ML20072L107

Forwards Public Version of Rev 6 to Emergency Plan, Consisting of Amend 39 to Fsar.Return Receipt Requested

ML20072L107
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	03/08/1983
From:	Smart T TEXAS UTILITIES SERVICES, INC.
To:	Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20072L092	List: ML20072L107
References
NUDOCS 8303310105
Download: ML20072L107 (2)

Text

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o FILE NO. 619.39.

TEXAS UTILITIES SERVICES INC.'

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March 8,1983 Mr. Harold R. Denton Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, MD 20014

SUBJECT:

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446 TRANSMITTAL OF EMERGENCY PLAN REVISION 6

Dear Mr. Denton:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.54, paragraph [q], as revised in the Federal Register [47 FR 57670] and approved by the Office of Management and Budget; OMB approval No. 3150-0011, we have reduced the total number of copies previously transmitted to you.

Enclosed are 2 copies of Revision 6 (part of Amendment 39 of the.

CPSES/FSAR dated March 8,1983) to copy Nos. 309 and 310 of of the CPSES Emergency Plan. Please complete the attached form acknowledging the. receipt of the same and, return to this office.

The Instruction sheets enclosed therein shall be used to assist you in incorporating Revision 6 (Amendment 39) changes to your Emergency Plan, and as such, these should be retained until the Effective Page listing is again updated.

If you have any questions, please contact me at (214) 653-4862.

Sincerely, Teri L. Smart TLS:grr Enclosure 8303310105 830328' PDR ADOCK 05000445 F

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TEXAS UTILITIES SERVIC$S INC.

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Mail to: Teri L. Smart Texas Utilities Services Inc.

2001 Bryan Tower Dallas, TX 75201

SUBJECT:

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION FSAR AMENDMENT 39 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT Amendment 39 to Copy No.M4G3/O of the CPSES Final Safety Analisis Report has been rsceived.

Organization Name Copy Holder's Name

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Signature Date

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March 8,1982 n.;.aany

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Mr. Harold R. Denton Director.of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 SUBdECT: COMANCHE PEAK STEAM LLECTRIC STATION DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446 TRANSMITTAL OF AMENDMENT

Dear Mr. Denton:

In accordance with 10 CFR Part 50 (c) (1) (1), Texas Utilities Generating Company, as lead Applicant and as agent for the Owners and Applicants (Dallas Power & Light Company, Texas Electric Service Company, Texas Power & Light Company, Texas Municipal Power Agency, and Brazos Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.), herewith submits Amendment 39 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

Enc 1'osed are the following prescribed documents and the number of each:

FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT - 3 signed (and sworn)

AMEN 0 MENT 39 originals *Ad 60 copies Respectfully submitted, A.

R.

. Gary RJG:grr

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e UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION s

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In the Matter of

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TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY

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Docket Nos. 50-445

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50-446 (Comanche Peak Steam Electric

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Station, Units 1 and 2)~

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AFFIDAVIT P.. J. Gary being duly sworn, hereby deposes and says that he is Executive Vice President and General Manager of Texas Utilities Generating Company, the Applicaitt herein; that he is duly authorized to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission this Amendment to its Application and supporting ducumentation for Operating Licenses for

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the captioned facilities; that he is familiar with the content thereof; and that the matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

m R. J[ Gar [y /

Executive Vice President and General Manager STATE OF TEXAS

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ss COUNTY OF DALLAS )

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for Mftn/o,d, on this f d day of M,198 I

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My commission expires 4/. /7

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REVISION 6 INSTRUCTION SHEET The following instructional information is being furnished to help insert Revision 6 into the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station

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Emergency Plan. Revision 6 is Amendment 39 of the FSAR.

Discard the old sheets and insert the new sheets, as listed be' ow.

l Keep these instruction sheets in back of the Affidavit of the Emergency Plan to serve as a record of changes.

Remove Insert Front /Back Front /Back EP Approval Sheet (Rev. 5)

EP Approval Sheet (Rev. 6) i i

thru thru x

xi 1-1/1-2 1-1/1-2 thru thru 1-29 1-31 T1.1 T1.1 T1.2 T1.2 F1.1 F1.1 F1.2 F1.2 F1.3 F1.3 F1.4 F1.4 2-1/2-2 2-1/2-2 2-3 R6-1 g

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T2.1 (4 Sheets)

T2.1 IS. Sheets)

T2.2 (4 Sheets)

T2.2 (17 Sheets)

.T2.3 (4 Sheets)

T2.4 (4 Sheets) 3-1/3-2 3-1/3-2' 3-3/3-4 3-3/3-4 3-5 4-1/4-2 4-1/4-2 4-3/4-4 4-3/4-4 4-5/4-6 4-5/4-6 T4.1 T4.1 F4.1 F'4.1

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F4.2 F4.3 F4.4 F4.5 5-1/5-2 5-1/5-2 6-1/6-2 6-1/6-2 thru thru 6-17 6-17/6-18 T6.5 T6.5 T6.7 (9 Sheets)

T6.7 (12 Sheets)

T6.8 (10 Sheets)

F6.8 7-1/7-2 7-1/7-2 thru thru 7-3/7-4 7-7 e

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Front /Back Front /Back f

8-1/8-2 8-1/8-2 thru thru 8-5 8-7 9-1/9-2

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9-1/9-2 9-3/9-4 9-3/9-4 10-1/10-2 10-1/10-2 11-1/11-2 11-1/11-2 thru thru 11-5 11-5 F11.1 F11.1 12-1/12-2 12-1/12-2 12-3/12-4 12-3/12-4 13-1/13-2 13-1/13-2 13-3 13-3 14-1 14-1 H-1/H-2 H-1/H-2 Letter of Agreement (Granbury Volunteer Fire Dept.)

Letter of Agreement (Institute of Nuclear

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Power Operations)

Letter of Agreement (Texas A&M' University)

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COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION l

EMERGENCY PLAN I

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i TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page

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Preface 1

1.0 Organization 1-1 1.1 Organizational Control of the Emergency Response 1-1 1.1.1 Emergency Response Crganizations and

'l-1 Responsibilities 1.1.2 Concept of Operations 1-3 1.1.3 Emergency Response Organization 1-4 Interrelarionships 1.1.4 Emergency Response Functions 1-4 i

1.1.5 Authority and Agreements 1-4 1.2 CPSES Organization 1-5 1.2.1 CPSE5 Normal Operating Organization 1-5 1.2.2 TUGC0 Nuclear Organization 1-6 1.2.3 CPSES Emergency Organization 1-6 1.2.4 Minimum CPSES Ernergency Organization Staffing 1-19 1.2.5 Other Onsite Emergency Organization Assignments 1-19 1.2.6 Interfaces 1-20 1.2.7 Long-term Organization and Extended Operations 1-20 1.2.3' Corporate Support 1-21 i

1.3 Emergency Response Support Organizations and 1-24 Resources l

1.3.1 Local Agencies 1-24 1.3.2 State Agency Support 1-26 t

1.3.3 Federal Agency Support 1-27 1.3.4 Private Organization Support 1-29 i

MARCH 8, 1983 1

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title P_ age

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2.0 Emergency Classificatin'n System 2-1 2.1 ~

Emergency Action Levels 2-1 2.1.1 Notification of Unusual Event 2-1 2.1.2 Alert 2-2 2.1.3 Site Area Emergency 2-2 2.1.4 Cencral Emergency 2-2 2.2 Emergency Action Level Initiating Conditions ~

2-2 3.0 Notification Methods and Procedures 3-1 3.1 Initial Notification 3-1 3.2 Verification of Initial Notification 3-1 3.3 Notification of CPSES Emergency Organization 3-2 Members 3.3.1 Notification of Unusual Event 3-2 3. 3. 2.

Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency 3-2 3.4 Initial Messages to Offsite Authorities 3-2 3.5 Follow-up Messages to Offsite Authorities 3-3

.3.6 Public Warning 3-4

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3.7 Methods of Providing Public.Information 3-5 Regarding Protective Action Measures 4.0 Emergency Communications 4-1

4.1 System Description

4-1 4.1.1 Plant Public Page Party System 4-1 4.1.2 Intraplant Telephone System 4-2 4.1.3 Intraplant Sound-Powered Telephone System 4-2' 11 MARCH 8, 1983

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,s TABLE OF CONTEN.TS Section Title F_ age P,,

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-m 4.1.4 Intraplant Portable Radio Transmitter Receiver 4-4 System 4.1.5 Public Telephone System 4-4 4.1.0 Two-way Radio Transmitter - Receiver System 4-4 (Plant-to-Offsite) 4.1.7 Direct Telephone Line to the System Dispatcher 4-4 4.1.8 Other Direct Telephone Lines 4-4 4.1.9 Emergency Evacuation Alarm System 4-4 4.1.10 Direct Line to the Regional and Local 4-5

, Emergency Operations Centers 4.2 NRC Emergency Notification System 4-5 4.3 NRC Health Physics Network 4-5 4.4 Facsimile Communications 4-6 5.0 Public Education and Information 5-1 5.1 Public Information Releases During Emergency 5-2 Conditions 5.2 Rumor-Control 5-2 6.0 Emergency Facilities and Equipment 6-1 6.1 Technical Support Center 6-1 6.2 Operations Support Center 6-2 6.3 Emergency Operations Facility 6-2 6.4 News Center 6-3 6.5 Emergency Response Facilities Radiological 6-4 Habitability

.i 6.6 Laboratory Facilities at the EOF-NOSF 6-4 6.7 Other Radiological Laboratory Support 6-5 iii MARCH 8, 1983

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title.

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6.8 Decontamination Facilities 6-6 6.9 Onsite Emergency Aid Tacilities 6-6 6.10 Emergency Equipment and Supplies 6-6 6.11 State and Local Emergency Operations Centers 6-7 6.12 Assessment Systems and Equipment 6-8 6.12.1 Safety Parameter Display System 6-8 6.12.2 Emergency Response Facility Computer System 6-9 6.12.3 Radiation Monitoring System 6-10 6.12.4 Health Physics Instrumentation 6-11 6.12.5 Meteorological Measurements Program 6-11 6.12.6 Swismic Monitoring 6-12 6.12.7 Hydrological Monitorin~g 6-15 6.12.8 Process Monitor Instrumentation 6-16 6.12.9 Fire Detection Instrumentation 6-16 6.12.10 Post Accident' Sampling System 6-17

.6.12.11 Envi'ronmental Radiological Monitoring Program 6-17 7.0 Accident Assessment 7-1 7.1 Computer Assessment of Radiological Conditions 7-2 i

7.1.1 Meteorological Data and Effluent Release Data 7-3 Summaries 7.1.2 Atmospheric' Dispersion Calculations 7-3 7.1.3 Plume Dose Calculations 7-3 7.1.4 Environmental Pathways Dose Calculations 7-4 7.2 Manual Assessment of Radiological Conditions 7-4

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TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Section

. Title Pm 7.3 Onsite arid Offsite Radiological Conditi~ ns 7-4 o

4 7.3.1 Onsite Radiological assessment,

7-5 7.3.2 Offsite Radiological Assessment 7-6 8.0 Protective Response 8-1 8.1 Onsite Warning 8-1 8.1.1 Employees (Unescorted TUGC0 Personnel) 8-1 8.1.2 Visitors (Escorted Personnel) 8-1 8.1.3 Contractor and Construction Personnel 8-1 8.1.4 Other Personnel Within the Exclusion Area 8-1 Boundary 8.2 Evacuation and Assembly 8-2 8.3 Radiological Monitoring of Evacuees 8-3 8.4 Personnel Accountability 8-3 8.5 Provisions for Protecting Onsite Emergency 8-4 Response Personnel 8.5.1 Respiratory Protection 8-4 8.5.2 Protective Clothing 8' 4 8.5.3 Radioprotective Drugs 8-5 8.6 Offsite Protective Actions 8-5 8.6.1 Emergency Planning Zones 8-6 8.6.2 Evacuation Time Estimates 8-7 8.6.3 Evacuation Map 8-7 8.6.4 Population Distribution Map 8-7 8.6.5 Bases for Choice of Recommended Protective 8-7 Actions V

MARCH 8, 1983 p-

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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9.0 Radiological Exposure Control 9-1 9.1 Emergency Exposure Criteria 9-1 9.2 Contamination Control 9-3 9.3 Decontamination 9-3 9'. 4 Radioactive Waste 9-4 10.0 Medical and Public Health Support 10-1 10.1 Hospital and Medical Support 10-1 10.2 Onsite First Aid 10-2 10.3 Transportation of Victims to Offsite Facilities 10-2 11.0 Recovery and Reentry 11-1 11.1 CPSES Recovery Organization 11-2 11.1.1 CPSES~ Recovery Organization - Functional 11-3 Responsibilities 11.2 Methods for Estimating Total Population 11-4 Exposure 12.0 Exercises and Drills 12-1 12.1 Exercises 12-1 12.2 Drills 12-1 12.2.1 Communications Drills 12-2 12.2.2 Fire Drills 12-2 12.2.3 Emergency Medical Drills 12-2 12.2.4 Radiological Monitoring Drills 12-2 12.2.5 Health Physics Drills 12-3 12.2.6 Repair and Damage Control 12-3 12.3 Drill and Exercise Scenarios 12-3 vi MARCH 8, 1983

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page

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12.4 Critique of Drills and fxercises 12-4 13.0 Radiological Emergency Response Training 13-l' 13.1

' Basic CPSES Emergency Plan 13-1 i

13.2 CPSES Emergency Organization 13-2 13.3 First Aid Training 13-2 13.4 Fire Control 13-2 13.5 Offsite Organizations 13-3 13.6 Offsite Medical Personnel 13-3 13.7 Emergency Planning Personnel 13-3 14.0 Responsibility for the Planning Effort:

14-1 Development, Periodic Review and Distribution of the Emergency Plan j

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o TABLE OF CONTENTS

'Pja ge Section Title j

.s 15.0 Appendices 15-1 A.

CPSES Shift Crew Chart B.

Time / Distance / Dose (Thyroid) Curve for a LOCA condition at CPSES C.

Time / Distance / Dose (Whole body, Gamma)

, Curve for a LOCA condition at CPSES D.

Time /Dists.nce/ Dose (Whole Body, Total)

Curve for a LOCA condition at CPSES E.

CPSES Site Map F.

CPSES 0-10 miles 1.

Demographic Information 2.

Area Map G.

CPSES 0-50 miles _

H.

Letters of Agreement J.

List Emergency Kit Equipment and Supplies List K.

List of Emergency Plan Procedures M.

CPSES. Evacuation Time Estimates and Staffing Evaluations N.

EPZ Evacuation Time Estimates P.

Cross Index to NUREG-0654 Q.

Definitions and Acronyms R.

Westinghouse Electric Corp., Water Reactor.

Div., Emergency Response Plan Note: The Letters "I",

"L", and "O' are not used as appendix cesignators.

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MARCH 8, 1983

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.s LIST OF TABLES Table Title

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1.1 Staffing' Requirements for Emergencies

• 1.'2 Graded Emergency Organization Response 2.1 Predetermined Response Actions 2.2 Initiating Conditions for Emergency Action Levels 4.1 Emergency Response Communication - Responsibilities and Interfaces 6.1 Area Radiation Monitoring System Parameters 6.2 Process Radiation Monitoring System Parameters 6.3

, Health Physics Laboratory Equipment 6.4 Portable Health Physics Equipment 6.5 Meteorological Instrumentation 6.6 Reactor Trip System Instrumentation 6.7 Instrumentation Summary Data A.1 Minimum Shift Crew Composition N.1 Summary of Results of Evacuation Time Analysis 1

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.e LIST OF FIGURES Figure

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1.1 Function Interfaces of the Integrated Emergency Response Organization 1.2 CPSES Organization Chart 1.3 TUCCo Nuclear Organization Chart 1.4 Emergency,0rganization 4.1 Control Room Communications Interfaces 4.2 Technical Support Center Communications Interfaces 4.3 Operations Support Center Communications Interfaces 4.4 Emergency Operations Facility Communications Interfaces 4.5 Security Communications Interfaces 6.1

, Integrated ERF Computer System 6.2 Block Diagram Radiatio.n Monitoring System 6.3 Seismic Instrumentation Schematic Diagram 6.4 Tabulation of Fire Hazards 6.5 Environmental Monitoring Locations 6.6 Meteorological - Primary System 6.7 Meteorological - Backup System

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9.1 Decontamination and First Aid Fheilities'in the Plant

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9.2 Emergency Operations Decontamination and First Aid Facilities in the Nuclear Operations Support Facility 11.1 CPSES Recovery Organization B.1 Thyroid Dose Following LOCA C.1 Whole Body Gamma Dose Following LOCA D.1 Whole Body Total Dose (Gamma & Beta) Following LOCA E.1 Site Area with Exclusion Boundary E.2 Site Area X

MARCH 8, 1983

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,,'j LIST OF FIGURES Figure Title F.1 Population Distribution 'by Sector-Area 0-10 Miles F.2 Area 0-10 Miles G1 Population Distribution by Sector-Area 10-50 Miles N.1 Evacuation Routes N.2.

Special Facilities N.3 General Populace 3

xi-MARCH 8, 1983

CPSES/EP 1.0 ORGANIZATION

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The Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) Emergency 0rganization is derived from and closely parallels the normal operating organization at CPSES. In support of the CPSES Emergency Organization, there are offsite emergency response organizations formed by the Texas Utilities Corporate structure, and the local, State and Federal governments. The responsibilities of each organization, and the functional interfaces between these organizations are identified below in Subsection 1.1,

" Organizational Control of the Emergency Response".

Subsection 1.2, "CPSES Organization", describes the structure of the CPSES

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Emergency 0rganization and the specific responsibilities and authorities of key emergency response personnel. Support services which are provided by the Texas Utilities Corporate.strue.ture are also described in Subsection 1.2.

The support and resources which TUGC0 can expect from local, State and Federal governments, and local support agencies to augment the TUGC0 emergency response capabilities are described in Subsection 1.3, " Emergency Response Support Organization and Resources".

1.1 ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL OF THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE 1.1.1 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 6

1.1.1.1 TUGC0 In the event of an emergency condition at CPSES which could affect the population-at-risk, TUGC0 is responsible for the following:

a.

Recognizing and assessing the scope of the emergency condition, and determining the extent to which the situation is, or is not, under control.

b.. Ensuring that requisite plant safety-related systems and engineered safety features are functioning properly, and implementing any other emergency response actions which may be required to assist in regaining control of the situation.

c.

Analyzing the potential or actual radiological impact to the public within the Plume Exposure Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).

d.

Taking those necessary actions to terminate or mitigate potential radiological consequences.

1-1 REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983 y

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Promptly noti,fying and updating, appropriate local, State, and Federal

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officials and agencies.

f.

Recommending protective actions to both local'and Sta,te officials, based upon the severity of the event and its potential impact upon the public.

g.

Providing timely and accurate information regarding the emergency condition and its consequences to the appropriate local and State officials, and the news media.

h.

Conducting onsite recovery efforts as required.

1.1.1.2 Local and State Agencies The Hood County Emergency Operations Plan, Somervell County Emergency Operations Plan, and Annex L of the State of Texas Emergency Management Plan contain the radiological emergency response plans which have been developed to govern the emergency response actions of the officials and agencies of Hood County, Somervell County, and the State of Texas, respectively. These plans set forth the division of responsibilities.for s

implementing offsite protective actions and the methods of communication 6

among the involved local and State agencies. Implementation of offsite protective actions within the Plume Exposure EPZ is the responsibility of Hood and Somervell counties. Appendix F, Figure F.1 illustrates the jurisdictional boundary between Hood and Somervell counties and the i

boundaries of the Plume Exposure EPZ. The Commander of Region 6A of the J

Texas Department of Public Safety is responsible for coordinating and providing support to local law enforcement agencies for the evacuation of the public from the Plume Exposure EPZ. The Director, Texas Division of Emergency Management, and the Texas Department of Health are responsible for implementing protect'ive actions within the Ingestion Exposure EPZ.

1.1.1.3

. Federal Agencies The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) are the primary Federal agencies responding to an emergency at CPSES. Additional Federal agencies provide ancillary services and support to the primary agencies. Management of the Federal response, which is divided into technical / radiological aspects and non-technical aspects, requires the coordination of the three primary agencies with each other, with Texas Utilities officials, and with State and local authorities. The NRC and DOE are responsible for the technical / radiological response and FEMA is responsible for the non-technical response; the overall responsibility is shared by all three primary agencies.

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REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

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1.1.2 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS In the event of an emergency condition a.t CPSES, the on-duty Shift

, Supervisor is the individual onsits who is responsible for initiating the CPSES Emergency Plan in accordance with the various Emergency Plan Procedures (EPP). The on-duty Shift Supervisor shall endeavor to maintain or place the Station in a safe, stable condition; take those actions required to protect the health and safety of the'public and Station personnel; and initiate requests for assistance as needed or as required by this plan. At the onset of an. emergency condition, the Shift Supervisor, who is onsite 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day, will assume the role of interim Emergency Coordinator and wi.ll continue to serve in this capacity until such time that he is relieved by the TSC Manager or the Emergency Coordinator.

Notification of those Station personnel who ard ass'igned to the CPSES Emergency Organization is discussed in Section 3.0, " Notification Methods and Procedures". The emergency classification system and the levels of activation of the CPSES Emergency Organization are discussed in Section 2.0, " Emergency Classification System".

The following paragraphs summarize the order of actions upon recognition of an emergency condition at CPSES.

1.1.2.1 Notification of Unusual Event 6

Upon occurrence of an event that is classified as a Notification of Unusual Event, the on-duty Shift Supervisor will direct prompt corrective action to insure the Station is placed or maintained in a stable condition. Key CPSES personnel, as well as individuals from the local and State emergency response organizations, will be notified. Support agencies, such as the local fire departments or hospitals will be notified as necessary. Should the event be of such a nature that escalation to a higher Emergency Action Level is probable, CPSES personnel, and local and State officials and agencies will be alerted to stand by for full activation.

1.1.2.2 Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency l

Upon occurrence of an event that is classified as an Alert, Site Area l

Energency, or General Emergency, the on-duty Shift Supervisor will direct prompt corrective action to return the plant to a safe, stable condition and to terminate or mitigate any radiological releases. Key CPSES personnel, as well as those individuals from local and State emergency response organizations, will be notified of the event and the nature of the emergency condition including its classification.

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REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

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en :w Communications will be established and maintained between these emergency

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response organizations and other support organizations to assure that the flow of information necessary to assess the situation is established, and to protect the population-at-risk. Assessment actions will be implemented based upon the severity of the event and the plant status to determine the potential consequences to the population-at-risk. The results of those assessment actions will be reported to local and State officials and will form the basis for decisions associated with the proper implemedtation of protective actions.

1.1.3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION INTERRELATIONSHIPS' The interrelationships between TUGC0 and its contractors and consultants; and local, State, Federal and private agencies are described throughout this section and illustrated in Figure 1.1.

1.1.4

. EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUNCTIONS The emergency response functions for the major elements of the plans and the responsibilities of key emergency response personnel in Hood County, Somervell County. and the State of Texas are addressed in the respective county and State emergency' response plans. For TUGCO, the emergency.

response functions and the key emergency plan position assignments for each function are summarized in Table 1.2.

These functions are addressed in 6

more detail throughout the remainder of this plan, particularly in

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Subsection 1.2, "CPSES Organization", and in the various Emergency Plan

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Procedures.

1.1.5 AUTHORITY AND AGREEMENTS The following docunents are the State and Federal legal instruments which establish authority for local and State agency support in the event of an emergency condition at CPSES.

Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (Public Law 920, 81st Congrkss) a.

signed January 12, 1951.

b.

Federal Civil Defense Guide, January,*1965, as amended.

c.

Civil Preparedness Guide.(CPG) Series, d.

Disaster Relief Act of 1974 PL-93-288.

Written agreements have been reached with those support agencies, as well as private support organizations, having an emergency response role.within the' basic 10-aile EPZ. These agreements take the form of Letters of Agreement (refer to Section 15.0, Appendix H) and agreements of 1-4

' REVISION 6

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CPSES/EP

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responsiblity as described in the Hood County and'Somervell County Emergency Operations Plans. Both types of agreements have been developed to ensure that there is a clear understanding of assigned responsibilities

'and that there will be proper coordination of activities in the event of an emergency. Letters of Agreement, establish an understanding of assigned responsibilities and ensure the proper coordination of activities in the event of an emergency condition at CPSES. The agreements with Hood County, Somervell County and the State of Texas are reflected in the associated county and State emergency response plans.

Section 15, Appendix H contains copies of those Letters of Agreement in effect as of the date of submittal of this plan. These Letters of Agreement will be updated as necessary, and confirmed as acceptable at least every two' years.

1.2 CPSES ORGANIZATION The CPSES Emergency Organization is derived from a'nd closely parallels the CPSES normal operating organization. This section describes the structures of the CPSES normal operating organization and the CPSES Emergency Organization. Those support services which are provided by the Texas Utilities Corporate structure to augment the CPSES emergency response are identified, as well as those services-which may be provided by TUGCO contractors or consultants.

1.2.1 CPSES NORMAL OPERATING ORGANIZATION 6

The CPSES normal operating organization is illustrated in Figure 1.2.

The Manager, Plant Operations, is in charge of CPSES and is responsible for Station operation.

In his absence, one of the following individuals will assume the responsibility for the operation of the Station:

Operations Superinten. dent Engineering Superintendent Maintenance Superintendent Administrative Superintendent.

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During backshift and weekend periods when the above personnel are not onsite, the on-duty Shift Supervisor is responsible for all activities conducted at CPSES.

The Manager, Plant Operations, reports directly to the Manager, Nuclear Operations, in the TUCC0 Nucl~ ear Organization.

1-5 REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

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w 1.2.2 TUGC0 NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION a

Figure 1.3 illustrates the TUCCO Nuclear Organization which provides support and training to the CPSES normal operating organization. The TUGC0 Nuclear Organization is headed by the Vice President, Nuclear.

Responsibility for the direction and control of the onsite activities of the TUGC0 Nuclear Organization lies with the Manager, Nuclear Operations.

The Manag.er, Nuclear Operations, reports directly to the Vice President, Nuclear.

6 1.2.3 CPSES EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION The CPSES Emergency Organization is illustrated in Figure 1-4.

The specific responsibilities and authorities of key emergency response personnel are described below. Those individuals from the CPSES normal operating organization who are designated to assume key CPSES Emergency Organization positions are also identified below. The duties and responsibilities of' additional support staff personnel are provided in the various Emergency Plan Procedures.

1.2.3.1 Emergency Coordinator The Emergency Coordinator has the responsibility and authority to 5

immediately and unilaterally initiate all provisions of the CPSES Emergency Plan, and for the evaluation, coordination, and control of all onsite activities related to the TUCCO emergency response until such time that the

)

event is closed out or the CPSES Recovery Organization is formed. The

'~

responsibilities assigned to the Emergency Coordinator include the following:

Assessment of the plant status and the. determination of the required a.

Emergency Action Level, b.

Notification of the NRC, the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) in 6

Waco, officials!.in Hood and Somervell counties,'and any other emergency response organizations as appropriate.

Activation and direction of the CPSES Emergency Organization.

c.

t l

d.

Establishing and maintaining communications with offsite emergency

(

operations centers. Also designating TUGC0 personnel to interface with those Federal, State, and local authorities who will be stationed at l

h

.t e Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).

Ensuring that the CPSES Emergency Organization is fully and correctly e.

staffed.

I 1-6 REVISION 6 l

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4 f.

Evaluation of the offsite radiological conditions in order to formulate evacuation or other protective action recommendations to be provided to offsite authorities.

g.

Prompt notification to the State and/or local officials of the projected dose to the population-at-risk based upon the Emergency -

Action Level.

h..' Personnel accountability with the assistance of CPSES Security and each department supervisor or senior individual.

1.

Designating personnel within the CPSES Emergency Organization to maintain logbooks of significant events, actions and data'.

i

j. Authorization of all re-entries into evacuated onsite areas.

k.

Approval of all public information and news media releases issued from CPSES.

l l

l.

Providing support and assistance to Federal, State and local personnel, both at the EOF and at the various other emergency operations centers.

Coordination of all offsite CPSES-emergency response activities with m.

i those activities conducted onsite, 6

n.

Coordination of those activities conducted from the EOF, if activated.

4 The Emergency Coordinator shall not delegate his decision-making authority for notifying or making protective action recommendations to offsite authorities, or for authorizing re-entries into evacuated onsite areas.

