ML20215B142
| ML20215B142 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 12/09/1986 |
| From: | SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215B117 | List: |
| References | |
| OL-5, NUDOCS 8612120049 | |
| Download: ML20215B142 (104) | |
Text
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Aucust 1, 1986, revised as of November 24, 1986
.a n d , further revised in accordance w~.th Licensina Board instructions of December 4, 1986 IN '
EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS RELATING;?
TO THE FEBRUARY 13, 1986 EXERCISE :" k Sk r ,.:_
o zg Sp
.. :9 I. CONTENTIONS EX l-7: LILCO'S LACK OF LEGAL AUTHORITYN IS A FUNDAMENTAL FLAW hj Contentions EX 1-7. Not admitted.
II. CONTENTIONS EX 8-14: LACK OF ACTIVE GOVERNMENTAL PARTICIPATION IS A FUNDAMENTAL FLAW Contentions EX 8-14. Not admitted.
III. CONTENTIONS EX 15-19: LIMITED SCOPE OF THE EXERCISE PRECLUDES REASONABLE ASSURANCE FINDING Contentions EX 15 and EX 16: [The matters set forth in i
suboart C of EX 18 are admitted as additional alleced defici-i encies in the exercise; and the matters alleced in EX 20 are i
deemed covered by EX 15 and 16]. The scope of the February 13 exercise of the LILCO Plan was so limited that it could not and did not yield valid or. meaningful results on implementation capability as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2), in that it did
- not include demonstrations or evaluations of major portions of 1
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., .a the LILCO Plan and the emergency response capabilities of many persons and entities relied upon to implement the LILCO Plan.
The data set forth in subparts A-I, K, and M of Contention EX 15 and A-L and N of Contention EX 16 individually and collectively establish that the exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan. The exercise results do not demonstrate that the LILCO Plan could or would be implemented, and the exetcise results preclude a finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Thus, the exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan.
Specifically, several critical aspects of offsite emergency preparedness, and major substantive portions of the LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise. Neither the exercise scenario (which LILCO prepared), nor responses by players during the exercise, nor any FEMA evaluation or observation, addressed the elements identified in EX 26 A-I, K and M of emergency prepared-ness required by the referenced sections of the NRC's regulations and NUREG 0654.
The failure of each of the persons and entities identified in EX 16 A-L and N below to participate in the exercise both individually and collectively means that the exercise did not c0cply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(14) and did not demonstrate that tr.e LILCO Plan can or will be implemented, as required by 10 CFR I
$$ 50.47(a)(1) and (a)(2). Rather, the exercise results were so limited that they demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the scope of s 8 the exercise and in the implementability of the Plan and preclude a finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will'be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).
Other than LILCO and its personnel, the majority of the or-ganizations, entities, and individuals relied upon in the LILCO Plan for implementation of that Plan did not participate in the exercise. Thus, the ex'ercise did not address the willingness, availability, training, equipment, capability, or adequacy of performance of the entities and individuals identified in EX 16 A-L and N below, each of which is necessary to implement the i
portions of the LILCO Plan referenced in each subpart. The fact j that each of these entities and individuals did not participate in the exercise precludes a finding that the LILCO Plan is capable of implementation or a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
EX 15.A. (Suboarts C and D of EX 16 subsumed in this suboart; and the failure to test sirens as alleced in EX 24 will be considred as an examole of an additional omission].
Procedures for actual notification of the public and actual issuance of emergency information and protective action recommendations to the public, as set forth in OPIPs 3.3.4, 3 . 8 .' l and 3.8.2, and at pages 2.2-2 thru 2.2-2a, 3.3-4 thru 3.3-6, 3.4-6, 3.8-4, 3.8-6 and Appendix A, pages IV-2 and IV-3 of the LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise, in that sirens, the LILCO EBS system, and WALK Radio were not tested, used, demonstrated, or involved in the exercise. Thus, neither the notification capabilities of LILCO or WALK Radio personnel, nor the notification capabilities of LILCO's EBS system, were evaluated during the exercise. Such capabilities are' required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR Part 50, App. E S IV.D; NUREG 0654 SS II.E and F, and Appendix 3, and were required to be demon-i strated in the exercise. Objectives EOC 14 and 15. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
LILCO's suggestion that the conduct of a " prompt notification test" would correct this deficiency (sag letter dated June 20, 1986, from John Leonard to Harold Denton (SNRC-1269), Enclosure 1 at 4) is incorrect. Such a test, assuming one were conducted in the future, would deal with siren operability; it would not test or demonstrate the ability of LILCO's offsite response organization to integrate that single portion of an emergency response with the remaining actions necessary in an emergency, nor would it test or demonstrate that the LILCO Plan could be implemented.
EX 16.C. (This suboart subsumed in basis A of EX 15]. WALK Radio did not participate in the exercise. It is relied upon for 1 initial notification of the public of an emergency as well as for i
e- .-- . , -
r -
. s issuance to the public of protective action recommendations and other emergency information. Egg LILCO Plan at 2.2-2 thru 2.2-2a, 3.3-4 thru 3.3-6, 3.4-6, and 3.8-6; OPIP 3.3.4; OPIP 3.8.1; OPIP 3.8.2.
EX 16.D. (This suboart subsumed in basis A of EX 15]. No other radio stations participated in the exercise. Under the LILCO Plan, stations WBLI, WCTO, WGLI, WGSM, WLIM, WLIX, WLNG, WRCN, WRHD, and WRIV are relied upon to constitute LILCO's EBS system; therefore they are relied upon for initial notification of, and communication of protective action recommendations and other emergency information to, the public. Egg _LILCO Plan at 2.2-2 thru 2.2-2a; App. B.
EX 24. [Not seoaratelv admitted but failure to test sirens sill be dealt with as an additional examole of an omission under subcart A of EX 15]. EOC ARCA 7 refers to the fact that there was no activation of the siren system during the exercise. FEMA Report at 41. The siren system is the central feature of the prompt notification system in the LILCO Plan. Egg Plan at 3.3-4 thru 3.3-6 and 3.4-6; OPIP 3.3.4. Its exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding that LILCO can and will provide early notification of an emergency to the public as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E S D.3, and thus precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.
~. ___ _._ __
t EX 15.B. (Suboart B of EX 16' subsumed in-this suboart].
t i Procedures for notification of, and issuance of protective action l
I recommendations to, the members of the public in the water-portion of the plume exposure EPZ, as set forth in OPIP 3.3.4,
, and at pages 2.2-2a and 3.3-5 and Appendix A at IV-4 and IV-6 of 4
the LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise, in that the U.S.
l Coast Guard did not participate in the exercise (other than
- perhaps the receipt of one or more telephone calls) and FEMA 1
never evaluated Coast Guard performance (assuming arcuendo there was any). Such capabilities are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, S IV.D, and NUREG 0654 SS II.E and F, Appendix 3, and the exercise was supposed to (but did not) test the alleged Coast Guard commitment under the LILCO Plan to notify water-borne , traffic in the EPZ. Egg, e.a., FEMA 1
j Report at 9; objective EOC 16. The water portion of the EPZ constitutes nearly 50 percent of the physical area of the plume EPZ. The exclusion of such procedures from the exercise pre-i cludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective i
i measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emer- I i
f gency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the j LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
- EX 15.H. (Suboart B of EX 16 subsumed in this suboart].
Demonstration of the capability of implementing protective action f recommendations for the public on the waters of the plume exposure EPZ, or for transients on beaches or in parks or similar l
l areas in the EPZ, as set forth in OPIP 3.3.4, and at pages 2.2- l 2a, 3.3-4 thru 3.3-6, 3.8-1 thru 3.8-3, and Appendix A at IV-4 i
i l 4 l l- l l
j . e and IV-6 of the LILCO Plan, was excluded from the exercise. Such
> capabilities are required by 10 CFR S 10.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 SS II.J, and objectives FIELD 9 and EOC 16 required a demonstration of the ability to evacuate all or part of the 10-mile EPZ including the water portion. There in fact was no demonstration of any ability to effect an evacuation of the water portion of the EPZ. This exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
EX 16.B. (This suboart subsumed in bases B and H of EX 15].
The U.S. Coast Guard did not participate in the exercise beyond perhaps receiving phone calls. It is relied upon.for initial notification of, and communication and implementation of protective action recommendations to, members of the public in the water portion of the plume exposure EPZ, and for private and commercial vessel traffic control and access restriction on the water portion of the EPZ. See LILCO Plan at 2.2-2a, 3.3-5; OPIP 3.3.4. The water portion of the EPZ constitutes approximately 50 percent of the entire EPZ. FEMA did not observe or evaluate the Coast Guard's performance of any of these activities, including, if it occurred in fact, the dispatching of any Coast Guard vessels into the EPZ.
EX 15.C. Procedures for public education and the dissemi-nation of information to the public on a periodic basis, as set forth in OPIP 3.8.1, and at pages 3.8-1 thru 3.8-4 and Appendix A i
h e
- l at IV-3 thru -4, IV-70 of the LILCO Plan, and a demonstration of l
! the adequacy of public education materials, were excluded from the exercise. Such programs and materials are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(7), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 5 IV.D, and NUREG 0654 5 II.G. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S-50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is i
fundamentally flawed.
EX 15.D. [Suboarts H, I, and J of EX 16 subsumed in this suboart]. Procedures relating to evacuation of EPZ hospital 4
patients and patients in the Suffolk Infirmary, and a demon-l stration of the capability of implementing such an evacuation, j were excluded from the exercise. There are approximately 850
! patients in the Central Suffolk, St. Charles, and John T. Mather Hospitals and the Suffolk Infirmary (OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 2), of j which approximately 155 are designated maternity, newborn, or pediatric. Procedures to evacuate these persons and the capability and resources to implement them are required by 10 CFR
, SS 50.47(b)8) and (b)(10), and NUREG 0654 S II.J.9 and 10. Their i
exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable as-surance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
i <
[
EX 16.H. [This suboart subsumed in basis D of EX 15].
Officials from hospitals located in the EPZ -- Central Suffolk Hospital, St. Charles Hospital, John T. Mather Hospital -- and the Suffolk Infirmary did not participate in the exercise. Such officials are relied upon for determination and implementation of protective action recommendations for hospital patients. Egg App. A at IV-172; OPIP 3.6.5 S 2.0 (Note); OPIP 3.6.1 5 5.3.2.
EX 16.I. [This suboart subsumed in basis D of EX 15].
Officials and personnel from the nine nursing and adult homes located in the EPZ did not participate in the exercise. Such personnel are relied upon for implementation of protective action recommendations for the residents and patients in such hcmes.
Egg App. A at II-28 thru -29, IV-173 thru -176; OPIP 3.6.5.
EX 16.J. (This suboart subsumed in basis D of EX 15].
Officials from hospitals, nursing homes, and similar facilities outside the EPZ relied upon for relocation services and necessary health care for special facility evacuees did not participate in the exercise. The LILCO Plan fails to include agreements for such facilities which indicate an ability to provide necessary reception services, in violation of NUREG 0654 S II.J.10; instead, the Plan merely includes a list of such facilities and indicates LILCO's reliance upon them for relocation services and necessary health care for evacuees from hospitals, nursing and adult homes in the EPZ. Egg App. A at IV-166a thru -168, IV-172 thru -178; OPIP 3.6.5.
. . . - - - ._ -. . - ~ ..
1
! EX 15.E. [Suboart F of EX 16 subsumed in this suboart].
- Procedures relating to the sheltering of school children (ggg >
i OPIP 3.6.5; OPIP 3.6.1; App. A at II-19 thru -21) were excluded I Such procedures, and the resources and capa-from the exercise.
bilities necessary to implement them, are required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(8) and (b)(10), and NUREG 0654 SS II.J.9 and 10.
Officials of most of the school districts relied upon in the i
l LILCO Plan for.the implementation of the protective action of ,
0
- sheltering have stated that they do not have the resources and i
are not capable of implementing such an action during a Shoreham 1
l emergency. The exclusion of LILCO's proposed school sheltering l procedures from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency as required by 10 CFR l 5 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
EX 15.F. [Suboarts F and G of EX 16 and EX 26 subsumed in this suboart]. FEMA did not observe any demonstration of the organizational ability necessary to effect an early dismissal of I
- schools, even though such a demonstration was one of the exercise l objectives. Egg objective EOC 18; FIELD 15; FEMA Report at 38.
Under the LILCO Plan, early dismissal is one of the primary pro- ,
l i
] tective actions for school children. LILCO Plan at 3.6-7; App. A I
l at II-19 thru -21; OPIP 3.6.5. Thus, procedures relating to the early dismissal of schools and the ability to implement them are !
required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S II.J. Offici-
< . l als of most of the school districts relied upon in the LILCO Plan 1
l
for the implementation of early dismissals have stated trat they do not have the resources and are not capable of safely or effec-tively implementing an early dismissal during a Shoreham acci-dent.
FEMA's failure to observe any demonstration of the ability to implement LILCO's proposed protective action of early dismis-sal during the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be implemented in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is funda-mentally flawed.
EX 15.G.
[Suboarts F and G of EX 16, EX 26, and EX 30 subsumed in this suboart]. Procedures relating to the evacuation of school children, as set forth in OPIP 3,6.5 and in Appendix A at II-19 thru -21 of the LILCO Plan, which refer to non-existent school plans and rely upon school officials to locate and mobi-lize necescary personnel and equipment to implement an evacua-tion, were excluded from the exercise. Such procedares and the capability of implementing them are required by 10 CFJ SS 50.47(b)(8) and (b)(10), and NUREG 0654 SS II.J.9 and 10.
Officials of most of the school districts relied upon in the LILCO Plan for the implementation of school evacuations have stated that they do not have the resources and are not capable of safely or effectively implementing an evacuation of schcol children during a Shoreham accident.
And, the one free play message in the exercise purportedly involving simulated evacuation assistance for the Ridge Elementary School did not even purport to demonstrate the resources or capabilities of
- 11 -
! officials of that school or.of the Longwood School District to implement an evacuation, and thus failed to demonstrate the 4
resources or capabilities necessary to implement the proposed procedure for evacuation of school children set forth in the LILCO Plan. The exclusion of such procedures from the exercise i precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate pro-tective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham i
accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1), and precludes any finding that objectives EOC 20 and FIELD 16 were met. According-ly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
EX 16.F. (This suboart subsumed in bases E, F, and G of EX 15]. Other than one or two persons from the Shoreham-Wading River School District, school officials and personnel, including teachers, from the two parochial schools, 13 nursery schools, and 33 public schools located in the EPZ, as well as those from the seven school districts outside the EPZ but with children who reside within the EPZ, did not participate in the exercise.
Personnel from such schools are relied upon for implementation of protective action recommendations for school children under the LILCO Plan. Eeg App. A at II-19 thru -21, IV-169 thru -171; OPIP 3.6.5.
EX 26. (Not separately admitted but will be dealt with under suboarts F and G of EX 15]. EOC ARCA 9 refers to the fact '
that only Shoreham-Wading River Central School District partici-f pated in the exercise. FEMA Report at 41. According to the 1
l LILCO Plan, all protective actions for school children are to be
! implemented by school district and school personnel, not by 12 -
_________________.________s.
LILCO. OPIP 3.6.5; App. A at II-19 thru -21. There are 33 public schools, 15 private and nursery schools, and one BOCES supervisory district within the EPZ; in addition, there are seven school districts outside the EPZ with children who reside within the EPZ, plus three private schools and one BOCES supervisory district with buildings located just beyond the EPZ. App. A at II-19 thru -21 and IV-169 thru -171. The LILCO Plan relies upon these school officials and personnel, and their failure to participate in the exercise constitutes a deficiency which precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken for school children in the event of a Shoreham accident.
EX 30. [Not separately admitted but will be dealt with un-der suboart G of EX 15]. Patchogue SA ARCA 5 refers to the fact that it took 40 minutes to dispatch a LILCO bus driver to pick up a bus to use to simulate the evacuation of 40 children from the Ridge Elementary School. FEMA Report at 67. Under the LILCO Plan, such procedures, involving the use of LILCO bus drivers for evacuation, are relied upon for evacuation of special facilities and nursery schools (OPIP 3.6.5), although with respect to all other schools including Ridge, LILCO assumes that regular school bus drivers would perform necessary driving duties. This defi-ciency demonstrates LILCO's inability to promptly communicate transportation needs of members of the public and to effectively implement procedures to effect evacuation of special facilities.
Thus, it precludes a finding that LILCO has adequate provisions for prompt communication among response personnel as required by
10 CFR S 50.47 (b)(6), or that the protective action of evacua-tion can and will be implemented as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10). It also precludes a finding of reasonable assur-ance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.
EX 16.G. (This suboart subsumed in bases F and G of EX 15].
Other than two drivers from the Shoreham-Wading River School District, school bus drivers did not participate in the exercise.
