ML20077H909
ML20077H909 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Grand Gulf ![]() |
Issue date: | 08/09/1983 |
From: | MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO. |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20077H907 | List: |
References | |
NUDOCS 8308120033 | |
Download: ML20077H909 (55) | |
Text
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TRANSMITTAL OF PROPOSED CHANGES TO GRAND GULF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
- 1. (GGNS - 97, 203, 261, 360, 381, 389, 390, 392, 436, 444, 505 720, 721)
(Partial resubmittal of Item #4, AECM-83/0373)
SUBJECT:
Technical Cpecification Tables 3.3.2-1, 3.3.2-2, 3.3.2-3, 3.6.4-1, 3.6.6.2-1, 4.3.2.1-1 Technical Specifications 3/4.6.4 and 4.6.1.1.b and Bases 3/4.6.6 and 3/4.6.4, pages 3/4 3-10, 3/4 3-12 through 15, 3/4 3-17, 3/4 3-18, 3/4 3-20, 3/4 3-23, 3/4 6-1, 3/4 6-27, 3/4 6-29 through 3/4 6-35, 3/4 6-37, 3/4 6-39 through 3/4 6-42, 3/4 6-48, B3/4 6-5, and B3/4 6-6.
DISCUSSION: A. The changes to Table 3.3.2-1 include the following:
- 1. Delete valve group 5 and 9 from present item 1.b, Drywell Pressure-High and 1.d. Manual Initiation.
Delete valve group 5 fron items 2.a and 2.h, Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 and Marual Initiation.
- 2. Add v. group 9 to 5.b, RCIC Steam Supply Pressure
- Low.
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- 3. Add new note (k) to 6.d, Reactor Vessel (RHR Cut-in Permissive) Pressure - High, to 6.e, Drywell Pressure
- High and to the bottom of page 3/4 3-14. Note (k) states: Valves E12-F037A and E12-F037B are closed by high drywell pressure. All other group 3 valves are closed by high reactor pressure.
- 4. Add new note (m) to 5.b. page 3/4 3-12, RCIC Steam Supply Pressure-Low and to new 1.e page 3/4 3-10 Drywell Pressure-High (ECCS - Division 1 and Division
- 2) and to the bottom of page 3/4 3-14 to reflect that .
valve group 9 must receive concurrent drywell !
pressure-high and RCIC Steam Supply Pressure-Low signals to isolate.
- 5. Add new 1.b. 1.c. 1.e. and 1.f for ECCS initiated i closure signals for primary containment isolation valves. These items are also added to Tables 3.3.2-2, 3.3.2-3, and 4.3.2.1-1.
- 6. Valve group 6 is split into groups "6a" and "6b" to identify valve closure signals from primary containment isolation instrumentation and from ECCS signals.
- 7. Add noted (c) and (d) to Primary Containment Isolation (Manual Initiation) valve group column.
l 8308120033 830809 PDR ADDCK 05000416 P PDR i
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- 8. Add new note (n) to new items 1.c, i.e, and to page 3/4 3-14. Note (n) states: Valves E12-F042A and E12-F042B are closed by Containment Spray System l initiation signals. j
- 9. Add new ACTION statement 29 to apply to new ECCS instrumentation added to the subject table.
B. Specification 4.6.1.1 is changed to exempt isolation valves located in the steam tunnel from the requirements of surveillance 4.6.1.1.b by modifying the ** footnote on page 3/4 6-1.
C. Specification 3.6.4 is changed to ensure consistency between Tables 3.3.2-1 and 3.6.4-1. The proposed change is to add a "#" to the Applicability statement and a footnote to the bottom of page 3/4 6-27. This note will require the isolation valves listed on Table 3.6.4-1 to be OPERABLE when the corresponding actuation instrumentaticn is required to be OPERABLE per Table 3.3.2-1.
D. Table 3.6.4-1 lists the Containment and Drywell Isolation Valves in four sections. Section 1 contains the Automatic Isolation Valves which are those valves that receive an automatic isolation signal fron Table 3.3.2-1 instrumentation and are located on the Containment or Drywell penetrations.
The valves included in Section 2 are Manual Isolation valves which receive a remote manual signal from a handswitch and are located on the Containment or Drywell Penetrations.
Some of the valves in Section 2 may receive automatic signals, but not automatic isolation signals from instrumentation in Table 3.3.2-1. The valves included in Section 3 are those which do not receive isolation signals from instrumentation listed in Table 3.3.2-1 and do not utilize a remote manual handswitch. Section 3 includes check valves, local manual operated valves and power operated valves that do not utilize a handswitch. Section 4 of Table 3.6.4-1 contains test connection valves. The changes to Table 3.6.4-1 fall into the following categories:
- 1. Correction of maximum isolation times
- 2. Correction of valve group assignments
- 3. Penetration number corrections
- 4. Addition of new valves
- 5. Addition to and correction of present footnotes
- 6. Placement of valves in proper section of the table.
- 7. Correction of typographical error.
E. Tabic 3.6.6.2-1 contains a list of secondary containment ventilation system automatic isolation dampers and valves.
Section "a" of the table lists dampers with their associated maximum isolation times. Section "b" lists valves and their associated maximum isolation times. The changes to Table 3.6.6.2-1 fall into the following categories:
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- 1. Correction of maximum isolation times
- 2. Addition of dampers A more detailed description of the changes to Tables 3.6.4-1 and 3.6.6.2-1 is provided below in the j'stification section.
Bases Sections 3/4.6.4 and 3/4.6.6 are expanded to discuss the methods used for determining maximum valve isolation times.
JUSTIFICATION: A. The changes to Table 3.3.2-1 are proposed to correct previous omissions and to more accurately describe the signals that operate valve groups. The changes to present items 1.b. 1.d, 2.a. and 2.h delete valve groups 5 and 9 because these valve groups receive an isolation signal from ECCS rather than a containment isolation signal.
New items 1.b. 1.c 1.e, and 1.f are added to Table 3.3.2-1 to indicate that the isolation actuation signals originate from ECCS rather than containnent isolation actuation instrumentation. Minimum operable channels per trip system for these new items is the same as on Table 3.3.3-1 for the same instrumentation. Applicable Operational Conditions for the new ECCS items are the same as present similar isolation actuation instrumentation on Table 3.3.2-1. Present ACTION statement 20 as applicable to isolation actuation instrumentation is inappropriate for the new ECCS instrumentation added to Table 3.3.2-1.
New ACTION statement 29 is proposed for new items 1.b, 1.c. 1.e, and 1.f to read as follows: "Close the affected system isolation valve (s) within one hour or be in at least 110T SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SilUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />."
The action of placing the affected system isolation valve (s) in the closed position provides the required isolation function for the affected containment penetrations. Systems affected by closure of these valve (s) are addressed through the Technical Specifications governing each individual system (i.e.,
LCO's and Action Statements for an ECCS system if one or more of its valves or instruments are inoperable).
Present ACTION statement 20 is considered overly restrictive for the systems being added to the subject instrumentation table. The action required by the proposed ACTION statement 29, in addition to required actions associated with the affected inoperable systems, addressed elsewhere in the technical specification, are considered adequate.
Additions are likewise made to Tables 3.3.2-2, 3.3.2-3, and 4.3.2.1-1 to incorporate the setpoints, response times and surveillance requirements for the ECCS instrumentation.
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Valve group 6 is separated into "6a" and "6b" to show l valves receiving isointion signals from containment isolation actuation instrumentation (6a) and ECCS signals (6b). Valve group 9 is added to 5.b, PCIC Steam Supply 1 Pressure - Low and to new 1.c Drywell Pressure-High (ECCS l Division 1 and Division 2), along with footnote (m) to clarify that group 9 valves must receive concurrent drywell pressure and RCIC Steam Supply Pressure-Low signals to isolate. Note (k) is added to 6.d and 6.e valve groups and to the bottom of page 3/4 3-14. Note (k) clarifies that valves E12-F037A and E12-F037B are closed by high drywell pressure and all other group 3 valves are closed by high reactor pressure. The addition of notes (c) and (d) clarifies that Manual Isolation also actuates Standby Gas Treatment and isolates Control Room Emergency Filtration. Note (n) is added to clarify that Valves E12-F042A and E12-F042B are closed by Containment Spray System initiation.
B. The proposed changes to specification 3.6.1.1 will exempt from surveillance 4.6.1.1.b primary containment isolation valves located in the steam tunnel which are locked closed. The harsh envhonment ani high radiatior in the steam tunnel would preclude visual verification of these valves during normal operation as required by surveillance 4.6.1.1.b.
C. The proposed change to Specification 3.6.4 is made to require the containment and drywell isolation valves to be OPERABLE when their corresponding actuation instrumentation in Table 3.3.2-1 is required to be OPERABLE. This change provides consistency between the Instrumentation and the Containment Syarams Sections of the Technical Specifications.
D. The ch: nges to Table 3.6.4-1 are justified as follows:
- 1. All proposed valve closing time changes except E12-F024A-A and E12-F024B-B were derived by applying margins to previous test data. These margins were obtained from ASME Section XI which states that valves closing faster than 10 seconds are allowed a l
50% change in closing speed and valves closing slower i than 10 seconds are allowed a 25% change in speed before increased surveillance is required. To determine the maximum closing time for the valves, a factor of two times the allowable from previous test closure to next test closure (based on the 50% and 25% values) was added to the stroke times obtained from previous test data. For example:
A valve for which previous test data indicates a 20 second closing time would have a 5 second (25%) from previous test to next test Allowabic l
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Value. Two times the Allowable Value (or 10 seconds) would then be added to the tested closing time of 20 seconds to give the maximum closing time for the valve of 30 seconds.
The closing times-for E12-F024A-A and E12-F024B-B were reduced from 93 neconds to 90 seconds. The analytical value of 50 seconds is used in FSAR accident analysis and is thus required. These valves have been tested and found to close in less than 80 seconds, well below their analytical time requirements.
The present maximum closure times in the table have no consistent basis and use values from design or purchase specification values. The proposed Technical Specification changes will provide a consistent basis for the maximum isolation times and will provide a realistic measure of valve performance through both the Technical Specification and ASME Section XI testing. The methodology used for determining maximum valve isolation times is added to Bases Sections 3/4.6.4 and 3/4.6.6.
Valves in Table 3.6.4-1 which have analytical closing time requirements are IB21-F028A, B, C, D; IB21-F022A, B, C, D; IE12-F008; IE12-F009; 1E12-F024A, B; IM41-F011 F012, F034, F035; 1E12-F028A, B; IM41-F015 F013. F016, F017; and E51-F063, E51-F064 Only the following valve stroke times are increased by this item:
lE12-F0llA-A IP45-F068 IE61-F007 IE51-F031 IP11-F131 lE51-F077 IP60-F009 IE21-F012 lE61-F005A 1P44-F070 lE61-F005B IG33-F034 IPS2-F195
- 2. E12-F023-B is corrected to read E12-F023-A.
- 3. E12-F042A-A and E12-F042B-B have been left in Section
- 1. Ilowever, these valves do not receive an automatic isolation signal from instrumentation listed in Table 3.3.2-1. The automatic signal received for closing these valves is a " containment spray" signal. These valves would close on a " containment spray" signal to divert the RllR water to the containment spray header.
These valves may be operated by a remote handswitch.
New note (n) is added to Table 3.3.2-1 to clarify the source of isolation signals.
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- 4. E22-F023-C, E51-F031-A, and E21-F012-A should have superscript (d). The superscripts for these valves were apparently omitted.
- 5. P44-F076-A, P44-F077-B, and P44-F074-B are moved from Section 2,b to Section 1.b. These valves receive automatic isolation signals, group 6a, from instrumentation listed in Table 3.3.2-1,
- 6. E61-F020 is being added to the table. This valve was inadvertently left off the table. It receives group 5 isolation signals.
- 7. G33-F253 has the wrong valve group identified. This is a group 8 valve, not group 10.
- 8. E12-F027B should be E12-F027B-B. This change makes the valve identification consistent with the rest of the table.
- 9. E12-F042C-B - The superscript (e) is being changed to superscript (c). This is apparently a typographical error. The valve will be tested per (c) as are other valves with similar piping configurations. This footnote describes the type of leak test required.
- 10. E12-F064B-B is being moved from Section 3 to Section
- 2. This is a minimum flow valve and serves the same function as E12-F064A-A which is already in Section
- 2. The valve has a handswitch for remote manual operation.