Upon determining the appropriate Emergency Action Level (EAL) in accordance with Procedure EPP-201, " Assessment of Emergency Action Levels and Plan Activation", the on-duty Shif t. Supervisor initially assumes the position.

- including a.ll prescribed responsibilities and authorities, of the Emergency

-Coordinator, as the interim Emergency Coordinator.

If conditions warrant.

l the on-duty Shift Supervisor shall direct activation of the CPSES emergency response facilities based upon the EAL and transfer the position of the t

I4 Emergency Coordinator as the facilities are staffed and become functional.

The Technical Support Center (TSC) Manager shall assume the position of the l

Emergency Coordinator at the TSC as the interim Emergency Coordinator at an l

Alert or higher EAL if the EOF has not been activated. If the EOF has been activated, the position of Emergency Coordinator shall be assumed by the Manager, Nuclear Operations, or a designated alternate at the EOF. Should the Manager, Nuclear Operations, be unavailable to assume the position of Emergency Coordinator upon the activation of the EOF, one of the following

[

individuals would assume this position (in descending order of succession):

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REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983 l

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Operations Support Superintendent

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Manager, Plant Operations Engineering Superintendent Vice President, Nuclear.

Transfer of the respons'ibilities of Emergency Coordinator are formally accomplished when the following steps have been completed:

a.

The current Emergency Coordinator has fully briefed his successor on the current plant status, and the status of offsite and onsite 6

emergency response activities.

b.

Offsite emergency response organizations have been notified of the turnover.

c.

The turnover is documented in the Emergency Response and Recovery Activities Logbook.

The Emergency Coordinator shall retain his prescribed responsibilities and authorities until such time that the event is either closed out, or the CPSES Recovery Organization is formed and functional, and a similar transition has occurred between the Emergency Coordinator and the Recovery Manager.

.)

J 1.2.3.2 Communications Coordinator d

Emergency communications encompass those radio and telecommunications within and between the onsite and offsite emergency response organizations that are pertinent to the mitigation of the emergency condition. These communications shall be logged for the purposes of collecting and preserving historical information.. A description of the communications system itself is prov'ided in Section 4.0, " Emergency Communications".

At the onset of an emergency condition, communications shall originate from the Control Room by an individual designated by the Shift Supervisor as a Communicator.

If the emergency condition requires activation of the TSC or EOF, primary communications, functions will be transferred to these facilities. If activated, the EOF will become the center for coordinating communications with offsite emergency response organizations.

5 Responsibilities for the coordination of communications activities at the EOF are assigned to the Communications Coordinator. Personnel assigned as communicators in the EOF are under the direction of the Communications Coordinator. The primary individual designated to assume this position 1-8 s

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upon activation of the EOF is the Director, Nuclear Training. The' designated alternates are Training Supervisors.

The functions assigned to the Communications Coordinator include:

a.

Coordination and direction of the activities of those communicators stationed at the EOF.

b.

Ensuring that communications procedures are being properly implemented and that the records of incoming and outgoing messages are being properly maintained by CPSES emergency response personnel.

6 c.

Ensuring that communications within the CPSES Emergency Organization, and with the Federal, State, and local emergency response organizations are being maintained.

d.

Initiating requests through the Logistical Support Coordinator for any assistance required for the repair and maintenance of communications equipment, or for any additional communications equipment required.

e.

Providing general support and assistance to the Emergency Coordinator as required.

1.2.3.3 Public Information Coordinator The Public Information Coordinator is responsible for, and has the authority to, coordinate public information releases to be issued by TUGCO.

The Public Information Coordinator reports to the EOF, if activated.

Procedure EPP-115 " Release of Emergency-Related Information to the Public", provides instructions to the Public Information Coardinator regarding the notification of the news media, the preparation and issuance of press releases, and the coordination of information to be released in conjunction with Corporate, Federal, State an'd local public information 6

personnel.

The Public Information Coordinator will assist the Emergency Coordinator in the following areas:

-a.

Formulation of all TUCCO public information releases concerning the emergency condition; providing assurance that any public information releases are up-to-date and technically accurate; and assisting the CPSES spokesperson in their~ presentation.

b.

Coordinating with the Emergency Coordinator to obtain approv'al for all public information releases.

1-9 REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

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Cobrdination of public information releases and rumor control

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activities with county and State public information personnel.

d.

Assisting the News Center Manager in the arrangements for, and the r

coordination of, any press conferences to be conducted at the News Center.

e.

Acting as a liaison between CPSES public information personnel and Corporate public information personnel.

1.2.3.4 Security Supervisor In an emergency condition, the $ecurity Supervisor is responsible for, and has the authority to, coordinate the following security activities:

'a.

Security of the entire plant site within the Exclusion Area Boundary.

6 b.

The movecent and badging of all personnel entering the CPSES site to provide emergency response support.

c.

Ensuring that all non-essential site persont el are evacuated, if evacuaticn is required, and that unauthorized personnel cannot enter the CPSES site.

d.

Assisting in the implementation of any security requirements imposed upon off' site emergency response support required by the plant (e.g.,

~

)

' medical or firefighting).

j e.

Coordinating the assembly and accountability of Station personnel at the designated plant assembly point (s).

f.

Initiating personnel accountability procedures and maintaining accountability records during the emergency condition.

g.

Coordinating search and rescue efforts with the Operations Support Center (OSC) Supervisor and, as appropriate, Squaw Creek Park.

personnel.

CPSES Security personnel are responsible for maintaining Station security, for controlling site and vital area access, and for maintaining personnel accountability information. Selected Security personnel are members of the l

Station Fire Brigade.

The primary individual designated to assume this position upon activation of the EOF is the Security Supervisor. The designated-alternates are 6

Security Coordinators. The Security Supervisor will report to the EOF, if activated, during a Site Area Emergency or a General Emergency. If the EOF 1-10 REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

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is.not operational, the emergency response duties and responsibilities of the Security Supervisor will be assumed by the on-duty Security Shift Supervisor at the Primary Access Point.

1.2.3.5 Logistical Support Coordinator At the EOF, the Logistical Support Coordinator is responsible for the following emergency response functions:

Coordinating, directing 'nd responding to requests from the CPSES-a a.

Emergency Organization,for administrative and irgistical assistance.

b.

Coordinating the recall and deployment of CPSES administrative support personnel as needed to respond to the emergency condition, c.

Ensuring that the general needs of all onsite emergency response personnel (including State, local and Federal personnel) are met (e.g.,

communications and equipment repair, food, sleeping facilities, or office supplies).

d.

Ensuring the timely completion of all offsite logistical assistance provided in support of emergency response and recovery efforts, e.

Supervising and coordinating the retrieval of drawings and documents for the CPSES Emergency Organization.

6 f.

Ensuring that onsite records management support and recordkeeping efforts are being carried out.

g.

Arranging transportation and temporary housing for onsite emergency response personnel as needed.

h.

Assisting the Communications Coordinator in obtaining any additional communications equipment required.

The primary individual designated to assume this position upon activation of the EOF is the Administrative Superintendent. The designated alternate is the, Administrative Supervisor. If the EOF is not activated, the TSC Advisor shall assume the above responsibilities and authorities at the TSC.

1.2.3.6 Radiation Protection Coordinator-At the EOF, the Radiation Protection Coordinator is responsible' for the following emergency response functions:

a.

Providing envircnmental, radiological, and health physics support to the emergency response effort.

1-11 REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

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b.

Coordinating all TUGC0 onsite and offsite radiological monitoring efforts.

Ensuring that emergency sampling, radiological monitoring, r,adiological c.

safety, bioassay, access control, and decontamination procedures are being properly implemented.

d.

Ensuring that personnel radiation' exposures are maintained in accordance witt. plant administrative limits and 10 CFR, Part 20 limits, except when authorized by the Emergency Coordinator for life-saving 6

situations or to correct an urgent plant emergency condition, Assisting in planning personnel rescue operations, if necessary, e.

f.

Assisting in the transfer of injured and'non-e'ssential personnel if radiation or contamination hazards are involved.

g.

Initiating requests, through the Logistical Support-Coordinator for the following as necessary:

1.

Additional radiation monitoring equipment.

2.

Additional health physics support personnel.

3.

Additional instrumentation and equipment.

h.

Advising the Emergency Coordinator on matters involving radiological safety.

i. Reviewing and evaluating all radiological data, including appropriate chemical and radiochemical results.

j. Ensuring that appropriate records of radiological monitoring and dose assessment activities are maintained.

6 k.

Coordinating IOGC0 offsite radiological assessment activities with those of the county, State, and Federal agencies.

1.

Correlation, assessment and prediction of current and anticipated release rates and radiation levels.

m.

Assisting the Emergency Coordinator in the formulation of recommendations to be submitted to the counties and State regarding the protective action measures to be implemented for the general public.

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Evaluating current and forecasted meteorological data and determining any resultant effects upon the radiological release-and' dose p roj ec t' ions.

6 o.

Providing the Public Information Coordinator with an accurate assessment of the radiological conditions which is suitable for release to the public.

The Radiation Protection Engineer is the primary individual designated to assume this position upon activation of the EOF, The designated, alternates are the Chemistry and Environmental Engineer and the Health Physics Supervisor (Dallas). If the EOF is not activated, the'Onsite Radiological 6

Assessment Coordinator shall assume the above responsibilities and authorities at the TSC.

1.2.3.7 Offsite Radiological Assessment Coordinator The primary individual designated to assume this position upon activation of the EOF is a Radiation Protection Section Health Physicist. The designated alternates are Training Specialists, Nuclear. The Offsite Radiological Assessment Coordinator reports to the Radiation Protection Coordinator at the EOF, His principal emergency response functions include:

a.

Coordinating TUGC0 offsite radiological assessment activities with those of the counties and State.

b.

Reviewing and evaluating all offsite radiological data.

Assisting th,e Radiation Protection Coordinator and Emergency c.

6 Coordinator in the formulation of recommendations to be submitted to the counties and State regarding protective action measures to be implemented for the general public.

d.

Obtaining current'and forecasted meteorlogical data and determining any resultant effects upon the radiological release and dose projections.

Providing input and advice to State radiological monitoring teams e.

regarding ingestion pathway monitoring (e.g., vegetation, water, and milk supplies).

f.

Maintaining appropriate records of radiological monitoring and dose assessment activities.

l 1-13 REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

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n 1.2.3.8 Engineering Support Coordinator "b

The primary individual designated to assume this position upon activation of the EOF is the Operations Support Superintendent. The designated alternates are the Operations Support Engineer and the Technical Support Engineer. The principal emergency response functions of the Engineering Support Coordinator at the EOF include:

a.

Advising the Emergency Coordinator on technical matters.

b.

Providing backup engi.neering support to,the Engine'ering Team Coordinator at the TSC.

Identifying the need for and coordinating any Corporate or,outside c.

engineering assistance.

d.

Reviewing public information releases prior to their issuance to ensure technical accuracy.

1.2.3.9 Technical Support Center Manager s

The TSC Manager is responsible for all onsite emergency response activities conducted within the Protected Area which are required to place the plant in a safe, stable condition. Specific responsibilities and authorities of the TSC Manager include:

3)

^i 6

a.

Directing the operation of the TSC.

b.

Relieving Control Room personnel of the administrative functions and decisions.

c.

Coordination and direction of all onsite activities conducted from-the TSC, including:

1.

Establishment of proper communications with the Control Room, OSC, EOF and other emergency response facilities as appropriate.

2.

Determination of the extent of the emergency condition and the current status of onsite emergency response activities.

3.

Coordination and direction of all emergency response operations performed by TUGC0 personnel within the Protected Area.

d.

Receiving and distributing plant status.and technical information received in the TSC.

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C'PSES/EP e.

Maintaining communications with the Emergency Coordinator in order to provide plant condition information and to review any plant manipulations that might affect offsite consequences, and to provide any protective action recomme'ndations for Station personnel or the public.

f.

Coordinating those Operations Engineering and Maintenance emergency response activities conducted from the TSC-.

g.

Initiating personnel rescue or emergency repair and damage control operations as appropriate.

h.

Providing input to NRC representatives stationed at the TSC regarding plant Operating License requirements.

The primary individual designated to assume this position upon activation of the TSC is the Manager, Plant Operations. The designated alternates are (in descending order of succession):

6 Engineering Superintendent Operations Superintendent Maintenance Superintendent.

If the EOF has not been activated, the TSC Manager shall also assume the position of interim Emergency Coordinator from the on-duty Shift Supervisor.

1.2.3.10 Maintenance Coordinator The primary individual designated to assume this position upon activation of the TSC is the Maintenance Superintendent. The designated alternates are the Maintenance Services Engineer and the Electrical Maintenance Engineer. -

At the TSC, the Maintenance Coordinator is responsible for coordinating emergency repair and damage control activities through the Operations Support Center (OSC) Supervisor. The specific responsibilities of the Maintenance Coordinator include:

Advising the TSC Manager and other TSC personnel regarding the status a.

of onsite emergency repair and damage control activities.

b.

Advising the OSC Supervisor regarding any changes in plant conditions that may impact emergency repair and damage control activities.

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w 1.2.3.11 Operations Coordinator At the TSC, the Optrations Coordinator is resp ~onsible for, advising the TSC Manager and other TSC personnel regarding plant conditions and operational manipulations. The primary functions of the Operations Coordinator include:

~

a.

Maintaining an up-to-date knowledge of plant conditions and the effect of proposed operational manipulations.

b.

Working with the Maintenance Coordinator and the Engineering Team Coordinator to provide engineering and maintenance assistance to Operations personnel stationed in the Control Room.

The primary individual designated to assume this position upon activation of the TSC is the Operations Superintendent. The designated alternates are the Operations Engineer and the Operations Supervisor.

1.2.3.12 Engineering Team Coordinator The TSC Engineering Team is managed by the Engineering Team Coordinator whose primary function is to interface between the TSC Engineering Team and the TSC Manager. The Engineering Team' Coordinator's responsibilities at 6

the TSC include:

a.

Verifying that emergency response engineering support personnel with

)

TSC assignments are in position, or have been notified and are proceeding to the TSC.

b.

Direction and coordination of the activities of the TSC Engineering Team.

c.

Direction and coordination of those efforts to technically assess the plant status and the severity of the emergency conditions.

d.

Advising the TSC Manager on technical matters relating to the NSSS, fuel integrity, plant systems and equipment, plant electrical systems and equipment, and plant instrumentation.

The primary individual designated to assume this position upon activation of the TSC is the Engineering Superintendent. The designated alternates are the Reactor Engineer and the Instrunent and Controls Engineer.

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1.2.3.13 Onsite Radiological Assessment Coordina' tor The primary individual designated to assume this position upon activation of the TSC is a Radiation Protection Engineer. The designated alternates are Radiation Protection Section Health Physicists. The Onsite Radiological Assessment Coordinator is responsible for the radiological aafety of all CPSES personnel onsite. The primary emergency response functions of the Onsite Radiological Assessment Coordinator include:

a.

Ensuring that emergency sampling and radiological survey procedures are being properly implemented, and that the resultant information is available to the EOF, TSC and Control Room.

b.

Accumulation, tabulation, and evaluation of data regarding plant conditions, such as meteorological data and area radiation monitoring readings, and onsite and in-plant radiological survey results.

Ensuring that the use of protective clothing,' respiratory protection c.

and access control within the plant is properly implemented.

d.

Ensuring that appropriate bicassay procedures have been implemented for 6

onsite personnel when a radiological incident has occurred.

e.

Ensuring that personnel radiation exposures are maintained in accordance with plant administrative limits and 10 CFR, Part 20.

f.

Ensuring that personnel are properly decontaminated, if necessary.

g.

Assisting in planning personnel rescue operations, if necessary, h.

Assisting in the transfer of injured and non-essential personnel if radiation or contamination hazards are involved.

1.

Review and evaluation of all onsite radiological data, including,

~

appropriate chemical and radiochemical analysia res'ults.

j. Maintaining appropriate records of onsite emergency response activities.

1.2.3.14 TSC Advisor The primary individual designated to assume this position upon activation of the TSC is the Results Engineer. The designated alternates are Results Engineering Section Engineers. The specific responsibilities of the TSC Advisor include:

1-17 REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

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Providing technical advice to tfie TSC Manager as required.

- u' b.

Assigning edministrative and clerical assistance within the TSC.

c.

Coordinating warehouse support services, including the procurement and expedition of materials.

6

. Providing logistical support services (e.g., food, clothing, or d.

sleeping facilities) for onsite emergency response personnel.

l e.

Directing the activities of those communicato'rs assigned to the TSC.

f.

Ensuring that all TSC. communications equipment is fsactioning properly.

g.

If the EOF is not activated, reviewing public information releases for technical accuracy prior to their issuance.

j 1.2.3.15. Operations Support Center Supervisor Tha OSC Supervisor's responsibilities include the following:

i a.

Activating and establishing communications at the OSC.

I b.

Supervising those personnel assigned to the OSC and maintaining a j

reserve operating staff.

"I c.

As instructed by the Maintenance Coordinator, dispatching personnel to 6

assist in emergency repair and damage control activities, performing radiological surveys, personnel rescue operations, establishing control areas, and initiating recovery action's.

l d.

Coordinating emergency repair and damage control activities with the Maintenance Coordinator in the TSC.

A i

The primary in'dividual designated to assume this position upon activation of the OSC is th'e Mechanical Maintenance Engineer. The designated alternates are.the Electrical Maintenance Engineer and a Mechanical Maintenanc7 Supervisor.

1.2.3.16 Shift Technical Advisor A Shift Technical Advisor (STA) shall be assigned to each operating shift and shall be capable of reporting to the Control Room within 10 minutes after being notified of an emergency condition. The STA's emergency re,sponse functions include evaluating plant conditions and providing advice to the Shift Supervisor regarding plant transient analysis, accident mitigation, and other matters related to operational safety.

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1.2.4 MINIMUM CPSES EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION STAFFING On-shift staffing and staff augmentation assignments are identified in

~

Table 1.1.

In the event of an emergency condition, Control Ecom personnel shall remain assigned to the unaffected unit as specified in Section 15.0, Appendix A.

The staffing plan is consistent with the guidance set forth in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1.

Details regarding the assignments and associated responsibilities are addressed in the various Emergency Plan Procedures.

1.2.5 OTHER ONSITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION ASSIGNMENTS In addition to the key emergency response personnel described in the preceding paragraphs, other CPSES personnel will assume active roles in supporting the overall emergency response. Assignments and responsibilities of these support personnel are generally described below, and more specifically described in the Emergency Plan Procedures.

1. 2.' 5.1 Station Operations and Firefighting The Operations Department is responsible for al'1 Station operations. The normal on-shif t operating crew is capable of handling emergency operations 6

and is also capable of aiding in other areas of the emergency response.

Off-duty Operations personnel shall be called upon as necessary to augment the on-shift operating crew. At all times, the Shift Supervisor or an Assistant Shift Supervisor is in charge of all activities conducted in the Control Room.

The Operations Department and Security personnel shall provide a five-man Fire Brigade on each shift in accordance with the CPSES Fire Protection Program.

If necessary, the on-shift Fire Brigade will be augmented by the local volunteer fire department. Operations personnel are also available.

to augment the Emergency Repair and Damage Control Group as necessary.

1.2iS.2 Security The CPSES Security Organization is responsible for perforuing an accountability check of all TUGC0 personnel onsite for events classified as a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency, and for controlling access to the site property. If evacuation of the site is required, the CPSES Security Organization will assist in the evacuation, and conduct an accountability check of all TUGC0 personnel dispatched to the designated assembly areas.

1-19 REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

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1.2.5.3 Administrative Support The C?SES adminietrative support staff will provide general logistical, administrative and clerical support to the 'CPSES Emergency Organization.

This includes long-range planning for personnel, materials, facilities; and providing office and clerical services. Additionally, the administrative support staff will coordinate warehouse and procurement activities, and obtain support services such as arrangments for food, clothing and overnight accommodations.

1.2.5.4 Engineering Working out of the TSC, the TSC Engineering Team will provide plant engineering assistance, and evaluate any possible corrective actions to be taken to mitigate the emergency condition or to terminate a release.

Additional engineering support will be provided by the EOF Engineering Team.

1.2.5.5 Radiation Protection / Chemistry On-shift Radiation Protection and Chemistry and Environmental personnel shall be qualified to implement radiation protection procedures and chemistry sampling procedures, respec!tively, and to perform the necessary 6

in-plant and onsite radiological surveys, and sampling until additional Radiation Protection or Chemistry and Environmental personnel arrive onsite. Radiation Protection personnel shall also be qualified in the

'}.

methods of decontaminating personnel, equipment and areas. Decontamination efforts may also involve personnel from the Operations and Maintenance departments.

1.2.6 INTERFACES Figure 1.1 illustrates the immediate and long-term interfaces between the CPSES Emergency Organization.and the organizations of the affected local, State and Federa offices and agencies. The immediate interfaces with CPSES are. directed to the Control Room, as shown by the dashed lines on b'igure 1.1.

Long-term interfaces are shown by solid lines on Figure 1.1.

The functioris of the TSC, OSC and the EOF are described in Section 6.0,

" Emergency Facilities and Equipment".

' 1.2.7 LONG-TERM ORGANIZATION AND EXTENDED OPERATIONS Activation of the CPSES Emergency Organization will, directly and indirectly, result in a response by essentially all personnel normally associated with CPSES, particularly by management and key support personnel. Therefore, within several hours after the initiating event, a decision will be made by the Emergency Coordinator to provide and prepare 1-20 m)

REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

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for a long-term augmented emergency response organization. The Emergency Coordinator and other TUGC0 management personnel will determine when the CPSES Recovery' Organization is to be formed. Prior to.the formation of the CPSES Recovery Organization, the situation may require that the CPSES Emergency Organization remain in place for a protracted period of time to bring the plant to a safe, stable condition. As conditions allow, shif t schedules and assignments will be developed by those personnel in charge of the Control Room and the emergency response facilities. Prior to their 6

implementation, these schedules and assignments shall be reviewed and approved by the Emergency Coordinator. The Emergency Coordinator is responsible for ensuring continuity of resou'rces (technical, administrative, and material) within the CPSES Emergency Organization. The Emergency Coordinator has been delegated authority to obtain any necessary assistance from outside agencies, such as suppliers, contractors, and consultants.

1.2.8 CORPORATE SUPPORT In addition to the CPSES staff, the Texas Utilities Company system has numerous resources which are available to support CPSES during an emergency., The Emergency Coordinator is the individual onsite who will request Corporate support services as required by the emergency condition.

Any requests will be made to the Vice President, Nuclear, or his designee.

The required resources shall be made available by TUGC0 Nuclear Operations, 6

TUGC0 Lignite Operations, or other Texas Utilities Company departments, when requested by the Vice President, Nuclear, or his designated alternate.

In addition to the above activities, the Vice President, Nuclear, also supports the CPSES Emergency Organization in the following areas:

Interfacing with TUGC0 Corporate management to obtain. policy decisions a.

in'a timely manner and to ensure that all TUGC0 resources are available to support the emergency response and recovery efforts.

b.

Maintaining close contact with personnel located in the Corporate offices to keep them informed of the progress'of the emergency r'esponse and recovery efforts.

Responding to request's from the Emergency Coordinator.

c.

d.

Acting as a liaison between TUGC0 and those governmental officials not directly involved in the emergency response or recovery efforts.

The following paragraphs describe the various types of Corporate support available to the CPSES Emergency Organization.

6 1-21 REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

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l.2.8.1 TUGC0 Nuclear

~

a.

Nuclear Operations - The'TUGC0 Nuclear Operations Support Department shall provide technical and analytical support in the following alreas:

fire protection, chemistry, radiochemistry, shielding design, instrumentation and controls, transient analysis and systems interaction, structural design, thermal hydraulics, and mechanical and electrical systems.

6 b.

Health Physics - The TUGC0 Health Physics Group shall provide radiological analysis, administrative support and management support as requested by the CPSES Emergency Organization or the CPSES Recovery Organization.

In addition, this group may provide TUGC0 management with an independent, internal assessment of the radiological-significance and potential effects which.may result from an emergency condition at CPSES.

a c.

Quality Assurance - If requested, the TUCCO Quality Assurance Department shall provide personnel to assist in recovery operations.

1.2.8.2 TUCCO Lignite Operations TUGC0 currently operates 8 lignite-fuiled units at three locations, each of which has associated mining operations. This group is capable of furnishing perso'nnel, equipment and supplies when required. The varicus 3

types of equipment available include bulldozers, scrapers, front-end j

2 loaders, dump trucks, fork lifts, mobile lifting equipmen't, pumps and air compressors.

If requested TUGC0 Lignite Operations will also provide 6

electricians, mechaaics, instrument and control technicians, and chemistry technic,ians to augment CPSES emergency response and recovery efforts.

1.2.8.3

'Other Texas Utilities Support Organizations a.

Engineering and Construction - As required..the Texas Utilities I

Services. Inc. (TUSI) Engineering and Construction Department shall furnish manpower, tools, equipment, and materials for engineering and construction services to provide temporary facilities, electrical i

power, and communication services.

In addition, this department shall provide any technical or analytical support required by the plant staff. This support shall include design modifications to systems and 6

structures, to ensure saat the plant can be maintained in a safe shutdown condition, or to mitigate the effects of an emergency condition. This department's responsibilities also include the notification of key engineering support personnel and. interfacing with other departments to provide technical and analytical suppcrt.

1-22

's

..)

REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

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CPSES/EP,

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.TUSI Engineering and Construction maintains an onsite staff,of approximately 50 engineers in the following disciplines: nuclear, mechanical, electrical, instrumentation and control, and civil.

b.

Legal

'"'.e law firm of Worsham, Forsythe and Samples has been retained by Texas Utilities to provide legal assistance and support regarding CPSES. In the event of an emergency condition at CPSES Worsham, Forsythe and Samples sha'll provide legal assistance for the handling of claims and litigation, and legal counsel for other Company actions related to the emergency response and recovery efforts.

c.

Insurance - The TUSI Risk Msnagement and Insurance Department shall advise other Company groups and departments of those emergency response and recovery activities affecting TUGCO's nuclear property insurance, property loss control, and daniage cost. accumulation. This department shall also coordinate tl.sse activities involving TUCCO's liability insurance carriers. This department shall investigate all injuries to Company personnel and the public, and major incidences of property damage to est.ablish cause.

d.

Purchasing The TUSI Purchasing Group shall provide materials, contract services, and transportation support functions. This group shall be responsible for contacting the appropriate State and county agencies to determine travel conditions for transportation of personnel and equipment to the site.

e.

Security - The Director, Corporate Security, shall have the responsibility for providing security for news conferences conducted in the Corporate office facilities, augmenting the site security supervisory staff, and assisting the Security Supervisor in obtaining any additional contract security personnel.

f.

Human Resources - The TUSI Human Resources Group shall provide, and coordinate the assignment of additional manpower in support of emergency response and recovery efforts'.

g.

Environmental Group - The TUSI Environmental Group shall provide supporc to environmental monitoring activities. This support may be provided in the form of additional personnel to gather vegetation and ground saeples for radiological analysis during the post-accident sampling of the ingestion exposure pathway, technical expertise to support environmental analysis activities, or interface with offsite testing laboratories.

1-23 l

MARCH 8, 1983

e CPSES/EP "c

h.

Public Information - The Texas Utilities Information. Services Group shall cocrdinate public information releases to'the news media with

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local, State and Federal officials and agencies. This group shall interface with the Public Information Coordinator at the EOF to ensure that only information tha't is reviewed and approved by the Emergency Coordinator is released to the public, and that all public information releases are coordinated.

1.3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS AND RESOURCES Various local, State Federal and private agencies, which provide personnel to support or augment the CPSES Emergency Organization, are described in this subsection. When personnel from these agencies are on the Station property, they are subject to the authority of the Emergency Coordinator, 6

and for reasons of safety end security, they shall c~ommence or cease their actions when so directed by the Emergency Coordinator.

This subsection also describes the arrangements which have been made for requesting and effectively utilizing the described assistance and resources, and for accommodating Federal, State and I? cal representatives at the EOF.

1.3.1 LOCAL AGENCIES The key emergency response organizations involved at the local level with emergencies at CPSES are the Hood County and Somervell County Emergency Organizations. These organizations are responsible for implementing

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protective measures for citizens in their respective counties. Each organization is composed of numerous agencies which perform various duties in response to an emergency condition. The County Judge is in charge of the emergency organization and directs the operations of the agencies described below. Letters of Agreement with individual agencies, which delineate their support, are included in Section 15.0, Appendix H.