School bus drivers from 10 school districts, as well as from numerous private and nursery schools, are relied upon for imple-mentation of the protective actions for school children of early dismissal and evacuation. See LILCO Plan, App. A at II-19 thru
-20; OPIP 3.6.5.
EX 15 I. [Suboart A of EX 16 and EX 37 subsumed in this subcart]. Procedures for determining, issuing, and implementing protective action recommendations for the ingestion pathway EPZ (aside from the single recommendation that dairy animals be placed on stored feed), as set forth in OPIP 3.6.6 and at pages 3.6-1 thru 3.6-4 and 3.6-7a thru 3.6-8a of the LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise in that the State of Connecticut did not participate in the exercise and LILCO did not implement such procedures even for the portion of the ingestion pathway EPZ located in the State of New York. Such capabilities are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, S IV.F, and NUREG 0654 S II.J, and by objectives EOC 9, 12. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
EX 16.A. (This suboart subsumed in basis I of EX 15]. The State of Connecticut did not participate in the exercise beyond perhaps receiving a phone call from a LILCO " player" at approxi-mately 10:30. Connecticut is relied upon for issuance and imple-mentation of protective actions for the portion of the ingestion 1
pathway EPZ located within its borders. 2 See LILCO Plan at 3.6 8; OPIP 3.6.6.
EX 37. [Not separately admitted but incorcorated into subcart I of EX 15]. The exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that the LERO players did not determine, recommend or implement the protective actions necessary to mitigate the consequences of the radiological release in the in-gestion pathway, as required by OPIP 3.6.6, 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S II.J.ll. For the reasons set forth below, LILCO failed to satisfy objectives EOC 8 and 12 and the exercise results preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).
Specifically, during the exercise the LERO personnel at the EOC failed to perform any of the following actions:
EX 37.A. LERO personnel failed to extend protective action recommendations for the ingestion pathway beyond the 10-mile EPZ and thus failed to mitigate the radiological consequences of the accident, as required by OPIP 3.6.6., SS 1, 2 and 5. According t
to OPIP 3.6.6., when a Site Area Emergency is declared, it is to be immediately recommended that rtilk producing animals in those zones within two miles of the plz.nt be placed on stored feed.
OPIP 3.6.6, S 5.1.1.1.b. During the exercise, LERO made this recommendation for zones A-E at 8:19 when the Site Area Emergency was announced. At that time, there had not yet been a signifi-cant release and no protective actions had yet been recommended for people (except for the dismissal of school children).
Pursuant to OPIP 3.6.6 5 5.1.1.1.c, at 10:24, when a General Emergency was declared, LERO expanded its earlier recommendation to include milk-producing animals in the entire 10-mile EPZ. At that time, LERO was recommending evacuation of the public from only zones A-M, Q and R. However, when LERO's evacuation recommendation was expanded to cover the entire 10-mile zone, well after there had been a substantial release, and there ware projections of substantial doses out to the 10-mile boundary, there was rio further expansion of the recommendation to shelter milk-producing animals outside the EPZ boundary and place them on stored feed. Documents generated at the EOC fail to indicate that such a recommendation was ever even considered. This failure violates OPIP 3.6.6 5 5.1.1.1.a, which expressly provides:
In the early stages of an emergency, the milk pathway is the most significant. Thus, early protective actions for preventing contamina-tion of milk in the affected area are recom-mended prior to obtaining confirmatory data.
s-t LILCO's failure even to consider whether to expand its recom-i mended protective measures to include the milk pathway beyond the 10-mile EPZ demonstrates LILCO's noncompliance w'ith 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0664 5 II.J.ll.
EX 37.B. LERO personnel never recommended any protective measures for other than dairy animals, such as, for example, pigs, lambs, commercially grown ducks, turkeys, and other poul-try, either inside or outside the EPZ, and thus failed to miti-gate the radiological consequences of the accident as required by OPIP 3.6.6. In light of the releases projected during the exer-cise, such animals could have become contaminated. There is no indication that LERO personnel even considered the need for protective measures to cover these elements of the food chain.
The failure to consider and to make protective action recommen-dations for non-dairy animals constitutes noncompliance with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S II.J.ll.
EX 37.C. LERO personnel failed to make protective action recommendations concerning drinking water, fruits, vegetables and other food chain items, contrary to OPIP 3.6.6, S 5.4.3.1. That OPIP provides that if (1) a release is in progress and (2) off-site dose projections have been completed, the public should be advised that such items may be contaminated. During the exer-cise, there was an early release (at approximately 8:30), fol-lowed by a larger release when the core melt began (at approxi-mately 11:30). Dose projections were available by 11:49.
However, LILCO never warned the public of possible food chain
f contamination, even though the LILCO players were told that approximately 18 percent of the public had not yet evacuated from the 10-mile EPZ by 2:40.
4 l EX 37.D. During the exercise, LERO personnel apparently never completed the " Ground Deposition Calculation Worksheet for l
I Particulate Radionuclide Releases," OPIP 3.5.2, Att. 3, although the necessary data were apparently available and completion of i
j such a form is required by OPIP 3.5.2, S 5.3, and OPIP 3.6.6.
1 For the foregoing reasons, the exercise precludes a finding 4
that the LILCO Plan complies with 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S II.J.ll, and precludes a finding of reasonable .
] assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.
EX 15.J. Not admitted.
EX 15.K. Procedures relating to the radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees from special facilities who, ac-cording to the LILCO Plan, are to be evacuated to special recep-tion centers, were excluded from the exercise. Such procedures,
, and the resources and capabilities necessary to implement them, are required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(8), (b)(10); NUREG 0654 S II.J.9 and 10 and objective FIELD 21. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that
- adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event
- of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).
Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed. ;
l l
l i
]
EX 15.M. Procedures relating to recovery and re-entry and activities to implement recovery and re-entry, as set forth in OPIP 3.10.1 and at pages 3.10-1 thru 3.10-2 of the LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise. Such capabilities are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(13), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E S IV.H, and NUREG 0654 S II.M. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as 1
required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
1 EX 16.E. According to FEMA, Marketing Evaluations, Inc. did
- not participate in the exercise. FEMA Report at iii. It is relied upon for verification of siren operation and evacuation.
Sgg LILCO Plan at 2.2-4g, App. A at V-9, and App. B; OPIP 3.3.4.
EX 16.K. The following bus companies or yards did not participate in the exercise:
(1) Baumann & Sons Buses, Inc. -- East Northport Yard (50)
(2) Baumann & Sons Buses, Inc. -- Amityville Yard (74) l (3) Huntington Coach Corp. (100)
(4) Herman E. Swezey Co., Inc. (29)
(5) United Bus Corp. ---Ronkonkoma Yard (46)
(6) Suffolk Transportation Service, Inc. --
Lakeland Yard (40)
(7) Suffolk Transportation Service, Inc. --
Bayshore Yard (147) 4
- --. - .e- ,- - . . - r- 3 .-. y
(8) Coram Bus Service -- Coram Yard (39)
(9) Coram Bus Service -- Rocky Point Yard (27)
(10) Louis A. Fuoco Buslines, Inc. (39)
(11) Starlite Bus Co., Inc. (60) !
(12) Seaman Bus Co, Inc. (35)
They are relied upon for implementation of the protective action of evacuation in that the LILCO Plan assumes that each listed entity would provide for LILCO's use the number of busijs indi-cated in parentheses above. Egg LILCO Plan, App. B.; OPIP 3.6.4.
EX 16.L. The following ambulance companies did not partici-l pate in the exercise:
(1) Bi-County Ambulance and Ambulette (8)
(2) Gosline Ambulance Service (5)
(3) Mercy Medical Transportation Service (7)
(4) Nassau Ambulance Service (11)
(5) New York Patient Aids, Inc. (18)
(6) Orlando Ambulance and Ambulette Service, Inc.
(6)
- (7) Peconic Ambulance Service, Inc. (10)
(8) Transportation With Care (9)
(9) Weir Metro AmbuService, Inc. (62)
They are relied upon for implementation of the protective action of evacuation in that the LILCO Plan assumes that each company will provide the number of ambulance and ambulette vehicles, manned with the necessary personnel, indicated in parentheses in the above list. Sgg LILCO Plan, App. B.; OPIP 3.6.5.
i
EX 16.M. Not admitted EX 18.C. (Admitted ag_further deficiencies in succort of' EX 15 and 16]. The exercise did not ensure that emergency organization personnel are familiar with their duties. As described below and in Contention EX 16, the organizations and a
a personnel listed in Contention EX 16 did not participate in the exercise and the participation of certain other organizations was so limited that the exercise did not ensure that the personnel of '
such organizations, relied upon for implementation of the LILCO Plan, are familiar with their duties. Specifically:
(i) The " participation" of the following bus companies or yards in the exercise consisted merely of receiving a tele-phone call and a request that only four buses be prepared for LILCO's use (the LILCO Plan assumes each yard actually will pro-vide the number of buses listed in parentheses):
(a) Bruno Bus Company (30)
(b) Educational Bus Transportation, Inc. (100)
(c) Suburbia Bus Corp. -- Setanket Yard (80)
(d) Suburbia Bus Corp. -- Middle Island Yard (110)
(e) United Bus Corp. -- Yaphank Yard (64)
(f) United Bus Corp. -- Coram Yard (90)
(g) Baumann & Sons Buses, Inc. -- Westhampton '
Yard (5)
(h) Baumann & Sons Buses, Inc. -- Bohemia. Yard (90)
(ii) The " participation" of the !!edibus, Inc. and Stat
! Equipment Corp. ambulance companies consisted only of providing l 12 vehicles.(six ambulances and six ambulettes). Those companies
- are relied upon in the LILCO Plan, however, for 11 ambulances and j 45 ambulettes, all 57 of which are supposed to be properly manned .
I by trained workers. LILCO Plan, App. B; OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 6.
(iii) The only " participation" by the Nassau County Red Cross in the exercise was the presence of two individuals in the EOC and perhaps a small number at the Nassau Coliseum. The LILCO Plan assumes that the Nassau Red Cross will provide personnel at the reception center to identify congregate care centers, to assign evacuees to such centers, to open and operate as many congregate care centers as are necessary to handle the total number of evacuees, and to provide shelter management, food i services, clothing, registration, information, nursing, medical services, and counseling. LILCO Plan at-2.2-2, 3.6-7, and 3.6-t 7a.
(iv) The only " participation" of~the U.S. Coast Guard in the exercise was to engage in telephone conversations. No actions were taken by the Coast Guard to implement or to 7
demonstrate the capability of implementing the LILCO Plan, :
despite the fact that the LILCO Plan relies upon the Coast Guard for notification of, and communication of protective action
. recommendations to, the public on the waters of the EPZ as well
.,_.n.,.-,,,-- . - , , . - - - - - , - - - , - - - . - . -..-,-.-n. . , . . ,
- . - . - - - . . . . - . - . - - . . - . . - . , , ,- .n. -
- as private and commercial vessel traffic control and access control on the water portion of the EPZ. LILCO Plan at 2.2-2a; App. A at IV-6.
(v) The " participation" of the Shoreham-Wading River School District in the exercise was limited to one or two telephone calls to one school official (the District Superin-tendent), and interviews with two school bus drivers located at one of the district's schools. No early dismissal, sheltering or evacuation was performed; no children were moved or otherwise involved; no teachers, principals, or other school personnel were involved; and, the two bus drivers did nothing but drive their i
buses to the high school when requested to do so by the Superin- s tendent. The LILCO Plan, however, relies upon actions by school officials and school personnel from all the district's schools, and substantially all the school bus drivers, and the cooperation of parents, to implement an early dismissal, sheltering, or evacuation of school children. OPIP 3.6.5; App. A at II-19 thru
-22.
(vi) The " participation" of Nassau County in the exercise was limited to the receipt of phone calls. According to the LILCO Plan, however, Nassau County is expected to receive regular briefings (OPIP 3.1.1, Att. 1 at 10), and tc provide police officers to perform traffic control on the public roads near the Nassau Coliseum, to perform traffic control and supervise parking at the Coliseum (OPIP 4.2.3 5 2.5), and to provide security at the Coliseum. Plan at 3.6-7, 4.7-1. In
addition, during the exercise, LERO personnel pretended to request that Nassau County provide social service assistance. In the exercise, Nassau County performed none of these functions.
Contention EX 17. Withdrawn.
Contention EX 18.A. & B. Not admitted.
Contention EX 19. [ Admitted for lecal arcument]. The exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan resulting from FEMA's inability to make a reasonable assurance finding in LILCO's favor regarding the implementability of the LILCO Plan. FEMA stated in advance of the exercise that it would not be able to make a favorable reasonable assurance finding based on the exercise results. See, e.g., Letter from Samuel W.
Speck, FEMA, to William J. Dircks, NRC, October 29, 1985. After the exercise, FEMA reiterated this point. Sgg, e.c., FEMA Report at ix. In fact, however, FEMA's former Region II Director, Frank Petrone, stated on February 15, 1986, that a "no reasonable assurance" finding was necessary: "Since this Plan cannot be !
implemented without state and local government participation, we
[ FEMA] cannot give reasonable assurance under NUREG 0654 that the public health and safety can be protected." !
l The NRC's regulations require, as a prerequisite to licensing, that the NRC have and review FEMA " findings and determinations as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate and whether there is reasonable assurance that they can be imolemented . . . ." 10 CFR 550.47(a)(2) (emphasis added).
The exercise results were so limited that FEMA was unable to make the required reasonable assurance finding. Accordingly, the exercise confirmed a fundamental flaw in LILCO's Plan, i.e., that l
the Plan, as exercised, cannot provide a basis for a FEMA reasonable assurance finding. Thus, the exercise precludes the NRC from finding reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham
,1 accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).
IV. CONTENTIONS EX 20-22: FEMA'S CONCLUSIONS PRECLUDE A REASONABLE ASSURANCE FINDING Contention EX 20. Not admitted.
Contention EX 21. (Suboart L of EX 15, suboart N of EX 16, suboart K of EX 22, and EX 32 constitute an additional basis of EX 21 relatina to concrecate care centers]. FEMA had no basis or insufficient data to support its conclusion that certain exercise objectives identified in subparts A-F below were met or were partly met during the exercise in that even with respect to the events and activities which FEMA did observe, the samples which' FEMA reviewed were much too small to permit valid generalizations or to support FEMA's conclusions concerning these objectives.
Therefore, FEMA's conclusions on such objectives cannot support a finding of reasonable assurance that the LILCO Plan can and will be implemented as required by 10 CFR _ 0.47(a)(2). Thus, the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that
s adequate protective measures can and will be taken in a Shoreham accident as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). The LILCO Plan is, i therefore, fundamentally flawed.
2 EX 21.A. Under the LILCO Plan, 60 Route Alert Drivers are expected to be available to drive through the EPZ to notify the public of an emergency in the event of siren failure. Egg Plan, l Fig. 2.1.1; OPIP 3.3.4, Att. 1. Specifically, a total of 20
.i Route Alert Drivers are to be available at each of the Port 4
Jefferson, Patchogue and Riverhead Staging Areas to drive 33, 26 l and 30 routes, respectively. See Plan, Fig. 2.1.1; OPIP 3.3.4, Att. 3. During the exercise, however, only three Route Alert Drivers (one from each Staging Area) were dispatched by LILCO and observed by ?EMA. FEMA Report at 57, 64 and 74; sgg also FEMA Report at 20. Based solely on these observations, FEMA concluded that objectives FIELD 5, SA 9, and EOC 15 were met or partly met. FEMA Report at 34, 56, 57, 62, 64, 72 and 74. The sample upon which FEMA based these conclusions was much too small to justify FEMA's generalizations with respect to all Route Alert j Drivers, or LILCO's ability to notify the public in the entire i
EPZ.
Furthermore, even with respect to the small sample observed by FEMA, FEMA found that the time necessary to brief, deploy, and drive even one route (i.e., assuming only one failed siren for each Staging Area) was excessive. FEMA Report at 57, 64 and 74.
In light of the small sample reviewed by FEMA and its conclusions !
even with respect to the three Route Alert Drivers it did observe, FEMA's conclusions with respect to objectives FIELD 5, l
1 1
SA 9, and EOC 15 are without basis and invalid. The exercise results concerning those objectives preclude a finding of ,
reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.
EX 21.B. According to the LlLCO Plan, evacuation of the transit-dependent population requires 333 LILCO bus drivers to retrieve 333 buses from 20 bus company locations, and to make 377 bus trips (using 236 buses) over 43 separate routes within the l EPZ, plus 97 trips to the Nassau Coliseum. Eeg OPIP 3. 6.4 ; App.
A at IV-74a thru -165d. According to the Plan, 108 bus drivers are required to make 169 bus trips from the two transfer points under the jurisdiction of the Port Jefferson Staging Area, 100 bus drivers are required to make 139 bus trips from the five transfer points under the jurisdiction of the Riverhead Staging Area, and 125 bus drivers are required to make 166 bus trips from the four transfer points under the jurisdiction of the Patchogue Staging Area. See OPIP 3.6.4, Att. 11; cf. Plan, Fig. 2.1.1.
