ML20072M508
| ML20072M508 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 07/11/1983 |
| From: | Ridgway D CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8307140454 | |
| Download: ML20072M508 (35) | |
Text
v Qv 4 July 11, 1983 fl IX' UNITED STATES OF AMERICA '2Y f
/' s NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION C
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In the Matter of )
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CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-400 OL AND NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) 50-401 OL MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY )
)
(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power )
Plant, Units 1 and 2) )
APPLICANTS' RESPONSE TO EDDLEMAN PROPOSED CONTENTIONS ON HARRIS EMERGENCY PLAN I. INTRODUCTION
" Wells Eddleman's Contentions re CP&L Site Emergency Plan (SHNPP Operating Manual, Volume 3, Book 1)" ("Eddleman Proposed Contentions"), dated May 2, 1983, resubmits 12 previously filed contentions, and proposes an additional ten new contentions, all ostensibly dependent on Applicants' emergency plan for the Harris plant, which was served on all parties to this proceed 4 ing on March 29, 1983.
The Board's May 27, 1983 " Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Cost Savings Contentions, Discovery Disputes, and Scheduling Matters)" allowed all parties until June 24, 1983 to file 8307140454 830711 PDR 0 ADOCK 05000400 PDR
_ _ _ _ . i
e onsite emergency planning contentions. The Board further
- ordered that any Applicant and Staff responses to such proposed contentions be filed by July 11, 1983. No party other than Mr. Eddleman has filed onsite emergency planning contentions.
In accordance with the Board's directives, Applicants respond herein to Mr. Eddleman's proposed contentions on the Harris emergency plan.
On June 30, 1983, after Mr. Eddleman filed his onsite emergency planning contentions, the Commission issued its deci-sion in Duke Power Company (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2) CLI-83-19, 17 N.R.C. (1983), affirming in part and vacating in part ALAB-687. The Commission affirmed the Appeal Board's three-part test for good cause for late filed conten-tions (i.e., the elaboration of factor (i) in 10 C.F.R.
S 2.714(a)(1)), but found that all of the five factors in l'O C.F.R. S 2.714(a)(1) should be applied by licensing boards.
The Commission also affirmed the Appeal Board's holding that "the institutional unavailability of a licensing-related document does not establish good cause for filing a contention late if information was publicly available early enough to provide the basis for the timely filing of that contention."
In accordance with the Commission's decision, all five factors in 10 C.F.R. 5 2.714(a)(1) must be addressed where Mr.
Eddleman has reasserted a previously deferred contention or has proposed a new contention, based on the recent availability of Applicants' onsite emergency plan. Applicants appreciate that
relying on ALAB-687, the Board's instructions regarding contentions based on emergency plans undoubtedly led Mr.
Eddleman to believe that addressing all five factors in this instance was not necessary. Nevertheless, on May 14, 1983, Mr.
Eddleman had served a " Supplement re contentions 150-160, and 161 re 5 factors for late filing of contentions." In that document, Mr. Eddleman made cursory observations with respect to each of the five factors, but (understandably) did not fully anticipate the thrust of the Commission's decision. Applicants therefore propose that Mr. Eddleman be prepared to address the five factors at the prehearing conference on July 20, 1983.
II. DISCUSSION A. Requirements For Contentions Applicants have previously discussed at length the general legal standards governing the admissibility of proposed conten-tions in an NRC licensing proceeding. See, e.g., " Applicants' Response To Supplement To Petition To Intervene By Wells Eddleman" (June 15, 1982), at 2-19. Accordingly, there is no need to restate in full the Commission's requirements; rather, Applicants simply summarize here the general principles to be l
l applied in determining the admissibility of Mr. Eddleman's pro-posed contentions.
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- 1. Scope of Hearing Notice A threshold requirement for an admissible contention is that it address a matter which is within the scope of the issues set forth in the Commission's Notice of Opportunity for Hearing in this proceeding. See Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear 1), ALAB-619, 12 N.R.C. 558, 565 (1981); Portland General Electric Co.
(Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-534, 9 N.R.C. 287, 289-90, n.6 (1979); Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-316, 3 N.R.C. 167, 170-71 (1976).
- 2. Bases with Reasonable Specificity The Commission's Rules of Practice, at 10 C.F.R. 5 2.714(b), further require that an intervenor include with proposed contentions "the bases for each contention set forth with reasonable specificity."
There are several purposes which underlie the Commission's standard in section 2.714(o):
A purpose of the basis-for-contention requirement in Section 2.714 is to help as-sure at the pleading stage that the hearing process is not improperly invoked. For ex-ample, a licensing proceeding before this agency is plainly not the proper forum for an attack on applicable requirements _or for challenges to the basic structure of the Commission's regulatory process. Another purpose is to help assure that other parties are sufficiently put on notice so that they will know at least generally what they will have to defend against or oppose.
Still another purpose is to assure that the proposed issues are proper for adjudication J
in the particular proceeding. In the final analysis, there must ultimately be strict observance of the requirements governing intervention, in order that the adjudiga-tory process is invoked only by those ,
persons who have real interests at stake and who seek resolution of concrete issues.
Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-216, 8 A.E.C. 13, 20-21 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
The notice aspect of the requirement is a natural out-growth of fundamental notions of fairness applied to the party with the burden of proof. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board has observed:
The applicant is entitled to a fair chance to defend. It is therefore entitled to be told at the outset, with clarity and precision, what arguments are being advanced and what relief is being asked * * *
- So is the Board below. It should not be necessary to speculate about what a pleading is supposed to mean.
Kansas Gas and Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit No. 1), ALAB-279, 1 N.R.C. 559, 576 (1975) (emphasis supplied; footnote omitted). Moreover, the Licensing Board is entitled to adequate notice of a petitioner's specific conten-tions to enable it to guard against the obstructionism of its processes. As the Supreme Court noted, in upholding the Commission's requirements for a threshold showing of materiali-ty for environmental contentions:
- [I]t is incumbent upon intervenors who wish to participate to structure their participation so that it is meaningful, so that it alerts the agency to the interve-nors' position and contention. * **
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Indeed, administrative proceedings should not be a game or forum to engage in un-justified obstructionism by making cryptic aad obscure reference to matters that "ought to be" considered * * *.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 553-54 (1978).
Yet, important as the notice aspect of the standard is, the requirement for bases with reasonable specificity goes be-yond the " notice pleading" allowed in the federal courts, which has been found to be insufficient for NRC licensing proceed-ings. See Wolf Creek, supra, ALAB-279, 1 N.R.C. at 575, n.32 (1975). On the other hand, the regulation does not require the intervenor to detail the evidence which will be offered in.
support of each proposed contention. Peach Bottom, supra, ALAB-216, 8 A.E.C. 13, 20 (1974).1/ In short, the standard falls somewhere in between, and "[t]he degree of specificity with which the basis for a contention must be alleged initially involves the exercise of judgment on a case-by-case basis."
Id.
There are also certain practical considerations which should play a particularly important role here in the Board's application of the " bases with reasonable specificity" standard to a particular proposed contention -- beyond the question of 1/ See also Mississippi Power and Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nu-clear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-130, 6 A.E.C. 423, 426 (1973); Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear j Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 N.R.C. 542, 548-49 l (1980).
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whether the proposed contention provides clear and precise notice of the issues on which Applicants may bear the burden of proof. First, the contention should refer to and address per-tinent documentation, available in the public domain, which is relevant to this facility.2/ In the instant case, the Board deferred ruling on emergency planning contentions filed prior to availability of the emergency plans, pending service of the plans themselves, and accorded intervenors the opportunity to file refined and additional contentions after reviewing the plans. See " Memorandum and Order (Reflecting Decisions Made Following Prehearing Conference)" (September 22, 1982), at 4-8.
Thus, the requirement for specific reference to relevant docu-mentation applies with special force to the CP&L "Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Plan, Unit No. 1 & Unit No. 2" (March 1983, Rev. O), but may also include applicable NRC Staff regulatory guides and other published reports. In addition, there should be either a reasonably logical and tech-nically credible explanation, or a plausible and referenced au-thority for the factual assertions in the contentions. The in-tervenor's personal opinion alone is not adequate for this purpose.
2/ See Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-24, 14 N.R.C. 175, 181-84 (1981).
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- 3. Challenges to Regulations All rules and regulations of the Commission, and the underlying bases for those rules and regulations, are immune to attack in an individual licensing proceeding unless a petition is first made to the licensing board for an exception or waiv-er. The sole ground for a petition for waiver or exception shall be that special circumstances with respect to the subject matter of the particular proceeding are such that application of the specific challenged rule or regulation (or provision thereof) would not serve the purposes for which the rule or regulation was adopted. The petition must be accompanied by an affidavit in support of that basis for the petition. Opportu-nity is provided for other parties to respond to the petition, including the submission of reply affidavits. If the licensing board determines that a prima facie showing has been made in support of waiver or exception, it shall, before ruling, cer-
. tify directly to the Commission for a determination on the mat-ter. If the licensing board does not determine that such a prima facie showing has been made, it must deny the petition.
10 C.F.R. S 2.758; Potomac Electric Power Co. (Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-218, 8 A.E.C.
79, 89 (1974).
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- 4. Rulemakings Licensing boards should not accept in individual licensing proceedings contentions which are, or are about to become, the subject of general rulemaking by the Commission. Potomac Electric Power Co. (Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-218, 8 A.E.C. 79, 85 (1974); Sacramento I
Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generation Station), ALAB-655, 14 N.R.C. 799, 816 (1981).
B. Eddleman's Proposed Contentions Eddleman proposed Contention 150 is an attempt to resurrect -- without revision or further definition -- twelve emergency planning contentions filed earlier in this proceed- _
ing, on which the Board deferred ruling pending the availabili- l ty of the Harris emergency plan. Applicants first discuss these previously filed contentions, denominating each with the prefix "150/"; i.e., previously-filed Contention 2 is here denominated " Contention 150/2."
Eddleman proposed Contention 150/2 alleges that Applicants should provide all towns and cities within 30 miles of the plant with pressurized ionization monitors "to assure accurate and complete information on radioactive materials * *
- at any given location * *
- and to assure the public it is is getting
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accurate information and thus to prevent panic."3/ Mr.
3/ Although Mr. Eddleman's May 2, 1983 filing does not so in-dicate, the Board deferred only the latter part of his proposed (Continued Next Page)
_g.
Eddleman further asserts that the monitors should have both low- and high-range capability; should be capable of analyzing rate of emission as well as quantities and identities of radionuclides emitted; and should be readable both by onsite personnel and remotely via telephone.