Each county has an " Emergency Operations Plan" and a " Manual of. Emergency Procedures", which are predicated on the county's ability to respond and which prescribe an emergency response base.d upon the declared Emergency Action Level.

1.3.1.1 Law Enforcement l

Agreements have been reached with the'Somervell County and Hood County i

Sheriff's departments to support the CP$ES emergency response with a commitment of officers and vehicles to assist in evacuation efforts, traffic control and security.

1-24 3)

REVISION 6 MARCH 8. 1983

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CPSES/EP

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j The Sheriff's departments are also responsible for county'ation of those communications during an emergency condition at CPSES, including notific county officials who form the county emergency response organization. The Sheriff's office in each county will be used as the primary County 6

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) for that county.

1.3.1.2 Firefighting Support Local firefighting support is provided t,o CPSES through a written agreement with the Somervell County Volunteer Fire Department in Glen Rose Texas.

This organization can respond to the site within approximately 30 minutes 6

with.at least one (1) fire truck. The'Somervell County Volunteer Fire Department is located eight (8) road miles from CPSES.

1.3.1.3 Ambulance Services.

Written agreements with the Glen RoseISomervell County Volunteer Fire Department Ambulance Service and the Hood General Hospital Ambulance Service describe their support in providing back-up assistance to CPSES to transport injured personnel to a local hospital. Hood General Hospital Ambulance Service can provide one (1) ambulance with an Emergency Medical Technician and a paramedic within 30 minutes. Somervell County can provide one (1) ambulance within 30 minutes._

1.3.1.4 Medical Support Hood General Hospital in Granbury, Texas, is located approximately 16 road miles from CPSES. A Letter of Agreement has been obtained from Hood General Hospital to receive and treat injured personnel from CPSES who have been contaminated with radioactive material or who have received an overexposure requiring medical evaluation. The Hood General Hospital facilities are equipped to treat at least five (5) injured, contaminated persons simultaneously.

Backup medical services, support and definitive care are provided through a contract and a Letter of Agreement with Radiation Management Corporation and'its affiliated hospital, Northwestern 5

Memorial Hospital, which is located in Chicago, Illinois Injured personnel whose medical treatment is not complicated by radiological considerations may be sent to either Hood General Hospital cr Marks English Hospital, which is located approxi'mately eight (8) road miles from CPSES in Glen Rose, Texas.

Medical support for CPSES is discussed in greater detaf1 in Section 10.0,

" Medical and Public Health Support".

1-25 REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983 a ~

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CPSES/EP

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1.3.2 STATE AGENCY SUPPORT 1.3.2.1 Texas Division of Emergency Management The Texas Division of Emergency Management (DEM) is the lead agency 6

responsible for coordinating the overall response to emergency situations in the State of Texas. The Director', DEM, will assume overall direction and control of the State's response to an emergency condition at CPSES.

1.3.2.2 Texas Department of Health The Bureau of Radiation Control of the Texas Department of Health 'TDH) is

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the responsible agency in the State of Texas for responding to radiological emergencies. The TDH's response to a radiological emergency at CPSES will be directed by the Chief, Bureau of Radiation Centrol. Radiological emergency preparedness planning is addressed in Appendix 7 to Annex L of the Texas Emergency Management Plan.

In the event of an emergency condition at CPSES, the TDH is notified by the Texas Department of Public Safety office in Waco, Texas. Upon notification 6

f a General Emergency at CPSES, the TDH shall send a Response Team to the' 10-mile EPZ under the direction of the Chief of Field Operations. This Response Team is capable of. supporting the CPSES Emergency Organization in a

the following areas:

Environmental and radiological monitoring, including a mobile

)

a.

radiological laboratory. This laboratory will serve as a backup to Station facilities for low-level sample evaluation. CPSES will provide 5

three (3) telephone lines and a 208 VAC, 150 amp, single-phase circuit for use by the mobile radiological laboratory.

It is expected that this laboratory will arrive onsite within approximately four (4) hours of notification.

In addition, space for five (5) personnel and three (3) telephone lines have been provided in the EOF for the State's accident assessment team.

b.

Assessment of offsite hazards and protective action recommendations.

1.3.2.3 Texas Department,of Public Saf'ty e

A written agreement with the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) confirms their support for the CPSES Emergency Plan. The Dist'rict Commander of the DPS will provide support to local ~ 1aw enforcement agencies for the evacuation of the public from the 10-mile EPZ. The DPS provides communications support essential in coordinating the emergency response of local agencies,-such as law enforcement agencies and fire departments, within the 10-mile EPZ.

The area around CPSES is under the jurisdiction of the DPS Region 6A Headquarters in Waco, Texas.

1-26 s

REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

CPSES/EP n

.T 1.3.3 FEDERAL AGENCY SUPPORT, The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and.U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) are the primary Federal agencies responding to an emergency condition at'CPSES. Additional Federal agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Comme.rce, and National Weather Service, provide ancillary services and support to the primary agencies.

l6 Management of the Federal response, which is divided into technical /

radiological aspects and non-technical aspects, requires the coordination of the three primary agencies with each other, with Texas Utilities officials, and with State and local authorities. The NRC and DOE are responsible for the technical / radiological response and FEMA is responsible for the non-technical response; the overall responsibility is shared by all three primary agencies.

To support Federal emergency response efforts, the following facilities, all of which are located within sixty (60) miles of CPSES, are available.

Airports: Granbury, Cleburne, Stephenville, Meacheam in Fort Worth, Love in Dallas and Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Motels:

Glen Rose, Granbury, Cleburne, Stephenville, Fort Worth and Dallas CPSES:

Working space within the EOF has been allocated for ten (10)

Federal emergency response personnel, as well as five telephones with access to an offsite exchange. Three (3) 5 independent, 120 VAC, 30 amp circuits with standard connectors and two (2) telephone lines have been provided for the lutC mobile radiological laboratory.

The Logistical Support Coordinator.will provide any additional assistance l6 as n6cessary to support Federal emergency response efforts.

l5 1.3.3.1 ' Nuclear Regulatory Commission

~

The NRC reviews and determines the adequacy of the CPSES Emergency Plan and Emergency Preparedness Program, and evaluates the compatibility of the 5

CPSES Emergency Plan with those of the State and counties.

The NRC, because of its familiarity with CPSES operations and reactor specific j

terminology, is responsible for coordinating the overall technical aspects of the Federal response. Primarily, NRC activities are focused on those emergency response activities occurring onsite and directed toward the mitigation of the emergency condition.

1-27 REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

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i CPSES/EP en se Upon receiving notification of an emergency condition at.CPSES, the NRC will' respond pursuant to the Emergency Action Level. If a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency has been declare ~d, the NRC will dispatch

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emergency response personnel and equipment to CPSES. The NRC Response Team 5

is expected to arrive onsite within 24 hcurs of receiving notification.

1.3.3.2 Federal Emergency Management Agency The FEMA provides assistance to the State and local governments in the preparation, review and testing of their radiological emergency response plans. FEMA als'o provides the normal interface between other Federal agencies and the local governments.

FEMA coordinates the non-technical aspects of the Federal response, including any assistance to Federal, State, and local organizations in matters regarding transportation, communications, housing, implementing l

offsite protective. action measures, and other matters not specifically designated as-the responsibility of the NRC. FEMA will send at least one individual to the EOF to coordinate non-technical emergency response' activities with the NRC, TUGCO, and the State and local governments.

1.3.3.3 Department of Energy The DOE is the third segment of the Federal response. The DOE is responsible.for coordinating Federal offsite radiological monitoring and assessment activities and for relaying the information gathered to-NRC assessment personnel stationed at the site.

The DOE has a regional Coordinating Office for Radiological Assistance i

located in Albuquerque, New Mexico. This agency is capable of providing i

emergency radiological monitoring teams, on a 24 hour-per-day basis, in support of the CPSES Emergency Organization. The Emergency Coordinator and the Recovery Manager are the only two'TUGC0 personnel at CPSES who possess the authority to request DOE assistance.

If requested, the DOE will-respond.within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> with resources that include:

a.

Radiological assistance teams.

b.

Communications equipment (including microwave capabilities).

Aircraft for airborne radiological monitoring and transportation, and c.

I mobile laboratories for surface radiological monitoring.

d.

Specialists (technical, and administrative personnel not directly involved in field operations, such as information officers, clerical workers, etc.).

1-28 y) l MARCH 8, 1983

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CPSES/EP

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If requested by the Emergency Coordinator, a DOE coordinator will be 6

dispatched to the Facility to direct DOE emergency response activities.

Because of the magnitude of the resources that DOE commands, it is expected that minimal support from the CPSES Emergency Organization will ta 5

required.

1.3.4 PRIVATE ORGANIZATION SUPPORT TUGCd recognizes the need for support from private sector organizations.

These organizations may provide services or assistance that are useful to TUGC0 in training onsite and offsite emergency response personnel, or in supporting emergency response and recovery efforts at CPSES. These services or assistance, which are readily available on a contractural basis, inclu'de, but are not limited to, the following:

a.

Contract health physic technicians (e.g., Rad Services or Institute for Resources Management).

b.

Medical treatment services (e.g., Radiation Management Corporation).

6 c.

Fuel analysis and accident assessment (e.g., Exxon or Westinghouse).

d.

Engineering analyses (e.g., Electric Power Research Institute or the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center).

e.

Industry support resources (e.g., Institute of Nuclear Power Operations).

Since most of these services and assistance are readily available Letters of Agreement and descriptions of these services are not necessarily included in the following in this plan. The organizations providing specific services to CPSES Emergency Organization are:

1.3.4.1 Squaw Creek' Park, Inc.

Squaw Creek Park, Inc. operates and maintains Squaw Creek Park, a 470 acre recreation area adjacent to Squaw Creek Reservoir, north of the station.

The park and reservoir are owned by Texas Utilities. Squaw Creek Park, Inc. is responsible for controlling access to the park and reservoir. The park and reservoir are accessible via a single public road from State Road 144 Fol' lowing the, declaration of a Site Area Emergency or General 6

Emergency at CPSES, Squaw Creek Park, Inc. is responsible for

. accountability and evacuation of the park and reservoir in accordance with 5

their emergency response procedures.

1-29 i

REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983 l

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-CPSES/EP w

1.3.4.2 Westinghouse Electric Corpor'ation The nuclear steam supply systems (NSSS) at CPSES were supplied by Westinghouse Water Reactors Division (WRD).

In its capacity as a supplier, Westinghouse can provide emergency response assistance to CPSES on an around-the-clock basis. The Westinghouse Emergency Response Plan (refer to Section 15, Appendix R):

Describes the Westinghouse emergency response organization, its role, a.

scope, functions and responsibilities', and how it is activated.

b.

Identifies those key Westinghouse individuals to be available in the early' phase of an emergency response.

Defines the Westinghouse interfaces with other involved parties.

c.

6l d.

Defines the Westinghouse role in emergency-related news communications and its. interaction with CPSES Public Information personnel and the news media.

1.3.4.3 Radiation Management Corporation TUGC0 has entered into contract with Rhdiation Management Corporation to 6j augment local medical support for radiologically-related injuries. A Letter of Agreement with Radiation Management Corporation confirming their s

support is located in Section 15, Appendix H.

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Radiation Management Corporation provides training to hospital, ambulance and Station personnel concerning the treatme,nt, handling and transporting of contaminated, injured personnel. Radiation Management Corporation also provides, on a 24-hour-per-day basis, experienced staff and consultant pers'onnel, fixed and mobile laboratory facilities, whole body counting 6l equi ment, and a definitive care-centers to respond to radiologically-P l

g related injuries.. The definitive. care center is located a,t Northwestern f

31 Memorial Hospital in Chicago. Illinois.

1.3.4.4 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations One of the roles of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) is to assist the affected utility in quickly applying the resources of the nuclear 3

industry to meet the needs of the emergency response.

INPO, when notified of an emergency situation at CPSES, will provide appropriate emergency response assistance as requested. CPSES will notify l

INPO,1f and when the conditions warrant their technical support.

1-30 s

REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983 g

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CPSES/EP INPO is capable of providing the following emergency response support functions:

6 a.

Assistance in locating sources of, and making arrangements to obtain, emergency manpower and equipment.

b.

Analysis of the operational aspects of the incident.

5 c.

Dissemination of information to member utilities concerning the incident that is applicable to their operations.

d.

Identification of industry experts who could advise CPSES on technical 6

matters.

To support these functions, INPO maintains the following emergency response support capabilities:

a., A dedicated Emergency Call Number capable of reaching designated INPO staff and activating INP0 emergency response support functions 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 5

per day, seven days per week.

b.

Designated INPO representative (s) who can be dispatched to the utility emergency response organization to coordinate INP0's emergency tesponse l6 support activities and information flow, 24-hour-per-day operation of an Emergency Response Center at INPO.

5 c.

If requested by the Emergency Coordinator, one or more suitably qualified members of INP0's technical staff may report to the EOF and assist the CPSES Emergency Organization in coordinating INP0's response to the 6

emergency as follows:

Staffing a single position responsible to the Emergency Coordinator as a.

a liaison for all INP0 matters.

l 1

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Working with the INPO Duty Person in Atlanta, Georgia, to coordinate requests for any assistance, INP0 emergency response activities and related communications.

6 l

Assisting the CPSES Emergency Organization as requested in initiating c.

and updating entries into industry information exchange systems, such as NOTEPAD, regarding the accident status and related information of 5

value to other utilities.

d.

Ensuring that all information concerning the emergency condition which l6 is released by the INPO liaison, is properly and formally cleared 5

through TUCCO channels.

1-31 REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

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e, CPSES/EP TABLE I.i STAFF 1MC REQUIREMENTS 60K FHERCENC1ES '

Additions Within Min.

Functional Area Task Position Title On Shift A0 70 e

Station Operation Aasessment of Operational Aspects Shif t Supervisor (SRO)

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Mechanical Engineer I

Health Physicist Operations Engineer I

Radiological Assessnent Station Surveys R.P. Technician I

1 il0 1

Chentstry/Radioclyenistry Chem. & Envir. Technicien 1

3 Offsite Surveys R.P. Technicians I

3 Onsite Surveys,

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1 Dose Assessnents R.P. Engineer 1

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Fire figh t ing 58 Local Support Rescue Operations apd first Aid 2*-

Local Support Site Access Contral Security, firefighting, Cuards-Per Security Local and Personnel Accountability Cunnu11eations, personnel Plan Support accountability-TOTAL 10 15 16 Ma r he provided by shif t personnel assigned other functions.

Shift Supervisor serves in this capacity untt! relieved by the ihnager, Plant Operations REVI$l0N 6 or his alternate.

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2.0 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM Emergency conditions are tnose situations occurring which cause or may threaten to cause radiological hazards affecting the health and safety of employees or the public, or which may result in damage to property. This section describes the system to be utill:ed at CPSES to classify possible radiological and other emergency conditions. This system is consistent with the guidance set forth in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, and.is 6.

compatible with that used by State and local agencies. The Emergency Action Levels (EAL) established for each emergency classification have been reviewed with offsite authorities who are responsible for implementing protective measures for the population-at-risk.

'2.1 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS The four classes of EAL's are:

a.

Notification of Unusual Event b.

Alert c.

Site Area Emergency d.

General Emergency.

The first two classes, Notification of Unusual Event and Alert are designed to provide early notification to offsite agencies of the occurrence of minor events at CPSES which might escalate to a more serious situation if incorrect personnel actions were taken or subsequent equipment failure occurred. The Site Area Emergency class includes those conditions in which.

significant releases are occurring or are expected to occur, but where a core meltdown situation is not' indicated. The General Emergency class includes those situations in which actual or imminent core degradation or melting is occurring with the potential for, or actual loss of, containment integrity. A gradation of responses is provided to assure prompt action whether the seriousness of the event intensifies or diminishes.

Each EAL is associated with a particular set of predetermined response actions which are identified in Table 2.1.

Specific details regarding required actions to be taken at CPSES for each EAL are specified in the Emergency Plan Procedures. Emergency conditions which determine the appropriate EAL are generally described in the following paragraphs and are specifically defined in Table 2.2.

The specific instruments, parameters, 6

and status indicators used to establish the appropriate EAL are specified in Procedure EPP-201, " Assessment of Emergency Action Levels and Plan Activation". If an emergency condition changes in its severity, it 2-1 REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983-

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CPSES/EP g

er

.b n The EAL's specified in Table 2.2 are based upon the criteria set ferth in one or more of the following documents:

a.

Plant system design specifications b.

Plant Technical Specification limits

'.FSAR accident analyses c.

d.

10CFR, Part 20 and 10CFR, Part 100 limits e.

EPA Protective Action Guides f.

NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations" 6

g.

NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants".

The EAL's to be implemented are not necessarily based upon actual radiological exposures to the population-at-risk, but rather are based upon the potential exposures or specific p.lant conditions which may pose a threat to the population-at-risk.

The initiating conditions have been conservatively established for the Site Area Emergency to ensure that offsite support agency emergency rer,ponse actions are initiated and performed in a timely manner. The initiating conditions for the General Emergency'have been established to provide a more realistic basis for evacuation or sheltering decisions.

l l

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2-3 i

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REVISION 6 l

MARCH 8, 1983 l

a CPSE$/EP TABLE 2.1

~ ".:

PREDETERMINED RESPONSE ACTIONS

~

(Sheet 1 0F 6)

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT Class Description Predetermined CPSES Response Actions Unusual events are in progress or 1.

Assess and respond accordingly.

have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level 2.

Inform local and State authorities of safety of the plant. No releases of the condition, any significant of radioactive material requiring actions taken or underway, and any offsite response or radiological need for offsite assistance.

monitoring are expected unless further degradatio'n of plant safety 3.

If required, augment on-shift system occurs.

resources as a precautionary measure.

6 Purpose 4.

Escalate to a more severe class, if appropriate.

The purpose of this classification i,s to:

_ 5.

Inform local and State Authorities of the event close-out.

1.

Assure that the first step in any emergency response later found to be necessary has been carried out, 2.

Bring the operating staff to a state of readiness, and 3.

Provide for systematic handling of unusual events, information and decision-making.

REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

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e-CPSES/EP TABLE 2.1

~

PREDETERMINED RESPONSE ACTIONS (Sheet'2 0F 6)

~

ALERT Class Description Predetermined CPSES Response Actions Events are in progress or have 1.

Assess and' respond accordingly, occurred which involve an adtual or potential substantial degradation of 2.

Promptly inform local and State the level of safety of the plant.

authorities of the emergency Any releases are expected to be condition, its status, and the limited.co small fractions of the reasons for the declaration of the

- EPA Protective Action Guides emergency as soon as the condition exposure levels.

is discovered.

Purpose 3.

Augment resources and activate the Technical Support Center and 6

The purpose of this classification Operations Support Center. Bring is to:

the Emergency Operations Facility and other key emergency response 1.

Assure that emergency response personnel to standby status.

personnel are readily available to respond if the situation 4

Dispatch Onsite Survey Teams and becomes more serious or to-associated communications.

perform confirmatory radiological monitoring, if required, and 5.

Provide periodic plant status updates to offsite authorities.

2.

Provide offsite authorities with current status information.

6.

Provide periodic assessments of meteorological conditions to offsite authorities and, if any radiol,ogical release,s are i

t occurring, dose estimates fo'r those releases.

7.

Escalate to a more severe class, if appropriate.

8.

Inform local and State authorities of the event close-out or a de-escalation in the Emergency Action Level.

-REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983.

~

~

CPSES/EP TABL'E 2.1..

w

.~

PREDETERMINED RESPONSE ACTIONS (Sheet 3 0F 6)

SITE AREA EMERCENCY Class Description Predetermined CPSES Response Actions Events are in progress or have 1.

Assess and respond accordingly.

. occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant 2.

Promptly inform local and State functions needed for the protection authoritics of the emergency of the public..Any releases which condition, its status, and the occur are not expected to exceed reasons for the declaration of the the EPA Protection Action Guides emergency as soon as the condition exposure levels except near the is discovered.

site boundary.

3.

Augment resources by activating the 6

Technical Support Center, Purpose _

Operations Support Center, and Emergency Operations Facility.

The purpose of this classification is to:

__ 4 Deploy Onsite Survey Teams and Offsite Monitoring Teams and 1.

Assure that emergency response associated communications.

facilities are manned, S.

Dedicate individuals for providing 2.

Assure that radiological plant status updates to offsite monitoring teams are deployed, authorities and periodic media briefings.

3.

Assure that personnel required-for the evacuation of near-site

6..Make senior onsite technical and areas are at their duty management staff available for stations if the.situati,on consultation with the NRC and the becomes more serious, State on a periodic basis.

l 4.

Provide for consultation with, 7.

Provide periodic assessments of l

offsite authorities, and meteorological conditions and dose estimates to offsite authorities 5.

Provide periodic updates to the if any radiological releases are public through offsite occurring.

authorities.

8 Provide release rate information and dose projections based upon available information-regarding plant conditions and foreseeable contingencies.

REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983 9

y

. CPSES/EP-TABLE 2.1

~

w PREDETERMINED RESPONSE ACTIONS (Sheet 4'0F 6)

SITE AREA EMERGENCY (Continued)

Predetermined CPSES Response Actions 6

9.

Escalate to a General Emergency class, if appropriate.

10.

Inform local and State' authorities

~

of the event close-out or a de-escalation in the Emergency Action Level.

e 4

REVISION 6 MARCH 8. 1983 n.

e

i CPSES/EP TABLE 2.1 3

w PREDETERMINED RESPONSE ACTIONS (Sheet 5 0F 6)

GENERAL EMERGENCY Class Description Predetermined CPSES Response Actions Events are in progress or have 1.

Assess and respond accordingly.

occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core 2.

Promptly inform local and State degradation or melting with the authorities of the emergency

. potential for loss of containment condition, its status, and the integrity. Releases can be reasons for the declaration of the reasonably expected to exceed EPA.

emergency as soon as the condition Protective Action Guides exposure is discovered.

levels offsite for more than the 6

immediate site area.

3.

Augment resources by activating the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center and Purpose Emergency Operations Facility.

The purpose of this classifiction

-. 4. Dispatch Onsite Survey Teams and is to:

Offsite Monitoring Teams and associated communications.

1.

Initiate predetermined protective actions for.the 5.

Dedicate individuals for providing

public, plant status updates to offsite authorities and periodic media 2.

Provide continuous assessment briefings.

of plant information and radiological monitoring 6.

Make senior onsite technical and measurements taken by the management staff available for licensee and offsite consultation with the NRC and the organizations, State on a periodic basis.

3.

Initiate additional measures as 7.

Provide periodic assessments of indicated by actual or potential meteorplogical conditions and dose radiological releases, estimates to offsite authorities if any radiological releases are 4.

Provide for consulation with occurring, offsite authorities, and 8.

Provide release rate information 5.

Provide periodic updates to the and dose projections based upon public through offsite available information regarding authorities.

plant conditions and foreseeable contingencies.

REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

~-

.CPSES/EP TABLE.2.1 n

PREDETERMINED RESPONSE ACTIONS (Sheet 6 0F 6)

GENERAL EMERGENCY (Continued)

Predetermined CPSES Response Actions 6

9.

Inform local and State authorities of the event close-out or a de-escalation in the Emergency Action Level.

4 i

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REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

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CPSES/EP

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TABLE 2.2

~

INITIATING CONDITIONS FOR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (Sheet 1 of 17)

Radioactive Effluent Release UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY Caseous radioactive' Gaseous radioactive Effluent monitors detect Effluent monitors detect effluent release to the effluent release to the levels corresponding to levels corresponding to environment exceeding environment greater than greater than 50 an/hr 1 Rem /hr Whole Body or Technical Specification 10 times Technical Whole Body or 250 mR/hr 5 Rem /hr Thyroid at the Ifmits (3.11.2.1, Specification limits Thyroid for 1/2 hour at site boundary under actual 3.11.2.2, 3.11.2.3).

(3.11.2.1, 3.11.2.2, the site boundary for meteorological conditions, 3.11.2.3).

stable meteorological conditions (Stability cut Classification F).

p These dose rates are cut projected based on other 6

plant parameters or Greater than 500 mR/hr in-plant aamples, Whole Body or 2500 mR/hr Thyroid for 2 minutes at cut

(

the site boundary for stable meteorological These dose rates are conditions (Stability measured in the environs.

Classification F),

1 2L These dose rates are projected based on other plant parameters, id[

These dose rates are measured in the environs, y

s REVISIONi5 l

u nr.. n

oan,

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CPSES/EP TABLE 2.2 INITIATING CONDITIONS FOR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (Sheet 2 of 17)

Radioactive Effluent Release (continued)

UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY E

EPA PAC exposure levels are projected to be exceeded outside the site boundary.

Liquid radioactive Liquid radioactive j

effluent release to effluent release to 6

environment exce'eding environment greater Technical Specification than 10 times Technical limits (3.11.1.1, Specification limits i

3.11.1.2).

(3.11.1.1,.3.11.1.2).

.c l

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Y REVISIONfv'.n, so n nee, a

N CPSES/EP

~

t TABLE 2.2 INITIATING CONDITIONS FOR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (Sheet 3 of 17)

Loss of Primary Coolant Boundary UNUSUf.L EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERALEMERGENdY Reactor Coolant System Reactor Coolant System Loss of coolant accident Small or\\large loss of leak rate exceeding leak rate greater than 50 greater than the makeup coolant accident with Technical Specification but less than makeup capacity of 2 centrifugal failure of ECCS to perform limits (3.4.6.2).

capacity of 2 centrifugal charging pumps leading to severe core charging pumps (approximately 300 gpm).

degradation or melting.

(approximately 300 gpm).

6 Loss of coolant accident greater than the makeup capacity of 2 centrifugal charging pumps 'and loss of containment integrity.

Small or large loss of coolant accident and containment temperature is excessive and still rising.

or containment cooling has failed.

4 e e

I ManruR~{6 REVISION 1oR2

CPSES/EP

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TABLE 2.2 INITIATING CONDITIONS FOR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (Sneet 4 of 17)

Steam Generator Tube Failure UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY Primary to secondary Rapid gross failure of' Rapid failure of steam Se'e General Emergency for leak rate exceeding one steam generator tube generator tubes with loss Fuel Element Failure, and Technical Specification with loss of offsite of off' site power (leak Main Steam Lin,e Break.

limits but less than the power (leak rate less rate greater than makeup 8

than the makeup capacity than the makeup capacity centrifugal charging of 2 centrifugal charging of 2 centrifugal charging pumps, approximately pumps (approximately pumps, approximately 300 gpm).

300 gpm).

300 gpm).

d 6

i Rapid failure of steam See Site Area Emergency generator tubes (leak for Main Steam Line

^

rate greater than makeup

Break, capacity-of 2 centrifugal charging pumps, approximately 300 gpm).

I See Alert for Main Steam Line Break.

f REVISION 6j,'

MARCH 8, 1983

'/

CPSES/EP TABLE 2.2 INITIATING CONDITIONS FOR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (Sheet 5 of 17)

Main Steam Line Break UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY Rapid depressurization Steam line break with Steam line break with Steam line break outside of the secondary side.

primary-to-secondary leak primary-to-secondary leak containment and no rate greater than 10 gpm.

rate greater than 50 gpm capability to isolate with and indication of fuel primary-to-secondary leak damage.

rate greater than 50 gpm and indication of fuel damage.

6 Steam line break inside containment with primary-to-secondary leak rate greater than 50 gpm and indication of fuel damage and potential for loss of containment.

integrity.

Failure of a safety valve or relief valve in a safety-related system to close following pressure reduction to the applicable rescat pressure.

f REVISION 4.*

MARCH 8,-1983

._)

CPSES/EP TABLE 2.2 INITIATING CONDITIONS FOR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (Sheet 6 of 17)

Fuel Element Failure UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY i

Fuel cladding failure Severe fuel cladding Degraded core with Degraded core with loss of greater than 0.1 percent failure greater than 1.0 possible loss of coolable coolable geometry and cg; exceeding Technical minutes,fyt a total Reactor Coolant System leak, increase in 30 minutes percent increase in 30 geometry.

rate greater than 50 gpm Specification limits failed fuel equal to 5%,

with potential for loss of (34.8).

ci a dose equivalent of containment integr,ity.

l I-131 activity in the Reactor Coolant System.

greater than 300 uci/mg.