During the exercise, FEMA observed only two bus drivers from each of the Riverhead and Port Jefferson Staging Areas. FEMA Report at 58, 74. After retrieving a bus from the assigned bus company yard, they each drove one EPZ route, then returned to their assigned transfer point and proceeded to the Nassau Coliseum. Based solely on its observation of two bus drivers making one run each, FEMA concluded that objective FIELD 9 was met by the Port Jefferson and Riverhead Staging Areas. FEMA Report at 58 and 74. In addition, FEMA observed four bus drivers i from the Patchogue Staging Area attempt to retrieve buses and
drive bus routes. FEMA Report at 64-65. FEMA concluded, on the basis of those drivers' inability to pick up buses or to drive routes properly or in a timely manner, that objective FIELD 9 was not met at the Patchogue Staging Area. Id. Nonetheless, based upon its observations of eight drivers making a total of eight bus runs, at least three of which were judged unsatisfactory by FEMA, FEMA concluded that objective EOC 16 was met. FEMA Report at 34.
! In light of the small sampling of bus drivers reviewed by FEMA, and FEMA's conclusions regarding the entire sample of bus
- drivers reviewed at the Patchogue Staging Area, FEMA's conclu-l l sions as to objective FIELD 9 for Port Jefferson and Riverhead, and as to EOC 16 for the entire EPZ, are without basis and invalid, and fail to justify FEMA's generalizations about all
- LILCO bus drivers under the LILCO Plan. The exercise results concerning those objectives thus preclude a finding of reasonable t
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.
EX 21.C. Eleven school districts (with 33 schools), one BOCES supervisory district, two parochial schools, and 13 nursery schools have school buildings located within the EPZ. In addi-tion, there are seven school districts with no school buildings within the EPZ but whose district boundaries include residences within the EPZ (i.e., with children who live in the EPZ); and, [
there are three parochial schools and one BOCES supervisory dis-trict with buildings located just beyond the EPZ boundary. See OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 3; cf. App. A at IV-169 thru -171. During the
exercise, FEMA observed two buses report to one school (Shoreham-Wading River High School), where two bus drivers allegedly re-ceived maps and instructions. FEMA Report at 43. FEMA was not able to observe the organizational ability to effect an early dismissal of schools, however. FEMA Report at 38. FEMA also observed one bus, driven by a LILCO employee, arrive at the Ridge Elementary School (almost three hours after it had been "re-quested" in a free play message). FEMA Report at 38.
Neither of the two Shoreham-Wading River buses observed by FEMA drove any early dismissal or evacuation routes or transported any children, nor had either of the bus drivers received any training or information concerning any plans for protecting or evacuating school children in the event of a Shoreham emergency. See FEMA Report at 44-45. The free play message " requesting" a bus to Ridge Elementary School was injected by FEMA at 10:30; however a bus driver was not dis-patched to pick up a bus until 40 minutes after the request was received by the Patchague Staging Area. FEMA Report at 66. The bus did not arrive at the school until 1:23 (FEMA Report at 3d) and, according to LILCO, even as late as 4:23, it had not arrived at the Reception Center. The bus did not transport any children, and neither the driver, the FEMA evaluator, nor any other exercise player, had any cc7 tact with any officials from the Ridge School or the Longwood School District. The FEMA evaluator i
merely observed the bus arrive at and leave the school.
Based solely upon these observations, however, and despite FEMA's acknowledged failure to observe LILCO's ability to effect an early dismissal, and the irrelevance of the situation postulated in the Ridge School free play message to the evacua-
-tion procedures in the LILCO Plan (sge Contention EX 20.G), FEMA nonetheless concluded that objectives FIELD 15 and 16 and EOC 20 were met. FEMA Report at 38, 43.
4' The limited observations and irrelevant sample upon which U
FEMA based these conclusions do not justify FEMA's generalization about the ability to evacuate all schools, school districts, and i school children in the EPZ and the ability to accomplish an early dismissal of all such schools, districts and children in the event of a Shoreham emergency. In light of FEMA's limited observation, the irrelevance of the Ridge School free play message, and the size of the sample reviewed by FEMA, FEMA's conclusions as to objectives FIELD 15 and 16 and EOC 20 are without basis and invalid. The exercise results concerning those objectives preclude a finding of' reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.
EX 21.D. According to the LILCO Plan, evacuation of the institutionalized, mobility-impaired population in the EPZ (excluding residents at facilities which LILCO assumes would not require transportation assistance and those in the three hospitals and the Suffolk Infirmary (cf. App. A at IV-175 and OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 2)) requires 23 ambulances and 178 ambulettes i
] from 11 ambulance companies to make runs-from the approximately
10 special facilities in the EPZ requiring transportation assistance from LILCO (there are, altogether, 19 health care facilities, excluding hospitals, at 23 locations throughout the EPZ) to unidentified reception centers outside the EPZ. See OPIP 3.6.5; App. A at IV-166a thru -168, IV-173 thru -178.
During the exercise, FEMA observed only one ambulance driver and one ambulette driver each drive one route. Based solely on its observation of these two activities, FEMA concluded that objective FIELD 13 was met. FEMA Report at 43. The sample upon which FEMA based this conclusion was much too small to justify FEMA's generalization about all ambulance and ambulette drivats and LILCO's ability to evacuate institutionalized, mobility-impaired individuals from all the special facilities located in ,
the EPZ. In addition, based upon its observation of two drivers, FEMA concluded that objective EOC 16 was met with respect to all the institutionalized, mobility-impaired residents of the EPZ.
FEMA Report at 34. In light of the size of the sample reviewed by FEMA, FEMA's conclusions as to objectives FIELD 13 and EOC 16 are without basis and invalid. The exercise results concerning those objectives preclude a finding of reasonable assurancq that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event i
of a Shoreham accident.
EX 21.E. Under the LILCO Plan, 165 Traffic Guides are expected to man 130 traffic control points (TCPs) in order to j implement an evacuation of the EPZ. OPIP 3.6.3, Att. 4. More specifically, 72 Traffic Guides f rom the Port Jef ferson Stagi,ng Area are expected to man 58 TCPs; 41 Guides from the Patchogue
N Staging Area are expected to man 28 TCPs; and 52 Guides from the Riverhead Staging Area are expected to man 44 TCPs. LILCO Plan, ,
4 Fig. 2.1.1; OPIP 3.6.3, Att. 4. During the exercise, however, FEMA apparently only observed a total of 27 TCPs manned by 32 Guides (10 TCPs with 10 Guides from Port Jefferson; nine TCPs 4 with 14 Guides from Patchogue; and eight TCPs with eight Guides ;
from Riverhead). Egg FEMA Report at 57, 64 and 74. Based solely on these observations,. FEMA concluded that objectives FIELD 6 and 11, SA 9, and EOC 16 and 19 were met or partly met. FEMA Report at 34, 38, 56, 57, 62, 64, 65, 72, 74 and 75. The sample upon which FEMA based these conclusions was much too small, ,
however, to justify FEMA's generalizations with respect to all ;
Traffic Guides, all TCPs, and evacuation and access control of d
the entire EPZ.
Furthermore, even with respect to the small sample observed by FEMA, FEMA found (i) that the time between deployment from the staging area and arrival at TCPs was excessive -- i.e., two hours
! after declaration of a general emergency and well over an hour after the first evacuation recommendation -- for the eight TCPs from the Riverhead Staging Area (FEMA Report at 74); (ii) that only one out of the 14 Guides interviewed from the Patchogue Staging Area knew the location of the Reception Center-(FEMA Report at 64); and, (iii) that communications between-the Port Jefferson Staging Area and Traffic Guides was sometimes difficult due to poor radio reception (FEMA Report at 56). In addition, 4
FEMA acknowledged that it was unable to. render any evaluation ,
4
) regarding the timeliness of TCP set-up with respect to any of the .
~ -.. __ - - . _ - - .. . . . _ - = . .~ .
10 TCPs within the Port Jefferson Staging Area's jurisdiction.
FEMA Report at 57. In light of the small sample reviewed by FEMA and its conclusions even with respect to the few'TC.Ps it did observe, FEMA's conclusions with respect.to objectives FIELD 6 and 11, SA 9, and EOC 16 and 19 are without basis and invalid.
The exercise results concerning those objectives preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident. ,
EX 21.F. During the exercise, FEMA chose only two locations 1 to observe LILCO's ability to deal with impediments to evacuation !
] (objective EOC 17). These two locations -- in the vicinity of I
TCPs 41 and 124 -- both involved simulated traffic obstructions;
.i I they were the result of a simulated accident involving a gravel 1
1 truck and three cars (TCP 124) and a simulated accident involving a fuel truck (TCP 41). FEMA Report at 30, 36-38.
FEMA was unable to observe LILCO's response to the fuel i
truck impediment (ggg FEMA Report at 37, 57-58), found LILCO's response to the gravel truck impediment inadequate (FEMA Report I
at 36-38), and concluded that objective EOC 7 was only partly met ,
I and objective EOC 17 was not met (FEMA Report at 29-30, 36-38). l FEMA nonetheless concluded that objectives EOC 16 and FIELD-9 for i the Port Jefferson Staging Area were met and that cbjective FIELD 10 for the Patchogue Staging Area was partly met (FEMA Report at i 34, 58, 65). Those conclusions are without basis and iuvalid, in l
light of the following facts:
l l
i
(i) FEMA never even observed LILCO's response to the fuel truck impediment (which occurred within the Port Jefferson Staging Area's jurisdiction (see App. A, Fig. 8, and FEMA Report at 57-58);
(ii) LILCO did not respond to the fuel truck impediment until more than three hcurs after the free play message had been injected at 11:00 (FEMA Report at 36-37, 57);
(iii) There were substantial delays in LILCO's response to the gravel truck impediment (which occurred within the Patchogue Staging Area's jurisdiction, see App. A, Fig. 8, and FEMA Report at 65);
(iv) The response was inadequ-te for removal of the gravel truck impediment (only one tow truck was dispatched even though the simulated accident involved three cars and the gravel truck, and no scraper was sent to remove spilled gravel from the road) (FEMA Report at 37, 65);
(v) At least two hours elapsed before LILCO's Transportation Support Coordinator was informed that a bus evacuation route was potentially blocked by the gravel truck impediment (FEMA Report at 36). l In addition, the sample upon which FEMA based its conclu-sions regarding objectives EOC 16 and FIELD 9 for the Port Jefferson Staging Area and FIELD 10 for the Patchogue Staging Area was much too small to justify FFMA's generalizations with respect to the entire EPZ and LILCO's ability to implement an evacuation during a Shoreham accident. Under the LILCO Plan, 165 Traffic Guides are expected to man 130 traffic control points in l l
1 order to implement an evacuation of the EPZ. App. A, Fig. 8; OPIP 3.6.3, Att. 4. These locations are manned by LILCO because traffic must be kept moving through them in order to permit evacuees to follow the routes prescribed in the LILCO Plan. The evacuation time estimates used by the LILCO players during the exercise were premised on the assumption that such prescribed routes were in fact available for full capacity use throughout the evacuation process. Thus, there are a substantial number of places where impediments are likely to occur because of anticipated heavy traffic, and where their occurrence would have significant impact upon the ability to implement an evacuation, but which were ignored in FEMA's evaluation of LILCO's ability to remove impediments. Furthermore, the two locations actually chosen for the impediment demonstrations during the exercise are virtually the only locations on the evacuation routes chosen for.
the impediment messages which would allow easy re-routing of evacuation traffic around the traffic impediments, assuming arcuendo, LILCO had been able to respond to the locations of the impediments in a timely manner.
In light of the small sample of traffic impediment locations i
observed by FEMA, FEMA's conclusions with respect to the single l 1
attempted impediment response it did observe, and the unique and l
unrepresentative impediment locations chosen by FEMA, FEMA's I 1
conclusions with respect to objectives EOC 16, FIELD 9 for the Port Jefferson Staging Area and FIELD 10 for the Patchogue l
1 l
i 1
. . .. ._ _ _ _ _ -. _ . . . _ . - - . _ _. . ._= _.
Staging Area are without basis and invalid, thereby precluding a 4
finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.
EX 15.L. '[To be liticated as an additional basis of EX 21).
t A demonstration of the availability, accessibility, and adequacy of facilities designated to tua used as congregate care centers ;
I i
for evacuees under the LILCO Plan (agg, e.a., OPIP 4.2.3, pages 2.2-2 thru 2.2-2a, 3.6-7 thru 3.6-7a, 3.7-2, 3.9-6, and.4.8-1 and 1
Appendix B of the LILCO Plan) was excluded from the exercise, in
~
that the two facilities involved in the exercise are not among those identified in the Plan. Egg FEMA Report at 82-83. Such I facilities are also not referenced in any letter of agreement
- r i from the Red Cross. Such facilities and agreements guaranteeing and demonstrating their availability, accessibility and adequacy ,
j are required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(8) and_(b)(10); NUREG 0654
, SS II.A.3, C.4, J.10.a. and g., and J.12; and objectives FIELD 18 l f
and 22. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of '
reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and-I '
} will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by
- 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is ,
1 l fundamentally flawed.
i EX 32. [Not separately admitted but will be dealt with as-
)
I an additional basis for EX 21]. The Congregate Care Center ARCA i
refers to the fact that~ the two facilities used.during the .
^
i exercise are not part of the LILCO Plan. FEMA Report at 83. j i Indeed, there are no congregate care facilities identified in the i LILCO Plan, nor are there agreements in the Plan which indicate-i !
2 f
~- _ -- . . _ __ - _ _ . _ . _ - _ - - - - - - _ . - _ - _ - - - - _
i that any such facilities exist or are available for LILCO's use
, during a Shoreham accident. Thus, this deficiency precludes a P finding that LILCO has adequate facilities to support the emergency response as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(8), as well t as a finding that the protective action of evacuation would be i
implemented as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10). It also
) precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a
. Shoreham accident.
EX 22.K. [Not seDarately admitted but will be considered l l
under EX 21 to extent that the basis concerns the fact that only
)
) I j two centers were activated). During the exercise, the LILCO i
players pretended that approximately 15 non-LILCO facilities, in addition to the two facilities observed by FEMA, were available to serve as congregate care centers, and that such facilitics had
- i a total capacity of approximately 34,900. Apparently, the LILCO players engaged in this pretense based on an assumption that the owners of such facilities, primarily schools in Nassau County, had agreed to allow LILCO and the Red Cross to use their facilities after a Shoreham accident. That assumption is false.
There are no agreements between LILCO or the Red Cross and the [
owners of the facilities mentioned during the exercise permitting l their use as part of the LILCO Plan or following a Shoreham
! accident and the Red Cross has so informed LILCO. Because the exercise was premised on the false assumption stated in this l
l subpart, the results of the exercise preclude a' finding of l
R l
+
l l
reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency. Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
EX 16.N. [To be liticated as an additional basis of EX 21].
The owners of facilities, purportedly available and relied upon to serve as congregate care centers, did not participate in the exercise, nor were the facilities themselves used or their adequacy demonstrated, during the exercise. See LILCO Plan, App.
B; see also FEMA Report at 82.
Contention EX 22. The exercise scenario and the activities, reports, and events which occurred during the exercise include or are premised upon certain assumptions, enumerated below, which conflict with established facts, uncontroverted evidence, and ASLB findings. Accordingly, FEMA's findings and conclusions identified in subparts A below, which incorporate or are based upon such false assumptions, are without basis and invalid, and cannot support a finding of reasonable assurance that the LILCO Plan can be implemented as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2).
Thus, the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency as required by 10 CFR S 50.47 (a)(1), and, accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
EX 22.A. [EX 46 to be dealt with under this suboart]. In the LILCO Plan, the Nassau Veterans Memorial Coliseuc is identi-fied as the only " reception center" for evacuees other than those with special needs. Thus, under the Plan, evacuees would be directed to report to the Coliseum for radiological monitoring and decontamination, registration, and direction to facilities for sheltering. Plan at 4.2-1 thru 4.2-2; OPIP 4.2.3. The exercise scenario, and FEM 4's conclusions on objectives EOC 16 and FIELD 9, 17, 19 and 21, are all based upon an assumption that the Nassau Veterans Memorial Coliseum is available for use by LILCO and the American Red Cross as a Reception Center for the registration and radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees and vehicles pursuant to the LILCO Plan. That assump-tion is false. In fact, there is no valid agreement permitting the use of the Coliseum as set forth in the LILCO Plan. Nassau County has expressly refused to agree to, or permit, the use of Nassau County facilities as part of, or to implement, the LILCO Plan. See Nassau County Board of Supervisors Resolution No.
