, LILCO's ability to respond to such impediments once again was testedt and, once again, LILCO failed the test. During the Exercise, LILCO "road crews" did not respond to certain impediments in a timely manner and traffic was incorrectly rerouted. fJLPA_ assessed __an _ ARCA_for_thifuieficient, D e rf orm anc e dEFA_ Rep o rt__at_BL_9Ad ovey eL_g iven lhe.

nmilarity_o Lt his_r r o blertt oa robl e ma_in ._19 BA_a nd_t h e reaft er

~

- 100 -

this eroblem should have been considered _ cart of a fundamental flaw in LILCO's ability to_ respond to_innadimenta

. LILCO's inadecuate response to the traffic impedimenta g lated durina the Exercise cannot be characterized as sinog the result of a sinale eerson's failure. See ALAB-903. slio op._

gt_2- gg, The LILCO Plan has no adeauate backun crovisions tq avoid the kinds of eroblems revealed _durina the Exercise or to correct such croblems once thev occur. Rather, such eroblems were the result of misCDmnunications, inadequacies in LILCO's trainina crocram, and_ basic flaws in LERQ'jLgonnand_and control structure. Thus, for examole, there was no indication durina thq Exercise that other members of LERO cuestioned the inadeauate anQ inaenrooriate__actionE_taken_by_the_LERQ_mersonnel who rg2RQnded to the imnedimentat Accordingly, LILCO failed to satisfy FA Objective 20, and demonstrated its lack of compliance with 10 CFR i 50.47(b) (10),

and NUREG-0654 5 II.J.10.k. The continuing existence of this fundamental flaw indicates that LILCO is incapakle_of correcting I

it. But, even if this flag _sould be carrggted, it would require  ;

extensive retrainina of LILCO cersonnel and_substantigl_rgyleg and revision _of LILCO's__ Plan and crocedures. This_ fundamental flag also precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency, as required by 10 CPR S 50.47(a) (1) .

Examples of this continuing fundamental flaw are as follows:

- 101 -

A. As was the case in the February 1986 exercise, the 1988

. Exercise demonstrated that LILCO cannot respond to impediments in a timely manner. Egg LBP-88-2, 27 NRC at 115-16. At 12:00 noon on Day 1 of the Exercise, a FEMA controller inserted a free-play message into the Exercise describing a simulated accident in which a large moving van, having struck a utility pole, was lying

, on its side on Granny Road, blocking all traffic and leaking diesel fuel. LILCO road crews reported to the wrong intersection, however, and did not reach the proper location until 1:15 p.m. -- one hour and 15 minutes after the impediment was first reported. This delay in responding to the impediment demonstrated that LILCO is still incapable of providing a reliable and prompt response to traffic impediments.

B. The 1986 exercise also demonstrated that LILCO cannot

, effectively reroute traffic away from an impediment. LBP-88-2, 27 NRC 116-18. This same problem arose again during the 1988 Exercise with respect to another impediment involving two j automobiles and a trailer carrying eight horses. A LILCO traf fic l

i guide was assigned to direct traffic away from the impediment.

J

! He failed to do so, however, and instead directed traffic l directly toward tho impediment. Egg FEMA Report at 89. This a

confirmed that LILCO continues to be unable to respond appropriately to traffic impediments and that LILCO cannot correct this fundamental flaw in its Plan.

C. LILCO was also untimely in communicating the existence of certain impediments to the public. Egg Contention 6.

- 102 -

. Contention 16 Access Control. The LILCO Plan provides that after an evacuation has been completed, personnel will be positioned around the evacuated areas to prevent access to those areas. OPIP 3.10.1 at 3. This is an essential element of LILCO's Plan which is recuired by 10 CFR E 50. 4 7 (b) (101 and NUREG-0654 4 II.J.10 and which was testad durina the Exercing oursuant to Obiective 20 of FEMA Gun 2ance Memorandum EX-3. ThdU

Exercise demonstrated however, that LILCO's Plan is fundamentally flawed because it does not provide adequate guidance as to where such personnel should be located. As a result of this defect in LILCO's Plan, it took many hours after the end of the evact :lon period to prepare and approve an access control plan. In an actual emergency, such a delay could have

. serious consequences for the public health and safety, since some people might attempt, either inadvertently or purposely, to enter evacuated (and possibly contaminated) zones. During the Exercise, the absence of pre-designated access control points also led to confusion concerning the Day 2 decision to "unshelter" the portions of the EPZ for which sheltering had been  ;

the initial protective action recommendation, in that such action without adequate control of access points to evacuated subzones posed risks to the "unsheltering" population. Egg FEMA Report at 47.