Contention 150/2 is inadmissible for a number of reasons.
First, to the extent that the contention alleges a need for monitors to provide an independent source of radiological data to offsite authorities and the general public, the contention would relate to offsite emergency plans, which have not yet is-sued. Accordingly, the contention is arguably premature.
Nevertheless, the alleged need for the monitors is appar-ently premised on an asserted distrust of CP&L's radiological monitoring system -- i.e., the monitors are needed "to assure the public it is getting accurate information." Yet, despite the availability of,the Harris emergency plan, Mr. Eddleman has failed to amend his contention to specifically criticize Appli-cants' radiological monitoring system or to otherwise give any indication of the basis for the apparent argument (not (Continued)
Contention 2. The Board expressly rejected the first part of proposed Contention 2 -- the part which asserted a need for pressurized ionization monitors at all plant discharge points as duplicative of Joint Contention VI. See " Memorandum and Order (Reflecting Decisions Made Following Prehearing Confer-ance)" (September 22, 1982), at 36-37. Accordingly, Applicants here address only the deferred portion of proposed Conten-tion 2.
articulated by Mr. Eddleman) that the real-time effluent monitoring provided by Applicants at all significant release points and the mobile area radiation monitoring capability are not adequate for emergency response. Certainly, Mr. Eddleman has never provided any explanation why radionuclide-specific information should be required.4/ In fact, EPA's Protective Action Guides, which form tha basis for protective action decision-making, are not radionuclide-specific. Thus, in the absence of even a theory to support the need for these moni-tors, proposed Contention 150/2 should be rejected for lack of basis.
Moreover, to the extent that proposed Contention 150/2 alleges a need for monitoring beyond the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone of approximately 10 miles radius, the contention constitutes an impermissible challenge to the Commission's emergency planning regulations, and must therefore be rejected. See 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(c)(2).
In any event, much of the apparent thrust of proposed Con-tention 150/2 is reflected in Joint Contention VI, which alleges:
The radiation detection and monitoring system of SHNPP is unable to assure that in-plant and off-site emergency response personnel receive timely and accurate 4/ Mr. Eddleman also fails to identify any real-time monitors which are capable of analyzing the identities and quantities of radionuclides being emitted, or to explain why measurements of low levels of radioactivity (such as a pressurized ionization monitor measures) are needed for this application.
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information necessary to protect employees and the health and safety of the public under the ALARA standard. The monitoring system is not able to promptly detect the specific radionuclides and their amounts being released inside and outside the plant.
That contention has been accepted by the Board,5/ and effec-tively supersedes any conceivably litigable remnants of pro-posed Eddleman Contention 150/2.
Accordingly, for all these reasons, proposed Contention 150/2 must be rejected.
Eddleman proposed Contentions 150/29 and 150/30 assert a need for the provision of potassium iodide to the general public for use in a radiological emergency.6/ Because these contentions relate to offsite emergency response, they are still premature, and should be deferred pending availability of the offsite emergency plans. Applicants nevertheless note that, to the extent proposed Contention 150/30 asserts a need a
for protective action planning beyond the 10-mile plume EPZ, the contention constitutes a challenge to 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(c)(2), and is therefore objectionable.
5/ See " Memorandum and Order (Reflecting Decisions Made Fol-lowing Prehearing Conference)" (September 22, 1982), at 13-14.
6/ Though proposed Contentions 29 and 30 each originally had numerous parts, the Board deferred ruling only on those parts asserting a need for the provision of potassium iodide to the general public. See " Memorandum and Order (Reflecting Deci-sions Made Following Prehearing Conference)" (September 22,
.1982), at 46-47.
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l Eddleman proposed Contention 150/55 postulates that "a deranged fighter plane pilot might fire on the Harris plant with air-to-ground missiles." The Board previously rejected the contention in its entirety, on the ground that it is barred by 10 C.F.R. 5 50.13 and on the basis of a." judgmental determi-nation that the postulated risk is too remote to warrant con-sideration." See " Memorandum and Order (Reflecting Decisions Made Following Prehearing Conference)" (September 22, 1982), at 53-54. Mr. Eddleman has provided no arguments whatsoever for reconsideration of the Board's prior ruling; certainly he has failed to relate the proposed contention to the Harris emergen-cy plan. Accordingly, the contention should remain rejected.
Proposed Contention 150/57 consists of an introduction and four parts, raising numerous unrelated emergency planning mat-ters with respect to " Applicants' Emergency Response plan (and the State of NC/ FEMA plan)." Because the recent opportunity for filing emergency planning contentions was premised exclu-9 sively on the availability of Applicants' plan, Applicants' re-sponses are confined to the proposed contention as it relates to the Harris plan. To the extent that deferred proposed Con-tention 57 raised matters with respect to other plans, the con-
! tention should remain deferred.
Part A asserts that the emergency plan is deficient be-cause "(i]t doesn't yet exist." As to Applicants' plan for Harris, this assertion is patently untrue. Mr. Eddleman concedes that he has even received his own copy of the plan.
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See Eddleman Proposed Contentions, at 1. Accordingly, Part A of Contention 150/57 must be rejected.