782B-1986, June 16, 1986. Since the basic underlying premise of FEMA's conclusions that objectives EOC 16 and FIELD 9, 17, 19 and 21 were met or partly met (see FEMA Report at 34, 58, 74 and 80) is factually and legally incorrect, those conclusions are without basis and are invalid. Because the exercise and FEMA's conclusions were premised on the false assumption that the Nassau Coliseum would be available as a reception center, the results of the exercise preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken. Accordingly, 1
the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
1 EX 46. (,Not separately admitted but substance to be dealt l l
with under subpart A of EX 22]. The exercise results demon-strated a fundamental- flaw in the LILCO Plan in that the 1
i i
l
implementation of the Plan is dependent upon the availability of the Nassau Coliseum as the reception center for evacuees, when,
, in fact, that facility cannot be used for that purpose.
1 The exercise was fundamentally premised on the availability l 4
and use of the Nassau Coliseum as the focus and endpoint of a supposedly orderly evacuation. It was the facility to which LERO players assumed: eiacuees would go for radiological monitoring and decontamination of themselves and their vehicles; hundreds of buses and vans carrying persons out of the EPZ would report, discharge passengers, and be decontaminated; evacuees _would be !
registered, reunited with family members, and provided with assistance in seeking health care, housing, food and other services, and from which evacuees would be provided directions, or transportation to congregate care centers for sheltering.
E.c., objectives EOC 16, FIELD 17, 19, 21; exercise EBS messages.
Thus, the evacuation time estimates, traffic control strategies, ,
and other provisions of the LILCO Plan purportedly implemented ;
l' during the exercise, as well as all the directions, decisions, and actions of LERO players during the exercise, were premised on the assumption that the ultimate goal of the emergency response was to enable evacuees to reach the Nassau Coliseum if necessary l (for monitoring and decontamination) or if desired (for euniting with family members or shelter). All exercise activities a
relating to evacuation -- that is, everything that took place from shortly after 8:00 (when "prestaging" began) until the exercise ended ~at 4:30 -- were premised on the basic assumption that the Nassau Coliseum was available to LILCO to be a reception i ,
. , . - = , .,. . - - - . . - . , , . ,
center. Indeed, during the exercise the LILCO players in simulated EBS radio announcements advised approximately 100,000
" evacuees" to report to the Nassau Coliseum for monitoring and decontamination because they had potentially been exposed to radiation during their supposed evacuation efforts.
The exercise thus demonstrated that the availability of the Nassau Coliseum (a) is an essential element of the LILCO Plan as exercised, and (b) was an essential premise of the actions of the LERG players in atempting to implement that Plan during the exercise. The Coliseum is not in fact available for LILCO's use as a relocation center, however. See Nassau County Board of Supervisors' Resolution, June 16, 1986. Since the exercise demonstrated that LILCO is not capable cf implementing key portions of its Plan unless the Coliseum is available for LILCO's use, and since LILCO has no alternate reception center and failed to demonstrate during the exercise that it could implement critical aspects of its Plan, including managing an orderly evacuation, if the Coliseum were not available, the exercise l
demonstrated that in fact the Plan cannot be implemented and hence is fundamentally flawed. Therefore, LILCO failed to satisfy the exercise objectives cited in this contention, the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR SS 50.47(a)(1), (b)(P) and (b)(10), and NUREG 0654 S II.A.3 and J.9, 10, and 12, and the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.
EX 22.B. through E. Not admitted.
,e ,
, . } l 1 ,{
EX 22.F. Dealt with under EX 38 and 39.
~
EX 22.G. & H. Not admitted.
EX 22.I. Dealt with under EX 41.
EX 22.J. Not Admitted.
EX 22.K. Dealt with under EX 21.
V. CONTENTIONS EX 23-32: MANY ARCAs IDENTIFIED BY FEMA CONSTITUTE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS
, . Contention EX 23.' Dealt with under subpart C of EX 50.
Contention EX 24. Dealt with under subpart A of EX 15, i
Contention EX 25. Dealt with under subpart B of EX'41.
t j Contention EX 26. Dealt with under subparts F and G of EX 15.
Contentions EX 27 and 28. Dealt with under'subpart H of EX 50.
l Contention EX 29. Dealt with under subpart B of EX 41.
Contention EX 30. Dealt with.under subpart G of EX 15.
Contention EX 31. Dealt with under subpart A of EX 49.
a a
J
Contention EX 32. Dealt with under EX 21.
VI. CONTENTIONS EX 33-34: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS RELATING TO NOTIFICATION Contentions EX 33 and 34. Not admitted.
VII. CONTENTIONS EX 35-37: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS RELATING TO PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS Contention EX 35. Not admitted.
Contention EX 36. The exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that subsequent to their adoption of the original recommendations from the onsite staff at the EOF, LERO personnel made protective action recommendations without apparent basis, failed to consider alternative protective measures that could have resulted in more dose savings, and made inappropriate recommendations, in violation of 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 S I I . .T .10 . m . Thus, LILCO failed to satisfy objectives EOC 8 and 12 and the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).
Specifically, LERO personnel had no apparent basis for the decision to recommend that people in the original downwind zones i.e., zones A-M, Q, and R -- should as late as 3:48 leave their homes and attempt to evacuate if they had not done so ,
earlier. EBS messages simulated every 15 minutes between 12:06 and 3:48 contained such a recommendation. The documents gen-erated at the EOC fail to indicate that any calculations or dose projections were performed to determine if this remained an appropriate recommendation for the entire period during which it was broadcast. There is no indication that the continuing appropriateness of such a recommendation was ever even carefully considered by LERO personnel in the EOC.
In fact, while such EBS messages were being simulated (be-ginning at 12:06), the EOF was projecting that a wind shift would direct the plume away from the original downwind zones as early as 3:00. LERO personnel were aware of that projection. In light of that projection, however, it may have been more appropriate, and resulted in more dose savings, for individuals who had not yet left their homes by,, for example, 2:00 or 3:00, to remain sheltered in their homes until after the wind had shifted, rather than getting on the roads with no protection before the wind shift. After the shift, such persons may have been able to evacuate with a likelihood of less exposure and smaller doses.
The failure even to consider such an alternative protective action for those in the original downwind zones who had not yet evacuated is significant becauce the LERO players knew that as of 2:40, according to the exercise controller, there were still supposedly 20,550 people who had not yet evacuated.
Contention EX 37: Dealt with under subpart I of EX 15.
VIII. CONTENTIONS EX 38-39: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS RELATING TO PUBLIC INFORMATION Contention EX 38. [ Substance of basis F of EX 22 and EX 42 to be dealt with under EX 38 or 39: and first sentence of EX 44 consolidated with EX 38 and 39]. The exercise demonstrated a ;
fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that LILCO was unable to provide timely, accurate, consistent and non-confusing information to the news media at the Emergency News Center
(" ENC"), thus failing to implement Section 3.8.B and OPIP 3.8.1 ;
of the LILCO Plan. The Plan provides, in pertinent part, that:
"All Public Information personnel will confer on a regular basis to ensure that accurate and consistent emergency information is being shared and discussed" (Plan at 3.8-4); news briefings at the ENC "shall serve three purposes:
to provide accurate information on a timely basis to ensure public and media confidence ;
to prevent misinformation and rumors" ;
(Plan at 3.8-5); and, press conferences will " provide up-to-date information, respond to any rumor received, and answer any ;
questions the media may have." Plan at 3.8-6. Similarly, OPIP 3.8.1 provides that the LERO Coordinator of Public Information is l to " confer with the Director of Local Response . . . and the Public Information Staff at the ENC on a regular basis to main-tain consistent information content"; "obtain up-to-date infor- ;
mation regarding offsite emergency response in preparing press <
l t
releases"; and, " correct misinformation by . . . providing ac- l curate information to LILCO Rumor Control personnel and answering j l
questions regarding local response." As the examples in subparts A-Q below reveal, however, during the exercise LILCO was incapa-ble of complying with these directives. Thus, LILCO failed to satisfy objectives ENC 1 and 3-6, and the exercise demonstrated that the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed in that it cannot be implemented by LERO personnel and fails to comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(7) and NUREG 0654 S II.G.4.
Exercise results which individually and collectively evi-dence these LILCO failures and therefore preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident include the following:
EX 38.A. The ENC was not declared operational until 8:25, and there was apparently no contact with the media by LERO personnel at the ENC until after that time. The first press briefing was not held until 8:40. Thus, the ENC provided no information at all to the media until almost three hours after the emergency was declared, and long after the 6:52 EBS message announcing the Alert condition and school closings had been broadcast. In a real emergency such a delay would result in substantial confusion, speculation, rumor generation, lack of confidence in LILCO's ability to deal with the emergency, and refusal to believe information, advice or instructions subsequently disseminated by LILCO personnel.
EX 38.B. LERO News Release No. 1 announcing an Alert condition and the alleged fact that there had been no release of radiation was not provided to the press by the ENC until 8:21.
Although a Site Area Emergency had been declared at 8:19 and the ENC was informed of that declaration at that time (FEMA Report at 25), no mention was made to the media at 8:21 that a Site Area Emergency had been declared, that a minor release of radiation had occurred, and that dairy animals should be placed on stored feed. Thus, the first LERO press release did not contain up-to-date information, and it was inaccurate.
EX 38.C. The Site Area Emergency, radiation release, and dairy animal recommendation was announced by EBS broadcast at 8:41. Despite the fact that the decision to issue that EBS message was made by the LERO Director by.8:37, LERO News Release No. 2, which included the information in that EBS message, was not approved by the Director until 9:00. As of 9:15, it had still not been distributed to the press.
EX 38.D. Insufficient copying capabilities at the ENC contributed to delays in the distribution of information, including EBS messages and press releases, to the media. FEMA Report at 53.
EX 38.E. Insufficient and inadequate maps and displays in the media briefing room contributed to the confusing and unclear information being disseminated by LERO personnel. FEMA Report at 52, 54.
EX 38.F. Copies of EBS messages provided to the media con-tained extraneous information that should have been deleted, and ,
1 thus were unclear, confusing, and inconsistent with radio broad- I casts. Sge FEMA Report at 53, 54.
l l
e
- EX 38.G. LERO press releases were distributed much too late, and were inaccurate and in conflict with other data i.a "he public domain by the time they were provided to the media.
Although the ENC received LERO Press Release No. 3 at 10:15, it was not posted at the ENC for tne press until 11:10. LERO Release No. 4 was received by the ENC at 10:45, but was not posted until 11:56. LERO Release No. 5 covered the 10:24 evacuation recommendation for zones A-M, Q and R. It was .
4 approved by the LERO Director at 11:02, but did not even arrive at the ENC until 11:36, and was not made available to the press until sometime later. LERO Release No. 6, approved by the Director at 12:25, was not posted at the ENC until 2:10; LERO Release No. 7, approved at 1:11, was received by the ENC at 1:47, but not posted for the press until 3:07.
EX 38.H. The LERO Director decided to recommend evacuation of the entire EPZ at 11:46 and the recommendation was announced to the public in a 12:00 noon EBS message. FEMA Report at 26.
However, the ENC did not inform the media of the Director's decision, or the content of the 12:00 EBS message, which was supposedly repeated every 15 minutes thereafter, until 12:47.
EX 38.I. Although LERO workers were instructed to ingest KI tablets at 9:45, LERO ENC personnel did not decide to inform the media of that fact until 1:05, and the media was then requested not to print that information. Such a delay and the attempt to conceal pertinent information about the health-threatening effects of tSe accident would result in further reductions in LILCO's credibility and refusals of the media and the public to obey LILCO's advice during a real emergency.
EX 38.J. During press conferences, LERO personnel were unable to respond satisfactorily or accurately to questions about evacuation. In addition, the ENC personnel were unable to provide any information to the media, much less accurate and timely data, concerning traffic conditions, conditions or evacuation activity on the water portion of the EPZ, or protective actions for the correctional facility in the EPZ.
They also were unable to respond to questions about manpower at bridges and tunnels on evacuation routes, or the activities of the Nassau County Police. In addition, LERO Public Information personnel were unable to contact Marketing Evaluations, Inc. in a timely manner and therefore had no information concerning siren activation failure.
EX 38.K. Not admitted.
EX 38.L. The log kept by ENC personnel recorded that at 12:01, the gravel truck impediment was being removed. In fact, as of that time, no equipment had yet arrived at the site of the gravel truck impediment, and when it eventually did arrive, it was inadequate to remove the impediment. Seg FEMA Report at 36-
- 37. Thus, ENC personnel had inaccurate information which, if released, would have misled the public into believing the inter-section was clear when in fact it was not.
EX 38.M. At the 1:48 press conference, LERO personnel at the ENC were not able to respond to questions about the fuel truck impediment, although that impediment had arisen almost 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> earlier.
EX 38.N. At press conferences, LERO personnel frequently misstated facts and provided inaccurate information. For example, at 9:16, it was incorrectly announced that the Site Area Emergency had been declared at 8:23, and that plant shutdown had occurred at 5:15. The correct times were 8:19 and 5:15.
Similarly, at 11:38, LERO incorrectly announced that the winter populatian of the EPZ is hgher than the summer population.
EX 38.0. Although LILCO Press Releases 4 and 5 were received by the ENC at 8:45 and 9:05, respectively, they were not given to the Media Monitoring personnel at the ENC until 9:31.
EX 38.P. The Rumor Control operation, which is coordinated and controlled by LERO Public Information and ENC personnel, was ineffective as described in Contention EX 39.
EX 38.Q. Neither LILCO's proposal to expedite the dissem-ination of information by substituting summary information for press releases and transmitting it by computer to the ENC, nor its proposal to add an extra LERO spokesperson at the ENC, would resolve the deficiencies revealed during the exercise, including those listed in this contention and in Contention EX 38. Nor would replacement of copying machines. Sgg letter dated June 20, 1536, from John D. Leonard to Harold Denton (SNRC-1269), Encl. 1 at 7; letter dated June 20, 1986, from John D. Leonard to Harold Denton (SNRC-1270), Att. I at 2.
Contention EX 39. [ Substance of basis F of EX 22 and EX 42 to be dealt with under EX 38 or 39; and first sentence of EX 44 consolidated with EX 38 and 39]. The exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that LILCO is incapable of dealing with rumors or responding to inquiries from the public during an emergency as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(7), and NUREG 0654 S II.G. According to the LILCO Plan, in an emergency the public is expected to call LILCO Customer Relations District Offices and Customer Call Boards to obtain information and ask questions. Plan at 3.8-5; OPIP 3.8.1. And, during the exercise, simulated EBS messages instructed the public to call LILCO District Offices to have questions answered. Thus, the Plan provides, under the heading " Correcting Misinformation," that "LILCO personnel at these locations will be provided with updated press releases. If they cannot answer the inquiry they will call the ENC where a coordinated rumor control point will be manned by representatives from LERO and the Utility." Plan at 3.8-5.
During the exercise, LILCO employees from several LILCO District Offices and Call Boards responded to simulated inquiries from the public. As demonstrated by the examples set forth below, however, such responses demonstrated LILCO's inability to dispel rumors, to correct misinformation, to provide necessary and 1
accurate information to the public, to provide such information j l
in a timely manner, and to provide consistent, coordinated, and l l
non-conflicting information to the public. Thus, LILCO failed to I comply with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), and NUREG 0654 S II.G. It also l
failed to comply with the provisions of its own Plan, or to satisfy objectives ENC 1, 3-6. These examples of repeated errors and failures demonstrate a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan.
EX 39.A. During the exercise, the LILCO District Offices and Call Boards consistently had incorrect or superseded information concerning the status of the emergency, protective action recommendations, and other basic data. Thus, they were unable to provide accurate and essential information to members of the public or the press. Instead, if Call Board operators received calls from the public, as postulated in the LILCO Plan to occur during an actual emergency, they could have provided only information that was inaccurate, incomplete, inconsistent and in conflict with that being released by other LILCO personnel at other locations (for example, in EBS messages or press releases). See FEMA Report at 53. For example:
(i) The logs kept by all the LILCO Call Board opera-tors, including, for example, those kept by the Port Jefferson, Patchogue, and Brentwood Customer Call Board operators, indicate that the information available to them until approximately 11:00 stated that a Site Area Emergency existed, even though a General Emergency had been declared at 9:39.
(ii) The logs kept by the Call Board operators indicate that the operators did not receive word that people in zones A-M, Q, and R had been advised to evacuate until approximately 12:35, even though that advisory had first been issued to the public at 10:24.
1 4
(iii) The logs kept by the Call Board operators indicate that the operators did not receive word that LERO had recommended evacuation of the entire EPZ until approximately 2:00, even though that advisory had first been made at approximately 12:00
! noon.
i j (iv) The logs kept by the Call Board operators indicate I that the operators did not receive word of the declaration of an i
Unusual Event until approximately 8:15, although that declaration 0
was in fact made at 5:40; similarly, the Call Board operators did i
not receive word that an Alert had been declared until l approximately 8:30, although the declaration was made at 6:17 and an EBS message was simulated at 6:52.
l (v) The Call Board logs indicate that most Call Board operators did not receive word that schools were supposed to be 4 implementing early dismissals until approximately 8:50, although i an EBS message regarding early school closings was simulated at i 6:52.
l, 1 EX 39.B. During the exercise, LILCO personnel were unable to provide prompt responses to simulated rumor messages, which-were in the scenario purporting to be telephone inquiries from i members of the public to LILCO Call Boards and District Offices.
i j Instead, responses were generally delayed by more than 30 minutes, and frequently longer. For example:
i (i) A rumor message inquiring whether the appliances in the caller's home were radioactive was given to the Patchogue I
Call Board operator at 1:45; a response was not relayed to the i
j caller until 2:24.
l 4
_ _ _ _ __ _ - - . _ _ - . ~- ., ,._, . . ___ _ _ . _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ . . _ _
(ii) A rumor message inquiring what to do about a-1 i daughter not yet home from.Shoreham-Wading River High School was 1
given to the Patchogue Call Board operator at 10:00; a response was not relayed to the caller until 10:52.