In addition, when questioned by FEMA evaluators, LERO personnel also exhibited a lack of understanding concerning who 103 -

should be allowed access to evacuated areas and what areas were

. specifically restricted. LILCo's failure to provide adequate access control demonstrates that it did not satisfy EOC objective 20 or FA objective 20, and that its Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR $ 50.47 (b) (10) . Ac:ordingly, there can be no finding that adequate protective measures can and will be implemented, as required by 10 CFR $ 50.47 (a) (1) . Even assumina that LILCO can correct this flaw, it will recuire extensive review of the LI LCO Plan and procedures, analysis of the EPZ and sub2Qne oerimeters, and additions of clans for_Drovidina agggss_ggntrol undeg different evacuation _segnarios. Thus, this_defget is_ net readily correctable.

Contention 17: Monitorina and Decontamination of Public and Emercency Workers. NRC regulations require the ability to provide monitoring and decontamination facilities for the public. 10 CFR 5 50. 47 (b) (10) ; NUREG-0654 5 II.J.12. The LILCo Plan has incQIDQrated this_ essential element _of_energellgy Diannina by oroviding prevkdes that persons from evacuated areas who may have been contaminated will be advised to report to "reception centers" for monitoring and, if necessary, decontamination. Pl an at 4. 2-1; OPIP 4. 2. 3. Likewise, NRC regulations require facilities for monitoring and decontaminating emergency workers. 10 CFR 5 50.47(b)(10); NUREG-0654 5 II.K.

For this purposo, LILCO has established an Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility ("EWDF"), to which emergency workers

- 104 -

must report following completion of their duties. Plan at 3.9-1;

. OPIP 3.9.2 at 3. The Exercise, however, revealed that LILCO is not capable of providing timely and effective monitoring and decontamination of the public or emergency workers. Rather, as set forth belos, LILCO was untimely in recommending that members of the public report to reception centers, and it employed improper monitoring and decontamination procedures. LILCO's inability to provide adequate monitoring and decontamination services is a fundamental flaw which is in violation of the foregoing NRC regulations and fails to satisfy FA objective and EWDF Objective 25. Accordingly, there can be no reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham, as required by 10 CFR $ 50.47 (a) (1) .

. As demonstrated _in the examnles below,__ errors by LILCO nersonnel were numerous _and diverse and involved _not only the communication _of_gggential information (subpart A) but also, defective ___n_erformance_of the_ simulated monitoring and decontamination functions _fgubpart B.4). This_ fact indigatta that it will recuire_ extensive _ review and revision ol_the LILCO Plan and erogedures, and substantial ritraining_of LILCO personnel _, to correct _this_ defect __if_it_in_ fact _la corregtablem IIMA's_ review _of_thesea atters_does_not_prov_ide_a_ baals tn Indect_this contentiondhe_IIFJLRerort_ doca _not_ address the Droblem reflegled in subpart A and_never_ explains _wh_v the_

- 105 -

examnlem in cubnart B do not constitute fundamental flaws.

. Indeed, taken trate that LERO's nerformance in monitorina and decontamination matters was seriousiv li g a durina the g cise.

A. As described in Contention 6 above, LILCO failed in EBS Nos. 4-6 to inform members of the evacuating public why they should report to the reception centers until the issuance of EBS No. 7, some seven-and-one-half hours after they were first advised to evacuate. Thus, LILCO failed to explain that evacuees needed to be monitored and, if necessary, decontaminated at the reception centers until EBS No. 7 was issued at 5:52 p.m. on Day

1. In an actual Shoreham emergency, the failure to inform the public of the reasons for going to the reception centers would likely lead to under-utilization of the reception centers (as in

. fact occurred during the Exercise) and to an increased likelihood that contaminated members of the public would not be dectntaminated.