6 Degraded core with loss of coolable geometry and rapid failure of steam generhtor tubes (leak rate greater than makeup capacity) with loss of offsite power.-

See General Emergency for Loss of Primary Coolant l

Boundary.

l L

Y REVISION 6,'

MARCH 8, 4983

(~'1 CPSES/EP TABLE 2.2 INITIATING CONDITIONS FOR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (Sheet 7 of 17)

I Loss of Electrical Power UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY Loss of of fsite power ojr Loss of offsite power Loss of offsite power and Loss of offsite' power and loss of onsite AC power and loss of onsite AC loss of onsite AC power loss of onsite AC power capability.

power capability, capability for more than capability concurrent with 15 minutes.

total loss of auxiliary feedwater makeup capability for several bours resulting i

in loss of level indication l

in all steam generators.

6 l

1 l

Loss of all' vital Loss of all vital onsite DC power.

onsite DC power for more than 15 minutes.

1 c

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Y REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1883 l

4 L-__

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CPSES/EP TABLE 2.2 INITIATING CONDITIONS FOR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (Sheet 8 of 17)

Fuel Handling Accident

~

UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY' Spent fuel handling Major damage to spent fuel accident with release in the Containment or the cf radioactivity.to Fuel Handling Building the Containment or (e.g., large object damages 6

the Fuel Handling fuel or water loss below

Building, fuel level).

e I

e 9

4 e

9 9

a 4

e i

6 unnen og* 6 REVISI0 4

inoo I

L

%i CPSES/EP TABLE 2.2 INITIATING CONDITIONS FOR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (Sheet 9 of 17)

Safety System Failure or Malfunction UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY' Any advertent or Complete loss of any Complete loss of any Transient' initiated by loss inadvertent ECCS function or system function or system needed of Feedwater and Condensate initiation with needed for. plant cold for plant hot shutdown.

Systems followed by loss of verification of flow shutdown.

the Auxiliary Feedwater

.to the reactor vessel.

System (loss of principal.

heat removal system).

6

~

Loss of engineered Failure of the Transient requiring Transient requiring operation safety feature or Reactor Protection operation of shutdown of shutdown systems with fire protection System to initiate system with failure to failure to trip which t

requiring shutdown by and complete a reactor trip (continued power results in core damage or.

Technical Specifica-trip which brings the generation but no core additional failure of core.

tion limits (3.3.1, reactor subcritical.

damage immediately cooling and makeup systems 3.3.2).

evident).

(which would lead to core melt).

d Loss of containment inte-grity requiring shutdown by Technical Specification limits (3.6.1).

Failure of a safety valve or relief valve in a safety-related system to close following pressure reduction to the. applicable rescat pressure.

.c f

REVISIOy%

MARCH 8,41983 j'

~

CPSES/EP J

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TABLE 2.2 INITIATING CONDITIONS FOR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (Sheet 10 of 17)

Abnormal Reacter Coolant System Pressure, Temperature or Flow UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY Reactor Coolant System Reactor coolant pump temperature and/or seizure leading to pressure exceeding fuel fail,ure.

Technical Specification limits (3.4.9).

Fuel temperature outside of Technical i

Specification limits 6

(3.2.2, 3.2.3).

O f

REVISION 6i.

i MARCH 8, 1983

o

)

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CPSES/EP TABLE 2.2 INITIATING CONDITION 5 FOR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (Sheet 11 of 17)

Loss of Plant bontrol/ Security Compromise UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERCENCY Security threat or ongoing security Physical attach.on the Physical attack on the plant att,empted entry oj; compromise resulting in plant involving imminent resulting in unauthorized attempted sabotage.

unauthorized individuals occupancy of the Control personnel occupying the commandering an area of Room, or any other vital Control Room, or any other 6

the plant, but not areas of the' plant as control over shutdown defined in the Modified.

vital areas of the plant as defined in the Modified capability or of any Amended Security Plan.

Amended Security Plan.

vital areas as, defined in the Modified Amended Security Plan.

I Fvacua' tion of Control Evacuation of Control

~

Room anticipated or Room required with cequired with control control of shutdown of shutdown systems systems not estab-established from lished from Remote Remote Shutdown Panel Shutdown Panel within within 15 minutes.

15 minutes.

O e

5 REVISION 6I' l

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CPSES/EP TABLE 2.2 INITIATING CONDITIONS FOR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (Sheet 12 of 17)

Loss of Assessment Capability UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY Loss of indications Loss of most or all Loss of most or all

~

or alarms pn process alarms (annu.n.ciators).

alarms (annunciators).

or effluent parameters, and plant transient or other significant initiated or in 6

assessment or progress.

communications capability requiring plant shutdown by Technical Specifi-cation limits (3.1.3.3, 3.3.3.5, 3.3.3.6).

c e

1 l

EtifSION 6 MARCH 8,19d3

)

b CPSES/EP TABLE 2.2 INITIATING CONDITIONS FOR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (Sheet 13 of 17) l Fire UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY Fire lasting more than Fire potentially Confirmed loss of safety 10 minutes within the affecting safety system functions due t 6

boundaries of the systems.

fire.

Protected Area but not affecting safety systems.

I G

9 t

O O

0 D

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6 O

MARCH 8.1983{'

REVISION 6

CPSES/EP TABLE 2.2 INITIATING CONDITIONS FOR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (Sheet 14 of 17)

Natural Phenomena

,6 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY An earthquake felt An earthquake indicated An earthquake indicated in-plant or detected to be greater than the to be greatar than Safe on seismic instru-Operating Basis Shutdown Earthquake mentation.

Earthquake (0.06g).

(0.12g) and plant not in cold shutdown.

Flood, experienced Flood, experienced Flood exceeding design or projected, exceeding or projected, exceed-limits, elevation 796 feet, 3

spillway elevation ing elevation 790.5 in the Safe Shutdown

~

6 of 783 feet in the Safe feet in the Safe Impoundment and plant not Shutdown Impoundment.

Shutdown Impoundment.

in cold shutdown.

Water level in the Safe Low water level in the Low water level in the Safe Shutdown Impoundment Safe Shutdown Impoundment Shutdown Impoundment below dropping uncontrollably, below elevation 765 feet, elevation 762 feet and plant not in cold shutdown.

National Weather National Weather Winds experienced in excess i

Se'rvice warning cy; Servide' warning cg; of design levels of 80 mph winds in excess of winds in excess of as measured on meteoro-mph as measured sph as measured logical tower and plant on meteorological tower.

on meteorological not in cold shutdown, tower.

A tornado observed A tornado striking approaching or setting the plant facility.

down on plant site, f

REVISION 5' MARCH 8,{$83

CPSES/EP TABLE 2.2 INITIATING CONDITIONS FOR. EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (Sheet 15 of 17)

Other Hazards UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY Aircraft crash onsite cn; Aircraft crash into Aircraft crash affecting unusual aircraft activity facility buildings or vital structures by impact over facility, structures.

or fire and plant not in cold shutdown.

Train' derailment onsite or near the site posing threat to the plant or 6

employees.

Near-site or onsite Known explosion Severe damage to safe explosion damage to facility shutdown equipment from affecting plant missile or explosion and operation.

plant not in cold shutdown.

Near-site or onsite Uncontrolled entry Uncontrolled entry into toxic or flammable gas into facility vital areas of toxic or release.

environs of toxic or flammable gases where flammable gases.

lack of access to the area constitutes a safety problem.

f s

REVISION 6 MARCH R.

10R

J

.1 CPSES/EP TABLE 2.2 INITIATING CONDITIONS FOR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS (Sheet 16 of 17)

Other Hazards (continued)

UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY Turbine rotating Turbine failure component failure causing casing causing rapid plant penetration.

shutdown.

Transporting an externally contami-nated, injured individual offsite.

Missile. impacts from 6

whatever source on facility.

.Significant loss of control of radioactive a

materials resulting in an increase in either area radiation monitor readings, airborne concentrations, or contamination levels by a factor of 1000 or more.

N REVISION.8 MARCH 8,{l983

[

x.-

CPSES/EP TABLE 2.2 INITIATING CONDITIONS FOR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS i

(Sheet 17 of 17)

Other Hazards (continued)

UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY

.CENERAL EMERGENCY Other plant conditions Other plant conditions Other plant conditions Other plant conditions exist, exist that warrant exist that warrant exist that warrant from whatever source, that increased awareness precautionary activation activation of emergency make the release of large on the part of the plant of the Technical Support response facilities and amounts of radioactivity in operating staff or Center and placing radiological monitoring a short time period possible State and/or local the Emergenc'y Operations teams, or a precaution-(e.g., any core melt offsite author'ities Facility and key ary notification to the situation).

6 59; require plant emergency response public near the site.

shutdown under Technical personnel on standby.

Specification require-g ments or involve other than a normal controlled shutdown.

f REVISION 6j.'

MARCH 8, 1983 w

o CPSES/EP

+

3.0 NOTIFICATION METHODS AND PROCEDURES This section describes the methods and procedures by which CPSES personnel will transmit emergency informati'on to local and' State authorities, and subsequently, from such authorities to the public. Details required in the initial and follow-up messages are described, as are the types of news releases which will be used to provide the public with information and protective action.

Procedure EPP-203, " Emergency Notification and Communications", describes the notification process required for activation of the CPSES Emergency, Organization, and contains the home and office phone numbers of all TUGC0, personnel who may be required to respond to an emergency condition at CPSES. This procedure also contains those 24-hour-per-day telephone numbers of local, State, and Federal emergency response support agencies, including the NRC. In the event of an emergency condition at CPSES, the NRC will be notified via the NRC Emergency Notification System (ENS) telephone located in the Control Room.

3.1 INITIAL NOTIFICATION Following the declaration of an emergency condition at CPSES, the on-duty Shift Supervisor will, as a minimum, ensure that and agencies are notified:

the following personnel 6

Hood County and Somervell County Emergency Operations Centers a.

b.

Region 6A Headquarters of the Texas Department of Public Safety in Waco, Texas c.

CPSES Operations Superintendent (or his designated alternate) d.

NRC Incident Response Center in Bethesda, Maryland.

3.2 VERIFICATION OF INITIAL NOTIFICATI'ON 1

The authenticity of the initial notifications provided to the Hood County and Somervell County Emergency Operations Centers and the Texas Department of Public Safety may be verified by return telephone calls to CPSES as specified in the county emergency response plans and the Texas Emergency Management Plan.

3-1 REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

9 CPSES/EP W*

e 3.3

' NOTIFICATION OF CPSES EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION MEMBERS 3.3.1 NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT Normally, the Technical Support Center..the Operations Support Center, and

.the Emergency Operations Facility will not be activated at the Notification of Unusual Event Emergency Action Level (EAL). However, any one or all of these facilities may be activated at a Notification of Unusual Event at the discretion of the Emergency, Coordinator, if escalation of the emergency condition appears imminent. Upon receiving notification of the emergency condition, the Operations Superintendent, or his designated alternate, shall initiate further notification of TUGC0 emergency response personnel as appropriate.

3.3.2 ALERT,, SITE AREA FMERGENCY OR GENERAL EMERGENCY The Shift Supervisor, or another member of the on-shift operating crew at 6

the direction of the Shift Sup'ervisor,-shall notify onsite personnel through an announcement over the plant page-party system. Off-duty emergency response personnel shall be notified in accordance with the provisions of Procedure EPP-203.

3.4 INITIAL MESSAGES TO OFFSITE AUTHORITIES The initial notification message transmitted to offsite authorities will

_Ji contain the following information:

a.

Caller identification.

b ', Class and a brief description of the emergency condition.

c.

Recommendations regarding activation of the Prompt Notification System.

i d.

Whether or not a radiological release is in progress and if so, the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) sectors affected by that release,

~

e.

Recommended protective actions, if any.

l f.

Status of o'ffsite radiological monitoring activities.

g.

Assistance, if any, which may Gb desired.

I 3-2 REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

A

,e CPSES/,EP

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1 3.5 FOLLOW-UP MESSAGES TO OFFSITE AUTHORITIES i

After the initial notifications to offsite authorities have been mad,e from CPSES, responsib,ility for communications with offsite authorities will be assumed by the Technical Support Center, until such time that the Emergency Operations Facility is manned and functional.

The 'following information will be provided to offsite authorities in follow-up messages if known and appropriate to the circumstances.

a.

Caller identification.

b.

Emergency Action Level in effect.

c.

Type of actual or projected radiological release (airborne, waterborne, or surface spill) and astimated duration and impact times, d.

Estimated quantity of radioactive material released, and the point of release.

6 Chemical and physical form of the released material, including e.

estimates of the relative quantities and concentrations of noble gases, iodines, and particulates.

f.

Meteorological conditions (wind velocity, direction, temperature, atmospheric stability data, and form of precipitation, if any).

g.

Actual or projected dose rates and the integrated doses at the site boundary, and at 2,5 and 10 miles, and the affected sectors.

h.

Estimates of any surface radioactive contamination, onsite or offsite.

1.

Status of emergency response actions initiated.

.j. Recommended offsita emergency response actions, including protective action measures.

k.

Requests for any required onsite support from offsite organizations.

l 1.

Prognosis for the escalation or termination of the, emergency condition

}

based upon current plant information.

1 l

3-3 l

REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

g

.., +...

- -,. -.... -. ?

n*

CPSES/EP 3.6 PUBLIC WARNING The resident and transient population within the 10-mile EPZ is alerted to an emergency condition at CPSES by an Outdoor Warnihg System. The Outdoor Warning System is comprised of a series of sirens which alert the populace to tune their t.elevisions and radios to designated Emergency Broadcast 5

System (EBS) stations to obtain current int'ormation and recommended protective actions.

The Outdoor Warning System consists of 40 sirens, each rated at 128 decibels (dB) at 100 feet. The locations of the sirens within the 10-mile EPZ are such that approximately 90 percent of the EPZ area is subject 'to the design basis alerting signal. The design basis alerting signal is at 6

least 10 dB above the ambient background noise level. Since the population density within the 10-mile EPZ around CPSES is less than 2000 persons per square mile and a field survey was not conducted, the ambient background 5l noise level was assumed to be 50 dB (per NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Appendix 3, 6l Paragraph 3.e).

Therefore, each siren emits a signal that is calculated to be 60 dB, 9000 feet from the source. The remaining 10 percent of the 10-mile EPZ has an estimated ambient background noise level of 40 dB and

'5 little or no known resident population. The sound level for the sirens in these areas is 50 dB which effectively doubles the radius of the siren coverage.

6l The EBS provides emergency-related information to t'he general public in the

.)

CPSES area over radio station WBAP (820 AM) and television station WFAA (Channel 5).

The information and instructions provided to the general 5

public via the EBS will originate from county officials. CPSES personnel will provide assistance to the counties in the preparation of EBS messages.

A public information package (refer to Sec' tion 5.0, "Public Education and Information", of this plan) is distributed to the residents and is 6

available to the transient population within the 10-mile EPZ to provide additional instructions and information regarding the actions of-the I

general public in the event of an emergency at CPSES.

Local officials, primarily the County Judges and the County Sheriffs, are responsible for operating the Outdoor Warning System and providing messages 5

to the EBS stations.

CPSES shall retain ownership, maintenance and I

testing of the system. CPSES and State emergency response personnel shall make recommendations to the local officials concerning the use of the system; however, only the local officials have access to the system l

controls and can authorize their use in warning the public.

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3-4 REVISION 6 l

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_j Operation of the Outdoor Warning System is, accomplished from,either l6 county's Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Normally, each county EOC will operate those sirens within its jurisdiction; however, should the need

-arise, either EOC can operate the entire system. The 10-mile EPZ has been 5

divided into four quadrants. The sirens located in each quadrant are programmed to a unique control code.

Each quadrant can be activated independently of the other quadrants. No single siren can be operated l6

' individually.

3.7 METHODS OF PROVIDING PUBLIC INFORMATION REGARDING PROTECTIVE ACTION MEASURES Subsection 3.6 identifies'the methods to be used in notifying the general public in the Plume Exposure EPZ of the occurrence of an emergency condition at CPSES. Recommendations regarding protective action measures to be implemented for the population-at-risk will be provided to county and State officials by the Emergency Coord'inator. Initial information t 6

expedite the implementation of~ protective measures by the public will be provided through messages broadcast on the EBS.

Messages to the public will address appropriate aspects of protection (e.g., sheltering, ad hoc respiratory protection, or eva.cuation).

Pre-formatted messages are included as_part of the State and county em'ergency response plans. Additional information'will be released as

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prescribed in Section 5.0 of this plan.

3-5 REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983 m

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• L-.

-r 4.0 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS A comprehensive communications system is provided to ensure reliable intraplant communications, plant-to-offsite telephone and carrier communications, and offsite emergency response communications with public safety agencies. Figures 4.1 through 4.5 illustrate the CPSES communication interfaces between each emergency response facility and the various responding organizations and offsite agencies.

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Effective communications between personnel during plant startup, operation, shutdown, refueling, and_ maintenance activities are provided by the use of private automatic branch exchange (PBX) telephone, sound-powered telephone, plant page-party, and two-way radio systems.

Procedure EPP-203, " Emergency Notification and Communications", provides-6 instructions fo'r the initial notification of all emergency response personnel, and offsite organizations and agencies who will respond to, or are required to be cognizant of, an emergency condition at CPSES. This procedure contains call lists, instructions for communicators and prescribed formats for notification messages to ensure that accurate information is transmitted in a timely manner.

Communications responsibilities for the organizations are described in Table 4.1, " Emergency Response Communications Responsibilities". This table lists the titles of those' individuals who have the primary responsibilities for emergency response communications.

4.1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The following systems comprise the intraplant and plant-to-offsite communication systems for both units at CPSES:

4.1.1 PLANT PAGE-PARTY SYSTEM 6

The intraplant page-party system provides two separate and independent channels of communication, namely page and party lines. The page-party line loud speakers are powered by individual amplifiers, and power to this system is supplied from a source which remains available in the event of a

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loss of offsite power.

l The system layout permits communication between the Control Room and all l

plant' areas and buildings for both units. This system also. permits two-way communications between two or more locations. Speakers and microphone handsets are installed at locations' vital to the operation of the plant and the safety of personnel. The voice paging channel output is audible over the expected noise levels under both normal and emergency conditions.

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REVISION 6 l

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Five separate and independent party lines are provided to. permit

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communicetions between handset stations only, thereby making the page channel available to others.- All five party lines are available at all handset stations, except those located in the plant elevators where only one party line is available. Selection of a desired channel is achieved by a multiposition switch provided as a part of the handset station. Both the page channel and the party line channels, which are independent, may be used simultaneously without interference.

A page-party line,(with only one party line) handset s ation is installed in each elevator to permit communications in an emergency situa. tion.

4.1.2 INTPAPLANT TELEPHONE SYSTEM An independent touchtone telephone system, the PBX telephone system, is provided for uninterrupted private communication between the following areas:,the Control Room, Fuel Building, health physics and instrument shop areas, remote shutdown panel area, hot shop, Security Building, reactor operating platform areas, intake structures, Maintenance Building offices, Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center, Ecargency Op"erations Facility, and the Nuclear Operation Support Facility and Administration Building offices and work areas.

The PBX telephone system is integrated with the Intraplant Communication System through an isolating device to ensure that a single failure in either one of these two systems does not affect safe and reliable operation of the other system. Power is supplied to the PBX telephone system from,

the non-ESF bus. When the PBX telephone system's normal AC power supply is lost, a number of predetermined telephone stations remain operable which derive their power from the public telephone system.

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4.1.3 INTRAPLANT SOUND-POWERED TELEPHONE SYSTEM A sound-powered. telephone system, which is independent of all other.

communications systems and external power sources, is provided to serve i

l three purposes:

(1) to provide communications in critical in-plant areas, I

6 (2) to serve as a backup to the plant page-party system in critical in-plant areas, and (3) to provide uninterruptible communication channels for maintenance, calibration, testing, and refueling activities. This system provides standby communications capability and does not depend on external sources of power other than the human voice.

This system consists of three subsystems per unit as follows:

l Subsystem One:

Maintenance Loops - Consists of a two-channel, hard-wired communications link between the Control Room area and i

l critical in-plant areas.

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REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983 L-

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Subsystem Two:

. Refueling Loops - Consists of a two-channel, hard-wired communications link between the Control Room area and 6

fuel handling areas. This subsystem is primarily provided for refueling operations.

Subsystem Three:

Emergency Loops - Consists of a two-channel, hard-wired communications link between the Remote Shutdown Panel and

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safety-related equipment areas. The cables of this subsystem are routed in separate conduits from the other two subsystems. This subsystem is primarily provided for communications in the unlikely event that the Control Room becomes uninhabitable.

The headset jack stations are conveniently located on panels in the Control Room and in critical areas.

Communications can be established between the Control Room and any local panel, or between any two local panels, by plugging the headsets into jack stationr which are mounted in the Control Room, or in or near the panels.

6 The number and location of sound-powered telephone system receptacles provide for sufficient communications to place the plant in a hot shutdown or a cold shutdown mode from either the Control Room or from the Remote Shutdown Panel and other areas. The sound-powered telephone system can be used as a backup to the plant page-party system in the critical equipment areas of the plant. One independent howler loop per unit is also provided for sound-powered signaling purposes.

4.1.4 INTRAPLANT PORTABLE RADIO TRANSMITTER-RECEIVER SYSTDi For the CPSES Security Organization's use only, two separate communications l6 channels of unique wavelengt,hs are provided to enable two-way radio communicat. ion between security posts and the various plant buildings.

Portable transmitter-receivers operating on either one or both channels are provided for use by Security personnel for communication between various areas of; the plant.

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.To improve reception in the plant buildings, monitor receivers or coaxial slotted cables, or both, are installed where required throughout the plant buildings. The radio transmitter carrier frequencies are chosen to preclude interference with radio-controlled cranes and the carrier frequencies used by the Switchyard remote supervisory carrier current equipment.

4-3 REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

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4.1.5 PUBL'IC TELEPHONE SYSTEM

' a)

The public telephone system is,interconne.cted to the Intraplant Telephone

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System (PBX telephone system) by trunk lines. This permits access to the public telephone system from the Control Room, Technical Support Center.

Emergency Operations Facility, Nuclear Operations Support Facility, health physics and instrument shop areas, Remote Shutdown Panel, Security Building, hot shop, Maintenance Building offices, Administration Building offices and work areas, and intake structures.

4.1.6 TWO-WAY RADIO TRANSMITTER-RECEIVER SYSTEM (IsLANT-TO-OFFSITE)

The two-way radio transmitter-receiver system is provided for emergency response communications between the plant and offsite public safety agencies.

In addition, this system will be utilized to activate a radio-paging 6

network which will notify key members of the CPSES Emergency Organization upon the declaration of an Emergency Action Level.

4.1.7 DIRECT TELEPHONE LINE TO THE SYSTEM DISPATCHER As an aid to power plant and transmission system operation, a direct leased telephone line and speaker circuit is available to the CPSES operators in the Centrol Room. This direct line is independent of the PSX system. The System Operations Center, which is manned at all times, makes the direct line available for outside communication in the event of an emergency.

i 4.1.8 OTHER DIRECT TELEPHONE LINES l

A number of trunk line.s provide direct communications between offsite 5

locations and various CPSES facilities. These lines allow offsite 1'

emergency response organizations to contact CPSES emergency response personnel at any. time co' verify initi'al communications and to establish, if necessary, communications with their personnel and facilities stationed onsite; allow CPSES radiological monitoring teams to transmit' field data should their radio fail; and allow the general public direct access to 6

CPSES Public Information personnel manning rumor control telephones.

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4.1.9 EMERGENCY EVACUATION ALARM SYSTEM The emergency evacuation alarm is generated by a solid state multifrequency audio oscillator capable of producing five distinctive tones which can be i,

heard over all plant paging zones via the plant page-party system. The l

5 evacuation alarm is a pulse tone at a freque'ncy of 475 (! 25) hertz at a l-rate of 4.5 (t 0.5) cycles /sec. This tone meets the specifications i

described in ANSI /ANS 2.3-1979 and Regulatory Guide 8.5.

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j REVISION 6 l

MARCH 8, 1983 l

O CPSES/EP The emergency evacuation alarm system, including the multifrequency audio oscillator, is powered.by a source which remains availab,le in the event of a loss of offsite power and provides a unique alarm signal to prompt personnel evacuation in the event of an emergency. This alarm is initiated by the Control Room operator in the event that a site evacuation is ordered by the Emergency Coordinator.

4.1.10 DIRECT LINE TO THE REGIONAL AND LdCAL EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTERS i

A dedicated line has been established that simultaneously links CPSES with the Texas Department of Public Safety office in Waco, the Somervell County Emergency Operations Center and the Hood County Emergency Operations Center. When a call has been initiated on this line, the other telephones will ring until one is acknowledged. A visiual indicator on the other

. telephones will alert the remaining parties to the open line.

Communications among individuals, which are unrelated to an actual emergency, exercise or drill, shall not be conducted on this line.

4.2 NRC EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM 5

The Emergency Notification System (ENS) is a direct and dedicated telephone from CPSES to the NRC Incident Response Center (IRC). 'In an emergency condition, CPSES initiates contact wit.h the NRC IRC, which is manned continuously by NRC technical staff Duty Officers, by cerely lifting the receiver from its cradle. This action will cause a ring at the IRC, thus alerting NRC personnel. At CPSES, ENS extensions are located in the Control Room, the Technical Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility. During emergencies, this line shall be used exclusively for transmitting unevaluated data to a limited audience at the IRC.

4.3 NRC HEALTH PHYSICS NETWORK 5

The Health Physics Network (HPN) is a direct and dedicated telephone system, similar to a long distance intercom system. Extensions'of this system are located in the Radiation Protection office, Emergency Operations Facility, NRC Resident Inspector's office and Technical Support Center.

In contrast to the ENS, the HPN telephones are not used for immediate notification. This system is activated by the NRC at the onset of an incident and will remain open throughout the incident for the collection of radiological and environmental information, and for communications between l

the IRC and the radiplogical assessment personnel located in the Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility.

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4-5, l

l REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

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4.4 FACSIMILE COMMUNICATIONS FacsimilkcommunicationscapabilityisprovidedviathePBXtelephone system between the Technical Support Center, Emergency Operations. Facility and the NRC. The facsimile transceivers utilize dial up telephones and must be attended in order to transmit or receive information.

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MARCH 8, 1983

~:.

e-CPSES/EP TABLE 4.1 EMERGENCY RESPONSE COMMUNICATIONS RESPONSIBILITIEE AND INTERFACES Emergency Response Facility /

Organization Responsibility Interface Control Room Shift Supervisor Control Room' personnel Technical Support Center TSC Manager Communicator Emergency Operations Facility Emergency Coordinator Communicator Onsite Survey Teams Onsite Radiological Field Teams Assessment Coordinator Communicator Offsite Monitoring Teams Radiation Protection Monitoring Teams 6

i Coordinator Communicator Hood County Emergency County Sheriff Dispatcher Operations Center Somervell County Emergency County Sheriff Dispatcher Operations Center Texas Department of Public Commander Dispa.tcher Safety. Waco NRC Incident Response Duty Officer Duty Officer Center, Bethesda I

NRC-Region IV Duty Officer Duty Officer Hood Ceneral Hospital Hospital Administrator Hospital Operator i

REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983 e-w

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NRC

+

Incident

[ Department l

Reepenee l

• f I

Center

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Public Safety Waco OFFSITE i

]

ONSITE I

Hood County h

EOC h

h Technical Support Center

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So.rv.ii 1

County A

EoC Emergency Operations CONTROL l

Facility ROOM i

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S.-Ic...nd C

off-outy Operation

• A l

**aa*8 Support l

Center Security in-Plant System l

Dispatcher I

Areae l

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Note 1 )

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LEGEND l

@ T.i., hon. (Norm.i>

l

@ Two-way R.dio

@ T.I. phon. (D.dicat.d>

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION

@ Em.rmy Notitic. tion Sy.t."

EMERGENCY PLAN (sieo r.pr.o.nts th. N.aith physics N.twork) h Sound-Powered Telephone System CONTROL ROOM COMMUNICATIONS INTERFACES Note 11 This system can access critical in-plant arose, fuel handling areas, and the Re-IO mote Shutdown Penel and saf ety-related egulament areas.

MARCH 8, 1983

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C.unty Support EOC ggypoRT C.at.r hjI Q

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@ T.I. phon. (Norr.i>

@ Two-w.y R.elo REVISION 6 -

I MARCH 8, 1983 (Q T.i. phon. masse t.e>

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION

@ Em.rS.ney Notnie tion Sr.t.m EMERGENCY PLAN l

t.i.o r.pr...nt. th. N..Mh Phy.lc.