(iii) A rumor message inquiring whether the caller, from Bellport, should evacuate was given to the Patchogue Call Board
{ operator at 12:05; a response was not relayed to the caller until 1:00.
(iv) A rumor message inquiring-about how extensive evacuation will be, and what to do about trucks going into the Shoreham area, was given to the Hicksville Call Board operator at 7:51; a response was not relayed to the caller until 8:20.
(v) A rumor message inquiring whether the cooling
?
l towers on the Shoreham plant had-blown-up was given to the 3
Riverhead Call Board operator at 1:30; a response was not relayed ;
1 l to the caller until 2:48.
(vi) A rumor message inquiring if lobsters caught off the Shoreham jetty that morning were safe to eat was received by i
i the Riverhead District Office at 11:30; a response was not i ,
relayed to the originating party until 12:28. J (vii) A rumor message from a caller whose husband works at the plant and was not home yet, inquiring whether he had been hurt, was given to the Brentwood Call Board operator at 12:43; a j response was not relayed to the caller until 1:30.
(viii) A rumor message inquiring whether the plant had l been taken over by Arab terrorists was received at 9:54; a j response was not relayed to the caller until 10:37.
4
_ . . . . _ . - . . . . . , . . ~ , , , . _ _ _ _ . - . ,.__,,_._,_r.~ , , . , _ _ _ , . _ . _.,_._...,_____.._..,,c- , . , _ _ _ . _ . . . , - -
(ix) A rumor message inquiring what to do with a horse was given to the Port Jefferson Call Board operator at 10:14; a response was not relayed to the caller until 10:47.
(x) A rumor message inquiring how to get off Shelter Island because the ferry had been cancelled was given to the Hamptons Call Board operator at 2:51; a response was not relayed to the caller until 3:24.
(xi) A rumor message from a caller who lived in Medford, but worked in Melville, inquiring what he should do was given to the Huntington Call Board operator at 2:32; a response was not relayed to the caller until 3:05.
(xii) A rumor message inquiring if he could eat the food in his refrigerator was given to the Babylon Call Board operator at 11:59; a response was not relayed to the caller until 12:29.
(xiii) A rumor message from a dairy farmer asking what to do if he is asked to evacuate was received at 9:38; a response was not relayed to the caller until 10:12.
EX 39.C. During the exercise, rumor control personnel were unable to provide accurate, satisfactory, or reasonable advice or information to simulated public inquiries set forth in rumor messages. Instead, such personnel frequently provided inaccurate or superseded information or demonstrated poor judgment in responding. For example:
(i) In response to an inquiry (at 7:51) from a person who "has trucks going to Suffolk," as to how extensive evacuation would be, the Hicksville Call Board operator responded (at 8:20) that the only protective action was the closing of schools, and that there had been no evacuation recommended. As of 8:20, however, LERO was already beginning to " pre-stage" for an evacuation, and a Site Area Emergency had been declared. In light of these facts, it was inappropriate and dangerous to advise the simulated caller to proceed as planned with sending trucks into the EPZ area.
(ii) In response to an inquiry at 11:30 (Rumor Control Question No. 11) whether lobsters caught that morning on the Shoreham jetty were safe to eat or touch, the Riverhead Call Board operator responded (at 12:28) that there was no reason to believe, and no data to indicate, that anything was wrong with the lobsters. As of 12:28, however, there had already been a s major release of radiation, and the entire EPZ had been advised i to evacuate. In light of these facts, it was inappropriate to advise the simulated caller to eat the lobsters, without even inquiring as to when that morning they had been caught, and where the caller was located.
(iii) In response to a rumor message from The New York Times, simulated at 8:45, and inquiring "what's going on" at the Shoreham plant, the rumor control responder related that at 5:40 an Unusual Event had been declared, and at 6:17 an Alert had been declared. By 8:45, however, a Site Area Emergency had been i l declared, schools had been closed and simulated EBS messages had l advised that dairy animals be put on stored feed. Thus, the information provided by LILCO's rumor control personnel was inac-1 curate, misleading, and inconsistent with information being dis-seminated by other LILCO personnel.
)
l i
1 !
i
(iv) In response to a rumor message simulated at 3:15, inquiring whether there had been a release, the rumor control
' responder provided data as of 1:00. Thus, the information pro-vided was inaccurate at the time given, and was misleading and inconsistent with information being disseminated by other LILCO personnel.
(v) A rumor message simulated at 11:45 was purportedly from Dan Rather, who wanted "to take a TV crew into the Shoreham plant," and inquired how to get there. In response, the rumor control responder stated "We don't advise going to the plant.
There is a Site Area Emergency. You will be in the way." The responder then gave directions to the plant. At 9:39, however, a General Emergency had been declared and as of 11:45, LILCO was recommending that almost all of the EPZ be evacuated. (At 11:46, the decision was made to evacuate the entire 10-mile EPZ.) The suggestion that going to the plant was inadvisable but nonetheless possible was incorrect, and such suggestion, combined with the giving of road directions to the plant, indicated extremely poor judgment.
(vi) In response to a rumor message simulated at 1:17 inquiring "what areas are to be evacuated," the rumor control responder at 1:21 related that zones A-M, Q and R should evacu-ate. By 12:00, however, a simulated EBS message had advised that the entire 10-mile EPZ was to evacuate. Thus, the information provided by LILCO's rumor control personnel was inaccurate, misleading, and inconsistent with information being disseminated by other LILCO personnel.
(vii) A rumor message was simulated at 1:15 from a caller in Wading River who reported that people on his street were evacuating, that he could not walk, and did not know what to do. The response to this call apparently was a recording that the office had been " closed due to conditions at the Shoreham plant," and giving the telephone numbers for electrical emer-gencies. The failure to properly advise the caller how to arrange for transportation for the mobility impaired was grossly 1
~
improper.
As the foregoing examples illustrate, the exercise demon-strated that LILCO is incapable of implementing its proposed rumor control procedures, or providing accurate, necessary, and consistent information to the public during an emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(7) and NUREG 0654, S II.G.3.c.
Accordingly, the Plan is fundamentally flawed and the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).
EX 44. (First sentence admitted and consolidated with EX 38 and 39; remainder not admitted]. The exercise revealed a funda-mental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that as a result of LILCO's ina-bility to provide accurate, clear, consistent and non-conflicting information to the public (see Contentions EX 38, EX 39, EX 40.C
& D, EX 42.D, EX 43.A, EX 45), there would be a substantial evac-uation shadow -- or voluntary evacuation of persons not advised to evacuate -- in the event of a Shoreham accident. See 21 NRC at 644, 670. I m O EX 22.F. (Not seoarately admitted but substance of basig F will be dealt with under EX 38 or 39]. During the exercise, the exercise players assumed that even in light of the actions taken by them in responding to the accident scenario, members of the public would follow all LILCO protective action recommenda-tions, no one would begin to evacuate until after 10:24 when the first EBS evacuation advisory was simulated, and throughout the entire simulated accident, no one who was not expressly advised to evacuate would attempt to do so. Thus, the actions taken by LERO during.the exercise, as well as FEMA's conclusions con-cerning objectives EOC 12, 16, SA 9, and FIELD 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 21, and 22, all assume that given the accident postulated during the exercise, and given the response of LILCO players to that accident during the exercise: (i) there would be no voluntary evacuation at any time by any persons not advised to evacuate, and (ii) there would be no evacuation activity at all prior to the first issuance of an evacuation advisory at 10:24.
For example, the actions of LILCO players during the exercise assumed, inter alia: no evacuation or mobilization traffic, accidents, or impediments on the roads prior to the first evacuation advisory (indeed, no impediments at all, except the two postulated in the " free play" messages, which LILCO was unable to remove); no evacuees ever on the roads, seeking assistance, or needing bus or ambulance transportation, other than those advised to evacuate by LILCO; no bus companies or ambulance companies refusing or being unable to make vehicles immediately available to LILCO because they were in use to l 1
evacuate persons other than those intended by LILCO; and no persons reporting to the Reception Center, other than the 100,000 advised to do so by LILCO.
These assumptions are false. In fact, if the accident pos-tulated in the exercise had actually occurred, and the activities of the LILCO players in response had actually been taken, evacua-tion activities by members of the public, both inside and outside the EPZ, would actually have started much earlier, in response to LILCO's actions such as, for example: (a) the first EBS an-nouncement of the emergency, which included the advisory to close all schools (issued at 6:52); (b) the advisory to put dairy ani-mais in zones A-E on stored feed (issued at 8:41); and (c) calls to bus companies to attempt to obtain buses for use in evacuating the public (simulated calls by LERO players began at 8:05). See FEMA Report at 26, 35. And, substantial numbers of people, in addition to just those residing in the zones advised to evacuate in the LILCO EBS messages, would actually attempt to evacuate.
Based upon survey research data, public response to the nuclear accident at Chernobyl, findings of the ASLB (21 NRC at 670), and for the reasons set forth in Contention EX 44, such voluntary evacuation, or evacuation shadov behavior, would in fact occur in light of (a) the contents of LILCO's EBS messages, (b) the con-tents and timing of its press advisories (see Contention EX 38),
(c) its rumor control activities during the exercise (see Contention EX 39), (d) conflicting and inconsistent information and press reports (see Contentions EX 38-40, EX 43), (e) pre-existing perceptions and fears of Long Island residents con-cerning nuclear accidents, (f) and LILCO's lack of credibility.
Furthermore, such evacuation would have had a substantial impact on the ability of LILCO players actually to perform the various activities undertaken or simulated by them during the exercise. They would not have been able te perform even the few activities they were able to demonstrate or " simulate" success-fully during the exercise if they had had to deal with the actual public response to the postulated accident and the LERO actions responding to that accident during the exercise.
Since the actions of the LILCO players and the conclusions drawn by FEMA from such actions were all premised on the false assumptions set forth above, FEMA's conclusions that objectives EOC 12, 16, SA 9, and FIELD 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 21 and 22 were met or partly met (see FhMA Report at 32-33, 34, 43, 56, 57, 58, 62, 64, 65, 66, 72, 74, 80 and 82) are without basis and invalid.
Because the exercise was premised on the false assumptions stated in this subpart, the results of the exercise preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency. Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
EX 42. (Not seoarately admitted but evidence related to matters raised in EX 42 will be heard under EX 38, 39, 41, and 10]. During the exercise, the LERO players were required to
)
respond to a limited number of factual situations, events, situations or possibilities -- such as free play messages,
~ .. .- - - - . -
questions from evaluators, or situations caused by their own errors -- that required LERO players to improvise appropriate actions instead of being able to follow prearranged response patterns -- such as those set forth in OPIPs and LILCO training materials. The response by LERO personnel to such surprises, unknowns, or tests of their knowledge during the exercise con-sistently resulted in inappropriate actions (and in some in-stances inappropriate corrective actions as well, which com-pounded the error), incorrect responses, and actions or responses inconsistent with the LILCO Plan and/or common sense. Examples of such repeated and consistent failures by LERO personnel to respond as necessary and appropriate to the minimal number of surprises and unknowns involved in the exercise are set forth in subparts A-G below.
Collectively and individually, LILCO's incorrect actions in response to unexpected situations demonstrate a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan, in that LILCO personnel are unable to imple-ment adequate responses as called for by the LILCO Plan during even a simulated emergency involving a minimal number of sur-prises and unknowns. In an actual emergency, there would be many more unexpected situations than occurred in the limited February 13 exercise which was largely scripted by LILCO, parti-3 cularly since, in a real emergency, the full complement of LERO personnel and supporting organizations would be expected to
. participate and several hundred thousand citizens of Long Island would attempt to take protective actions. LILCO's failure to i handle even the limited number of unexpected events which occurred on February 13 is thus a strong demonstration that the LERO players are incapable of implementing the Plan and demonstrates that LILCO failed to satisfy many critical exercise objectives, including EOC 1, 7, 8, 11, 16, 17, 20, ENC 3, 5, S.A 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, FIELD 8, 9, 10, 13, 16. Accordingly, the exercise results demonstrated fundamental flaws regarding LILCO's ability to implement the Plan which preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an actual Shoreham emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).
EX 42.A. FEMA inserted two free play road impediment mes-sages, requiring LERO players 'to respond to particular events which had not been specifically planned for in advance. As set forth in the FEMA Report (at 30, 36-38, 57-58, 65) and in Contention EX 41 (particularly subpart B), LERO's responses to the impediments were untimely, ineffective, and confused, demon-strating LERO's inability to deal with unexpected situations.
EX 42.B. LILCO failed to respond adequately, appropriately i or in a timely manner to a free play message requesting LERO assistance in evacuating 40 children from the Ridge Elementary School in that: l (i) Although the request for a bus to be dispatched to i I
Ridge Elementary School was made at about 10:30, the bus apparently did not arrive at the school until approximately 1:23
-- almost three hours later. FEMA Report at 38, 66. Although
a LERO personnel were aware of this lengthy delay, no actions were taken to check on the driver's whereabouts or to speed up his arrival.
(ii) As late as 4:23 -- almost six hours after the request for the bus for the Ridge Elementary School had been made
-- the bus still had not arrived at the Nassau Coliseum Reception Center. LERO personnel took no action in response to this information even though it indicated that 40 simulated children 1
and a bus had apparently never made it out of the EPZ.
EX 42.C. Responding to simulated rumor messages and t customer inquiries required LILCO to demonstrate an ability to handle unexpected situations since rumors necessarily involve the unexpected. As documented by the examples set forth in the FEMA Report (at 53) and in Contention EX 39, the LERO rumor control staff demonstrated repeatedly that it is incapable of responding effectively to unexpected situations.
EX 42.D. LILCO's Traffic Guides were incapable of responding adequately to the kind of inquiries that must be expected from evacuees during a Shoreham emergency, but which are not expressly discussed with responses set forth in the " Traffic Guide Procedure" in OPIP 3.6.3. For example, only one Traffic Guide out of the 14 interviewed by FEMA from the Patchogue Staging Area knew the location of the Nassau Coliseum Reception Center, and one Traffic Guide believed that the general public was to be directed to LILCO's EWDF during an actual emergency.
FEMA Report at 64. LILCO's Traffic Caldes also were not aware of the chain of command for authorization of exposures in excess of I
I
the general public PAGs, or that this would be a voluntary act on their part. In addition, some Traffic Guides indicated to FEMA evaluators that they might question the authorization of other LILCO personnel (specifically, the Lead Traffic Guides) regarding excess exposure. FEMA Report at 69. The behavior of the Traffic Guides interviewed by FEMA thus evidenced the inability of such personnel to cope with unrehearsed situations, including inquiries from evacuees, which would in fact be likely to arise in a real emergency. Such inability is significant because, under the LILCO Plan, Traffic Guides are likely to be the primary, if not only, emergency response personnel to whom evacuees would have personal access.
EX 42.E. LILCO's bus drivers were incapable of carrying out their assigned responsibilities and duties during the exercise when asked to locate bus yards and drive routes that had not been previously practiced, even though precisely such random and unrehearsed assignments are contemplated in OPIP 3.6.4. For example, of the four bus drivers dispatched from the Patchogue Staging Araa and evaluated by FCMA, one missed part of his assigned evacuation route, one went to the wrong bus transfer point and completed his route only after being prompted by the Federal evaluator, and one took over two hours to get to his bus transfer point 2 rom the staging area because he initially went to the wrong bus garage. Egg FEMA Report at 64-65.
EX 42.F. LERO was incapable of responding appropriately when, under the exercise scenario, events and situations esca-lated faster than the players had anticipated. For example, when j t
l'
]
1 l
a General Emergency was declared at 9:39, LERO had not fully mobilized its emergency personnel and was unable to dispatch in an adequate and timely manner even those personnel who had re-ported for duty. As a result, Traffic Guides arrived at their assigned TCPs well after evacuation had been advised by LILCO; bus drivers were not dispatched to pick up their buses from bus company' yards and, thereafter, to proceed to their assigned bus transfer points until over two hours aft,er the declaration of a Site Area Emergency and over one hour after the declaraton of a General Emergency; and Road Crews, Route Spotters and Route Alerting Drivers were also delayed in carrying out the duties and responsibilities assigned to them under the LILCO Plan. And, although these events during the exercise rendered false the statements in EBS messages that Traffic Guides were in place to assist evacuees and buses were travelling routes to pick up evacuees, LILCO did nothing to correct the messages, or otherwise to modify their activities to deal with the realities created by their own actions, which differed from the scenario exercised and assumed in the LILCO Plan.
