ML20214J639

Response to Util Submission of Revised Std Version of Intervenors Exercise Contentions,Per Board 861113 Order. Submission Seriously Distorts Margulies Board 861003 Rulings & Must Be Rejected.Related Info Encl.W/Certificate of Svc

ML20214J639
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	11/24/1986
From:	Ashare M, Lanpher L, Latham S, Palomino F KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, NEW YORK, STATE OF, SOUTHAMPTON, NY, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY, TWOMEY, LATHAM & SHEA
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
CON-#486-1672 OL-5, NUDOCS 8612010377
Download: ML20214J639 (176)

Text

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- l /672-i DOCKETED U91PC November 24, 1986

, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFIE ' ' ,

Before the Atomic Safety and Licensinj0gdard, n

)

In the Matter of )

)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5

) (EP Exercise)

(Shoreham Nuclear Ucwer Station, )

Un'it 1) )

)

SUFFOLK COUNTY, STATE OF NEW YORK, AND TOWN OF SOUTHAMPTON RESPONSE TO "LILCO'S SUBMISSION OF THE ' REVISED STANDARD VERSION' OF THE INTERVENORS' EXERCISE CONTENTIONS" P

s Pursuant to tne Licensing Board's November 13, 1986, Order, Suffolk County, the State of New York, and the Town of Southampton (" Governments") respond to LILCO's Submission of the

" Revised Standard Version" of the Intervenor.s' Exercise j Contentions. For reasons discussed below, the Governments submit that LILCO's submission seriously distorts the October 3 rulings of the Margulies Board and must be rejected.

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The Governments will not discuss each contention separately,

' since the Governments' views on the Margulies Board's rulings have already been expressed in detail in earlier filings.1

1 In particular, the Board is referred to the Governments' i November 10, 1986, filing wherein the Governments documented in l

(footnote continued) l

) ..

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8612010377 861124 l

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However, several more general comments are in order. First, LILCO has omitted in its version all contentions which were ,

denied admission, even when objections to those rulings are  ;

pending. Such selective reproduction by LILCO clearly assumes that no objections will be granted -- an assumption that no party can make in advance of this Board's ruling. Thus, the preferred way to proceed with any revised version of the Governments' contentions is to reproduce all of the contentions, with appropriate notations regarding those contentions which as of now have been denied admission. This was what was done in the earlier emergency planning litigation when the Governments on January 12, 1984, modified their earlier contentions to reflect Revision 3 of LILCO's Plan.2 It should be done again in this instance. This has the additional benefit of maintaining in a single document all of the issues that have been proposed for (footnote continued from previous page) detail that the Margulies Board's October 3 Order plainly ruled that many " denied" contentions were in fact subsumed into or consolidated with other contentions. See Suffolk County, State of New York and Town of Southampton Response to " Federal Emergency Management Agency's Motion to Reconsider Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Prehearing Conference Order Dated October 3, 1986, and Memorandum and Supporting Affidavit in Support of That Motion and attachment thereto."

2 Egg Proposed Emergency Planning Contentions Modified to Reflect Revision 3 of the LILCO Plan, January 12, 1984. In the January 12, 1984, filing, the Governments reproduced all contentions, including those that had been rejected in the Licensing Board's August 19, 1983, Prehearing Conference Order.

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litigation. The Governments thus submit a revised copy of the August 1, 1986, exercise contentions with the October 3 rulings of the Margulies Board noted thereon.3 Consistent with the January 12, 1984, filing, the Governments note all new material by underlining the additions.

Any material which is deleted is left in the contentions but a dashed line is run through it. Where whole contentions or parts have been denied admission, we have not inser ed a dashed line but, rather, have noted at the start of the contention or subpart that it has been denied admission by inserting the following:

[Not admitted by ASLB].4 Second, the Governments must stress that some of LILCO's so-called revisions to the exercise contentions constitute nothing more than an out-and-out effort by LILCO to get the Frye Board eo reverse the Margulies Board's rulings without ever having filed any objections. LILCO's effort violates the rules and this Board should not be a party to it. For example, Contention EX 50 involves deficiencies in LILCO's training 3 Copies of the revised version are being served on the Board, counsel, and the NRC's Docketing and Service Branch.

4 The Governments note that LILCO's version of the contentions is particularly difficult to review because while it is clear where LILCO has left out whole contentions or subparts, it is far more difficult to detect LILCO's internal editing where it has deleted cross references and made other similar changes. Eeg, for example, LILCO's editing of Contention EX 50 where certain cross references are deleted. This is all the more reason that any revision of the contentions should follow the Governments' format which is attached hereto.

program. It was admitted in its entirety by the Margulies Board.

Egg October 3 Order at 27-30. Contention EX 50 references other contentions, including Contention EX 45. The Margulies Board made clear that while it would hear evidence only a single time, such cross references were proper. Further, the Board expressly noted that other contentions had been consolidated with EX 50.

Egg October 3 Order at 29. Contention EX 45 is one such J

contention, since the Margulies Board stated: "The bases cited in EX~45 are therefore consolidated with EX 50." October 3 Order at 27. Yet, when LILCO produced its version of the contentions, Contention EX 45 is not included and the references to EX 45 in Contention EX 50 are also omitted. The effect of LILCO's

" reading" of the# October 3 Order is obvious: LILCO is attempting '

to cut back vastly on the scope of EX 50 despite the unmistakable intent of the Margulies Board that the bases set forth in EX 45 would be consolidated with EX 50. One does not " consolidate" the bases of one contention with another by removing all references to the contention which is being consolidated.

Another example of why this Board must not accept LILCO's

, new version of the contentions is its handling of Subpart L of l

Contention EX 15. Subpart L of EX 15 concerns congregate care centers and LILCO's failure during the exercise to activate any of the centers that had previously been relied upon. The Margulies Board ruled that Subpart L (along with EX 32) would be subsumed in EX 21. October 3 Order at 11, 17. EX 21, as presently written, does not mention congregate care centers. In i

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LILCO's version, it omits Subpart L of EX 15, omits EX 32, and places no reference to congregate care centers in EX 21. LILCO's intent is obvious: get rid of congregate care center issues altogether. But that clearly was not the Margulies Board's intent: it decided Subpart L of EX 15 and EX 32 were proper but should be litigated as an additional Subpart of EX 21. Indeed, on EX 32, the Margulies Board made its intent clear: "[T]his contention will be deemed an additional basis for Contention

" Again, therefore, the EX 21 . . . . October 3 Order at 17.

Governments must object strenuously to LILCO's new version.5 LILCO's treatment of subpart C of Contention EX 18 is similarly clearly objectionable. The Margulies Board stated:

"(W]e will admit one of its bases as a further clarification and specification of the matters admitted in Contention EX 15 or Contention EX 16. Basis C is admissible as detailing further deficiencies in the exercise." October 3 Order at 12 (Emphasis added). LILCO omits EX 18.C in its entirety. That is completely l inconsistent with the October 3 Order.

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j 5 In connection with the congregate care center issue, the Governments note a seeming inconsistency in the October 3 Order.

The Margulies Board indicated in its ruling on Contention EX 16 that Subpart N dealing with congregate care centers would be subsumed in the cooresponding portion of Contention EX 15.

i October 3 Order at 12. The corresponding portion of EX 16.N is EX 15.L, which the Board ruled would be handled as an additonal basis of Contention EX 21. Eeg October 3 Order at 11. The Governments assume, therefore, that EX 16 N should also be considered as part of an additional portion of EX 21 and have so provided in the attached revision of the exercise contentions.

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s i

A final example of deficiencies in LILCO's version of the contentions concerns EX 31. The Board stated that the matter alleged in EX 31 "will be subsumed under Contention EX 49, basis A admitted below." October 3 Order at 17. And later, in dealing with EX 49, the Board stated: [W]e also combine the matters alleged under Contention EX 31 with Contention EX 49 and will hear them tocether as Contention EX 49." October 3 Order at 29 (Emphasis added). But, again, LILCO omits EX 31 entirely and makes no notation that EX 49 includes the matters raised in EX 31. LILCO's omission cannot under any circumstances be squared with a fair reading of the October 3 Order.

The Governments will not detail the further deficiencies in LILCO's version of the Contentions. Suffice it to say, however, that LILCO's version is completely at odds with the October 3 Order. LILCO's version should be rejected.

The Governments finally note that,until the Board has ruled on objections to contentions and clarified the status of various

" denied" contentions, it is not possible to come up with a

" final" version of the exercise contentions. The full set of the August 1 contentions, as well as the revised version submitted herewith, are on the Governments' word processor. When the Board finally rules on the issues, the Governments are prepared to revise the contentions one last time -- republishing the entire

t set but with any Board rulings noted thereon in the manner which we have done.in today's submission. .

Respectfully submitted, Martin Bradley Ashare Suffolk County Attorney Building 158 North County Complex Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788 Herbert H. Brown /

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Lawrence Coe Lanpher Karla J. Letsche KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART 1900 M Street, N.W., Suite 800 Washington, D.C. 20036 Attorneys for Suffolk County Fa & a;, G % a ( p f, d '

Fabian G. Palomino Special Counsel to the Governor of the State of New York Executive Chamber, Room 229 Capitol Building Albany, New York 12224 Attorney for Mario M. Cuomo, Governor of the State of New York

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Stephen B. Latham Twomey, Latham & Shea P.O. Box 398 33 West Second Street Riverhead, New York 11901 Attorney for the Town of Southampton Dated: November 24, 1986

- . . . - . . _ _ _ ,  ? 1

Auoust 1, 1986, revised as of November 24, 1986 EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS RELATING ,

TO THE FEBRUARY 13, 1986 EXERCISE I. CONTENTIONS EX l-7: LILCO'S LACK OF LEGAL AUTHORITY IS A FUNDAMENTAL FLAW Preamble to Contentions Ex l-7 LILCO has no authority to implement its Plan. Cuomo v. Lona Island Lichtina Co., Consol. Ind. No. 84-4615 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,

slip op., Feb. 20, 1985) and Partial Declaratory Judgment entered March 28, 1985, amoeal nendinc.1 In permitting the exercise to 1 The Partial Declaratory Judgment entered against LILCO decreed that "the contested acts, enumerated more fully in the (C]omplaints, contemolated by LILCO in imolementino its Plan, are acts which are inherently governmental in nature and are embraced by the State's police powers and are therefore prohibited."

(Emphasis supplied). The Complaints challenge LILCO's legal authority to carry out the following specific functions, among others:

1. Exercise of basic command and control functions in the offsite area during a nuclear emergency;

2. Determination of how to protect the health, safety and welfare of persons within the plume exposure pathway and ingestion pathway EPZs;

3. Determination of whether EPZ residents should be evacuated or sheltered and, if so, where and how and communication of LILCO's recommendations concerning evacuation or sheltering to the general public;

4. Declaration of a public emergency, notification of the public concerning the emergency and communication of LILCO's recommendations concerning the emergency and all protective actions to the general public;

5. Direction of any evacuation effort and control and management of evacuation traffic;

6. Determination of protective measures throughout the ingestion pathway concerning food, produce and other health and safety issues and notification of the public (footnote continued)

go forward, the Commission mistakenly asserted that the exercise would test only those elements of the Plan that "LILCO may law-fully do on its own." NRC Memorandum and Order, Jan. 30, 1986, at 3-4. In fact, the exercise involved a purported attempted demonstration of LILCO's ability to perform activities (i) that had been challenged by the Governments in the Cuomo litigation, (ii) that were embraced by the New York State Supreme Court's finding that LILCO had no legal authority to implement its Plan, and (iii) that LILCO cannot legally carry out under the Cuomo decision or the Partial Declaratory Judgment entered therein.

The exercise results demonstrated fundamental flaws in the Plan, because the exercise demonstrated the importance of functions that are included in the Plan, as exercised, but that LILCO has no authority to perform. Indeed, the LILCO Plan, as exercised, could only be implemented if LILCO carried out the functions (such as basic command and control) which the Cuomo court ruled were beyond LILCO's power to perform. Since the LILCO Plan, as exercised, cannot be implemented absent LILCO's performance of these prohibited functions, and since LILCO cannot actually perform those functions, the exercise results demon-strate a fundamental flaw in LILCO's Plan, i.e., that the Plan, as exercised, cannot be implemented. Accordingly, neither the Plan nor the exercise provides the predicate for the reasonable (footnote continued from previous page) concerning such measures.

County of Suffolk v. LILCO Complaint, 1 17; Cuomo v. LILCO Complaint, 1 Fifteenth; Town of Southamoton v. LILCO Complaint, 1 19.

assurance finding required under the NRC's emergency planning regulations. Egg 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). The functions that are embraced by the Plan and the exercise and that are beyond LILCO's legal authority as defined by Cuomo v. LILCO include the fol-lowing:

CONTENTION EX 1. [Not admitted by ASLB]. The exercise attempted to demonstrate LILCO's ability to carry out the basic command and control functions outlined in the Plan. Sgg, e.g.,  ;

objectives EOC 8, 9, 14-21; FIELD 6, 10, 11, 12, 21; SA 6, 8, 9; EOF 3, which are set forth in the FEMA Post Exercise Assessment

(" FEMA Report"), April 17, 1986, at 9-15; Long Island Lighting Company, Shoreham Emergency Preparedness Drill Scenario, No. 8 -

Final (" Scenario"), Section 1.1.C. LILCO has no authority to exercise basic command and control functions in the offsite area during a nuclear emergency. Egg Cuomo v. LILCO, slip op. at p.

4, 1 2; Partial Declaratory Judgment, 1 2. In view of the necessity under the LILCO Plan, as exercised, for LILCO to perform such command and control functions, and in view of LILCO's lack of authority to carry out the basic command and control functions set forth in the Plan, the exercise results demonstrate that the Plan cannot be implemented, which precludes the required finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken or that the ,

Plan can be implemented. 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1) and (a)(2).

Moreover, LILCO's Plan, as exercised, fails to comply with NRC emergency planning regulations. 10 CFR S 50.47(b); 10 CFR Part i

i

50, App. E $$ IV.A and B; NUREG 0654 SS II.A.1-4. Accordingly, the exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in LILCO's Plan, because that Plan, as exercised, requires LILCO to perform command and control functions that are beyond LILCO's legal authority.

CONTENTION EX 2. [Not admitted by ASLB]. The exercise attempted to demonstrate LILCO's ability to make and implement 0

decisions on health, safety, and welfare protective actions for the general public and to communicate those decisions to the public at large, all in accordance with the Plan. Egg, gzg2, objectives EOC 12, 15, 21; FIELD 5; Scenario SS 1.1.C, 1.1.D, 1.1.F.1. LILCO has no authority to decide on basic protective actions, to communicate its decisions to the public or to implement its decisions as to how best to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the general public. Egg Cuomo v. LILCO, slip op. at p. 4, 1 5; Partial Declaratory Judgment, 1 2.

LILCO's lack of authority to make, communicate and implement health, safety, and welfare protective action decisions in accordance with its Plan precludes the required finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken or that the Plan can be implemented. 10

-CFR SS 50.47(a)(1) and (a)(2). Moreover, LILCO's Plan, as exer-cised, fails to comply with NRC emergency planning regulations.

10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(1), (b)(5), and (b)(6); 10 CFR Part 50, App. E S IV.D; NUREG 0654 SS II.E.5, 6, F.1, J.9, 10 and 11.

Accordingly, the exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in

i LILCO's Plan because that Plan, as exercised, requires LILCO to make, communicate and implement protective action decisions for the public that are beyond LILCO's legal authority.

CONTENTION EX 3. [Not admitted by ASLB]. The exercise attempted to demonstrate LILCO's ability to make and implement decisions for the public at large with respect to evacuation or sheltering and the appropriate means of effecting such protective a

responses, together with LILCO's ability to communicate its decisions concerning evacuation or sheltering to the general public, all in accordance with the Plan. Egg, e.a., objectives EOC 8-11, 13-21; EOF 3; SA 8, 9; FIELD 5, 6, 9-16, 21; Scenario SS 1.1.C, 1.1.D, 1.1.F.1, 3. LILCO has no authority to determine whether residents of and transients within the plume exposure pathway EPZ should be evacuated or sheltered, or, if so, where

and how, nor does it have the authority to implement any such decisions. Egg Cuomo v. LILCO, slip op. at pp. 4-5, 11 3, 4, and 7; Partial Declaratory Judgment, 1 2. LILCO's lack of authority to make decisions concerning evacuation or sheltering and to communicate those decisions to the general public in accordance with its Plan precludes the required finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken or that the Plan can be implemented. 10 CFR ,

S 50.47(a)(1) and (a)(2). Moreover, LILCO's Plan, as exercised, fails to comply with NRC emergency planning regulations. 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(5), (b)(6) and (b)(10); 10 CFR Part 50, App. E S IV.D; NUREG 0654 SS II.E.5, 6, and J.9-ll. Accordingly, the 1

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exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in LILCO's Plan, because that Plan, as exercised, requires LILCO to make, communicate and implement evacuation or sheltering decisions for the general public that are beyond LILCO's legal authority.

CONTENTION EX 4. (Not admitted by ASLB). The exercise attempted to demonstrate LILCO's ability to assess the nature of a Shoreham accident and declare a public emergency, to notify the public concerning the emergency and to communicate its protective action recommendations to the public, all in accordance with the Plan. Egg objectives EOC 8, 21; FIELD 5; Scenario, SS 1.1.C, 1.1.D, 1.1.F.1, 1.2.8.6-7. LILCO has no authority to declare a public emergency, to notify the public concerning the existence of a radiological emergency or to communicate its recommendations concerning required protective actions to the public. Egg Cuomo

v. LILCO, slip op, at 4-5, 11 5, 6, and 7; Partial Declaratory Judgment, 1 2; 10 CFR Part 50, App. E S IV.D.3. LILCO's lack of authority to declare an emergency, to give public notice of the emergency and to communicate its protective recommendations to the public in accordance with the Plan precludes the required i finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protec-  ;

i tive measures can and will be taken or that the Plan can be im-plemented. 10 CFR SS 50.47(a)(1) and (a)(2). Moreover, LILCO's Plan, as exercised, fails to comply with NRC emergency planning regulations. 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5), (b)(6) and (b)(10); NUREG 0654 $$ II.E.5 and 6. Accordingly, the exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in LILCO's Plan, because that Plan, as exer-1 l

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cised, requires LILCO to make, communicate, and implement evacuation or sheltering decisions for the general public that are beyond LILCO's legal authority.

CONTENTION EX 5. (Not admitted by ASLR]. The exercise attempted to demonstrate LILCO's ability to recommend or order an evacuation of the plume exposure pathway EPZ, to direct evacuation traffic and to control and manage the evacuation effort. Sig e,q,, objectives EOC 8, 9, 13, 14, 16-21; EOF 3; SA 9; FIELD '?, 6, 9-16; Scenario S 1.1.C. LILCO has no authority to order a public evacuation, to direct traffic or to control or manage an evacuation of the general public. Cuomo v. LILCO, slip op. at 5, 11 8, 10; Partial Declaratory Judgment, 1 2. LILCO's lack of authority to order an evacuation of the offsite area, to direct traffic or to control and manage the evacuation effort precludes the required finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken or that the Plan can be implemented. 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1) and (a)(2).

Moreover, LILCO's Plan, as exercised, fails to comply with NRC emergency planning regulations. 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10); NUREG 0654 SS II.J.9-ll. Accordingly, the exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in LILCO's Plan, because that Plan, as exercised, requires LILCO to order or recommend an evacuation and to conduct evacuation management activities, including traffic direction functions, that are beyond LILCO's legal authority.

1

CONTENTION EX 6. (Not admitted by ASLB]. During the exercise LILCO attempted to demonstrate its ability to make and implement protective action determinations concerning milk-producing animals within that portion of the ingestion pathway EPZ which is within 10 miles of the Shoreham plant and to notify the public concerning its recommendations. Sag, e.g., FEMA Report at 26. LILCO has no authority to decide upon and imple-ment protective measures in the ingestion pathway EPZ concerning health and safety issues or to notify the public concerning such measures. Cuomo v. LILCO, slip op. at 5, 1 11; Partial Declara-tory Judgment, 1 2. LILCO's lack of authority to make protective action decisions for the ingestion pathway EPZ and to communicate those decisions to the general public precludes the required finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protec-tive measures can and will be taken or that the Plan can be implemented. 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1) and (a)(2). Moreover, LILCO's Plan, as exercised, fails to comply with NRC emergency planning regulations. 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(1) and (b)(10); NUREG 0654 SS II.J.ll. Accordingly, the exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in LILCO's Plan, because that Plan, as exercised, requires LILCO to decide upon, communicate, and carry out protective actions that are beyond LILCO's legal authority.

CONTENTION EX 7. [Not admitted by ASLB]. The exercise demonstrated that implementation of the LILCO Plan requires LILCO to. perform the police power functions inherent in the activities necessary to accomplish the exercise objectives asterisked by

FEMA (111 FEMA Report at 9-15), as well as others not asterisked by FEMA but which also are beyond LILCO's legal authority under Gugpo v. LILCO. Such objectives are listed below. Thus, during the exercise LILCO personnel pretended or attempted to satisfy these objectives because under the LILCO Plan the activities contemplated by such objectives were essential elements of the required response to the postulated accident. However, LILCO's lack of legal authority actually to perform the activities involved in satisfying such objectives means that LILCO, in fact, is incapable of satisfying them. Because the exercise demonstrated that the capability of performing the functions referenced in such objectives is a prerequisite to implementation I

of the LILCO Plan, the exercise results, in light of LILCO's lack of legal authority set forth in Cuomo, preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident -- i.e., the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed. The exercise objectives which LILCO is incapable of satisfying are: EOC 5, 6, 8-21; EOF 3; BHO 10; ENC

4. 7; SA 6, 7, 9; EWDF 3; and FIELD 5, 6, 9-16, 21.

II. CONTENTIONS EX 8-14: LACK OF ACTIVE GOVERNMENTAL PARTICIPATION IS A FUNDAMENTAL FLAW Preamble to Contentions Ex 8-14:

LILCO has previously asserted that the exercise of its Plan was intended to test its " realism" argument, i.e., that State and County governments would act in the event of a radiological accident at Shoreham and carry out emergency response functions.

1 Thus, LILCO has argued that the exercise was intended to demon-strate that LILCO's Plan can accommodate ad D,qq responses by governmental entities including, specifically, New York State and Suffolk County.

The exercise did not attempt to demonstrate the " emergency response capabilities" of State and local governments nor did it attempt to demonstrate that the governments could implement the LILCO Plan without any preplanning or training. That fact is incontrovertible in light of the exercise scenario and the Commission's prior statements: "[T]his exercise will assume that the State / local government will not activate their emergency powers and authorities: e,a., at no time will the State / local government assume responsibility for protective action decisions, or take actions to effect/ implement these decisions." Scenario, S 1.3.D, at 1-21. Similarly, the NRC described the passive role assigned to " simulated" State and local government officials in the exercise as follows:

[F]ederal employees will play the role of (state and local governmental) officials during the Exercise. Through this role playing, the NRC is attempting to evaluate LERO's capabilities (1) to accommodate the presence of state and local offi-cials, (2) to support those officials using the resources available through LERO, and (3) to pro-vide those officials with sufficient information to carry out their state and county responsibili-l ties. These 'accors,' however, will be instructed not to olav decision-makino roles, not to assume any command and control authority, not to interact with members of the public so as to lead anyone to believe that they are actually county officials and not to actually oerform any state or local functions exclusively reserved to state or county officials by state or county laws.

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NRC Memorandum and Order, Jan. 30, 1986, at 5. (Emphasis supplied).

The exercise thus did not test the active emergency response participation by State and local government officials. And FEMA noted that it "cannot measure the capabilities and preparedness of State and local governments if called upon to respond." FEMA Report at 3. Therefore, by definition, the exercise cannot pro-

. vide any basis for a reasonable assurance finding with respect to b

the " emergency response capabilities" of such governments or LERO's ability to accommodate the active, ad h2E Participation by State or local governments in emergency response activities in the event of a radiological accident at Shoreham. Thus, consid-ered in the light of LILCO's " realism" argument and its premise of active State and local government participation, the exercise demonstrated fundamental flaws in the following particulars:

CONTENTION EX 8. [Not admitted by ASLB]. LILCO's " realism" argument assumes that State and local governments will respond to a radiological accident at Shoreham, use their emergency response powers and authorities, and carry out major portions of any required emergency response. The exercise, as conducted, assumed that State and local governments would n21 use their emergency powers and authorities and would not carry out major portions of any required emergency response. E.c., Scenario S 1.3.D; FEMA Report at 30-31; Log of LERO Director at 2-5. Indeed, during the exercise, State and County simulators refused to assume active roles. Insofar as LILCO's " realism" argument assumes the active

I participation of State and local governments in carrying out required emergency functions, the exercise, as conducted, did not permit an evaluation of " major portions of emergency response capabilities." Accordingly, the exercise of the Plan did not comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(14). Egg also 10 CFR Part 50, App.

E S IV.F. Absent an exercise carried out in compliance with S 50.47(b)(14) and Appendix E, there is no basis for a reasonable assurance finding with respect to the Plan. Union of Concerned Scientists v. N.R.C., 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.

denied agh nom. Arkansas Power & Licht Co. v. UCS, 105 S.Ct. 815 (1985).

CONTENTION EX 9. [Not admitted by ASLB]. LILCO's " realism" argument assumes that State and local government officials will respond to a radiological emergency at Shoreham and carry out governmental emergency response functions. In fact, the State and local government officials whose roles were allegedly l " simulated" during the exercise assumed passive roles. The simulated State and local government officials did not assume any

! command and control authority, interact with the public, or seek to perform State or local governmental functions. Egg Scenario, l

l l S 1.3.D; NRC Memorandum Order dated Jan. 30, 1986, at 5. The Plan, as exercised, is inconsistent with LILCO's " realism" argument, and the exercise, as conducted, did not permit an l

evaluation of " major portions of emergency response l

capabilities." Accordingly, the Plan, as exercised, fails to comply with NRC emergency planning regulations, including l

4 specifically 10 CFR $$ 50.47(b)(1) and (b)(14), the exercise i

demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the Plan if interpreted in light of LILCO's " realism" argument, and there is no basis for a reasonable assurance finding with respect to the Plan, as exercised.

CONTENTIOli EX 10. (Not admitted by ASLB]. LILCO's

" realism" argument assumes that the Plan will be implemented with the active participation of State and local governments. LILCO's Plan does not establish specific emergency responsibilities of State and local governments nor does the Plan assign primary responsibilities for emergency response to State and local governments, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(1). The Plan, as exercised, is inconsistent with LILCO's " realism" argument and j did not demonstrate the State and local governments' conduct or i

performance of " primary responsibilities for emergency response."

1 Accordingly, the Plan, as exercised, fails to comply with NRC emergency planning regulations, including specifically 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(1) and (b)(14), the exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the Plan if interpreted in light of LILCO's

. " realism" argument, and there is no basis for a reasonable assurance finding with respect to the Plan, as exercised.

CONTENTION EX 11. (Not admitted by ASLB]. LILCO's

" realism" argument assumes that State and local governments will actively respond to a radiological emergency at Shoreham and that LILCO a'nd its Plan could effectively accommodate the active ad

h2g exercise of emergency response functions by State and local governments. In fact, the exercise did not test the ability of LILCO, LERO or the Plan to accommodate State or local governments' active exercise of emergency response functions, because the exercise scenario stipulated that State and local governments, as simulated, would H21 activate their emergency powers and authorities, would H21 assume responsibility for protective action decisions, and would H21 take any actions to implement such decisions. Egg Scenario, S 1.3.D. Thus, the Plan, as exercised, and the exercise, as conducted, fail to comply with 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(1) and (b)(14) or NUREG 0654 SS II.N.1 and 3. Accordingly, the exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the Plan, if interpreted in the light of LILCO's " realism" argument, and there is no basis for a reasonable assurance finding with respect to the Plan, as exer-cised.