B. LERO personnel failed to follow the Plan and employed incorrect monitoring and decontamination procedures and, as the FEMA Report noted, were inconsistent in their use of contamination control procedures. FEMA Report at 97. These problems existed at all of the LILCO facilities designated for monitoring and decontamination.

1. At the Roslyn reception conter, monitoring personnel touched evacuees with survey probes, thus potentially contaminating the probes. In ad.lition, LERO personnel risked

- 106 -

spreading contamination when: a potentially contaminated

, emergency worker drove a clean vehicle away from the decontamination center without first being monitored; a tag was removed from a bag of contaminated clothing and handed to a person in the "clean areat" and a monitor placed a pen on a potentially contaminated vehicle and then picked it up.

Furthermore, most of the LERO workers at Roslyn demonstrated confusion regarding how to read and record thyroid scans.

Finally, there was no female decontamination leader present at Roslyn to answer the numerous questions women had for the decontamination leader.

2. At the Hicksville reception center, workers were observed monitoring an individual in the men's clean area with

] the meter probe closed, thus risking an inaccurate reading.

)

Moreover, a woman was decontaminated by shower three times, even though her reading was "clean" after the second shower. Improper j procedures also were used when an evacuee was told to put a clean 1

foot down on a contaminated step-off pad. Finally, Hicksville l workers displayed confusion regarding proper recording procedures.

3. At the Bellmore reception center, a contaminated person was sent into the shower without being instructed in proper decontamination procedures.

4. At the EWDF, only about half of the 40 persons that FEMA observed being monitored by LERO workers were monitored within 10 seconds of the 90 second guideline set forth in OPIP

- 107 -

3.9.2 for such monitoring. Monitoring of a substantial number of

. persons exceeded the guideline by more than one minute. In 7 addition, in some instances, instrument probes were not covered i

and could have become contaminated. l VII. Contentions 18-19: Fundamental Flavs Relating to Communications Contention 18: Esuinment and Recention Failures. NRC ,

regulations require that LILCO demonstrate that provisions exist I

for prompt communications between and among emergency personnel  !

and the offsite emergency response organizations. 10 CFR l 5 50. 47 (b) (6) ; NUREG-0654 5 II.F. In an attempt to meet this requkrement7 aumential element of amaraanev niannina. LILCO hts issued radios to its field workers so that they can communicate

, with personnel managing the emergency response, and has further f installed telephones and other such communications equipment ut various facilities from which an emergency will be managed. Ema Plan, 5 3.41 OPIP 3.6.3 at 3d. The Exercise revealed that this  !

communications system is not reliable, as many LILCo personnel  !

i were unable to communicate with other personnel due to  :

malfunctioning equipment or other problems with reception or r transmission. This pattern of communications breakdowns, which  ;

Ware numerous. widesoread and nervasive. constitutes a {

fundamental flaw, as it would severely impede an adequate response by emergency personnel in the event of an actual i i

emergency at Shoreham, LILCo has therefore failed to satisfy EOC f

• i

- 108 - l f

f 1

Objective 4, FA Objective 4 and BHO Objective 4, and it has

. further failed to comply with the foregoing regulatory requirements, thus precluding a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47 (a) (1) .  ;

Eauinment nroblemm such as those noted below miaht ordinarily be viewed as dav-of-the-exercise tyne nroblems which are easily correctable. For Shoreham, however. no such findino is consible. Since the 1986 exercise and the re.gults of the trainina drills conducted after the 1986 exercise. LILCO has been on notice of the immortance of effective gommunications. The fact that so many ecuitment-related nroblenE_ arose in 1988 is l

l illustratlye_ri..the..Iailure of LILcQ_to_dayntel ecessarr attention to_the de_ tails of connunicationi u These_rroblems are I

likely correctable but_not_ easily. RatheL _the DRMeIQM1 brgakdowns in the LILc0 communications svatem_ indicate that LILeo 4

must review and revige that s_vstem exjenglyely_befpre the communications f ailureg_ revealed _by_the_Exercig e_can_be remedied u_,