EX 42.G. During the exercise, ENC personnel were required to respond to media questions and exercise events and actions that had not been scripted by LILCO or set forth in the Plan or OPIPs. As set forth in Contention EX 38, they consistently failed to do so, thus evidencing their inability to perform the precise functions they are required to perform under the Plan.
IX. CONTENTIONS EX 40-45: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS RELATING TO IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTECTIVE ACTIONS Contention EX 40. The exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that the Plan fails to provide any traffic assistance or guidance for evacuees until long after they are likely to be on the roads attempting to evacuate. Under the LILCO Plan and the evacuation time estimates used by the LILCO players during the exercise, it is assumed that Traffic Guides will be at their Traffic Control Posts, " guiding" motorists and implementing traffic control strategies to assure that evacuees will follow the evacuation routes prescribed by the Plan, during i
l the entire evacuation process. Sge, e.g., App. A at IV-5 thru i
-72e and V-2; OPIP 3.6.3. Indeed, every_LILCO EBS message sup-i posedly broadcast every fifteen minutes, beginning with the message simulated at 10:24, stated that LERO Traffic Guides would be in place along evacuation routes to guide evacuees. However, for the reasons set forth in more detail below, the LILCO Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10), NUREG 0654 II.J.9 and J.10, LILCO failed to satisfy objectives EOC 7, 11, 16, SA 1, 2, 5, 7, 9, 10, FIELD 9, 11 and the exercise precludes a finding that the protective action of evacuation can and will be implemented in the event of a Shoreham accident. Specifically:
EX 40.A. During the exercise and pursuant to the LILCO Plan j (Plan, Figs. 3.3.3 and 3.3.4; OPIP 3.3.3; OPIP 3.6.3), the LERO 4
Traffic Guides were not notified of the emergency or required to report to the staging areas until after the declaration of a Site
)
Area Emergency. That declaration occurred at approximately 8:19, I 1
l a,nd the Traffic Guidas were presumably notified of the emergency
. beginning shortly thereafter.. By 9:00, only two Traffic Guides
.had reported to the Riverhead Staging Area (52 Traffic Guides are required under the Plan); only one had reported to the Port Jefferson Staging Area (72 are required under the Plan); and one had reported to the Patchogue Staging Area (41 are required under the Plan). At 9:40, still only 19 had reported to Riverhead, 10 to Port Jefferson, and 37 to Patchogue. Thus, at the time a ,
d General Emergency was declared -- 9:39 -- only 40 percent of the LERO Traffic Guides essential t'o the implementation of evacuation ,
i
'according to the LILCO Plan were mobilized; none were at their posts in the field to ' perform their duties under the Plan.
EX 40.B. Pursuant to OPIP 3.6.3 and during the exercise, no
' Traffic Guides were dispatched from the three staging areas until after the evacuation recommendation had been made uv Lhe public by simulated EBS message. And, subsequent to their being dispatchSd,it took substantial amounts of time before Traffic l
Guides arrived at their posts and were in a position to perform l
the'funcdions which the Plan and the evacuation time estimates used during the exercise assume will be performed throughout the entire evacuation process. Specifically:
(i) During the' exercise, the EBS messages recommending evacuation were simulated at 10:24 (zones A-M, Q, and R) and 11:46 (entire EPZ). The dispatch of Traffic Guides began at Riverhaad at 10:25.and 12:00, and was not completed until shortly after 11:00 and approximately 12:20, respectively. Traffic Guides at Port Jefferson were dispatched beginning at 10:30; the
- i.
- _. ... _ __ - - - - - = - - - - -- -
i process was not completed until either 12:20 or 12:49. Dispatch-1 ing at Patchogue began at 10:30 and was completed at approxi-mately 10:59.
(ii) Traffic Guides from the Patchogue Staging Area did not begin arriving at their posts until 11:00, with the last i
Guide reporting his arrival at 11:40. From the Port Jefferson Staging Area where dispatching was not completed until either 12:20 or 12:49, Traffic Guides took up to 58 minutes to arrive at their posts. The Riverhead Traffic Guides observed by FEMA did not arrive at their posts until between 11:50 and 12:10. Egg FEMA Report at 74. And, other Riverhead Traffic Guides were still not at their posts as of 12:50, even though in at least one case (TCP 26), the Guide had been dispatched at 11:08 -- almost 2 4
hours earlier.
Thus, even assuming arouendo that no one would attempt to evacuate prior to the EBS announcement at 10:24, the LILCO Plan, as demonstrated during the exercise, fails to provide any evacu-2 ation assistance, or the " guidance" necessary to ensure that evacuees follow the prescribed routes which form the basis of the evacuation time estimates used during the exercise, until long after evacuees would be on the road attempting to evacuate. In-deed, LILCO does not even have the potential capability to pro-vide such assumed assistance and guidance under the Plan as written, since according to the Plan no Traffic Guides are to be dispatched until after there has been an evacuation order.
4 l
r I
EX 40.C. Assuming arcuendo that no members of the public would seek to evacuate prior to the simulated EBS evacuation advisory at 10:24, once that radio broadcast had been made people would expect LILCO Traffic Guides to be in place to provide assistance and guidance with respect to evacuation routes. The EBS message supposedly aired during the exercise at 10:24 so states, and that message was supposedly repeated every 15 minutes. Thus, according to LILCO's own emergency information 1
repeatedly disseminated to the public beginning at 10:24, Traffic Guides would be in place. This information was false, and the LILCO personnel who issued it knew or should have known that it was false. The provision in the LILCO Plan requiring the issuance of such a false and misleading statement, and the actual use of such a message during the exercise, is a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan, and constitutes a violation of 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(7).
EX 40.D. Not admitted.
EX 40.E. Finally, attempting to dispatch Traffic Guides to those Traffic Control Posts within a 2-mile zone of the plant upon the issuance of an evacuation order, even assuming arcuendo that the " dispatch" activities could be accomplished more expe-ditiously than they were during the exercise, would not correct or even substantially lessen the defect inherent in the LILCO Plan. (See letter dated June 20, 1986, from John D. Leonard to Harld R. Denton (SNRC-1269), Encl. 1 at 16.) In light of the notification and reporting provisions for Traffic Guides, and the l realities that an evacuation order can swiftly follow a Site Area l
l
Emergency declaration and evacuation will begin prior to an official evacuation advisory, such an attempted "fix" to the fundamental defect in the LILCO Plan would be ineffective.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in subparts A through E, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed in that it fails to comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S II.J. The j exercise thus precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that 1
adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency.
J Contention EX 41. [ Basis I of EX 22 and EX 42 to be dealt with under EX 41]. The exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan and in LILCO's ability to control and manage an j orderly evacuation of the EPZ pursuant to that Plan in that the Plan fails to provide -- and LILCO failed to demonstrate -- an i
~
ability to remove impediments from the roadways until long after evacuation had begun. There are likely to be accidents and other
, events creating blockages on evacuation routes during a Shoreham
! emergency. LILCO's inability to deal with such impediments will cause delay in the implementation of protective cctions and i preclude LILCO from managing an orderly evacuation of the EPZ.
Under the LILCO Plan and the evacuation time estimates used by the LILCO players during the exercise, it is assumed that evacuees will be able to, and will, follow the LILCO prescribed evacuation routes, and that Road Crews' will remove impediments efficiently so that the prescribed routes remain open and
. available for use at full capacity during the entire evacuation i -. - _ _ _ - . _ , _ - -_- -
l l
process. Egg, e.a., App. A at IV-19, -23, V-1 thru -5, Table XII, and Fig. 8; OPIP 3.6.3. Not only did the exercise reveal 4
that LILCO's proposal for the removal of impediments to evacuation is inherently unworkable, but it also demonstrated 4 that the LERO players were incapable of properly responding to, much less " removing," the " impediments" created by FEMA's free play messages. For the reasons set forth in more detail below, 1
the exercise results demonstrated fundamental flaws in LILCO's Plan, noncompliance with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S II.J.10.k, and failure to satisfy exercise objectives, including EOC 5, 7, 8, 11, 16, 17, SA 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and FIELD 9, 10. Thus, the exercise results preclude a finding that j the protective action of evacuation.can and will be implemented in the event of a Shoreham accident.
EX 41.A. During the exercise and according to the LILCO Plan (Plan, Fig. 3.3.4; OPIP 3.3.2; OPIP 3.3.3; OPIP 3.6.3), the LERO Road Crews were not notified of the emergency or required to report to the staging areas until after the declaration of a Site Area Emergency. Such declaration was made at approximately 8:19.
Even on February 13, when the LERO personnel were on notice that I l
- they would be-called to report for duty, most Road Crew personnel 1
did not arrive at the staging areas until well after 10:00.
Thus, at 9:00, only one Road Crew member had reported to the Riverhead Staging Area (10 are required under the Plan), none had reported to Port Jefferson (14 are required under the Plan), and none had reported to Patchogue (14 are required under the Plan).
At 9:40, after a General Emergency had oeen declared, only two m g- , , , - ~ , - - ------,m ,g,- ,,-,w-- -e,,y .w -
.,p--g g e e-%--ewy*g 9-M e-
had reported to Riverhead, none to Port Jefferson, and two to Patchogue. By 10:00, eight had reported to Riverhead, one to Port Jefferson, and five t3 Patchogue. And at 10:20 -- about the time of LILCO's EBS announcement advising evacuation -- still only 8 had reported to Riverhead, seven to Port Jefferson, and 10 to Patchogue. Thus, at the time a General Emergency was declared
-- 9:39 -- only 10.5 percent of the Road Crew personnel essential to the implementation of the LILCO Plan were mobilized, even though the circumstances -- a pre-announced exercise -- were designed to maximize the likelihood of good LILCO performance.
In fact, even at the time of LILCO's evacuation advisory, only about 65 percent of LILCO's Road Crew personnel were mobilized, even though the circumstances -- a pre-announced exercise -- were designed to maximize the likelihood of good LILCO performance.
Thus, even assuming that no member of the public attempted to evacuate prior to the evacuation order, at the time of that order the LERO personnel essential to the implementation of the recommendation according to the LILCO Plan were not even fully mobilized.1 1 pursuant to OPIP 3.6.3, during the exercise the Road Crew personnel were not dispatched from the three staging areas until after the evacuation recommendation had been made to the public by simulated EBS message. The dispatch of Road Crew personnel began at Riverhead at about 10:47 and was completed at about 11:00; it began at about 10:46 at Port Jefferson and was completed at about 12:40 (with two Road Crews having to travel to Brentwood to pick up their tow trucks); it began at about 10:45 at Patchogue, and was completed at about 11:28. Subsequent to their being dispatched, it took substantial time before crews were in a position to drive to an identified impediment in the field and attempt to remove it. Thus, for example, as noted in subpart 3 of this contention, a Road Crew to deal with the simulated fuel truck impediment did not arrive at the impediment (footnote continued)
EX 41.B. [EX 25 and 29 to be dealt with under this suboart). LILCO was incapable of responding as required to either of the two free play messages indicating existence of major road impediments, one involving a gravel truck and three cars, and the other involving a fuel truck. Eeg FEMA Report at 30, 36-38, 57-58, 65. For example, although FEMA's free play messages were injected at about 10:40 for the gravel truck accident and 11:00 for the fuel truck accident (FEMA Report at 36):
(i) The Evacuation Route Coordinator failed to advise the Evacuation Support Communicator for Route Spotters / Road Crews of pertinent facts, including that the gravel truck impediment was a multiple vehicle accident, that the fuel truck impediment involved the possibility of fire since fuel was leaking, and that both shoulders of the road were blocked by the fuel truck. Such facts were required to be communicated under LILCO's Plan (see OPIP 3.6.3), and the consequence of not doing sa during the exercise was to delay substantially LILCO's response to the im-pediments (by approximately three hours for the fuel truck impediment). See FEMA Report at 30, 36-37, 57.
(ii) The LERO Evacuation Coordinator, who is to be kept informed of any problems with implementing an evacuation of the EPZ, including impediments or suspected impediments (see OPIP 3.6.3), was not informed of either the gravel truck or the fuel truck impediment until after about 12:13, and even then it was (footnote continued from previous page) scene until about 2:10, three hours after it had been dispatched.
FEMA Report at 37, 57-58.
FEMA, not any LERO personnel, which brought information regarding the impediments to the Evacuation Coordinator's attention. FEMA t Report at 36. Only thereafter did the Evacuation Coordinator discuss LILCO's response to the impediments with his staff.
Notwithstanding that FEMA-prompted discussion, however, (a) As late as 12:40, the Transportation Support Coordinator had not been informed that a bus evacuation route was potentially blocked by the gravel truck; (b) As late as 1:48, the Road Logistics Coordinator had not been informed that equipment needed to be sent to the site of the fuel truck accident (despite the fact that the Evacuation Coordinator had discussed the situation with i respect to road logistics with members of his staff as early as 12:16). As a result, the Road Crew assigned to the fuel truck impediment did not arrive at the scene of the simulated impediment until approximately 2:10 -- over three hours after the impediment had first been made known to LILCO by FEMA. FEMA Report at 36, 57.
(c) There was no EBS broadcast, or other public dissemination of information about the impediments, until 1:45.
(iii) LILCO's response, once it had finally begun, was inadequate with respect to both simulated impediments.
(a) Only one tow truck was dispatcned to the scene of the gravel truck impediment and no scraper was sent to remove spilled gravel from the road. As a result, there was
inadequate equipment available to remove the impediment, which j would have required 30 minutes or more to clear even with the proper equipment. Egg FEMA Report at 37, 65.
2 (b) Although Road Crews from the Port Jefferson Staging Area were dispatched by 11:50, the Road Crew assigned to respond to the fuel truck impediment (within Port Jefferson's area of responsibility) did not arrive at the impediment scene until about 2:10, by which time the FEMA evaluator had left.
FEMA Report at 57-58. At about 11:15, the Route Spotter / Road Crew Communicator at the EOC had requested the Port Jefferson Evacuation Support Coordinator to dispatch the Route Spotter on whose route the fuel truck impediment was located. This Route s l Spotter, however, was not dispatched until about 12:02, a delay i
of over 45 minutes which interfered with verification of the impediment. FEMA Report at 37.
EX 25. (Not separately admitted but to be dealt with under suboart B of EX 41].. EOC ARCA 8 refers to a delay of 45 minutes between an attempt to have field workers verify a fuel truck impediment and the dispatch of a Route Spotter from the Port Jefferson Staging Area. FEMA Report at 41. According to the LILCO Plan, all coordination of and decisionmaking concerning evacuation, including the direction of Traffic Guides, rerouting of traffic, and identification and responding to traffic impediments, is performed by personnel at the EOC. See OPIP 3.1.1; OPIP 3.6.3. In order to be able to make necessary decisions, achieve a coordinated response, and implement an evacuation, the coordinators and decisionmakers in the EOC must
_ __ . = . - - _ _ _ _ _ _ . . __ _ _ _ _ . .
d i have accurate and timely information from the field. Without such information, an evacuation cannot be accomplished according to the LILCO Plan. Thus, this deficiency precludes a finding that an evacuation can and will be implemented as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10), and precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.
4 1 EX 29. (Not separately admitted but will be dealt with a
under subcart B of EX 41]. Patchogue SA ARCA 2 refers to the fact that appropriate personnel and equipment were not dispatched
, to remove the simulated multiple vehicle accident road 2
impediment. FEMA Report at 67. The LILCO Plan and the evacuation time estimates in the Plan and used during the exercise assume that prescribed evacuation routes are clear of impediments and available for use by evacuees. App. A at V-2.
Under the Plan, Road Crew personnel are assumed to be available, appropriately equipped, and capable of quickly removing any impediments that appear during an evacuation. OPIP 3.6.3. Thus, this deficiency precludes a finding that the protective action of evacuation can and will be implemented as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) as well as a finding that adequate emergency l
- _ equipmen' to support the emergency response is available as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(8). It also precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.
EX 41.C and D. Not admitted.
1 I
I l
I
EX 41.E. The proposal to add a Traffic Engineer to the LERO personnel at the EOC (ggg letter dated June 20, 1986, from John D. Leonard to Harold R. Denton (SNRC-1269), Encl. 1 at 1) would not eliminate the flaws in the Plan which were demonstrated by the exercise, since that person's assigned task would be "to assist in evaluating road impediments and developing alternate routing." Even assuming such a person could provide such
" assistance," it would have no impact on the basic structural
- )
flaws in the Plan and demonstrated incapacities of LERO personnel described in this contention.