CONTENTION EX 12. [Not admitted by ASLB]. LILCO's

" realism" argument assumes that State and local governments will actively respond to a radiological emergency at Shoreham and that LILCO could implement its Plan under circumstances involving joint action by State and local government officials and by LILCO and its employees. In fact, the exercise did not test the ability of LILCO, LERO or the Plan to accommodate a joint goverr. ment / utility response, because the exercise scenario stipulated that State and local governments, as simulated, Nould remain passive observers rather than carry out a joint response

2- W with LILCO or LERO. Egg Scenario, S 1.3.D. Accordingly, the exercise did not permit any assessment of the effectiveness of the Plan under circumstances in which State and local government officials and LILCO personnel would jointly, but without preplanning, attempt to implement the Plan. The exercise failed to comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(14), and the Plan, as exercised, does not comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(1). Accordingly, the exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the Plan, if interpreted in light of LIICO's " realism" argument, and there is no basis for a reasonable assurance finding with respect to the Plan, as exercised.

CONTENTION EX 13. (Not admitted by ASLB). The exercise did not involve the active participation by New York State and local governments. Egg FEMA Report at ix. Insofar as the " realism" argument assumes that the Plan would be implemented with the active participation of State and local governments, the exercise l did not constitute an exercise of actual State and local l

l government actions nor did it provide an opportunity to " evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities" allocated to State and local governments as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(14).

Accordingly, the exercise, considered in the light of the

" realism" argument, did not comply with Section 50.47(b)(14), and there is no basis for a reasonable assurance finding with respect i

to the Plan.

i

(

15 -

l l

r C.ONTENTION EX 14. [Not admitted by ASLB]. The exercise did not involve the active participation by New York State or local governments. Egg FEMA Report at ix. Insofar as the " realism" argument assumes that the Plan will be implemented with the active participation of State and local governments, the exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the Plan, because that Plan does not assign " primary responsibilities for emergency response" to the governments assigned those responsibilities under the

" realism" argument. Accordingly, the Plan fails to comply with NRC emergency planning regulations, including 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (8), (10), (11), (12), (13),

(14), (15) and (16).

III. CONTENTIONS EX 15-19: LIMITED SCOPE OF THE EXERCISE PRECLUDES REASONABLE ASSURANCE FINDING CONTENTION EX 15. [The matters set forth in suboart C of EX 18 are admitted as additional alleced deficiencies in the exercise; and the matters alleced in EX 20 are deemed covered by EX 15 and 16]. The scope of the February 13 exercise of the LILCO Plan was so limited that it could not and did not yield valid or meaningful results on implementation capability as re-quired by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2), in that it did not include dem-onstrations or evaluations of major portions of the LILCO Plan.

The data set forth in subparts -A-M A-I, IC , and_M of this contention individually and collectively establish that the exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan. The exercise results do not demonstrate that the LILCO Plan could or

. . __ .-. - . - _ = _. -. . _ .

1 would be implemented, and the exercise results preclude a finding l

that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective '

measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological  ;

1 emergency at Shoreham, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). l Thus, the exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan.

Specifically, several critical aspects of offsite emergency preparedness, and major substantive portions of the LILCO Plan, 4

were excluded from the exercise. Neither the exercise scenario (which LILCO prepared), nor responses by players during the exercise, nor any FEMA evaluation or observation, addressed the following alements of emergency preparedness required by the referenced' sections of the NRC's regulations and NUREG 0654:

A. [Suboarts C and D of EX 16 subsumed in this suboart; and the failure to test sirens as alleced in EX 24 will be considred as an examnle of an additional omission].

Procedures for actual notification of the public and actual issuance of emergency information and protective action recommendations to the public, as set forth in OPIPs 3.3.4, 3.8.1 and 3.8.2, and at pages 2.2-2 thru 2.2-2a, 3.3-4 thru 3.3-6, 3.4-6, 3.8-4, 3.8-6 and Appendix A, pages IV-2 and IV-3 of the LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise, in that sirens, the LILCO EBS system, and WALK Radio were not tested, used, demonstrated, or involved in the exercise. Thus, neither the notification capabilities of LILCO or WALK Radio personnel, nor the notification capabilities of LILCO's EBS system, were evaluated during the exercise. Such capabilities are required by

~ , - , . , - . , , , , - , . ~ - . - , . . , , --,-,-.-.------.---.,,----n--.,,-- -,.-,--.-...-,---..-.,-,,---.,n,----

,-------s

10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR Part 50, App. E S IV.D; NUREG 0654 SS II.E and F, and Appendix 3, and were required to be demon-strated in the exercise. Objectives EOC 14 and 15. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

LILCO's suggestion that the conduct of a " prompt notification test" would correct this deficiency (agg letter dated June 20, 1986, from John Leonard to Harold Denton (SNRC-1269), Enclosure 1 at 4) is incorrect. Such a test, assuming one were conducted in the future, would deal with siren operability; it would not test or demonstrate the ability of LILCO's offsite response organization to integrate that single portion of an emergency response with the remaining actions necessary in an emergency, nor would it test or demonstrate that the LILCO Plan could be implemented.

B. (Suboart B of EX 16 subsumed in this suboart].

Procedures for notification of, and issuance of protective action recommendations to, the members of the public in the water portion of the plume exposure EPZ, as set forth in OPIP 3.3.4, and at pages 2.2-2a and 3.3-5 and Appendir A at IV-4 and IV-6 of the LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise, in that the U.S.

Coast Guard did not participate in the exercise (other than perhaps the receipt of one or more telephone calls) and FEMA

> never evaluated Coast Guard performance (assuming arauendo there

was any). Such capabilities are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, S IV.D, and NUREG 0654 SS II.E and F, Appendix 3, and the exercise was supposed to (but did not) test the alleged Coast Guard commitment under the LILCO Plan to notify water-borne traffic in the EPZ. Egg, e,q,, FEMA Report at 9; objective EOC 16. The water portion of the EPZ constitutes nearly 50 percent of the physical area of the plume EPZ. The exclusion of such procedures from the exercise pre- .

O cludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emer-gency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

C. Procedures for public education and the dissemi-nation of information to the public on a periodic basis, as set forth in OPIP 3.8.1, and at pages 3.8-1 thru 3.8-4 and Appendix A at IV-3 thru -4, IV-70 of the LILCO Plan, and a demonstration of the adequacy of public education materials, were excluded from the exercise. Such programs and materials are required by 10 CFR I S 50.47(b)(7), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, S IV.D, and NUREG 0654 l

5 II.G. .Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by i 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

D. (Suboarts H, I, and J of EX 16 subsumed in this l

suboart}. Procedures relating to evacuation of EPZ hospital 1

patients and patients in the Suffolk Infirmary, and a demon-

a --.

..w. ,

L stration of the capability of implementing such an evacuation, were excluded from the exercise. There are approximately 850 patients in the Central Suffolk, St. Charles, and John T. Mather Hospitals and the Suffolk Infirmary (OPIP'3'.6.5, Att. 2), of ,

which approximately 155 are designated maternity, newborn, or -

pediatric. Procedures to evacuate these persons and the ,

capability and resources to implement them are re' quired by 10 -CFR SS 50.47(b)8) and (b)(10), and NUREG 0654 S.II.J.9 and-10. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable as-surance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally i flawed. ,

E. [Suboart F of EX 16 subsumed in this suboart).

Procedures relating to the sheltering of school, children (agg OPIP 3.6.5; OPIP 3.6.1; App. A at II-19 thru -21) were excluded i

from the exercise. Such procedures, and the resources and capa-bilities necessary to implement them, are required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(8) and (b)(10), and NUREG 0654 SS II.J.9 and 10.

Officials of most of the school districts relied upon in the LILCO Plan for the implementation of the protective action of sheltering have stated that they do not have the resources and are not capable of implementing such an action during a Shoreham emergency. The exclusion of LILCO's proposed school sheltering procedures from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken

..m .,._,mv. .m... .. , , . _ ,w, ,..---.___-y_. , ,.,,-,--, _

in the event of a Shoreham emergency as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

F. (Suboarts F and G of EX 16 and EX 26 subsumed in this suboart]. FEMA did not observe any demonstration of the organizational ability necessary-to effect an early dismissal of schools, even though such a demonstration was one of the exercise objectives. Sgg objective EOC 18; FIELD 15; FEMA Report at 38.

Under the LILCO Plan, early dismissal is one of the primary pro-tective actions for school children. LILCO Plan at 3.6-7; App. A at II-19 thru -21; OPIP 3.6.5. Thus, procedures relating to the early dismissal of schools and the ability to implement them are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S II.J.

Officials of most.of the school districts relied upon in the LILCO Plan for the implementation of early dismissals have stated that they do not have the resources and are not. capable of safely or effectively implementing an early dismissal during a Shoreham accident. FEMA's failure to observe any demonstration of the ability to implement LILCO's proposed protective action of early dismissal during the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be implemented in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is funda-mentally flawed.

G. (Suboarts F and G of EX 16, EX 26, and EX 30 subsumed in this suboart]. Procedures relating to the evacuation of school children, as set forth in OPIP 3.6.5 and in Appendix A

• at II-19 thru -21 of the LILCO Plan, which refer to non-existent school plans and rely upon school officials to locate and mobi-lize necessary perconnel and equipment to implement an evacua-tion, were excludhd from the exercise. Such procedures and the capability of' implementing them are required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(8)' and (b)(10), and NUREG 0654 SS II.J.9 and 10.

Officials of most of the school districts relied upon in the LILCO Plan for the implementation of school evacuations have stated that they do not have the resources and are not capable of safely or effectively implementing an evacuation of school children during a Shoreham accident. And, the one free play message in the exercise purportedly involving simulated evacuation assistance for the Ridge Elementary School did not even purport to demonstrate the resources or capabilities of officials of that school or of the Longwood School District to implement an evacuation, and thus failed to demonstrate the resources or capabilities necessary to implement the proposed procedure for evacuation of school children set forth in the LILCO Plan. The exclusion of such procedures from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate pro-tective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1), and precludes any finding that objectives EOC 20 and FIELD 16 were met.

Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

H. [Subcart B of EX 16 subsumed in this suboart].

Demonstration of the capability of implementing protective action recommendations for the public on the waters of the plume

exposure EPZ, or for transients on beaches or in parks or similar areas in the EPZ, as set forth in OPIP 3.3.4, and at pages 2.2-2a, 3.3-4 thru 3.3-6, 3.8-1 thru 3.8-3, and Appendix A at IV-4 and IV-6 of the LILCO Plan, was excluded from the exercise. Such capabilities are required by 10 CFR S 10.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 SS II.J, and objectives FIELD 9 and EOC 16 required a demonstration of the ability to evacuate all or part of the 10-mile EPZ including the water portion. There in fact was no demonstration of any ability to effect an evacuation of the water portion of the EPZ. This exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

I. (Suboart A of EX 16 and EX 37 subsumed in this suboart]. Procedures for determining, issuing, and implementing protective action recommendations for the ingestion pathway EPZ (aside from the single recommendation that dairy animals be l placed on stored feed), as set forth in OPIP 3.6.6 and at pages i

3.6-1 thru 3.6-4 and 3.6-7a thru 3.6-8a of the LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise in that the State of Connecticut did not participate in the exercise and LILCO did not implement such l procedures even for the portion of the ingestion pathway EPZ located in the State of New York. Such capabilities are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, S IV.F, and NUREG 0654 S II.J, and by objectives EOC 9, 12. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

J. (Not admitted by ASLB]. Procedures and arrangements relating to the provision of medical services for offsite contaminated injured individuals were excluded from the exercise. Such arrangements are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(8), (b)(12); NUREG 0654 $ II.L and objective FIELD 23.

The LILCO Plan contains nothing but a list of facilities described by LILCO as potentially available to provide such services (OPIP 4.2.2, Att. 1), but no procedures setting forth i

how contaminated injured individuals could or would be transported to such facilities, whether such facilities are in fact available and properly equipped to provide necessary ser-vices, or whether such facilities have trained personnel and other necessary resources to provide the required services in a timely manner. During the medical drill referenced in the FEMA Report, only the treatment of an individual contaminated and in-jured onsite was demonstrated, and the purported treatment was provided at Central Suffolk Hospital, located in the EPZ. The exclusion from the exercise of the demonstration of procedures for the treatment of individuals contaminated and injured offsite precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate pro- ,

. tective measures can and will be implemented in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accord-ingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

._- . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ ~ __ _ __ __ - _ . -

K. Procedures relating to the radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees from special facilities who, ac-cording to the LILCO Plan, are to be evacuated to special recep-tion centers, were excluded from the exercise. Such procedures, and the resources and capabilities necessary to implement them, are required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(8), (b)(10); NUREG 0654 S II.J.9 and 10 and objective FIELD 21. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).

Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

L. [To be liticated as an additional basis of EX 21).

A demonstration of the availability, accessibility, and adequacy of facilities designated to be used as congregate care centers for evacuees under the LILCO Plan (agg, e.a., OPIP 4.2.3, pages 2.2-2 thru 2.2-2a, 3.6-7 thru 3.6-7a, 3.7-2, 3.9-6, and 4.8-1 and Appendix B of the LILCO Plan) was excluded from the exercise, in that the two facilities involved in the exercise are not among those identified in the Plan. Egg FEMA Report at 82-83. Such facilities are also not referenced in any letter of agreement j from the Red Cross. Such facilities and agreements guaranteeing l

l and demonstrating their availability, accessibility and adequacy are required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(8) and (b)(10); NUREG 0654 SS II.A.3, C.4, J.10.a. and g., and J.12; and objectives FIELD 18 and 22. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and

will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

M. Procedures relating to recovery and re-entry and activities to implement recovery and re-entry, as set forth in OPIP 3.10.1 and at pages 3.10-1 thru 3.10-2 of the LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise. Such capabilities are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(13), 10 CFR Part'50, Appendix E S IV.H, and 0

NUREG 0654 S II.M. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and.will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

CONTENTION EX 16. (The matters set forth in suboart E of EX 18 are admitted as additional alleced deficiencies in the exercisel and the matters alleced in EX 20 are deemed covered by EX 15 and 16]. The scope of the February 13 exercise of the LILCO Plan was so limited that it could not and did not yield valid or meaningful results regarding LILCO's capability to implement its Plan, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2), in that i

l it did not include demonstrations or evaluations of emergency l

response capabilities of many persons and entities relied upon to l implement the LILCO Plan. In addition, the exclusion of these entities from the exercise precludes a finding that the exercise l

evaluated major portions of emergency response capabilities, as i

required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(14). The failure of each of the

persons and entities identified in subparts -A-N- A-L and N below to participate in the exercise both individually and collectively means that the exercise did not comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(14) and did not demonstrate that the LILCO Plan can or will be implemented, as required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(a)(1) and (a)(2).

Rather, the exercise results were so limited that they demon-strated a fundamental flaw in the scope of the exercise and in the implementability of the Plan and preclude a finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).

Other than LILCO and its personnel, the majority of the or-ganizations, entities, and individuals relied upon in the LILCO Plan for implementation of that Plan did not participate in the exercise. Thus, the exercise did not address the willingness, availability, training, equipment, capability, or adequacy of l performance of the entities and individuals identified in i subparts A-N A-L and N below, each of which is necessary to implement the portions of the LILCO Plan referenced in each subpart. The fact that each of these entities and individuals did not participate in the exercise precludes a finding that the LILCO Plan is capable of implementation or a finding of reason-able assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

A.

(This suboart subsumed in basis H of EX 15]. The State of Connecticut did not participate in the exercise beyond perhaps receiving a phone call from a LILCO " player" at approximately 10:30. Connecticut is relied upon for issuance and implementation of protective actions for the portion of the ingestion pathway EPZ located within its borders. Sgg LILCO Plan at 3.6-8; OPIP 3.6.6.

B.

(This suboart subsumed in bases B and H of EX 15].

The U.S. Coast Guard did not participate in the exercise beyond perhaps receiving phone calls. It is relied upon for initial notification of, and communication and implementation of protective action recommendations to, members of the public in the water portion of the plume exposure EPZ, and for private and commercial vessel traffic control and access restriction on the water portion of the EPZ. Egg LILCO Plan at 2.2-2a, 3.3-5; OPIP 3.3.4.

The water portion of the EPZ constitutes approximately 50 percent of the entire EPZ.

FEMA did not observe or evaluate the Coast Guard's performance of any of these activities, including, if it occurred in fact, the dispatching of any Coast Guard vessels into the EPZ.

C.

(This suboart subsumed in basis A of EX 15]. WALK Radio did not participate in the exercise. It is relied upon for initial notification of the public of an emergency as well as for issuance to the public of protective action recommendations and other emergency information. Egg LILCO Plan at 2.2-2 thru 2.2-2a, 3.3-4 thru 3.3-6, 3.4-6, and 3.8-6; OPIP 3.3.4; OPIP 3.8.1; OPIP 3.8.2.

1

.~. . _ -

i D. (This suboart subsumed in basis A of EX 15]. No other radio stations participated in the exercise. Under the LILCO Plan, stations WBLI, WCTO, WGLI, WGSM, WLIM, WLIX, WLNG, WRCN, WRED, and WRIV are relied upon to constitute LILCO's EBS system; therefore they are relied upon for initial notification

. of, and communication of protective action recommendations and other emergency information to, the public. Egg LILCO Plan at 2.2-2 thru 2.2-2a; App. B.

E. According to FEMA, Marketing Evaluations, Inc. did not participate in the exercise. FEMA Report at iii. It'is relied upon for verification of siren operation and evacuation.

I Egg LILCO Plan at 2.2-4g, App. A at V-9, and App. B; OPIP 3.3.4.

F. (This suboart subsumed in bases E, F, and G of t

EX 15]. Other than one or two persons from the Shoreham-Wading River School District, school officials and personnel, including teachers, from the two parochial schools, 13 nursery schools, and 33 public schools located in the EPZ, as well as those from the seven school districts outside the EPZ but with children who reside within the EPZ, did not participate in the exercise.

Personnel from such schools are relied upon for implementation of protective action recommendations for school children under the LILCO Plan. Egg App. A at II-19 thru -21, IV-169 thru -171; OPIP 3.6.5.

G. (This suboart subsumed in bases F and G of EX 15].

j Other than two drivers from the Shoreham-Wading River School District, school bus drivers did not participate in the exercise.

4 School bus drivers from 10 school districts, as well as from i

._.---m . - - _ _ . . _ , , . ~ ~ - _ - - _ _ - - _ - , _ . . . . . _ . , _ . . . . _ _ __ . . _ . _ , _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - . . _ . _ . - _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . .

numerous private and nursery schools, are relied upon for imple-mentation of the protective actions for school children of early dismissal and evacuation. Egg LILCO Plan, App. A at II-19 thru

-20; OPIP 3.6.5.

H. (This suboart subsumed in basis D of EX 15].

Officials from hospitals located in the EPZ -- Central Suffolk Hospital, St. Charles Hospital, John T. Mather Hospital -- and the Suffolk Infirmary did not participate in the exercise. Such officials are relied upon for determination and implen'entation of protective action recommendations for hospital patients. Egg App. A at IV-172; OPIP 3.6.5 S 2.0 (Note); OPIP 3.6.1 5 5.3.2.

I. (This suboart subsumed in basis D of EX 15].

Officials and personnel from the nine nursing and adult homes located in the EPZ did not participate in the exercise. Such personnel are relied upon for implementation of protective action recommendations for the residents and patients in such homes.

Egg App. A at II-28 thru -29, IV-173 thru -176; OPIP 3.6.5.

J. (This suboart subsumed in basis D of EX 15].

Officials from hospitals, nursing homes, and similar facilities l outside the EPZ relied upon for relocation services and necessary health care for special facility evacuees did not participate in the exercise. The LILCO Plan fails to include agreements for such facilities which indicate an ability to provide necessary reception services, in violatio- of NUREG 0654 S II.J.10; instead, the Plan merely includes a list of such facilities and indicates LILCO's reliance upon them for. relocation services and

. ~.

l necessary health care for evacuees from hospitals, nursing and adult homes in the EPZ. Egg App. A at IV-166a thru -168, IV-172 thru -178; OPIP 3.6.5.

K. The following bus companies or yards did not parti-cipate in the exercise:

~

(1) Baumann & Sons Buses, Inc. -- East Northport Yard (50)

(2) Baumann & Sons Buses, Inc. -- Amityville Yard (74)

(3) Huntington Coach Corp. (100)

(4) Herman E. Swezey Co., Inc. (29)

(5) United Bus Corp. -- Ronkonkoma Yard (46)

(6) Suffolk Transportation Service, Inc. --

Lakeland Yard (40)

(7) Suffolk Transportation Service, Inc. --

Bayshore Yard (147)

(8) Coram Bus Service -- Coram Yard (39)

(9) Coram Bus Service -- Rocky Point Yard (27)

(10) Louis A. Fuoco Buslines, Inc. (39)

(11) Starlite Bus Co., Inc. (60)

(12) Seaman Bus Co, Inc. (35) j They are relied upon for implementation of the protective action of evacuation in that the LILCO Plan assumes that each listed entity would provide for LILCO's use the number of buses indi-cated in parentheses above. Egg LILCO Plan, App. B.; OPIP 3.6.4.

L. The following ambulance companies did not parti-cipate in the exercise:

(1) Bi-County Ambulance and Ambulette (8)

(2) Gosline Ambulance Service (5)

l (3) Mercy Medical Transportation Service (7) l (4) Nassau Ambulance Service (11)

(5) New York Patient Aids, Inc. (18)

(6) Orlando Ambulance and Ambulette Service, Inc.

. (6)

(7) Peconic Ambulance Service, Inc. (10)

(8) Transportation With Care (9)

(9) Weir Metro AmbuService, Inc. (62)

They are relied upon for implementation of the protective action of evacuation in that the LILCO Plan assumes that each company i

i will provide the number of ambulance and ambulette vehicles, manned with the necessary personnel, indicated in parentheses in the above list. Sag LILCO Plan, App. B.; OPIP 3.6.5.

M. (Not admitted by ASLB]. Local governments did not participate in the exercise, other than perhaps the receipt of one or two telephone calls by personnel in Nassau County. They are relied upon for, inigt alia, local law enforcement, emergency fire and rescue services, snow removal, traffic control on the i . roads surrounding the Nassau Coliseum, and traffic control, parking supervision, and security at the Nassau Coliseum. Egg LILCO Plan at 1.4-2a thru 1.4-2b, 2.2-4g thru 2.2-4h, 4.7-1; OPIP 4.2.3.

j N. (To be litiaated as an additional basis of EX 21].

The owners of facilities, purportedly available and relied upon I to serve as congregate care centers, did not participate in the l

l l

1 i

- , . ~ . . _ . , , . - - - - _ - . _ . _ - . - - _ _ - _ . _ _ _ . - . _ - - - - . . . _ - - - - _ . . - - - - - _ _ . _ - - . - ..____.s._._ _ _ _ - _ . - . - - . _ _ - - - - . . .

ll 4

exercise, nor were the facilities themselves used or their adequacy demonstrated, during the exercise. Egg LILCO Plan, App.

B; 331 glag, FEMA Report at 82.

CONTENTION EX 17. [ Withdrawn]. The failure to include in the exercise the elements of emergency preparedness and of LILCO's Plan set forth in Contention Ex 15, and the entities and

, individuals identified in Contention Ex 16, constitutes a violation of 10 CFR S 50.47(b) 14) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 5 IV.F. The LILCO Plan specifies that periodic exercises will be carried out to demonstrate a capability to implement the Plan and to permit the necessary reasonable assurance finding. Plan at 5.2-6 thru 5.2-7; OPIP 5.1.1. Contrary to the LILCO Plan, 4

however, and the regulations cited herein, the February 13 exercise did not meet the criteria set forth either in the regulations or in the LILCO Plan. The absence of an exercise of the type specified and required by the regulations and by the LILCO Plan itself precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and.will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident. Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

r CONTENTION EX 18. [Not seoaratelv admitted by ASLB; suboart

) C admitted as noted below]. The scope of the February 13 exercise was so limited that it could not and did not yield valid or meaningf'ul results on implementation capability, as required i

, __-._.. -. - _ _ _ . . . _ , . . _ ~ _ _ _ _ -

4 by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2), in that the exercise failed to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR Part.50, Appendix E, S IV.F.1, for a full participation exercise. Appendix E provides:

A full participation exercise which tests as

. much of the licensee, State and local emer-gency plans as is reasonably achievable with-out mandatory public participation shall be conducted for each site . . . . This exer-cise shall . . . . include participation by each State and local government within the plume exposure pathway EPZ and each State within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ.

" Full participation" when used in conjunction with emergency preparedness exercises for a particular site means appropriate offsite local and State authorities and licensee personnel physically and actively take part in testing their integrated capability to adequately access and respond to an accident at a commercial nuclear power plant. " Full participation" includes testing the major observable portions of the onsite and offsite emergency plans and mobilization of State, local and licensee personnel and other re-sources in sufficient numbers to verify the capability to respond to the accident scenario. ,

In the absence of a full participation exercise, there is no basis upon which to make a finding that the LILCO Plan can or will be implemented. Thus, the February 13 exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

Specifically, the exercise failed to satisfy the require-4 ments of a full participation exercise for the following reasons:

A. (Not admitted by ASLB]. The exclusion from the l

l _-

. . - , - - _ - - . . _ . -- _ _ - - - . -. - - . _ - _ _ - - _ - . . - - - . - . - = - - - . - . . - . -

4 exercise of the elements, entities and individuals as set forth in Contentions Ex 15 and Ex 16 resulted in a lack of required i

governmental participation, a failure to include in the test as much as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public l participation, a failure to exercise major observable portions of the LILCO Plan, and a failure to accomplish mobilization of sufficient numbers of personnel. In fact, the exercise did not permit a determination that LILCO and supporting organizations and personnel are capable of responding to the accident scenario.

B. [Not admitted by ASLB]. The exercise did not 5 include participation by Suffolk County, the State of New York, or the State of Connecticut, in violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 5 IV.F.1, which specifies that a full participation exercise "shall include participation by each State and local government within the plume exposure pathway EPZ and each State i,

within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ." (Emphasis added).

C. (Admitted as further deficiencies in sunoort of EX 15 and 16]. The exercise did not ensure that emergency organization personnel are familiar with their duties. As

! described below and in Contention Ex 16, the organizations and personnel listed in Contention Ex 16 did not participate in the 7

exercise and the participation of certain other organizations was so limited that the exercise did not ensure that the personnel of

( such organizations, relied upon for implementation of the LILCO Plan, are familiar with their duties. Specifically:

I l

- _ ~ _ . _ - - _ , - . _ _ _ .. . . _ , _ . _ . _ , . - . . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . , _ _ . . _ , _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ . , , _ _ _ . _ . . . _ _ _ , .

(i) The " participation" of the following bus companies or yards in the exercise consisted merely of receiving a telephone call and a request that only four buses be prepared for LILCO's use (the LILCO Plan assumes each yard actually will provide the number of buses listed in parentheses):

(a) Bruno Bus Company (30)

(b) Educational Bus Transportation, Inc.

(100)

(c) Suburbia Bus Corp. -- Setanket Yard (80)

(d) Suburbia Bus Corp. -- Middle Island Yard (110)

(e) United Bus Corp. -- Yaphank Yard (64)

(f) United Bus Corp. -- Coram Yard (90)

(g) Baumann & Sons Buses, Inc. --

Westhampton Yard (5)

(h) Baumann & Sons Buses, Inc. -- Bohemia Yard (90)

(ii) The " participation" of the Medibus, Inc. and Stat Equipment Corp. ambulance companies consisted only of providing 12 vehicles (six ambulances and six ambulettes). Those companies are relied upon in the LILCO Plan, however, for 11 ambulances and 45 ambulettes, all 57 of which are supposed to be properly manned by trained workers. LILCO Plan, App. B; OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 6.

(iii) The only " participation" by the Nassau County Red Cross in the exercise was the presence of two individuals in the EOC and perhaps a small number at the Nassau Coliseum. The LILCO Plan assumes that the Nassau Red Cross will provide per-sonnel at the reception center to identify congregate care

l l

centers, to assign evacuees to such centers, to open and operate as many congregate care centers as are necessary to handle the total number of evacuees, and to provide shelter management, food services, clothing, registration, information, nursing, medical services, and counseling. LILCO Plan at 2.2-2, 3.6-7, and 3.6-7a.