Substantial trainina of LILCQ_rergonneLvilLalso_be reouiret.

t j Ihe__ fact that FEMA found_30 defiglency_ relating _to these 1

Matters is not dis _cogitivado_t_._only_didlDiA__ngt addreg g ,

t of these_.rroblens. the orchlems_it_did addresa_ vere _ looked at in isolation mrather than collectivelv1__When_ looked _at sollectively mthe_problens_ addressed _in_this_ contention. 11 e

109 -

established, would nreclude a reasonable assurance findina and o reauire a findina that LILCO's Plan is fundamentally flawed.

Examples of these communications mouinment and recention problems during the Exercise were as follows:

A. Some radios issued to traffic guides dispatched out of the Riverhead and Patchogue Staging Areas failed to operate, necessitating the delivery of replacement radios. FEMA Report at 88. Another radio used by one of the field teams also failed to operate properly. Id. at 61.

B. Between 11:00 a.m. and 11:20 a.m. on Day 1 of the Exercise, LILCO lost all radio contact with field workers in the vicinity of Port Jefferson. Heavy static afterward further

, impeded effective communications and unnecessarily delayed the 1

receipt of the first free-play message and consequently delayed the response to that message. Egg FEMA Report at 42.

C. LERO field personnel were hampered in attempting to communicate details of an impediment to the EOC because of inadequate coverage of the radio signal. Egg FEMA Report at 76.

D. Personnel arriving at the scene of another impediment were unable to notify the EOC of the impediment, although such communication was attempted three times. Ess TEMA Report at 89.

E. At times, radio traffic on the evacuation support communicatior.s frequency was so heavy that no further message traffic could be handled. This would have had the potential in a real emergency of delaying the transmission and receipt of priority messages.

- 110 -

i

F. The Exercise revealed that not all the school buses that LILCO intends to rely upon in an actual emergency are equipped with radios, thus precluding any communication with school bus drivers in those buses. FEMA Report at 108; 333 also Contention 14.

G. LILCO documents also appear to indicate that the RECS (dedicated) telephone system did not function properly in some instances.

Contention 19: Failure to Communicate Information. Igg LILCO Plan recuires LILCO cersonnel to communicate effectively amena themselves, to other non-LILCO emeraency workers. local covernments, the oublic and the. media. See e.a,. Plan. Flas.

2.2.1. and 3.4.1. The Exercise demonstrated. however, that LILCO's Plan is fundamentally flawed in that much of LERO, and personnel working in support of LERO, are unable to obtain, identify, process, communicate, and transmit essential information and data effectively, accurately, appropriately, and on a timely basis as is necessary to implement the LILCO Plan.

Examples of the repeated failures of LERO personnel in communicating emergency information and data during the Exercise are enumerated in subparts A-E below. Collectively and individually, they demonstrate LILCO's lack of compliance with 10 CFR 5 50.47 (b) (6) and NUREG-0654 i II.F, repeated violations of  !

LILCO's own procedures, and LILCO's f ailure to satisfy numerous  !

, objectives of the Exercise. These failures preclude a finding of

- 111 -

l

reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham, as required by 10 CFR i 50.47(a) (1) . The Exercise results further demonstrate that LILCO's communications defrets are not readily correctable. Indeed, the fundamental communications problems identified in the February 1986 exercise (113 27 NRC at 110-15) have not been remedied, indicatina that LI LCO is incanable of correctina those eroblems. But. even if correctable. the multiple fundamental flaws in LILCO's Plan, and the chronic nature of those flaws ggponstrate that such efforts would recuire extensive review and revision of the LILCO Plan and procedures. and extensive retraininc of LILCO ogrgonngl. The numerous ce3munications flaws revealed by the Exercise thus preclude , finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a shoreham emergency.