EX 22.I. [Not separately admitted but will be dealt with under EX 41]. During the exercise, two impediments to evacuation were postulated in " free play" messages. FEMA's conclusions on objectives EOC 16, FIELD 9 for the Port Jefferson Staging Area, and FIELD 10 for the Patchogue Staging Area, were all based upon the exercise assumption that in order to implement its Plan including the protective action of evacuation, LILCO needs to be capable of removing only two road impediments. That assumption has no basis. Even if road impediments were-assumed to include only traffic accidents (contrary to the NUREG 0654 provision which clearly includes impediments caused by inclement weather),
LILCO itself has estimated that four accidents / breakdowns would occur during an evacuation of the EPZ (see Cordaro et al., ff.
Tr. 6685, at 8). In fact, during the two-week period from
, February 6-20, 1986 (i.e., the weeks immediately before and after i
the February 13 exercise, and including the day of the exercise),
there were a total of 335 recorted traffic accidents in the Sixth
. = -
k Precinct of the Suffolk County Police Department, which includes the 10-mile EPZ.2 Of these 335 reported accidents, 62 involved personal injuries, 38 required ambulance response, and 65 required the assistance of one or more tow trucks. Thus, on average, there were over 22 reported accidents per day during this two-week period, with more than four, on average, involving personal injuries and the assistance of one or more tow trucks, and approximately two-and-one-half, on average, requiring ambulance response.
Because the exercise was premised on the false assumption that the capability of removing two roadway impediments was
, sufficient to assure that an evacuation could be implemented, the i
! results of the exercise, even assuming arcuendo that LILCO could have demonstrated such capability, preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency. Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
Contention EX 42. Dealt with under EX 38 and 39.
Contention EX 43. Not admitted.
Contention EX 44. First sentence dealt with under EX 38 and
- 39. Remainder not admitted.
2 Under New York law, an accident is required to be reported if the property damage exceeds $400, or if the accident results in personal injury. Of course, a substantial number of accidents that fall.within these criteria are not reported.
Contention EX 45. Bases consolidated with EX 50.
X. CONTENTIONS EX 46-49: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS RELATING TO POST-EVACUATION SERVICES FOR EVACUEES -
Contention EX 46. Dealt with under subpart A of FX 22.
Contention EX 47. The exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that LILCO failed to demonstrate the ability to register, monitor and decontaminate evacuees from special facilities who are transported to reception centers other than the Nassau Coliseum, or that such activities could be accom-p113hed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> as required by NUREG 0654 S II.J.12.
Thus, LILCO has not satisfied objectives FIELD 13 and 21, and the exercise precludes a finding that the LILCO Plan complies with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(1), (b)(8), (b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S II.J.9, 10, and 12.
According to the estimates in the Plan, if there were an evacuation of the entire EPZ, there could be as many as 1600 residents of nursing and adult homes, health care and other special facilities, all with special needs, requiring that they be sent to special reception facilities (OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 2),
plus tens of thousands of school children. This number could be increased by approximately 850 persons if the hospitals in the EPZ and the Suffolk Infirmary also were evacuated. Id. The LILCO Plan, Rev. 6, which was the subject of the exercise, has no provision for the registration, radiological monitoring or de-contamination of such individuals; nor does it include provisions for reception centers for the vast majority of such individuals, or agreements indicating that any such reception centers are in fact available or adequate to serve that purpose. Rather, it includes registration, radiological monitoring and decontami-nation procedures to be implemented, and equipment and personnel-to be present, only at the Nassau Coliseum and the Emergency l Worker Decontamination Center. OPIP 4.2.3; OPIP 4.3.1. This is a deficiency in the Plan which violates NUREG 0654 S II.A.3, J.10.d and 12, and 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(8) and (b)(10). It precludes a finding that the LILCO Plan is adequate, or that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency as i required by 10 CFR S 50.47 (a)(1).
Furthermore, the proposal in the new Revision '7 version of OPIP 4.3.1, purportedly to address this deficiency (see letter dated June 20, 1986, from John D. Leonard to Harold Denton, (SNRC-1270), and Att. I at 4), fails to correct this deficiency for the following reasons:
EX 47.A. The proposal to send only one monitor to each special facility reception center -- assuming arauendo reception j centers existed -- is unworkable. See OPIP 4.3.1 5 5.1.6 (Rev.
7). For example, one of the few special facility reception centers designated by LILCO is expected to receive up to 465 evacuees. OFIP 3.6.5, Att. 2. One person could not adequately i
or effectively perform the necessary monitoring, recordkeeping,
, and related activities that would be required at such a center.
l
H EX 47.B. The proposal to have monitoring done as evacuees leave their buses, ambulances or ambulettes (Egg OPIP 4.3.1 S 5.4.9.c (Rev. 7)) is unworkable. It could not be done in inclement weather, there is no assurance that reception centers
-- assuming trauendo they existed -- would be laid out to permit such activities at unloading points, and the evacuees, who by definition have special needs, cannot be subjected to waits in buses or ambulances while lines of others arriving ahead of them are monitored by one LERO worker.
EX 47.C. The proposal to have bus drivers keep necessary monitoring records (see OPIP 4.3.1 S 5.4.9.c (Rev. 7)) is unworkable. Such personnel have not been trained for such a function, nor have they been properly equipped to fulfill it. It is also impractical to expect a bus driver to be able to perform such a function.
EX 47.D. The proposal to have persons found to be contami-nated "get back on the bus" and eventually driven to the Nassau Coliseum (agg OPIP 4.3.1. S 5.4.9.d (Rev. 7)) is unworkable, impractical and dangerous. The evacuees at special facility reception centers are, by definition, in need of special care that cannot be provided at the Nassau Coliseum. To refuse to decontaminate them, and instead to send them to a facility that is not equipped to handle their special needs, and in the process delay their decontamination and also expose them to other contaminated people on the bus, thus potentially increasing their i l
exposure, is without justification. 1
l 1
EX 47.E. The provision that it is not necessary to provide ;
monitoring personnel at reception centers for schools (geg OPIP 4.3.1. S 5.1.5 (Rev. 7)) is wholly inadequate. Assuming arauendo that such reception centers exist -- and they do not -- there is no basis for LILCO's refusal to provide radiological monitoring and decontamination services to the school children evacuees who would be taken there. This refusal is a clear violation of NUREG 0654 S II.J.12. Furthermore, the LILCO explanation that such services are not necessary "if the parents are going to be picking up the children," makes no sense, and fails to correct the deficiency.
Finally, during the exercise, messages apparently were transmitted among certain LILCO players referring to requests that monitoring personnel be sent to certain hospitals and fa-cilities outside the EPZ. The exercise failed to demonstrate, however, that LILCO is capable of providing registration and monitoring at actual reception centers for actual evacuees with special needs during a real emergency, since: (a) such personnel were not actually sent to any special reception center facilities during the exercise (all the referenced facilities were only
" simulated" reception centers in any event since none of them participated in the exercise); and (b) there was no demonstration i
that the LILCO personnel were capable of (i) performing the i necessary registration and monitoring of the number of evacuees with special needs likely to be taken to such facilities, or (ii) otherwise properly implementing necessary procedures for registering, monitoring and decontaminating evacuees at such
facilities, even assuming arouendo that facilities for use as special facility reception centers exist. Accordingly, the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).
Contention EX 48. Not admitted.
Contention EX 49. The exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that LILCO is incapable of performing neces-sary registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> as required by NUREG 0654 S II.J.12. For the reasons set forth below, during the exercise LILCO demonstrated that it has insufficient staffing, and insufficient equipment, to perform the necessary registration, monitoring and decontamination of evacuees which is required to effect an evacuation and to comply with 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(1), (b)(8), (b)(10). Therefore, LILCO does not satisfy objective FIELD 21 and its Plan is fundamentally flawed since it has no capacity to handle satisfactorily the evacuees that may arrive after a Shoreham emergency.
EX 49.A. [EX 31 will be dealt with under this suboart].
! Although the Plan asserts that LILCO personnel assigned to the reception center to perform radiological monitoring will monitor one evacuee every ninety seconds (OPIP 3.9.2 S 5.4.7), in fact during the exercise this procedure frequently took up to five minutes per evacuee. At that actual monitoring rate, the 78 i
monitors assigned to the reception center in the Plan could i
]
I
monitor only 11,232 evacuees in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (assuming no breaks, and assuming all monitors were constantly available and monitoring).
This is far less than the 32,000 evacuees which LILCO used to believe might be directed to the Coliseum and demonstrates the fundamental flaw in LILCO's planning for evacuees needing monitoring and decontamination. In fact,'during the exercise, LILCO in simulated EBS messages advised over 100,000 evacuees (i.e., all those in zones A, B, F, G, K, and Q) to report to the Nassau Coliseum for radiological monitoring because they had been potentially exposed to radiation during their simulated evacuation trips. Clearly, under the LILCO Plan, even assuming that no persons other than those advised to do so by LILCO actually report to the reception center for monitoring and, if necessary, decontamination, such a number of anticipated evacuees could not be monitored in a timely fashion -- i.e., within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
EX 31. [Not separately admitted but will be subsumed under suboart A of EX 49). The Reception Center ARCA refers to the fact that it took LERO personnel four to five minutes to monitor an individual evacuee, as opposed to 90 seconds as presumed in OPIP 3.9.2 S 5.4.7. FEMA Report at 31. According to the LILCO Plan, 78 monitors are expected to perform the radiological l monitoring of all evacuees who report to the Reception Center.
OPIP 4.2.3 S 5.5.1. During the exercise approximately 100,000 persons were advised in simulated EBS messages to report to the Coliseum for monitoring. At the rate of 4 minutes per evacuee the 78 monitors would need approximately 35 hours4.050926e-4 days <br />0.00972 hours <br />5.787037e-5 weeks <br />1.33175e-5 months <br /> to perform the monitoring required by NUREG 0654 S II.J.12. Thus, this deficiency precludes a finding that LILCO has sufficient staff to respond as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(1). It also precludes z.
finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures
) can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.
EX 49.B. Furthermore, the LILCO proposal to telephone INPO, other power plants, and other entities to obtain additional moni-toring personnel, and the other features of the purported " alter-3 nate" monitoring plan in OPIP 4.2.3, S 5.11, were not implemented or demonstrated during the exercise. Such entities did not par-ticipate in the exercise nor was there any demonstration of the capability of those entities either to provide the personnel or
} equipment which LILCO players pretended would be available, or to provide them in a timely manner. In addition, FEMA did not evaluate the adequacy or implementability of any such proposals during the exercise. See FEMA Report at 81. Thus, the exercise provides no basis to find that such proposals could be implemented, cr. even if they could, that they would result in an l ability to perform the necessary monitoring of the number of evacuees anticipated to report to the reception center.
EX 49.C. There is no basis to assume that only those perscns expressly advised by LERO to report to the reception center for monitoring because of potential exposure during evacuation activities would actually seek such monitoring.
Indeed, upon hearing that all residents of so many zones had potentially been exposed, and in light of the large amount of
voluntary evacuation likely to occur for the reasons set forth in Contention EX 44, substantially more people than the number expressly advised to report would be likely to seek such monitoring. Thus, the LILCO response would, in fact, be even more 3 deficient than was demonstrated during the exercise.
For the foregoing reasons, the LILCO Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(1), (b)(8), (b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S II.J.12. The exercise thus precludes a finding of reasonable 3
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).
XI. CONTENTION EX 50: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN LILCO'S TRAINING PROGRAM Contention EX 50. [The alleoed mistakes related to trainina raised in EX 42 will be dealt with under EX 50; and bases for EX 45 are consolidated with EX 50]. The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's Plan is fundamentally flawed in that members of LERO, as well as the personnel of various organizations upon which LILCO relies for implementation of the Plan, are unable to carry out effectively or accurately the LILCO Plan because of inadequate training.
Under the LILCO Plan, LILCO is responsible for the training and retraining of both LILCO and non-LILCO personnel in LERO.
Training began in 1983 and, since that time, has consisted of classroom instruction, tabletop sessions, and drills / exercises.
Plan at 5.1-1 thru 5.2-7 and Figs. 5.1.1, 5.2.1; OPIP 5.1.1.
i i
LILCO requires all LILCO members of LERO to participate in its
~
training' program on an annual basis. Plan at 5.1-1, 5.1-7 and 5.1-8; OPIP 5.1.1. At a minimum, this requires each LILCO worker in LERO, each year, to attend classroom instruction sessions on seven emergency response training modules and to participate in i at least one tabletop session / drill / exercise; on average, how-
- ever, LILCO personnel are required, each year, to attend class-
! room instruction sessions on nine. modules and to participate in l :I i three tabletop sessions /drilld/ exercises. Plan, Figs. 5.1.1 and 5.2.1; OPIP 5.1.1. Thus, as of the time of the February 13 exer-cise, the bulk of LILCO's LERO personnel had already undergone almost three years of training by LILCO involving, on average, classroom instruction on a total of 27 training mi '. ales and participation in nine tabletop sessions / drills / exercises.
The large number of training deficiencies revealed during l the exercise collectively demonstrate LILCO's lack of compliance with 10 CFR.S 50.47(b)(14) and (15) and NUREG 0654, S II.N and O, and violations of LILCO's Plan and procedures (chiefly OPIP 5.1.1), as well as LILCO's overall inability to implement'the i
LILCO Plan and procedures as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).
, In its April 17, 1985 Partial Initial Decision, the-ASLB found ,
i that the "LILCO Plan training program meets the regulatory i standards," but that conclusion was expressly:
)
. made subject to confirmation by a finding, to be made by FEMA after a graded exercise, that 4
the Plan can be satisfactorily. implemented
] with the training program submitted and that LILCO possesses an adequate number of trained LERO workers.
1 4
21 NRC 644, 756. No such findings have been made by FEMA; in fact, as noted below, in its Report FEMA identified a significant number of training deficiencies. The exercise results thus dis-close fundamental flaws in LILCO's training program which pre-clude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emer-gency.
Every instance of a LILCO training deficiency revealed during the exercise is net described at length in this contention because they are so numerous; virtually every error made by a LILCO player during the exercise involved to some degree a fail-ure of the LILCO training program to prepare personnel adequately to perform necessary actions. Thus, each " deficiency" and each "ARCA" identified by FEMA, plus each additional error committed during the exercise and identified in other contentions, provides a basis for the Governments' allegation that the exercise results demonstrate a fundamental flaw in LILCO's training program.
Because such errors are all identified elsewhere, in the interest of brevity and to avoid needless repetition, in subparts A-I below, the Governments use cross-references to identify specific examples of the training deficiencies which support this contention.3 3 References in the subparts to FEMA deficiencies ("D") and ARCAs are to Table 3.1 in tne FEMA Report, where the deficiencf.es and ARCAs are numbered and identified by LILCO facility. Herein the Port Jefferson Staging Area is referred to as "PJSA"; the Riverhead and Patchogue Staging Areas as "RSA" and "PSA"; and the Reception Center as "RC."
EX 50.A. 'The exercise demonstrated.that the LILCO program has not successfully or effectively trained or prepared LERO personnel to respond properly, appropriately, or effectively to unanticipated and unrehearsed situations likely to arise in an emergency. Exercise actions and events which support this alle-gation are described in Contentions EX 38, EX 39, EX 41, and EX 42, and in the following FEMA Comments: EOC-D-1; ENC-D-1; PSA- !
D-1; PSA-D-6; R-D-2; EOC-ARCAs-2, 3, 9; ENC-ARCA-2; PSA-ARCAs-5, 4
7, 8, 9, 10, 11.
EX 50.B. The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's training i program has been ineffective in instructing LERO personnel to follow and implement the LILCO Plan and LILCO procedures, and in imparting basic knowledge and information essential to the ability to implement such procedures. Exercise actions and events which support this allegation are described in Contentions EX 33, EX 35-39, EX 41, EX 42, EX 45, EX 49, and in the following FEMA conclusions: EOC-D-1; ENC-D-1; R-D-2; PSA-D-6; EOC-ARCAs 2,.
5, 6, 7, 9; PJSA-ARCA-1; PSA-ARCAs 3, 4, 7, 8; , 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16; R-ARCAs 4, 5, 6; RC ARCA 1.
i EX 50.C. [The alleoed missteo described in EX 23 will be considered under this suboart]. The exercise demonstrated that thg LILCO training program has.not successfully'or effectively trained LERO personnel to wommunicate necessary and sufficient data and information, to inquire and obtain such information, or to recognize the need to do so. Exercise actions and events 4
which support this allegation are described in Contentions-EX 34,
- i
36, 38, 39, EX 41, EX 42, EX 45, and in the following FEMA con-clusions: EOC-D-1; ENC-D-1; EOC-ARCAs 4, 5, 6, 7, 9; ENC-ARCA 2; PSA-ARCA E, 9, 11, 12; R-ARCA 1.
EX 23. [Not seoarately admitted but will be considered under suboart C of EX 50]. EOC ARCA 5 refers to a 2.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> delay by LILCO personnel in correcting the error of reporting extrapolated dose data as actual measurements at other distances.