(iv) The only " participation" of the U.S. Coast Guard in the exercise was to engage in telephone conversations.

No actions were taken by the Coast Guard to implement or to demonstrate the capability of implementing the LILCO Plan, despite the fact that the LILCO Plan relies upon the Coast Guard for notification of, and communication of protective action recommendations to, the public on the waters of the EPZ as well as private and commercial vessel traffic control and access control on the water portion of the EPZ. LILCO Plan at 2.2-2a; App. A at IV-6.

(v) The " participation" of the Shoreham-Wading River School District in the exercise was limited to one or two telephone calls to one school official (the District Superin-tendent), and interviews with two school bus drivers located at one of the district's schools. No early dismissal, sheltering or evacuation was performed; no children were moved or otherwise involved; no teachers, principals, or other school personnel were involved; and, the two bus drivers did nothing but drive their buses to the high school when requested to do so by the Superin-tendent. The LILCO Plan, however, relies upon actions by school officials and school personnel from all the district's schools,

and substantially all the school bus drivers, and the cooperation of parents, to implement an early dismissal, sheltering, or evacuation of school children. OPIP.3.6.5; App. A at II-19 thru

-22.

(vi) The " participation" of Nassau County in the exercise was limited to the receipt of phone calls. According to the LILCO Plan, however, Nassau County is expected to receive regular briefings (OPIP 3.1.1, Att. 1 at 10), and to provide police officers to perform traffic control on the public roads near the Nassau Coliseum, to perform traffic control and supervise parking at the Coliseum (OPIP 4.2.3 5 2.5), and to provide security at the Coliseum. Plan at 3.6-7, 4.7-1. In addition, during the exercise, LERO personnel pretended to request that Nassau County provide social service assistance. In the exercise, Nassau County performed none of these functions.

CONTENTION EX 19. (Admitted for leoal aroument].

The i exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan resulting from FEMA's inability to make a reasonable assurance finding in LILCO's favor regarding the implementability of the LILCO Plan. FEMA stated in advance of the exercise that it would l not be able to make a favorable reasonable assurance finding based on the exercise results. Egg, e.a., Letter from Samuel W.

Speck, FEMA, to William J. Dircks, NRC, October 29, 1985. After the exercise, FEMA reiterated this point. Egg, e.a., FEMA Report at ix. In fact, however, FEMA's former Region II Director, Frank Petrone, stated on February 15, 1986, that a "no reasonable

l l

assurance" finding was necessary: "Since this Plan cannot be implemented without state and local government participation, we (FEMA] cannot give reasonable assurance under NUREG 0654 that the

public health and safety can be protected."

The NRC's regulations require, as a prerequisite to I

licensing, that the NRC have and review FEMA " findings and determinations as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate and whether there is reasonable assurance that they can be imolemented . . . ." 10 CFR 550.47(a)(2) (emphasis added).

The exercise results were so limited that FEMA was unable to make i

the required reasonable assurance finding. Accordingly, the exercise confirmed a fundamental flaw in LILCO's Plan, i.e., that the Plan, as exercised, cannot provide a basis for a FEMA reasonable assurance finding. Thus, the exercise precludes the NRC from finding reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).

, IV. CONTENTIONS EX 20-22: FEMA'S CONCLUSIONS

]

PRECLUDE A REASONABLE ASSURANCE FINDING l

d CONTENTION EX 2J, (Not seoarately admitted; EX 15 and 16

deemed to cover each of the matters soecified in EX 20]. During i

the exercise, FEMA failed to review and/or evaluate critical aspects of, and assumptions involved in, the activities or events which FEMA relied upon in reaching its conclusions that certain exercise objectives were met or partly met. The FEMA conclusions identified in subparts A-O below are based on incomplete data or ,

39 -

no data at all and are invalid. Therefore, the exercise "results" embodied in such FEMA conclusions preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency, as required I by 10 CFR SS 50.47(a)(1) and (a)(2), and, accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

i A. FEMA did not review the existence, operability, or 4

adequacy of tone alert radios which, according to the LILCO Plan:

9 (i) are installed in schools, hospitals, nursing / adult homes, handicapped facilities and major employers; (ii) are operable; and (iii) are accessible to appropriate officials, who know and understand their purpose and implications. Egg, e.g., LILCO Plan at 3.3-4, 3.4-6 and Fig. 3.4.1; App. A at II-18, -19 and IV-3,

-4, -166a, -170, -172, and -173; OPIP 3.3.4; OPIP 3.4.1. Egg also FEMA Report at 34. Since under the LILCO Plan, tone alert radios are an integral part of the LILCO Prompt Notification System (agg Plan at 3.3-4 and 3.4-6; OPIP 3.3.4), FEMA's failure to review these devices renders its conclusions that objectives

EOC 11 and 15 were met and that objective EOC 14 was partly met (FEMA Report at 32, 34) without basis and invalid, and precludes

! a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken.

B. FEMA did not review the implementation of LILCO's procedures involving actions by WALK Radio personnel, implemen-tation of WALK Radio internal procedures, and communications and interactions between WALK Radio personnel and LILCO. Egg OPIP l 3.3.4; OPIP 3.8.2. Such WALK Radio actions are necessary i

e f

. , , ,-, , . _ , , - . m-.-..r.,-....,e.,,- - - , .-

f prerequisites to the operation of the LILCO EBS system, notifi-I cation of the public of an emergency, and communication to the l public of protective action recommendations and emergency infor-mation. Therefore, FEMA's conclusions that objectives EOC 11, 15, and 21 were met (FEMA Report at 32, 34 and 38) are without basis, invalid, and preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken.

C. FEMA did not review LILCO's ability to share information with other agencies at the ENC prior to its release.

Indeed, the only " sharing" observed by FEMA was between LILCO employees. Egg FEMA Report at 53. Demonstration of such ability, however, was included in objective ENC 4 and is required by NUREG 0654 S II.G.4.b. Therefore, FEMA's conclusion that objective ENC 4 was met (FEMA Report at 53) is without basis, invalid, and precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

D. FEMA did not review any actions taken to implement or to demonstrate the ability to implement: (1) notification of the public on the water portion of the EPZ; (ii) the communication of protective action recommendations to such per-sons; (iii) evacuation of the water portion of the EPZ; (iv) commercial and private vessel traffic control; or (v) access control in the water portion of the EPZ. Therefore, FEMA's

conclusions that objectives EOC 15 and 16 were met as to the water portion of the EPZ (FEMA Report at 34) are without basis, i

-_,,-.,,.-..--,_,.._.--n.- -..__.-.,,__,.---,,,.,.,_n,,. ,-----,.--_--,.--,_,wn.wv.-w.an,,,_-.-.-.n,_--.,..,n,. , , , . , .,-- -

J invalid, and preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

E. FEMA did not review LILCO's ability: (i) to identify or contact appropriate school, hospital, and nursing /

adult home and other special facility officials; or (ii) to communicate to such officials protective action recommendations for school childre,n, hospital patients, and nursing / adult home and other special facility residents. Such actions are essential to the implementation of protective actions for school children, special facility residents and hospital patients under the LILCO Plan. Egg OPIP 3.6.5. Moreover, FEMA did not review LILCO's ability to determine the appropriate protective action recommen-dations for hospital patients and Suffolk County Infirmary pati-ents by, among other things, consulting with hospital officials as required under the Plan. Egg OPIP 3.6.1 $5.3.2; OPIP 3.6.5 52.0 (Note); App. A at IV-172. Therefore, FEMA's conclusions that objectives EOC 11, 16 and 20 and FIELD 13, 15, and 16 were

met, and that objective EOC 12 was partly met (FEMA Report at 32-33, 34, 38 and 43), are without basis, invalid, and preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures or actions purportedly necessary to the accomplishment of such protective measures can and will be taken.

F. Only one school district, Shoreham-Wading River,

! participated in the exercise, and that district's participation was limited to the dispatching of two buses to the district's high school. FEMA Report at 38, 43. Nevertheless, based upon

4 the limited actions of that one district, FEMA drew conclusions about LILCO's ability to demonstrate a sample of resources necessary to effect an early dismissal of all school children from all school districts in the EPZ or with children residing withlintheEPZ. FEMA Report at 43.

4 The LILCO Plan, however, relies upon school officials from each of the 11 school districts and 15 private and nursery schools within the EPZ and seven additional school districts outside the EPZ but with children residing within the EPZ to implement the early dismissals set forth as a protective action for school children in that Plan. Egg OPIP 3.6.5; App. A at II-19 thru -21. Thus, there was no basis for FEMA's conclusions regarding LILCO's ability to demonstrate a sample of resources necessary to effect an early dismissal of all. school children from all school districts.

Even with respect to the one district which participated in the exercise, however, FEMA failed to review:

(i) the number of buses necessary to accomplish an early dismissal of school children; (ii) the availability during a Shoreham emergency of such a number of buses; (iii) the availabi-lity during a Shoreham emergency of the number of bus drivers necessary to accomplish an early dismissal of school children; (iv) the availability during a Shoreham emergency of the number of school personnel necessary to implement an early dismissal of school children; (v) the amount of time necessary to accomplish an early dismissal of achool children during a Shoreham emergency; or, (vi) whether the early dismissal of school

children was an appropriate protective action for the school children in that district, given the accident in the exercise scenario. Therefore, FEMA's conclusions that objective EOC 12 was partly met and that objective FIELD 15 was met (FEMA Report at 32-33 and 43), even as to only the Shoreham-Wading River School District, are without basis, invalid, and preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

G. The exercise included one " free play message" allegedly intended to demonstrate LILCO's organizational ability to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the 10-mile EPZ, by requiring a response with respect to 40 children from one school (Ridge Elementary School in the Longwood School District).

FEMA Report at 38. The situation postulated in the free play message, however, and LILCO's response to it during the exercise,

, were inconsistent with the provisions of the LILCO Plan concerning evacuation of schools.,

The Plan assigns the responsibility for implementing

, such an evacuation, and for obtaining and mobilizing the

resources necessary for such implementation, to school officials, not LERO. LILCO Plan, App. A at II-19 thru -20; OPIP 3.6.5. No officials, personnel or children from Ridge Elementary School, or from the Longwood School District, participated in the exercise.

Therefore, contrary to the assertion in the FEMA Report (p. 38),

t i objective EOC 20 was not met and there was no demonstration of the ability to implement the provisions of the LILCO Plan for evacuating that or any other school. And, in resolutions adopted

l by that School District's Board of Education and sworn testimony before the ASLB, such officials have stated that they are incapable of implementing an evacuation as proposed by LILCO.

Sag, e.o., Purcell, 11 al., ff. Tr. 10,727, Att. 6; Muto and Smith (Schools), ff. Tr 11,001. The supposed ability of LILCO to drive a bus to the Ridge School -- the capability purportedly

" demonstrated" in response to the free play message -- thus fails to demonstrate that the LILCO Plan for evacuation of school children can be implemented. In fact, the response to the Ridge School free play message has no relevance to whether the provisions of the LILCO Plan can or will be implemented.

Nonetheless, on the basis of the response to the free play message involving the Ridge School, FEMA concluded that i

LILCO could effect an orderly evacuation of all school children in the EPZ. Even with respect to the one school to which the

" free play message" related, however, and despite its irrelevance to the LILCO Plan, FEMA failed to review: ,

(i) the existence, availability, location, or adequacy of a relocation center for the children from the Ridge Elementary School (or, for that i matter, for any school within the EPZ or with children residing 1

i within the EPZ) approved and agreed to by the owners of the center and by the appropriate school officials; (ii) the number of buses necessary to accomplish such an evacuation; (iii) the availability during a Shoreham emergency of the necessary number

of buses; (iv) the availability during a Shoreham emergency of the number of bus drivers necessary to accomplish such an l

evacuation; (v) the availability during a Shoreham emergency of l

l I .

I

the number of school personnel necessary to accompany and supervise children during such an evacuation; (vi) the amount of time necessary to accomplish an evacuation of such children; (vii) whether such an evacuation was an appropriate protective action for the children in the Ridge Elementary School given the accident and the exercise scenario; or, (viii) whether during the exercise the one bus upon which FEMA's conclusions were based ever even made it out of the EPZ.

In addition, LILCO's response to the Ridge School free play message failed to demonstrate that it is capable of evacuating students from Ridge School in that it Pook three hours for the requested bus to reach the school after it had been "re-quested"~and the driver apparently never arrived at the reception center. Egg Contention Ex 42 for details.

For the foregoing reasons, FEMA's conclusions that objective EOC 12 was partly met and that objectives EOC 20 and FIELD 16 were met (FEMA Report at 32-33, 38 and 43) are mean-ingless. The exercise provides no basis for a finding of reasonable assurance that the provisions in the LILCO Plan for evacuation of school children can and will be implemented in the event of a Shoreham accident. Furthermore, these FEMA conclusions, even as to only the Ridge Elementary School as postulated in the " free play message," are without basis, invalid, and preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

H. During the exercise, FEMA observed one ambulance (sent to Our Lady of Perpetual Help Convent), and one ambulette (sent to United Cerebral Palsy Residence in Ridge). FEMA Report at 36. The activities of these two vehicles were allegedly intended to demonstrate both LILCO's organizational ability to effect an orderly evacuation of the institutionalized, mobility-impaired individuals in the EPZ, and a sample of the resources necessary to effect such an evacuation. On the basis of these 0

two observations, FEMA drew a conclusion about LILCO's ability to effect an evacuation, by ambulance and ambulette, of all institutionalized, mobility-impaired individuals within the EPZ.

Under the LILCO Plan, however, 23 ambulances and 178 ambulettes (plus approximately 15 buses) are required to evacuate just the institutionalized, mobility-impaired population in the EPZ housed at the approximately 10 special facilities requiring transportation assistance from LILCO in the event of a Shoreham accident. These numbers do not include the three hospitals within the EPZ or the Suffolk Infirmary, which collectively could house as many as 850 patients, with the Suffolk Infirmary alone requiring 84 ambulances, nine ambulettes, and one bus to evacuate its patients. OPIP 3.6.5, Atts. 2 and 12; gf. App. A at IV-172 thru -178.

Even with respect to the two ambulance /ambulette runs it observed, however, FEMA failed to review: (1) the availability, location, or adequacy of the VA Hospital in Northport (to which evacuees from the Convent were to be taken) or the United Cerebral Palsy Residence in Stony Brook (to which

-l

evacuees from the United Cerebral Palsy Residence in Ridge were "

to be taken) as relocation centers; (ii) whether the VA Hospital, in Northport, or the United Cerebral Palsy Residence in' Stony Brook, or any other relocation / reception center, had been '

approved or agreed to by the official's responsible for the health and care of the residents of the Convent and the United Cerebral Palsy Residence; or (iii) whether the evacuation of the residents of the Convent and the United Cerebral Palsy Residence was an appropriate protective action given the accident in the exercise scenario. Further, although FEMA states that 57 ambulances and 118 ambulettes are available under LILCO's Plan'(FEMA Report at 35), FEMA never verified such availability, which is. contrary to assurances provided in the FEMA RAC Report on Revision 5 and FEMA's prior testimony (Tr. 12,242). Therefore, FEMA's conclusions that objective EOC 12 was partly met and that objectives EOC 16 and FIELD 13 were met (FEMA Report at 32-33, 34 and 43), even as to the one ambulance and one ambulette dispatched during the exercise, are without basis, invalid, and preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

I. FEMA did not review (i) the amount of time neces-sary during a Shoreham emergency to accomplish an evacuation by LILCO of those residents of special facilities in the EPZ re-quiring ambulance and ambulette services (excluding hospitals and the Suffolk Infirmary, approximately 748 individuals according to OPIP 3.6.5, 808 individuals according to the FEMA Report at 35);

i (ii) the existence, availability, adequacy, or location of relo-cation'or reception centers equipped to accept such individuals following a Shoreham evacuation, and approved and agreed to by the officials responsible for those facilities as well as those responsible for the health and care of the residents of special facilities in the EPZ; (iii) the actual availability to LILCO, during a Shoreham emergency, of the number of ambulances and ambulettes necessary to accomplish such an evacuation; (iv) the actual availability during a Shoreham emergency of the number of ambulance and ambulette drivers and medical technicians necessary to drive and staff such vehicles during such an evacuation; i

(v) the actual availability during a Shoreham emergency of any l additional ambul'ances, with necessary drivers and technicians, from volunteer fire companies or volunteer ambulance companies I

(agg FEMA Report at 35); or (vi) whether such an evacuation of

^

the special facilities in the EPZ was an appropriate protective action given the accident in the exercise scenario. Therefore,

FEMA's conclusions that objectives EOC 16 and FIELD 13 were met and that objective EOC 12 was partly met (FEMA Report at 32-33, 34 and 43) are without basis, invalid, and preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and i will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

4 J. FEMA did not review (i) the amount of time neces-sary during a Shoreham emergency to accomplish an evacuation of the residents of the EPZ without access to transportation and therefore dependent upon LILCO for evacuation by bus (approxi-mately 11,000 individuals according to Appendix A, Table XIII, at

IV-74g and -74h); or, (ii) the actual availability to LILCO, dur-ing a Shoreham emergency, of the number of buses which, according to the assumptions in the LILCO Plan, are necessary to accomplish such an evacuation (333 buses according to OPIP 3.6.4, Att. 5) particularly in an emergency, such as that in the exercise sce-nario, which occurs when school is in session; or (iii) whether such an evacuation of the transit-dependent population was an appropriate pro.tective action given the accident in the exercise scenario. The[o efore, FEMA's conclusions that objective EOC 12 was partly met and that objectives EOC 16 and FIELD 9 at the Port Jefferson and Riverhead Staging Areas were met (FEMA Report at 32-33, 34, 58 and 74) are without basis, invalid, and preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

K. FEMA did not review the performance by LILCO Traffic Guides of any of the traffic guidance or control activi-ties assigned to them in the LILCO Plan, and which, under that Plan, are essential both to accomplishing an evacuation of the EPZ and to controlling access to evacuated areas. Sag, e.Q.,

OPIP 3.6.3; FEMA Report at 22. Furthermore, the successful performance of such functions by Traffic Guides, during the entire evacuation process, is the premise of the evacuation time estimates used by LILCO players during the exercise. To reach its exercise conclusions, however, FEMA merely reviewed the availability of cones and barricades and interviewed some Traffic Guides. Therefore, FEMA's conclusions that objective EOC 16 was met, that objective FIELD 9 was met by the Port Jefferson and l , - - - - - _ . _

Riverhead Staging Areas, and that objective FIELD 11 was met by the Port Jefferson and Riverhead Staging Areas (FEMA Report at 34, 57, 58, and 74) are without basis, invalid, and preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

L. FEMA did not review LILCO's ability (i) to staff the Nassau Coliseum Reception Center, (ii) to register evacuees, (iii) to perform radiological monitoring and decontami-nation of evacuees and vehicles, or (iv) to handle contaminated waste, as would be necessary if, as in the exercise, 100,000 individuals were advised to report to the Reception Center for monitoring and possible decontamination. Therefore, FEMA's conclusions that objectives FIELD 17 and 19 were met and that objective FIELD 21 was partly met (FEMA Report at 80) are without basis, invalid, and preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident. ,

M. FEMA did not review LILCO's ability to identify, activate, or staff congregate care centers in a timely manner as set forth in the LILCO Plan (agg, e.c., Plan at 4.8-1 and Appendix B), :<nce the two facilities involved in the c::ercise were pre-selected by LILCO and are not among the facilities listed in the Plan. Sgg FEMA Report at 23, 82. Therefore, FEMA's conclusions that objectives FIELD 18, 20 and 22 were met (FEMA Report at 82) are without basis, invalid, and preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

N. FEMA did not review: (i) LILCO's ability to maintain staffing of LILCO personnel in LERO positions at necessary levels if a second or third shift were required; (ii) the ability of LILCO or of the American Red Cross to maintain staffing at the Reception Center and congregate care centers on a 24-hour basis; or (iii) whether LILCO could assure the necessary level of staffing of the number of ambulances, ambulettes, and school buses necessary to evacuate the school children, residents of nursing and adult homes, and patients in hospitals and other special facilities located in the EPZ..

Instead, during the exercise FEMA reviewed only rosters of names, not whether personnel were available or capable of reporting as required. Therefore, FEMA's conclusions that objectives EOC 3, SA 3, EWDC 3, and FIELD 19 and 20 were met (FEMA Report at 28, 55, 60, 71, 78, 80 and 82) are without basis, invalid, and preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

O. FEMA did not review the impact, upon LILCO's ability to mobilize LERO workers, of the fact that the date of the exercise was known well in advance by those workers. Such knowledge had a significant impact upon both the time necessary l

to accomplish such mobilization and the availability and willingness of workers to report. FEMA's failure to take into account the advance knowledge and readiness of the LERO workers renders its conclusions that objectives EOC 2, ENC 1, SA 2, EWDF 1, and FIELD 17 and 18 were m'et (FEMA Report at 27, 52, 55, 60,

71, 78, 80 and 82) without basis, invalid, and preclude a finding ,

i of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.  !

CONTENTION EX 21. (Suboart L of EX 15, suboart N of EX 16, suboart K of EX 22, and EX 32 constitute an additional basis of EX 21 relatina to concrecate care centers]. FEMA had no basis or insufficient data to support its conclusion that certain exercise objectives identified in subparts A-F below were met or were partly met during the exercise in that even with respect to the events and activities which FEMA did observe, the samples which FEMA reviewed were much too small to permit valid generalizations or to support FEMA's conclusions concerning these objectives.

Therefore, FEMA's conclusions on such objectives cannot support a finding of reasonable assurance that the LILCO Plan can and will be implemented as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2). Thus, the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in a Shoreham accident as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). The LILCO Plan is, therefore, fundamentally flawed.

A. Under the LILCO Plan, 60 Route Alert Drivers are expected to be available to drive through the EPZ to notify the public of an emergency in the event of siren failure. Egg Plan, Fig. 2.1.1; OPIP 3.3.4, Att. 1. Specifically, a total of 20 Route Alert Drivers are to be available at each of the Port Jefferson, Patchogue and Riverhead Staging Areas to drive 33, 26 and 30 routes, respectively. Egg Plan, Fig. 2.1.1; OPIP 3.3.4,

l l l

Att. 3. During the exercise, however, only three Route Alert Drivers (one from each Staging Area) were dispatched by LILCO and observed by FEMA. FEMA Report at 57, 64 and 74; agg.also FEMA Report at 20. Based solely on these observations, FEMA concluded that objectives FIELD 5, SA 9, and EOC 15 were met or partly met. FEMA Report at 34, 56, 57, 62, 64, 72 and 74. The sample upon which FEMA based these conclusions was much too small to justify FEMA's generalizations with respect to all Route Alert Drivers, or LILCO's ability to notify the public in the entire ,

EPZ.

Furthermore, even with respect to the small sample observed by FEMA, FEMA found that the time necessary to brief, deploy, and drive even one route (i.e., assuming only one failed siren for each Staging Area) was excessive. FEMA Report at 57, 64 and 74. In light of the small sample reviewed by FEMA and its conclusions even with respect to the three Route Alert Drivers it did observe, FEMA's conclusions with respect to objectives FIELD 5, SA 9, and EOC 15 are without basis and invalid. The exercise results concerning those objectives preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

B. According to the LILCO Plan, evacuation of the transit-dependent population requires 333 LILCO bus drivers to retrieve 333 buses from 20 bus company locations, and to make 377 bus trips (using 236 buses) over 43 separate routes within the EPZ, plus 97 trips to the Nassau Coliseum. Egg OPIP 3.6.4; App.

A at IV-74a thru -165d. According to the Plan, 108 bus drivers

are required to make 169 bus trips from the two transfer points under the jurisdiction of the Port Jefferson Staging Area, 100 bus drivers are required to make 139 bus trips from the five transfer points under the jurisdiction of the Riverhead Staging Area, and 125 bus drivers are required to make 166 bus trips from the four transfer points under the jurisdiction of the Patchogue i

Staging Area. Sgg OPIP 3.6.4, Att. 11; 21. Plan, Fig. 2.1.1.

During the exercise, FEMA observed only tw2 bus drivers from each of the Riverhead and Port Jefferson Staging Areas. FEMA Report at 58, 74. After retrieving a bus from the assigned bus company yard, they each drove one EPZ route, then returned to their assigned transfer point and proceeded to the Nassau Coliseum. Based solely on its observation of two bus drivers making one run each, FEMA concluded that objective FIELD 9 was met by the Port Jefferson and Riverhead Staging Areas.

FEMA Report at 58 and 74. In addition, FEMA observed four bus drivers from the Patchogue Staging Area attempt to retrieve buses and drive bus routes. FEMA Report at 64-65. FEMA concluded, on the basis of those drivers' inability to pick up buses or to drive routes properly or in a timely manner, that objective FIELD 9 was n21 met at the Patchogue Staging Area. Id. Nonetheless, based upon its observations of eight drivers making a total of eight bus runs, at least three of which were judged unsatis-factory by FEMA, FEMA concluded that objective EOC 16 was met.

FEMA Report at 34.

In light of the small sampling of bus drivers reviewed by FEMA, and FEMA's conclusions regarding the entire sample of bus drivers reviewed at the Patchogue Staging Area, FEMA's conclusions as to objective FIELD 9 for Port Jefferson and Riverhead, and as to EOC 16 for the entire EPZ, are without basis and invalid, and fail to justify FEMA's generalizations about all LILCO bus drivers under the LILCO Plan. The exercise results concerning those objectives thus preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

C. Eleven school districts (with 33 schools), one BOCES supervisory district, two parochial schools, and 13 nursery schools have school buildings located within the EPZ. In addi-tion, there are seven school districts with no school buildings within the EPZ but whose district boundaries include residences within the EPZ (i.e., with children who live in the EPZ); and, there are three parochial schools and one BOCES supervisory dis-trict with buildings located just beyond the EPZ boundary. Egg OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 3; gfz App. A at IV-169 thru -171. During the exercise, FEMA observed two buses report to one school (Shoreham-Wading River High School), where two bus drivers allegedly re-ceived maps and instructions. FEMA Report at 43. FEMA was not able to observe the organizational ability to effect an early dismissal of schools, however. FEMA Report at 38. FEMA also observed one bus, driven by a LILCO employee, arrive at the Ridge Elementary School (almost three hours after it had been "re-quested" in a free play message). FEMA Report at 38.

Neither of the two Shoreham-Wading River buses observed by FEMA drove any early dismissal or evacuation routes or transported any children, nor had either of the bus drivers received any training or information concerning any plans for protecting or evacuating school children in the event of a Shoreham emergency. Egg FEMA Report at 44-45. The free play message " requesting" a bus to Ridge Elementary School was injected by FEMA at 10:30; however a bus driver was not dis-h patched to pick up a bus until 40 minutes after the request was received by the Patchaque Staging Area. FEMA Report at 66. The bus did not arrive at the school until 1:23 (FEMA Report at 38) and, according to LILCO, even as late as 4:23, it had not arrived at the Reception Center. The bus did not transport any children, and neither the driver, the FEMA evaluator, nor any other exercise player, had any contact with any officials from the Ridge School or the Longwood School District. The FEMA evaluator merely observed the bus arrive at and leave the school.

Based solely upon these observations, however, and despite FEMA's acknowledged failure to observe LILCO's ability to effect an early dismissal, and the irrelevance of the situation 3

postulated in the Ridge School free play message to the evacua-tion procedures in the LILCO Plan (ggg Contention Ex 20.G), FEMA nonetheless concluded that objectives FIELD 15 and 16 and EOC 20 were met. FEMA Report at 38, 43.