FEMA's findings en the Exercise _rroyidft._noj ar_to this contention. FEMA failed to review many of the eroblems and alga

_f_ ailed to_rgview LERO's communications as a whol h_eyen thouch the 1986 exercise had demonstrated a cerygglye_ communication deficiency. The_nultirle_. bases of contention.,19_Diend with EDecificity many reasons ___to belicye thal _LERO's communications ASAene_ continues _to_be_ flawed d afnissible_ contention has thereforel eenaledm Thelaseador_ contention 19 arc _asd olloWSL e

- 112 -

I i  !

1 l

l t

1 A. The Exercise demonstrated numerous problems with {

l . communications to, from and among emergency workers at the l j staging areas. For instance, many workers failed to attend ,

l briefing sessions, and when briefing sessions were attended, the

) briefings were often inadequate. Furthermore, FEMA observed that ,

j staging area personnel ignored current information broadcast over I the public address system and did not always know thw current  !

(

j Energency Classification Level. FEMA Report at 72. FEMA also i

, l

observed that one of the staging areas lacked adequate means for  ;

I i

! keeping personnel posted on current emergency conditions. Id. i I

i 4

In addition, staging area personnel neglected to transmit ls i

important information up the chain of communication to the EOC, i

l such as the fact that school bus drivers'could not be dispatched  !

l

• because of the lack of LERO assignment packets at the bus yards. [

] . Egg Contention 14. j B. EOC personnel demonstrated difficulty in communicating

important information to other emergency facilities and f 1 ,

personnel, especially with respect to their communications with the ENC which were frequently untimely and inaccurate. San l

Contentions 5-9. In a real emergency, the failure to communicate

]

) effectively with other emergency facilities and personnel would lead to an uncoordinated and confused emergency response. ,

l C. EOC personnel also demonstrated extreme difficulty in  !

processing and communicating timely, accurate, cansistent and  ;

concisa information to the public. Eta Contention 6-9.

similarly, ENC personnel failed in many respects in communicating

- 113 -

effectively with the media, Many examples are found in i

Contentions 6-7. LILCO's inability to communicate emergency information to the media and to the public effectively and in a j timely manner would likely lead, in an actual emergency, to a confused public response, thus increasing the risks of increased doses of radiation to the public.

D. EOC personnel also displayed their inability to communicate effectively with simulated government "officials."

l As set forth in Contentions 4-5. LERO communications with such i

"officials" were frequr.ntly inaccurate, confused, contradictory, disorganized and untimely. Thus, LILCO has not demonstrated the I

ability to keep such "officials" informed or to call on such government "officials" for arsistance, even assuming, for the

~

) sake of argument only, that such government officials would

~

j assist LERO and follow the LILCO Plan in the event of a Shoreham

] emergency.

j E. The Exerciso also revealed inadequate communications between the EOC and field personnel, such as field monitoring teams, traffic guides and road crews, in that EOC .irsonnel failed to provide those workers with adequate guidance. The lack of guidance was exactarbated by the issuance of inaccurete maps to several categories of workers, including school bus drivers, field monitoring teams, and route spotters. Egg FEMA Report at 65, 82, 111.

1 I

j  ;

1 4

- 114 -

i

VIII. Contention 20: Fundamental Flaws in LILCO's

,Trainina Procram The Exercise demonstrated that LILCO's Plan is fundamentally flawed in that members of LERO, as well as personnel from organizations who are relied upon by LERO, are unable to carry out the LILCO Plan effectively or accurately because of inadequate training.