N.tw.th)

TECNNICAL SUPPORT CENTER COMMUNICATIONS INTERFACES i

l FIGURE 4.2

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Centrol Room i.

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SUPPORT Emergency h

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Center Onette and ler-Plant Survey I

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@ T. - we,Rede.

COMANCHE PEAK

@ Tel. phone (Oedicated)

STEAM ELECTRIC STATION I EMERGENCY PLAN l

OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER l

COMMUNICATIONS INTERFACES FlouRE 4.3 l

REVISION'6 MARCH 8, 1983

s s

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W

..e CPSES NRC OHelte incident l

MonMoring i

i

Response

Teeme Center

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of Public OFFSITE

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Support

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'\\ FACILITY OPERATIONS #

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f Support V

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Off-Duty Personnel Operatione

. A, Support Center i

f Security 5

1 i

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LEGEND skj Telephone Normal)

@ Two-way Radle COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION y Telepnene (Dedicated)

EMERGENCY PLAN i

j Emergency Neilfication System EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (eleo represente the Health Phyelce COMMUNICATIOr8 INTERFACES

. Network)

FIGURE 4.4 l

REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

9M

.s OFFsITs

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8 Control i

County Room EOC

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SECURITY f

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l FacilMy

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Technical I

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@ To w a (w==an COMANCHE PEAK

@ Two-way R.mo STEAM ELECTRIC STATION EMERGENCY PLAN SECURITY COMMUNIC %TIOES INTERFACES FIGURE 4.5 REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

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5.0 PUBLIC EDUCATION AND INFORMATION A public information program hss been developed by TUGC0 to inform and educa'te the public within ths 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). The scope of this program includes providing to the public information about nuclear power and CPSES, and providing protective action instructions for the public use in the event that an emergency is declared at.CPSES. The program has been reviewed by the local governments, the Texas Division of Emergency Management, and the Texas Department of Health.

An information package will be prepared and distributed annually eq each residence with the 10-mile EPZ. This information package contains generic information about nuclear power and specific information about CPSES.

This information package'also addresses recommended protective actions, such as sheltering or evacuation, recommended steps to prepare for taking a protective action, a map showing evacuation routes, a list of the relocation centers, a list of radio and television stations that provide emergency information, and a list of telephone numbers for obtaining information from the local-sheriff's offi'ce or CPSES. For handicapped persons, two cards (one addressed to each county sheriff) will be enclosed in this package. The completed card will inform the sheriff of the location of the handicapped person and whether or not special a.sistance or transportation is required. Revisions to the information packaga will be distributed as necessary. An independent company provides a mailing list that includes all residents within the two counties. This list, which updated annually, will be used to distribute a periodic newsletter and the annual emergency information package.

6 The transient population within the 10-mile EPZ will receive emergency

,information specific to CPSES from public notices and pamph.lets placed in locations such as Squaw Creek Park, the entrance to Dinosaur State Park, County Courthouses,. County Law Enforcement Centers, and other public buildings. Private businesses shall also be utilized with cooperation from the owner. This information will be, limited to protective action recommendations, a list of the relocation centers, a map showing'the I

evacuation routes, telephone numbers for' contacting the local sheriff's.

l office or CPSES and a list of the radio and television stations that provide emergency information.

Public meetings may be held occasionally to answer any questions that the local residents may have about CPSES and emergency preparedness. Prior to the annual exercise, a news conference will be conducted by TUGC0 Public Informa~ tion personnel to acquaint the news media with the purpose of the L

exercise, to present information and answer questions regarding emergency l

preparedness activities at CPSES, and to educate the media concerning I

nuclear power. These meetings may be held in the Nuclear Operations Support Facility (NOSF), in local community meeting halls or in the i

5-1 REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983 vt

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Dallas-Fort. Worth Metroplex area, and will be preceeded by a public -

announcement.

The Nuclear Operations Support Facility (NOSF) at CPSES encompasses a vis'itor's center. The visitor's center consists of a public viewing room that overlooks the simulator, a display area and an auditorium. In the auditorium, which seats 75 people, the visiting public may view a brief slide show about nuclear power. News conferences will also be held in the auditorium. The display area is approximately 3,000 square feet in size 6

and contains a number of exhibits ranging from the development of nuclear power and CPSES to film clips about spent fuel cask testing and a quiz about nuclear power.

5.1 PUBLIC INFORMATION RELEASES DURING EMERGENCY CONDITIONS In the event of an emergency condition at CPSES, the news media will be invited to news conferences conducted by the Company spokesperson at the NOSF auditorium or other alternate facility. To the extent possible, the Public Information Coordinator shall coordinate these news conferences with Federal, State and local public information personnel. Public information releases shall be made in accordance with Procedure EPP-115. " Release of Emergency-Related Information to the Public".

5.2 RUMOR CONTROL At CPSES, two telephones shall be utilized for rumor control. During

' )

routine' operations, these telephones will be answered by Public Information personnel during the normal Station operating hours. At other times, an 6

automatic answering machine will refer the caller to the Hood County or Somervell County sheriff's Office. Should an emergency sitt stion arise, personnel from the CPSES Administrative Department will man these telephones under the direction of the Public Information Coordinator on a I24-hour-per-daybasisuntilreleasedbytheEmergencyCoordinator.

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REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983 1

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,3 6.0 EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT This section identifies, locates and describes those emergency response facilities and equipment utilized by the CPSES Emergency Organization in because of its role in normal Station operations, is always functional, a the event that an cmergency is declared at CPSES. The Control Room, thus is not considered in the following discussion.

Although the Emergency Coordinator has the option of activating any one or all of the CPSES emergency response facilities at an Emergency Action Level (EAL) other than that prescribed in the Emergency Plan Procedures governing emergency response facility activation, facility activation is generally dependent upon the EAL declared.

6-The facility layouts and the specific details regarding the activation and staffing of each emergency response facility are provided in the various Emergency Plan Procedures referenced in this section. The duties and i

responsibilities of those personnel assigned to each emergency response facility are described in Proredures EPP-109, " Duties of the Emergency Coordinator", and EPP-112. " Duties of Emergency Response Personnel".

6.1 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER The Technical Support Center (TSC) is the onsite emergency response facility located close to the Control Room that shall provide plant management and technical support to Control Room personnel during emergency conditions. The TSC is equipped with technical data displays and plant records to assist TSC personnel in the detailed analysis and diagnosis of abnormal plant conditions and any signifis.ut ::1 case of radioactivity to the environment. The TSC shall be the primary communications center for the plant during an emergency. The TSC Manager shall use the resources of the TSC to assist the Control Room personnel by handling administrative items, technical ev'aluations, and contact with offsite authorities, thus relieving the Control Room of these functions. At CPSES, the TSC is 6

located in the observation area above the Control Room, at elevation

)

840'-6" of the Control Building. This places it in close proximity to the Control Room and provides it with the sante habitability conditions as the Control Room. The TSC encompasses approximately 1,500 sq. ft, in area.

The TSC staff is composed of Station management, Engineering, Operations, Maintenance and Radiation Protection personnel. The TSC Manager is supplemented by the TSC Advisor, the Maintenance Coordinator, the-Operations Coordinator, the Engineering Team Coordinator and the Onsite Radiological Assessment Coordinator, and their support personnel. The duties and responsibilities for each TSC emergency plan position.are described in Procedure EPP-112.

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REVISION 6 l-MAR,CH 8, 1983

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To support'the emergency response activities of those pers'onnel assigned to

• the TSC, the TSC is equipped with interactive terminals to the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and the Radiation Monitoring System (RMS),

as-built Station drawings and flow diagrams, status boards, a technical library, and radio and telephone communications equipment. The TSC has been designed and is equipped to support continuous operations over a 6

protracted period of time.

Generally, the TSC will be activated at an Alert or higher EAL as prescribed in Procedure EPP-204, " Activation of the Technical Support Center".

In the event that the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is activated, the responsibilities for communicating and interfacing with offsite Federal, State and local authorities shall be transferred to the EOF.

6.2 OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER The Operations Support Center (OSC) is an onsite emergency response staging area separate from the Control Room and the TSC, where the Emergency Repair and Damage Control Group and other CPSES emergency response support personnel shall report in an emergency. Direct communication's are provided between the OSC and the TSC so that personnel reporting to the OSC can be assigned to duties in support of emergency response operations. The OSC is located south of the Turbine Building at elevation 810', and encompasses an area of approximately 1,000 sq. ft.

To support the emergency response activities of the OSC Supervisor a.nd

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6 ther emergency response personnel stationed at the OSC, the OSC is equipped with Emergency Lockers and Kits, respiratory protection equipment, auxiliary lighting, radio and telephone communications equipment, and first aid equipment.

As a minimum, the OSC will be activated at an Alert or higher EAL as prescribed in Procedure EPP-205, " Activation of the Operations Support Center".

6.3 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is the onsite emergency response facility from which the management of the overall CPSES emargency response, including coordination with Federal, State, and local officials, and 6

coordination of radiological and environmental public protective actions will occur. The EOF is equipped with appropriate technical data-displays and plant records to assist EOF personnel in the diagnosis of plant conditions and to evaluate the potential or actual release of radioactive materials to the environment. At the EOF, the Emergency Coordinator shall organize and manage offsite TUGC0 resources to support TSC and Control Room 9

6-2 I

REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

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personnel. The EOF is a part of'the Nuclear Operations Support Facility (NOSF), which is located 1.2 miles west of the Station in an optimum I

meteorological sector.

2he. EOF encompasses a working space area of approximately 3,200 sq. ft.,

and will accommodate approximately 35 persons, including 10 Federal emergency response personnel. If required, provisions will be made to accommodate a limited number of -local and State emergency response personnel at the EOF.

The EOF staff is composed of management personnel drawn from th'e Station and TUGC0 Nuclear Adminihtration organizations, and Engineering, Administrative, Security, and Radiation Protection personnel. The Emergency Coordinator is supported by the Engineering Support Coordinator, the Logistical Support Coordinator, the Security Supervisor, the Communications Coordinator, the Public Information Coordinator, and the Radiation Protection Coordinator, and their staffs. The duties and responsibilities for each EOF emergency plan position are described in Procedures EPP-109 and EPP-112.

6 To support the emergency response activities of those personnel assigned to the EOF, the EOF is equipped with interactive terminals for the SPDS and RMS, as-built Station drawings and flow diagrams, status boards, a technical library, and radio and telephone communications equipment. In addition, the EOF is equipped to process personnel dosimetry and isotopically analyze samples collected by the radiological monitoring teams. Furthermore, since the EOF is attached to the NOSF, convenient access is provided to the News Center, decontamination facilities, the Control Room simulator, nuclear operations training facilities, laboratories, classrooms, and a library located in the ene NOSF. The EOF has been designed and is equipped to support continuous operations over a protracted period of time.

Generally, the EOF will be activated if a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency is declared at CPSES. Activation of the EOF will be accomplished j

as prescribed in Procedure EPP-206, " Activation of the Emergency Operations

~

Facility".

6.4 NEWS CENTER The News Center is the single contact point at CPSES for the dissemination L

[

of information to the public and news media. The News Center contains facilities and equipment to support public information and rumor control activi:ies, and is capable of accommodating 75 media personnel. The News i

Center is located in the NOSF.

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J Those activities conducted at the News Center will be coordinated by the News Center Manager and his support staff as prescribed in Procedure EPP-112.

6 As a minimum, the News Center will be activated if a Site Area Emergency or a General Emergency is declared at CPSES. Activation of the News Center will be accomplished as prescribed in Procedure EPP-207, " Activation of the News Center".

6.5 EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES RADIOLOGICAL HABITABILITY Each of the CPSES emergency response facilities meets or exceeds the habitability specifications required by NUREG-0696, " Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities". As stated perviously, the TSC is located within the Control Room shielding and ventilation envelope. The OSC has no special shielding or ventilation requirements. The EOF has a dedicated ventilation system with HEPA filtration that will mafntain a 5

slight pcsitive pressure within that fac'ility. A shielding evaluation of the EOF exterior walls has confirmed a protection factor of 15 to 1.

These facilities should be habitable throughout most emergency conditions.

For radiological considerations, an emergency response facility shall be evacuated if the direct radiation levels within that facility cause personnel exposures in excess of twice the CPSES administrative limits within one hour. Airborne considerations shall be evaluated pursuant to the current status of the emergency condition. To ensure that the established limits are not exceeded, a portable radiation detector, such as the Ludlum Model 300 Area Monitor, and a constant air monitor (CAM), which is capable of the simultaneous detection of radioactive particulates, halogens and noble gases and of sufficient s9nsitivity to detect the halogens in concentrations as low as 1 x 10 uCi/ce, shall be placed in each emergency response facility.

Should evacuation of the EOF be required, the. Emergency Operations Center.

in either Somervell County or Hood County shall be utilized as an alternate CPSES emergency response management, decision-making and communications center. Radiological assessment activities shall be relocated to the State's mobile radiological laboratory.

6 6.6

' LABORATORY FACILITIES AT THE EOF-NOSF Backup chemical and radiochemical laboratory facilities are provided at the EOF-NOSF complex. These facilities include a fully-equipped chemistry laboratory, a separate radiochemistry laboratory, and a radiation counting room. The total dedicated floor space is approximately 1,200 sq. ft.

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Figure 6.8 shows the location of these laboratory facilities relative to the EOF.

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During normal operations, the EOF-NOSF laboratory facilities will be maintained and used for training purposes. During an emergency-situation, these facilities will be readily available for performing post-accident radiological analyses.

The radiation measurement instrumentation available in the EOF counting room includes the following:

a.

A Canberra Series 85/Ge-Li gamma-ray spectral analysis system; and b.

A Nuclear Management Corporation PC-55 alpha-beta gas proportional counter.

Since these radiation counting systems are located in a low background area, these systems will provide backup capabilities for measuring the gross radiation level and isotopic characterization of diluted, post-accident samples of primary coolant. These systems also provide additional capabilities for recounting particulate filters and silver zeolite / charcoal cartridges, which are obtained from the radiological mo'nitoring teams, for radioiodines and noble gas isotopes. Envirencental samples may also be analyzed at the EOF-NOSF laberatory facilities.

6.7 OTHER RADIOLOGICAL LABORATORY SUPPORT 6

In' addition to those chemi'al and radiochemical laboratory facilities c

. located onsite at CPSES, the following laboratory facilities are available s

to TUCCO in support of emergency response activities:

j a.

The mobile radiological laboratory operated by the Texas Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control, provides back-up capabilities to onsite facilities in the evaluation of low-level radiochemical samples.

It is expected that this laboratory will arrive onsite within four (4) hours of initial notification.

b.

The chemical'and radiochemical laboratory. facilities of neighboring nuclear utilities as coordinated by INPO.

c.

The NRC mobile radiological laboratory as coordinated by the NRC-Regior IV Site Team Leader.

d.

The laboratory facilities of the Nuclear Science. Center at Texas A&M University in College Station, Texas. This laboratory's capabilities include environmental sample evaluation, and gamma, pH, chloride, boron, dissolved oxygen and conductivity analyses.

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6.8 DECONTAMINATION FACILITIES Decontamination stations are located in the Turbine Building and at the NOSF. These stations are equipped with showers, sinks, supplies and spare clothing to support decontamination activities.

The decontamination facility located in the NOSF adjacent to the EOF is designed to accommodate personnel evacuating from the Station who may be contaminated and personnel returning f rom the field or from planned.

reentries into the Station. environs. This facility is equipped with a g

sink, three showers, two personnel survey areas, a dressing area, and an interim radionetive warte and material storage room. Water used for decontamination parposes shall be retained in a storage tank for later sampling and processing, if required. Any solid waste generated as a result of decontamination activities shall be introduced into the Station radioactive waste processing system when it is appropriate to do so.

' These facilities are illustrated in Figures 9.1 and 9.2 in Section 9.0,

" Radiological Exposure Control", of this plan.

6.9 ONSITE EMERGENCY AID FACILITIES First aid stations are located in the Turbine Building across from the Radiation Protection office and at the NOSF. These stations are equipped with standard first aid supplies and stretchers.

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6.10 EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES Each emergency response facility (the Control Room, TSC, EOF and OSC), as well as Hood General Hospital, is supplied with emergency equipment and supplies commensurate to the response expected from that facility.

S.ection 15.0, Appendix J provides representative listing of those emergency

.6l equipment and supplies maintained at each emergency response facility.

Complete equipment and supplies-lists, and the associated surveillance and inventory requirements are provided in Procedure EPP-107, " Maintenance and Inventory of Emergency Equipment and Supplies". This procedure requires an inventory check of all emergency supplies at least once each calendar quarter and after each use or periodic testing. Exchange or removal of items shall.be controlled such that the prescribed inventory levels are always maintained.

Those emergency equipment and supplies maintained at the EOF include three 6

radiological monitoring field kits containing protective clothing, respiratory protection equipment, portable radiation monitoring equipment, and miscellaneous maintenance-type equipment. These equipment and supplies are available for use by the Offsite Monitoring Teams, personnel stationed at the EOF, and personnel who may be required to reenter the Station 6-6 i

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environs., The TSC, OSC and Control Room are similarly stocked with emergency equipment and supplies to ensure their preparedness in the event 6

of an emergency. Photography equipment shall be made available from the CPSES Administration Building as required by the situation.

Thyroid blocking drugs shall be stored in bulk at the EOF.

Immediately available supplies will provide protection for at least 200 Station, 6

Federal, State and local emergency response personnel for a period of up to 7 days. Smaller quantities shall be maintained in the radiological monitoring field kits, the TSC and the OSC.

At least one Company vehicle, which is maintained a,e the CPSES Administration Building, shall be available for use by Offsite Monitoring 5

Teams personnel. The keys for this vehicle are maintained by CPSES Security at the Primary Access Point.

Those supplies maintained at Hood General Hospital include protective clothing, personnel monitoring equipment, contamination control supplies, and' selected procedures for use by the hospital staff.

6.11 STATE AND LOCAL EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTERS The State of Texas Emergency Operations Center (EOC) serving CPSES is located in Waco, Texas, and is colocated with the Department of Public l6 Safety (DPS) District 6A Office. This office is staffed 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />s-per-day by the commanding Highway Patrol Officer and his staff.

Initial notification of an emergency condition at CPSES will be transmitted to the Regional EOC via a dedicated telephone line from CPSES to the Regional E0C.

The EOC in Waco shall then notify the State EOC in Austin, Texas, from which the State's emergency response operations would then be activated in 6

accordance with the Texas Emergency Management Plan.

The Emergency Operations Centers for the two county governments surrounding CPSES are the Hood County and Somervell County Sheriff's Offices. Each 5

Sheriff's Office shall initiate its respective county Emergency Operations Pla'n.

At the request of the appropriate State or local authorities, Texas 6

Utilities representatives, who are familiar with Station operations and the CPSES Emergency Plan, shall be dispatched to the State and local E0C's.

The representatives will function as advisors to the EOC managers and could act as a liaison between those managers and the CPSES Emergency 5

Organization. However, these representatives will not act as spokespersons for the Company.

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6.12 ASSESSMENT SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT 6

The following paragraphs describe those systems and equipment to be utilized by the CPSES Emergency Organization to ascess plant systems status; in-plant, onsite and offsite radiological conditions; and the overall safety status of the plant.

6 12.1 SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTDI The Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) provides assistance to Control Room personnel in evaluating the safety status of the plant. The SPDS serves to concentrate a minimum set of plant parameters from which the plant safety status can be assessed. More detailed plant information is provided by secondary displays.

The SPDS information is based on software and displays developed for the Safety Assessment System (SAS). The SAS provides a centralized, flexible, computer-based data and display system to assist Control Room, TSC and EOF personnel in evaluating the overall safety status of the plant. This is accomplished by providing to these personnel a high-level graphic display containing a minimum set of key plant parameters. All graphic displays are presented to the Control Room personnel on a high-resolution, multi-color CRT.

All data displayed by the SAS is validated by comparing redundant sensors, checking the data values ~against reasonable limits, calculating rates of

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change, and checking temperature-versus-pressure curves. These data 6l displays are updated and validated on an essentially real-time basis. A 1 dedicated function button panel allows the operator to select from several predetermined second-level displays at any time. The SPDS displays are also available to TSC and EOF personnel.

The primary display consists of 'aar graphs of selected parameter values, digital ~ status indicators for important safety system parameters, and i

digital values. The parameters indicated by bar graphs and digital value's include reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure, RCS temperature, prescurizer level, steam generator levels and steam generator pressures. Status indicators are provided for the containment environment and secondary I

system radiation levels. Reactor vessel level (if available), core exit temperature, amount of subcooling available, and containment radiation levela are indicated by digital values. Each of the bar graphs indicate wide-range values. If a parameter's value is outside the normal range, the bar color will tura red.

In addition, there is a message area on the primary display which indicates that an appropriate secondary display provides further information in. those cases where an off-normal value is detected or an event is occurring.

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The entire SPDS is not designed to Class 1E standards and does not meet the single-failure criterion. The senso'rs and signal conditioners (such as preamplifiers and isolation devices) are designed and qualified to meet Class 1E standards for those SPDS parameters that are also used by safety systems. Furthermore, the sensors and signal Onditioners for those parameters of the SPDS which are identical to zne parameters specified in Regulatory Guide 1.97 are designed and qualified to meet the criteria 6

set forth in that Regulatory Guide.

The SPDS utilized in the Control Room is designed to an operational unavailability goal of 0.01.

The shutdown unavailability goal for the SPDS during cold shutdown and refueling modes for the reactor is 0.2.

The unavailability goal of 0.01 is more stringent than can be reasonably achieved without some redundancy. Therefore, dual minicomputers, data multiplexors, and other critical peripherals will be installed. Power to the SPDS is provided from the Non-1E Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS) l5 System.

6.12.2 EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY COMPUTER SYSTEM The Emergency Response Facility (ERF) Computer System for CPSES is configured as illustrated in Figure 6.1.

The overall system principally consists of:

a.

Isolation devices with integral digiting equipment which will provide 12 bit resolution of the parameter ranges.

b.

Fiber optic cable runs between the remote multiplexors/ isolators and ERF Computer.

This system is considered to be the Data Acquisition System (DAS). The DAS 0

will be powered from the Non-1E UPS System.

Redundant minicomputers are provided for the data processing / distribution /

and recordkeeping functions required. The mi'nicomputers are located in the same room as the plant process computer, but do not rely upon the process computer for any ERF Computer System functions. The minicomputers are als l5 powered from the Non-1E UPS System.

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The display system consists of col'orgraphic display units implementing ~the SAS software. Two displays are' located in the Control Room, three in the TSC', and two in the EOF. One of the Control Room display units is dedicated to the display of SPDS-type parameters. The other display units have full display capability, including the SPDS-type parameters, as well as all other parameters available to the computer. The Control Room and 5

TSC displays are also powered from the Non-1E UPS System.

The integrated ERF Computer System reliability design goal has been established at 0.01 unavailability during all plant operating modes above cold shutdown.

1 6.12.3 RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM 5

The Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) includes the Area Radiation j

Monitoring System (ARMS) and the Process Radiation Monitoring System 61 (PRMS). The block diagram presented in Figure 6.2 illustrates this system.

4 5l The basic RMS is composed two dedicated microcomputers in communication with each other (one in each of two central display consoles), distributed dedicated microprocessors (one for each local detector / monitor assembly) and a report computer. At cach monitor, control, data processing, data storage and multi-level alareing are phrformed locally by the dedicated microprocessor; also, processed data is communicated to central consoles.

These monitor functions are performed at each monitor independently fram the remainder of the system. This independence is ensured by use of

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s optical couplers in the monitor input / output circuits and by the distances 6l separating the monitors.

The RM-21 report computer is also considered part of the RMS. The primary 6

function of the RM-21 report computer is to provide assistance in meeting those NRC requirements governing the assessment of routine and accident-radiation doses. The RM-21 generates two basic calculations for atmospheric dispersion:

(1) for routine releases and (2) for accident releases..For routine releases, dispersion is calculated using the sector-average version of the equations for atmospheric relative concentration (atmospheric dispersion factor, X/Q). For accident releases, the sector-average and the center-line versions of the X/Q equations are utilized. These calculations are performed in accordance with-methodology specified in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.111 for routine releases and, to some extent, in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.145 for accident releases (effluent plume meander is not calculated for accident conditions). Each release point is' 5

considered separately so that the height of rele~ase and vent conditions are taken into account. All calculations _ utilize the Gaussian plume model.

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.'S The RM-21 report computer also generates dose calculat' ions for routine and, "l6

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accident conditions using the computed hourly effluent radionuclide releases, dilution / deposition rates, and site-specific data constants.

Dose calculations for accident conditions consider those doses caused by exposure tc the plume, i.e., beta (skin), gamma (whole body), and thyroid (inhalation). Doses are computed by using X/Q values and Q (release) values, using the most recent data available. Results of the dose calculations can be printed for operator use and may be displayed graphically as a gaseous release isopleth. Complete information regarding these systems is provided in the CPSES Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR),

Sections 11.5 and 12.3.4.

6.12.3.1 Area Radiatio'n Monitoring Svstem The ARMS continually monitors the radiation fields in various representative regions within the plant. Table 6.1 lists the parameters monitored by this system.

6.12.3.2 Process Radiation Monitorine System The PRMS provides a means for assessing the radioactivity levels in plant process and effluent streams, and controls those plant process and effluent streams, including the handling and piocessing of radioactive waste. The PRMS provides source term data to the RM-21 report computer. Table 6.2 l6 lists the parameters monitored by this system.

6.12.4 HEALTH PHYSICS INSTRUMENTATION The Radiation Protection Section maintains a supply of health physics 1aboratory and portable surveying equipment. While this equipment is used routinely used during normal Station operations, it is also available to supplement the energency response radiological monitoring equipment.

6 Tables 6.3 and 6.4 provide listings of the health physics laboratory and portable survey equipment routinel'y uspd at CPSES.

6.12.5 METEOROLOGICAL MEASUREMENTS PROGRAM The meteorological measurements program at CPSES includes the following:

A primary meteorological measurements system, as illustrated in Figure a.

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A backup meteorological measurements system, as illustrated in Figure 6.7; 6-11 REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

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r A system for making near real-time predictions of bhe. atmospheric c.

effluent transport and diffusion; and d.

A capability for' remote interrogation. on demand, of the measurements a'd prediction systems.

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i Wind speed and wind direction at the 10- and 60-meter levels on the primary' meteorological tower, as well as the temperature differential between the 6

10- and 60-meter levels, are continuously recorded at /Se Meteorological Instrument Panel, and scanned once-per-minute by the RMS computer where this data is averaged each hour and stored. A time-related history of the meteorological data is also available in analog form (strips charts) and from the hourly averaged digital data provided by the RMS computer.

5 lI The ambient temperature at the 10-meter level, dew point and precipitation are also displayed on the Meteorological Instrument Panel in the Control Room.

- 6 The RMS computer tracks the current averages of diffusion meteorology, measured effluent release rates, and the inventory for fission products 5

released. The system is provided with the required software to permit the plant operators to make real-time, site-specific estimates and predictions of atmospheric effluent transport and diffusion during and immediately following an accidental airborne release of radioactivity from the plant.

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The backup meteorological tower will provide measurements of wind speed and direction, and delta-temperature for substitution of lost or invalid data gathered from the primary meteorological tower.

6 At CPSES, the meteorological measurements program will be conducted in accordance with the requirements specified in Regulatory Guides 1.21 and i

4.1, the proposed Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.23, and NUREG-0654/

FEMA-REP-1,. Revision 1.

Further details of this program are provided in the CPSES FSAR, Section 2.3.

i In the event of an' emergency condition at CPSES, should additional meteorological data or forecasts be required, the National Weather Service office in Fort Worth will be contacted. Weather alerts will be

.3 communicated to the CPSES Control Room by the System Dispatcher.

6.12.6 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION Seismic instrumentation is provided within the plant so that, in the event of an earthquake, sufficient data will be generated to permit verification i

f of the dynamic analysis of the plant and evaluation of the safety of continued operations.

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The seismic instrumentation installed at CPSES includes the following 6

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instruments:

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a.

A triaxial time-history accelerograph, which consists of triaxial acceleration sensors, a seismic trigger, a magnetic tape recorder and controls, and a magnetic playback unit. The function of the triaxial j

time history accelerograph is to measure and permanently record absolute acceleration as a function of time during an earthquake.

b.