- 11. P41-F159A-A - The superscript (e) is being changed to superscript (c). This is apparently a typographical error. The valve will be tested per (c) as is P41-F159B-B. This footnote describes the type of Icak test required.
- 12. B33-F204 and B33-F205 are being moved to Section 3.b.
These valves are local manually operated valves.
- 13. In Section 3 of the table, Cont. Leak Rate System penetration 40(I)(0) la being moved to page 3/4 6-39 to correct the order of penetration listing.
- 14. Penetration numbers for M61-F015, M61-F019, and M61-F017, and are corrected from Outboard (0) to Inboard (I) . Penetration numbers for M61-F014, M61-F018, M61-F016, and B33-F017B are corrected from Inboard (I) to Outboard (0) .
- 15. M61-F021 and M61-F020 are being added to the table.
These valves were inadvertently left off the table.
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- 16. E51-F258 should be penetration #29(0)
E51-F257 should be penetration #29(0)
These changes constitute correction of errors.
- 17. Change footnotes on page 3/4 6-29 as follows:
- a. Change (f) to read: Hydrostatically sealed by feedwater leakage control system. Type C test results not required to be included when determining the combined leakage rate.
10 CFR 50 Appendix J III.C.3 allows deletion of this leakage from the combined leakage rate.
- b. Add footnote (g)to read: Normally closed or locked closed manual valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.
This footnote applies to sections 2, 3, and 4 of Table 3.6.4-1. The addition of this footnote will enhance operational flexibility and provide control of valve position.
E. The changes to Table 3.6.6.2-1 are justified as follows:
- 1. Under dampers in Section a, the following changes are proposed and justification provided:
- a. Add Q1M41-F007, Q1M41-F008, Q1M41-F036, and Q1M41-F037. These dampers were inadvertently omitted from the table.
- b. All closing times in Table 3.6.6.2-1.a are based on accident analysis in Chapter 15 of the FSAR which used a 4 second closing time. This change will make the damper closing times consistent with the FSAR.
SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION:
The proposed changes fall into the following major categories:
- 1. Corrections.
- 2. Additions to the tables.
- 3. Changes to ensure consistency in the Technical Specifications between Tables 3.3.2-1 and 3.6.4-1.
i Valve isolation times (except for E12-F024A-A and E12-F024B-B) presently do not have a consistent basis. Some are from design or purchase specifications. The proposed change will make the basis for maximum isolation times consistent and follow ASME Section XI requirements. The closing times for E12-F024A-A and G14sp10
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l i E12-F024B-B were reduced to correspond to their analytical closing times used in FSAR accident analysis. The changes to the footnotes on page 3/4 6-29 are proposed to follow 10CFR50 Appendix J.III.C.3 requirements and to add administrative control to manually operated valves. The closing times for dampers listed in 3.6.6.2-1.a are based on Chapter 15, FSAR requirements.
The changes proposed constitute administrative changes, corrections of errors or imposition of more stringent requirements. These changes do not introduce a significant reduction in margin of safety and they do not involve a i
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated nor does it create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. Thus, no significant hazards considerations are involved.
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O INSERT D To Bases Page B3/4 6-5 The maximum isolation times for containment and drywell automatic isolation valves are the times used in the FSAR accident analysis for valves with analytical closing times. For automatic isolation valves not having analytical closing times, closing times are derived by applying margins to previous valve closing test data obtained by using ASME Section XI criteria.
Maximum closing times for these valves was determined by using a factor of two times the a.lowable (from previous test closure to next test closure) ASME Section XI margin and adding this to the previous test closure time.
INSERT E To Page 3/4 3-15 TRIP FUNCTION TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUE
- b. Reactor Vessel Water Level- # #
Low Low, Level 2 (ECCS -
Division 3)
- c. Reactor Vessel Water Level- # #
Low Low Low, Level 1 (ECCS -
Division 1 and Division 2)
- c. Drywell Pressure-liigh (ECCS - # #
Division I and Division 2) l f. Drywell Pressure-lligh (ECCS - # #
l Division 3) l G14spil
INSERT F To Page 3/4 3-18 TRIP FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME
- b. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Less than or equal to 13(a)
Level 2 (ECCS - Division 3)
- c. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Less than or equal to 13(a)
Low, Level 1 (ECCS - Division 1 and Division 2)
- e. Drywell Pressure-High (ECCS - Division Less than or equal to 13(8) 1 and Division 2)
- f. Drywell Pressure-liigh (ECCS - Division Less than or equal to 13(")
3)
INSERT C To Page 3/4 3-20 OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS IN CilANNEL WilICH CllANNEL FUNCTIONAL CllANNEL SURVEILLANCE TRIP FUNCTION CllECK TEST CALIBRATION REQUIRED
- b. Reactor Vessel Water Level- (c) (c) (c) 1, 2, 3, and #
Low Low, Level 2 (ECCS -
Division 3)
- c. Reactor Vessel Water Level- (c) (c) (c) 1, 2, 3, and #
Low Low Low, Level 1 (ECCS -
Division 1 and Division 2)
- e. Drywell Pressure-Iligh (ECCS - (c) (c) (c) 1, 2, 3 Division 1 and Division 2)
- f. Drywell Pressure-liigh (ECCS - (c) (c) (c) 1, 2, 3 Division 3)
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INSERT H i To Bases Page B3/4 6-6 i
i The maximum isolation times for secondary containment automatic isolation dampers / valves are the times used in the FSAR accident analysis for dampers / valves with analytical closing times. For automatic isolation valves not having analytical closing times, closing times are derived by applying margins to previous valve closing test data obtained by using ASME Section XI criteria. Maximum closing times for these valves was determined by using a factor of two times the allowable (from previous test closure to'next test closure) ASME.Section XI margin and adding this to the previous test closure time.
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TABLE 3.3.2-1 .;
ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUE NTATION o Nl
@ VALVE GROUPS MINIMUN APPLICA8tE 9l 9
G; OPERATED BY OPERA 8LE CHANNELS OPERATIONAL (
TRIP FINICTION SIGNAL (a) PER TRIP SYSTEN (b) CONDITION ,, ACTION j g : j Q 1. PRIMARY CONTAIWGENT ISOLATION 4
H a. Reactor Vessel Water Level- GE '
Low Low, Level 2 E , 7, 8, 10(c)(d) 2 1, 2, 3 and # 20 J.h: Drywell Pressure - High +, 7,gc)(d) 2 1,2,3 20 pe. Containment and Drywell 7 2I '3 1, 2, 3 and
- 21 5 Ventilation Exhaust C W
Radiation - High High Ga p
1, 2, 3 and *# 22 g o.
14: Manual Initiation +, y, 7, 8, +, 10
[* 2. MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION
, y J
,, a. Reactor Vessel Water Level- I ,
o Low Low Low, Level 1 1, t 2 1,2,3 20
- b. Main Steam Line ew t Radiation - High 1,10(f) (2 1,"'h 1,2,3 23 I
w '*
- c. Main Steam Line D Pressure - Low 1- h ,"'n ] 1 24
,e
- d. Main Steam Line gg) 1, 23 p Flow - High 1 . . .
- e. Condenser Vacuum - Low 1 2 1, 23 ,
w
- f. Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature - High 1 2 1,2,3 23
- g. Main Steam Line Tunnel $ 1 a Temp.- High 1 2 1,2,3 23 ,
1,-9, 10 m ;-;. 1, 2, 3 22 lgg
- h. Manual Initiation ,
- b
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INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3.2-1 (Continued) 3 f1,3 59,39I 3 92.f 1 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION (4 34 4 4 *f, fod 720,7u }
ACTION ACTION 20 -
Be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
ACTION 21 -5 Close the affected system isolation valve (s) within one hour -
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8' a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, or 3, be in at least HOT .
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SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN b'd within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. F '"~" 'Y D{ *-
- b. In Operational Condition *, suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, handling of irradiated fuel in the containment and
$9 1
$ operations with a potential for draining the reactor E{$ vessel.
t 0 ACTION 22 -
Restore the manual initiation function to OPERABLE status within S h3 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> y7 and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
ACTION 23 -
Be in at least STARTUP with the associated isolation valves closed 5g within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> g and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
3 pACTION 24 -
Be in at least STARTUP within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
- O -
Establish SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY with the standby gas d} ACTION 25treatment system operating within one hour.
-sj ACTION 26 -
Restorethemanualinitiationfunctiunk.oOPERABLEstatus
( I* within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or close the affected system isolation valves within the next hour and declare the affected system inoperable.
} ({. ACTION and declare the affected system inoperable.
- g 27 the affected system isolation valves within one hcur Close Lock the affected system isolation valves closed within one hour kg(ACTION TNswr D28 )---1 and declare the affected system inoperable. y s,, m ,,r A, * - - - - -
, , NOTES .
g %)g ,
(- I When handling irradiated fuel in the containment and during CORE o3 ALTERATIONSandoperationswithapotentialfordrainingthereactorves
! =' #
During CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
- i a) See Specification 3.6.4, Table 3.6.4-1 for valves in each valve group, d j ((b) A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for
,h' required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped con-dition provided at least one other OPERABLE channel in the same trip system fx is monitoring that parameter, k j (c) Also actuates the standby gas treatment system.
M Also actuates the control room emergency filtration system in the isolation h (d) mode of operation.
W e). A ug::!: : d/:r tr dr::::1: ::t e te th: t '; :ytt .
s h
f) Also trips and isolates the mechanical vacuum pumps. -
_(
/ 1T Also actuates secondary containment ventilation isolation dampers and I !
Sy'f [Q, A channel is OPERABLE if 2 of 4 instruments in tha valves per Table 3.6.6.2-1.
(i) Closes (j) only RWCU A etuatas sy) Lstem tts Stre isolation y Gas valves Tr aan.a.s G33-F001, 5'ysTe ~. G33-F004, and G33-F251.
m) e'selstM A.ryo'lla q w Bdf)l , y e s. eT* a% s *3 rLa ve d ladon cy sTe~s 3 hs T1.s Aus:I.'avy Bollboy . I ~ '
GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 3-14
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=
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TABLE 3.3.2-2 2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS E
o o ALLOWA8LE ;
E TRIP FUNCTION TRIP SETPOINT VALUE
- 1. PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION , . , , . , .
Z a. Reactor Vessel Water Level -
~ Low Low, Level 2 > -41.6 inches *
> -43.8. inches
- f. Drywell Pressure - High i 1.73 psig i 1.93 psig
.jd Containment and Drywell Ventilation - '
/ Exhaust Radiation - High High < 2.0 mr/hr** < 4.0 mr/hr**
,.. h.# Manual Initiation NA NA
, 2. MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION
w Low Low Low, Level 1 > -150.3 inches * > -152.5 inches E b. Main Steam Line Radiation - High 5 3.0 x full power i 3.6 x full power 5;* background background w
- c. Main Steam Line Pressure - Low > 849 psig 1 837 psig
- d. Main Steam Line Flow - High i 169 psid i 176.5 psid
- e. Condenser Vacuum - Low > hes Hg. Vacuum > 8.7 inches Hg. Vacuum
- f. Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature - High < 480*F** < h *F** us *
- g. Main Steam Line Tunnel a Temp. - High N'F** k 'F**
- h. Manual Initiation NA NA y
- 3. SECONDARY CONTAlfetENT ISOLATION
- a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - .
Low Low, tevel 2 > -41.6 inches * > -43.8 inches vwi f b. Drywell Pressure - High h1,73psig 1.93 psig N$
- c. Fuel Handling Area Ventilation N l Exhaust Radition - High High 1 2.0 mR/hr** 1 4.0 mR/hr** Qg
- d. Fuel Handling Area Pool Sweep 4 _ ... .