The limited observations and irrelevant sample upon which FEHA based these conclusions do not justify FEMA's generalization about the ability to evacuate all schools, school r ,

districts, and school children in the EPZ and the ability to accomplish an early dismissal of all such schools, districts and children in the event of a Shoreham emergency. In light of FEMA's limited observation, the irrelevance of the Ridge School free play message, and the size of the sample reviewed by FEMA, FEMA's conclusions as to objectives FIELD 15 and 16 and EOC 20 are without basis and invalid. The exercise results concerning those objectives preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

D. According to the LILCO Plan, evacuation of the institutionalized, mobility-impaired population in the EPZ (excluding residents at facilities which LILCO assumes would not require transportation ast*atance and those in the three hospitals and the Suffolk Infirmary (gfz App. A at IV-175 and OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 2)) requires 23 ambulances and 178 ambulettes from 11 ambulance companies to make runs from the approximately 10 special facilities in the EPZ requiring transportation assistance from LILCO (there are, altogether, 19 health care facilities, excluding hospitals, at 23 locations throughout the EPZ) to unidentified reception centers outside the EPZ. Egg OPIP 3.6.5; App. A at IV-166a thru -168, IV-173 thru -178.

During the exercise, FEMA observed only one ambulance driver and one ambulette driver each drive one route.

Based solely on its observation of these two activities, FEMA concluded that objective FIELD 13 was met. FEMA Report at 43.

The sample upon which FEMA based this conclusion was much too

small to justify FEMA's generalization about all ambulance and i

ambulette drivers and LILCO's ability to evacuate institutionalized, mobility-impaired individuals from all the ,

special facilities located in the EPZ. In addition, based upon its observation of two drivers, FEMA concluded that objective EOC 16 was met with respect to all the institutionalized, mobility-impaired residents of the EPZ. FEMA Report at 34. In light of the size of the sample reviewed by FEMA, FEMA's conclusions as to objectives FIELD 13 and EOC 16 are without basis and invalid.

The exercise results concerning those objectives preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

E. Under the LILCO Plan, 165 Traffic Guides are expected to man 130 traffic control points (TCPs) in order to implement an evacuation of the EPZ. OPIP 3.6.3, Att. 4. More specifically, 72 Traffic Guides from the Port Jefferson Staging 4 Area are expected to man 58 TCPs; 41 Guides from the Patchogue Staging Area are expected to man 28 TCPs; and 52 Guides from the Riverhead Staging Area are expected to man 44 TCPs. LILCO Plan, Fig. 2.1.1;-OPIP 3.6.3, Att. 4. During the exercise, however, FEMA apparently only observed a total of 27 TCPs manned by 32 Guides (10 TCPs with 10 Guides from Port Jefferson; nine TCPs with 14 Guides from Patchogue; and eight TCPs with eight Guides from Riverhead). Egg FEMA Report at 57, 64 and 74. Based solely on these observations, FEMA concluded that objectives FIELD 6 and 11, SA 9, and EOC 16 and 19 were met or partly met. FEMA Report at 34, 38, 56, 57, 62, 64, 65, 72, 74 and 75. The sample

. - - - - - . _ _ _ - - _ . - . - . - _ _ . - - . _ - .- - . - ,_. - - __ - \

upon which FEMA based these conclusions was much too small, however, to justify FEMA's generalizations with respect to all Tra'ffic Guides, all TCPs, and evacuation and access control of the entire EPZ.

Furthermore, even with respect to the small sample observed by FEMA, FEMA found (1) that the time between deployment from the staging area and arrival at TCPs was excessive -- i.e.,

two hours after declaration of a general emergency and well over an hour after the first evacuation recommendation -- for the eight TCPs from the Riverhead Staging Area (FEMA Report at 74);

(ii) that only one out of the 14 Guides interviewed from the Patchogue Staging Area knew the location of the Reception Center (FEMA Report at 64); and, (iii) that communications between the Port Jefferson Staging Area and Traffic Guides was sometimes difficult due to poor radio reception (FEMA Report at 56). In addition, FEMA acknowledged that it was unable to render any evaluation regarding the timeliness of TCP set-up with respect to any of the 10 TCPs within the Port Jefferson Staging Area's jurisdiction. FEMA Report at 57. In light of the small sample reviewed by FEMA and its conclusions even with respect to the few TCPs it did observe, FEMA's conclusions with respect to objectives FIELD 6 and 11, SA 9, and EOC 16 and 19 are without basis and invalid. The exercise results concerning those objectives preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

F. During the exercise, FEMA chose only two locations to observe LILCO's ability to deal with impediments to evacuation (objective EOC 17). These two locations -- in the vicinity of TCPs 41 and 124 -- both involved simulated traffic obstructions; they were the result of a simulated accident involving a gravel truck and three cars (TCP 124) and a simulated accident involving a fuel truck (TCP 41). FEMA Report at 30, 36-38.

FEMA was unable to observe LILCO's response to the fuel truck impediment (agg FEMA Report at 37, 57-58), found LILCO's response to the gravel truck impediment inadequate (FEMA Report at 36-38), and concluded that objective EOC 7 was only partly met and objective EOC 17 was not met (FEMA Report at 29-30, 36-38).

FEMA nonetheless concluded that objectives EOC 16 and FIELD 9 for the Port Jefferson Staging Area were met and that objective FIELD 10 for the Patchogue Staging Area was partly met (FEMA Report at 34, 58, 65). Those conclusions are without basis and invalid, in light of the following facts:

(i) FEMA never even observed LILCO's response to the fuel truck impediment (which occurred within the Port Jefferson Staging Area's jurisdiction (ggg App. A, Fig. 8, and FEMA Report at 57-58);

l (ii) LILCO did not respond to the fuel truck impediment until more than three hours after the free play message had been injected at 11:00 (FEMA Report at 36-37, 57);

. - -,. - - m. --

(iii) There were substantial delays in LILCO's response to the gravel truck impediment (which occurred within the Patchogue Staging Area's jurisdiction, agg App. A, Fig. 8, and FEMA Report at 65);

(iv) The response was inadequate for removal of the gravel truck impediment (only one tow truck was dispatched even though the simulated accident involved three cars and the gravel truck, and no scraper was sent to remove spilled gravel from the road) (FEMA Report at 37, 65);

(v) At least two hours elapsed before LILCO's Transportation Support Coordinator was informed that a bus evacuation route was potentially blocked by the gravel truck impediment (FEMA Report at 36).

In addition, the sample upon which FEMA based its conclu-sions regarding objectives EOC 16 and FIELD 9 for the Port Jefferson Staging Area and FIELD 10 for the Patchogue Staging Area was much too small to justify FEMA's generalizations with respect to the entire EPZ and LILCO's ability to implement an evacuation during a Shoreham accident. Under the LILCO Plan, 165 Traffic Guides are expected to man 130 traffic control points in order to implement an evacuation of the EPZ. App. A, Fig. 8; OPIP 3.6.3, Att. 4. These locations are manned by LILCO because traffic must be kept moving through them in order to permit evacuees to follow the routes prescribed in the LILCO Plan. The evacuation time estimates used by the LILCO players during the exercise were premised on the assumption that such prescribed routes were in fact available for full capacity use throughout i

the evacuation process. Thus, there are a substantial number of places where impediments are likely to occur because of anticipated heavy traffic, and where their occurrence would have significant impact upon the ability to implement an evacuation, but which were ignored in FEMA's evaluation of LILCO's ability to remove impediments. Furthermore, the two locations actually chosen for the impediment demonstrations during the exercise are virtually the only locations on the evacuation routes chosen for the impediment messages which would allow easy re-routing of evacuation traffic around the traffic impediments, assuming arcuendo, LILCO had been able to respond to the locations of the impediments in a timely manner.

In light of the small sample of traffic impediment locations observed by FEMA, FEMA's conclusions with respect to the single attempted impediment response it did observe, and the unique and unrepresentative impediment locations chosen by FEMA, FEMA's conclusions with respect to objectives EOC 16, FIELD 9 for the Port Jefferson Staging Area and FIELD 10 for the Patchogue Staging Area are without basis and invalid, thereby precluding a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

CONTENTION EX 22. The exercise scenario and the activi-ties, reports, and events which occurred during the exercise include or are premised upon certain assumptions, enumerated below, which conflict with established facts, uncontroverted evidence, and ASLB findings. Accordingly, FEMA's findings and

conclusions identified in subparts 4 44& below, which incorporate or are based upon such false assumptions, are without basis and invalid, and cannot support a finding of reasonable assurance that the LILCO Plan can be implemented as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2). Thus, the exercise precludes a finding of rea-sonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency as required by 10 CFR S 50.47 (a)(1), and, accordingly, the LILCO Plan is funda-mentally flawed.

A. [EX 46 to be dealt with under this suboart]. In the LILCO Plan, the Nassau Veterans Memorial Coliseum is identified as the only " reception center" for evacuees other than those with special needs. Thus, under the Plan, evacuees would be directed to report to the Coliseum for radiological monitoring and decontamination, registration, and direction to facilities for sheltering. Plan at 4.2-1 thru 4.2-2; OPIP 4.2.3. The exercise scenario, and FEMA's conclusions on objectives EOC 16 and FIELD 9, 17, 19 and 21, are all based upon an assumption that the Nassau Veterans Memorial Coliseum is available for use by LILCO and the American Red Cross as a Reception Center for the registration and radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees and vehicles pursuant to the LILCO Plan. That assumption is false. In fact, there is no valid agreement permitting the use of the Coliseum as set forth in the LILCO Plan. Nassau County has expressly refused to agree to, or permit, the use of Nassau County facilities as part of, or to implement, the LILCO Plan. Egg Nassau County Board of Super-

visors Resolution No. 782B-1986, June 16, 1986. Since the basic underlying premise of FEMA's conclusions that objectives EOC 16 and FIELD 9, 17, 19 and 21 were met or partly met (ggg FEMA Report at 34, 58, 74 and 80) is factually and legally incorrect, l those conclusions are without basis and are invalid. Because the exercise and FEMA's conclusions were premised on the false assumption that the Nassau Coliseum would be available as a reception center, the results of the exercise preclude a finding ,

of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken. Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally I

flawed.

B. [Not admitted by ASLB}. According to the LILCO 1

Plan, all protective actions for the school children in the EPZ would be implemented pursuant to " plans" for early dismissals or evacuations during a Shoreham accident, which supposedly have

! been adopted by schools and school districts in the EPZ. OPIP 3.6.5; App. A at II-19 thru -20. The exercise scenario, and FEMA's conclusions concerning objectives EOC 20 and FIELD 15 and 16, are thus based on the following assumptions: (i) that all the schools and school districts in the EPZ and those with chil-dren who live in the EPZ have adopted plans setting forth how they would conduct an early dismissal, or would evacuate their students, pursuant to a LILCO recommendation under the LILCO Plan in the event of a Shoreham accident; and, (ii) that all such schools and districts have the necessary resources and capabili-1

I ties to conduct an early dismissal or to evacuate their students safely, pursuant to a LILCO recommendation under the LILCO Plan, in the event of a Shoreham accident. Both assumptions are false.

In fact, no schools or districts in the EPZ or with children who live in the EPZ have adopted any plans to conduct an early dismissal or an evacuation of their students, pursuant to a LILCO recommendation, in the event of a Shoreham accident. In-deed, the majority of the school districts and many schools and school-related associations have adopted resolutions setting forth reasons why it would be impossible to conduct such actions safely in the event of a Shoreham accident, and refusing to par-ticipate in LILCO's emergency planning activities or to implement in any way the LILCO Plan.

Since the basic underlying premises of FEMA's conclusions that objectives EOC 20 and FIELD 15 and 16 were met or partly met (agg FEMA Report at 38, 43) are factually incor-rect, those conclusions are without basis and invalid. Because the exercise and FEMA's conclusions were premised on the false assumptions stated in this subpart, the results of the exercise preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate pro-tective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency. Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

C. [Not admitted by ASLB). According to the LILCO Plan, early dismissals and evacuations of the school children in the EPZ would be performed by the regular school bus drivers employed by the schools or school districts. App. A at II-20; OPIP 3.6.5. The exercise scenario, and FEMA's conclusions i

concerning objectives EOC 20 and FIELD 15 and 16, are thus based on the assumption that in the event of a Shoreham accident there would be a sufficient number of school bus drivers available and willing to drive school buses during the accident that it would be possible to conduct an early dismissal, or to evacuate all the school children from the EPZ, in a safe and timely manner. That assumption is false.

In fact, a growing number of school bus drivers --

at latest count 198 out of 363 school bus drivers from all 10 school districts in the EPZ which have school bus drivers, including 100 percent of the drivers from the Rocky Point and South Manor School Districts -- have stated in signed certifi-cations that they could not and would not agree to drive a school bus in the event of a Shoreham accident, and that they would not participate in implementing the LILCO Plan. Such statements corroborate the data from surveys conducted in 1982 of school bus drivers on the same subject.

Since the basic underlying premise of FEMA's con-clusions that objectives EOC 20 and FIELD 15 and 16 were met or partly met (agg FEMA Report at 38, 43) is factually incorrect, those conclusions are without basis and invalid. Because the exercise and FEMA's conclusions were premised on the false assumption stated in this subpart, the results of the exercise preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protec-tive measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency. Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

l

)

l D. [Not admitted by ASLB]. According to the LILCO Plan, an evacuation of the school children in the EPZ requires that they be transported to " reception centers" outside the EPZ l 1

(App. A at II-20; OPIP 3.6.5), although, in violation of NUREG j 0654 S II.A.3, C.4, J.9 and J.10, the Plan fails to identify such centers. Thus, the exercise scenario, and FEMA's conclusions concerning objectives EOC 20 and FIELD 16, are all based on the following assumptions: (i) that there exist relocation centers for school children evacuated from schools in the EPZ or from schools outside the EPZ having children who live inside the EPZ; (ii) that such centers have been agreed to and approved by the officials of all such schools who are responsible for the safety of the children in their charge; and, (iii) that the owners of such facilities have agreed to make their facilities available for such a purpose pursuant to the LILCO Plan. All three assumptions are false.

In fact, there are no identified relocation centers for school children who may need to be evacuated in the event of a Shoreham emergency; no schools in the EPZ or with children living in the EPZ have agreed to relocate the children in their charge to any facilities pursuant to any LILCO Plan in the event of a Shoreham accident; and, there are no valid agreements per-mitting the use of any facilities outside the EPZ as relocation centers for school children evacuated pursuant to the LILCO Plan in the event of a Shoreham accident. An evacuation, as

postulated in the LILCO Plan and in the regulations, cannot be effected in the absence of a relocation center, outside the EPZ, to which evacuated children would be taken.

Since the basic underlying premises of FEMA's con-clusions that objectives EOC 20 and FIELD 16 were met or partly i

met (agg FEMA Report at 38, 43) are factually incorrect, those conclusions are without basis and invalid. Because the exercise and FEMA's conclusions were premised on the false assumptions stated in this subpart, the results of the exercise preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures 4

can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency.

Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

E. [Not admitted by ASLB]. As proposed in the LILCO Plan, an evacuation of the institutionalized, mobility-impaired cannot be effected in the absence of reception or relocation centers to which the evacuated special facility residents would be taken. The exercise scenario, and FEMA's conclusions concerning objectives EOC 16 and FIELD 9 and 13 with respect to institutionalized, mobility-impaired individuals, including residents of nursing and adult homes, in the EPZ are based on.the following assumptions: (i) that there exist relocation or reception centers for institutionalized, mobility-impaired individuals in the EPZ; (ii) that such centers have been agreed to and approved by the officials of the nursing / adult homes and other facilities who are responsible for the safety of the

residents in their charge; and, (iii) that the owners of such relocation / reception centers have agreed to make their facilities available for such a purpose pursuant to the LILCO Plan.

All three assumptions are false. In fact, with the possible exception of three of the 23 health care facilities and hospitals _in the EPZ, there are no identified relocation or re-ception centers for institutionalized, mobility-impaired indi-viduals within the EPZ who may need to be evacuated in the event of a Shoreham emergency (agg, e.g., OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 2).

Similarly, with the possible exception of three facilities, none of the health care facilities in the EPZ has agreed to relocate the residents in their charge to any relocation or reception centers pursuant to the LILCO Plan in the event of a Shoreham accident. And, there are no valid agreements permitting the use of any facilities outside the EPZ as relocation or reception centers for residents of most of the nursing / adult homes and other health care facilities evacuated pursuant to the LILCO Plan in the event of a Shoreham accident.

Since the basic underlying premises of FEMA's conclusions that objectives EOC 16 and FIELD 9 and 13 were met or partly met (FEMA Report at 34, 43, 58 and 74) are factually in-correct, those conclusions are without basis and invalid. Be-cause the exercise and FEMA's conclusions were premised on the false assumptions stated in this subpart, the results of the exercise preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate ye- n< t '-~

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protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency. Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

F. [Not separately admitted but substance of basis F wil1 be dealt with under EX 38 or 39]. During the exercise, the exercise players assumed that even in light of the actions taken I

by them in responding to the accident scenario, members of the public would follow all LILCO protective action recommendations, no one would begin to evacuate until after 10:24 when the first EBS evacuation advisory was simulated, and throughout the entire simulated accident, no one who was not expressly advised to i evacuate would attempt to do so. Thus,.the actions taken by LERO

during the exercise, as well as FEMA's conclusions concerning objectives EOC 12, 16, SA 9, and FIELD 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 21, and 22, all assume that given the accident postulated during the exercise, and given the response of LILCO players to that accident during the exercise

(i) there would be no voluntary evacuation at any time by any persons not advised to evacuate, and (ii) there would be no evacuation activity at all prior to the first issuance of an evacuation advisory at 10:24. For example, the actions of LILCO players during the exercise assumed, inter alia: no evacuation or mobilization traffic, accidents, or impediments on the roads prior to the first evacuation advisory (indeed, no impediments at all, except the two postulated in the " free play" messages, which LILCO was unable to remove); no evacuees ever on the roads, seeking assistance, or needing bus or ambulance transportation, other l

than those advised to evacuate by LILCO; no bus companies or ambulance companies refusing or being unable to make vehicles immediately available to LILCO because they were in use to evacuate persons other than those intended by LILCO; and no persons reporting to the Reception Center, other than the 100,000 advised to do so by LILCO.

These assumptions are false. In fact, if the accident postulated in the exercise had actually occurred, and 0

the activities of the LILCO players in response had actually been taken, evacuation activities by members of the public, both inside and outside the EPZ, would actually have started much earlier, in response to LILCO's actions such as, for example:

(a) the first EBS announcement of the emergency, which included the advisory to close all schools (issued at 6:52); (b) the advisory to put dairy animals in zones A-E on stored feed (issued at 8:41); and (c) calls to bus companies to attempt to obtain buses for use in evacuating the public (simulated calls by LERO players began at 8:05). Egg FEMA Report at 26, 35. And, substantial numbers of people, in addition to just those residing j in the zones advised to evacuate in the LILCO EBS messages, would actually attempt to evacuate. Based upon survey research data, public response to the nuclear accident at Chernobyl,- findings of the ASLB (21 NRC at 670), and for the reasons set forth in Contention Ex 44, such voluntary evacuation, or evacuation shadow behavior, would in fact occur in light of (a) the contents of LILCO's EBS messages, (b) the contents and timing of its press advisories (agg Contention Ex 38), (c) its rumor control acti-i

vities during the exercise (agg Contention Ex 39), (d) con-flicting and inconsistent information and press reports (agg Contentions Ex 38-40, Ex 43), (e) pre-existing perceptions and I fears of Long Island residents concerning nuclear accidents, (f) and LILCO's lack of credibility. -

Furthermore, such evacuation would have had a sub-stantial impact on the ability of LILCO players actually to per-form the various activities undertaken or simulated by them during the exercise. They would not have been able to perform even the few activities they were able to demonstrate or

" simulate" successfully during the exercise if they had had to deal with the actual public response to the postulated accident and the LERO actions responding to that accident during the exercise.

Since the actions of the LILCO players and the conclusions drawn by FEMA from such actions were all premised on the false assumptions set forth above, FEMA's conclusions that objectives EOC 12, 16, SA 9, and FIELD 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 21 and 22 were met or partly met (ggg FEMA Report at 32-33, 34, 43, 56, 57, 58, 62, 64, 65, 66, 72, 74, 80 and 82) are without basis and invalid. Because the exercise was premised on the false as-sumptions stated in this subpart, the results of the exercise preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protec-tive measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency. Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

_wr

G. [Not admitted by ASLB]. Under the LILCO Plan, LILCO is supposed to consult with hospital officials to obtain an agreement upon the appropriate protective action for the patients i

and, if evacuation is decided upon, LILCO is supposed to implement that evacuation. Egg OPIP 3.6.1 S 5.3.2; OPIP 3.6.5, SS 2.0 (Note). The actions of the LILCO players during the exercise and FEMA's conclusions on objectives EOC 16, and FIELD 9 and 13 are based on the assumption that during an accident such as that postulated in the exercise, officials from the three hospitals in the EPZ (Central Suffolk, St. Charles, and Mather) and the Suffolk Infirmary would agree to shelter their patients upon LILCO's suggestion, despite the facts that (1) everyone else in the EPZ was told they should evacuate, and (ii) 100,000 people required radiological monitoring because of potential exposure.

During the exercise, LILCO never consulted with any hospital officials. There is no basis for the assumption that in a situation such as that presented during the exercise, such officials would agree to leave all their patients in the EPZ rather than choose to attempt an evacuation for at least some of the patients. Moreover, even assuming arcuendo that the re-sources LILCO asserts could be available actually were available

! in an accident, the Plan contains no procedure to implement an evacuation of the hospitals beyond the assertion that vehicles should be supplied "on an as-available basis" after the homebound and all other special facilities have been evacuated. See OPIP 3.6.5 SS 5.6.2, 5.9.3. The exercise failed to demonstrate the resources or capability of accomplishing such an evacuation.

Because the exercise and FEMA's conclusions on objectives EOC 16, FIELD 9 and 13 were premised on the baseless assumption stated above, the results of the exercise preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency. Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

H. [Not admitted by ASLB]. Under the LILCO Plan, 333 buses are required to evacuate the transit-dependent population, and an additional 41 buses are required to evacuate special facilities, private and nursery schools. Egg OPIP 3.6.4; OPIP 3.6.5, Atts. 2 and 3. The exercise scenario, the actions of LILCO players during the exercise and FEMA's conclusions concerning objectives EOC 16 and FIELD 9 and 12, are based on the assumption that the number of buses sufficient to accomplish an evacuation of all the transit-dependent and residents of special facilities would be available for use by LILCO bus drivers.

Thus, during the exercise, LILCO players pretended that all buses required under the LILCO Plan were available for their use, although actually during the exercise the players only sought to

! have 32 buses made available to them. (Apparently, only nine

). buses were actually picked up and driven during the exercise.)

i In fact, very few of the buses assumed by LILCO to be-available would actually be available to LILCO if an accident occurred during the school year -- as was postulated during the exercise -- since substantial numbers of them are committed to school districts. The " agreements" between bus companies and LILCO all provide that buses would be available to LILCO only

after all prior commitments to schools had been fulfilled.

Because the exercise, the actions of the LILCO players, and FEMA's conclusions on objectives EOC 16, FIELD 9 and 12 were all premised on the false assumption that all buses required under the Plan would be available to LILCO, those FEMA conclusions are without basis and invalid, and the results of the exercise preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency. Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

I. (Not seoarately admitted but will be dealt with under EX 41]. During the exercise, two impediments to evacuation were postulated in " free play" messages. FEMA's conclusions on objectives EOC 16, FIELD 9 for the Port Jefferson Staging Area, and FIELD 10 for the Patchogue Staging Area, were all based upon the exercise assumption that in order to implement its Plan including the protective action of evacuation, LILCO needs to be capable of removing only two road impediments. That assumption has no basis. Even if road impediments were assumed to include only traffic accidents (contrary to the NUREG 0654 provision which clearly includes impediments caused by inclement weather),

LILCO itself has estimated that four accidents / breakdowns would occur during an evacuation of the EPZ (gen Cordaro gt al., ff.

Tr. 6685, at 8). In fact, during the two-week period from February 6-20, 1986 (i.e., the weeks immediately before and after the February 13 exercise, and including the day of the exercise),

l there were a total of 335 reported traffic accidents in the Sis:th

Precinct of the Suffolk County Police Department, which includes the 10-mile EPZ.2 Of these 335 reported accidents, 62 involved personal injuries, 38 required ambulance response, and 65 required the assistance of one or more tow trucks. Thus, on average, there were over 22 reported accidents per day during this two-week period, with more than four, on average, involving personal injuries and the assistance of one or more tow trucks, and approximately two-and-one-half, on average, requiring ambulance response.

Because ti.e exercise was premised on the false assumption that the capability of removing two roadway impediments was sufficient to assure that an evacuation could be implemented, the results of the exercise, even assuming arauendo that LILCO could have demonstrated such capability, preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency.

Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

J. [Not admitted by ASLB]. During the exercise, in accordance with the LILCO Plan, non-dedicated, commercial telephone lines, with no backup means of communication, were relied upon for the following essential notification and communication activities:

2 Under New York law, an accident is required to be reported if the property damage exceeds $400, or if the accident results in personal injury. Of course, a substantial number of accidents that fall within these criteria are not reported.

1,.,.

(i) Notification by LILCO of (a) Nassau County, (b) the State of Connecticut, and (c) FEMA; in addition, LILCO's Plan assumes that notification and communication ~with the Federal Aviation Administration-and the U.S. Coast Guard will be via non-dedicated commercial telephone lines. Egg. Plan at 3.4-4; Figs. 3.3.5 and 3.4.1.

(ii) Notification of " key" emergency response personnel who are employed by LILCO, by means of pagers which must be accessed by commercial telephones. Plan, at 3.4-5.

(iii) Notification of all other emergency response personnel who are employed by LILCO, by means of telephone calls from other emergency workers. OPIP 3.3.2.

(iv) Notification of hospitals within the EPZ and reception' hospitals outside the EPZ, ambulance dispatch stations, schools, bus companies, nursing / adult homes, and other special facilities and handicapped persons in the EPZ, to verify their awareness of an emergency, the need to evacuate, and to arrange for evacuation assistance. Sgg OPIP 3.6.4; OPIP 3.6.5.

(v)- Notification of non-LILCO organizations and personnel relied upon in the LILCO Plan, either by means of pagers which must be accessed by ce mmercial telephones (e.o. , the American Red Cross, Marketing Evg w ations, Inc., Impell Corp.),

or-by telephone calls (e,q., Hyatt Management, Island Helicopter, New York Telephone Company). Egg Plan, Fig. 3.3.6 and App. B; OPIP 3.6.3; OPIP 3.6.5.

(vi) Implementation of the LERO Family Tracking Center activities (OPIP 3.4.2); and

(vii) LILCO's Rumor Control operation (OPIP 3.8.1).

The exercise scenario, and FEMA's conclusions on objectives EOC 2, 5, 11, 16, and 20, BHO 2, ENC 1, SA 2, EWDF 1, and FIELD 2, 9 (for the Port Jefferson and Riverhead Staging Areas), 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18, were based on the assumption I that commercial telephone lines would be available for LILCO's use during a Shoreham accident. That assumption is false.

1

-Commercial telephones are subject to overload and, as FRMA itself 0

has testified in this proceeding, it must be expected that the telephone system would become overloaded in the event of a Shoreham accident. Egg McIntire, ff. Tr. 2086, at 8. Indeed, telephone overload has to be anticipated during any time of trouble or emergency, as evidenced most recently during Hurricane Gloria in Fall, 1985.

Under the LILCO Plan, the possibility of overload is particularly acute because, in addition to the heavy telephone use by the public likely to occur,during a Shoreham emergency, LILCO employees themselves would be making extensive use of the telephone lines, as required in the Plan and demonstrated during the exercise. Because the exercise and FEMA's conclusions on the

-objectives identified herein were premised on the false assump-

. tion that commercial telephone lines at all times would be avail-able for LILCO's use during a Shoreham accident, the results of the exercise preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency. Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is funda-mentally flawed.