A triaxial peak accelerograph, which is designed to permanently record 7

the peak seismic accelerations of seismic Category I' equipment and l

f ii P P ng.

A passive response spectrum recorder, which is designed to permanently c.

record spectral accelerations corresponding to specified frequencies in the foundation of each Containment Building and the supporto of the seismic Category I equipment and piping.

d.

A response spectrum switch, which is designed to provide a signal for remote, immediate indication wSen any specified, preset, spectral 3

acceleration has been exceeded.

e.

A seismic switch, which is design _ed to provide a signal for remote immediate indication when a specified, preset,' acceleration has been exceeded.

The seismic instrumentation is fully described in Section 3.7 B.4 of the CPSES FSAR.

6.12.6.1 Location and Description of Instrumentation

.The seismic instruments enumerated in the previous section are situated.at the following locations in each unit:

a.' The triaxisl time history accelerograph has three triaxial acceleration The first is located at the top of the Containment Building sensors.

mat, the second is located on the 4xterior face of the Containment Building wall at elevation 1,000'-6", and the third is located in the

" free field". These sensors have the function of sensing the absolute seismic accelerations in two horizontal ort.hogonal directions and in the vertical direction at the Containment foundation, on the l

Containment structure and in the " free field". The data collected by the sensors is transmitted to the recorder.

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In addition; a seismic trigger is installed on the Contdinment Building I}

foundation and is connected to all three sensors and the recorder. The function of the seismic trigger is to start the time-history accelerograph whenever a preset threshold is exceeded for any of the three directions. A time delay device keeps the entire system operating for five seconds after the last motion above the threshold of the trigger.

The triaxial time-h.istory accelerograph also includes a magnetic tape' recorder and a playback unit which records the signals for accelerations-versus-time in the three.orthogonal directions and provides immediate visual display of the recorded time histories on a strip chart, b.

The triaxial peak accelerograph is d passive instrument that requires no power source to sense motion and the record data. It is placed on one of the steam generators, on the RCS piping, and on one of the safety injection pumps in the Safeguards Building for recording the peak seismic accelerations on those equipment and systems.

The passive response spectrum recorder is placed on the Containment c.

Building foundation, on one of the steam generator compartment walls, and near one of the safety injection pumps in the Safeguards Building for recording the seismic responses at these locations for different preset frequencies, d.

The response spectrum switch is located on the Containment Building foundation and is used for transmitting a signal to the Control Ro'm o

whenever the response in any of the three orthogonal directions exceeds a preset value.

T'he seismic switch is located on the Containment Building foundation e.

and is used for transmitting a signal to the Control Room whenever the acceleration.in one of the three orthogonal directions exceeds a preset value.

6 A schematic diagram of the seismic instrumentation is presented in Figure 6.).

Based upon the information contained in Section 2.5 of both the CPSES FSAR 6 l and Environmental Report (ER), which discuss the low probability of a significant seismic event' occurring within the CPSES area, the requirement for accessing offsite seismic monitoring equipment is considered unnecessary.

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6.12.6.2 Control Room Notification of a Seismic Event 4

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In the event of any seismic activity of sufficient intensity to activate the seismic instrumentation, the Control Room is alerted by means of the seismic annunciation system, which consists of visual and audible alarms.

j; Approximately 15 seconds after the basement acceleration falls below the threshold level, the recorders are automatically shut off. Operations personnel will then obtain the strip chart records of the acceleration i

time-history in the. longitudinal, transverse and vertical directions.

These records are then compared with previously prepared templates, on which allowable acceleration amplitudes have been clearly marked, to determine whether continued plant operation is considered safe or the plant-should be shut down pending further evaluation.

The seismic trigger is set to activate the instrumentation at an i

acceleration level slightly above normal ambient vibrations and well below the postulated Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) " free field" ground l6 acceleration. Any response'of the seismic instrumentation above this predetermined threshold is evaluated by Operations personnel as previously described.

In addition to this data, the operator obtains the response spectra to aid

,him in taking the appropriate action if an earthquake larger than the OBE

.has occurred. These response spectra are. generated by several response

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I spectrum recorders installed at selected locations in seismic Category I j

structures, systems and components, as described in Section 6.12.6.1.

l6 6.12.7 HYDROLOGICAL MONITORING The hydrological monitoring equipment installed at CPSES provides data on the water level in Squaw Creek Reservoir. The level indicator is not capable of being read in the Control Room. To compensate, operators periodically read the level indicator locally and communicate this information to the Control Room.

Based upon the information contained in Section 2.4 of both the CPSES FSAR and,ER, which discuss the low probability of a significant hydrological j

event occurring within the CPSES area, the requirement for accessing offsite hydrological monitoring equipment is considered unnecessary.

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6.12.8 PROCESS MONITOR INSTRUMENTiTION 6l The SPDS and ERF Compdter provide plant data dispFays to Control Room personnel and to those CPSES Emergency Organization personnel stationed in the TSC and EOF. This information is also made available to Control Room 6

Personnel by remote monitoring indicators located on the main control board. Table 6.7 summarizes those main control board indications available to Control Room personnel.

6.12.9 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION.

i i

This section identifies and describes the fire detection instrumentation 6

installed at CPSES. This information.is summarized in Figure 6.4.

A complete description of the CPSES Fire Protection Program is provided in the CPSES FSAR, Section 9.5.1.

Columns 19 and 20 on Figure 6.4 list the various types and intended services of firo detectors utilized at CPSES.

a.

Column 19-Type of Detector 6

h l

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.T is co umn i enti ies the quantity and type of detectors installed in each fire area. Detectors are selected in accordance with the class of combustible material, the type of equipment located in the fire area, the type of fixed fire protection system installed in that area, and the physical arrangement of the area. The types of detectors are as

-)

follows:

1.

Ionization detectors (ID) respond to the products of combustion.

2.

Thermal detectors (TD) respond to the heat of combustion.

3.

Infrared detectors (IR) respond to the presence of flame.

l l

The term "none" indicates that there are no detectors installed in the area.

I 6l b.

Column 20-Intended Service i

l This' column identifies the designated function of th'e fire detection system, subsequent to. activation, in an individual fire area. The t

l intended response subsequent to activation may consist of:

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A local alarm (LA), which annunciates an alarm in the specific 1.

fire area.

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2.

A remote alarm (RA), which annunciates an alarm in the Conttol Room and throughout the plant.

3.

Fixed system actuation (FSA), which actuates the fixed fire protection system in the specific fire area.

4.

A water flow alarm (FA) which annunciates an alarm indicating water flow to a fixed fire extinguishing system.

6.12.10 POST-ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM The CPSES Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) is supplied by the Reactor Plant Services Division of General Dynamics in Groton, Connecticut. The PASS is composed of two independent subsystems - the Reactor Coolant PASS l6 and the Containment Air PASS.

The Reactor Coolant PASS is capable of collecting a primary coolant or containment sump liquid sample as required by NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requiremehts". The Reactor Coolant PASS is a dual module unit consisting of one sample. module and one remote operating module. The sample module is located in the Primary Plant Sample Room and contains the valves and components required to physically collect the sample. The remote operating module is located in.the Switchgear Room (normally, a low radiation area) and contains the sample system mimic board, electrical controls and instrumentation readouts necessary to operate the sample module remotely.

The Containment Air PASS has the capability of collecting a sample of the containme.nt atmosphere as required by NUREG-0737. The Containment Air PASS is also a dual module unit consisting of one sample module and one remote operating module. The sample module is located in the Primary Plant Sample Room and contains the valves and components required to physically collect a sample of the containment atmosphere. The remote operating module is located in the Switchgear Room and contains the sample system mimic board, slave ' valves, and nitrogen flask required to operate the sample module remotely.

i Use of the PASS during an emergency condition will be governed by Procedure EPP-311, " Post-Accident Sampling." Operating procedures for the PASS will s

be developed prior to operation.

6 6.12.11 ENVIRONMENTAL RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING PROGRAM The CPSES-Environmental Radiological Monitoring Program is addressed in the CPSES Technical Specifications and conforms to the Branch Technical Positions Yequirements.

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6l To support the CPSES Environmental' Radiological Monitoring Program, nine

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d (9) airborne monitoring stations and 43 TLD's have been strategically placed in the area surrounding CPCES. The airborne monitoring stations, which are located in and around the plant perimeter, are designed to collect particulate and radiciodine samples. The TLD's are designed for determining the gamma dose in the environment.

16 TLD's are located on the plant perimeter (1 in each sector); 16 TLD's are located 4 to 5 miles from the plant (1 in each sector) and the remaining 11 TLD's are placed in selected areas.

Figure 6.5 and Procedure EPP-309, "Offsite Radiological Monitoring", provide more specific information regarding these locations.

6 The program itself is described in Chemistry and Environmental Section Procedure ENV-101, "Preoperational Environmental Radiological Monitoring

, Program".

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TABLE 6.5 METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION Parameter Location of Parameter Measured l6 Measured Primary Tower Backup Tower Wind Speed 10 meters & 60 meters 10 meters Wind Direction 10 meters a 60 a'eters 10 meters Temperature 10 meters & 60 meters *

. 10 meters Dew Point 10 meters 10 me'ters Precipitation Ground Gro6nd The Primary Meteorological Tower has,two independent delta-T loops 6

(4 temperature sensors in all).

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l REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983 l

6-s i)

CPSES/EP TABLE 6.7 (SHEET 1 0F 12)

INSTRUMENTATION

SUMMARY

DATA Type /

R.G. 1.97 Instrument Tag Va ria ble Category Type / Cat.

Quantity Numbers Range Qualifica tion RCS Pressure (WR)

Al, 81, B2 B1, C1 2 per unit irr-403, 0-3000 psig EQ, SQ Cl, D2 PT-405 T(110T) RCS (WR)

Al, B2, B1 1 per loop' TE-413A 0-7000F EQ, SQ C2 TE-423A TE-433A TE-443A T(COLD) RCS (WR)

Al, B2 B1, B3 1 per loop TE-413B 0-7000F EQ, SQ TE-423B TE-4338 ITE-443B 6

Steam Gen.

Al, 31 D1 1 per Steam LT-501 0-100%

Note 1 Wa ter Level (WR)

D2, B2 Gen.

LT-502 SQ(1)

LT-503 LT-504 Steam Cen.

Al, B1 None 4 per Steam LT-517 to 519 0-100%

EQ, SQ Wa ter Level (NR)

D2 Ge n.

LT-527 to 529 LT-537 to 539 LT-547 to 549 LT-550 to 553 Pressurizer Al', B1 D1 4 per unit LT-459 0-100%

EQ, SQ Level D2 LT-460 LT-461 LT-462 Containment Al, 81, B1, Cl

• 4'per unit Pr-934 to 937 0-60 psig EQ, SQ Pressure (NR)

B2, C2, S*

D2 REVISION 6.'

MARCH 8,1)i83

CPSES/EP TABLE 6.7 (SHEET 2 0F 12)

Type /

R.C. 1.97 Instrument Tag Va ria ble Ca tegory Type /Ca t.

Quantity Numbers Range Qualification Steamline Pressure Al, B1, D2 3 per loop PI-514 to 516 0-1300 psig EQ, SQ D2 Fr-524 to 526 PT-534 to 536 PI-544 to 546 MJST Level Al, D2 D2 4 per unit LT-930 to 933 0-100%

EQ,.SQ Con ta inme nt Al, B1 (NR) B2, C2 2 per unit LT-4779 (WR) 808' - 817'6" EQ, SQ Wa ter Level (WR)

B2, C2, D2 (WR) B1, Cl LT-4781 (WR)

Note 2 CST Wa ter Level Al, D2 D1 2 per unit LT-2478 0-45' EQ, SQ.

LT-2479 I

Aux. Feedwater Al, B1 D2 2 per Steam FT-2463 A&B 0-550 gpa EQ, SQ 6

Flow D2 Cen.

Fr-2464 A&B FI-2465 A&B FT-2466 A&B Containment Rad.

A1, B1, El, C3 2 per unit RE-6290 A&B 100 _ 10 R/hr EQ,SQ 7

Level (iiigh Range) 82, C2, E2 Main Steamline A2, B2 E2 1 per steam-RE-2325 10 EQ(R)

~

Radia tion Cl, E2 line RE-2326 103 C1/cc Note 3 RE-2327 RE-2328 Steam Cen.

A2, B2, None 1 per unit RE-4200 10 EQ(R)

Blowdown Rad.

C2 10-1 C1/cc Note 3 Condenser Of f gas A2, B2 E2, C3

.1 per unit RE-2959 10 EQ(R)

Radia tion C2 10-1 Ci/cc Care exit A1, B1, Cl, B3 25 per train TE-001 to 050 0-23000F EQ, SQ

{

Tempe ra ture Cl REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983 k.

I CPSES/EP TABLE 6.7 (SHEET 3 0F 12)

(

Type /

R.G.

1.97 Instrtusent Tag Va ria ble Ca tegory Type / Cat.

Quantity Numbers Range Qualifica tion RCS Subcooling A2, B2 B2 2 per unit TY-CCM-A&B

-300 to 3000F EQ, SQ Neutron Flux B1 El 2 IR & 2 SR NN-35B & '36B 10 Note 4 10-3 amps

~

NI-318 & 32B 1 - 106 cps Control Rod B3 B3 I per control RBI & RB2 0-100%

None Position rod group Main Feedm'ter B2, D3 D3

~

1 per Steam FT-511

~

0-4.8x106 None Flow Gen.

FT-521 lb/hr FT-531 6

FT-541 t

Con tainment Bl C1 4 per unit AE-5506 A thru D 0-10%

EQ, SQ,

Hydrogen Concentra tio n Reactor Coolant C3 C3 l'per unit RCS Sampling N/A N/A Fission Product Systan Concentra tion Pressurizer C3 D3 1 per unit LT-470 0-100%

None Relief Tank Level Pressurizer C3 D3 1 per unit TZ-468 50-3500F None Relief Tank Tempera ture REVISION 6 MARCH 8. I983~

1 CPSES/EP TABLE 6.7 (SHEET 4 0F 12)

Type /

R.C. 1.97 Instrument Tag Va riable Category Type /Ca t.

Qua ntity Numbers Range Qualifica tion Pressurizer C3 D3 1 per unit FT-469 0-100 psig None Relief Tank Pressure Conta lmnent Cl, D2 B1, C1 2 per, unit PT-938 0-180 psig EQ-SQ I

Pressure (WR)

FT-939 Plant Vent C2, E2 C2, E2 1 per vent X-RE-5570 A&B 10 EQ(R)

Ef fluent Rad.

s ta ck 105 Ci/cc Area Rad. Levels C2 C2 12 per unit RE-6259 A&B 10 EQ(R)

Adjacent RE-6291 A&B 4

10 R/hr Con ta inment RE-6292 thru 6299 1 per unit RE-5637 104-EQ(R) 6 100 C1/CC 2 (shared)

XRE-6273 10 EQ(R) 4 10 mR/hr XRE-6275 Containment C2 B1 1 per active See FSAR Figure N/A EQ,SQ Isolation Valve valve 6.2.4-2 i

• Status ( Active)

CCW to RCP Valve D2 None 1 per valve HV-4699 N/A None Sta tus HV-4780 HV-4709 HV-4708 HV-4701 HV-4696 Pressurizer PORV D2 D2 1 per valve PCV-455A N/A EQ, SQ Sta tus PCV-456 f

REVISIONkd MARCH 8,11983

~.:)

CPSES/EP TABLE 6.7 (SilEET 5 0F 12)

Type /

R.C. 1.97 Instrument Tag Variable Category Type /Ca t.

Quantity Numbers Ra nge Qualifica tion RCS Safety D2 D2 1 per valve 8010A N/A*

EQ, SQ 8010B 8010C RCP Seal Wa ter D2 None 1 per RCP FT-142 0-20 gpm None Injection Flow FT-143 i

FT-144 FT-145 Pressurizer D3 None 1 per hea ter PCPRI N/A None llea ter Breaker PCPR2 Position PCPR3

PCPR4 6

CVCS Hakeup Flow D2 D2 1 per unit FT-121 0-200 gpm None CVCS Letdown Flow D2 D2 1 per unit FT-132 0-200 gpm None Volume Control D2' D2 1 per unit LT-112 0-100%

None Tank Level CVCS Valve Status D2 None 1 per valve 8100, 8112, 8160, N/A None 8152, 8146, 8147,.

LCV-459, LCV-460, 8145, 8149 A, B, C, 8153, 8154, 8143 HCV-123, TCV-129, PCV-131, TCV-3818 6,a f

REVISION {6 M8DrH R 10A1

~

V CPSES/EP TABLP. 6.7 (SHEET 6 0F 12)

Type /

R.G. 1. 9'7 Instrument Tag Va ria ble Ca tegory Type /Ca t.

Quantity Numbers Range Qualifica tion MSIV' & Bypass D2 None 1 per valve ilV-2333 A&B N/A None Valve Status llV-2334 A&B HV-2335 A&B llV-2336 A&B AFW Pump Turbine D2 None 1 per valve llV-2452-1 N/A None Main Steam IIeader ilV-2452-2 Isolation Valve S ta tus Main Feedwa ter D3 None 1 per valve FCV-510, 520, N/A None Control and 530, 540 Bypass Valve LV-2162, 2163, Sta tus 12164, 2165 6

CVCS Valve Status D2 None 1 per valve 8100, 8112, 8160 N/A None 8156, 8146, 8147, LCV-459, LCV-460, 8145, 8149 A, B, C, 8153, 8154, 8143 HCV-123, TCV-129, PCV-131. TCV-381,B Steam Cen. PORV D2 D2 1 per valve PV-2325 thru N/A None l

Status PV-2328 MSIV & By,,a s s D2 None 1 per valve

!!V-2333 A&B N/A None Valve Status

.HV-2334 A&B HV-2335 A&B HV-2336 A&B t

REVISION d.'

MARCH 8, Ib83

x..)

CPSES/EP s.

TABLE 6.7 (SilEET 7 0F 12)

Type /

R. G.

1.97 Instrument Tag Ve rf a ble Ca tegory Type / Cat.

Quantity Numbers Range Qualifications High llead Safety D2 D2 1 per train FT-918 0-800 gpm None Injection Flow FT-922' Low Head Sa fety D2 D2 1 per train FT-618 0-6000 gpm None

~

Injection Flow FT-619 FT-988 ECCS Valve Status D2 None 1 per valve LCV-Il2 B, C, 8105, N/A None 8106, 8479 A, B, 8808A, B, C, D, 8106 8812A, B, 8811A, B, 8809A, B, 8804A, B

~

SI Accumulator D3 D2 2 per tank LT-950 to 957 0-100%

None Tank Level SI Accumula tor D3 D2 2 per tank PT-960 to 967 0-100%

None Tank Pressure S/C Blowdown D2 None 1 per valve llV-2397, 2390, N/A None Isolation Valve 2399,& 2400 Sta tus Aux. Feedwa ter D2, None 1 par valve PV-2453A, B.

N/A None-Valve Status PV-2454A, B llV-2459 to 2462 IIV-2491A, B, HV-2492A, L, HV-24 93 A, B,

IIV-2494 A, B,

Conta inment D2 D2 1 per pump FT-4772-l&2 0-400 gpa None i

9 Spray Flow FT-4773-l&2 l

e 7

REVIS 0N 6 i

MARCH {8.14R1

l

... l

^

j CPSES/EP t

l TABLE 6.7 (Sheet 8 of 12) l I

l Type /

R.G. 1.97 Instrument Tag

~

Va ria ble Ca tegory Type / Cat.

Quantity Numbers Range Qualifica tions Containment D2 D2 1 per pump HV-4777, N/A None Spray Valve Status FV-4773-l&2 HV-4759 HV-4776, FV-4771-l&2, HV-4758 Conta i nment D2 D2 5 per unit TE-5400 to 5404 0-3000F EQ,SQ Atmosphere Tempera ture CCW Header D2 None 1 per header PT-4520 0-200 ps g None Pressure PT-4521 CCW lleader D2 D2 1 per header

.TE-4530 0-2000F None 6

Tenpera t ure TE-4534 CCW Siir8e Tank D2 None 1 per train LT-4500 0-6' Level LT-4501 CCW Flow D2 D2 1 per train FT-4536A 0-20,000 gpa None FT-4537A CCW Valve D2 None 1 per valve llV-4513, HV-4512 N/A None Sta tus HV-4572, HV-4573, HV-4574, HV-4576, HV-4575 HV-4537, IIV-4536, HV-4514 HV-4515 Service Water D2 None 1 per train FT-4258 0-20,000 gpm None Hrader Flow FT-4259 CR A/C Units D2 None 1 per A/C unit WL-5847B N/A None WL-58488 1

i WL-5851 L

REVIf}0N6 i

WL-5853 MARCH 8, 1983

._)

CPSES/EP Table 6.7 (SHEET 9 of 12)

Type R.C.

1. 9.7 Instrument Tag Variable Category Type /Ca t.

Qua ntity Numbers Range Qualifica tion CR Vent Damper D2 D2 1 per damper K-ilV-5826, -5829, N/A None.

Position

-5837, -5838, -5839,

-5840, HV-5847,

-5848, -5851

-5853, PV-5855,

-5856 Chilled Water D2 None

~

0-300 gpm None l per train FT-6708 Flow FT-6709 AC & DC Bus D2 D2 1 per bus lEB1, IEB2, N/A None lEB3, lEB4, 6

IPC1, IPC2,

~

IPC3, IPC4, IECl, lEC2, IEC3, IEC4, IEDI, IED2 RiiR Hea t Exchanger D2 D2 1 per train TR-612 50-4000F None Discha rge Tempera t ure RHR Flow D2 D2 I per train FT-618 0-6000 gpm None i

FT-619 RilR Valve Status D2 None 1 per. valve HCV-606, -607, N/A None 8701-A&B, 8702-A&B, 8716-A&B, i

FCV-610, -611, FCV-618, -619 CR.Radia tion E2 E2 2 plus mobile XRE-6281 10 I 4

monitor XRE-6282 10 mR/hr REVISi$46 l

MARCH 8,.1983 1

x.)

CPSES/EP Tablo 6.7 (SHEET 10 of 12)

Type R.G. 1.97 Instrument Tag Variable Ca tegory Type / Cat.

Quantity Numbers Range Qualifica tion RHR Pump Room E2 E2 1 per room RE-6260A 10 EQ(R)

~

4 Radia tion RE-6260B 10 R/hr Sample Room E2 E2 1

RE-6261 10 EQ(R) 4 Radia tion 10 mR/hr Plant Vent Stack E2 E2 1

RE-6259 10 EQ(R) 4 Sample Area Rad.

10 mR/hr Radia tion 10 EQ(R)

Ilot lab Area-E2 E2 X-RE-6283 l

4 10 mR/hr Liquid Waste E2 None 1

X-RE-5253 10 EQ(R) 6 Ef fluent Rad.

10-1 Ci/CC Turbine Building E2 None 1

RE-5100 10 EQ(R)

Drains Radiation 10-I Ci/CC Wind Speed E2 E3 2

X-SR-4128 0-100 mph

None, X-SR-4129 s

Wind Direction E2 E3 2

X-ZR-4126 0-5400 None X-ZR-4127

. Atmospheric E2 E3 1

l l

l l

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REVISION 6 MARCHl8,1983 t

T.)

• CPSES/EP TABLE 6.7 (SilEET 110F 12)

INSTRUMENTATION

SUMMARY

DATA r

Cen.

- genera tor ECCS- - Emergency Core Coolant System i

WR

- wide range S1

- Safety injection 1

j NR

- narrow range CR

- Control Room RCS

- Reactor Coolant System A/C

- air conditioning Aux.

- auxiliary Vent

- ventilation RWST Reactor Water Storage Tank RHR Residual Heat Removal CST

- Condensa te Storage Tank EQ

- Environmentally Qualified i

6 Rad.

radiation SQ

- Seismically Qualified IR intermediate range SQ(1)

Sensor only seismically qualified SR

- source range AFW

- Auxiliary feedwater CCW Component Cooling Wa ter EQ(R)

Environmentally Qualfied for Radiation Extremes RCP Reactor Coolant Pump a

CVCS Chemical and Volume Control System l

N/A

- not applicable l

MSIV main steam isolation valve l

i l

.I.

i

.e.

i f

REVISIO()

MARCH 8,41983

CPSES/EP TABLE 6.7 (SHEET 12 0F 12)

INSTRUMENTATION

SUMMARY

DATA NOTES h

1.

Steam generator w ter level (WR) is. utilized in conjunction with AW flow for determining when to terminate' SI for secondary breaks outside containment.

Steam generator mter level (WR) is only used for secondary breaks outside containment (the hostile environment that results from secondary breaks inside containment induces unacceptable errors). SI termination for secondary breaks inside containment it. based on AW flow.

2.

The Containment Wa ter Level (WR) covers the entire range of expected mter level in the Containment for post accident conditions.

Therefore, Containment Water Level (NR) is not considered as required for accident monitoring.

6 3.

Main Steamline Radiation and Steam Generator Blowdown Radiation are only required for (and qualified for) steam genera tor tube rupture detection.

}

4.

The Source Range and Intermediate Range Neutron Flux detectors are not qualified for the accident environment inside containment. Qualified detectors are not available. Adequate determination of reactivity control can be made us'ing backup variables.

4 i

i l

Y l

REVISION 6 e MARCH 8,if83

'j

s.

Storacje Classroom 6 l

Chemistry Lab.

Counting &

Dositaetry Command Center Hot Cell J

Toilet Storage 1

f Corridor l

l COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION EMERGENCY PLAN Emergency Operations Facility & Adjacent Laboratory Facilities MARCH 8, 1983 RGURE 6.8

_. 3 o

?.

j CPSES/EP

~

7.0 ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT The initial response to any emergency condition at CPSES is initiated from the Control Room. 'All abnormal events observed in or near plant facilities

.are insnediately reported to the Control Room operators, who then take the appropriate actions to correct the problem. The Control Room staff has numerous assessmant tools available to aid in diagnosing any problems and to assist in placing the plant in a safe and stable condition.

The primary systems used in the assesscent_of any radiological incident are the Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) and the Plant Process Monitoring System. The RMS is capable of evaluating current radiological data or l

l accepting manually input data to project dose isopleths. The Plant Process Monitoring System is used by the plant operating staff to analyze the steady state and dynamic behavior.of plant systems and to enable personnel to properly classify the emergency condition. Proper assessment and l

classification of emergency conditions are important not only from an accident mitigation point of view, but to also ensure that,the proper

}

resources and predetermined protective measures are employed to protect plant personnel and the general public. Upon recognition that an abnormal or emergency condition exists at CP.SES, plant operations personnel will implement prearranged response actions. The Control Room staff will evaluate the emergency and, if appropriate, classify the emergency into one of the four (4) EAL classification levels. To accomplish this, operational parameters and radiation monitoring instrument readings, or other symptoms l

indicative of system degradation would be evaluated against the Emergency Action Level criteria. These criteria are provided in Procedure EPP-201, 6

" Assessment of Emergency Action Levels and Plan Activation".- The Emergency Action Levels provided in the tables in Procedure EPP-201 are based upon j

specific instrument readings or identified abnormal conditions which relate i

to the classification levels. Specific plant parameters are also l

identified by' specific instrument and panel numbers in Procedure EPP-201.

l In the event that the emergency conditions dieteriorate.to a level where normal in-plant sampling techniques are inappropriate or unsafe, plant

{

personnel have the capabili.ty of acquiring critical samples through the l_

Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS). This system is available for sampling the Reactor Coolant System and the containment atmosphere. The results of the PASS sample analysis will be used to evaluate the affected

[

units core integrity and as an aid in determining release source terms i-tmder certain emergency conditions.

Information relating to the specific i

applications of the PASS and the resultant data are addressed in Procedure I

EPP-311, " Post-Accident Sampling".

The following paragraphs provide a general description of the capabilities and resources available to emergency response personnel in evaluating the onsite and offsite radiological conditions during an emergency.