Exhaust Radiation - High High -< 18 mR/hr** < 35 mR/hr**
,p
[
h
- e. Manual Initiation NA NA c) l
TABLE 3.3.2-2 (Continued) ci ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS ,'
ALLOWABLE
@ TRIP FUNCTION TRIP SETPOINT VALUE g REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM (Continued)
- d. RCIC Equipment Room Ambient Temperature - High i 189'Fa* 1 195'F**
7 p e. RCIC Equipment Room a Temp. - High 1,1gF** 1 g **F**
- f. Main Steam Line Tunnel Ambient Temperature - High < M 9'F** < 486 F** 2 3
~ IDI ~104 op % l
- g. Main Steam Line Tunnel a Temp. - High -
1 M* F *
- 5 98'F** U
- h. Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature Timer 1 30 minutes 1 30 minutes
- 1. RHR Equipment Roce Ambient Temperature - High i 169'F** 1 175'F**
- j. RHR Equipment Roce a Temperature - High 1 105'F** 1 108'F**
160 1
$ k. RHR/RCIC Steam Line Flow - High i 145" H 2O 5-M"HO 2 l Q .e
- 1. Manual Initiation NA NA
- 6. RHR SYSTEM ISOLATION y9 4 ,,a s
- a. RHR Equipment Room Ambient Temperature - High 1 169'F** 1 175'F**
w
- b. RHR Equipment Room a Temperature - High i 105'F** 1 108'F** V4$
N Ai ce
- c. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 -> 11.4 inches * -> 10.8 inches MMw I,
! d. Reactor Vessel (RHR Cut-in Permissive)
Pressure - High 5 135 psig i 150 psig* j$ w
- e. Drywell Pressure - High 5 1.73 psig i 1.93 psig 4n (5
- f. Manual Initiation #.ccor D^ 1 %ce #
~
NA NA I-w
- w. A v=Lu f ,
. %Ir 3. 3.1 - 2 sL O.'s~s A . t , S . t , a,,, e1 C . t as, p pl:e.,t,\ , y S
,, ee Bases..F..igure -- B 3/4 3-1. .
Initial setpoint. Final setpoint to be determined during startup test program. Any required change to this setpoint shall be submitted to the Commission within 90 days of test completion.
l, (&&NC ~ 4 7,103, 248; 360 s 3 8013 94, 39D, 3 9 2,93f, 9 p, gg TABLE 3.3.2-3 ISOLATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION RESPONSE TIME TRIP FUNCTI RESPONSE TIME (Seconds)# .
- 1. PRIMARY-CONTAINMENT ISOLATION
- a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 < 13(*)
d.g. Drywell Pressure - High 513(a)
- 3. p'. ContainmentandDryweg)VentilationExhaust < 13(,)**
Radiation - High High
- h. # i4anual Initiation NA
.EusE AT
" pr
- 2. MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION
- a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 < 1.0*/< 13(,)**
- b. Main Steam Line Radiation - Higb(b)
- c. Main Steam Line Pressure - Low 7 1.0*/7 13(**))**
- d. Main Steam Line Flow - High I7 1.0*/7 13(a)**
0.5*/7 13(
~
- e. Condenser Vacuum - Low NA
- f. Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature - High NA
- g. Main Steam Line Tunnel a Temp. - High NA
- h. Manual Initiation NA
- 3. SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION
- a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 < 13(*)
- b. Drywell Pressure - High 313(a)
- c. Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Exhaust Radiation - High Higb(b) < 13(,)
- d. Fuel Handling Area Pool Sweep Exhaust Radiation - High High(b) < 13(3)
- e. Manual Initiation NA
- 4. REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM ISOLATION ,
- a. A Flow - High NA
- b. A Flow Timer NA
- c. Equipment Area Temperature - High NA
- d. Equipment Area a Temp. - High NA
- e. Reactor Vessel Water level - Low Low, Level 2 < 13(,)
- f. Main Steam Line Tunnel Ambient Temperature - High NA
- g. Main Steam Line Tunnel a Temp. - High NA
! h. SLCS Initiation NA
- 1. Manual Initiation NA -
t i :
~
?
l GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 3-18
TABLE 4.3.2.1-1 -
c, ISOLAT 0N ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS E CHANNEL OPERATIONAL G. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL CONDITIONS IN WHICH a
z TRIP FUNCTION CHECK TEST -
CALIBRATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED
~ ' 1. PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION
Low Low, Level 2 5 M R 1, 2, 3 and #
d Drywell Pressure - High S M R 1,2,3 N.y.
/ 3. g. Containment and Drywell Ventilation Exhaust IN S E AT .'6,,
Radiation - High High S M R 1, 2, 3 and * '
- h. g. Manual Initiation NA M(a) NA 1, 2, 3 and *#
M b 2. MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION
$ a. Reactor Vessel Water Level -
Low Low Low, level 1 5 M R 1, 2, 3
- b. Main Steam Line Radiation - w High 5 M R 1,2,3 *
- c. Main Steam Line Pressure - @2 w
' Low S *M R 1 4%
ye
- d. Main Steam Li6e Flow - High 5 M R 1, 2, 3 % .e
- e. Condenser Vacuum - Low S M R 1, 2**, 3** f
- f. Main Steam Line Tunnel +e Temperature - High S M R 1,2,3 j&
- g. Main Steam Line Tunnel gy a Temp. - High 5
,~
M R 1,2,3 ge
- h. Manual Initiation NA M(a) NA 1, 2, 3 hk uO 4w ww te 4
i
\ .
n -
TABLE 4.3.2.1-1 (Continued) wg ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS f*
., .. o _ _
CHANNEL OPERATIOilAl.'
- D* .
k' CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL CONDITIONS IN WHICH wg SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED
! TRIP FUNCTION CHECK TEST CALIBRATION U&
-e
- 6. RHR SYSTEM ISOLATION fg
- a. RHR Equipment Room Ambient 1,2,3
[g.
.c
- N 5 M R Temperature - High 8
- b. RHR Equipment Room 1, 2, 3 59 M R a Temp. - High S A Qe
- c. Reactor Vessel Water Level - R 1,2,3 Low, level 3 S M w d. Reactor Vessel (RHR Cut-in R 1,2,3 i Permissive) Pressure - High S M M R 1,2,3 Y e. Drywell Pressure - High S 0 f. Manual Initiation MA MI ") NA 1, 2, 3 .
aco r d'^ '*
(c) Swevs tl=,e hp.S.o: sk Ils ^- -$.\
- M^' g I ( Pr * *'rf mm Ta +. 3.3. i- i .
as app %6 ts. . @ ;1
When handling irradiated fuel in the+ secondary containment and during CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. u{w
- 1: rn;^;r ;t:= grs=r 11"i5 ;;i;; ;;d/;r :ny t#.,f;; :t; : he i: :;:r. w)
- 0uring CORE ALTERATION and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. 3 S (a) Manual initiation switches shall be tested at least once per 18 months during shutdown. All other g' circuitry associated with manual initiation shall receive a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least.once per 31 days as part of circuitry required to be tested for automatic system isolation.
b) Each train or logic channel shall be tested at least every other 31 days.
- a . m . a ._ . _ ,~ e...... , s. ~ % ,,... u ._ A co W. user vu. . :s be.l.a h 4 : p sde.:.h 1. it.w ,peury + A m3 vs 4,:y y 1
re a r .skota.- , c .r., ce.a., , t ,h,p . TLe m .,e ( syy,, y, ,i 3, ,,,,g ;j) l d'd codsuse, v coum exceed 3 de A.tp.se/po J.
L
'97, 203,261, 360, 3 bl, l.
3/4.6 CONTAIMENT SYSTEMS
>DDNNJ k(, 505, ?2o., 72L J J I
3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAIMENT PRIMARY CONTAlWENT INTEGRITY '
~
l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.1 PRIMARY CONTAI MENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.
APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2* and 3.
j ACTION:
Without PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within I hour or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in
! COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
1 i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:
- a. After each closing of each penetration subject to Type B testing, i
except the containment air locks, if opened following Type M or 8 1 test, by leak rate testing the equipment hatch seals with gas at Pa, 11.5 psig, and verifying that when the measured leakage rate for these seals is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.2.d for all other Type B and C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less than or equal to 0.60 La.
- b. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all containment penetrations ** not capable of being closed by 0PERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in position, except as provided in Table 3.6.4-1 of Specification 3.6.4. ,
- c. By verifying each containment air lock OPERABLE per
! Specification 3.6.1.3.
- d. By verifying the suppression pool OPERABLE per Specification 3.6.3.1.
"See 5pecial Test Exception 3.10.1 *
- Exceptvalkes,blindflanges,anddeactivatedautomaticvalveswhich secured in the closed positio1V. hese penetrations shall be verified closed ;
during each COLD SHUTDOWN except such verification need not be performed more t often than once per 92 days.
3 ers b tuawah GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-1
I. (GGNs-tT,tOD,tc 2,56o 301, s 384> 396.,3123+3G344+>S*S.,1to,12.t)
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.4 CONTAlr*ENT AND ORYWELL ISOLATION VALVES LIMITINGCON6ITIONFOROPERATION 3.5.4 The contat'nment and drywell isolation valves shown in Table 3.6.4-1 shall be OPERABLE with isolation times less than or equal to those shown in Table 3.6.4-1.
APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and j 3 o,ud at.
ACTION:
I With one or more of the containment or drywell isolation valves shown in Table 3.6.4-1 inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in '
each affected penetration that is open and within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> either:
- a. Restore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status, or
- b. Isolate each affected penetration by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolated position," or
- c. Isolate each affected penetration by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange."
Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
" Isolation ~ valves closed to satisfy these requirements may be reopened on an interni,ttent basis under administrative controls. .
{
38+-'
da* d'8* ****"'**
l # Ts.i.a * *d 'd'v 8 5 Sa**d '" '75*'8 Te me OPERh6Ls unsu Theon Assoonies Aevuomed tw %ssa 8.INsntuusn=
3 2, -1, TAvesw sa Ase vimaa Te as CPEAAS44 l
GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-27
- ' {, (6 4 NS - 9 7; 2 0 3, 2 L I, ]4 0, 3 sq, 3 9 4, y 99, 3 9 y %
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEMS (Continued) excessive containment pressures and temperatures. The suppression'pcol cooling .
' mode is designed to limit the long term bulk temperature of the pool to 185'F considering ail of the post-LOCA energy additions. The suppression pool cooling trains, being an .i.ntegral part of the RHR system, are redundant, safety-related component systems that are initiated following the recovery of the reactor vessel water level by ECCS flows from the RHR system. Heat rejection to the standby service water is accomplished in the RHR heat exchangers.
The suppression pool make-up system provides water from the upper )
containment pool to the suppression pool by gravity flow through two 100%
' l capacity dump lines following a LOCA. The quantity of water provided is j
- sufficient to account for all conceivable post-accident entrapment volumes, t ensuring the long term energy sink capabilities of the suppression pool and i maintaining the water coverage over the uppermost drywell vents. The minimum freeboard distance above the suppression pool high water level to the top of the weir wall is adequate to preclude flooding of the drywell in the event of an inadvertent dump. During refueling, neither automatic nor manual action can open the make-up dump valves.
3/4.6.4 CONTAIMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of GDC 54 through 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environ-ment will be u,nsistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.
. The operability of the drywell isolation valves ensures that the drywell atmosphere will be o'rected to the suppression pool for the full spectrum of pipe t breaks inside the dryell. Since the allowable value of drywell leakage is so l
large, individual drywell penetration leakage is not measured. By checking valve operability on any penetration which could contribute a large fraction of the design leakage, the total leakage is maintained at less than the design value.
.NarT /4.6.5 DRYWELL POST-LOCA VACUUM BREAKERS Y The post-LOCA drywell vacuum breaker system is provided to relieve the vacuum in the drywell due to steam condensation following blow-down. Contain-ment air is drawn through the vacuum breaker check valves in the two branches of the separate post-LOCA vacuum relief line and in a branch of each drywell purge compressor discharge line. Vacuum relief initiates at a differential pressure of one psi. This vacuum relief, in conjunction with the rest of the drywell purge system, is necessary to insure that the post-LOCA drywell H2 I concentratiopdoesnotexceed4%byvolume.
l Followthg vacuum relief, the drywell purge system pressurizes the drywell, forcing noncendensibles through the horizontal vents and into the containment at a rate designed to maintain the H2concentration below the flammable limits.
There are two 2005 vacuum relief systems so that the plant may continue operation with one system out of service for a limited period of time.
GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-5
j,(GG[is - 97, 2.03, 248, 3 60, 381, 3 89,510, 3*t 2.,436,4 ++ 50 5, 72 0,7 2-h ,
l CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS l .
BASES P
3/4.6.6 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT
~
. Secondary containment is designed to minimize any ground level release of radioactive meterial which may result from an accident. The Auxiliary Building and Enclosure Building provide secondary containment during normal operation when the containment is sealed and in service. When the reactor is in COLD 4
SHUTDOWN or REFUELING, the containment may be open and the Auxiliary BuiTding and Enclosure Building then become the only containment.