Under the LILCO Plan, LILCO is responsible for the training of LERO personnel. Training began in 1983 and, since that time, has consisted of classroom instruction, tabletop sessions, drills and exercises. Plan at 5.1-1 thru 5.2-1 and Table 5.1.1; OPIP 5.1.1. LILCO requires all LILCO members of LERO to participate in its training program on an annual basis. ?lan at 5.1-1 and Table 5.1.1; OPIP 5.1.1 and .\tt. 1. Further,

. subsequent to the 1986 exerciso, LILCO conducted exter.sive additional training and drills. Thus as of the time of the Exercise, LILCO's LERO personnel had 11 aady undergone as much as i

five years of training. The_ fort 2Qin2_f acts _ItYeAl_that LILCO's

.trainina_IIQ2r/un_is_ considered an essential DRItJf its Plan.  ;

The 1986 exercise revealed many fundamental flaws in LILCO's training program which_were "significant_to the ability of LERO

_t_o__ imolemenLthe LILCC Plan d 27 NRC at 174-212. The 1988 Exercise demonstrated that these flaws have not been corrected and that, in fact, new flaws exist. In light of the large number of training deficiencies revealed during the Exercise, LILCO has  !

failed to comply with 10 CFR 5 50.47(b)(14) and (15), NUREG-0654

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5 II.N and 0, and its own Plan and procedures. These training program flaws preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency, as required by 10 CFR $ 50.47(a)(1) .

It is impossible to describe at length every instance of a LILCO training deficiency revealed during the Exercise because they are so numerous; virtually every error made by a LILCo player during the Exercise involved, to some degree, a failure of the LILCO training program to prepara personnel adequately to perform necessary actions. However, the numerous instances cited below demonstrate that the flaws in LILCO's trainino crocram are pervasive and systemic. It is accarent fron_theseaugggggg, errors, and from the fact that LILc0 has_ palled _to cure the trainina flaws found as a rgault of its 1986_ exercise, that the a . defects in LILco's trainina crocram are not readily_ccrrectable.

Assumina for the make of araument that thev are_ correctable, it would obviously reauire extensive review and revision of_JJ 3

trainina crocram to do so.

FEMA conducted no rvatematic review _of__LERQ'_s_ train! g DrQ2 ram and, hence, the FEMA Re_ cort contains_no findings _thteruin.__

Accordinalv. there is nothina in that Reogrt as_to which any deference must_bt_AffQIded.

Because etteh g errors reflecting _LILC01S_D00r_tIAlning DrQ2 rag are identified elsewhere, and to avoid needless repetition, subparts A-I below rely on cross-references to other 116 -

i contentions as much as possible to identify specific examples of

- the training deficiencies which support this contention.$/

A. The Exercise demonstrated that LERO personnel lack the necessary training to interface in a timely and effective manner with State and local government officials. LILCO's Plan requires LERO personnal to be capable of such interface. Plan at 2.2-6 thru 2.2-7; OPIP 3.1.1, Att. 10. Notwithstanding the L

requirements of LILCO's Plan, however, there were repeated <

instances during the Exercise in which LERO personnel did not keep government "officials" informed of critical events 'nd otherwise did not interface properly. Exercise events and examples which suppcrt this contention subpart are described in f Contentions 4-5.

B. The Exercise demonstrated that the LILCO training

. program has not successfully or ef fectively prepared LERO  !

personnel to respond properly, appropriately, or effectively to i unanticipated and unrehearsed situations likely to arise in an I I

emergency. Exercise actions and events which support this [

l contention subpart are described in contentions 4-0, 14-15. (

r C. The Exercise demonstrated that LILCo's training program j has been inef fective in instructing LERO personnel to follow and  ;

implement the LILCO Plan and LILCO procedures, and in imparting basic knowledge about the Plan and information essential to the ability to implement the Plan and procedures. Exercise actions 1/ References in the subparts to FEMA ARCAs are to the Table at pages 116-43 of the FEMA Report, where the ARCAs are numbered i and identified by LILCO f acility.

^

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I l

and events which support this contention subpart are described in

- Contentions 4-8, 11-12, 17, and by ths FEMA Report. Egg EOC ARCAs 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 22, 23, 25; Riverhead ARCAs 1, 2, 5,; Reception ARCA il Medical ARCA 1.

D. The Exercise demonstrated that the LILCO training program has not successfully or effectively trained LERO personnel to communicate necessary data and information, to 4

1. uire and obtain such information, or to recognize the need to do so. The Exercise results further demonstrated that LERO pa sonnel lack necessary training to communicate emergency information to the public in a timely, clear and non-confusing manner. Exercise events and examples which support this contention subpart are described in contentions 4-8, 11-12, 19, and in the FEMA Report. Esa EOC ARCAs 1, 2, and 5.