I i

j 7-1 i-1 i

l t

REVISION 6 i

MARCH 8, 1983 1

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CPSES/EP

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7.1 COMPUTER ASSESSMENT OF RADIOLOGICAL CONDITIONS The RMS receives data from several plant systems. The RMS projections provide the necessary information to determine the environmental.

consequences of any accidental releases of radioactive materials and also provides the Emergency Coordinator with sufficient information to formulate the proper recommendations for offsite protective actions. To assist in performing emergency dose calculations, Procedure EPP-301, " Computer Assessment of Radiological Conditions", provides personnel with instructions for utilizing the RMS RM-21 Report Processor. The RM-21 receives real time (10 minute average) inpu't data from the Process Radiation Monitoring System (PRMS) and the Meterological Instrument System to perform the dose projection calculations. If data from either source is either erroneous or unavailable, source terms (Q value) or default dispersion factors (X/Q) may be entered manually to provide a good estimate of the integrated dose values.

Additionally, information concerning the reisultant populat. ion doses will be evaluated at least daily during periods of effluent release and weekly thereafter until event closure. This information will be determined in accordancq with Radiation Protection Section Procedure HPI-304, " Population Dose Assessment with the RM-21".

The RM-21 computer software functions ollect and store meteorological and radiological effluent data, calculate atmospheric dispersion and dose 6

values, and generate. reports and graphic output. The software consists of

'].

over 50 programs which perform these functions. Some tasks in the software package perform only one function.

Meteorological data is sampled periodically and. stored'on a disk for use by the appropriate calculational routines. Similarly, effluent release data.

from the plant effluent monitoring system.is converted to release rates for i

each isotope. This data can be edited or isummarized by tasks in the t

software package. With both meteorological data,and effluent release data I

available, calculations of atmospheric dispersion and offsite radiation doses from the plume can be made for either routine or emergency situations.

j The following sections were extracted from the General Atomic's manuals on the RM-21 Computer System and summarize the calculations available. The j.

programs discussed below are. described also in Table 7.1.

l-(

l 7-2 i

l s

J i

REVISION 6 MARCH 8,'1983

U

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_!.72.1 t

CPSES/EP

]

7.1.1 METEOROLOGICAL DATA AND EFFLUENT RELEASE DATA SUMMARIES

, Option AV in task MIDASR is used to print the hourly or 10-min.

meteorological parameter averages over a specified time period. Option JF in task MIDASR categorizes and prints the meteorological data in joint frequency form by wind direction, wind speed group, and stability class for use in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.21 reports.

Summary routines are also included for radiological gas and liquid effluent releases. Two options (AG and AL) in task MIDASR add the quantities in-files EQ and EB to estimate the total. integrated effluent releases for gases and liquids, respectively. Results are printed by the task WASTER.

Option SW in task MIDASR is used to summarize solid waste shipments.

7.1.2 ATMOSPHERIC DISPERSION CALCULATIONS There are two basic calculations for atmospheric dispersion of effluent releases, one for routing conditions and one for accident conditions.

Atmospheric dispersion under routine conditions is calculated in the task

'CRISO.

This dispersion calculations in the task.GASPRO are used only for average conditions (the sector-average version of the X/Q equations is used), while the disperion calculations in the task-CRISO calculate plume concentrations for locations downwind-and crosswind. The task XDCALC 6

performs the dispersion calculations that back up the tasks GASPRO and CRISO, and performs special studies and checks. The above two basic calculatiens follow NRC Regulatory Guide.l.Ill guidance for calculations of effluent releases for routine conditions and, to some extent, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.145 for accident conditions. Meander of the plume is not considered in the calculations for accident conditions. To account for the height of release and vent conditions, each release point is considered separately. All calculations use the Gaussian-plume model.- Results for

~

hourly calculations are printed in the XDCALC, and average dispersion.

results are printed in option XQ of the task MIDASR. Optional graphics tasks.can be used to display isopleths of average dispersion on the CRT screen.

~

7.1.3 PLUME DOSE CALCULATIONS 1

The atmospheric dispersion calculations provide basis for plume dose calculation if~ effluent release data is available.

If the plume dose option is selected by the user, the calculation continues after the task CRISO obtains the X/Q value, reads the release (Q) value, and proceeds to compute the dose for the dose type selected. Dose calculations for

~

accident conditions need only consider those caused by exposure to the plume.

(i.e., beta (skin), gamma (whole body), or thyroid (inhalation).

Results for sequential, hourly, real-time dose calculations can also be 7-3 REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

e.,.,

,,di

.m_.._.__._g_..;.

m.__._._

._._.,m__.,

CPSES/EP obtained and printed'for operator using the task XDCALA.. Average plume doses are also calculated by the task XDCALC, but they.are printed in

~

option'XQ of the task MIDASR.

7.1.4 ENVIRONMENTAL PATHWAYS DOSE CALCULATIONS The environmental pathways dose calculations for routine conditions (performed in the task GASPRO) are considerably more complicated than the same calculations f.or accident conditions (performed in the task CRIS0) since both the environmental p,athways' food chains dose and the plume dose must be' computed for routine conditions. The pathways' doses are calculated in accordance with NRC Regulatory 1.109, Revision 1, for 8 human body organs, 7 pathways, and 4 age groups for up to 5 receptor locations.in each of 16 directions. After the task GASPRO completes the calculation, l

the task HYP0 reorders the results to select the receptor location that hypothetically receives the most exposure. Results of th.e pathways' dose calculations are printed by the task GDSPRT, and selected result.s are printed by DOSUM in a report format suitable for submittal to NRC.

7.2 MANUAL ASSESSMENT OF RADIOLOGICAL CONDITIONS 6

Should the RM-21 computer t-unavailable or not' capable.of providing the necessary projected dose information, calculations will be accomplished manually. Procedure EPP-302, " Manual Assessment of Radiological i

Conditions", contains the necessary equations, instructions and basic forms to support a totally manual effort of release rate and projected dose

, {)

determination. To facilitate the manual calculations, remote readouts of

~

all relevant process and area radiation monitors, process flow instruments and meteorological data is available in the Control Room. Also available are the two (2) Da'mes and Moore Dose Assessment Kits which are used in conjunction with programmable battery-powered calculators. Each kit contains a ten (10)-mile base map, an overlay of -concentric circles around

,the plant site and a set of seven (7) normalized relative concentration overlays, one for each of the seven Pasquill atmospheric stability classes.

l The' Dose Assessment Kits are located, one each, at the TSC and the EOF.

l In addition to the normal meteorological readouts needed for evaluating the dispersion and movement of the plume, backup capabilities are available in the form of a second meteorological tower. and the Dames and Moore Assessment Kit which provides an alternate means of calculating atmospheric stability class.

l l

7-4 3

1 l

l REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983 l

~

m CPSES/EP

• 1.

Should the RMS fail, and the instruments that supply data fail or the

=-

s

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instrument readings go offscale, a prediction of the onsite and offsite consequences will be accomplished using worst-case radiological data from the FSAR Design Basis Accident analysis. These projections will be performed using conservative assumptions to ensure the health and safety of the general public.

Once field data becomes available from the CPSES onsite and effsite radiological monitor,ing teams, projected dose information will be reevaluated and protective action recommendations to offsite officials updated to reflect actual field conditions.

7.3 ONSITE AND OFFSITE RADIOLOGICAL CONDITIONS 6

In the event of an uncontrolled relesse of radioactive materials, the protection of onsite personnel shall be given as high a priority as is given for the protection of the general public. A release to the environment is ncrmally monitored by permanently installed, real-time nonitoring instruments located at the effluent release points. Information from these monitors will be used to predict both onsite and offsite radiological conditions, thus reducing the potential for unexpected or unnecessary exposure to radiation. Radiation hazards within plant structures are also monitored.by area radiation monitors which provide data regarding specific areas of the plant -to the plant staff. To further aid in assessing potential radiation hazards onsite, in-plant and onsite radiological survey activities will be conducted with the following objectives:

1.

To determine whether external dose rates warrant evacuation.

2.

To determine whether iodine sampling is necessary.

In the early stages of the assessment, it may not be necessary to collect air samples if it has been determined that radioiodine is not a ' problem.

Since noble gases always accompany iodine in a release, and in general,will be released in substa'ntially greater quantities, it is possible to set an upper limit on possible airborne iodine based upon a measurement of the external gamma dose rate. In general, air samples shall be collected if the general area gamma dose rate increases to an established level and/or in-plant iodine monitor readings increase or alarm.

7.3.1 ONSITE RAPIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 6

Initially, during an emergency condition, the on-shift Radiation Protection technicians, and Chemistry and Environmental technicians will perform any onsite and in-plant radiological assessment, and sampling activities, respectively, as directed by the Shift Supervisor.

7-5 REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

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8 CPSES/EP 1

=r-In the event that the emergency condition escalates to an Alert, the responsibilities for onsite and offsite radiological assessment and survey activities will be assum,ed by the Onsite Radiological Assessment Coordinator. As CPSES Emergency Organization personnel become available, onsite radiological survey teams will be formed as required and dispatched from the OSC. Onsite Survey Teams will be composed of at least two members, at least one of which shall be a Radiation Protection technician.

The Onsite Survey Team (s) shall perform the required onsite and in-plant surveys in accordance with Procedure EPP-310. "Onsite and In-Plant Radiological Surveys".

In the event that the emergency condition escalates to a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency, the overall responsibility for onsite and 6

offsite radiological assessment will be assumed by the Radiation Protection Coordinator.

Communications between the Control Room, TSC, OSC, EOF and the Onsite Survey Team (s) will be conducted in accordance with Section 4.0 of this plan.

Transportation for the Onsite Survey Team (s) will be available at the CPSES Administration Building. The key (s) for the vehicle (s) will be maintained at the Primary Access Point. Based upon the arrival time (s) of CPSES Emergency Organization personnel, the Onsite Survey Teams should be deployed within 15 to 30 minutes after arrival onsite. Deployment time may vary due to the following factors:

the duration of the onsite briefing

. )

session; the time required to obtain and don protective clothing and equipment; and the time required to obtain and check the equipment specified in Appendix J of this plan.

7.3.2 0FFSITE RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT In the event that a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency is declared, the Of fsite-Radiation Protection Coordinator. assumes.the responsibilities for coordinating offsite radiological assessment and monitorit.g activities.

Each Offsite Monitoring Team will be composed of at least two members, at i

least one of which shall be a Radiation Protection technician.

6 The Radiation Protection Coordinator and his staff will dispatch the Offsite Monitoring Teams to the preselected monitoring points in the affected downwind sectors.

It is important that the locations at which environmental measurements are made be clearly identified. Offsite

~ environmental monitoring locations are identified in Procedure EPP-309, "Offsite Radiological Monitoring", and in Figure 6.3 of this plant. At the preselected monitoring points, the team shall perform external dose measurements, obtain air samples, determine contamination levels, and obtain vegetation and liquid samples, as required. This monitoring shall

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REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

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• continue, as required, througt ut the duration of the emergency so that the need for protection measures can be quickly assessed.

6 Communications between the TSC, EOF, and the Offsite Monitoring Teams will be conducted in accordance with Section 4.0 of this plan.

Transportation for the Offsite Monitoring Teams will be at the CPSES Administration Building. The keys for the vehic~les will be maintained at 6

the Primary Access Point. Based upon the arrival time (s) of CPSES Emergency Organization personnel, the Offsite Monitoring Teams should be deployed within 15 to 45 minutes after arrival onsite. Deployment time may vary dub to the following factors:

the duration of the onsite briefing session; the time required to obtain and. don protective clothing and equipment; and the time required to obtain and check the equipment specified in Appendix J of this plan.

The CPSES Offsite Monitoring Teams will be equipped with a variety of 6

survey equipment including a battery-powered multi-channel analyzer (MCA).

This equipment will allow for the field evaluation _9 air samples and can f

detect radiciodine concentrations as low as 1 x 10 uci/cc.

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, CPSES/EP 8.0 PROTECTIVE RESPONSE

. sl Protective response represents those actions taken for emergency workers and the public based upon the Emergency Action Level (EAL) classificatio'n and the resulting assessment of the plant status and radiological conditions. Guidelines for the choice of protective actions to be implemented are provided in this section,.as well as the methods to be used to notify the population-at-risk of the emergency conditions.

8.1

.ONSITE WARNING 8.1.1 EMPLOYEES (UNESCORTED TUGC0 PERSONNEL)

During an emergency condition, the primary means for alerting onsite personnel is via the use of the Station page-party system. This is a public address system which can be used to verbally' transmit warnings and instructions. An audible alarm can also be delivered through this system.

The Emergency Coordinator will use this system to notify site personnel of his decision to implement protective actions. The notification will indicate the nature of the emergency, its location, any onsite or in-plant areas to bc evacuated, any areas to be avoided, and the assembly area (s) 6 best suited for the incident if an evacuation is ordered. Any evacuation announcement, will be accompanied by an alarm. This alarm is described in Section 4.

8.1.2 VISITORS (ESCORTED PERSONNEL)

Visitors to the CPSES site are usually escorted by site personnel. During an emergency, it is that escort's responsibility to ensure that the visitor is directed in a manner appropriate to the emergency situation. The warning mechanism for visitors is the same as that for unescorted TUGC0 employees.

8.1.3 CONTRACTOR AND CONSTRUCTION. PERSONNEL Contractors and construction personnel will be alerted to the emergency condition as described above, except that the contracted organization will be responsible for further passing the emergency warning to their personnel working in those onsite areas that may be out of the range of the page-party system.

I 8.1.4 OTHER PERSONNEL WITHIN THE EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY

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If personnel, other than those described above, are thought to be within the Exclusion Area Boundary, the Emergency Coordinator will direct the Security Supervisor to pass warning instructions to those individuals.

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CPSES/EP Following the declaration of an Alert or higher EAL, Squaw Ereek Park personnel shall be notified directly by'the Emergency, Coordinator.

8.2 EVACUATION AND ASSEMBLY-Upon being alerted to the emergency condition, CPSES personnel not assigned to emergency response activities, visitors, and contractor and construction personnel shall proceed to, and remain at, their designated assembly areas until either the emergency condition is terminated or they are released by the Emergency Coordinator. Visitors shall remain with their escort or another CPSES individual'for security and safety reasons. ' Emergency,

response personnel shall proceed to,-and establish operations at, their designated l emergency response facilities unless directed otherwise by the Emergency Coordinator.

The onsite assembly areas include the hallways outside each Containment personnel hatch; the restricted area access point for the Restricted Area';

the CPSES Administration Building parking lot for administrative personnel i

and those personnel working within the Protected Area, but outside the 6

restricted area; and the Nuclear Operations Support Facility (NOSF) and Brown & Root Employment Office if a site evacuation is warranted.

Procedure EPP-210. " Evacuation", details the actions that shall be taken if I

a site evacuation is required. Should it become necessary to evacuate the CPSES site, the plant access road noted on the figures included in Section 15.0, Appendix E will be utilized as an evacuation route.

,.)

Transportation will be provided by the privately owned vehicle of the I

evacuee or his co-workers. Some limited vehicular transport may be erovided by CPSES Security-if Security vehicles and drivers are available.

A site evacuation also affects the Exclusion Area around CPSES as.well as the Station. Personnel stationed in the emergency response facilities shall remain in those facilities unless the situation or a complication-warrants evacuation. Squaw Creek Park.and Reservoir are also affected by a site' evacuation since these facilities are within the Exclusion Area B'oundary. Squaw Creek. Park, Inc. (SCPI) operates the park and is responsible for access to the reservoir during the park's hours of operation. SCPI is also responsible for the accountability and evacuation of the people in the park and on the reservoir. SCPI shall initiate their 6

evacuation procedure upon notification of a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency EAL. As required, individuals evacuated under emergency conditions shall be directed to a location designated by the Emergency Coordinator for radiological evaluation. Security is ultimately responsible for controlling access to the Exclusion-Area and may, with 6

assistance from local law enforcement agencies, aid SCPI in the evacuation effort.

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REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

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's The time estimate for evacuating the site is projected to be 58 minutes.

Justification for this time estimate is provided by.the discussion and formula presented in Sectirn 15.0, Appendis M.

8.3 RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING OF EVACUEES Should it become necessary to evacuate non-essential site personnel, radiological monitoring teams will be assigned to the assembly areas.

Personnel monitoring at the assembly areas will be conducted by Radiation Protection Section personnel. Additional support will be provided by the Chemistry and Environmental Section.

Radiological monitoring and decontamination supplies are stored at various locations onsite. Detailed personnel monitoring and decontamination procedures are stored with the equipment.

The teams wili establish a monitoring stat' ion at each assembly area. All evacuees will be required te pass through the monitoring station before being allowed to depart the assembly area. The name of each individual surveyed and the survey findings will be recorded by the radiological monitoring teams. An exception to this requirement may be necessary should the Emergency Coordinator determine that such monitoring is unnecessary, or would jeopardize the health of evacuating personnel due to unfavorable radiological conditions.

6 Personnel who have been found to be contaminated to levels in excess of 2

1000 DPM per 100 cm, will be escorted to decontamination facilities if decontamination cannot be completed at the monitoring station. Details of the type and extent of an individual's contamination will be recorded, as well as the type of survey instruments used and the results of the decontamination efforts.

Decontamination facilities are located within the plant and at the NOSF.

These facilities are described in greater detail in Section 9.0 of this plan.

Details regarding personnel monitoring and decontamination are provided in Procedure EPP-307, " Radiological Monitoring of Site Evacuees".

8.4 PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY Within 30 minutes of the declaration of an emergency, all personnel onsite will be accounted for. This will be accomplished through the use of a manual head count method as prescribed in Procedure EPP-209, " Personnel Assembly and Accountability".

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Basically, each Station supervisor or the senior individual onsite from his group is responsible for accounting for all persons working in, or visiting with, his group. Once personnel have arrived at the assembly areas, the supervisor or.most senior member of each group shall make a head count of 6

all personnel in his aroup and report his findings to the Emergency Coordinator. Each emergency response facility manager shall account for the personnel ass'igned to that facility and shall report this information to the Emergency Coordinator.

Security personnel, with the aid of the security computer, will be 6

responsible for continuous.ly accounting for all, individuals within the Protected Area thereafter.

Security will be directed to perform searches f'or all individuals who are not accounted for. Standard search and resc6e procedures will be used.

8.5 PROVISIONS FOR PROTECTING ONSITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONNEL Personnel arriving or remaining onsite shall be afforded sufficient protective clothing and equipment to ensure their ability to perform 6

emergency response or recovery operations as needed.

8.5.1 RESPIRATORY PROTECTION Respiratory protection equipment is available in numerous Emergency Kits and Emergency Lockers located throughout the site and from the Radiation

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Protection office. There are a sufficient number of full-face respirators 6

available in each 'onsite emergency response facility to equip every individual working in that facility, with extra respirators serving as spares. During an emergency condition, air sampling will b.e performed continuou, sly throughout the site area to ensure that protective measures are taken in a timely fashion.

In addition, self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and reserve air.

I supplies are provided for use by the c.ccupants of the onsite emergency l

response facilities. The Control Room is supplied with-6 SCBA's and 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> of reserve air supplies. The TSC, EOF, and OSC are also supplied l

with SCBA's.

Spare air bottles are available and can be refilled from j

onsite breathable air compressors and air reservoirs.

8.5.2 PROTECTIVE CLOTHING l

Protective clothing is also available in numerous Emergency Kit's and 6

Emergency Lockers located,throughout the site and from the Radiation Protection office. This clothing is standard anti-contamination (anti-C) clothing commonly used in nuclear power plants, and includes hoods, coveralls, shoe covers and gloves. There are a sufficient number of i

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MARCH 8, 1983

. _.. _. 7... _ n._ _,._3 CPSES/EP complete sets of anti-C's provided to clothe all personnel assigned to each

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emergency response facility. Spare sets of protective c.lothing are available in sizable quantities to permit " double" suiting for severely contaminated environments.

8.5.3 RADI0 PROTECTIVE DRUGS 4

A 7-day, 200-person,- supply of-the thyroid blocking agent, potassium iodine (KI), is stored at the Station. The main storage facility is located at the EOF. If conditions warrant, KI will be offered to onsite emergency response personnel.

8.6 0FFSITE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS The CPSES Emergency Organization is expected to make recommendations t 6

State and local authorities concerning protective actions to protect the public in the event of.an emergency situation at CPSES. The Texas Department of Health-is the lead State organization responsible for.

t implementing offsite protective actions involving emergency conditions at nuclear power plant facilities. State and local authorities are responsible for controlling access to the 10-mile EPZ under emergency conditions. Offsite protective actions are based upon recommendations provided by the Emergency Coordinator to State and county officials.

Instructions to the public regarding implementation of protective actions shall be provided by county and State officials via the Emergency Broadcasting System (EBS). Preformatted messages intended for the public shall be released to the news. media by the State -and county officials in ecnjunction with the EBS announcements. These messages are included in each county's Manual of Emergency of Procedures and are consistent with the CPSES EAL classification scheme.

Specific gui. dance regarding notification, evacuation, access control, control of public water supplies, control of distribution of affected agricultural products, and evacuation routes is available in Appendix 7 of the Texas Emergency Management -Plan and the county Emergency Operations Plans. In addition, Procedure EPP-304, " Protective Action Guides,"

describes the types of protective actions.which are appropriate to the emergency conditions encountered, and complies with the Environmental Protection A'ency (EPA) " Manual of Protective Action Guides."

g Upon identification and classification of an emergency condition, 0

' notification will be made as prescribed in the Emergency Plan Procedures.

Decisions regarding evacuation, sheltering, or relocation of the population-at-risk, as well as the means for public notification, are prescribed in the county Emergency Operations Plans. Recommendations of protective actions for the public will be based upon ensuring that 8-5 REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

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Procedure EPP-304.

In addition to the specific ider.tification and classification of an f

emergency condition, other plant conditions may exist that make releases of large amounts of radioactivity in a short time frame possible. In these cases, precautionary protective actions wilI be considered and recommendations communicated to the appropriate offsite agencies. The plant conditions which could combine to create the potential for release include the following:

a.

Core melt event sequences where releases from the Containment are not yet taking place, and large amounts of fission products are not yet present in the containment atmosphere.

I 6

b.

Core melt event sequences where large amounts of fission products are present in the containment atmosphere.

c.

Core melt event secuences where releases from the Containment are not yet taking place, stainment failure is likely with large amounts of fission produa or noble gases present in the containment atmosphere.

Although no releases may actually be occurring under these conditions,-

varying potential for significant releases does exist. Decisions as to whether or not to recommend and implement precrutionary protective actions

~J will depend upon the evaluation of the situation. Recommendations for precautionary protective actions range from taking shelter to downwind evacuations. These protective actions will be modified as release information becomes available. Dose projections, the time available to evacuate, and estimated evacuation times will all be considered as part of P

this process.

8.6.1 EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONES The Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ) are defined as those areas for which planning is needed to ensure that prompt and effective actions can be taken to protect the public in the event of an accidental release of 6

radioisotopes. The Ingestion Exposure EPZ has a radius of 50-miles, and is divided into 16 equal sectors (22.5 degrees each) such that, ih an emergency, only those affected sectors need be addressed. The Plume Exposure EPZ, with a 10-mile radius, is divided into concentric circles of one mile increments with the plant in the center. Maps of these EPZ's are 6

provided in Section 15.0, Appe.ndices F and G.

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The Emergency Coordinator will provide State and local authorities with the 6""

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status of the emergency situation and recommend any protective actiens to

. be taken.- Once local authorities have decided that protective actions are.

to be taken, the entire population within the affected sectors of the Plume Exposure EPZ must be notified in a reasonable time frame. Responsibilities 6

for the notification of the population within the affected sectors in an

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emergency situation lie with the local authorities and are outlined in each county's Emergency Operations Plan. The notification system is described in Section 3.0 of this plan.

8.6.2 EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES Evacuation time estimates for evacuation from the Plume Exposure EPZ have been developed in compliance with the provisions of Appendix 4 to NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, and are provided in Section 15.0, Appendix N.

8.6.3 EVACUATION MAP 0

Section 15'.0, Appendix N, Figure N.4, illustrates the primary and secondary evacuation routes in the Plume Exposure EPZ.

8.6.4 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION MAP Section 15.0, Appendix F. Figure F.1, illustrates the population distribution within a 10-mile radius of CPSES. This map is divided into

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the same sectors as the EPZ maps.

8.6.5 BASES FOR CHOICE OF RECOMMENDED PROTECTIVE ACTIONS Once offsite doses have been calculated in'accordance with Procedure 5

EPP-301, " Computer Assessment of Radiological Conditions", or Procedure EPP-302, " Manual Assessment of Radiological Conditions", the resultant l6 information is used in conjunction with Procedure EPP-304 to formulate any l

i protective action recommendations.

If conditions warrant, the Emergency' 5

Coordinator shall recomaknd protect _,1 actions to the ap'propriate county and State officials. The protective actions recommended for the public as set forth is in Procedure EPP-304, are based upon the guidelines expressed l6 in the EPA " Manual of Protective Action Guides" (EPA-520/1-75-001); "Public Protection Strategies for Potential Nuclear Reactor Accidents: Sheltering Concepts with Existing Public and Private Structures" (SAND 77-1725),

Sandia Laboratory; and " Examination of Offsite Radiological Emergency Measures for Nuclear Reactor Accidents Involving Core Melt" (SAND 78-0454),

l Sandia Laboratory.

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REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983 y-s

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CPSES/EP 9.0 RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE CONTROL During an emergency condition at CPSES, Procedurc EPP-305, " Exposure Guidelines and Personnel Dosimetry During Emergency Conditions", will be

• utilized. This procedure specifies the responsibilities and actions of the Radiation Protection Coordinator regarding the use of high-range dosimeters, the processing frequency of dosimetry, and the criteria which allows emergency response personnel to receive a radiation dose in excess of the limits set forth in 10 CFR, Part 20.

Unless a life-saving or urgent plant emergency necessitates a planned over-exposure, all emergency response activities shall be performed so as not to exceed the gxposure limits established in 10 CFR, Part 20.

Radiation Protection procedures governing the frequency of donirster evaluation and maintenance of ex'posure records exist for routine operations. These procedures discuss the proper use of self-reading dosimeters and establish the frequency and criteria for TLD evaluation.

Routine TLD processing is accomplirSed in the Operations Support Center using automatic equipment linked to a records management computer. A manual TLD reader and a terminal to the records management computer are maintained in the Emergency Operations Facility Counting Room. During routine operations, this processing equipment is normally not operated on a 24-hour-per-day basis; however, during emergency conditions, Radiation Protection personnel will be assigned to support 24-hour-per-day operation of this equipment, if required.

The use of self-reading dosimeters will permit up-to-the-minute tracking of personnel exposures. Decisions related to planned over-exposure, pre-mature TLD processing, and exposure extensions will be based on each individual's current exposure history and self-read dosimeter data.

9.1 EMERGENCY EXPOSURE CRITERIA 6

CPSES utilizes the emergency exposure criteria recommended by the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements and published in NCRP Report No. 39, " Basic Radiation Protection Criteria". NCRP Report No. 39 was selected (over the Environmental Protection Agency " Manual of Protective Action Guides") as the preferred guidance for use at CPSES because this report does not specify a particular source of radiation. The provisions of NCRP Report No. 39 shall be followed and the dose to emergency response personnel held to the lowest practical levels. Only the Emergency Coordinator shall authorize emergency workers to receive doses in excess of the 10 CFR, Part 20 limits.

If time permits, the Emergency Coordinator or the Radiation Protection Coordinator will discuss the rationale for exceeding the 10 CFR, Part 20 limits with NRC representatives.

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CPSES/EP For life-saving actions, such as searching for and removing injured -

persons, or entering contaminated areas to prevent conditions that could 0

.potentially injure numbers of people, the followin: criteria shall be applied:

a.

Rescue personnel should be CPSES volunteers or professional rescue personnel.

b.

Rescue personnel should be familiar with th'e consequences of exposure 6

to radiation.

c.

Women capable of reproduction should.not.take part in these actions.

6l d.

All other things being equal, volunteers above the age of 45 should be selected.

6 e.

The planned individual dose to the whole body shall not exceed 100 rems.

' f.

Internal exposure should be ednfmized by the use of the best availabic respiratory. protection, and contamination should be controlled by the use of available protective clothing, g.

Normally, exposure under these conditions shall be limited to once in a

- lifetime.

6 h.

Persons receiving exposures as indicated above should be advised to avoid procreation for a period up to a few months.

For actions in less urgent emergency situations, where it is desirable te 6

enter a hazardous area to protect facilities and equipment, eliminate,the further escape of effluents,~or to control fires, the following criteria shall be applied:

a.

Pc.rsons performing the planned action should be CPSES volunteers I

familiar with the consequences of exposure to radiation.

b.

Women capable of reproduction shall not take part in these actions.

c.

Planned individual dose to the whole body shall not exc'eed 25 rems.

d.