! Establishing and maintaining a vacuum in the Auxiliary Building and Enclo-sure Building with the standby gas treatment system once per 18 months, along with the surveillance of the doors, latches, dampers and valves, is adequate to ensure that there are no violations of the integrity of the secondary containment.
! cien.t iodine The OPERABILITY of thewill removal capability standby gas treatment be available in the event systems ensuresThe of a LOCA. that suffi-reduction in conteinment iodine inventory reduces the resulting site boundary radiation doses associated with containment leakage. The operation of this system and resultant iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions used in the LOCA analyses. Cumulative operation of the system with the heaters OPERABLE for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> over a 31 day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the absorbers and HEPA filters.
i Lf ,, 3/4.6.7 ATMOSPHERE CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that these systems will be available to maintain the hydro-gen concentration within the containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. The hydrogen recombiner and the hydrogen ignition systems are capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with (1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water and (3) corrosion of metals within containment. '
l Two 100% drywell purge systems are the primary wans of H2 control within the drywell purging hydrogen produced following a LOCA into the containment volume. Hydrogen generated from the metal-water reaction and radiolysis is assumed to evolve to the drywell atmosphere and form a homogenous mixture througn natural forces and mechanical turbulence (ECCS pipe break flow). The drywell purge system forces crywell atmosphere through the horizontal vents and into the containment and as a result no bypass path exists.
The hydrogen control system is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, " Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment l
Following a LOCA", March 1971.
The operability of at least 41 of 45 ignitors in either hydrogen ignition subsystem will maintain an effective. coverage throughout the containment and i drywell. Eadi subsystem of ignitors will initiate combustion of any sig-nificant anotkit of hydrogen released after a degraded core accident. This. :
system will hisure burning in a controlled manner as the hydrogen is released {
instead of allowing it to be ignited at high concentrations by a random igni-tion source.
GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-6
. . . .o TABLE 3.6.4-1 C_0NTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES MAXIMUM SYSTEM AND PENETRATION ISOLATION TIME VALVE NUMBER NUMBER VALVE GROUF(*) (Seconds)
- 1. Automatic Isolation Valves
- a. Containment Main Steam Lines B21-F028A 5(0) 1 5 Main Steam Lines B21-F022A 5(I) 1 5 Main Steam Lines B21-F067A-A 5(0) 1 6 Main Steam Lines 821-F0288 6(0) 1 5 Main Steam Lines B21-F0228 6(I) 1 5 Main Steam Lines B21-F0678-A 6(0) 1 6 Main Steam Lines B21-F028C 7(0) 1 5 Main Steam Lines B21-F022C 7(I) 1 5 Main Steam Lines 821-F067C-A 7(0) 1 6 Main Steam Lines B21-F028D 8(0) 1 5 Main Steam Lines B21-F022D 8(I) 1 5 Main Steam Lines B21.-F0670-A 8(0) 1 6 RHP Reactor E12-F008-A 14(0)(c) 3 40 Shutcown Cooling Suction RHR Reactor E12-F009-B 14(I)(c) 3 40 Shutdown Cooling . 1 e Suction Steam Supply to E51-F063-B 17(I) 4 20 RHR and RCIC Turbine Steam Supply to E51-F064-A 17(0) 4 20 RHR and RCIC Turbine Steam Supply to E51-F076-B 17(I) 4 20 RHR and RCIC Turbine ,
RHR to Head Spray E12-F023- 18(0)(c) 3 90 Main Steam Line B21-F019-A 19(0) 1 15 Drains Main Steam Line B21-F016-B 19(I) 1 15
, Drains RHR Heat Exchanger E12-F042A-A 20(I)(c) 5 22 l
l "A" to LPCI l
Ta) See Specification 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, for isolation signal (s) that operates each valve group.
(b) Hydrostatically tested to ASME Section XI criteria.
(c) 11.5 psig.
(d) Hydrostatically Hydrostatically tested tested by with water pressurizing at P,s,ystem to 1.10 P,,
12.65 psig.
(e) Hydrostatically tested during system functional tests.
(f) Hydrgs g cally sealed by feedwater leakage control system. Type C test4not requiredj/ to N 8 A'"u'** w HEN ncisitMimug rat co n s e Neo Lea v44a hats.
Noltn ALLf oLOS4D Cit LocKg D CLDGO P4hM9h k Yhl \lG h Af ad CPed fD CW AA! MreA MM&f" Sases vapeA ADHsNijb7A ATiva CONTAob.
GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-29 l
l l
. 1, (GGMS ~ 47,20 3, 261) 360; 3b1 2 3093 EiI#2 3T2s A3Gp44A's S* > 720s72Q TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Ccntinu2d)
CONTAINMENT AND ORYWELL ISOLATION VALVES MAXIMUM SYSTEM AND PENETRATION ISOLATION TIME VALVE NUMBER NUMBER VALVE GROUP (a) (Seconds)
Containment (Continued) C-.
RHR Heat Exchanger E12-F028A-A 20(I)(c) 5 78
-g "A" to LPCI
. RHR Heat Exchanger E12-F037A-A 20(I)(c) 3 63 "A" to LPCI RHR Heat Exchanger E12-F0428-B 21(I)(c) 5 22 "B" to LPCI RHR Heat Exchanger E12-F0288-B 21(I)(c) 5 78 "B" to LPCI RHR Heat Exchanger E12-F0378-8 21(I)(c) 3 63 "B" to LPCI RHR "A" Test Line E12-F024A-A 23(0)(d) 5 E TO to Supp. Pool RHR "A" Test Line E12-F011A-A 23(0)(d) 5 ,2T E to Supp. Pool 4 HP "*" Test Lir.c E12-F290? ^ 23(0)(d) -G -
9
- 1I te Supp. oce!
RHR "C" Test Line to Supp. Pool E12-F021-B 24(0)(d) 5 101 ) i HPCS Test Line E22-F023-C 27(0)N 6 le 60 RCIC Pump Suction E51-F031-A 28(0)(d) 4 38' S RCIC Turbine E51-F077-A 29(0)(c) 9 X 2h Exhaust 1.PCS Test Line E21-F012-A 32(0)(d) 5 lef 14t Cont. Purge and M41-F011 34(0) 7 4 Vent Air Supply Cont. Purge and M41-F012 34(I) 7 4 Vent Air Supply Cont. Purge and M41-F034 35(I) 7 4 and Vent Air Exh.
Cont. Purge and M41-F035 35(0) 7 4 and Vent Air Exh.
Plant Service P44-F070-B 36(I) 6o ,24-33 Water Return Plant Service P44-F069-A 36(0) 6 g 24 Water Return Plant Service P44-F053-A 37(0) 6e 24 Water Supply Chilled Water P71-F150 38(0) 6o 30 Supply
< Chilled Water P71-F148 39(0) 6o 30
' Return GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-30
l l, (&& Alf - 9 7,103y 1 & I; 360, 3 GI, 394, 3 9p, 391/636,8944,[25,7to,ytI)
TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued)
CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES MAXIMUM.
SYSTEM AND - PENETRATION ISOLATION TIME VALVE NUMBER NUMBER VALVE GROUP (a) (Seconds)
Containment (Continued)
~
Chilled Water P71-F149 39(I) 64 30 Return Service Air PS2-F105 41(0) 64 4 Supply Inst. Air Supply P53-F001 42(0) 64 4 RWCU to Main G33-F034-A 43(0) 8 -& 71 Condenser RWCU to Main G33-F028-8 43(I) 8 23 Condenser RWCU Backwash to G36-F106 49(I) 6a 30 C/U Phase Sep. Tank RWCU Backwash to G36-F101 49(0) 6A 30 C/U Phase Sep. Tank Drywell & Cont. P45-F067 50(I) 6A 4 Equip. Drain Sump Disch.
Drywell & Cont. P45-F068 50(0) 6a #7 Y
Equip. Drain Sump Disch.
Drywell & Cont. P45-F061 51(I) 6a 4 Floor Drain Sump Disch.
Drywell & Cont. P45-F062 51(0) 6 d. 4 Floor Drain Sump Disch.
Condensate Supply P11-F075 56(0) 6A 30 FPC & CU to Upper G41-F028-A 57(0) 6A 44 Cont. Pool Upper Cont. Pool G41-F029-A 58(0) 6a 40 to Fuel Pool Drain Tank i Upper Cont. Pool G41-F044-B 58(I) 64 40 to Fuel Pool Drain Tank-Aux. E:1dg. Fir. P45-F273-A 60(0) 6 d, 23 I and Equip. Orn. -
Tks.ftoSupp. Pool ,
{
Aux. Bldg. Fir. P45-F274-B 60(0) 64 23
[
and Equip. Drn.
! Tks. to Supp. Pool GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-31
- f. (GG hlS- 41,203,16 is3 40,39I,3M, 3 90, 311, 4 3 4, 44*t, S*S, 720s 7 '2 t)
TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued)
CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES
, MAXIMUM SYSTEfiAND PENETRATION ISOLATION TIME VALVE RUMBER NUMBER VALVE GROUP (,) (Seconds)
Contafnment (Continued)
Comb. Gas Control E61-F009 65(0) 7 4 Cont. Purge (Outside Air Supply)
Comb. Gas Control E61-F010 65(I) 7 4 Cont. Purge (Outside Air Supply)
Purge Rad. E61-F056 66(I) 7 4 Detector Purge Rad. E61-F057 66(0) 7 4 Detector RHR "B" Test Line E12-F024B-B To Suppr. Pool 67(0)(d) 5 43~10 RHR "B" Test Line E12-F011B-B 67(0)(d) 5 27 ml "
a$t E12-i2000-0 O
.c 07(0)(d) 0 0 M
Re ue ng Water P11-F130 69(0)(c) 6a 4 Transf. Pump Suction Refueling Water P11-F131 69(0)(c) 6 at #f Transf. Pump Suction Instr. Air to ADS P53-F003-A 70(0) 6A 4 RCIC Turbine Exh. E51-F078-8 75(0) 9 7 Vacuum Breaker RWCU to Feedwater G33-F040-8 83(I) 8 30 RWCU to Feedwater G33-F039-A 83(0) 8 29 Chemical Waste P45-F098 84(I) 6 *- 4 Sump Discharge Chemical Waste P45-F099 84(0) 64 4 j Sump Discharge Supp. Pool Clean- P60-F009-A 85(0) 6A +8 up Return Supp. Pool Clean- P60-F010-B 85(0) 6A 4 i
up Return i
Demin.; Water P21-F017-A 86(0) 64 10 Supply to Cont. {
Demin. Water P21-F018-B 86(I) 6a 10 Supply to Cont.
l RWCU Pump Suction G33-F001-B 87(I) 8 30 GRAND GULF-UNIT 3 3/4 6-32
f, {G6NS-4 7, Lo3, 261,360, 391,364, 3 Ms 3 92: *f 36, 4 4 *f, fos, *12.q,12.1)
TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued)
_ CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES r '. , , MAXIMUM SYSTE)1AND PENETRATION ISOLATION T-IME VALVE; NUMBER NUMBER VALVEGROUP([)(Seconds)
Containment (Continued)
RWCU ' Pump Suction G33-F252-A 87(I) 8 30 RWCU Pump Suction G33-F004-A 87(0) 8 30 RWCU Pump Disch. G33-F053-8 88(I) 8 22 RWCU Pump Disch. G33-F054-A 88(0) 8 22
- b. Drywell Instrument Air P53-F007-B 327(0) 6a 4 l
N[* RWCU Pump Suction RWCU Pump Suction G33-F250-A 337(I) 8 30 G33-F251-B 337(0) 8 30 Combustible Gas E61-F0038-B 338(0) 64 60 Con.
Combustible Gas E61-F003A-A 339(0) 6A 60 Con.
Combustible Gas E61-F005A-A 340(0) 6 4. 65 - g'*/
Con.
Combustible Gas E61-F005B-B 340(0) 6a 60- F'f Con.
Combustible Gas E61-F007 341(0) 6A 7 Con.