K. [Not separately admitted but will be considered under EX 21 to extent that the basis concerns the fact that only two centers were activated]. During the exercise, the LILCO players pretended that approximately 15 non-LILCO facilities, in addition to the two facilities observed by FEMA, were available to serve as congregate care centers, and that such facilities had a total capacity of approximately 34,900. Apparently, the LILCO players engaged in this pretense based on an assumption that the owners of such facilities, primarily schools in Nassau County, had agreed to allow LILCO and the Red Cross to use their facilities after a Shoreham accident. That assumption is false.

There are no agreements between LILCO or the Red Cross and the owners of the facilities mentioned during the exercise permitting their use as part of the LILCO Plan or following a Shoreham accident and the Red Cross has so informed LILCO. Because the exercise was premised on the false assumption stated in this subpart, the results of the exercise preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency. Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

V. CONTENTIONS EX 23-32: MANY ARCAs IDENTIFIED BY FEMA CONSTITUTE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS Preamble to Contentions Ex 23-32 The exercise revealed many errors in LILCO's Plan, including those identified in Contentions 23-32 below. Although identified by FEMA as " Areas Requiring Corrective Action" ("ARCAs"), for the

reasons set forth in Contentions 23-32, each one in fact consti-tutes a fundamental flaw -- or a deficiency -- which precludes a finding that there is reasonable assurance that the LILCO Plan can and will be implemented or that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham, as required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(a)(1) and (a)(2).

CONTENTION EX 23. [Not seoarately admitted but will be considered under suboart C of EX 50]. EOC ARCA 5 refers to a 2.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> delay by LILCO personnel in correcting the error of reporting extrapolated dose data as actual measurements at other distances. FEMA Report at 41. This violates OPIP 3.5.2 and, depending upon the particular numbers involved in the error, could result in substantially erroneous dose projections and wholly iaappropriate protective action recommendations. Thus, this deficiency precludes a finding that actual and potential offsite consequences of an accident are accurately assessed, and that appropriate protective actions can and will be chosen during an accident, as required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(9) and (b)(10).

It, therefore, precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in a Shoreham accident.

CONTENTION EX 24. [Not separately admitted but failure to i

test sirens will be dealt with as an additional example of an omission under suboart A of EX 15]. EOC ARCA 7 refers to the I

fact that there was no activation of the siren sys' tem during the

exercise. FEMA Report at 41. The siren system is the central feature of the prompt notification system in the LILCO Plan. Egg Plan at 3.3-4 thru 3.3-6 and 3.4-6; OPIP 3.3.4. Its exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding that LILCO can and will provide early notification of an emergency to the public as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E J

S D.3, and thus precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

CONTENTION EX 25. [Not seoarately admitted but to be dealt with under suboart B of EX 41). EOC ARCA 8 refers to a delay of 45 minutes between an attempt to have field workers verify a fuel truck impediment and the dispatch of a Route Spotter from the Port Jefferson Staging Area. FEMA Report at 41. According to the LILCO Plan, all coordination of and decisionmaking concerning evacuation, including the direction of Traffic Guides, rerouting of traffic, and identification and responding to traffic impediments, is performed by personnel at the EOC. Egg OPIP 3.1.1; OPIP 3.6.3. In order to be able to make necessary decisions, achieve a coordinated response, and implement an evacuation, the coordinators and decisionmakers in the EOC must have accurate and timely information from the field. Without such information, an evacuation cannot b.' accomplished according to the LILCO Plan. Thus, this deficiency precludes a finding j that an evacuation can and will be implemented as required by 10  ;

l I

l

. .. - -. -.. - .- . . _ - - .. - - - -_-. . - - _ . . - _ . . . - . . . .. 0

CFR S 50.47(b)(10), and precludes a finding of reasonable assurance.that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

CONTENTION EX 26. [Not seoaratelv admitted but will be dealt with under suboarts F and G of EX 15]. EOC ARCA 9 refers to the fact that only Shoreham-Wading River Central School District participated in the exercise. FEMA Report at 41.

According to the LILCO Plan, all protective actions for school children are to be implemented by school district and school personnel, not by LILCO. OPIP 3.6.5; App. A at II-19 thru -21.

There are 33 public schools, 15 private and nursery schools, and one BOCES supervisory district within the EPZ; in addition, there are seven school districts outside the EPZ with children who reside within the EPZ, plus three private schools and one BOCES supervisory district with buildings located just beyond the EPZ.

App. A at II-19 thru -21 and IV-169 thru -171. The LILCO Plan relies upon these school officials and personnel, and their failure to participate in the exercise constitutes a deficiency which precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken for school children in the event of a 3horeham accident.

CONTENTION EX 27. (Not separately admitted but will be dealt with under suboart H of EX 50]. EOC FIELD ARCAS 1, 3 and 5 refer to the fact that school bus drivers have had no training in  :

dosimetry, use of potassium iodide or excess exposure

, . - - - - n. - , , - - - . . _ , - - . - . . , - - - . . . . _ . - . . . , - , - - - - . -

authorization procedures and that LILCO has not provided dosimetry or supplies of KI for them. FEMA Report at 45-46.

According to the LILCO Plan, school bus drivers are relied upon for implementation of the protective actions of early dismissal and evacuation of school children in the EPZ. OPIP 3.6.5. Thus, these deficiencies preclude a finding that protective actions for school children can and will be implemented as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10), that means are in place for controlling radiological exposure of emergency workers as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(11), or that radiological emergency response training has been provided to those called upon to assist in an emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(15). They also preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

CONTENTION EX 28. [Not seoarately admitted but will be dealt with under suboart H of EX 50). EOC FIELD ARCA 4 refers to the fact that ambulette drivers are not all trained in excessive exposure authorization and procedures. FEMA Report at 46.

According to the LILCO Plan, ambulette drivers are relied upon for implementation of the protective action of evacuation for special facility residents and the homebound. OPIP 3.6.5. Thus, this deficiency precludes a finding that protective actions for special facility residents and the homebound can and will be implemented as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10), that means are in place for controlling radiological exposure of emergency workers as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(ll), or that I

radiological emergency response training has been provided to those called upon to assist in an emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(15). The deficiency also precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

CONTENTION EX 29. (Not seoaratelv admitted but will be dealt with under suboart B of EX 41]. Patchogue SA ARCA 2 refers to the fact that appropriate personnel and equipment were not dispatched to remove the simulated multiple vehicle accident road impediment. FEMA Report at 67. The LILCO Plan and the evacuation time estimates in the Plan and used during the exercise assume that prescribed evacuation routes are clear of impediments and available for use by evacuees. App. A at V-2.

Under the Plan, Road Crew personnel are assumed to be available, appropriately equipped, and capable of quickly removing any impediments that appear during an evacuation. OPIP 3.6.3. Thus, this deficiency precludes a finding that the protective action of evacuation can and will be implemented as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) as well as a finding that adequate emergency equipment to support the emergency response is available as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(8). It also precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

CONTENTION EX 30. [Not seoaratelv admitted but will be dealt with under suboart G of EX 15]. Patchogue SA ARCA 5 refers to the fact-that it took 40 minutes to dispatch a LILCO bus driver to pick up a bus to use to simulate the evacuation of 40 children from the Ridge Elementary School. FEMA Report at 67.

Under the LILCO Plan, such procedures, involving the use of LILCO 1 bus drivers for evacuation, are relied upon for evacuation of special facilities and nursery schools (OPIP 3.6.5), although with respect to al other schools including Ridge, LILCO assumes that regular school bus drivers would perform necessary driving 4

duties. This deficiency demonstrates LILCO's inability to promptly communicate transportation needs of members of the public and to effectively implement procedures to effect i evacuation of special facilities. Thus, it precludes a finding that LILCO has adequate provisions for prompt communication among 3 response personnel as required by 10 CFR S 50.47 (b)(6), or that the protective action of evacuation can and will be implemented as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10). It also precludes a I

finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

CONTENTION EX 31. (Not seoarately admitted but will be subsumed under suboart A of EX 49]. The Reception Center ARCA '

refers to the fact that it took LERO personnel four to five j minutes to monitor an individual evacuee, as opposed to 90 seconds as presumed in OPIP 3.9.2 S 5.4.7. FEMA Report at 81.

According to the LILCO Plan, 78 monitors are expected to perform l

> l l

the radiological monitoring of all evacuees who report to the Reception Center. OPIP 4.2.3 S 5.5.1. During the exercise approximately 100,000 persons were advised in simulated EBS messages'to report to the Coliseum for monitoring. At the rate of 4 minutes per evacuee the 78 monitors would need approximately 85 hours9.837963e-4 days <br />0.0236 hours <br />1.405423e-4 weeks <br />3.23425e-5 months <br /> to perform the monitoring required by NUREG 0654 S II.J.12. Thus, this deficiency precludes a finding that LILCO has sufficient staff to respond as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(1). It also precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

CONTENTION EX 32. [Not seoarately admitted but will be dealt with as an additional basis for EX 21]. The Congregate Care Center ARCA refers to the fact that the two facilities used during the exercise are not part of the LILCO Plan. FEMA Report at 83. Indeed, there are no congregate care facilities identified in the LILCO Plan, nor are there agreements in the Plan which indicate that any such facilities exist or are available for LILCO's use during a Shoreham accident. Thus, this deficiency precludes a finding that LILCO has adequate facilities tosupporttheemergenchresponseasrequiredby10CFR S 50.47(b)(8), as well as a finding that the protective action of eva uation would be implemented as required by 10 CFR S E0.47(b)(10). It also precludes a finding of reasonable assur-arce that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in tne event of a Shoreham accident.

l

VI. CONTENTIONS EX 33-34: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS RELATING TO NOTIFICATION CONTENTION EX 33. [Not admitted by ASLB]. The exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that LILCO is incapable of providing prompt notification to State and local governntental agencies within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency, as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, S IV.D.3.

Egg also 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5); NUREG 0654, SS II.E. During the exercise an Unusual Event emergency was declared at 5:40 (FEMA Report at 25); thus pertinent governmental entities should have been notified by 5:55.

The simulators purportedly representing the State of New York and Suffolk County were not contacted by 5:55. Egg FEMA Report at 25. In fact, LILCO did not notify the New York and Suffolk County simulators until 6:45, which is even more than 15 minutes after the 6:17 Alert declaration. FEMA Report at 25.

Assuming arcuendo that receipt of telephone calls by Nassau County and Connecticut constitutes " participation" in the exer-cise (and assuming any such calls actually were made),3 LILCO failed to demonstrate the ability to provide timely notification to these governments as well. The first attempt by LILCO to contact Nassau County was not until 8:20, more than two hours after the emergency was first declared. It is unclear whether this first attempt to contact Nassau County was successful. The 3 According to FEMA, the State of Connecticut and Nassau County did not participate in the exercise (FEMA Report at lii),

and thus there was no demonstration of LILCO's capability to no-tify Nassau County or the State of Connecticut.

first attempt to contact the State of Connecticut was also not until 8:20. This was unsuccessful, as were attempts at 8:50 and 10:20. It appears that the earliest contact with Connecticut (assuming it actually occurred at all) was not until 10:30, four hours and 35 minutes after such contact should have been made.

LILCO's delay in even attempting to contact Nassau County and Connecticut also violates the provisions of the LILCO Plan (gg_e Plan, Fig. 3.3.3; OPIP 3.3.2) which require such notification when an Alert has been declared. LILCO failed to even purport to attempt to notify Nassau County and Connecticut until after a Site Area Emergency had been declared at 8:19.

Accordingly, the exercise demonstrated fundamental flaws in the LILCO Plan and LILCO's implementation of the Plan in that the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D, and NUREG 0654 S II.E; LILCO's players failed to make timely notification during the exercise, as required by the regulations and LILCO's own Plan; and LILCO failed to satisfy objectives EOC 5 and 11. The exercise results thus preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).

i CONTENTION EX 34. [Not admitted by ASLB). The exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that LILCO is incapable of providing prompt notification to the public in the event of a siren failure, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E S IV.D, and NUREG 0654 S II.E. According

to the LILCO Plan, in the event of siren failure, Route Alert Drivers will be dispatched to drive through the area around the failed siren and broadcast, through loudspeakers, a notification message. LILCO Plan at 3.3-4; OPIP 3.3.4. During the exercise, LILCO attempted to demonstrate the capability of implementing this procedure, and to support compliance with the regulatory requirements for prompt notification and alerting of the public, in response to " free play" messages postulating the failure of three sirens (one in each staging area's territory). One Route Alert Driver was dispatched from each staging area to drive through the simulated siren failure areas identified in the messages. In all three cases, however, the notification process took much too long, and demonstrated LILCO's failure to comply with the regulatory requirement of prompt public notification.

Specifically, as of 9:52, 90 minutes after the siren failure message had been received by the EOC, the Port Jefferson Route Alert Driver had completed only one half of his route. FEMA Report at 57, 58. Thus, he would not have completed his entire route until about three hours after receipt of the failure message. Similarly, the Riverhead Driver did not complete his assigned route until 78 minutes after the failure message had I

been received by the Riverhead Staging Area and one hour and 41 minutes after the EOC received the message of the failed siren.

t The Patchogue Driver completed his route 70 minutes after receipt of the failure message at the Patchogue Staging Area. FEMA Report at 68, 74. Accordingly, the results of the exercise preclude a finding that LILCO complied with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5),

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E S IV.D, and NUREG 0654 S II.E, and demonstrated LILCO's inability to implement its Plan. The exercise also demonstrated LILCO's failure to satisfy objective FIELD 5. The exercise results thus demonstrated a fundamental

. l flaw in LILCO's Plan which precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).

VII. CONTENTIONS EX 35-37: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS RELATING TO PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS CONTENTION EX 35. [Not admitted by ASLB]. The exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that LERO personnel did not make independent assessments, evaluations, judgments or determinations as to protective action I recommendations, including those made by onsite personnel, as  ;

1 required by OPIP 3.6.1. There was also no demonstration of their ability to do so. Such independent judgments and independent evaluations of onsite recommendations are an essential element of adequate emergency response, as embodied in the Commission's regulations, which contemplate that command and control decisions, including protective action recommendations, will be made by officials of State and local governments, and not by the licensee. Egg, e,q,, 10 CFR S 50.47; 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, S_IV.D.3; NUREG 0654; Lona Island Lichtino Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644, 686 (1985), appeal oendina.

During the exercise the LERO players failed to perform the following tasks, each of which is set forth in OPIP 3.6.1, before adopting any of three protective action recommendations made by the onsite personnel at the EOF:

A. LERO personnel failed to obtain the data, from the onsite staff or elsewhere, which were necessary to enable them to exercise independent judgment concerning protective action decisions, to make independent and personal assessments of the appropriateness of protective action recommendations received from the onsite staff, or to make independent determinations of what protective action recommendations would be appropriate.

B. LERO personnel failed to analyze independently or critically the protective action recommendations transmitted by the onsite staff. Sgg, e.c., FEMA Report at 3 (" discussions of evacuation options were limited, and all LILCO evacuation recom-mendations were followed").

C. LERO personnel failed to independently develop protective action recommendations, separate from those provided by the onsite staff, based on dose projections or offsite radio-logical monitoring survey data.

( D. LERO personnel failed to obtain or prepare suf-ficient or appropriate data or documentation necessary to support the protective action decisions and recommendations made at the EOC. This failure violates OPIP 4.1.2 in addition to OPIP 3.6.1.

Thus, the exercise demonstrated that the LILCO Plan fails'to comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S IIJ.10.m, and the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable l

l

assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR

$ 50.47(a)(1).

Specifically, during the exercise onsite personnel at the EOF made three recommendations of protective actions to LERO personnel at the EOC. At 9:47, the EOF recommended sheltering for zones A-M, Q and R; at 9:58, the EOF rescinded the sheltering recommendation and recommended evacuation for zones A-M, Q and R and at 10:10 that recommendation was adopted by LERO at the EOC; at 11:25, the EOF recommended evacuation for zones N, O, P, and S, and that recommendation was adopted by LERO at 11:46. Upon receiving each of the EOF recommendations, according to OPIP 3.6.1, EOC personnel should have independently evaluated them and their bases, as well as independently developed their own recommendations. This was not done. Thus, contrary to the guidance and instructions in OPIP 3.6.1, during the exercise the LERd actions were the following: ,

(i) Between 9:44 and 9:58 -- 1132, after receipt of the EOF sheltering recommendation -- LERO performed no computer or manual calculations using exercise scenario data to determine dose projections or protective action recommendations; and LERO neither requested nor apparently was aware of the data or calculations upon which the EOF's recommendation was based.

The EOC records generated during the exercise fail to indicate that there was any substantive discussion, analysis, evaluation or consideration given to the EOF sheltering recommendation.

(ii) Between 9:58 and 10:10 -- i.e., between re-I ceipt and LERO adoption of the EOF recommendation to evacuate j zones A-M, Q, and R -- LERO performed no computer or manual calculation of projected doses as required by OPIP 3.6.1 SS 5.1 and 5.2. LERO had, and apparently requested, no data from the EOF demonstrating that the recommendation was correct or appro-priate (indeed, a Radiological Emergency Data Form received by the EOC and reflecting EOF data at that time includes readings that appear far too low to justify an evacuation order). The documents generated at the EOC also fail to indicate that LERO personnel exercised any informed independent judgment in adopting the EOF recommendation.

(iii) Between 11:20 and 11:46 -- i.e., between receipt and LERO adoption of the EOF recommendation to evacuate  ;

zones N, O, P, and S -- LERO performed no calculations to derive dose projections in light of the predicted wind shift (which was  ;

apparently the sole basis for the EOF recommendation). LERO had no data from the EOF or BHO demonstrating that the recommendation was necessary, appropriate or correct in light of the predicted wind shift. The documents generated at the EOC fail to indicate that LERO personnel exercised any informed independent judgment in adopting the EOF recommendation.

In light of the failures identified above, the exercise demonstrated that LERO personnel are not capable of either i identifying, requesting, receiving or interpreting data necessary to evaluating and making independent protective action decisions, or determining appropriate protective action recommendations.

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.. _ , - _ . . - . _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ , _ _ . . . _ _ _ ~ . . _ . , _ . _ . _ , . _ . . . . , . - . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . - . . _ _ . _ _ - . . . _ _ _ _ _ , - , - _ , .

Thus, LILCO failed to satisfy exercise objective EOC 12. The exercise in fact demonstrated that LILCO is incapable of making protective action recommendations, that the Plan thus fails to comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 S II.J, and that LILCO failed to satisfy objectives EOC 8 and 12. According-ly, the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).

CONTENTION EX 36. The exercise demonstrated a fundamental a

flaw in the LILCO Plan in that subsequent to their adoption of the original recommendations from the onsite staff at the EOF, LERO personnel made protective action recommendations without apparent basis, failed to consider alternative protective measures that could have resulted in more dose savings, and made inappropriate recommendations, in violation of 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 S II.J.10.m. Thus, LILCO failed to satisfy objectives EOC 8 and 12 and the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).

Specifically, LERO personnel had no apparent basis for the decision to recommend that people in the original downwind zones

-- i.e., zones A-M, Q, and R -- should as late as 3:48 leave their homes and attempt to evacuate if they had not done so earlier. EBS messages simulated every 15 minutes between 12:06 and 3:48 contained such a recommendation. The documents gen-

erated at the EOC fail to indicate that any calculations or dose projections were performed to determine if this remained an appropriate recommendation for the entire period during which it was broadcast. There is no indication that the continuing appropriateness of such a recommendation was ever even carefully considered by LERO personnel in the EOC.

In fact, while such EBS messages were being simulated (be-ginning at 12:06), the EOF was projecting that a wind shift would direct the plume away from the original downwind zones as early as 3:00. LERO personnel were aware of that projection. In light of that projection, however, it may have been more appropriate, and resulted in more dose savings, for individuals who had not yet left their homes by, for example, 2:00 or 3:00, to remain sheltered in their homes until after the wind had shifted, rather than getting on the roads with no protection before the wind shift. After the shift, such persons may have been able to evacuate with a likelihood of less exposure and smaller doses.

The failure even to consider such an alternative protective action for those in the original downwind zones who had not yet evacuated is significant because the LERO players knew that as of 2:40, according to the exercise controller, there were still supposedly 20,550 people who had not yet evacuated.

CONTENTION EX 37. (Not seoarately admitted but incoroorated into suboart I of EX 15]. The exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that the LERO players did not deter-mine, recommend or implement the protective actions necessary to

mitigate the consequences of the radiological release in the in-gestion pathway, as required by OPIP 3.6.6, 10 CPR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 $ II.J.ll. For the reasons set forth below, LILCO failed to satisfy objectives EOC 8 and 12 and the exercise results preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).

i Specifically, during the exercise the LERO personnel at the 0

EOC failed to perform any of the following actions:

A. LERO personnel failed to extend protective action recommendations for the ingestion pathway beyond the 10-mile EPZ I and thus failed to mitigate the radiological consequences of the i accident, as required by OPIP 3.6.6., SS 1, 2 and 5. According to OPIP 3.6.6., when a Site Area Emergency is declared, it is to I

be immediately recommended that milk producing animals in those zones within two miles of the plant be placed on stored feed.

OPIP 3.6.6, S 5.1.1.1.b. During ,the exercise, LERO made this 4 recommendation for zones A-E at 8:19 when the Site Area Emergency l was announced. At that time, there had not yet been a

significant release and no protective actions had yet been recommended for people (except for the dismissal of school children). Pursuant.to OPIP 3.6.6 5 5.1.1.1.c, at 10:24, when a l

General Emergency was declared, LERO expanded its earlier recommendation to include milk-producing animals in the entire 10-mile EPZ. At that time, LERO was recommending evacuation of the public from only zones A-M, Q and R. However, when LERO's

(

evacuation recommendation was expanded to cover the entire 10-r mile zone, well after there had been a substantial release, and there were projections of substantial doses out to the 10-mile-boundary, there was no further expansion of the recommendation to shelter milk-producing animals outside the EPZ boundary and place them on stored feed. Documents generated at the EOC fail to indicate that such a recommendation was ever aven considered.

This failure violates OPIP 3.6.6 5 5.1.1.1.a, which expressly provides:

In the early stages of an emergency, the milk pathway is the most significant. Thus, early protective actions for preventing contamina-tion of milk in the affected area are recom-mended prior to obtaining confirmatory data.

LILCO's failure even to consider whether to expand its recom-mended protective measures to include the milk pathway beyond the 10-mile EPZ demonstrates LILCO's noncompliance with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S II.J.11.

B. LERO personnel never recommended any protective measures for other than dairy animals, such as, for example, pigs, lambs, commercially grown ducks, turkeys, and other poul-try, either inside or outside the EPZ, and thus failed to miti-gate the radiological consequences of the accident as required by OPIP 3.6.6. In light of the releases projected during the exer-

cise, such animals could have become contaminated. There is no 1

{ indication that LERO personnel even considered the need for

! protective measures to cover these elements of the food chain.

The failure to consider and to make protective action recommen-dations for non-dairy animals constitutes noncompliance with 10 l

CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S II.J.11.

l l

i.

C. LERO personnel failed to make protective action recommendations concerning drinking water, fruits, vegetables and other food chain items, contrary to OPIP 3.6.6, S 5.4.3.1. That OPIP provides that if (1) a release is in progress and (2) off-site dose projections have been completed, the public should be advised that such items may be contaminated. During the exer-cise, there was an early release (at approximately 8:30),'fol-lowed by a larger release when the core melt began (at approxi-mately 11:30). Dose projections were available by 11:49.

However, LILCO never warned the public of possible food chain contamination, even though the LILCO players were told that approximately 18 percent of the public had not yet evacuated from the 10-mile EPZ by 2:40.

D. During the exercise, LERO personnel apparently never completed the " Ground Deposition Calculation Worksheet for Particulate Radionuclide Releases," OPIP 3.5.2, Att. 3, although the necessary data were apparently available and completion of such a form is required by OPIP 3.5.2, S 5.3, and OPIP 3.6.6.

For the foregoing reasons, the exercise precludes a finding that the LILCO Plan complies with 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S II.J.ll, and precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

l l

l VIII. CONTENTIONS EX 38-39: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS RELATING TO PUBLIC INFORMATION CONTENTION EX 38. [ Substance of basis F of EX 22 and EX 42 to be dealt with under EX 38 or 39; and first sentence of EX 44 consolidated with EX 38 and 39). The exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that LILCO was unable to provide timely, accurate, consistent and non-confusing information to the news media at the Emergency News Center

(" ENC"), thus failing to implement Section 3.8.B and OPIP 3.8.1

of the LILCO Plan. The Plan provides, in pertinent part, that

"All Public Information personnel.will confer on a regular basis to ensure that accurate and consistent emergency information is being shared and discussed" (Plan at 3.8-4); news briefings at the ENC "shall serve three purposes:

• to provide accurate information on a timely basis

• to ensure public and media confidence

• to prevent misinformation and rumors" (Plan at 3.8-5); and, press conferences will " provide up-to-date information, respond to any rumor received, and answer any 4

questions the media may have." Plan at 3.8-6. Similarly, OPIP 3.8.1 provides that the LERO Coordinator of Public Information is to " confer with the Director of Local Response . . . and the Public Information Staff at the ENC on a regular basis to main-tain consistent information content"; "obtain up-to-date infor-3 mation regarding offsite emergency response in preparing press releases"; and, " correct misinformation by . . . providing a~c-curate information to LILCO Rumor Control personnel and answering

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questions regarding local response."' As the examples in subparts

-A-Q below reveal, however, during the exercise LILCO was incapa-ble of complying with these directives. Thus, LILCO failed to satisfy objectives ENC 1 and 3-6, and the exercise demonstrated that'the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed in that it cannot be implemented by LERo personnel and fails to comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(7) and NUREG 0654 S II.G.4.

Exercise-results which individually and collectively evi-dence these LILCO failures and therefore preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident include the following:

A. The ENC was not declared operational until 8:25, and there was apparently no contact with the media by LERO personnel at the ENC until after that time. The first press briefing was not held until 8:40. Thus, the ENC provided no information at all to the media until almost three hours after the emergency was declared, and long after the 6:52 EBS message announcing the Alert condition and school closings had been broadcast. In a real emergency such a delay would result in substantial confusion, speculation, rumor generation, lack of confidence in LILCO's ability to deal with the emergency, and refusal to believe information, advice or instructions subsequently disseminated by LILCO personnel.

B. LERO News Release No. 1 announcing an Alert condition and the alleged fact that there had been no release of radiation was not provided to the press by the ENC until 8:21.

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Although a Site Area Emergency had been declared at 8:19 and the ENC was informed of that declaration at that time (FEMA Report at 25), no mention was made to the media at 8:21 that a Site Area Emergency had been declared, that a minor release of radiation had occurred, and that dairy animals should be placed on stored feed. Thus, the first LERO press release did not contain up-to-date information, and it was inaccurate.

C. The Site Area Emergency, radiation release, and dairy animal recommendation was announced by EBS broadcast at 8:41. Despite the fact that the decision to issue that EBS message was made by the LERO Director by 8:37, LERO News Release No. 2, whi.ch included the information in that EBS message, was not approved by the Director until 9:00. As of 9:15, it had still not been distributed to the press.

D. Insufficient copying capabilities at the ENC contributed to delays in the distribution of information, including EBS messages and press releases, to the media. FEMA j Report at 53.

E. Insufficient and inadequate maps and displays in j the media briefing room contributed to the confusing and unclear information being disseminated by LERO personnel. FEMA Report at 52, 54.

l F. Copies of EBS messages provided to the media con-tained extraneous information that should have been deleted, and thus were unclear, confusing, and inconsistent with radio broad-casts. Egg FEMA Report at 53, 54.

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G. LERO press releases were distributed much too late, i

and were inaccurate and in conflict with other data in the public I l

domain by the time they were provided to the media. Although the ENC received LERO Press Release No. 3 at 10:15, it was not posted at the ENC for the press until 11:10. LERO Release No. 4 was received by the ENC at 10:45, but was not posted until 11:56.