Part B asserts that the Harris plan is deficient in that it does not include " realistic estimates of the effects of Class IX accidents as required by the fact that such an accident has occurred, at TMI-2." However, Mr. Eddleman has completely failed to explain how such " realistic estimates" should be incorporated into the plan. The contention therefore lacks the specificity required of a litigable contention.
Moreover, to the extent that Mr. Eddleman would have the Harris plan consider the effects of " Class 9" accidents by en-larging the plume EPZ beyond a radius of approximately 10 miles, Part B of the contention is a clear and impermissible challenge to the Commission's regulations, (see 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(c)(2)) and is without basis. In fact, the entirety of the Commission's new emergency planning regulations were pro-mulgated after -- and indeed included consideration of -- the TMI-2 accident. See generally, 45 Fed. Reg. 55402, 55403 (1980), at " Rationale for the Final Rules."
The basis for establishing the size and nature of the EPZs set forth in Commission regulations is contained in, inter alia, NUREG-0396, " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0396;' EPA 520/1-78-016 (December 1978). Appendix E to 10 C.F.R. Part 50,
- n. 2. NUREG-0396 was developed by a task force composed of
recognized NRC and EPA experts on the effects of radioactivity.
In recommending the size and nature of the EPZs, this planning document specifically recognized the possibility of a range of accidents including worst case Class 9 accidents.
The EPZ recommended is of sufficient size
[10 mile radius] to provide dose savings to
. the population in areas where the projected dose from design basis accidents would be expected to exceed the applicable PAGs
[ Protective Action Guidelines] under unfa-vorable atmospheric conditions * * * *
[C]onsequences of less severe Class 9 accidents would not exceed the PAG level outside the recommended EPZ distance. In addition, the EPZ is of sufficient size to provide a substantial reduction in early severe health effects (injuries or deaths) in the event of the more severe Class 9 ,
accidents. [NUREG-0396, at 16-17.] l Appendix I of NUREG-0396 further explained that the lO-mile EPZ was designed to provide full protection to the public in the event of any Class 9 accident.
Class 9 accidents cover a full spectrum of releases * * *
- The lower range of the spectrum would include accidents in which a core " melt-through" of the containment would occur * * * * [T]he doses from
" melt-through" releases * *
- generally would not exceed even the most restrictive PAG beyond about 10 miles from a power plant. The upper range of the core-melt accidents is categorized by those in which the containment catastrophically fails and releases large quantities of radioactive materials directly into the atmosphere be-cause of over-pressurization or a steam ex-plosion. These accidents have the potential to release very large quantities .
- *
- of radioactive materials. There is a full spectrum of releases between the lower and upper range with all of these releases involving some combination of atmospheric and melt-through accidents. These very se-vere accidents have the potential for
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causing serious injuries and deaths.
Therefore, emergency response for these conditions must have as their first priori-ty the reduction of early severe health effects. Studies have been performed which indicate that if emergency action such as sheltering or evacuation were taken within about 10 miles of a power plant, there would be significant savings of early injuries and deaths even from the most "se-vere" atmospheric releases. [NUREG-0396, at I-6 to I-7. Footnote omitted).
Commission regulations also reference NUREG-0654,
" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emer-gency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0654/ FEMA-FEP-1, (January 1980), as providing a basis for selection of the size and nature of the EPZs. 10 C.F.R. 9 50.47, n. 1. NUREG-0654, a joint NRC and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) document, adopted the approach recommended in NUREG-0396 regarding the size and nature of the EPZs and noted that its conclusions were based upon, inter alia, consideration of a range of potential
-accidents to include worst case core melt accidents involving a containment breach. NUREG-0654, at 7. In short, Commission emergency planning regulations were promulgated after thorough consideration of, inter alia, accidents of all types, including worst case core melt " Class 9" accidents.
In sum, Applicants oppose the admission of Part B of pro-posed Contention 150/57 as lacking in specificity, without basis, and constituting a veiled challenge to the fundamental i basis of the Commissi6n's emergency planning regulations.
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Part C asserts that the plume EPZ'is not appropriately set !
in that it does not address the specific needs of certain popu-lations, does not " realistically estimate notification and evacuation times for an accident occurring between midnight and 6 a.m.," and does not " provide for effects outside 10 miles or potential maximum radiation effects in the EPZ as far as evacu-ation is concerned." Finally, it is asserted that the evacua-tion plan does not provide for the evacuation of Chapel Hill and does not fund emergency planning for state and local governments (thus allegedly failing to recognize asserted needs for independent monitoring, prompt warning, and a means to evacuate the population).
The issues raised in Part C -- e.g., public notification and evacuation times, offsite effects of radiation, public evacuation and funding for state and local emergency planning
-- are largely matters of offsite emergency planning. Thus, Part C could be considered an offsite emergency planning con-tention, and ruling deferred pending availability of offsite plans. However, Part C is actually cast as a sweeping chal-lenge to the size of the EPZ, which is established by Commission regulation. Accordingly, while the contention is not directly related to the recently-filed Harris emergency l
plan, Board disposition of the contention need not await issu-ance of the offsite emergency plans.