Mg Drywell Air Purge M41-F015 345(I) 7 4 Supply Drywell Air Purge M41-F013 345(0) 7 4 Supply Drywell Air Purge M41-F016 347(I) 7 4 Exhaust 1
Orywell Air Purge M41-F017 347(0) 7 4 Exhaust Equipment Drains P45-F009 348(I) 64 4 Eouipment Drains P45-F010 348(0) 6* 4 Floor Drains P45-F003 349(I) 6A 4 Floor Drains P45-F004 349(0) 6A 4 Service Air P52-F195-B 363(0) 6A 4&-/6 Chemical Sump P45-F096-A 364(I) 6a 8 Disch.
Chemical Sump P45-F097-B 364(0) 6A 8 Disch.
- RWCU k Heat G33-F253 366(0) WF 30 [
Excti. ;
Reacto'r Water B33-F019 465(I) 10 28.4 Sample Line Reactor Water B33-F020 465(0) 10 28.4 Sample Line GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-33
t
' yans,-s7, ses, es1,uo, sa1,ses, sso, s1e, Asc,444,. sos,no,,n)
ZWserf A g
(p w 6-ss) .
Plwt bke W 4er P44 -Fo74 -A 3 31 (I) 4.a 32 ts.he.s Plut 'Sers:c.e WJ.e P44- Fo77 - 6 33 tCo) 6a 32 k IwrM Plot 5.re: e Wder PW4 - ro74- 5 33Z(0) 6a. 32 L Tt \1 ra s.A s (p 3/4 6-35)
Cmks4.L\s Gss E G I - F o t.0 3 41(0) 5 I5 Cou.
i i
1 t '
I = j e
' ~ ~ - - - - - r-----. . . . _ - , , _ , , _ _ _ , _ . , , . _ __ _
p * *$,(G6N S - 91, 2.0 3 ,1.4, I, 3 g,c, 5 g n , 3 g q, 3 go, 3 9,_, y y) 4, ,,, g,3, ,2o, .,u}
TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued)
CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES F
SYSTEM'AND PENETRATION VALVE NUMBER NUMBER
- 2. Manual Isolation Valves (7) -
- a. Containment Main Steam Lines E32-F001A-A 5(0)
Main Steam Lines E32-F001E-A 6(0)
Main Steam Lines E32-F001J-A 7(0)
Main Steam Lines E32-F001N-A 8(0)
Feedwater Inlet B21-F065A-A 9(0)
Feedwater Inlet B21-F065B-A 10(0)
RHR Pump "A" E12-F004A-A 11(0)(d)
Suction RHR Pump "B" E12-F004B-B 12(0)(d)
Suction RHR Pump "C" E12-F004C-B 13(0)(d)
Suction RHR Heat Ex. " A" E12-F027A-A 20(0)(c) to LPCI RHR Heat Ex. "B" E12-F0278-6 21(0)(C) to LPCI c.
RHR Pump "C" to E12-F042C-B 22(0)N)
LPCI RHR "A" Test Line E12-F064A-A 23(0)(d)
To Suppr. Pool RHR "C" Test Line E12-F064C-B 24(0)(d)
To Suppr. Pool HPCS Suction E22-F015-C 25(0)(d)
HPCS Discharge E22-F004-C 26(0)(c)
HPCS Test Line E22-F012-C 27(0)
RCIC Turbine Exh. E51-F069-A LPCS Pump Suction E21-F001-A 29(0)(d)
LPCS Pump E21-F005-A 30(0)(c) 31(0)
Discharge ~
LPCS Min. Flow E21-F011-A 32(0)(d)
CRD Pump C11-F083-A 33(0)
Discharge CCW Supply P42-F066-A 44(0)
CCW Return P42-F067-A 45(0) ,
CCW R& urn P42-F068-B '
RCIC Mump E51-F019-A 45(I)(d) 46(0)
Discharge e I
Min.' Flow Reactor Recirc. B33-F128-B 47(1)
Post Accident Sampling GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-34
, , [((,.(,N S ~ 9 7,2.03, 'Z4 3; 3 6 0) 35is399 31Dj ~3 41, 43 6, 4 4 't, fos, 7.to, Ja.s) i TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued)
CONTAINMENT AND DRWELL ISOLATION VALVES SYST(MAND PENETRATION -
NUMBER l VALVE NUMBER Containment (Continued)
Reactor Recirc. 873-F127-A 47(0)
Post Accident Sampling
, Vent Hender to E12-F073B-B 0 RHg P.,w "B " Tasr LN 4 Supp. Pool RHR "C" Relief E12-F346-B 48(
71B(0)
Q)Id)
Ei2.-Fod4 a-a 47(o)@
Viv. Vent Hdr.
to Suppr. Pool
& Post-Acc.
Sample Ret.
RHR Heat Ex. "A" E12-F073A-A 77(0)(d)
~
Relief Reactor Recirc. B33-F126-B 81(I)
Accident Sampling
! Reactor Recirc. B33-F125-A 81(0) '
Accident Sampling SSW Supply "A" P41-F159A-A 89(0)p)
P41-F168A-A SSW Return "A" SSW Return "A" P41-F160A-A 90(I)((c) c)
P41-F168B-B 90(0)Ic)
SSW Return "B" 91(I)(#)
SSW Return "B" P41-F160B-B 91(0)(c)
SSW Supply "B" P41-F159B-B 92(0)
Drywell Press. M71-F593- A 101C(0)
Inst.
~
Drywell Press. M71-F591A-A 101F(0)
Inst.
Drywell Press. M71-F591B-B 102D(0)
Inst.
Ctmt. Press. Inst. M71-F592A-A 103D(0)
Ctmt. Press. Inst. M71-F592B-B 104D(0)
Drywell H2 E61-F595C 106A(0)
Analyzer Sample Drywell H2 E61-F595D 106A(I)
Analyzer Sample Drywell H2 Ana- E61-F597C 106B(0) lyzer Sample Ret.
. Drywell H2 Ana- E61-F597D 106B(I) l
' lyzer Sample Ret.
Ctat. H2 E61-F596C 105A(0)
$alyzerSample !
Cts (t. H2 E61-F596D 105A(I) .
Analyzer Sample .-
106E(0) i Ctat. Hz Analyzer E61-F598C Sample / tt.
Ctat. H 2 s alyzer E61-F5980 106E(I)
Sample Ret.
GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-35
- 3 *((,4N S ~ 9 2,103, 2.s s,16 0 3 91, 3Sf 4, 3 90, 3121 434, 4 4 4, Sos, j z o, ja. g)
TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Ccntinu;d)
CONTAINMENT AND ORYWELL ISOLATION VALVES SYSTEM AND PENETRATION VALVE NUMBER NUMBER
- b. Drywell ,
Cont. Cooling P42-F114-B 329(0)
Water Inlet Cont. Cooling P42-F116-A 330(I)
Water Outlet Cont. Cooling P42-F117-B 330(0)
Water Outlet "I --t k r; ';.':t r "" "075 ^ 221(!) .
":tur-
? ? ;r. k rs. ";t:- "-F077 " 221(0)
". :t ur-mi,_. e._.. u..__ nnn_en,n_n eeeins
- - - - - - - - . . w. - --,-j C ; "22-F20' 222(!)
t {l . - P.
C;-br55 i=P S22-F205 222'0) 3.
Other
- a. Containment isolation valves @ )
Fuel Transfer F11-E015 4(I)
Tube Ce,,t. Leek Rete NA 00(!)(0)
Feedwater Inlet B21-F010A f)
Feedwater Inlet 821-F032A 9(I)((I) 9(0)
Feedwater Inlet B21-F010B 10(I)(I) I)
Feedwater Inlet B21-F032B RHR "A" Suction E12-F017A 10(0)((d)
RHR "B" Suction E12-F017B 11(0)(d) 12(0)
RHR "C" Suction E12-F017C RHR Shutdown E12-F308 13(0)((d) 14(I) c) ,
Cooling Suction RHR Head Spray E51-F066 18(I)(c)
RHR Head Spray E12-F344 IB(I)(c)
RHR Heat Ex. "A" E12-F044A 20(I)(c) to LPCI RHR Heat Ex. "A" E12-F025A 20(I)(c) to LPCI RHR Heat Ex. "A" E12-F107A 20(,1)(c) to LPCI RHR Heat Ex. "B" E12-F025B 21(I)(c) to LPCI t
( RHR Hept Ex. "B" E12-F044B 21(I)(c) ,
to LPCI i RHR Heat Ex. "B" E12-F107B 21(I)(C) to LPCI {
l l GRANO GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-37 1
, fG& hts - 4 4,203, ? 6I; 3 40, '3 9 I, 3 9 4, 3 90, .19 2., 9 3 g, q q q , go,g, ,,,, g,)
TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Ccntinued)
CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES i
SYSTE4 AND PENETRATION ,
NUMBER
. VALVE FUMBER ,
Containment (Continued)
CRD Pump C11-F122 33(I)
Discharge PSW Supply P44-F043 37(I)
Plant Chilled P71-F151 38(I) [c,J. Lea h A#4 fs y
' Water Supply e 40 CIXo)
Service Air P52-F122 41(I) Lana *(for val-* N*-)
Supply Instr. Air Supply P53-F002 42(I)
CCW Supply P42-F035 44(I)(,)
RCIC Disch. E51-F251 46(0)
Min. Flow RCIC Disch. E51-F252 46(0)(*)
Min. Flow RHR Heat Ex. "B" E12-F055B 48(0)(d)
Relief Vent Header RHR Heat Ex. "B" E12-F103B 48(0)(d)
Relief Vent Header RHR Heat Ex. "B" E12-F104B 48(0)(d)
Relief Vent Header Refueling Wtr. G41-F053 54(0)
Stg. Tk. to Upper Ctmt. Pool Refueling Wtr. G41-F201 54(I)
Stg. Tk. to Upper Ctmt. Pool Condensate Supply P11-F004 56(I)
FPC & CU to Upper G41-F040 57(I)
Cont. Pool Stby. Liquid C41-F151 61(I)
Control Sys.
Mix. Tk.
(future use) l Stby. Liquid C41-F150 61(0)
Control Sys.
t . Mix. Tk.
- $$ "$ bi Ling
= rc = 07:0 F
- RHR P6mp "B" Test E12-F276 67(0)(') .'
Link RHR P0mp "B" Test E12-F277 67(0)(') g Line RHR Pump "B" Test E12-F212 67(0)(')
l Line GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-39
i
$, fG6NS ~ 9 7s 19), 2M, 360, 39 n, 39 4, 34g 3 93g 9y p y TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued)
CONTAINMENT AND ORYWELL ISOLATION VALVES SYST.EM AND PENETRATION VALVE NUMBER NUMBER Containment (Continued) '
RHR Pump "B" Test E12-F213 67(0)(')
Line RHR Pump "B" Test E12-F249 67(0)(*)
LI"'
RHR Pump "B" Test Line E12-F250 67(0)(e) ggg" Q suppe.6"Ted Pe:A L*.we b S-6 E tz-F 190 k,
RH Pump "B" Test E12-F334 67(0) g,7(of RHR Pump "B" Test E12-E335 67(0)(c)
Line Inst. Air to ADS P53-F006 70(I)
. LPCS Relief Valve E21-F018 71A(0)(d)
Vent Header RHR Pump "C" E12-F025C 71B(0)(d)
Relief Valve Vent Header RHR Shutdown E12-F036 73(0)(d)
Vent Header RHR Shutdown E12-F005 76B(0)(d)
Suction Relief Valve Disch.
RHR Heat Ex. "A" E12-F055A 77(0)(d)
Relief Vent Header RHR Heat Ex. "A" E12-F103A 77(0)(d)
Relief Vent Header RHR Heat Ex. "A" E12-F104A 77(0)(d)
Relief Vent Header Cont. Leak Rate NA 82(I)
SS 'k" Supply P41-F169A 89(I)
SSW "B" Supply P41-F169B 92(I) .
i Ctat. Leak Rate M61-F015 110A(9th')
Test Inst.
Ctat. Leak Rate M61-F014 110ApyCO)
Test Inst.
110C497(I)
Ctm{.LeakRate M61-F019 Test Inst. . i Ctat. Leak Rate M61-F018 110CfrFf'(0) I Tekt Inst.
I Ctat. Leak Rate M61-F017 110F407(T)
Test Inst.
l Ctat. Leak Rate M61-F016 110 Fir &7(0)
Test Inst.
GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-40
$[S&NS '12, 203s 2ils 3 6 0) 3 % t, 3 9 %, 3 76 312, Y 14 *i 4 4, fos,7zo,nd TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued)
CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES SYJTEM AND PENETRATION ~
VALVE NUMBER NUMBER b ." Drywell LPCI "A" E12-F041A 313(1)
LPCI "B" E12-F041B 314(1)
LPCI "B" E12-F236 314(0)
CRD to Recirc. B33-F013A 326(I)
Pump A Seals CRD to Recirc. B33-F017A 326(0)
Pump A Seals Instrument Air P53-F008 327(I)
Standby Liquid C41-F007 328(I)
Control Standby Liquid C41-F006 328(0)
Control Cont. Cooling P42-F115 329(1)
Water Supply CWusata Flost C*an.
Plant Service P44-F075 332(1) 333-rzov 333 CD Water Supply F c,%J ,sa, rios A c.*a.
CRD to Recirc. B33-F013B 346(I) gy,_ 7 2,5 7,3 (oy Pump B Seals CRD to Recirc. B33-F017B 346 (o)
Pump B Seals Service Air P52-F196 363(I)
BLIND FLANGES Containment NA 343 Leak Rate System Cont. 4,4 k A d c. A461-Fo2I af 35A (I) re st rust' co4 Leak 41;c. M6l- Fo zo 't3sA(o)
- l. :
?
k l
l l " GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-41 l
], (&&NS- 9 7, 203, 2 L I, 3 60, 3 11, 39 4, 390, 2 9 2. , 4 34, 4 4 9, %s, ;2 c, ,t )
TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued)
CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES SYSTEM-AND PENETRATION -
VALVE NUMBER NUMBER 4.
Test Co'nnections (7) .
- a. Containment Main Steam T/C B21-F025A 5(0)
Main Steam T/C B21-F025B 6(0)
Main Steam T/C B21-F025C 7(0)
Main Steam T/C B21-F0250 Feedwater T/C B21-F030A 8(0)(I)
Feedwater T/C B21-F063A 9(0)(I)
Feedwater T/C B21-F063B 9(0) II)
Feedwater T/C B21-F030B 10(0) I RHR Shutdown Cool. E12-F002 10(0)((c))
14(0)
Suction T/C RCIC Steam Line E51-F072 17(0)
T/C RHR to Head E12-F342 18(0)(c)
Spray T/C RHR to Head E12-F061 18(0)(c)
Spray T/C LPCI "C" T/C E12-F056C 22(0)(c)
RHR "A" Pump E12-F322 23(0)(c)
Test Line T/C RHR "A" Pump E12-F336 23(0)(c)
Test Line T/C RHR "A" Pump E12-F349 23(0)(c)
Test Line T/C RHR "A" Pump E12-F303 23(0)(c)
Test Line T/C RHR "A" Pump E12-F310 23(0)(c)
Test Line T/C RHR "A" Pump E12-F348 23(0)(c)
Test Line T/C RHR"C" Pump E12-F311 24(0)(c)
Test Line T/C RHR"C" Pump E12-F304 24(0)(c)
Test Line T/C HPCS Discharge T/C E22-F021 26(0)(c)
HPCS Test Line T/C E22-F303 27(0)((c)
- HPCS Test Line T/C E22-F304 27(0) c)
RCIC Turbine E51-F258 1934'(0)(c) ,
Exhaust T/C -
RCIC TJrbine E51-F257 2.7.M(0)(c) ,
Exhadst T/C '
LPCS T/C E21-F013 31(0)(c) i LPCS Test Line E21-F222 32(0)(c)
T/C LPCS Test Line E21-F221 32(0)(c)
T/C l
l GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-42 l
L
], (64 NS - 1 ~) 2 03s 2 ' ') 360 s 1*I,399,31 43'6 4 4 4, sos, ns nu)
TABLE 3.6.6.2-1 SECONDARY
- CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM AUTOMATIC ISOLATION DAMPERS / VALVES MAXIMUM
- ~
ISOLATION TIME DAMPER / VALVE; FUNCTION (Number) (Seconds) a.
Dampers Auxiliary Building Ventilation Supply Damper (QlT41F006) F 4 Auxiliary Building Ventilation Supply Damper (Q1T41F007) X4 Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Exhaust Damper (Q1T42F003) #4 Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Exhaust Damper (Q1T42F004) E4 Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Supply Damoer (QlT42F011) #4 i Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Supply Damper (Q1T42F012) #9 ..
Fuel Pool Sweep Ventilation Supply Damper (QlT42F019) XV Fuel Pool Sweep Ventilation Supply Damper (QlT42F020) #4 Cost <.%~e.,7 J- D e y wa. I I Aras W T I T;- , 4 Svyt y Ds~yev (tyrmstfooy) l LanTe.%ent & Drywe.Il Arm %M'!E*'* * *t S"ff'Y L sv y (9Im4sFoo8)
CenTe,%e at d- bey weII hes %ntElet% 4
%vsr Ds~yer CQ tM4 s yo50 conre.',,ne., r V De y wall A ve~ % diefs'as, '+
5 A.,, r D ~j,4 r carM4 ro77)
L
{ :
I :
{
GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-48
~
- 2. (GGNS - 97, 203, 261, 360, 381, 389, 390, 392, 436, 444, 505, 720, 721)
(Partial resubmittal of Item #4, AECM-83/0373)
SUBJECT:
Technical Specification Tables 3.6.4-1, 3.6.6.2-1, pages 3/4 6-29 through 3/4 6-33, and 3/4 6-49 through 3/4 6-52.
DISCUSSION: A. Table 3.6.4-1 lists the Containment and Drywell 1 solation Valves in four sections. Section 1 contains the Automatic Isolation Valves which are those valves that receive an automatic isolation signal from Table 3.3.2-1 instrumentation and are located on the Containment or Drywell penetrations. The valves included in Section 2 are Manual Isolation valves which receive a remote manual signal from a handswitch and are located on the Containment or Drywell Penetrations. Some of the valves in Section 2 may receive automatic signals, but not automatic isolation signals from instrumentation in Table 3.3.2-1. The valves included in Section 3 are those which do not receive isolation signals from instrumentation listed in Table 3.3.2-1 and do not utilize a remote manual handswitch. Section 3 includes check valves, local manual operated valves and power operated valves that do not utilize a handswitch. Section 4 of Table 3.6.4-1 contains test connection valves. The changes to Table 3.6.4-1 correct the maximum isolation times.
B. Tabic 3.6.6.2-1 contains a list of secondary containment ventilation system automatic isolation dampers and valves.
Section "a" of the table lists dampers with their associated maximum isolation times. Section "b" lists valves and their associated maximum isolation times. The changes to Tabic 3.6.6.2-1 correct the maximum isolation times for the valves in section "b".
A more detailed description of the changes to Tables 3.6.4-1 and 3.6.6.2-1 is provided below in the justification section.
JUSTIFICATION: A. The changes to Table 3.6.4-1 are justified as follows:
All proposed valve closing time changes except E12-F028A-A and E12-F028B-B were derived by applying margins to previous test data. These margins were obtained from ASME Section XI which states that valves closing faster than 10 seconds are allowed a 50% change in closing speed and valves closing slower than 10 seconds are allowed a'25%
change in speed before increased surveillance is required.
To determine the maximum closing time for the valves, a factor of two times the allowable from previous test j-closure to next test closure (based on the 50% and 25%
values) was added to the stroke times obtained from previous test data. For example:
G14spl3
A valve for which previous test data indicates a 20 second closing time would have a 5 second (25%) from previous test to next test Allowable Value. Two times the Allowable Value (or 10 seconds) would then be added to the tested closing time of 20 seconds to give the maximum closing time for the valve of 30 seconds.
The present maximum closure times in the table have no consistent basis and use values from design or purchase specifications. The proposed Technical Specification changes will provide a consistent basis for the maximum isolation times and will provide a realistic measure of valve performance through both the Technical Specification
- and ASME Section XI testing.
Valves in Table 3.6.4-1 which have analytical closing time requirements are 1B21-F028A, B, C, D; IB21-F022A, B, C, D;
- 1E12-F008; 1E12-F009; 1E12-F024A, B; 1M41-F011, F012, F034, F035; 1E12-F028A, B; 1M41-F015, F013, F016, F017; and E51-F063, F064. The change in valve closing times from 78 to 90 seconds for E12-F028A-A and E12-F028B-B is based on accident analysis time requirements for
B. The char.ges to Table 3.6.6.2-1 are justified as follows:
The maximum isolation time for valves in Section b, was determined using the same approach as in Table 3.6.4-1, discussed above.
Dampers in Table 3.6.6.2-1 which have analytical closing time requirements are T41-F006 F007; T42-F003, F004,
! F011 F012, F019, F020; and M41-F007 F008, F036, F037.
The closing times for these dampers are not affected by this Technical Specification change.
i SIGNIFICANT IIAZARDS CONSIDERATION:
Valve isolation times presently do not have a consistent basis.
Some are from design or purchase specifications. The proposed change will make the basis for maximum isolation times consistent and follow ASME Section XI requirements. These changes do not introduce a significant reduction in margin of i
safety and they do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated nor does it create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. Thus, no significant hazards considerations are involved.
C14sp14
' ' 2 {6 fr M - 47,2o3,26Is 340, 3 91, 3 s'9, 3 98, 5 y 2.,s24, sq y se, gog, ~ygo, y ,_p)
TABLE 3.6.4-1 CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES MAXIMUM SYSTEM AND PENETRATION ISOLATION TIME VALVEf(UMBER NupeER VALVE GROUP (a) (Seconds)
- 1. Automatic Is'olation Valves
- a. Containment .
MainSteam(ines B21-F028A 5(0) 1 5 Main Steam Lines 821-F022A 5(I) 1 5 Main Steam Lines 821-F067A-A 5(0) 1 Ar' ? l Main Steam Lines 821-F028B 6(0) 1 5 Main Steam Lines 821-F0228 6(I) 1 5 Main Steam Lines B21-F0678-A 6(0) 1 4rT l Main Steam Lines e B21-F028C 7(0) 1 5 Main Steam Lines 821-F022C 7(I) 1 5 Main Steam Lines B21-F067C-A 7(0) 1 #7 l Main Steam Lines 821-F0280 8(0) 1 5 l Main Steam Lines B21-F0220 8(I) 1 5 Main Steam Lines 821.F0670-A 8(0) 1 Jr7 l
- 4HR Reactor E12-F008-A 14(0)(C) 3 40 Shutdown Cooling Suction RHR Reactor E12-F009-B 14(I)(C) 3 40 Shutdown Cooling .
Suction Steam Supply to E51-F063-B 17(I) 4 20 l RHR and RCIC Turbine l
Steam Supply to E51-F064-A 17(0) 4 20 l RHR and RCIC Turbine Steam Supply to E51-F076-B 17(I) 4 g /6 RHR and RCIC Turbine RHR to Head Spray E12-F023-B 18(0)(c) 3 M74 MM n Steam Line B21-F019-A 19(0) 1 4510 Drains Main Steam Line B21-F016-B 19(I) 1 49.zo Drains RHR Heat Exchanger E12-F042A-A 20(I)(c) 5 22 "A" to LPCI (a) See Specification 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, for isolation signal (s) that operatos each valve group.
(b) Hydrosgtically tested to ASME Section XI criteria.
(c) 11.5 psig.
(d) Hydros 1atically Hydrostatically tested tested by with pressurizing water at P,s,ystem to 1.10 12.65 P,,psig.
, (e) Hydrostatically tested during system functional tests.
(f) Hydrostatically sealed by feedwater leakage control system. Type C test not required.
GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-29 .