LERO Release No. 5 covered the 10:24 evacuation recommendation for zones A-M, Q and R. It was approved by the LERO Director at 11:02, but did not even arrive at the ENC until 11:36, and was not made available to the press until sometime later. LERO Release No. 6, approved by the Director at 12:25, was not posted at the ENC until 2:10; LERO Release No. 7, approved at 1:11, was received by the ENC at 1:47, but not posted for the press until 3:07.

H. The LERO Director decided to recommend evacuation of the entire EPZ at 11:46 and the recommendation was announced to the public in a 12:00 noon EBS message. FEMA Report at 26.

However, the ENC did not inform the media of the Director's l decision, or the content of the 12:00 EBS message, which was l

supposedly repeated every 15 minutes thereafter, until 12:47.

I. Although LERO workers were instructed to ingest KI

(

1 tablets at 9:45, LERO ENC personnel did not decide to inform the media of that fact until 1:05, and the media was then requested not to print that information. Such a delay and the attempt to conceal pertinent information about the health-threatening 1

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-3

. ' g ..

effects of the accident would result in further reductions in LILCO's credibility and refusala of' the . media '2nd the public to obey LILCO's advice during(a rear Emergkncy.' '

o J. During press /honfei'ences, LERO personn[el were I

unable to respond satisfactorily'or accurately to questions about evacuation. In addition, the ENC p6rsonnel were unable to provide any information to'the media, much less accurate and ,

timely data, concerning trafffo conditions, conditions or evacuation activity on the water portion0 of the EPZ, o$

protective actions for the'. correctional facility in the EPZ.

,(  !

They also were unable to respond to questions about manpower at bridgesandtunnelsonevacuationroutes,ortheactibltiasof ~!

the Nassau County Police. In addition, LERO Public Infolma'; ion personnel were unable to contact Marketing Evalbations, Inc. in a timely manner and therefore had no information concerning siren activation failure. l ,

K. (Not admitted by L AS);&]'. T e. ENC did not learn of p

the pretended Red Cross designatic'n of 15' congregate care centers until 2:40. The EOC had this information, however, at 12:03.

Thus, the ENC did not receive, and therefore was not in a position to disseminate information in'a: timely manner.

L. The log kept by ENC personnel' recorded that at 12:01, the gravel truck impediment was being removed. In fact, as of that time, no equipment had yet arrived at the site of the gravel truck impediment, and when it eventually did arrive,'it was inadequate to remove the impediment. figg PEFA Report at 3 ti-

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J

37. Thus, ENC personnel had inaccurate information which, if released, would have misled the public into believing the inter-i section was clear when in fact it was not.

M. At the 1:48 press conference, LERO personnel at the ENC were not able to respond to questions about the fuel truck impediment, although that impediment had arisen almost 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> earlier.

N. At press conferences, LERO personnel frequently misstated facts and provided inaccurate information. For example, at 9:16, it was incorrectly announced that the Site Area Emergency had been declared at 8:23, and that plant shutdown had occurred at 5:15. The correct times were 8:19 and 5:15.

Similarly, at 11:38, LERO incorrectly announced that the winter population of the EPZ is hgher than the summer population.

O. Although LILCO Press Releases 4 and 5 were received by the ENC at 8:45 and 9:05, respectively, they were not given to the Media Monitoring personnel at the ENC until 9:31.

P. The Rumor Control operation, which is coordinated and controlled by LERO Public Information and ENC personnel, was ineffective as deacribed in Contention Ex 39.

Q. Neither LILCO's proposal to expedite the dissem-ination of information by substituting summary information for press releases and transmitting it by computer to the ENC, nor its proposal to add an extra LERO spokesperson at the ENC, would resolve the deficiencies revealed during the exercise, including those listed in this contention and in Contention Ex 38. Nor would replacement of copying machines. Egg letter dated June 20,

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1986, from John D. Leonard to Harold Denton (SNRC-1269), Encl. 1 at 7; letter dated June 20, 1986, from John D. Leonard to Harold Denton (SNRC-1270), Att. I at 2.

CONTENTION EX 39. [ Substance of basis F of EX 22 and EX 42 to be dealt with under EX 38 or 39; and first sentence of EX 44 consolidated with EX 38 and 39]. The exercise revealed a fundarental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that LILCO is incapable of dealing with rumors or responding to inquiries from the public during an emergency as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(7), and NUREG 0654 S II.G. According to the LILCO Plan, in an emergency the public is expected to call LILCO Customer Relations District Offices and Customer Call Boards to obtain information and ask questions. Plan at 3.8-5; OPIP 3.8.1. And, during the exercise, simulated EBS messages instructed the public to call LILCO District Offices to have questions answered. Thus, the Plan provides,.under the heading " Correcting Misinformation," that "LILCO personnel at these locations will be provided with updated press releases. If they cannot answer the inquiry they will call the ENC where a coordinated rumor control point will be manned by representatives from LERO and the Utility." Plan at 3.8-5.

During the exercise, LILCO employees from several LILCO District i

Offices and call Boards responded to simulated inquiries from the public. As demonstrated by the examples set forth below, however, such responses demonstrated LILCO's inability to dispel I rumors, to correct misinformation, to provide necessary and i

l accurate information to the public, to provide such information

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in a timely manner, and to provide consistent, coordinated, and non-conflicting information to the public. Thus, LILCO failed to comply with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), and NUREG 0654 5 II.G. It also failed to comply with the provisions of its own Plan, or to satisfy objectives ENC 1, 3-6. These examples of repeated errors and failures demonstrate a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan.

A. During the exercise, the LILCO District Offices and Call Boards consistently had incorrect or superseded information concerning the status of the emergency, protective action recommendations, and other basic data. Thus, they were unable to provide accurate and essential information to members of the public or the press. Instead, if Call Board operators received calls from the public, as postulated in the LILCO Plan to occur during an actual emergency, they could have provided only information that was inaccurate, incomplete, inconsistent and in conflict with that being released by other LILCO personnel at other locations (for example, in EBS messages or press releases).

Sgg FEMA Report at 53. For example:

(i) The logs kept by all the LILCO Call Board l

t operators, including, for example, those kept by the Port Jefferson, Patchogue, and Brentwood Customer Call Board operators, indicate that the information available to them until approximately 11:00 stated that a Site Area Emergency existed, even though a General Emergency had been declared at 9:39.

l l

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l

(ii) The logs kept by the Call Board operators indicate that the operators did not receive word that people in zones A-M, Q, and R had been advised to evacuate until approximately 12:35, even though that advisory had first been issued to the public at 10:24.

(iii) The logs kept by the Call Board operators indicate that the operators did not receive word that LERO had recommended evacuation of the entire EPZ until approximately 2:00, even though that advisory had first been made at approx-imately 12:00 noon.

(iv) The logs kept by the Call Board operators indicate that the operators did not receive word of the dec-laration of an Unusual Event until approximately 8:15, although that declaration was in fact made at 5:40; similarly, the Call Board operators did not receive word that an Alert had been declared until approximately 8:30, although the declaration was made at 6:17 and an EBS message was simulated at 6:52.

(v) The Call Board logs indicate that most Call Board operators did not receive word that schools were supposed to be implementing early dismissals until approximately 8:50, although an EBS message regarding early school closings was simulated at 6:52.

B. During the exercise, LILCO personnel were unable to provide prompt responses to sinulated rumor messages, which were in the scenario purporting to be telephone inquiries from members 1

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l t

of the public to LILCO Call Boards and District Offices. In-stead, responses were generally delayed by more than 30 minutes, and frequently longer. For example:

(i) A rumor message inquiring whether the appli-ances in the caller's home were radioactive was given to the Patchogue Call Board operator at 1:45; a response was not relayed to the caller until 2:24.

(ii) A rumor message inquiring what to do about a daughter not yet home from Shoreham-Wading River High School was given to the Patchogue Call Board operator at 10:00; a response was not relayed to the caller until 10:52.

I (iii) A rumor message inquiring whether the caller, from Bellport, should evacuate was given to the Patchogue Call Board operator at 12:05; a response was not relayed to the caller until 1:00.

(iv) A rumor message inquiring about how extensive evacuation will be, and what to do about trucks going into the Shoreham area, was given to the Hicksville Call Board operator at 7:51; a response was not relayed to the caller until 8:20.

(v) A rumor message inquiring whether the cooling towers on the Shoreham plant had blown up was given to the Riverhead Call Board operator at 1:30; a response was not relayed to-the caller until 2:48.

(vi) A rumor message inquiring if lobsters caught off the Shoreham jetty that morning were safe to eat was received by the Riverhead District Office at 11:30; a response was not relayed to the originating party until 12:28.

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l (vii) A rumor message from a caller whose husband works at the plant and was not home yet, inquiring whether he had been hurt, was given to the Brentwood Call Board operator at 12:43; a response was not relayed to the caller until 1:30.

(viii) A rumor message inquiring whether the plant had been taken over by Arab terrorists was received at 9:54; a response was not relayed to the caller until 10:37.

(ix) A rumor message inquiring what to do with a horse was given to the Port Jefferson Call Board operator at 10:14; a response was not relayed to the caller until 10:47.

(x) A rumor message inquiring how to get off Shelter Island because the ferry had been cancelled was given to the Hamptons Call Board operator at 2:51; a response was not relayed to the caller until 3:24.

(xi) A rumor message from a caller who lived in Medford, but worked in Melville, inquiring what he should do was given to the Huntington Call Board operator at 2:32; a response was not relayed to the caller until 3:05.

(xii) A rumor message inquiring if he could eat the food in his refrigerator was given to the Babylon Call Board operator at 11:59; a response was not relayed to the caller until 12:29.

(xiii) A rumor message from a dairy farmer asking what to do if he is asked to evacuate was received at 9:38; a response was not relayed to the caller until 10:12.

(

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l

C. During the exercise, rumor control personnel were unable to provide accurate, satisfactory, or reasonable advice or information to simulated public inquiries set forth in rumor messages. Instead, such personnel frequently provided inaccurate or superseded information or demonstrated poor judgment in responding. For example:

(i) In response to an inquiry (at 7:51) from a l

person who "has trucks going to Suffolk," as to how extensive evacuation would be, the Hicksville Call Board operator responded (at 8:20) that the only protective action was the closing of schools, and that there had been no evacuation recommended. As of 8:20, however, LERO was already beginning to " pre-stage" for an evacuation e and a Site Area Emergency had been declared. In light of these facts, it was inappropriate and dangerous to advise the simulated caller to proceed as planned with sending trucks into the EPZ area.

(ii) In response to,an inquiry at 11:30 (Rumor Control Question No. 11) whether lobsters caught that morning on the Shoreham jetty were safe to eat or touch, the Riverhead Call Board operator responded (at 12:28) that there was no reason to believe, and no data to indicate, that anything was wrong with the lobsters. As of 12:28, however, there had already been a major release of radiation, and the entire EPZ had been advised to evacuate. In light of these facts, it was inappropriate to advise the simulated caller to eat the lobsters, without even inquiring as to when that morning they had been caught, and where the caller was located.

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(iii) In response to a rumor message from The New ,

York Times, simulated at 8:45, and inquiring "what's going on" at the Shoreham plant, the rumor control responder related that at 5:40 an Unusual Event had been declared, and at 6:17 an Alert had been declared. By 8:45, however, a Site Area Emergency had been declared, schools had been closed and simulated EBS messages had advised that dairy animals be put on stored feed. Thus, the information provided by LILCO's rumor control personnel was inac-curate, misleading, and inconsistent with information being dis-seminated by other LILCO personnel.

(iv) In response to a rumor message simulated at 3:15, inquiring whether there had been a release, the rumor control responder provided data as of 1:00. Thus, the information pro-vided was inaccurate at the time given, and was misleading and inconsistent with information being disseminated by other LILCO personnel.

(v) A rumor message simulated at 11:45 was purportedly from Dan Rather, who wanted "to take a TV crew into the Shoreham plant," and inquired how to get there. In response, the rumor control responder stated "We don't advise going to the plant.

There is a Site Area Emergency. You will be in the way." The responder then gave directions to the plant. At 9:39, however, a General Emergency had been declared and as of 11:45, LILCO was recommending that almost all of the EPZ be evacuated. (At 11:46, the decision was made to evacuate the entire 10-mile EPZ.) The suggestion that going to the plant wars inadvisable but

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l

nonetheless possible was incorrect, and such suggestion, combined with the giving of road directions to the plant, indicated extremely poor judgment.

(vi) In response to a rumor message simulated at 1:17 inquiring "what areas are to be evacuated," the rumor control responder at 1:21 related that zones A-M, Q and R should evacu-ate. By 12:00, however, a simulated EBS message had advised that the entire 10-mile EPZ was to evacuate. Thus, the information provided by LILCO's rumor control personnel was inaccurate, misleading, and inconsistent with information being disseminated by other LILCO personnel.

(vii) A rumor message was simulated at 1:15 from a caller in Wading River who reported that people on his street were evacuating, that he could not walk, and did not know what to do. The response to this call apparently was a recording that the office had been " closed due to conditions at the Shoreham plant," and giving the telephone numbers for electrical emer-gencies. The failure to properly advise the caller how to arrange for transportation for the mobility impaired was grossly improper. -

As the foregoing examples illustrate, the exercise demon-strated that LILCO is incapable of implementing its proposed rumor control procedures, or providing accurate, necessary, and consistent information to the public during an emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(7) and NUREG 0654, S II.G.3.c.

Accordingly, the Plan is fundamentally flawed and the exercise

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l

precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an accident, as required by 10 CFR S S0.47(a)(1).

IX.- CONTENTIONS EX 40-45: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS RELATING TO IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTECTIVE ACTIONS CONTENTION EX 40. The exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that the Plan fails to provide any traffic assistance or guidance for evacuees until long after they are likely to be on the roads attempting to evacuate. Under the LILCO Plan and the evacuation time estimates used by the LILCO players during the exercise, it is assumed that Traffic Guides will be at their Traffic Control Posts, " guiding" motorists and 4

implementing traffic control strategies to assure that evacuees will follow the evacuation routes prescribed by the Plan, during the entire evacuation process. Egg, gigt, App. A at IV-5 thru

-72e and V-2; OPIP 3.6.3. Indeed, every LILCO EBS message sup-posedly broadcast every fifteen minutes, beginning with the message simulated at 10:24, stated that LERO Traffic Guides would be in place along evacuation routes to guide evacuees. However, for the reasons set forth in more detail below, the LILCO Plan l fails to comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10), NUREG 0654 II.J.9 and

! J.10, LILCO failed to satisfy objectives EOC 7, 11, 16, SA 1, 2, 5, 7, 9, 10, FIELD 9, 11 and the exercise precludes a finding that the protective action of evacuation can and will be <

implemented in the event of a Shoreham accident. Specifically:

i

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A. During the exercise and pursuant to the LILCO Plan (Plan, Figs. 3.3.3 and 3.3.4; OPIP 3.3.3; OPIP 3.6.3), the LERO Traffic Guides were not notified of the emergency or required to report to the staging areas until after the declaration of a Site Area Emergency. That declaration occurred at approximately 8:19, and the Traffic Guides were presumably notified of the emergency beginning shortly thereafter. By 9:00, only two Traffic Guides had reported to the Riverhead Staging Area (52 Traffic Guides are required under the Plan); only one had reported to the Port Jefferson Staging Area (72 are required under the Plan); and one had reported to the Patchogue Staging Area (41 are required under the Plan). At 9:40, still only 19 had reported to'Riverhead, 10 to Port Jefferson, and 37 to Patchogue. Thus, at the time a General Emergency was declared -- 9:39 -- only 40 percent of the LERO Traffic Guides essential to the implementation of evacuation according to the LILCO Plan were mobilized; none were at their posts in the field to perform their duties under the Plan.

B. Pursuant to OPIP 3.6.3 and during the exercise, no Traffic Guides were dispatched from the three staging areas until after the evacuation recommendation had been made to the public by simulated EBS message. And, subsequent to their being dispatched, it took substantial amounts of time before Traffic Guides arrived at their posts and were in a position to perform the functions which the Plan and the evacuation time estimates used during the exercise assume will be performed throughout the entire evacuation process. Specifically:

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(i) During the exercise, the EBS messages recom-mending evacuation were simulated at 10:24 (zones A-M, Q, and R) and 11:46 (entire EPZ). The dispatch of Traffic Guides began at Riverhead at 10:25 and 12:00, and was not completed until shortly after 11:00 and approximately 12:20, respectively. Traffic Guides at Port Jefferson were dispatched beginning at 10:30; the process was not completed until either 12:20 or 12:49. Dis-patching at Patchogue began at 10:30 and was completed at 0

approximately 10:59.

(ii) Traffic Guides from the Patchogue Staging Area did not begin arriving at their posts until 11:00, with the last Guide reporting his arrival at 11:40. From the Port Jefferson Staging Area where dispatching was not completed until either 12:20 or 12:49, Traffic Guides took up to 58 minutes to arrive at their posts. The Riverhead Traffic Guides observed by FEMA did not arrive at their posts until between 11:50 and 12:10. geg FEMA Report at 74. And, other Riverhead Traffic Guides were still not at their posts as of 12:50, even though in at least one case (TCP 26), the Guide had been dispatched at 11:08 -- almost 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> earlier.

Thus, even assuming arcuendo that no one would attempt to evacuate prior to the EBS announcement at 10:24, the LILCO Plan, as demonstrated during the exercise, fails to provide l

l any evacuation assistance, or the " guidance" necessary to ensure that evacuees follow the prescribed routes which form the basis of the evacuation time estimates used during the exercise, until long after evacuees would be on the road attempting to evacuate.

l

- -116 - ,

Indeed, LILCO does not even have the potential capability to pro-vide such assumed assistance and guidance under the Plan as written, since according to the Plan no Traffic Guides are to be dispatched until after there has been an evacuation order.

C. Assuming arcuendo that no members of the public would seek to evacuate prior to the simulated EBS evacuation advisory at 10:24, once that radio broadcast had been made people would expect LILCO Traffic Guides to be in place to provide assistance and guidance with respect to evacuation routes. The EBS message supposedly aired during the exercise at 10:24 so states, and that message was supposedly repeated every 15 minutes. Thus, according to LILCO's own emergency information repeatedly disseminated to the public beginning at 10:24, Traffic Guides would be in place. This information was false, and the LILCO personnel who issued it knew or should have known that it was false. The provision in the LILCO Plan requiring the issuance of such a false and misleading statement, and the actual 1

use of such a message during the exercise, is a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan, and constitutes a violation of 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(7).

In addition, by creating public expectations that

, such evacuation aasistance, including directions and guidance as 1

to-evacuation routes, was available when in fact it was not, the likelihood is substantially increased that none of LILCO's recommendations or other emergency information would be believed ,

or followed by the public.

I i

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D. [Not admitted by ASLB). Moreover, as set forth in f

Contention Ex 44, the assumption that no evacuees would be on the roads prior to 10:24 is without basis, and false. While the first EBS evacuation advisory was simulated at 10:24, earlier EBS messages had advised (at 6:52) that schools were all being closed, (at 8:41 and every fifteen minutes thereafter) that there had been a release of radiation at 8:19 and that dairy animals should be placed on stored feed, and (at 10:03 and 10:29) that at 9:39 a General Emergency had been declared due to a failure in plant safety systems. The assumption that the EBS broadcasts beginning at 6:52 would not have generated substantial evacuation activity beginning well before the official recommendation to evacuate at 10:24 is without basis. In fact, for the reasons set forth in Contention Ex 44, in a real Shoreham accident substantial numbers of people would begin to evacuate much earlier. Under the LILCO Plan, and as revealed in the exercise, however, there is no provision for assisting such evacuees with their evacuation efforts.

Furthermore, during the exercise LERO personnel pretended that prior to 10:24 no evacuation activities at all had occurred. In fact, with evacuation beginning soon after 6:52, the time necessary for the Traffic Guides to make their way to the staging areas to report for duty, as well as to drive to their assigned posts in the field, would in fact take substan-tially longer than it did during the exercise, when there was no

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unusual traffic on the roads at all. Thus, the actual defect in the LILCO Plan is even more substantial than was revealed during the exercise.

E. Finally, attempting to dispatch Traffic Guides to those Traffic Control Posts within a 2-mile zone of the plant upon the issuance of an evacuation order, even assuming arouendo that the " dispatch" activities could be accomplished more expe-ditiously than they were during the exercise, would not correct or even substantially lessen the defect inherent in the LILCO Plan. (Egg letter dated June 20, 1986, from John D. Leonard to Harld R. Denton (SNRC-1269), Encl. 1 at 16.) In light of the notification and reporting provisions for Traffic Guides, and the realities that an evacuation order can swiftly follow a Site Area Emergency declaration and evacuation will begin prior to an official evacuation advisory, such an attempted "fix" to the fundamental defect in the LILCO Plan would be ineffective.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in subparts A through E, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed in that it fails to comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S II.J.

The exercise thus precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency.

CONTENTION EX 41. (Basis I of EX 22 and EX 42 to be dealt with under EX 41]. The exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan a'nd in LILCO's ability to control and manage an orderly evacuation of the EPZ pursuant to that Plan in that the

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Plan fails to provide -- and LILCO failed to demonstrate -- an ability to remove impediments from the roadways until long after evacuation had begun. There are likely to be accidents and other events creating blockages on evacuation routes during a Shoreham emergency. LILCO's inability to deal with such impediments will cause delay in the implementation of protective actions and l preclude LILCO from managing an orderly evacuation of the EPZ.

Under the LILCO Plan and the evacuation time estimates used by the LILCO players during the exercise, it is assumed that acuees will be able to, and will, follow the LILCO-prescribed evacuation routes, and that Road Crews will remove impediments efficiently so that the prescribed routes remain open and available for use at full capacity during the entire evacuation process. Egg, e.q,, App. A at IV-19, -23, V-1 thru -5, Table XII, and Fig. 8; OPIP 3.6.3. Not only did the exercise reveal that LILCO's proposal for the removal of impediments to evacuation is inherently unworkable, but it also demonstrated that the LERO players were incapable of properly responding to, much less " removing," the " impediments" created by FEMA's free play messages. For the reasons set forth in more detail below, the exercise results demonstrated fundamental flaws in LILCO's j Plan, noncompliance with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S II.J.10.k, and failure to satisfy exercise objectives, including EOC 5, 7, 8, 11, 16, 17, SA 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and l

FIELD 9, 10. Thus, the exercise results preclude a finding that the protective action of evacuation can and will be implemented

( in the event of a Shoreham accident.

l l

t

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I I

A. During the exercise and according to the LILCO Plan (Plan, Fig. 3.3.4; OPIP 3.3.2; OPIP 3.3.3; OPIP 3.6.3), the LERO Road Crews were not notified of the emergency or required to report to the staging areas until after the declaration of a Site Area Emergency. Such declaration was made at approximately 8:19.

Even on February 13, when the LERO personnel were on notice that they would be called to report for duty, most Road Crew personnel did not arrive at the staging areas until well after 10:00.

Thus, at 9:00, only one Road Crew member had reported to the Riverhead Staging Area (10 are required under the Plan), none had reported to Port Jefferson (14 are required under the Plan), and

t none had reported to Patchogue (14 are required under the Plan).

At 9:40, after a General Emergency had been declared, only two had reported to Riverhead, none to Port Jefferson, and two to l Patchogue. By 10:00, eight had reported to Riverhead, one to Port Jefferson, and five to Patchogue. And at 10:20 -- about the time of LILCO's EBS announcement advising evacuation -- still only 8 had reported to Riverhead, seven to Port Jefferson, and 10 to Patchogue. Thus, at the time a General Emergency was declared

-- 9:39 -- only 10.5 percent of the Road Crew personnel essential to the implementation of the LILCO Plan were mobilized, even though the circumstances -- a pre-announced exercise -- were l

designed to maximize the likelihood of good LILCO performance.

In fact, even at the time of LILCO's evacuation advisory, only about 65 percent of LILCO's Road Crew personnel were mobilized, even though the circumstances -- a pre-announced exercise -- were designed to maximize the likelihood of good LILCO performance.

l

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Thus, even assuming that no member of the public attempted to evacuate prior to the evacuation order, at the time of that order the LERO personnel essential to the implementation of the recommendation according to the LILCO Plan were not even fully mobilized.4 B. [EX 25 and 29 to be dealt with under this suboart].

LILCO was incapable of responding as required to either of the two free play messages indicating existence of major road impediments, one involving a gravel truck and three cars, and the other involving a fuel truck. Egg FEMA Report at 30, 36-38, 57-58, 65. For example, although FEMA's free play messages were injected at about 10:40 for the gravel truck accident and 11:00 for the fuel truck accident (FEMA Report at 36):

(i) The Evacuation Route Coordinator failed to ad-vise the Evacuation Support Communicator for Route Spotters / Road Crews of pertinent facts, including that the gravel truck impedi-ment was a multiple vehicle accident, that the fuel truck impedi-ment involved the possibility of fire since fuel was leaking, and 4 Pursuant to OPIP 3.6.3, during the exercise the Road Crew personnel were not dispatched from the three staging areas until after the evacuation recommendation had been made to the public by simulated EBS message. The dispatch of Road Crew personnel began at Riverhead at about 10:47 and was completed at about 11:00; it began at about 10:46 at Port Jefferson and was completed at about 12:40 (with two Road Crews having to travel to Brentwood to pick up their tow trucks); it began at about 10:45 at Patchogue, and was completed at about 11:28. Subsequent to their being dispatched, it took substantial time before crews were in a position to drive to an identified impediment in the field and attempt to remove it. Thus, for example, as noted in subpart B of this contention, a Road Crew to deal with the simulated fuel truck impediment did not arrive at the impediment scene until about 2:10, three hours after it had been dispatched.

l FEMA Report at 37, 57-58.

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. - , ,. - w,-- ---- - r-- ---y

that both shoulders of the road were blocked by the fuel truck.

Such facts were required to be communicated under LILCO's Plan (agg OPIP 3.6.3), and the consequence of not doing so during the exercise was to delay substantially LILCO's response to the im-pediments (by approximately three hours for the fuel truck

impediment). Egg FEMA Report at 30, 36-37, 57.

(ii) The LERO Evacuation Coordinator, who is to be

. kept informed of any problems with implementing an evacuation of 0

the EPZ, including impediments or suspected impediments (agg OPIP 3.6.3), was not informed of either the gravel truck or the fuel truck impediment until after about 12:13, and even then it was FEMA, not any LERO personnel, which brought information regarding the impediments to the Evacuation Coordinator's attention. FEMA Report at 36. Only thereafter did the Evacuation Coordinator discuss LILCO's response to the impediments with his staff.

Notwithstanding that FEMA-prompted discussion, however, (a) As late as 12:40, the Transportation Support Coordinator had not been informed that a bus evacuation route was potentially blocked by the gravel truck; (b) As late as 1:48, the Road Logistics

, Coordinator had not been informed that equipment needed to be sent to the site of the fuel truck accident (despite the fact that the Evacuation Coordinator had discussed the situation with respect to road logistics with members of his staff as early as 12:16). As a result, the Road Crew assigned to the fuel truck impediment did not arrive at the scene of the simulated 1

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impediment until approximately 2:10 -- over three hours after the impediment had first been made known to LILCO by FEMA. FEMA Report at 36, 57.

(c) There was no EBS broadcast, or other public dissemination of information about the impediments, until 1:45.

(iii) LILCO's response, once it had finally begun, was inadequate with respect to both simulated impediments.

(a) Only one tow truck was dispatched to the scene of the gravel truck impediment and no scraper was sent to remove spilled gravel from the road. As a result, there was inadequate equipment available to remove the impediment, which would have required 30 minutes or more to clear even with the proper equipment. Egg FEMA Report at 37, 65.