To the extent that Part C seeks to extend the plume EPZ beyond a radius of approximately 10 miles, to include hospital l
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i patients, jail prisoners and college students in Chapel Hill, Raleigh and Durham, that part of Contention 57 constitutes a i
challenge to 10 C.F.R. 6 50.47(c)(2). While particular atten-
- tion must be devoted to emergency planning for special facility i
populations (such as the hospitalized, imprisoned and school i
students) within the EPZ, see, e.g., NUREG-0654, Criteria J.lO.d and J.10.e, and Appendix 4, at 4-3, 4-8, the existence of special facility populations outside a 10-mile radius is not 1 one of the factors to be considered in determining the exact configuration of the EPZ. See 10 C.F.R. 6 50.47(c)(2).
. Mr. Eddleman's assertion that the 10-mile EPZ is inadequate to provide for children under 6, persons under 18, and pregnant
- women similarly fails as a contention; again, neither the age nor the reproductive status of the general population outside a 10-mile radius is a factor to be considered in determining the
! exact configuration of the EPZ. See 10 C.F.R. 6 50.47(c)(2).
l Thus, that portion of Part C is also a challenge to the Commission's regulations.
i Applicants further object to that portion of Part C that asserts that the plume EPZ "does not realistically estimate no-tification and evacuation times for an accident occurring
- between midnight and 6 a.m." Mr. Eddleman has failed to provide any basis for the proposition that the EPZ should estimate' notification and evacuation times. Indeed, there is simply no logical basis in fact for such an assertion; Appli-I cants believe that the contention evidences a fundamental l -
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, misunderstanding of the EPZ concept. The plume EPZ is nothing I more than the geographic area defined about a reactor as a j' basis for planning; it does not include any estimates of noti-l i
fication and evacuation times -- realistic or otherwise. Nor has Mr. Eddleman specified how estimates of notification and i evacuation tima should be factored into the EPZ. Finally, to the extent that Mr. Eddleman asserts that factors such as noti-l fication and evacuation times should be considered in some 1
l (unspecified) fashion in determining the exact configuration of the EPZ, that portion of the contention should be rejected as a i
challenge to 10 C.F.R. $ 50.47(c)(2), which does not provide I for consideration of such factors in defining the EPZ.
i Applicants also object to that portion of Part C which 4
asserts that the plume EPZ does not " provide for effects i
outside 10 miles or potential maximum radiation effects in the EPZ as far as evacuation is concerned." The first part of the assertion is yet another challenge to 10 C.F.R. 6 50.47(c)(2),
! and therefore must be rejected. The second part of the asser- ,
i tion is so lacking in clarity and specificity that it fails to put the parties on notice of the issues for litigation; nor has
- Mr. Eddleman advanced any basis for his assertion that the EPZ does-not consider " maximum radiation affects." Applicants therefore oppose the admission of the quoted portion of Part C.
The' basic thrust of the concluding paragraph of Part'C of proposed Contention 150/57 again criticizes Harris emergency planning for not including Chapel Hill, which is well beyond l
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the 10-mile radius of Harris. Accordingly, that portion of the contention must be rejected as a challenge to 10 C.F.R.
I 50.47(c)(2). Moreover, each of the specific concerns expressed in the concluding paragraph of Part C -- including the expansion of the EPZ and the funding of state and local emergency planning (in recognition of asserted needs for inde-pendent monitoring, prompt notification, and means of evacua-tion) -- are directly raised in the December 21, 1981 petition for rulemaking filed by the Citizens' Task Force, Docket No.
PRM-50-31, currently pending before the Commission.
In Part D of the proposed contention, Mr. Eddleman asserts that the Harris plan "has other specific deficiencies which can only be determined after [he has) seen a copy of'it." As exam- _
ples of such deficiencies, Mr. Eddleman provides only a laundry list of broad areas such as " training," " manning" of offsite emergency response organization, " times and methods of evacua-tion" and "means of locating the plume and assessing its dangers." As discussed above, Mr. Eddleman has in fact received a copy of the Harris plan, so that the basic premise of this part of the contention -- the unavailability of the plan -- is invalid. Moreover, the examples of " deficiencies" cited by Mr. Eddleman appear to be offsite planning concerns which would not be expected to be addressed _in the Harris plan.
Finally, given the availability of the Harris plan, the gener-alized assertions of Part D clearly lack the specificity required of a litigable contention; nor has Mr. Eddleman supplied any bases for his chargen. Part D of proposed Contention 150/57 must therefore be rejected.
l Accordingly, for all the abovo-stated reasons, proposed l
Contention 150/57 should be rejected in its entirety.
I Proposed Contention 150/63 asserts generally that Appli-cants' plan is deficient in that it does not provide for medi-cal treatment for members of the public injured by radiation, in that it does not provide for medical care "on a mobile basis," does not assure the availability of sufficient facilities, does not plan to utilize facilities beyond a 30-mile radius (although, it is alleged, closer facilities may be contaminated), and does not consider the medical consequences of a " Class 9" accident. The Commission has re-cently addressed the subject of medical services for members of the public who are contaminated and traumatically injured, or who have been exposed to dangerous levels of radiation as a result of a radiological accident. See Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 &
3), CLI-83-10, 17 N.R.C. (April 4, 1983). The Commission there held:
With respect to individuals who become in-jured and are also contaminated, the ar-rangements that are currently required for onsite personnel and emergency workers provide emergency capabilities which should be adequate for treatment of members of the ,
general public. Therefore, no additional ,
medical facilities or capabilities are required for the general public. However, facilities with which prior arrangements are made and those local or regional facilities which have the capability to
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l treat contaminated injured individuals should be identified. Additionally, emer-gency service organizations within the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) should be provided with informa-tion concerning the capability of medical facilities to handle individuals who are contaminated and injured. With respect to individuals who may be exposed to dangerous levels of radiation, treatment requires a lesser degree of advance planning and can be arranged for on an as-needed basis dur-ing an emergency. Emergency plans should, '
however, identify th'ose local or regional medical facilities which have the capabilities to provide appropriate medical treatment for radiation exposure. No con-tractual agreements are necessary and no additional hospitals or other facilities need be constructed.