FEMA Report at 41. This violates OPIP 3.5.2 and, depending upon the particular numbers involved in the error, could result in substantially erroneous dose projections and wholly inappropriate protective action recommendations. Thus, this deficiency precludes a finding that actual and potential offsite consequences of an accident are accurately assessed, and tnat appropriate protective actions can and will be chosen during an accident, as required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(9) and (b)(10). It, therefore, precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in a Shoreham accident.
EX 50.D. The exercise demonstrated that.LILCO's training program has not successfully or effectively trained LERO personnel to . follow directions given by superiors during an emergency. Exercise actions and events which support this allegation are described in Contentions EX 41, EX 42, EX 45 and in the following FEMA conclusions: EOC-D-1; PSA-D-6; PJSA-ARCA j 1; PSA-ARCAs 9, 13, 16; R-ARCAs 4, 6; RC-ARCA 1.
l l
EX 50.E. The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's training 4 program has not successfully or effectively trained LERO per-sonnel to exercise independent judgment or good judgment, or to
! use common. sense in dealing with situations presented during an emergency or in implementing the LILCO Plan and procedures.
Exercise actions and events which support this allegation are
< described in Contentions EX 34, 36, 38-43, EX 45 and in the following FEMA conclusions: EOC-D-1; PSA-D-1; RD-2; EOC-ARCAs 2, 3, 9; ENC-ARCA 2; PSA-ARCAs 5, 7, 8, 10, 12; R-ARCA 1.
2 EX 50.F. The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's training program has not successfully or effectively trained LERO per-sonnel to deal with the media or otherwise provide timely, ac-curate, consistent and nonconflicting information to the public, through the media, during an emergency. Exercise actions and events which support-this allegation are described in Contentions EX 37, EX 38, EX 40.C, and EX 43.A and in the following FEMA conclusions: ENC-D-1; ENC-ARCAs 2, 3.
~
i EX 50.G. The exercise demonstrated that LILCO has failed to provide training to persons and organizations relied upon for the ,
implementation of its Plan other than those employed by LILCO.
Exercise actions and events which support this allegation are i
described in Contentions EX 27, EX 28 and in the following FEMA conclusions: EOC-ARCAs 11, 12, 13, 14, 15. !
l EX 50.H. [The alleced errors described in EX 27 and 28 will l l
be dealt with under this suboart]. The exercise demonstrated that LERO training is deficient in the area of dosimetry, exposure control, KI, understanding of radiation terminolog'y, and
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l
related areas. Such training deficiencies are very serious i
because members of the public and non-LILCO personnel relied upon to respond to a Shoreham accident (for example, school officials, special facility personnel, and other individuals who are expected by LILCO to respond on an ad h2g basis) would seek information on such subjects from LERO personnel during a real emergency. Since LERO personnel do not understand and know how a to use dosimetry equipment and the related procedures, they would t
- be incapable of responding accurately or effectively concerning i those subjects to members of the public, or other workers ex-j pected to respond. The following exercise actions and events are examples cf dosimetry-related training deficiencies: Contentions EX 42, EX 45, FEMA Conclusions EOC-ARCAs 11, 12, 13, 14, 15; PJSA-ARCA 1; PSA-ARCAs 12, 13, 14, 15, 16; RSA-ARCAs 4, 5, 6.
EX 27. [Not separately admitted but will be dealt with under suboart H of EX 50]. EOC FIELD ARCAS 1, 3 and 5 refer to the fact that school bus drivers have had no training in dosime-try, use of potassium iodide or excess exposure authoriz'ation procedures and that LILCO has not provided dosimetry or supplies of KI for them. FEMA Report at 45-46. According to the LILCO Plan, school bus drivers are relied upon for implementation of the protective actions of early dismissal and evacuation of
-school children in the EPZ. OPIP 3.6.5. Thus, these deficien-I cies preclude a finding that protective actions for school chil-dren can and will be implemented as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10), that means are in place for controlling radio-logical exposure of emergency workers as required by 10 CFR l t
, ., , . - - ---,-- --. . - . . ~ . , - , _ _ . , - . . , , - - . . . - .
S 50.47(b)(ll), or that radiological emergency response training has been provided to those called upon to assist in an emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(15). They also preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.
EX 28. [Not seoarately admitted but will be dealt with under suboart H of EX 50]. EOC FIELD ARCA 4 refers to the fact that ambulette drivers are not all trained in excessive exposure authorization and procedures. FEMA Report at 46. According to the LILCO Plan, ambulette drivers are relied upon for implementa-tion of the protective action of evacuation for special facility residents and the homebound. OPIP 3.6.5. Thus, this deficiency precludes a finding that protective actions for special facility residents and the homebound can and will be implemented as re-quired by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10), that means are in place for con-trolling radiological exposure of emergency workers as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(ll), or that radiological emergency response training has been provided to those called upon to assist in an emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(15). The deficiency !
also precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.
EX 50.I. The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's proposals to modify training materials or procedures to " emphasize" such .
' things as " accurate use of field data," the need "to relay instructions," "the need to be more precise with information," or )
other matters already in the procedures and training materials (ggg letter dated June 20, 1986, from John Leonard to Harold Denton (SNRC-1269), Encl. 1) -- training materials and procedures which have been so unsuccessful for three years -- would not correct the flaws revealed by the exercise.
EX 45.A. LILCO's response to the two free play impediment messages involved numerous serious communicatians failures which played a major role in LILCO's inability to remove the simulated impediments as provided in the Plan, and as would be necessary to implement an evacuation. In addition, the types of actions which, as described below, LERO personnel failed to take in response to the impediment messages are similar to those that would be required under the LILCO Plan in response to many other situations which would occur in substantial numbers during a real emergency. Therefore, these failures are significant and preclude the reasonable assurance finding required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Specifically:
(i) The Evacuation Coordinator, who is respons.ible for coordinating all evacuation traffic control, evacuation transportation, and evacuation implementation (OPIP 2.1.1) was never informed by LERO personnel of either of the free play impediment messages, contrary to OPIP 3.6.3 which requires such communication. The Evacuation Route Coordinator was giv 2n 'he fuel truck impediment message at 11:00 and the gravel truck impediment message at 10:40. The Evacuation Coordinator was not ,
informed of either one, however, until after 12:13, when he was informed by the FEMA controller. See FEMA Report at 36. The
late notification of the Evacuation Coordinator, as well as the lack of status updates and other necessary communications between and among the Evacuation Route Coordinator, the Traffic Control Coordinator, the Road Logistics Coordinator, the Transportation Support Coordinator, Lead Traffic Guides, Road Crews, Evacuation Route Spotters, and Evacuation Support Communicators, as required j , by OPIP 3.6.3, led to the substantial delays and ultimate inability to respond adequately to the impediments. In fact, the delays caused by such failures would have been even greater in an actual emergency, since in the exercise LERO never even discovered its errors; rather, it was the FEMA controller who alerted LERO to the problem LERO itself had created.
! (ii) LERO personnel at the EOC failed to include essential information communicated to them via the free play impediment messages on LERO message forms, nor did they otherwise communicate such critical data to the other LERO personnel expected to respond to the impediments. as required by OPIP 3.6.3 and OPIP 4.1.2. Seg FEMA Report at 30. For example, important information was not included on the 10:45 LERO message from the Evacuation Route Coordinator to the Evacuation Support Communicator for Route Spotters / Road Crews regarding the gravel truck impediment, including the fact that three passenger cars were involved in the accident. Similarly, essential information ;
was not included on the 11:06 LERO message from the Evacuation l Route Coordinator to the Route Spotter / Road Crew Communicator I
regarding the fuel truck impediment, including that fuel was leaking, that there was the possibility of fire, and that both l l
1 l
i
l shoulders of the road were blocked. Egg FEMA Report at 30. l Because of these failures, the equipment eventually sent to respond to the gravel truck impediment was inappropriate and l inadequate to remove the simulated obstruction, and the equipment eventually sent to respond to the fuel truck impediment was so substantially delayed that LILCO's response was not observed by FEMA. FEMA Report at 37, 39, 57-58.
(iii) The Evacuation Coordinator and other LERO personnel were not properly informed concerning a " visual check" of the fuel. truck impediment received by the Transportation Support Coordinator from the Bus Dispatcher at the Patchogue Staging Area, and appropriate actions therefore were not taken in respopee, contrary to OPIP 3.6.3 and OPIP 4.1.2, until more than '
three hcurs after the free play message had been injected. See FEMA Repoic at 30, 57.
(iv) LERO personnel were unable to locate, communicate with, or timely dispatch a Route Spotter to investigate and verify the fuel truck impediment. They were also unable to determine whether one had actually been dispatched. Thus, at about 11:15, the Route Spotter / Road Crew Communicator requested the Port Jefferson Evacuation Support Communicator to determine whether a Route Spotter had been dispatched as required under the Plan, and as apparently assumed by the LERO players. The spotter was not in fact dispatched until about 12:02. See FEMA Report at 37.
(v) Although the FEMA controller had informed LERO personnel of their initial errors in dealing with the gravel and fuel truck impediments at about 12:13, and despite the fact that the Evacuation Coordinator had discussed the situation with some of his staff at about 12:16, as,of 12:40, the Transportation Support Coordinator still had not been informed that bus evacuation route M-1 was potentially blocked by the gravel truck, contrary to OPIP 3.6.3. And, las late as 1:48, the Road Logistics 1
Coordinator hAd not been informed that there might be a need to send equipment to the site of the fuel truck impediment. Egg FEMA Report at 36. Thus, the initial errors, omissions, and failures to follow procedures and accurately transmit information were compounded by additional errors even after the first errors had been identified for LERO by FEMA. These later errors further illustrate the significance of LERO's inability to obtain and transmit essential information, since they had demonstrable impact on other aspects of the overall emergency response.
(vi) As a result of the numerous failures and delays in ihternal LERO communications, information concerning the road impediments and the need to avoid the blocked evacuation routes was not communicated to the public until 1:46 when EBS message number 8 was simulated. This further demonstrates the impact of LERO's ccmmunications failures upon its ability to implement its Plan.
EX 45.B. The response of LERO personnel to the Ridge Elementary School free play message also demonstrates LILCO's inability to communicate essential information to appropriate 4
response personnel in a timely manner, as required by OPIP 3.6.5.
The free play message requesting LERO to provide a bus and driver to assist in transporting 40 children from Ridge Elementary School was given to the Evacuation Coordinator at the LERO EOC at approximately 10:30. The request was communicated to the Special Population Bus Dispatcher at the Patchogue Staging Area within about 10 minutes, but in violation of OPIP 3.6.5, the staging area personnel did not respond appropriately or quickly in processing the communication. As a result, the bus driver was not even dispatched to a bus yard to pick up a bus for 40 minutes. Egg FEMA Report at 38, 66. Furthermore, there were no apparent efforts by LERO personnel to follow up on their dispatch orders during the approximately three hour period prior to the report that the driver had arrived at the school. Finally, LERO's inability to contact, communicate with, or even locate the LERO bus driver, when as of 4:23 he had still not arrived at the Reception Center, further demonstrates LILCO's inability to obtain or follow up on the absence of information critical to the implementation of a required protective action.
EX 45.7. LERO was unable to notify or communicate emergency information to the FAA or the LIRR, despite the provisions in OPIP 3.6.3 requiring notification of the FAA in order to have air traffic diverted from the EPZ, and the obvious need to have the LIRR divert its trains from the EPZ. The failure of LERO ,
i personnel to perform these tasks evidences their inability to e
appropriately process, act upon, and communicate emergency l, information. See FEMA Report at 29. -
. . - ...~:
EX 45.D. Communications relating to release data and dose projections were not handled properly cr accurately as required by OPIP 3.6.1. For example, LERO personnel failed to designate clearly on the EOC dose assessment status boards the distinctions between DOE RAP monitoring data and LILCO field monitoring data.
See FEMA Report at 29-30. This failure demonstrates not only an inability to effectively communicate important dose information and potentially significant distinctions between the information from the two sources, but also an inability to recognize the significance of that distinction, contrary to the requirements of OPIP 3.6.1. Similarly, downwind distances of sample readings by field monitors were incorrectly reported as 7000 meters instead of 700 meters for a thyroid dose. This error resulted in an initial calculation of thyroid dose as 900 mrem /hr at 4.3 miles downwind, instead of 9000 mrem /hr at about 0.5 miles downwind.
See FEMA Report at 33. And, at the EOC, several extrapolated doses at various distances were reported as actual measurements rather than as projected data on the dose assessment status board. It took two and one half hours to identify and correct this error. See FEMA Report at 33. These failures indicate a significant inattention to detail and accuracy in recording, processing, and communication of data critical to the accident assessment and protective action recommendation processes which are at the core of an emergency response. Such failures could lead to dangerous errors in a real emergency.
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EX 45.E. During the exercise, the LERO Director apparently left the " command room" on st eral occasions, and therefore was not available to take calls over the RECS telephone or the dedicated telephone. Since, pursuant to OPIP 3.1.1 and OPIP 3.3.1, data and information critical to command decisions are communicated by these means, his absence and resulting inability to obtain and act upon such d'ta a quickly was significant.
Moreover, the secretary who took the calls in the Director's absence merely told the callers that the Director would call back, and failed to take a message in writing and carry it to the Director immediately upon completion of the transmission. Final-ly, LERO failed to have key ~ events or evacuation status boards in the EOC command room. Thus, updated information on the status of the emergency situation was not visible to LERO workers in those areas at all times. See FEMA Report at 30. These failures to obtain or communicate vital data, and to have updated information available and visible in the command rocm substantially impair the ability of command personnel to perform their duties under the Plan.
EX 45.F. There were numerous failures to obtain, process, communicate and appropriately act upon important emergency information and data demonstrated by the performance of LERO ENC, Public Information and Rumor Conttul personnel, in violation of OPIP 3.8.1. These are detailed in Contentions EX 38 and EX 39.
The fact that.such persc.inel exhibited such communication
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t _
O
- inabilities is particularly significant since each individuals were purportedly selected for their LERO positions because of their communications expertise.
EX 45.G. LERO personnel at the staging areas evidenced an inability to accurately, appropriately or in a timely manner obtain, record, transmit, or act upon emergency data, in viola-tion of OPIPs 4.1.2, 3.6.3, 3.6.4, 3.6.5, and OPIP 3.9.1. For example:
(i) Personnel at the Riverhead Staging Area did not properly record or appropriately identify event status informa-tion on Emergency Event Status Forms or on status boards. Sgg FEMA Report at 72.
(ii) Communications between the Port Jefferson Staging Area and Traffic Guides was difficult due to poor radio recep-tion, and disrupted other essential communications from that Staging Area. See FEMA Report at 56. Such difficulties would be much more serious in an actual emergency when many more traffic guides would be attempting to make radio communications with the staging areas involved.
(iii) The Bus Dispatcher at the Patchogue Staging Area repeatedly made inaccurate and misleading announcements to bus drivers concerning the dose levels at which they were to call in.
These incorrect instructions concerning such important informa-tion in fact led to confusion on the part of the bus drivers, and could be very dangerous in a real emergency. See FEMA Report at 6o.
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e .
(iv) The Transfer Point Coordinator at the Brookhaven National Laboratory Transfer Point was unable to follow instruc-tions and transmit information and directions from the staging area to bus drivers during the exercise. For example, he di-rected a bus driver to the EWDF despite the fact that a message from the Bus Dispatcher to all Transfer Point Coordinators had directed that all drivers arriving at transfer points before 4:00 should be directed to the Nassau Coliseum Reception Center. See 0
FEMA Report at 65.
EX 45.H. LERO personnel at the EOC and staging areas were !
unable to transmit consistent or accurate information concerning assistance from the Suffolk County Police Department ("SCPD")
during the exercise. For example, at 9:19, the LERO Manager 5/as told by simulators purportedly representing Suffolk County.
officials that no County resources would be available to assist
- LILCO during the exercise. This fact was confirmed by the County simulators at 10:15, 10:26 and 10:36, according to the logs kept l However, at 9:20 the Evacua- i by the LERO Manager and Director.
tion Coordinator recorded in his log that the SCPD had offered to I provide LILCO whatever assistance was required, and the Traffic Control Coordinator was advised of this purported information at 9:35. At 10:02,# the Evacuation Coordinator notified the staging areas that the SCPD had offered assistance on traffic control,
~~
route alerting, and route spotting, and that police officers would be dispatched to the staging areas for briefings. And, ,
between 10:02 and 10:15, the Traffic Control Coordinator informed "
(i) the Riverhead Staging Area to expect 39 SCPD officers to
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report for assignment to traffic control and. route spotting functions; (ii) the Port Jefferson Staging Area to expect 74 SCPD officers and; (iii) the Patchogue Staging Area to expect 37 SCPD officers. These messages, all of which conflicted with the facts known and recorded by the LERO Manager and Director, were in turn transmitted to Lead Traffic Guides, Dosimetry Recordkeepers, and other staging area personnel. The erroneous information which had been communicated to the staging areas was not corrected until approximately 10:50. In a real emergency, such a total failure of communication could lead to serious problems.
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