(b) Although Road Crews from the Port Jefferson Staging Area were dispatched by 11:50, the Road Crew assigned to respond to the fuel truck impediment (within Port Jefferson's area of responsibility) did not arrive at the impediment scene until about 2:10, by which time the FEMA evaluator had left. FEMA Report at 57-58. At about 11:15, the Route Spotter / Road Crew Communicator at the EOC had requested the Port Jefferson Evacuation Support Coordinator to dispatch the Route Spotter on whose route the fuel truck impediment was located. This Route Spotter, however, was not dispatched until l about 12:02, a delay of over 45 minutes which interfered with verification of the impediment. FEMA Report at 37.

l

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C. [Not admitted by ASLB). As set forth in Contention Ex 44, the LILCO assumption that prior to 10:24 no evacuees would be on the roads, and therefore there would be no impediments to remove or evacuation to be managed, is without basis. In fact, in light of the EBS messages simulated beginning at 6:52, for the reasons set forth in Contention Ex 44, substantial numbers of people would begin to evacuate much earlier than 10:24. Under the LILCO Plan, and as revealed in the exercise, however, there is no provision for rematung roadway impediments or managing an evacuation until long after such evacuation begins, thus further demonstrating a fundamental flaw.in LILCO's Plan for managing an orderly evacuation.

D. [Not admitted by ASLB]. The exercise results further revealed that the assumption that impediment removal would take place throughout the evacuation process, which is the basic premise of the evacuation time estimates relied upon during the exercise, is without basis. With substantial voluntary

. evacuation beginning soon after 6:52, the time necessary for the Road Crews to make their way to the staging areas to report for duty, as well as to drive to their predesignated deployment locations and to impediment locations in the field, would in fact take substantially longer than it did during the exercise, when there was no unusual traffic on the roads at all. This further underscores that LILCO's Plan is fundamentally flawed because there is no viable plan for timely removal of road impediments or for management of an orderly evacuation. Accordingly, the LILCO Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1), in that there can

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be no finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency.

E. The proposal to add a Traffic Engineer to the LERO r

pe'sonnel at the EOC (1g1 letter dated June 20, 1986, from John D. Leonard to Harold R. Denton (SNRC-1269), Encl. 1 at 1) would not eliminate the flaws in the Plan which were demonstrated by the exercise, since that person's assigned task would be "to assist in evaluating road impediments and developing alternate routing." Even assuming such a person could provide such

" assistance," it would have no impact on the basic structural flaws in the Plan and demonstrated incapacities of LERO personnel described in this contention.

CONTENTION EX 42. [Not seoarately admitted but evidence related to matters raised in EX 42 will be heard under EX 38, 39, 41, and 50]. During the exercise, the LERO players were required to respond to a limited number of factual situations, events, situations or possibilities -- such as free play messages, l

questions from evaluators, or situations caused by their own errors -- that required LERO players to improvise appropriate actions instead of being able to follow prearranged response j patterns -- such as those set forth in OPIPs and LILCO training materials. The response by LERO personnel to such surprises, unknowns, or tects of their knowledge during the exercise con-sistently resulted in inappropriate actions (and in some in-stances inappropriate corrective actions as well, which com-pounded the error), incorrect responses, and actions or responses

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inconsistent with the LILCO Plan and/or common sense. Examples of such repeated and consistent failures by LERO personnel to respond as necessary and appropriate to the minimal number of surprises and unknowns involved in the exercise are set forth in subparts A-G below.

Collectively and individually, LILCO's incorrect actions in response to unexpected situations demonstrate a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan, in that LILCO personnel are unable to imple-ment adequate responses as called for by the LILCO Plan during even a simulated emergency involving a minimal number of sur-prises and unknowns. In an actual emergency, there would be many more unexpected situations than occurred in the limited February 13 exercise which was largely scripted by LILCO, parti-cularly since, in a real emergency, the full complement of LERO personnel and supporting organizations would be expected to participate and several hundred thousand citizens of Long Island would attempt to take protective actions. LILCO's failure to handle even the limited number of unexpected events which occurred on February 13 is thus a strong demonstration that the LERO players are incapable of implementing the Plan and demonstrates that LILCO failed to satisfy many critical exercise objectives, including EOC 1, 7, 8, 11, 16, 17, 20, ENC 3, 5, SA 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, FIELD 8, 9, 10, 13, 16. Accordingly, the exercise results demonstrated fundamental flaws regarding l LILCO's ability to implement the Plan which preclude a finding of l-

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reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an actual Shoreham emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).

A. FEMA inserted two free play road impediment mes-sages, requiring LERO players to respond to particular events which had not been specifically planned for in advance. As set forth in the FEMA Report (at 30, 36-38, 57-58, 65) and in Contention Ex 41 (particularly subpart B), LERO's responses to the impediments were untimely, ineffective, and confused, demon-strating LERO's inability to deal with unexpected situations.

B. LILCO failed to respond adequately, appropriately or in a timely manner to a free play message requesting LERO assistance in evacuating 40 children from the Ridge Elementary School in that:

(i) Although the request for a bus to be dis-patched to Ridge Elementary School was made at about 10:30, the bus apparently did not arrive at the school until approximately 1:23 -- almost three hours later. FEMA Report at 38, 66.

Although LERO personnel were aware of this lengthy delay, no actions were taken to check on the driver's whereabouts or to speed up his arrival.

(ii) As late as 4:23 -- almost six hours after the request for the bus for the Ridge Elementary School had been made

-- the bus still had not arrived at the Nassau Coliseum Reception Center. LERO personnel took no action in response to this information even though it indicated that 40 simulated children and a bus had apparently never made it out of the EPZ.

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C. Responding to simulated rumor messages and customer inquiries required LILCO to demonstrate an ability to handle unexpected situations since rumors necessarily involve the unexpected. As documented by the examples set forth in the FEMA Report (at 53) and in Contention Ex 39, the LERO rumor control staff demonstrated repeatedly that it is incapable of responding effectively to unexpected situations.

D. LILCO's Traffic Guides were incapable of responding adequately to the kind of inquiries that must be expected from evacuees during a Shoreham emergency, but which are not expressly discussed with responses set forth in the " Traffic Guide Procedure" in OPIP 3.6.3. For example, only one Traffic Guide out of the 14 interviewed by FEMA from the Patchogue Staging Area knew the location of the Nassau Coliseum Reception Center, and one Traffic Guide believed that the general public was to be directed to LILCO's EWDF during an actual emergency. FEMA Report at 64. LILCO's Traffic Guides also were not aware of the chain of command for authorization of exposures in excess of the l general public PAGs, or that this would be a voluntary act on their part. In addition, some Traffic Guides indicated to FEMA l evaluators that they might question the authorization of other LILCO personnel (specifically, the Lead Traffic Guides) regarding excess exposure. FEMA Report at 69. The behavior of the Traffic Guides interviewed by FEMA thus evidenced the inability of such personnel to cope with unrehearsed situations, including inquiries from evacuees, which would in fact be likely to arise in a real emergency. Such inability is significant because, l

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under the LILCO Plan, Traffic Guides are likely to be the primary, if not only, emergency response personnel to whom evacuees would have personal access.

E. LILCO's bus drivers were incapable of carrying out their assigned responsibilities and duties during the exercise when asked to locate bus yards and drive routes that had not been previously practiced, even though precisely such random and unrehearsed assignments are contemplated in OPIP 3.6.4. For example, of the four bus drivers dispatched from the Patchogue Staging Area and evaluated by FEMA, one missed part of his assigned evacuation route, one went to the wrong bus transfer

-point and completed his route only after being prompted by the Federal evaluator, and one took over two hours to get to his bus transfer point from the staging area because he initially went to the wrong bus garage. Sag FEMA Report at 64-65.

F. LERO was incapable of responding appropriately when, under the exercise scenario, events and situations esca-lated faster than the players had anticipated. For example, when a General Emergency was declared at 9:39, LERO had not fully mobilized its emergency personnel and was unable to dispatch in an adequate and timely manner even those personnel who had re-ported for duty. As a result, Traffic Guides arrived at their assigned TCPs well after evacuation had been advised by LILCO; bus drivers were not dispatched to pick up their buses from bus l

l company yards and, thereafter, to proceed to their assigned bus transfer points until over two hours after the declaration of a Site Area Emergency and over one hour after the declaraton of a i

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f

._.._ , ,___.. _____ _ .____-~_ ._ _

. _ _ . _ _ . _ . , _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - . _ _ . . ~ , . _ _ , . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . . _

General Emergency; and Road Crews, Route Spotters and Route Alerting Drivers were also delayed in carrying out the duties and responsibilities assigned to them under the LILCO Plan. And, although these events during the exercise rendered false the statements in EBS messages that Traffic Guides were in place to assist evacuees and buses were travelling routes to pick up evacuees, LILCO did nothing to correct the messages, or otherwise to modify their activities to deal with the realities created by their own actions, which differed from the scenario exercised and essumed in the LILCO Plan.

G. During the exercise, ENC personnel were required to respond to media questions and exercise events and actions that had not been scripted by LILCO or set forth in the Plan or OPIPs.

As set forth in Contention Ex 38, they consistently failed to do so, thus evidencing their inability to perform the precise func-tions they are required to perform under the Plan.

CONTENTION EX 43. [Not admitted by ASLB). The exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that LILCO is not capable of implementing an evacuation of the transit-dependent population as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S II.J.10. For the reasons set forth below, LILCO failed to satisfy objectives EOC 1, 2, 11, 16, SA 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, FIELD 9 and 14, and the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will.be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).

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4 1

According to the LILCO Plan (OPIP 3.3.3; OPIP 3.6'.4), and during the exercise, bus drivers, who are expected to drive buses to transport the transit-dependent population out of the EPZ and to the designated reception center, were not notified of the emergency or required to report to staging areas until after the declaration of a Site Area Emergency. That declaration occurred i at about 8:19. Although beginning at approximately 8:05, certain l

LERO coordinators began activities purportedly to " pre-stage" for an anticipated evacuation order, the bus drivers were not even notified of the emergency until sometime after the Site Area Emergency declaration at 8:19.

As a result, by 9:00, only 14 bus drivers had reported to the Riverhead Staging Area (100 are necessary under the Plan);

only one had reported to the Patchogue Staging Area (182 are required under the Plan);'and only five had reported to the Port Jefferson Staging Area'(108 are required under the Plan). At 9:40, still only 32 had reported to Riverhead, 24 to Patchogue, and nine to Port Jefferson. Thus, at the time a General Emergency was declared -- 9:39 -- less than 17 percent of the LERO bus drivers essential to the implementation of an evacuation according to the LILCO Plan were mobilized; none were yet in a position to begin the evacuation process, Under the LILCO Plan, bus drivers are not1 dispatched to bus company yards to pick up buses until after they have reported to their staging areas and received necessary dosimetry. Although certain " pre-staging" of buses began at approximar.ely 9:45, bus drivers did not begin arriving at bus transfer points -- the

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starting point for the running of their evacuation routes --

until much later and bus runs did not actually begin until 11:23.

The LILCO Plan asserts that the bus runs should not start until one hour after an evacuation recommendation is made to the public. OPIP 3.6.4, S 5.3.4. For the reasons set forth below, however, the exercise demonstrated that this provision of the Plan, and the way the bus procedure is implemented by LILCO, are fundamentally flawed, in that buses will not be available to transport evacuees out of the EPZ (a) at the time LILCO represents to the public that they will be, or (b) when the public will actually seek to evacuate.

A. Assuming arauendo that no members of the public would seek to evacuate prior to the simulated EBS evacuation advisory at 10:24, once that radio broadcast had been made, people would expect LILCO bus drivers to be driving their routes and picking up evacuees. The EBS message supposedly aired during the exercise at 10:24 stated that "scecial buses will travel alona emeroency routes to transoort you to the receotion center."

This message was repeated every 15 minutes. Thus, according to LILCO's own emergency information repeatedly disseminated to the public, beginning at 10:24, buses would be immediately available for those persons in need of transportation out of the EPZ. This information was false, and the LILCO personnel who issued it knew or should have known that it was false. The provision in the LILCO Plan requiring the issuance of such a false and misleading statement, and the actual use of such a message during the exer-cise, is a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan, and constitutes a

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violation of.10 CFR S 50.47(b)(7). In addition, by creating public expectations that evacuation transportation was available when in fact it was not, under the LILCO Plan and as demonstrated during the exercise, the likelihood is substantially increased that none of LILCO's recommendations or other emergency informa-tion will be believed or followed by the public.

B. As set forth in Contention Ex 44, the assumption that no evacuees would seek to evacuate prior to 10:24, when the EBS evacuation advisory was simulated, is without basis and false. While the first EBS evacuation advisory was simulated at 10:24, earlier EBS messages had advised (at 6:52) that schools were being closed, (at 8:41 and every 15 minutes thereafter) that I there had been a release of radiation at 8:19 and that dairy animals should be placed on stored feed, and (at 10:03 and 10:29) that at 9:39, a General Emergency had been declared due to a failure in plant safety systems. The assumption that the EBS broadcasts beginning at 6:52 would not have generated substantial evacuation activity beginning well before the official announce-ment -- and well before the first buses became available to as-sist those without transportation, at 11:30 -- is without basis.

In fact, for the reasons set forth in Contention Ex 44, sub-stantial numbers of people would seek to evacuate much earlier.

Under the LILCO Plan, and as revealed in the exercise, however, there is no provision for providing transportation to those needing it until much later.

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Indeed, with evacuation beginning soon after 6:52, the time necessary for bus drivers to receive assignments, then to drive to bus yards and pick up buses, and then to drive to transfer points to begin their runs, would in fact take substantially longer that it did during the exercise, when there was no unusual traffic on the roads at all. Thus, in a real emergency, LILCO's inability to implement an evacuation of the transit-dependent population would in fact be substantially greater than was demonstrated during the exercise.

Accordingly, the LILCO Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(7), (b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S II.G. and J. And, the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that ade-quate protective measures can and will be implemented in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47 (a)(1).

CONTENTION EX 44. [First sentence admitted and consolidated with EX 38 and 39; remainder not admitted]. The exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that as a result of LILCO's inability to provide accurate, clear, consistent and non-conflicting information to the public (ggg Contentions Ex 38, Ex 39, Ex 40.C & D, Ex 42.D, Ex 43.A, Ex 45), there would be a substantial evacuation shadow -- or voluntary evacuation of persona not advised to evacuate -- in the event of a Shoreham accident. Egg 21 NRC at 644, 670. (Not admitted hereafter].

The LILCO Plan, as exercised on February 13, fails to take into account, or deal with at all, the substantial impact of such

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_ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . . _ _- . _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ - _ _ _ _ . . _.- _ ,. _ ,__ ..~,. _ _ , -

l l

voluntary evacuation upon LILCO's ability to implement the Plan or to assure that adequate protective measures can and will be taken by persons who require such protection in the event of an accident. Indeed, LILCO players asserted repeatedly during the exercise that there was no voluntary evacuation whatsoever.

Thus, the exercise results revealed a fundamental flaw in LILCO's 4 Plan and its capability to be implemented, in that the results are based upon data and assumptions which are untrue. Thus, the LILCO Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1) and no reasonable assurance finding can be made.

The Plan, the exercise scenario, and the actions of the LILCO players during the exercise all assumed that only persons advised to evacuate would actually do so and that they would not evacuate until told to do so. For example, the following elements of the LILCO Plan are designed to handle only the number of evacuees presumed by'LILCO to be in the EPZ (160,000) and advised to evacuate (during the exercise, 160,000).

A. The numbers, types and locations of evacuation vehicles (including buses, ambulances, ambulettes, and vans),

evacuation routes, bus drivers, bus routes, traffic guides, traffic control points, road crew personnel, impediment removal equipment, and perimeter control points; B. The number, locations of, and facilities at the few purportedly available relocation or reception centers identified in the Plan; C. The level of staffing at staging areas, the EOC, and the reception centers;

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i.

D. Public notification and-information provisions, including EBS messages; E. Provisions for notifying and mobilizing emergency workers; and F. Provisions for registration, monitoring and decontamination of evacuees.

During the exercise, the LILCO players assumed that there was no evacuation activity by any persons other than those within the EPZ zones advised to evacuate.

In fact, however, when substantial numbers of individuals refuse to obey LILCO's protective action recommendations and seek l to evacuate whether advised to do so or not -- as would occur in l

light of LILCO's demonstrated inability to provide accurate, clear, consistent and non-conflicting information during even a simulated emergency -- the LILCO Plan could not and would not be implemented. For example, during the exercise, with aq actual evacuation behavior at all, the LILCO players still were unable to notify governments or the public promptly, communicate effectively with each other or wi;h the media or the public, deal with traffic impediments, reach traffic control points, locate and drive evacuation bus routes, monitor simulated evacuees, or evacuate school children. Egg, e,q., Contentions Ex 33, Ex 34, Ex 38-43, Ex 45, Ex 49. With substantially more evacuees on the road and in need of information, assistance, and emergency services than are planned for in the LILCO Plan, the abilities of LILCO personnel to implement protective actions as set forth in that Plan would be even further diminished.

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m Furthermore, the exercise failed to demonstrate that LILCO has the ability to expand its response on an ad hqq basis as contemplated by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(1) and NUREG 0654 S II.A, and as would be required given the likely evacuation shadow LILCO's actions would create. Indeed, the exercise demonstrated the opposite. Given LILCO's demonstrated inability to deal with unanticipated occurrences within the 10-mile EPZ (agg, e,c.,

Contentions Ex 38, Ex 39, Ex 41 and Ex. 42), the exercise results demonstrate that LILCO has no capability of expanding its response on an ad hqq basis to deal with conditions outside the 10-mile EPZ which are caused by the evacuation shadow.

Accordingly, since the exercise demonstrated that the Plan fails to include the provisions, personnel, equipment, facilities, and preparedness necessary to deal with voluntary evacuees and to assure that such evacuees do not interfere with the ability of persons actually advised to evacuate to do so safely and effectively, the exercise demonstrated that the Plan is fundamentally flawed. The exercise thus precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).

CONTENTION EX 45. (Not seoaratelv admitted but bases cited in EX 45 are consolidated with EX 50]. The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's Plan is fundamentally flawed in that members of LERO, and personnel working in support of LERO, are unable to obtain, identify, process and transmit essential information and

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l

data effectively, accurately, appropriately, and on a timely basis as is necessary to implement the LILCO Plan. Examples of the repeated failures of LERO personnel in communicating emergency information and data during the exercise are enumerated in subparts A-H below. Collectively and individually, they demonstrate LILCO's lack of compliance with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(6) and NUREG 0654 S II.F, repeated violations of LILCO's own procedures, LILCO's failure to satisfy objectives EOC 1, 5, 7, 11, 12, 16, 17, 20, BHO 7, ENC 3, 5, SA 1, 5, 7, 9, 10,' and FIELD 9, 10, and LILCO's overall inability to implement the LILCO Plan as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Thus, the exercise results revealed multiple fundamental flaws in LILCO's Plan which preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency.

A. LILCO's response to the two free play impediment messages involved numerous serious communications failures which played a major role in LILCO's inability to remove the simulated impediments as provided in the Plan, and as would be necessary to implement an evacuation. In addition, the types of actions which, as described below, LERO personnel failed to take in l response to the impediment messages are similar to those that would be required under the LILCJ Plan in response to many other situations which would occur in substantial numbers during a real emergency. Therefore, these failures are significant and preclude the reasonable assurance finding required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Specifically:

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(1-) The Evacuation Coordinator, who is responsible for coordinating all evacuation traffic control, evacuation transportation, and evacuation implementation (OPIP 2,1,1) was never informed by LERO personnel of either of the free play impediment messages, contrary to OPIP 3.6.3 which requires such communication. The Evacuation Route Coordinator was given the fuel truck impediment message at 11:00 and the gravel truck impediment message at 10:40. The Evacuation Coordinator was not informed of either one, however, until after 12:13, when he was informed by the FEMA controller. Egg FEMA Report at 36. The late notification of the Evacuation Coordinator, as well as the lack of status updates and other necessary communications between and among the Evacuation Route Coordinator, the Traffic Control Coordinator, the Road Logistics Coordinator, the Transportation Support Coordinator, Lead Traffic Guides, Road Crews, Evacuation Route Spotters, and Evacuation Support Communicators, as required by OPIP 3.6.3, led to the substantial delays and ultimate inability to respond adequately to the impediments. In fact, the delays caused by such failures would have been even greater in an actual emergency, since in the exercise LERO never even

,_ discovered its errors; rather, it was the FEMA controller who alerted LERO to the problem LERO itself had created.

(ii) LERO personnel at the EOC failed to include essential information communicated to them via the free play impediment messages on LERO message forms, nor did they otherwise communicate such critical data to the other LERO personnel i expected to respond to the impediments, as required by OPIP 3.6.3 l

l l

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and OPIP 4.1.2. Egg FEMA Report at 30. For example, important information was not included on the 10:45 LERO message from the Evacuation Route Coordinator to the Evacuation Support Communicator for Route Spotters / Road Crews regarding the gravel l

truck impediment, including the fact that three passenger cars l were involved in the accident. Similarly, essential information ;

was not included on the 11:06 LERO message from the Evacuation Route Coordinator to the Route Spotter / Road Crew Communicator regarding the fuel truck impediment, including that fuel was leaking, that.there was the possibility of fire, and that both shoulders of the road were blocked. Egg FEMA Report at 30.

Because of these failures, the equipment eventually sent to respond to the gravel truck impediment was inappropriate and inadequate to remove the simulated obstruction, and the equipment eventually sent to respond to the fuel truck impediment was so substantially delayed that LILCO's response was not observed by FEMA. FEMA Report at 37, 39, 57-58.

(iii) The Evacuation Coordinator and other LERO personnel were not properly informed concerning a " visual check" of the fuel truck impediment received by the Transportation Support Coordinator from the Bus Dispatcher at the Patchogue Staging Area, and appropriate actions therefore were not taken in response, contrary to OPIP 3.6.3 and OPIP 4.1.2, until more than three hours after the free play message had been injected. Egg FEMA Report at 30, 57.

(

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i l

l i

(iv) LERO personnel were unable to locate, communicate with, or timely dispatch a Route Spotter to investi- l l

gate and verify the fuel truck impediment. They were also unable to determine whether one had actually been dispatched. Thus, at about 11:15, the Route Spotter / Road Crew Communicator requested the Port Jefferson Evacuation Support Communicator to determine whether a Route Spotter had been dispatched as required under the Plan, and as apparently assumed by the LERO players. The spotter was not in fact dispatched until about 12:02. Egg FEMA Report at 37.

(v) Although the FEMA controller had informed LERO personnel of their initial errors.in dealing with the gravel and fuel truck impediments at about 12:13, and despite the fact that the Evacuation Coordinator had discussed the situation with some of his staff at about 12:16, as of 12:40, the Transportation Support Coordinator still had not been informed that bus evacuation route M-1 was potentially blocked by the gravel truck, contrary to OPIP 3.6.3. And, as late as 1:48, the Road Logistics Coordinator had not been informed that there might be a need to send equipment to the site of the fuel truck impediment. Egg FEMA Report at 36. Thus, the initial errors, omissions, and failures to follow procedures and accurately transmit information were compounded by additional errors even after the first errors had been identified for LERO by FEMA. These later errors further illustrate the significance of LERO's inability to obtain and transmit essential information, since they had demonstrable impact on other aspects of the overall emergency response.

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. , - -- --- . , - - , . . ,----a-- - - - , .

~

J (vi) As a result of the numerous failures and delays in internal LERO communications, information concerning the road impediments and the need to avoid the blocked evacuation routes was not communicated to the public until 1:46 when EBS message number 8 was simulated. This further demonstrates the impact of LERO's communications failures upon its ability to implement its Plan.

B. The response of LERO personnel to.the Ridge 0

Elementary School free play message also demonstrates LILCO's inability to communicate essential information to appropriate response personnel in a timely manner, as required by OPIP 3.6.5.

The free play message requesting LERO to provide a bus and driver to assist in transporting 40 children from Ridge Elementary School was given to the Evacuation Coordinator at the LERO EOC at approximately 10:30. The request was communicated to the Special i Population Bus Dispatcher at the Patchogue Staging Area within about 10 minutes, but in violation of OPIP 3.6.5, the staging area personnel did not respond appropriately or quickly in processing the communication. As a result, the bus driver was not even dispatched to a bus yard to pick up a bus for 40 minutes. Egg FEMA Report at 38, 66. Furthermore, there were no apparent efforts by LERO personnel to follow up on their dispatch orders during the approximately three hour period prior to the report that the driver had arrived at the school. Finally, 1

LERO's inability to contact, communicate with, or even locate the LERO bus driver, when as of 4:23 he had still not arrived at the I

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t

Reception Center, further demonstrates LILCO's inability to obtain or follow up on the absence of info'rmation critical to the implementation of-a required protective action.

C. LERO was unable to notify or communicate emergency information to the FAA or the LIRR, despite the provisions in OPIP 3.6.3 requiring notification of the FAA in order to have air traffic diverted from the EPZ, and the obvious need to have the LIRR divert its trains from the EP3. The failure of LERO personnel to perform these tasks evidences their inability to appropriately process, act upon, and communicate emergency information. Egg FEMA Report at 29.

D. Communications relating to release data and dose projections were not handled properly or accurately as required by OPIP 3.6.1. For example, LERO personnel failed to designate clearly on the EOC dose assessment status boards the distinctions between DOE RAP monitoring data and LILCO field monitoring data.

i Egg FEMA Report at 29-30. This-failure demonstrates not only an inability to effectively communicate important dose information and potentially significant distinctions between the information

! from the two sources, but also an inability to recognize the significance of that distinction, contrary to the requirements of OPIP 3.6.1. Similarly, downwind distances of sample readings by field monitors were incorrectly reported as 7000 meters instead of 700 meters for a thyroid dose. This error resulted in an initial calculation of thyroid dose as 900 mrem /hr at 4.3 miles downwind, instead of 9000 mrem /hr at about 0.5 miles downwind.

Egg FEMA Report at 33. And, at the EOC, several extrapolated

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doses at various distances were reported as actual measurements rather than as projected data on the dose assessment status board, it took two and one half hours to identify and correct .

this error. Egg FEMA Report at 33. These failures indicate a significant inattention to detail and accuracy in recording, processing, and communication of data critical to the accident assessment and protective action recommendation processes which are at the core of an emergency response. Such failures could lead to dangerous errors in a real emergency.

E. During the exercise, the LERO Director apparently left the " command room" on several occasions, and therefore was not available to take calls over the RECS telephone or the dedicated telephone. Since, pursuant to OPIP 3.1.1 and OPIP

.3.3.1, data and information critical to command decisions are communicated by these means, his absence and resulting inability to obtain and act upon such data quickly was significant.

Moreover, the secretary who took the calls in the Director's absence merely told the callers that the Director would call back, and failed to take a message in writing and carry it to the Director immediately upon completion of the transmission. Final-ly, LERO failed to have key events or evacuation status boards in the EOC command room. Thus, updated information on the status of the emergency situation was not visible to LERO workers in those areas at all times. Egg FEMA Report at 30. These failures to obtain or communicate vital data, and to have updated information

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available and visible in the command room substantially impair the ability of command personnel to perform their duties under the Plan.

F. There were numerous failures .o obtain, process, communicate and appropriately act upon important emerge..cy information and data demonstrated by the performance of LERO ENC, Public Information and Rumor Control personnel, in violation of OPIP 3.8.1. These are detailed in Contentions Ex 38 and Ex 39.

The fact that such personnel exhibited such communication inabilities is particularly significant since such individuals were purportedly selected for their LERO positions because of their communications expertise.

G. LERO personnel at the staging areas evidenced an inability to accurately, appropriately or in a timely manner obtain, record, transmit, or act upon emergency data, in viola-tion of OPIPs 4.1.2, 3.6.3, 3.6.4, 3.6.5, and OPIP 3.9.1. For example: ,

(i) Personnel at the Riverhead Staging Area did not properly record or appropriately identify event status information on Emergency E%ent Status Forms or on status boards.

Egg FEMA Report at 72.

(ii) Communications between the Port Jefferson Staging Area and Traffic Guides was difficult due to poor radio reception, and disrupted other essential communications from that Staging Area. Egg FEMA Report at 56. Such difficulties would be

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^

1 I

much more serious in an actual emergency when many more traffic guides would be attempting to make radio communications with the staging areas involved.

1 (iii) The Bus Dispatcher at the Patchogue Staging ,

Area repeatedly made inaccurate and misleading announcements to bus drivers concerning the dose levels at which they were to call in. These incorrect instructions concerning such important infarpation in fact led to confusion on the part of the bus drivers, and could be very dangerous in a real emergency. Egg FEMA Report at 68.