Slip opinion at 2-3.
Despite the availability of the Harris plan, Mr. Eddleman has failed to identify any manner in which the provisions for medical care described in sections 4.6.3.6 and 4.6.3.7 of the plan fall short of the San Onofre standard. Indeed, Mr. Eddleman does not even reference the relevant sections of the Harris plan. Moreover, the Commission's San Onofre deci-sion plainly bars requiring the further planning for medical care for the general public that proposed Centention 150/63 contemplates. Accordingly, the contention must be rejected as a challenge to the Commission's emergency planning regulations, and as lacking in basis.
The general thrust of proposed Contention 150/97 is that the Harris plan does not "take sufficient account of, or provide means to deal:with" rapidly-escalating emergencies.
However, despite the availability of the plan -- which describes, inter alia, the procedures for activation of the emerger.cy rasponse organizations and facilities, assessment of 3
the event, and corrective and protective actions --
Mr. Eddleman has failed to provide further specificity, and has neither explained how the plan fails to address rapidly-escalating emergencies nor detailed the remedial measures he asserts are necessary to adequately provide for such emergencies. Particularly, Mr. Eddleman has not identi- l fled any deficiencies in the concept of operations of emergency response which would render it ineffective in a rapidly-escalating emergency. Applicants therefore oppose the admis-sion of Contention 150/97 on the ground that it is so lacking in specificity that it fails to give the other parties adequate notice of the issues for litigation.
Proposed Contention 150/99 asserts that the provisions for updating and testing Applicants' emergency plan are deficient in that they will not keep the plan sufficiently up to date.
However, although the plan is available, Mr. Eddleman has failed to identify any specific deficiencies in section 5.0 of the plan, which details Applicants' provisions for maintaining emergency preparedness (including the updating of plans and procedures and the conduct of periodic drills and exercises).
Moreover> the types of information which Mr. Eddleman lists as examples of the information to be updated in the plan -- e.g.,
the locations of institutions and residences of disabled A
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persons and persons lacking private transportation -- are offsite planning concerns, which are not included in the Harris plan, and therefore need not be updated. Accordingly, proposed Contention 150/99 must be rejected.
Proposed Contention 150/100 alleges that Applicants' emer-gency plan is deficient in that it does not provide for the decontamination of farmlands, homes and food after a " Class 9" accident. However, protective actions such as sheltering, evacuation, decontamination and protection of food supplies are matters of offsite emergency planning, and accordingly need not be addressed in Applicants' plan. Proposed Contention 150/100 should therefore be rejected.
Similarly, proposed Contention 150/117 maintains that the .
Harris plan fails to "make adequate provision for mobilizing wrecker trucks and other equipment necessary to keep evacuation routes clear in the event evacuation is necessary."
Mr. Eddleman also asserts that such wreckers must be capable of responding to " accidents involving hazardous cargoes that happen to be on the road at the time of evacuation." Related proposed Contention 150/118 further alleges that the Harris plan does not assure that such " hazardous materials and car-goes" will be " identified and secured and safeguarded" in the event of an evacuation. But, again, actions such as mainte-nance of safe evacuation routes are properly the responsibility of the offsite emergency response organization, and therefore need not be reflected in Applicants' plan. Accordingly, ;
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. l proposed Contentions 150/117 and 150/118 should also be rejected.
Proposed Contention 150/124 asserts that Applicants lack the experience and technical ability adequately to plan for emergencies and lack the capability to implement appropriate protective measures. Particularly given the availability of Applicants' plan -- which generally describes the emergency or-ganization (including represented fields of expertise and specialties) (see 5 2.2) as well as the provisions for training of emergency planning and response personnel (see 5 5.2) --
Mr. Eddleman's generalized assertion plainly lacks the specif-icity required of a contention under the Commission's regula-tions, and is completely lacking in basis.
Mr. Eddleman's further generalized assertion that Appli-cants lack the capability to implement appropriate protective actions as required by NUREG-0654 criterion J.9 is objection-able as a broad " catch-all" assertion which simply restates the ultimate emergency planning issue, and fails to give the other parties any notice of the specific issues for litigation. The second.part of the contention is objectionable on the addition- .
al ground that NUREG-0654 criterion J.9 does not require that an applicant have the capability to implement protective actions; rather, NUREG-0654 recognizes that the responsibility for the actual implementation of protective actions rests'with the state and local governments. For all these reasons, pro-posed Contention 150/124 must be rejected.
Proposed Contention 151 asserts that Applicants' plan "does not provide the medical personnel available to treat per-sonnel injured onsite, [as] required by NUREG-0737 Rev. 1, p.