---_______________________m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . - . . - - - _ - - - , , . . . - , .m. .,~. - _ , --r-.-.-,_,..__y, ..m,-,m,.w,.,,,,v,,,,-m.y , w m7m -
2, (6&MS- 9 J,2 D,14 I; 360, 371,3 8'4, 3 to, 511, 4.94 y y v, J~os, y 2. p, 7 t g)
TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Crntinued)
CONTAINMENT AND ORYWELL ISOLATION VALVES MAXIMUM SYSTEM AND PENETRATION ISOLATION TIME VALVE NUMBER. NUMBER VALVE GROUP (*) (Seconds)
Contairment (Continued)
RHR Heat Exchanger E12-F028A-A 20(I)(c) 5 NP 70 "A" to LPCI RHR Heat Exchanger E12-F037A-A 20(I)(C) 3 O'7V "A" to LPCI RHR Heat Exchanger E12-F0428-B .21(I)(C) 5 22 "B" to LPCI RHR Heat Exchanger E12-F0288-B 21(I)(C) 5 J& 90 "B" to LPCI RHR Heat Exchanger E12-F0378-B 21(I)(c) 3 g79 "B" to LPCI RHR "A" Test Line E12-F024A-A 23(0)(d) 5 93 to Supp. Pool RHR "A" Test Line E12-F011A-A 23(0)(d) 5 27 to Supp. Pool 4
""" "*" i nt L M ~12 T2^0A A 2XOdd) ; 4-- $
RHR " ' Tes rte E12-F021-B 24(0)(d) 5 M l49 to Supp. Pool 1 " 4W75 HPCS Test Line E22-F023-C 27(0) 6 RCIC Pump Suction E51-F031-A 28(0) 4 38 RCIC Turbine E51-F077-A 29(0)(C) 9 18 Exhaust LPCS Test Line E21-F012-A 32(0) 5 101 Cont. Purge and M41-F011 34(0) 7 4 Vent Air Supply Cont. Purge and M41-F012 34(I) 7 4 Vent Air Supply Cont. Purge and M41-F034 35(I) 7 4 and Vent Air Exh.
Cont. Purge and M41-F035 35(0) 7 4 and Vent Air Exh.
Plant Service P44-F070-B 36(I) 6 24 Water Return Plant Service P44-F069-A 36(0) 6 -EtJ3 ~
Water Return Plant Service P44-F053-A 37(0) 6 -et 33; WatefSupply ,
ChillebWater P71-F150 38(0) 6 3011l Supply 1 Chilled Water P71-F148 39(0) 6 4011 k Return i GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-30
~~
L{&&NS -t 1 12#3 1* Al 5 bO f 3 I 3 3 *# 1
'3 9 2-) 4 '3 $ H ' 't/ S O IS 'I 2 #s '/ 1 1)
TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued)
,. CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES MAXIMUM SYSTEM AND PENETRATION ISOLATION TIME VALVE: NUMBER NUMBER VALVE GROUP (a) (Seconds)
I Containment (Continued) -
Chilled Water P71-F149 39(I) 6 M 12.
Return Service Air PS2-F105 41(0) 6 h&
Supply Inst. Air Supply P53-F001 42(0) 6 #6 RWCU to Main G33-F034-A 43(0) 8 21 Condenser RWCU to Main G33-F028-B 43(I) 8 E 7/
Condenser RWCU Backwash to G36-F106 49(I) 6 Mll C/U Phase Sep. Tank RWCU Backwash to G36-F101 49(0) 6  C/U Phase Sep. Tank Drywell & Cont. P45-F067 50(I) 6 +7 Equip. Drain Sump Disch.
Drywell & Cont. P45-F068 50(0) 6 4 Equip. Drain Sump Disch.
Drywell & Cont. P45-F061 51(I) 6 #7 Floor Drain Sump Disch.
Drywell & Cont. P45-F062 51(0) 6 #7 Floor Drain Sump Disch.
Condensate Supply P11-F075 56(0) 6 &7 FPC & CU to Upper G41-F028-A 57(0) 6 -44.f/
Cont. Pool Upper Cont. Pool G41-F029-A 58(0) 6 40 f1 to Fuel Pool Drain Tank Upper Cont. Pool G41-F044-B 58(I) 6 .4&}7 to Fuel Pool Drain Tank-Aux. Sidg. Fir. P45-F273-A 60(0) 6 MIZ !
andIE :
Tks.! to quip. Drn.
Supp. Pool '
Aux. B'1dg. Fir. P45-F274-B 60(0) 6 2332.
and Equip. Drn.
Tks. to Supp. Pool GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-31 i
l
~
- 2. (&&NS -9 7,2.03, 2.6 Is 3 M, 31YI, 3 K1, 3 9p, 312, y 34 w 't, Co.r,7 2.o,'? 21 )
TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued)
- CONTAINMENT AND ORYWELL ISOLATION VALVES
, MAXIMUM SYSTES AND PENETRATION ISOLATION TIME VALVE SUMBER NUMBER VALVE GROUP (a) (Seconds)
Containment (Continued)
Comb. Gas' Control E61-F009 65(0) 7 4 Cont. Purge (Outside Air Supply)
Comb. Gas Control E61-F010 65(I) 7 4 Cont. Purge (Outside Air Supply)
Purge Rad. E61-F056 66(I) 7 4 Detector Purge Rad. E61-F057 66(0) 7 4 Detector RHR "B" Test Line E12-F024B-B 67(0)(d) 5 93 To Suppr. Pool RHR "B" Test Line E12-F011B-B 67(0)(d) 5 MN
,,,,I,,Suppr. Pool l
... ..7 ..,,.
.m 3..
, ,,m (d)
.,w, e
p Y Refueling Water P11-F130 69(0)(c) 6 AF l Transf. Pump Suction Refueling Water P11-F131 69(0)(c) 6 4 Transf. Pump Suction Instr. Air to ADS P53-F003-A 70(0) 6 4 RCIC Turbine Exh. E51-F078-B 75(0) 9 .-?-/D Ve:uum Breaker RWCU to Feedwater G33-F040-8 83(I) 8 4 0' 4 '2.
RWCU to Feedwater G33-F039-A 83(0) 8 2942 Chemical Waste P45-F098 84(I) 6 t lif l Sump Discharge Chemical Waste P45-F099 84(0) 6 #T Sump Discharge Supp. Pool Clean- P60-F009-A 85(0) 6 4 i up Return Supp. Pool Clean- P60-F010-B 85(0) 6 A-f I upRefurn i Demin.4 Water Supply to Cont.
P21-F017-A 86(0) 6 40'/7 {
Demin. Water P21-F018-B 86(I) 6 -le/?
I (, Supply to Cont.
RWCU Pump Suction G33-F001-B 87(I) 8 .3082.
1 GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-32
2,(64NS - 41,2 0.3, 2 4 /> 340s391301 s 1 390s 312}tM) 44% S*S) ~I 3 Os ] 2 l)
TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued)
CONTAINMENT AND DRYWELL ISOLATION VALVES f
MAXIMUM SYSTEM AND PENETRATION ISOLATION TIME VALVE-NUMBER NUMBER VALVE GROUP (a) (Seconds')
Contajnment (Continued)
RWCU Pump . Suction G33-F252-A 87(I) 8 .ae 't 2.
RWCU Pump' Suction G33-F004-A 87(0) 8 & f/ 2 RWCU Pump Disch. G33-F053-B 88(I) 8 -GP32 RWCU Pump Disch. G33-F054-A 88(0) 8 4031
Combustible Gas E61-F003A-A 339(0) 6 -(# 8 'f Con.
Combustible Gas E61-F005A-A 340(0) 6 55 Con.
Combustible Gas E61-F0058-B 340(0) 6 60 Con.
Combustible Gas E61-F007 341(0) 6 2 Con.
Drywell Air Purge M41-F015 345(I) 7 4 Supply Drywell Air Purge M41-F013 345(0) 7 4 Supply Drywell Air Purge M41-F016 347(I) 7 4 Exhaust Drywell Air Purge M41-F017 347(0) 7 4 Exhaust Equipment Drains P45-F009 348(I) 6 46 Equipment Drains P45-F010 348(0) 6 44 eivor urains P45-F003 349(I) 6 A-6 Floor Drains P45-F004 349(0) 6 4-4 Service Air PS2-F195-B 363(0) 6 10 Chemical Sump P45-F096-A 364(I) 6 &-7 Disch.
Chemical Sump P45-F097-B 364(0) 6 -&1 Disch.
RWCU to Heat G33-F253 366(0)
! Exct .
10 , 40 'f/: f Reactor Water Sample Line B33-F019 465(I) 10 Md4 Reactor Water B33-F020 465(0) 10 J&:t34 Sample Line l
GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-33 1
L
2
, s.(fxC n s - 11, tes,TABLE 261,'560, 381, 30VsTfaj 3.6.4.2-1 (Continued) 39339243GM FA1 l SECONDARY CONTAINNENT 4TNTILAT10N SYSTDI AUTOMATIC ISOLATION DAM ERS/VAlvis l 9thKDEM
- ISOLATION TIFE '
VALVE FUNCT10N (Number) (Seconds _)__ .
- b. Velves' Plant Chilled Water system Aux. Bldg. Isol. Valve (P71-F306) g /(
Plant Chilled Water System Aux. B1dg. Isol. Valve (P71-F304) # 14 Plant Chilled Water System Aux. Bldg. Isol. Valve
/7 (P71-F302) I Plant Chilled Water System Aux. Bldg. Isol. Valve' (P71-F300) / 7 Plant Chilled Water System Aux. 31dg. Isol. Valve (P71-F307) )df /4 Plant Chilled Water Systee Aux. Oldg. Isol. Valve (P71-F305) #lY Plant Chilled Water System Aux. Bldg. Isol.. Valve (P71-F303) F7 Plant Chilled Water System Aux. Bldg. Isol. Valve (P71-F301) ( 7 Service Air System Aux. Bldg. Isol. Valve (P52-F221A) , /6 Service Air System Aux. Bldg. Isol. Valve (P52-F160A) fh Service Air System Aux. Bldg. Isol. Valve l
(P52-F2218) /}
Service Air System Aux. Bldg. Isol. Valve (P52-F1608) ffp Instrument Air System Aux. Bldg. Isol. Valve (P53-F0264) /7 :
Inst nt Air System Aux. Bldg. Isol. Valve (Pss-
) (7 -
FM.C F11t-Desin S Valve (G46-F253) ysten Backwash Aux. Oldg. Isol. /h GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-49
- 1
\
l ** ,' - 1. ~
E' )DCN%-bt' ,70s'tvs13 ts t'ssba s 9 a-tg91' )seenun*P( ttS' 040' C 6E' kG9' sver 4rr >% S*S i
$)3ON0V4A 30N1VINM3NI A3N111V110N $A513N VD1OWV1131501V110N 0vNd335/AvlA3S
- wxtunu I501V110N 1!uE .
AylA3 ARN3110N'~ )MnegaJ( )5*seups(
Aetaes )soun unap(
EM3R sesimes4 83AD 1g ynx gtpS tsoL Aetas i )StS-itot( '
M lT gnan gesiats4 83AD 14* ynu gtpS tsoL Aetas
)St9-d106( g /7 gasteeJ golleJ SAsgas vitu gtpS tsoL Aetna
)sZt-Jttt( X lI gnatseJ goltaJ $tsgas ynu gtpS ! sot
- Aetas
)slI itI'( ID li gn3n ynx gtpS tsoL' Aetas )SEC-4ZtS( tp s2 gn3n ynu stpS tsoL Aetas )SEC-dZN( iJ lT sd3n ynx gtpS ! sot Aetas )490-400t( tA 1T ga3n ynu stpS ! sot
- Aetas )d90-4009( iJ 11 I' fd30 ynx gtpS ! sot
- Aetas )490-4004( tA tt 5d30 vnx gips ! sot
- Aetas )490-3008( /IT J)as daogasn ou KS stae ynu gtpS ! sot
- Aet^a
)49t-dZSZV( M$
dnas daotasn ou SKssam ynx gtpS ! sot
- A tas
)49t-distV( /1 l
J)Ja dJogasn ou gKsgsE ynx* $tpS tsoL AetAa
- )49t-itEZV( /$
J)as daogasglou 5#stes ynu gtpS ! sol Aetas
)d9t-di9TS( /f J)as dJotasnov stsgas ynx stp6 ! sot
- Aetas
)49t-dtSts( /4 '
J)as dae 1ssggu gKsses ynx* stp6 tsot* AelaS
)dse-drMs( ff $
seup 3 gsgnat negna t u ussaa gnu GtpS tsot* A'Las
)dtI-JOSI( / /y SUVIS 0013-RN11 i t/t 9-50
,. ~. _ _ _ _-_ __ . _ _ . _
L .