(iv) The Transfer Point Coordinator at the Brookhaven National Laboratory Transfer Point was unable to follow instructions and transmit information and directions from the staging area to bus drivers during the exercise. For example, he directed a bus driver to the ENDF despite the fact that a message from the Bus Dispatcher to all Transfer Point Coordinators had directed that all drivers arriving at transfer points before 4:00 should be directed to the Nassau Coliseum Reception Center. Egg FEMA Report at 65.

H. LERO personnel at the EOC and staging areas were unable to transmit consistent or accurate information concerning assistance from the Suffolk County Police Department ("SCPD")

during the exercise. For example, at 9:19, the LERO Manager was told by simulators purportedly representing Suffolk County officials that no County resources would be available to assist LILCO during the exercise. This fact was confirmed by the County simulators at 10:15, 10:26 and 10:36, according to the logs kept

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by the LERO Manager and Director. However, at 9:20 the Evacuation Coordinator recorded in his log that the SCPD had offered to provide LILCO whatever assistance was required, and the Traffic Control Coordinator was advised of this purported information at 9:35. At 10:02, the Evacuation Coordinator notified the staging areas that the SCPD had offered assistance on traffic control, route alerting, and route spotting, and that police officers would be dispatched to the staging areas for briefings. And, between 10:02 and 10:15, the Traffic Control Coordinator informed (i) the Riverhead Staging Area to expect 39 SCPD officers to report for assignment to traffic control and route spotting functions; (ii) the Port Jefferson Staging Area to expect 74 SCPD officers and; (iii) the Patchogue Staging Area to expect 37 SCPD officers. These messages, all of which conflicted with the facts known and recorded by the LERO Manager and Direc-tor, were in turn transmitted to Lead Traffic Guides, Dosimetry

j. Recordkeepers, and other staging area personnel. The erroneous information which had been communicated to the staging areas was not corrected until approximately 10:50. In a real emergency,

such a total failure of communication could lead to serious problems.

X. CONTENTIONS EX 46-49: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS RELATING TO POST-EVACUATION SERVICES FOR EVACUEES t

l CONTENTION EX 46. [Not seoarately admitted but substance to be dealt with under suboart A of EX 22]. The exercise results demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that the

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l l

implementation of the Plan is dependent upon the availability of the Nassau Coliseum as the reception center for evacuees, when, in_ fact, that facility cannot be used for that purpose.

The exercise was fundamentally premised on the availability and use of the Nassau Coliseum as the focus and endpoint of a supposedly orderly evacuation. It was the facility to which LERO players assumed: evacuees would go for radiological monitoring and decontamination of themselves and their vehicles; hundreds of buses and vans carrying persons out of the EPZ would report, discharge passengers, and be decontaminated; evacuees would be registered, reunited with family members, and provided with assistance in seeking health care, housing, food and other services, and from which evacuees would be provided directions, or transportation to congregate care centers for sheltering.

E.g., objectives EOC 16, FIELD 17, 19, 21; exercise EBS messages.

Thus, the evacuation time estimates, traffic control strategies, and other provisions of the LILCO Plan purportedly implemented during the exercise, as well as all the directions, decisions, and actions of LERO players during the exercise, were premised on the assumption that the ultimate goal of the emergency response was to enable evacuees to reach the Nassau Coliseum if necessary (for monitoring and decontamination) or if desired (for reuniting <

with family members or shelter). All exercise activities relating to evacuation -- that is, everything that took place from shortly after 8:00 (when "prestaging" began) until the exercise ended at 4:30 -- were premised on the basic assumption that the Nassau Coliseum was available to LILCO to be a reception

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center. Indeed, during the exercise the LILCO players in simulated EBS radio announcements advised approximately 100,000

" evacuees" to report to the Nassau Coliseum for monitoring ar.d decontamination because they had potentially been exposed to radiation during their supposed evacuation efforts.

The exercise thus demonstrated that the availability of the Nassau Coliseum (a) is an essential element of the LILCO Plan as exercised, and (b) was an essential premise of the actions of the 0

LERO players in atempting to implement that Plan during the exercise. The Coliseum is not in fact available for LILCO's use as a relocation center, however. Sig Nassau County Board of Supervisors' Resolution, June 16, 1986. Since the exercise demonstrated that LILCO is not capable of implementing key portions of its Plan unless the Coliseum is available for LILCO's use, and since LILCO has no alternate reception center and failed to demonstrate during the exercise that it could implement critical aspects of its Plan, including managing an orderly evacuation, if the Coliseum were not available, the exercise demonstrated that in fact the Plan cannot be implemented and hence is fundamentally flawed. Therefore, LILCO failed to satisfy the exercise objectives cited in this contention, the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR SS 50.47(a)(1), (b)(8) and (b)(10), and NUREG 0654 S II.A.3 and J.9, 10, and 12, and the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

> - 150 - _

CONTENTION EX 47. The exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that LILCO failed to demonstrate the ability to register, monitor and decontaminate evacuees from special facilities who are transported to reception centers other than the Nassau Coliseum, or that such activities could be accom-plished within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> as required by NUREG 0654 S II.J.12.

Thus, LILCO has not satisfied objectives FIELD 13 and 21, and the exercise precludes a finding that the LILCO Plan complies with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(1), (b)(8), (b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S II.J.9, 10, and 12.

According to the estimates in the Plan, if there were an evacuation of the entire EPZ, there could be as many as 1600 residents of nursing and adult homes, health care and other special facilities, all with special needs, requiring that they be sent to special reception facilities (OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 2),

plus tens of thousands of school children. This number could be increased by approximately 850 persons if the hospitals in the EPZ and the Suffolk Infirmary also were evacuated. Id. The LILCO Plan, Rev. 6, which was the subject of the exercise, has no provision for the registration, radiological monitoring or de-contamination of such individuals; nor does it include provisions for reception centera for the vast majority of such individuals, or agreenents indicating that any such reception centers are in fact available or adequate to serve that purpose. Rather, it includes registration, radiological monitoring and decontami-nation procedures to be implemented, and equipment and personnel to be present, only at the Nassau Coliseum and the Emergency

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L

Worker Decontamination Center. OPIP 4.2.3; OPIP 4.3.1. This is a deficiency in the Plan which violates NUREG 0654 S II.A.3, J.10.d and 12, and 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(8) and (b)(10). It precludes a finding that the LILCO Plan is adequate, or that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency as required by 10 CFR S 50.47 (a)(1).

Furthermore, the proposal in the new Revision 7 version of OPIP 4.3.1, purportedly to address this deficiency- (agg letter dated June 20, 1986, from John D. Leonard to Harold Denton, (SNRC-1270), and Att. I at 4), fails to correct this deficiency for the following reasons:

A. The proposal to send only one monitor to each special facility reception center -- assuming arauendo reception centers existed -- is unworkable. Egg OPIP 4.3.1 5 5.1.6 (Rev.

7). For example, one of the few special facility reception centers designated by LILCO is expected to receive up to 465 evacuees. OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 2. One person could not adequately or effectively perform the necessary monitoring, recordkeeping, and related activities that would be required at such a center.

B. The proposal to have monitoring done as evacuees leave their buses, ambulances or ambulettes (agg OPIP 4.3.1 S 5.4.9.c (Rev. 7)) is unworkable. It could not be done in inclement weather, there is no assurance that reception centers

-- assuming arauendo they existed -- would be laid out to permit such activities at unloading points, and the evacuees, who by

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2

.d'efinition have special needs, cannot be subjected to waits in buses'or ambulances while lines of others arriving ahead of them are monitored by one LERO worker.

C. The proposal to have bus drivers keep necessary monitoring records (agg OPIP 4.3.1 S 5.4.9.c (Rev. 7)) is unworkable. Such personnel have not been trained for such a function, nor have they been properly equipped to fulfill it. It is also impractical to expect a bus driver to be able to perform such a function.

D. The proposal to have persons found to be contami-nated "get back on the bus" and eventually driven to.the Nassau Coliseum (agg OPIP 4.3.1. S 5.4.9.d (Rev. 7)) is unworkable, impractical and dangerous. The evacuees at special facility reception centers are, by definition, in need of special care that cannot be provided at the Nassau Coliseum. To refuse to decontaminate them, and instead to send them to a facility that is not equipped to handle their special needs, and in the process delay their decontamination and also expose them to other contaminated people on the bus, thus potentially increasing their exposure, is without justification.

E. The provision that it is not necessary to provide monitoring personnel at reception centers for schools (agg OPIP 4.1.1. S 5.1.5 (Rev. 7)) is wholly inadequate. Assuming arouendo that such reception centers exist -- and they do not -- there is no basis for LILCO's refusal to provide radiological monitoring and decontamination services to the school children evacueec who would be taken there. This refusal is a clear violation of NUREG

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0654 S II.J.12. Furthermore, the LILCO explanation that such services are not necessary "if the parents are going to be picking up the children," makes no sense, and fails to correct the deficiency.

Finally, during the exercise, messages apparently were transmitted among certain LILCO players referring to requests that monitoring personnel be sent to certain hospitals and facilities outside the EPZ. The exercise failed to demonstrate, however, that LILCO is capable of providing registration and monitoring at actual reception centers for actual evacuees with special needs during a real emergency, since: (a) such personnel were not actually sent to any special reception center facilities during the exercise (all the I

referenced facilities were only " simulated" reception centers in any event since none of them participated in the exercise); and (b) there was no demonstration that the LILCO personnel were capable of (i) performing the necessary registration and monitoring of the number of evacuees with special needs likely to be taken to such facilities, or (ii) otherwise properly implementing necessary procedures for registering, monitoring and decontaminating evacuees at such facilities, even assuming aIouendo that facilities for use as special facility reception l

l centers exist. Accordingly, the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).

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CONTENTION EX 48. [Not admitted by ASLB}. The exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that it fails to include arrangements for medical services, adequate emergency facilities, personnel, and equipment to care for contaminated injured individuals, including members of the public exposed to high levels of radiation who are not otherwise injured. Such arrangements, facilities, and equipment are required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(8), (b)(12) and NUREG 0654 SS II.L. The LILCO Plan merely includes a list of hospitals, described by LILCO as pur-portedly " capable of treating contaminated / injured individuals."

Egg OPIP 4.2.2, Att. 1. The Plan contains no indication or assurance that any such listed hospitals have: "the capability for evaluation of radiation exposure and uptake"; sufficient personnel who "are adequately prepared to handle contaminated individuals"; "any special radiological capabilities"; or

" facilities and trained personnel able to care for contaminated injured persons," all of which are required by NUREG 0654 S II L.

And, during the exercise, there was no demonstration that any listed hospitals are capable of providing medical services to contaminated injured individuals as required, or that LILCO is capable of transporting such individuals to such facilities during a Shoreham accident.5 Thus, for the reasons set forth 5 The " medical drill" conducted on February 9, 1986 and dis-cussed in the FEMA Report at 84-85 dealt only with the purported response of LILCO's onsite organization to an accident involving a simulated contaminated / injured onsite worker. The simulated worker was transported to Central Suffolk Hospital pursuant to the Onsite Plan. Thus, that drill has no relevance to LILCO's ability to provide necessary medical services for contaminated injured individuals offsite, particularly since Central Suffolk (footnote continued)

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below, and as demonstrated during the exercise, the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(8), (b)(12) and NUREG 0654 S II.L, LILCO did not satisfy objectives FIELD 23 and 24, and the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).

A. LILCO has no agreements with the hospitals listed in the Plan (OPIP 4.2.2, Att. 1) which provide that those faci-lities will be available and capable of rendering necessary medical treatment to contaminated individuals in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham. In the absence of such agreements, the LILCO Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR SS 50.47(a)(1), (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(8), (b)(12), and NUREG 0654 SS II.A.3 and C.4. The exercise did not include the partici-pation of any of these facilities, or any demonstration of their availability or capability of rendering necessary treatment to contaminated individuals following a radiological accident.

B. Medical personnel at the hospitals identified in the Plan have not been trained to perform necessary medical services during a radiological emergency, nor have they been trained sufficiently concerning decontamination procedures and l treatment. As a result, the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR i

SS-50.47(a)(1), (b)(12), (b)(14), (b)(15) and NUREG 0654 SS II.

L, N, and O. The exercise did not include the participation of 1

j any personnel from the hospitals listed in the Plan, or any l

(footnote continued from previous page)

Hospital, which participated in the onsite medical drill, is located in the EPZ.

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demonstration of their knowledge or capabilities of performing the necessary medical or decontamination procedures during a radiological emergency.

C. The Plan includes no provisions for transporting contaminated injured individuals to the hospitals listed in the Plan, many of which are located substantial distances from the Shoreham plant and the EPZ. As a result, the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR $$ 50.47(a)(1), (b)(8), (b)(12) and NUREG 0654 S II.L. The exercise included no demonstration of the ability of LILCO to accomplish such transportation, much less to do so in a timely manner.

D. The Plan includes no procedures for the hospitals relied upon in the Plan to provide medical services and treatment to contaminated individuals. As a result the Plan fails to com-ply with 10 CFR SS 50.47(a)(1), (b)(8), (b)(12) and NUREG 0654 S II.L. The exercise included no demonstration of such procedures or the ability of LILCO to provide the necessary services.

CQN.TENTION EX 49. The exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that LILCO is incapable of performing neces-sary registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> as required by NUREG 0654 S II.J.12. For the reasons set forth below, during the exercise LILCO demonstrated that it has insufficient staffing, and insufficient equipment, to perform the necessary registration, monitoring and decontamination of evacuees which is required to effect an evacuation and to comply with 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(1), (b)(8), (b)(10). Therefore, LILCO l

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does not satisfy objective FIELD 21 and its Plan is fundamentally flawed since it has no capacity to handle satisfactorily the evacuees that may arrive after a Shoreham emergency.

A. [EX 31 will be dealt with under this suboart).

Although the Plan asserts that LILCO personnel assigned to the reception center to perform radiological monitoring will monitor one evacuee every ninety seconds (OPIP 3.9.2 S 5.4.7}, in fact during the exercise this procedure frequently took up to five

! O minutes per evacuee. At that actual monitoring rate, the 78 monitors assigned to the reception center in the Plan could monitor only 11,232 evacuees in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (assuming no breaks, and assuming all monitors were constantly available and monitoring).

This is far less than the 32,000 evacuees which LILCO used to I believe might be directed to the Coliseum and demonstrates the fundamental flaw in LILCO's planning for evacuees needing monitoring and decontamination. In fact, during the exercise, LILCO in simulated EBS messages advised over 100,000 evacuees (i.e., all those in zones A, B, F, G, K, and Q) to report to the i

Nassau Coliseum for radiological monitoring because they had been~

potentially exposed to radiation during their simulated

evacuation trips. Clearly, under the LILCO Plan, even assuming that no persons other than those advised to do so by LILCO actually report to the reception center for monitoring and, if necessary, decontamination, such a number of anticipated evacuees could not be monitored in a timely fashion -- 1,q., within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

158 -

B. Furthermore, the LILCO proposal to telephone INPO, other power plants, and other entities to obtain additional moni-toring personnel, and the other features of the purported " alter-nate" monitoring plan in OPIP 4.2.3, S 5.11, were not implemented or demonstrated during the exercise. Such entities did not par-ticipate in the exercise nor was there any demonstration of the capability of those entities either to provide the personnel or equipment which LILCO players pretended would be available, or to provide them in a timely manner. In addition, FEMA did not evaluate the adequacy or implementability of any such proposals during the exercise. Egg FEMA Report at 81. Thus, the exercise provides no basis to find that such proposals could be implemented, or, even if they could, that they would result in an ability to perform the necessary monitoring of the number of evacuees anticipated to report to the reception center.

C. There is no basis to assume that only those persons expressly advised by LERO to report to the reception center for monitoring because of potential exposure during evacuation l activities would actually seek such monitoring. Indeed, upon hearing that all residents of so many zones had potentially been exposed, and in light of the large amount of voluntary evacuation likely to occur for the reasons set forth in Contention Ex 44, i

substantially more people than the number expressly advised to '

report would be likely to seek such monitoring. Thus, the LILCO response would, in fact, be even more deficient than was demonstrated during the exercise.

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~ _ - - . . . _ - - - - - - , - _ . - . . . - -- - - . - - - - . -

For the foregoing reasons, the LILCO Plan f' ails to comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(1), (b)(8), (b)(10).and NUREG 0654 5 II.J.12. The exercise thus precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). ,

XI. CONTENTION EX 50: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN LILCO'S.

TRAINING PROGRAM CONTENTION EX 50. [Ibe alleced mistakes related to trainino raised in EX 42 will be dealt with ynder EX 50; and bases for EX 45 are consolidated with EX 501 The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's Plan is fundamentally flawed in that members of LERO, as well as the personnel of various organizations upon which LILCO relies for implementation of the Plan, are unable to carry out effectively or accurately the LILCO Plan because of inadequate training.

Under the LILCO Plan, LILCO is responsible for the training and retraining of both LILCO and non-LILCO personnel in LERO.

Training began in 1983 and, since that time, has consisted of classroom instruction, tabletop sessions, and drills / exercises.

Plan at 5.1-1 thru 5.2-7 and Figs. 5.1.1, 5.2.1; OPIP 5.1.1.

LILCO requires all LILCO members of LERO to participate in its training program on an annual basis. Plan at 5.1-1, 5.1-7 and 5.1-8; OPIP 5.1.1. At a minimum, this requires each LILCO worker f

l in LERO, each year, to attend classroom instruction sessions on seven emergency response training modules and to participate in r

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at least one tabletop session / drill / exercise; on average, how-ever, LILCO personnel are required, each year, to attend class-room instruction sessions on nine modules and to participate in three tabletop sessions / drills / exercises. Plan, Figs. 5.1.1 and 5.2.1; OPIP 5.1.1. Thus, as of the time of the February 13 exer-cise, the bulk of LILCO's LERO personnel had already undergone almost three years of training by LILCO involving, on average, classroom instruction on a total of 27 training modules and participation in nine tabletop sessions / drills / exercises.

The large number of training deficiencies revealed during the exercise collectively demonstrate LILCO's lack of compliance

with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(14) and (15) and NUREG 0654, S II.N and O, and violations of LILCO's Plan and procedures (chiefly OPIP 5.1.1), as well as LILCO's overall inability,to implement the LILCO Plan and procedures as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).

In its April 17, 1985 Partial Initial Decision, the ASLB found that the "LILCO Plan training program meets the regulatory a

standards," but that conclusion was expressly:

}

made subject to confirmation by a finding, to be made by FEMA after a graded exercise, that the Plan can be satisfactorily implemented with the training program submitted and that LILCO possesses an adequate number of trained LERO workers.

21 NRC 644, 756. No such findings have been made by FEMA; in fact, as noted below, in its Report FEMA identified a significant number of training deficiencies. The exercise results thus dis-close fundamental flaws in LILCO's training program which pre-i 1

161 -

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~ - - . -.,n,-

clude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emer-gency.

Every instance of a LILCO training deficiency revealed during the exercise is not described at length in this contention because they are so numerous; virtually every error made by a LILCO player during the exercise involved to some degree a fail-ure of the LILCO training program to prepare personnel adequately to perform necessary actions. Thus, each " deficiency" and each "ARCA" identified by FEMA, plus each additional error committed during the exercise and identified in other contentions, provides a basis for the Governments' allegation that the exercise results demonstrate a fundamental flaw in LILCO's training program.

Because such errors are all identified elsewhere, in the interest of brevity and to avoid needless repetition, in subparts A-I below, the Governments use cross-references to identify specific examples of the training deficiencies which support this contention.6 A. The exercise demonstrated that the LILCO program has not successfully or effectively trained or prepared LERO personnel to respond properly, appropriately, or effectively to unanticipated and unrehearsed situations likely to arise in an emergency. Exercise actions and events which support this alle-6 References in the subparts to FEMA deficiencies ("D") and ARCAs are to Table 3.1 in the FEMA Report, where the deficiencies and ARCAs are numbered and identified by LILCO facility. Herein the Port Jefferson Staging Area is referred to as "PJSA"; the Riverhead and Patchogue Staging Areas as "RSA" and "PSA"; and the Reception Center as "RC."

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gation are described in Contentions Ex 38, Ex 39, Ex 41, and Ex 42, and in the following FEMA Comments: EOC-D-1; ENC-D-1; PSA-D-1; PSA-D-6; R-D-2; EOC-ARCAs-2, 3, 9; ENC-ARCA-2; PSA-ARCAs-5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.

B. The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's training program has been ineffective in instructing LERO personnel to follow and implement the LILCO Plan and LILCO procedures, and in imparting basic knowledge and information essential to the ability to implement such procedures. Exercise actions and events which support this allegation are described in Contentions Ex 33, Ex 35-39, Ex 41, Ex 42, Ex 45, Ex 49, and in the following FEMA conclusions: EOC-D-1; ENC-D-1; R-D-2; PSA-D-6; EOC-ARCAs 2, 5, 6, 7, 9; PJSA-ARCA-1; PSA-ARCAs 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16; R-ARCAs 4, 5, 6; RC ARCA 1.

C. (The alleaed missten described in EX 23 will be considered under this suboart]. The exercise demonstrated that the LILCO training program has not successfully or effectively trained LERO personnel to communicate necessary and sufficient data and information, to inquire and obtain such information, or to' recognize the need to do so. Exercise actions and events which support this allegation are described in Contentions Ex 34-39, Ex 41, Ex 42, Ex 45, and in the following FEMA conclu-sions: EOC-D-1; ENC-D-1; EOC-ARCAs 4, 5, 6, 7, 9; ENC-ARCA 2; PSA-ARCA 8, 9, 11, 12; R-ARCA 1.

D. The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's training program has not successfully or effectively trained LERO ,

personnel to follow directions given by superiors during an

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emergency. Exercise actions and events which support this allegation are described in Contentions Ex 41, Ex 42, Ex 45 and in the following FEMA conclusions: EOC-D-1; PSA-D-6; PJSA-ARCA 1; PSA-ARCAs 9, 13, 16; R-ARCAs 4, 6; RC-ARCA 1.

E. The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's training program has not successfully or effectively trained LERO personnel to exercise independent judgment or good judgmenc, or to use common sense in dealing with situations presented duting an emergency or in implementing the LILCO Plan and procedures.

Exercise actions and events which support this allegation are described in Contentions Ex 34-43, Ex 45 and in the following FEMA conclusions: EOC-D-1; PSA-D-1; RD-2; EOC-ARCAs 2, 3, 9; ENC-ARCA 2; PSA-ARCAs 5, 7, 8, 10, 12; R-ARCA 1.

F. The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's training program has not successfully or effectively trained LERO per-sonnel to deal with the media or otherwise provide timely, ac-curate, consistent and nonconflicting information to the public, through the media, during an emergency. Exercise actions and events which support this allegation are described in Contentions Ex 37, Ex 38, E't 40.C, and Ex 43.A and in the following FEMA j conclusions: ENC-D-1; ENC-ARCAs 2, 3.

G. The exercise demonstrated that LILCO has failed to l provide training to persons and organizations relied upon for the implementation of its Plan other than those employed by LILCO.

Exercise actions and events which support this allegation are I described in Contentions Ex 27, Ex 28 and in the following FEMA conclusions: EOC-ARCAs 11, 12, 13, 14, 15.

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. . _. . . . _ __ = = _ .

H. (The alleaed errors described in EX 27 and 28 will i

be dealt with under this suboart]. The exercise demonstrated that LERO training is deficient in the area of dosimetry, exposure control, KI, understanding of radiation terminology, and

~

related areas. Such training deficiencias are very serious because members of the public and non-LILCO personnel relied upon to respond to a Shoreham accident (for example, school officials, special facility personnel, and other individuals who are expected by LILCO to respond on an Ad h2g basis) would seek information on such subjects from LERO personnel during a real emergency. Since LERO personnel do not understand and know how to use dosimetry equipment and the related procedures, they would be incapable of responding accurately or effectively concerning those subjects to members of the public, or other workers

expected to respond. The following exercise actions and events are examples of dosimetry-related training deficiencies

Contentions Ex 42, Ex 45, FEMA Conclusions EOC-ARCAs 11, 12, 13, l 14, 15; PJSA-ARCA 1; PSA-ARCAs 12, 13, 14, 15, 16; RSA-ARCAs 4, 5, 6.

I. The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's proposals to modify training materials or procedures to " emphasize" such things as " accurate use of field data," the need "to relay instructions," "the need to be more precise with information," or 2

other matters already in the procedures and training materials (agg letter dated June 20, 1986, from John Leonard to Harold i

i i - 165 -

Denton (SNRC-1269), Encl. 1) -- training materials and procedures which have been so unsuccessful for three years -- would not ,

i correct the flaws revealed by the exercise.

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i.

COLHETE

';5 NRC November 24, 1986 16 NOV 26 P3 :20 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Off:tt . .. -

00CKEri% A 'i Before the Atomic Safety and Licensino Board 1Fum:q A

)

In the Matter of )

)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5

) (EP Exercise)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of SUFFOLK COUNTY, STATE OF NEW YORK, AND TOWN OF SOUTHAMPTON RESPONSE TO "LILCO's SUBMISSION OF THE ' REVISED STANDARD VERSION' OF THE INTERVENORS' EXERCISE CONTENTIONS" have been served on the following this 24th day of November 1986 by U.S. mail, first class, except as otherwise noted.

Morton B. Margulies Joel Blau, Esq.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Director, Utility Intervention U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission N.Y. Consumer Protection Board Washington, D.C. 20555 Suite 1020 Albany, New York 12210 Dr. Jerry R. Kline Spence W. Perry, Esq.*

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board William R. Cumming, Esq.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of General Counsel Washington, D.C. 20555 Federal Emergency Management Agency 500 C Street, S.W., Room 840 Washington, D.C. 20472 e I

a Mr. Frederick J. Shon* Anthony F. Earley, Jr., Esq.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board General Counsel t!.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Long Island Lighting Company Washington, D.C. 20555 175 East Old Country Road Hicksville, New York 11801 Mr. William Rogers W. Taylor Reveley, III, Esq.*

Clerk Hunton & Williams Suffolk County Legislature P.O. Box 1535 Suffolk County Legislature 707 East Main Street Office Building Richmond, Virginia 23212 Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788 Mr. L. F. Britt Stephen B. Latham, Esq.

Long Island Lighting Company Twomey, Latham & Shea Shoreham Nuclear Power Station 33 West Second Street North Country Road Riverhead, New York 11901 Wading River, New York 11792 Ms. Nora Bredes Docketing and Service Section Executive Director Office of the Secretary Shoreham Opponents Coalition U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.

195 East Main Street 1717 H Street, N.W.

Smithtown, New York 11787 Washington, D.C. 20555 Mary Gundrum, Esq. Hon. Peter Cohalan New York State Department of Law Suffolk County Executive 2 World Trade Center, Rm. 4614 H. Lee Dennison Building New York, New York 10047 Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788 MHB Technical Associates Dr. Monroe Schneider 1723 Hamilton Avenue North Shore Committee Suite K P.O. Box 231 San Jose, California 95125 Wading River, New York 11792 l Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq. Fabian G. Palomino, Esq.

Suffolk County Attorney Special Counsel to the Governor Bldg. 158 North County Complex Executive Chamber, Rm. 229 l Veterans Memorial Highway State Capitol i Hauppauge, New York 11788 Albany, New York 12224 Mr. Jay Dunkleburger Bernard M. Bordenick, Esq.*

New York State Energy Office U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.

Agency Building 2 Washington, D.C. 20555 Empire State Plaza Albany, New York 12223 l

.: h.- -

'I s

l David A. Brownlee, Esq. Mr. Stuart Diamond Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Business / Financial 1500 Oliver Building NEW YORK TIMES Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222 229 W. 43rd Street New York, New York 10036 Mr. John H. Frye, III, Chairman

• Mr. Oscar H. Paris

• Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 V d Lawrence Coe LanpHer KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART 1900 M Street, N.W.

Suite 800 Washington, D.C. 20036 Date: November 24, 1986

• By Hand

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