17, re 10 C.F.R. 50 Appendix E, item 5" (regarding arrangements for the services of physicians and other medical personnel qualified to handle radiation emergencies onsite). The sole basis advanced for the contention is a reference to Annex A to the plan (entitled " Agreements"), which itself indicates that letters of agreement with physicians are being obtained. More-over, Mr. Eddleman has completely ignored sections 2.4.3.3 and 4.6.3.6.2 of the plan, which describe the emergency first aid personnel available on all shifts, who are trained to provide medical treatment onsite for contaminated injured personnel. .
Mr. Eddleman has provided no-basis whatsoever for his ap-parent assumption that Applicants will be unable to make ar-rangements with physicians for the necessary services; rather, he simply notes that Applicants have not yet done so. Yet there is no requirement that Applicants have arrangements such as these completed at this time. In the absence of some factu-al basis for the assumption that Applicants will be unable to make the required arrangements for medical services prior to full power operation, Mr. Eddleman is simply and impermissibly attempting to serve as a surrogate Staff reviewer. According-
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ly, proposed Contention 151 must be rejected.
Proposed Contention 152 states that the Harris plan " fails to comply with NUREG-0737, Rev. 1, p. 18 item (d) which J
requires communications-to NRC from control room, TSC and EOF to be tested monthly." Applicants do not contest the refer-enced provision of NUREG-0737, Supp. 1, and hereby commit to incorporate a provision for monthly testing of " communication by the licensee with NRC Headquarters and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations Center from the nuclear power reac-tor control room, the onsite technical support center, and the near-site emergency operations-facility." This representation of counsel effectively moots Mr. Eddleman's concerns. Accord-ingly, the contention should be rejected.
In proposed Contention 153, Mr. Eddleman alleges that the Harris plan "does not provide sufficient communication in the event of the failure of the plant PABX telephone system." Mr.
Eddleman has failed to address and take exception to the exten-sive information about the numerous redundant systems for plant and offsite communications provided both in the plan (see I l
SS 3.8.1, 3.8.2, 3.8.3) and in the FSAR (see 5 9.5.2). Thus,
. l his generalized expression of concern plainly lacks the specif- l icity required of a contention under the Commission's regula-tions. Accordingly, proposed Contention 153 must be rejected.
. Proposed Contention 154 asserts that plant operators are not qualified.to make initial dose projections in the event of an emergency; specifically, it is alleged that.the operators.
"are unqualified to make the detailed judgments that may be required by the procedures for dose estimating, given in Annex B" of the plan, characterized as " complex" (emphasis supplied).
The contention is thus based on the faulty assumption that Appendix B constitutes the " procedures" for dose projection to be followed by the operators in an emergency. In fact, Appen- l dix B provides the technical basis for dose projection, and is not a procedure. Indeed, as section 1.2 of the plan explains, all plant emergency procedures will be included in a separate book, distinct from the emergency plan itself. Further, Annex E to the plan is a list of plant emergency, procedures, which indicates that Emergency Procedures 3.4.1, 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 are entitled, respectively, " Initial Dose Projections," "Whole Body Dose Projections," and " Thyroid Dose Projections."
Mr. Eddleman provides no factual basis whatsoever for either his assumption that operators are incapable of following a pro-cedure to make initial dose projections or his assertion that "there are no educational or other requirements for operators that assure they will exercise good judgment in dealing with this complex task." For all these reasons, proposed Contention 154 should be rejected for lack of basis.
The general thrust of proposed Contention 155 is that, al-i though Applicants provide for an " Emergency Response Facility Information System" ("ERFIS") for the TSC at page 3-7 of the i, Harris plan, there is no commitment that the ERFIS provided l will meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.97. To the contrary) Mr. Eddleman has simply overlooked section 3.2.3, which expressly states that the ERFIS will provide " Measurement and Indication of Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Rev. 2) variables."
Accordingly, proposed Contention 155 lacks basis, and must be rejected.
Similarly, proposed Contention 156 asserts that Appli-cants' plan " fails to comply with item (i) of NUREG-0737, Rev.
1, p. 20, which requires complete plant drawings and diagrams and records in the TSC. These are not mentioned in * *
- Table 3.1-1 and not specified as being complete and available in the TSC, as required, any place in the (plan)." Again, Mr. !
1 Eddleman has simply failed to reference the relevant portion of the plan. Sec+1on 8.2.1(i) of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 (which Mr. Eddleman cites) states that the TSC will be
"[p]rovided with accurate, complete and current plant records (drawings, schematic diagrams, etc.) essential for evaluation -
of the plant under accident conditions," and section 3.3 of the plan (entitled " Technical Support Center (TSC)") provides (see S 3.3.3), for the availability in the TSC of "(m]echanical systems, electrical systems drawings; Plant Operating Manual; FSAR; Corporate, plant, state & local emergency plans; photocopier" and notes the availability of the Document Control Library only one floor below. Mr. Eddleman has failed to indi-cate why the documents listed in the plan will not be adequate "for evaluation of the plant under accident conditions." Like proposed Contention 155, then, proposed Contention 156 is lacking'in basis and must be rejected.
Proposed Contention 157 maintains that the Harris plan "does not comply with item (k) of NUREG-0737, Rev. 1, p. 20
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which requires the TSC to be designed in accord with good human factors engineering." In support of this charge, Mr. Eddleman alleges only that the plan "does not mention human factors en-gineering with respect to TSC" and does,not in any other way indicate that human factors engineering principles have been considered in the design of the TSC. To the contrary, section 3.3.1 of the plan (" Technical Support Center (TSC) -- Charac-teristics") expressly provides that the TSC has been
"[d]esigned taking into accoup'. good human factors engineering principles." Thus, proposed Contention 157 is wholly without basis, and must be rejected.