(
- 2. (CGN$= 9 7, 205,261,160s 3 91,p 399,p 390,436,,4 44, Ses, 72a, yn)
TABLE 3.6.6.2-1 (Contitraed)
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEN AUTOMATIC ISCLATION DAMPERS / VALVES C naxInuN ISCLATION TIpE VALVE FUNCT100f (Number) (Seconds) l Valves (Continued)
Cond. & Refuel Water Transfer Aux. Bldg. Isol. Valve (P11-F064)
/7
( Cond. & Refuel Water Transfer Aux. B1dg. Isol. Valve (P11-F066) /7 Cond. & Refuel Water Transfer Aux. Bldg. Isol. Va!.ve (P11-F047) /7 Cond. & Refuel Water Transfer Aux. Bldg. Isol. Valve (P11-F063) / /3 Cond. & Refuel Water Transfer Aux. Bldg. Isol. Valve i (P11-F065) p7 Cond. & Refuel Water Tranfer Aux. Bldg. Isol. Valve (P11-F067) g7 Cond. & Refuel Water Transfer Aux. Bldp. Isol. Valve (P11-F061) py Floor and Equipment Drains Systes Aux. Bldg. Isol. Valve (P45-F158) g i3 ,
Floor and Equipment Drains System Aux. Bldg. Isol. Valve (P45-F160) y /3 Floor and Equipment Drains System Aux. Bldg. Isol. Valve (P45-F163) g (,
Floor and Equipment Drains System Aux. B1dg. Isol. Valve (P45-F159) f 13 Floor and Equipment Drains System Aux. B1dg. Isol. Valve (P45-F161) g 1.3 .
Makeup Water Treatment Sys. Aux. B1dg. Isol. Valve t (P11-F024)
! [ / Z. . -
Domestf6 Water System Aux. 81dg. Isol. Valve (P64-F029A) /- 0 P5W Aux. Bldg. Isol. Valve (P44-F121) g /30 GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-51
I 2 . & M 9 = 9 7, t O S p 2 6 p L 3 6 0; 3 9 3 e N M s M OS NS W Wp N SE*p50L) 2 p J TASLE 3.6.6.2-1 (Continued) ,
SECONDARY CONTAINNENT VENTILATION SYSTEM AUTOMATIC ISOLATION 0^."*ERS/ VALVES
- MAXIftM .
VALVE FUNCTI'ON'(Number) ,
Valves (Continued)
P5W Aux. Bldg. Isol. Valve (P44-F122) y f 94 P5W Aux. Bldg. Isol. Valve -
3 (P44-F117) g fg9 P5W Aux. Bldg. Isol. Valve (P44-F118) g fpf P5W Aux. 81dg. Isol. Valve (P44-F120) g f3o P5W Aux. B1dg. Isol. Valve (P44-F123) g f(ag P5W Aux. Bldg. Isol. Valve (P44-F116) g /09 P5W Aux. 51dg. Isol. Valve (P44-F119) g /09 RNR "A" Loop Discharge To Liquid Radweste Valve (E12-F203) g II-l t
( -
'- l
. ? t GRA W GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6-52
- --------g- ._, - ,-we,,,w ,,,.,.m , , _ , , , , , _ - ,, , _ , . - , , , _ . . , ,
0
- 3. (GCNS - 87) (Resubmittal of Item #2, AECM-83/0356)
SUBJECT:
Technical Specification 4.6.6.3.d.5, 4.7.2.d.3, B3/4.6.6, and B3/4.7.2 pages 3/4 6-54, 3/4 7-6, B3/4 6-6 and B3/4 7-1.
DISCUSSION: Technical Specification 4.6.6.3.d.5 and 4.7.2.d.3 require verifying that the heaters in the Standby Gas Treatment System and Control Room Emergency Filtration System dissipate the proper amount when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.
Ilowever, ANSI N510-1975 does not address heat dissipation testing of the heaters but does address other duct heater performance tests. The proposed change adds a statement to exempt the phase balance acceptance criteria (ANSI N510-1975, Section 14.2.3) from the test requirements. A description of the reasons for this exemption is added to the Bases.
JUSTIFICATION: The offsite pcwer system consists of a non-transpositional 500 kv grid. The grid has an inherent unbalanced load distribution which results in unbalanced voltages in the plant. Voltage unbalances exceeding 5% are not atypical. ANSI N510-1975 requires current balance between phases of the heater circuits l
to be within 5% of one another. The intent of the ANSI l requirement is to detect the heater failure by using phase balance. Due to the varying voltage unbalances at GGNS, which at times exceed the ANSI acceptance criteria, this is not a valid test. The verification of heater dissipation values to be within 10% (as required by Technical Specification 4.6.6.3.d.5 and 4.7.2.d.3, but not required by ANSI N510-1975) is adequate to verify heater operability.
SIGNIFICANT llAZARDS CONSIDERATION:
The proposed change is a purely administrative change which clarifies the Technical Specifications by exempting a portion of the ANSI N510-1975 acceptance criteria which is not applicable to the CGNS design. This change to the Technical Specifications does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety and it does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident which has been previously evaluated, nor does it create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident l
previously evaluated. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve any significant hazards consideration.
C55sp3
e
- 3. (GGys- e.7)
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS l
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)
~
- b. At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone cosmiunicating with the subsystem by:
i
- 1. Verifying that the subsystem satisfies the in place testing acceptance criteria and uses the test procedures of Regulatory Positions C.S.a, C.5.c and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and the system flow rate is 4000 cfm t 10%.
- 2. Verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis I
of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with j Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, l
March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory l Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978.
- 3. Verifying a subsystem flow rate of 4000 cfm i 10% during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.
- c. After every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber operation by verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a repre-sentative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2 March 1978, I meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a i
of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978.
- d. At least once per 18 months by:
- 1. Performing a system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system throughout its emergency operating sequence for the:
a) LOCA, and b) Fuel har.dling accident.
- 3. Verifying that the filter train starts and isolation dampers l open on each of the following test signals:
l
- a. Drywell pressure - high,
- b. Reactor vessel water level - low low, level 2,
, c. Fuel handling area ventilation exhaust radiation - high, and!
l ! d. Fuel handling area pool sweep exhaust radiation - high.
i 4.k Verifying that the fan can be raanually started. i
- 5. Verifying that the henters dissipate 50 2 5.0 kW when tested
( in accordance with ANSI H510-1975(Eu.ep % pue WMu crAc:
is not repked h be met)
GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 6 _.____
PLANT SYSTEMS 3.CGGNS-87)
( SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 2: Verifying that the subsystem satisfies the in place testing !
acceptance criteria and uses*the test procedures of Regulatory ' '
- Positions C.S.a. C.S.c and C.S.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and the system flow rate is 4000 cfm i 10%.
- 3. Verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, l March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory l Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978. !
- 4. Verifying a subsystem flow rate of 4000 cfm 10% during subsystem operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.
- c. After every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber operation by verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a repre-sentative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Positon C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2 March 1978.
- d. At least once per 18 months by:
( 1. Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 7.2 inches Water Gauge while operating the subsystem at a flow rate of 4000 cfm i 10%.
- 2. Verifying that on each of the below isolation mode actuation test signals, the subsys' tem automatically switches to the isola-tion mode of operation and the isolation valves close within 4 seconds:
a) High radiation in the outside air intake duct, b) High chlorine concentration in the outside air intake duct, c) High drywell pressure, and d) Low reactor water level.
- 3. 20.7 2 2.1 kW when tested l
Verifying thatwith in accordance theANSI heaters dissip(ate N510-1975 Eyceptike phase balace er,ter; l 15 N,f t egp/ red f. he Mat ,
t
- f. Aflter each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal ~adsorber i bank by verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove 99.95% of a i halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when they are tested
\
in place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the system at a flow rate of 4000 cfm 2 10%.
GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 7-6
~
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 2
BASES 3/4.6.6 set 0NDARY CONTAINMENT .
Secondary containment is designed to minimize any ground level release of radioactive material which may result from an accident. The Auxiliary Building ~
and Enclosure Building provide secondary containment during normal operation when the containment is sealed and in service. When the reactor is in COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING, the containment may be open and the Auxiliary Building and Enclosure Building then become the only containment.
Establishing and maintaining a vacuum in the Auxiliary Building and Enclo-i sure Building with the standby gas treatment system once per 18 months, along with the surveillance of the doors, latches, dampers and valves, is adequate to ensure that there are no violations of the integrity of the secondary containment.
l The OPERABILITY of the standby gas treatment systems ensures that suffi-cient , iodine removal capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The reduction in containment iodine inventory reduces the resulting site boundary radiation doses associated with containment leakage. The operation of this system and resultant iodine removal capacity are consistont with the assumptions used in the LOCA analyses. Cumulative operation of the system with the heaters OPERABLE for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> over a 31 day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the absorbers and HEPA filters.
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3/4.6.7 ATMOSPHERE CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the systems required for the detection and control of l hydrogen gas ensures that these systems will be available to maintain the hydro-gen concentration within the containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. The hydrogen recombiner and the hydrogen ignition systems are capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with (1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water and (3) corrosion of metals within containment.
Two 100% drywell purge systems are the primary means of H2 control within l the drywell purging hydrogen produced following a LOCA into the containment '
volume. Hydrogen generated from the metal-water reaction and radiolysis is
- .~....d tc, evolve to the drywell atmosphere and form a homogenous mixture through natural forces and mechanical turbulance (ECCS pipe break flow). The drywell purge system forces drywell atmosphere through the horizontal vents and into the containment and as a result no bypass path exists.
The hydrogen control system is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, " Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA", March 1971. 1
! The operability of at least 41 of 45 ignitors in either hydrogen ignition t subsystem w 11 maintain an effective coverage throughout the containment and i '
drywell. E ch subsystem of ignitors will initiate combustion of any sig- :
nificant amount of hydrogen released after a degraded core accident. This j l systen will' ensure burning in a controll.ed manner as the hydrogen is released instead of allowing it to be ignited at high concentrations by a random igni-i(
l tion source.
GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-6 i l
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3.(SGNS~$9) 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES _
3/4.7.1 SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the service water systems ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during ;
normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of these systems, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident conditions within acceptable limits.
3/4.7.2 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM
- The OPERABILITY of the control room emergency filtration system ensures i
that the control room will . ain habitable for operations personnel during and following all design basis accident conditions. Cumulative operation of the system for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> with the heaters OPERABLE over a 31 day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control room !
design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body, or its equivalent.
This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria i 19 of Appendix "A", 10 CFR Part 50.
The surveillance requirements orovide adequate assurance that RCICS will be OPERABLE when required. Although all active components are testable and l
( full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation during reactor operation, a complete functional test requires reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage'and to start cooling at the earliest possible moment.
3/4.7.3 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM l The reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system is provided to assure adequate core cooling in the event of reactor isolation from its primary heat sink and the loss of feedwater flow to the reactor vessel without requiring actuation of any of the Emergency Core Cooling System equipment. The RCIC system is conservatively required to be OPERABLE where m reactor pressure w ww.n d 5 psig even though the LPCI mode of the resid u . heat removal (RHR) system provides adequate core cooling up to 225 psig.
The RCIC system specifications are applicable during OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 3 when reactor vessel pressure exceeds 135 psig because RCIC is the primary non-ECCS source of emergency core cooling when the reactor is pressurized.
With the RCIC system inoperable,. adequate core cooling is assured by the OPERABILITY of the HPCS system and justifies the specif.ied 14 day out-of-service period.
The seveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that RCICS will .
be OPERABLE;when required. Although all active components are testable and -
full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation during reactor operation, a - I complete functional test requires reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping
(. .
is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage and to start cooling at the earliest possible moment.
GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 8 3/4 7-1
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Insert to Page B3/4 6-6 The surveillance testing for verifying heat dissipation for the Standby Gas Treatment Syctem heaters is performed in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 with the exception of the 5% current phase balance criteria of Section 14.2.3. The -
offsite power system for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station consist of a
~
non-transpositional 500 KV grid. The grid has an inherent unbalanced load distribution which results in unbalanced voltages in the plant. Voltage unbalances exceeding the ANSI N510-1975 5% criteria are not atypical.
Insert to Page B3/4 7-1 The surveillance testing for verifying heat dissipation for the Control Room Emergency Filtration System heaters is performed in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 with the exception of the 5% current phase balance criteria of Section 14.2.3. The offsite power system for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station consist of a non-transpositional 500 KV grid. The grid has an inherent unbalanced load distribution which results in unbalanced voltages in the plant. Voltage unbalances exceeding the ANSI N510-1975 5% criteria are not atypical.
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