. E. The Exercise demonstrated that LILCO's training program has not successfully or effectively trained LERO personnel to exercise good judgment or to use common sense in dealing with l

situations presented during an emergency, or in implementing the LILCO Plan and procedures. Exercise events and examples which support this contention subpart are described in Contentions 4-8, 11-12, 15, 17, and in the FEMA Repcrt. Egg EOC ARCAs 1, 3; Riverhead ARCA 2.

F. The Exercise demonstrated that LILCO's training program has not successfully or effectively trained LERO personnel to ,

deal with the media or otherwise provide timely, accurate,  !

consistent and non-conflicting information to the public, through

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the media or in response to rumors, during an emergency.

- Exercise events and examples which support this contention subpart are described in Contentions 6-7.

G. The Exercise demonstrated that LERO training is deficient in the area of dosimetry, exposure control, KI, understanding of radiation terminology, and related areas. In the 1986 exercise, LILCO made errors in this area, but the Licensing Board concluded that these errors did not rise to the level of a fundamenta' flaw. Ema 27 NRC at 204-05. A different conclusion is necessary now. Similar errors have been found in the 19PB Exercise, meaning that LILCO's training, despite the problems identified i:s LBP-88-2, has been ineffective. Such training deficiencies are serious because public and non-LILCO personnel relied upon to respond to a Shoreham accident (for l . example, school officials, special facility personnel, and other individuals who are expected by LILCO to respond on an ad h22 basis) would seek information on such subjects from LERO i

personnel during a real emergency. Since LERO personnel do not understand or know how to use dosimetry equipment and are apparently unable to comprehend the procedures relating to the use of such equipment, they would be incapable of responding accurately or effectively to questions concerning those matters raised by members of the public, or other non-LERO workers expected to respond. Exercise events and examples which support this contention subpart are described in Contention 19 and in the

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{

l I

r FEMA Report. 333 EOC ARCAs 4, 6, 7, 22, 23, 25; Riverhead ARCA l

- 5; Reception ARCA is Medical ARCAs 1, and 2. [

i H. The Exercise demonstrated that LERO personnel have been [

inadequately trained to correct errors or information when new i information or data are brought to their attention. This often

]

contributed to LERO conveying inaccurate information to the public. Exercise events and examples which support this

]

j contention subpart are described in Contentions 4-8, 11-12. l I. Most non-LERO personnel who are relied upon in LILCO's 1

i

{ Plan failed to participate in the Exercise. Ho'eever, those who i 3 i did participate demonstrated a lack of training to implement the i l

Plan. Exercise events and examples which support this contention i subpart are described in Contention 13 and in the FEMA Report. i Ett EOC ARCAs 4, 6, 7, 22, 23, 25; Medicals ARCA 1, 2, and 3.

i i l Respectfully submitted, f

E. Thomas Boyle ,

Suffolk County Attorney  !

4 Building 158 North County Complex l j Veterans Memorial Highway  !

Hauppauge, New York 11788 Michael S. Miller mar #*AL

' wrenceCoe' Lanpher

(

Christopher M. McMurray (

J. Lynn Taylor  !

J Cecilia L. Norton KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART  !

i j 1800 M Street, N.W. i e South Lobby - 9th Floor  !

Washington, D.C. 20036-5891 {

l l i Attorneys for suffolk County i 1  !

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4 ,

L

A* du Abl1% /s Fabian G. Palodino/ /~'m Richard J. Zannleuter Special Counsel to the Governor -

, of the State of New York Executive Chamber, Room 229 Capitol Building Albany, New York 12224 Attorneys for Mario M. Cuomo, i Governor,,of the State of New York {

StepheryE.' Tatham

. bd E Afd /4L / \ 6 Twomey, Latham & Shea l P.O. Box 398  :

33 West Second Street l Riverhead, New York 11901  ;

t November 29, 1988 Attorney for the Town of j Southampton '

l I

i s

0

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