In proposed Contention 158, Mr. Eddleman asserts that the radiation protection afforded for the EOF and the TSC is insuf-ficient in that they are designed to hold exposures below 5 rem for design basis accidents, but do not guarantee equivalent protection for accidents beyond design basis. However, the ra-diation protection standards which Applicants have committed to meet in sections 3.3.1 and 3.5.1 of the plan are actually General Design Criterion 19 of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A.
Thus, the contention that the design basis accident is an in-sufficient limiting condition for design constitutes an impermissible attack on the Commission's regulations, which must be rejected.
Proposed Contention 159 essentially parallels proposed Contention 156 (which complained that Applicants' plan failed to provide for the necessary drawings and records in the TSC),
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except that the complaint in proposed Contention 159 is with j i
respect to the EOF. While it is true, as Mr. Eddleman asserts, that Table 3.1-1 does not provide for the availability of these documents in the EOF, it is not true that their availability is "not established elsewhere in the (plan]." Mr. Eddleman has simply overlooked section 3.5.3 of the plan, which provides for the availability in the EOF of the same documents available in the TSC (in addition to a telecopier). Mr. Eddleman has failed to provide any indication why the available records will not be adequate "to perform EOF functions." The contention is there-fore lacking in basis, and must be rejected.
Proposed Contention 160 asserts that "[t]he initial and later assignments of emergency personnel from the Harris plant staff in [ Applicants' plan] fail to assure that these personnel are qualified for those assignments." Mr. Eddleman's sole ref-erence to the plan as basis for this contention is a reference to Table 2.2-3, which -- he notes -- " designates * *
- the Senior specialist-Electrical to run the OSC, and multi-media trained personnel to run the fire brigade." According to Mr. Eddleman. the plan makes no provisions for training these people to perform their limited emergency response functions.
Mr. Eddleman fails to identify any alleged deficiencies in ei-ther Applicants' training program for all emergency response personnel, described in section 5.2 of the plan (which, con-trary to Mr. Eddleman's assertion, provides for both initial training and annual retraining, see S 5.2.1) or Applicants' program of drills and exercises, described in section 5.3 of the plan. Given the availability of Applicants' plan, Mr. Eddleman's failure to even reference the sections of the plan relevant to the contention render his generalized asser-tions inappropriate for litigation. Proposed Contention 160 should therefore be rejected as lacking the requisite specif-icity and basis.
III. CONCLUSION For all the reasons discussed herein, Mr. Eddleman's pro-posed Contentions 150/2, 150/29, 150/30, 150/55, 150/57, 150/63, 150/97, 150/99, 150/100, 150/117, 150/118, 150/124, and 151 through 160 must be rejected. -
Respectfully submitted, 1 MMLD Thoma E ~ A . Baxber,)P.O. U Delissa A. Ridgway SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 822-1000 Richard E. Jones Samantha Francis Flynn CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY P.O. Box 1551 Raleigh, North Carolina 26602 (919) 836-7707
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Dated: July 11, 1983 i
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
)
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-400 OL AND NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) 50-401 OL MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY )
)
(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power )
Plant, Units 1 and 2) )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing " Applicants' Response to Eddleman Proposed Contentions on Harris Emergency Plan" were served this lith day of July, 1983, by deposit in the U.S. mail, first class, postage prepaid, to the parties identified on the attached Service List.
2 1 QL41 Delista(A. Ridgkay ) U L Dated: July 11, 1983 4
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD l
In the Matter of )
)
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-400 OL tud NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) 50-401 OL MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY )
)
(Shearon Harris Nuc143r Power )
Plant, Units 1 and 2) )
SERVICE LIST James L. Kelley, Esquire John D. Runkle, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Conservation Council of North Carolina U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 307 Granville Road Eashington, D.C. 20555 Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514 Mr. Clenn O. Bright M. Travis Payne, Esquire
, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Edelstein and Payne U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Post Office Box 12643 Eashington, D.C. 20555 Raleigh, North Carolina 27605 Dr. James H. Carpenter Dr. Richard D. Wilson Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 729 Hunter Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Apex, North Carolina 27502 Washington, D.C. 20555
- r. el a ddleman Charles A. Barth, Esquire (4) 718-A Iredell Street Mym n Ka m , Esquire
' Durham, North Carolina 27705 Office of Executiva Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Richard E. Jones, Esquire Washington, D.C. 20555 Vice President and Senior Counsel Docketing and Service Section (3) Carolina Power & Light Company
- Office of the Secretary Post Office Box 1551 (,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Phyllis Lotchin .
Mr. Daniel F. Read, President 108 Bridle Run -
Chapel Hill Anti-Nuclear Group Effort Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514 Post Office Box 524 .
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514 Deborah Greenblatt, Esquire 1634 Crest Road Raleigh, North Carolina 27606 4
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Service List Page Two r i
Bradley W. Jones, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marrietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Ruchanne G. Miller, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel .
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Karen E. Long, Esquire Public Staff - NCUC Post Of fice Box 991 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 m
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