Planned individual dose to the hands and forearms shall not exceed 100

rems, Internal exposure shall b.e minimized by the use of respiratory e.

protection and contamination. controlled by the use of protective clothing.

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REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

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Normally, exposure under these conditions shall be limited to once in a lifetime.

9.2 CONTAMINATION CONTROL The results of onsite and offsite contaminatio surveys, performed in 6

accordance with Procedures EPP-309, "Offsite Radiological Monitoring", and EPP-310. "Onsite and In-Plant Radiological Surveys", shall be used as the basis for determining and posting radiologically controlled areas. The posting of a controlled area will be accomplished in accordance with

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Procedure.HPT-604, " Establishment of Zones, Posting and Labeling".

Whenever ground or surface contamination levels for Unrestricted reas 2

exceed 1000 DPM per 100 cm within the Exclusion Area Boundary, but outside the Protected Area, that contaminated area will be isolated and treated as a Radiation Controlled Area. Appropriate radiological protecti'on and access control measures shall be implemented as described in the plant Radiation Protection Section procedures.

In the event contamination levels 2

in a Restricted Area exceed 2000 DPM/100 cm, decontamination or other necessary protective actions shall be considered. The return of the affected are.9 to normal use shall be permitted when contamination levels have been reouced to Unrestricted Area levels.

To assure that onsite personnel do not receive excess exposure via the ingestion pathway, drinking water and food supplies that have at any time been outside the Control Room ventilation envelope and within a Radiation Controlled Area shall not be consumed.-

6 9.3 DECONTAMINATION Decontamination of contaminated personnel will be directed by personnel from the Radiation Protection Section and will be performed in accordance with Procedures EPP-307, " Radiological Monitoring of Site Evacuees", and HPI-402, " Personnel Decontaminatien". Procedure EPP-307 prescribes that personnel decontamination is deemed necessary if contamination levels are found to be in excess of 1000 DPM per probe area. Procedures EPP-307 and HPI-303 list decontamination methods and techniques as well as those actions to be taken in the event of severe skin contamination or suspected internal contamination.

The plant decontamination facility, illustrated in Figure 9.1, is located on elevation 810' at the normal radiological access control p'oint in the Turbine Building adjacent to the Radiation Protec' tion Office. An additional decontamination facility, illustrated in Figure 9.2, is located in the Nuclear Operations Support Facility (NOSF) for use during emergency situations. Suitable decontaminants and additional clothing are provided at both facilities.

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REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983

-7 CPSES/EP w m The decontamination of personnel, equipment, or areas will be dependent

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upon the conditions present at that time, and will be directed to minimize personnel' exposures both to contaminate'd personnel, if applicable, and to 6

the person performing the decontamination. Radiation Protection procedures for routine operations list the methods, limits and precautions necessary for decontamination activities. These procedures shall also be referenced for area posting and material release requirements.

Durind an emergency condition, areas of the Station which are normally 6

considered unrestricted access areas may become contaminated such that these areas will be considered Radiation Controlled Areas. Radiation Protection personnel will survey the Station and make changes as necessary during the course of the emergency.

If the immediate area around the Station should become contaminated, then a Radiation Controlled Area access 6-Point may be established at the NOSF. The decontamination facility at the NOSF would then be used as required to decontaminate personnel leaving the Station.

The decontamination of equipment and areas will be performed as the emergency condition permits, with priority being given to equipment or areas essential to the recovery of the Station to a safe, stable condition.

Contaminated areas and equipment shall be classified as such when the 6

contamination levels prescribed in Pr6cedure HPI-404, " Area and Equipment Decontamination", are exceeded.

9.4 RADIOACTIVE WASTE

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Radioactive waste generated or accumulat'ed by the hospital, or by ambulance or other emergency response personnel may be brought to the NOSF for 6

temporary storage. As conditions permit, this radioactive waste will be returned to the Sta' ion for processing.

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10.0 MEDICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH SUPPORT 7;3

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10.1 HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL SUPPORT' 1

l Two local hospitals Hood General Hospital in Granbury and Marks English i

1 Hospital in Glen Rose, are 'available for accepting injured persons from CPSES. Hood General Hospital serves as the local support hospital and is

j prepared to receive contaminated, injured personnel from CPSES. Hood i

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General Hospital personnel are equipped and trained to provide gross decontamination. Life-saving activities and patient stabilization in the event of extrece over-expo.:ures. The Marks English Hospital in Glen Rose is not prepa?ad to treat radiologically-related injuries from CPSES; 4

however, this hospital may be utilized for the treatment of non-radiologically-related injuries.

In conjunction with above hospital arrangements, Texas Utilities Generating Company has contracted with Radiation Management Corporation (RMC) to provide expertise, facilities and. equipment to assure CPSES of a.

comprehensive radiological emergency medical assistance. program on a N

24-hour-per-day basis. RMC also assists-in the specification of the facilities at Hood General Hospital; the training of hospital, ambulance and TUGC0 personnel;.and the conduct of medical emergency drills.

6 i

Additional support provided by RMC includes the 24-hour, seven-day-per-week availability of the expert consultation-and services of a Radiation Emergency. Medical (REM) Team. The REM Team is composed of a licensed physician and a certified health physicist to respond to an accident. RMC also provides bioassay laboratory and whole body counting services if requested. Medical consultation is also available from specialists in a j

variety of related disciplines.

j In the event that more definitive. medical evaluation or treatment is required, the victim may be transported to the RMC facilities at the Northwestern Memorial Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. The capabilities of Northwestern Memorial Hospital include a fully equipped radio surgery

. suite; reverse isolation units; and facilities for white, cell transfusion,.

. bone marrow transplant and chromosome analysis.

I Letters of agreement with Hood General Hospital and Radiation Management Corporation are included in Section 15.0, Appendix H.

A letter of agreement is not required from Marks English Hospital since that hospital 6

l will not provide specialized services for treating radiologically-related

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injuries..

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10.2 ONSITE FIRST AID The first aid station for CPSES is located on elevation 810',of the Turbine Building ac.ross the hallway from the Radiation Protection office. The station is equipped with standard first aid supplies such as bandages, splints, non-prescription medications, first aid manual and a stretcher.

First aid kits, stretchers, and eye-wash stations are alto located throughout the plant a't appropriate locations. First aid treatment facilities and equipment are also maintained in the NOSF.

The training.provided to CPSES Radiation ?rotection and Emergency Repair and Damage Control personnel includes the techniques to be used for 6

preparing a contaminated, injure.d individual for transport to Hood General Heapital. A sufficient numbe.r of,CPSES employees have also received basic first aid training and are capable of rendering first aid to injured or ill victims prior to the arrival of medical personnel.

10.3 TRANSPORTATION OF VICTIMS TO OFFSITE FACILITIES I

A Company ambulance is available to CPSES to' transport injured personnel,,

who may also be radiologically contaminated, to the appropriate medical facility. As discussed in Section 1.0, agreements with local ambulance services provide for back-up assistance as needed. Protective clothing, and dosimetry requirements for transporting injured and contaminated victims are described in the Procedure EPP-308, " Transporting of Contaminated Injured Personnel". Each ambulance carries radio l) communications equipment that allow the attendants to confer with. doctors

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I at either local hospital. Any injured, contaminated individuals transported to Hood General Hospital shall be accompanied by a Radiation Protection Technihian who shall be equipped with an FM transceiver. Via 6l this transceiver and a telephone at the plant, or the ambulance radio, any ambulance should be able to communicate with the receiving hospital staff.

The primary function of Hood General Hospital is to stabilize the injured individual. Should definitive care be required at the Northwestern 5

Memorial Hospital, arrangements for transporting the individual shall be made contingent upon the extent of the injuries and existing radiological conditions.

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11.0

- RECOVERY AND REENTRY s

Once emergency conditions have subsided at CPSES, and the situation is no 6

longer considered a threat to onsite personnel or the gsneral public, efforts shall be initiated to restore the affected unit (s) to full operation or place the affected unit (s) in a long-term safe. shutdown condition until' full operation can be resumed. The scope of these efforts is. dependent upon the severity of the emergency, ranging from a. simple close-out to a full-scale mobilization of personnel and resources to support a long-term recovery effort. if a recovery effort is deemed necessary, the CPSES Recovery Organization shall be established to ensure that personnel and resources are properly applied to that effort.

The transition from.the CPSES Emergency Organization to ti e CPSES Recovery Organization is diccated by the severity of the emergency conditions experienced onsite and offsite. Once the Emergency Coordinator has established the fact that the emergency conditions have subsided, he and 5

other appropriate TUGC0 personnel shall assess the need for initiating a y

recovery effort. Whether it is decided that the event should be closed out or that the CPSES Recovery Organization should be established, this decision shall be discussed with the appropriate TUGC0 management 6

. personnel. The State and county emergency response organizations shall be notified prior to closing out the event or entering the recovery phase.

In all cases, the NRC shall be notified of~the decision.

If established, overall technical direction and control of the CP5ES Recovery Organization is assumed by the Recovery Manager. The CPSES Recovery Organization absorbs the existing CPSES Emergency Organization, and management of all activities conducted from the EOF is assumed from the Emergency Coordinator by the Recovery Manager. The Recovery Manager shall also assume direction and control of the CPSES Emergency Organization.

During the recovery phase, CPSES Emergency Organization personnel-will continue'their functional assignments. As appropriate, the TSC Advisor or the Communications Coordinator shall ensure that the supporting emergt.ncy 6

response organizations are informed of the change in Station status and of-I the CPSES organizational transition. Procedure EPP-121 " Recovery and Reentry", delineates the requirements and actions to be taken for recorary phase activities, including the transition to the CPSES Recovery Organization, and for personnel reentry into evacuated onsite areas.

t Recovery operations include the evaluation of historical and real-time data and reports, the selection of the proper corrective action and reatoration I

activities, and the acquisition of the equipment and personnel to j

accomplish those activities.

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CPSES/EP i h Reentry into the en'vir'ons of the Station _by selected personnel is one of the most important sources of information available to the CPSES Recovery Organization. These activities should aid in ascertaining the resources, manpower and recovery actions necessary to restore the Station to operational status.

I The Emergency Coordinator (or the Recovery Manager) has the responsibility i

.for authorizing reentry into a previously evacuated area. Reentries shall be made in accordance with the criteria established in Procedure EPP-121,

" Recovery and Reentry", and the exposure guidelines established in Procedure.EPP-305, "Exposurg Guidelines and Personnel Dosimetry During Emergency Conditions".. Procedure EPP-305 provides specific instructions 6

and criteria for exposure control and, if necessary, a planned over-exposure. All efforts shall be made to k,eep exposures as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).

The de-eccalation or close-out of the activities of the CPSES Recovery Organization shall be based upon the recommendation of the Recovery Manager and approved by the Vice President Juelear. This decision nay be based on a number of criteria, such as:

s Completion of'all corrective actio,n or restoration activities.

a.

b.

Availability of the affected unit (s) to resume power operation.

Reduced need for specialized talents and resources to perform recovery 1.

c.

activities.

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11.1 CPSES RECOVERY ORGANIZATION The CPSES_ Recovery Organization is composed of both onsite and offsite personnel. Corporate and contract personnel are utilized as needed to expand the capabilities of onsite personnel. Since the magnitude of any recovery effort is dependent upon the scope of the event, the CPSES Recovery Organization staffing requirements are difficult to predict in advance; therefore, this plan only predesignates certain management level positions in the CPSES Recovery Organization. The managers form their respectire groups as they deem appropriate to deal with the recovery effort.

6 The basic CPSES Recovery Organization is ill'ustrated in Figure 11.1.

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11.1.1 CPSES RECOVERY ORGANIZATION - FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 6

11.1.1.1 Recovery Manager The Recovery Manager is responsible for directing the actions of the CPSES Recovery Organization and for restoring CPSES to a fully operational status. The Manage,r, Nuclear Operations, is the principal Recovery Manager.

In his absence, the Vice President, Nuclear, or a designated member of senior managem'nt may serve as the Recovery Manager.

e The responsibilitics and authorities assigned to the Emergency Coordinator 6

in Section 1.0 of this plan will be transferred to the Recovery Manager when the CPSES Recovery Organization is formed, thus assuring the continuity of resources, communications and.other activities initiated by the C?SES Emergency Organization. The Recovery Manager.shall also command those resources available from the Corporate offices.

5 11.1.1.2 Operations Support Operations Support personnel are responsible for the analysis and development of plans and procedures in direct support of operations with the objective of restoring the Station to operational status. Their primary responsibilities include:

a.

Providing direct support to shift operations.

b.

Analyzing instrument and control problems and developing modification and repair plans.

c.

Analyzing conditions and developing guidance for shift operations personnel regarding core protection.

d.

Developing out-of-normal and emergency procedures for operations support.

11.1.1.3 Technical Support Technical Support personnel are responsible for the following:

a.

Determining the need for and providing engineering and technical l

specialists to support other managers as required.

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Assuring that design and construction activities are adequately staffed and equipped to provide timely support.

c.

Providing direct interface between CPSES personnel and others on 6

l administrative matters.

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d.

Directing, coordinating, and approving all engineering, design and construction activities conducted onsite during the recovery phase.

DevelopinganyrequiredmodificationsIor.radwastesystemsinsupport e.

of recovery operations.

6 f.

Providing technical expertise for Station repair and modification

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activities in support of the resolution of mechanical and electrical problems.

4 g.

Providing qualified personnel to augment emergency repair and damage control teams.

11.1.1.4 Corporate Office Support Texas Utilities Corporate office personnel will augment the CPSES Reco,very Organization and support recovery activities as. requested by the Recovery Manager. The Corporate Purchasing and Public Information departments shall support the CPSES Recovery Organization and assist in procuring services and equipment and disseminating information to the public. Other Corporate support to recovery efforts shall be provided as described in Section 1.0 of this plan.

6 11.2 METHODS FOR ESTIMATING TOTAL POPULATION EXPOSURE CPSES will periodically estimate total population exposure as a result of (5) an emergency condition. Total population exposure will be estimated on a

. routine basis for operational releases, as well as for any releas'es that may result from an emergency condition.

Numerous thermo-luminescent dosimeters (TLD) are located throughout the 10-mile EPZ. These devices will provide 'a detailed description of the radiation dose received by the local population of each location. These devices are checked periodically during routine' operations and will be checked at greater frequency during, and immediately after, an emergency situatidn at CPSES. Procedures for conducting this TLD monitoring program are addressed in the plant Chemistry and Environmental Section procedures.

In addition to the TLD monitoring. program, data concerning population doses is evaluated at least daily during periods of effluent release and weekly thereafter until event closure. This information shall be determined through the use of plant process monitoring equipment, in accordance with Radiation Protection Section Procedure HPl-304, " Population Dose Assessment with the,RM-21".

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A computerized dose assessment system also exists for use during snd after an emergency condition at CPSES. This system is capable of calculating the total man-rem exposure based upon calculated release rates. These release 6

rates are calculated from actual plant monitor instrument readings and real-time meteorological data.

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RECOVERY MANAGER g.

I EMERGENCY OPERATIONS TECHNICAL CORPORATE ME ORGANIZATION SUPPORT SUPPORT SUPPORT COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION EMERGENCY PLAN CPSES RECOVERY ORGANIZATION REVISION 6 MARCH 8, 1983 FIGURE 11.1 1

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...-~.y CPSES/EP er 12.0 EXERCISES AND DRILLS Emergency preparedness e.tercises are conducted annually at CPSES to 6

l evaluate the integrated capability and a major portion of,the basic elements of the overall emergency response. Drills are conducted to develop and maintain key skills,.co evaluate segments of the overall emergency response and to periedically confirm che availability and operability of emergency equipment. Exercises and drills shall be conducted in accordance with NRC and FEMA rules (10 CFR, Part 50.47 and

.44 CFR, Part 351). The Manager, Plant Operations, along with other key 5

personnel from TUGC0 and participating offsite organizations, is responsible for planning and scheduling drills and exercises.

As soon as possible af ter an exercise or drill, a critique shall be held to identify the strengths and weaknesses exposed as a result of that activity.

6 d

Deficiencies identified as a result of these exercises and drills shall be corrected. A formal evaluation should result from the critique. Procedure EPP-104, " Emergency Preparedness Drills and Exercises", provides guidelines i

for developing, conducting, evaluating and documenting emergency preparedness drills and exercises, and the responsibilities for implementing this procedure.

12.1 EXERCISES To adequately test the CPSES Emergency Plan and the state of emergency preparedness at the State and local level, and to familiarize personnel with their duties and responsibilities, an annual emergency preparedness 6

exercise will be performed at CPSES. The exercise will involve postulated emergency conditions bared upon a preplanned scenario developed in accordance with Procedure EPP-104. The annual exercise shall include the

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mobilization of TUGCO, State and local personnel and resources to the extent that the adequacy' of the integrated emergency response capability can be verified. Critical communications links between the participating emergency response organizations shall also be tested. The exercise scenario shall be varied from' year'to year so as to ensure that all basic

,6 elements of the various emergency plans and emergency response organizations associated with CPSES are tested within a five-year period.

The exercise planning efforts shall address provisions to start at least one exercise between the hours of 6:00 p.m. and midnight, and another-between the hours of midnight and 6:00 a.m. within a six-year period. Some exercises should be unannounced.

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12.2' DRILLS Drills for testing, developing and maintaining skills in particular areas 6l shall be conducted periodically at CPSES. In some ar.eas, practical drills shall be used to evaluate personnel and allow for " hands on" training. The drills should follow preplanned scenarios developed to thoroughly test the response of the personnel involved. During drills, if appropriate, 6

on-the-spot correction of incorrect performance shall be made and demonstration of'the proper performance offered by the drill controller.

State personnel should periodically participate in the radiologfcal monitoring and health physics drills. The following drills are required:

12.2.1 COMMUNICATIONS DRILLS

.The communications links between CPSES, the DPS office in Waco, and the 6

Hood County and Somervell County Emergency Operations Centers shall be j

tested monthly. Communications between CPSES, and State and Federal

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agencies shall be tested quarterly. Communications between CPSES, the State and local Emergency Operations Centers, and the radiological monitoring teams shall be tested annually. Communications drills shall j

also address the aspect of understanding the content of messages.

i 12.2.2 FIRE DRILLS

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' Fire drills shall be conducted quarterly in accordance with the 6

requirements of the CPSES Technical Specifications. The local county h,

volunteer fire department should participate in one of the periodic drills.

l 12.2.3 EMERGENCY MEDICAL DRILLS i

Onsite personnel who are assigned to the Emergency Repair and Damage Control Group shall receive annual instruction in handling injured, contaminated individuals. Offsite ambulance and medical support services shall participate in an annual drill or the annual exercise; 12.2.4 RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING DRILLS Station personnel wko are assigned to radiological monitoring teams shall l

participate in annual drills which will involve responses to all aspects of 6l onsite and offsite environmental monitoring.

These drills shall include collection and analysis of all sample media l

(e.g., water, vegetation, soil and air), and provisions'for communications and record keeping.

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• L or 12.2.5 HEALTH PHYSICS DRILLS Health physics drills shall tc :ndu:::d Oc=i-annually which involve.

response to, and analysis of, simulated elevated airborne and liquid samples, and direct radiation measurements in'the environment.

Analysis of in-plant liquid samples with actual elevated radiation levels, including use of the Post-Accident Sampling System, shall be included in health physics drills on an annual basis.

12.2.6 REPAIR AND DAMAGE CONTROL Personnel who are assigned to the Emergency Repair and Damage Control Group shall participate in annual drills which involve response to various scenarios concerning repair or recovery of damaged equipment and plant functions. The annual drill may be conducted as part of the annual exercise.

12.3 DRILL AND EXERCISE SCENARIOS Drill and exercise scenarios shall be developed to provide a mechanism with 6

which to effectively test and evaluate the CPSES Emergency Preparedness Planning Program. These scenarios should allow free play for decision-making and shall include the following minimum criteria:

a.

The basic objective (s) of each drill and exercise, and appropriate evaluation criteria; b.

The date(s), time period (s), location (s) and participating 6

organizations; c.

The simulated events; d.

A time schedule of real and simulated initiating events; e.

A narrative summary describing the conduct of the exercise or 6

drill which address such elements as simulated casualties, offsite fire department assistance, rescue of personnel, use of protective clothing, deployment of radiological monitoring teams, and public information activities; and f.

A description of the arrangements for, and advance materials to '

be provided to, official observers. Qualified personnel from Federal, State and local agencies, and from CPSES will observe and critique the exercises and drills conducted at CPSES.

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The scenario to be utilized in the annual exercise shall.be developed undar

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the direction of the Corporate Health Pnysics Supervisor., The date and objectives of the annual exercise shall be approved by the Vice President, Nuclear. Scenarios developed for those exercises or drills requiring NRC and/or FEMA evaluation shall be submitted for review and approval by the NRC and/or FEMA.

12.4 CRITIQUE OF DRILLS AND EXERCISES Drills and exercises shall provide the principal means for assessinh the effectiveness of the CPSES Emergency Plan, its associated implementing procedures, and the state of emergency preparedness of personnel and equipment. In order to evaluate the performance and lessons learned, a critique shall be conducted in a timely manner following each drill or exercise. The critique shall be initiated by the senior drill controller, or by the Manager, Plant Operations, in the case of the annual exercise.

The objectives of the critique session shall be to evaluate the emergency response of the participating personnel, to assess the adequacy of 6

dedicated emergency equipment, and to identify deficiencies in the CPSES Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Procedures as written.

The critique shall compare the observed emergency response of the participants with the response anticipated in the drill / exercise scenario.

The critique shall include a discussion of bor!' acceptable as well as unacceptable emergency responses. Observed deficiencies, as well as recommended corrective actions, shall be rJcorded by the Emergency Planning

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Coordinator. Recommendations shall include any provisions for additional training, assignment of appropriate personnel, suitability / performance of i

emergency equipment, and any changes in scope or completeness of the CPSES Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Procedures.

The Emergency Planning Coordinator shall be responsible for preparing a written summary of the critique. This summary shall include the objectives of the drill /exercice and a list of participants, controllers, and t

i observers. This summary shall also include a list of any identified deficiencies, as well as recommendations for their resolution.

In addition, the joint NRC-FEMA critique of the annual exercis.e may result in NRC and FEMA recommendations or requirements to TUGGO for improving j

emergency preparedness at CPSES. The Manager, Plant Operations, shall be responsible for ensuring TUGC0 compliance to any such requirements. The Emergency Planning Coordinator shall be responsible for incorporating those appropriate changes to the CPSES Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Procedures.

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13.0 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAINING All CPSES personnel and visitors, including those individuals working onsite on a temporary basis or in a training staths, who will be unescorted within the Protected Area, shall receive an orientation on the CPSES Emergency Plan to apprise them of their expected actions and to e'nsure their safety in the event of an emergency. Station personnel shall be kept informed of changes in the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Procedures as appropriate, by annual retraining or additional training as directed by the Managne, Plant Operations.

Personnel assigned specific duties during an emergency condition at CPSES shall receive training appropriate to their respective assignments as specified in Procedure TRA-105, " Emergency Preparedness Training". This procedure delineates the requirements and responsibilities for deieloping, implementinte and maintaining the CPSES Emergency Preparedness Training Program. This procedure also describes the specialized initial training and periodic retraining to be provided to those individuals who are expected to respond to an emergency condition at CPSES as prescribed in this plan and its associated Emergency Plan Procedures. Satisfactory completion of the required training is mandatory prior to an individual 6

assuming an emergency plan position assignment.

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The responsibility for coordinating the CPSES Emergency Preparedness Training Program is assigned to the Director, Nuclear Training.

The TUGC0 Quality Assurance Department, located in the Corporate offices, shall be responsible for auditing the effectiveness of the CPSES Emergency Preparedness Training Program. The CPSES Quality Assurance Section, which is located onsite, shall routinely surveil CPSES Emergency Preparedness Training Program activities.

The CPSE'S Emergency Preparedness Training program shall address the following areas:

13.1 BASIC CPSES EMERGENCY PLAN This training will be provided to.all personnel assigned to the CPSES Emergency Organization. The objectives of this training include familiarization of the student with the basic CPSES Emergency Plan, its activation and implementation, and the concept of operations of the CPSES Emergency Organization. Within the scope of this training, onsite assembly, accountability and evacuation procedures will also be addressed.

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CPSES/EP 13.2. CPSES EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION As appropriate, personnel assigned to the CPSES Emergency Organization

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shall be provided training in their assigned emergency response functions.

Within the scope of this training, the following topics will be addressed:

a.

Emergency response facility staffing and activation b.

Notification procedures and_ methods of communications c.

Accident assessment d.

Onsite and offsite radiological assessment e.

In-plant and onsite radiological surveys f.

Offsite radiological monitoring g.

Protective action guides h.

Personnel dosimetry requirements

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Post-acc.ident sampling procedures-6

j. Contamination control methods and personnel monitoring procedures k.

Emergency repair and damage control procedures.

Where applicable, this training will include instruction in the selection and use of instruments and equipment.

13.3 FIRST' AID TRAINING Selected CPSES personnel shall attend Red Cross Multi-Media or equivalent first aid training to ensure that first aid-qualified personnel are available onsite at all times.

13.4 FIRE CONTROL A training program shall be provided to those CPSES employees who serve on the Fire Brigade. This training program shall be coordinated by the Director, Nuclear Training. This' training program shall address those methods and equipment utilized for fighting the various types of fires that could occur onsite. Appropriate emphasis will be also placed on the radiological aspects of firefighting.

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". 6 13.5 0FFSITE ORGANIZ'ATIONS Offsite groups, such as the fire departments and rescue and ambulance se.rvices, that participate in emergency preparedness and response activities shall receive sufficient instruction to ensure that they are familiar with the CPSES Emergency Plan, the general CPSES site layout, and 6

their expected response actions in the event of an incident at CPSES requiring.their assistance. Retraining to maintain emergency preparedness shall be conducted on'an annual basis.

13.6 0FFSITE MEDICAL PERSONNEL On an annual basis, selected staff members from offsite medical support facilities shall receive trai'ning coccerning the medical aspects of 6

radiological injuries.

13.7 EMERGENCY PLANNING PERSONNEL CPSES personnel assigned responsibilities for emergency preparedness planning activities shall attend formal training courses to maintain their 6

proficiency in all facets of emergency preparedness planning. The FEMA Radiological Accident Assessment Course, courses offered by Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and participation in seminars, work shops and other utility emergency preparedness drills and exercises may serve as part of this training.

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y-CPSES/EP m-14.0 RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PLANNING EFFORT The M' nager, Plant Operations, has the overall responsibility for eme'rgency a

preparedness planning at CPSES. Specific responsibility for emergency preparedness planning at CPSES is assigned to the Emergency Planning Coordinator. The position of Emergency Planning Coordinator will be assigned to an individual from the Radiation Protection Section. The

' Emergency Planning Coordinator is responsible for, and has the authority to coordinats, the planning effort with all supporting organizations.

As required, the Emergency Planning Coordinator.will periodically review the CPSES Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Procedures, and update these documents accordingly.

In addition e.o maintaining the CPSES Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Procedures, the Emergency Planning Coordinator is also responsible for planning and coordinating exercises and drills, for evaluating emergency equipment needs, and for coordinating with the TUGC0 Nuclear Training Department to develop the CPSES Emergency Preparedness Training Program.

An independent review of the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Procedures shall be conducted annually. This review will address emergency preparedness training, drills, exercises and emergency equipment, and shall 6

be conducted in accordance with Procedure EPP-102, " Review, Update and Control of the Emergency Plan".

This review shall be documented and the documentation shall be retained for a period of five years. This review is the responsibility of the Corporate Health Physics Supervisor.

The Station Operations Review Committee is responsible for the review of the execution of the CPSES Emergency Plan in the annual exercise. The Emergency Planning Coordinator will ensure that corrective actions identified during the exercise critique, or from any other periodic reviews and surveillances are properly implemented in the CPSES Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Procedures.

Copies' of the CP'SES. Emergency Plan and the Emergency Plan Manual (proced-l ures) shall be distributed by the Emergency Planning Coordinator to those j

individuals and organizations concerned with emergency preparedness planning at CPSES. These documents shall be assigned a control number.

Revisions to these documents shall be issued in accordance with CPSES procedural requirements for controlled documents to ensure that the holders of these documents are in possession of up-to-date documents. The call I

lists contained in Procedure EPP-203, " Emergency Notification and Communications", shall be reviewed on a quarterly basis by the Emergency l

Planning Coordinator and updated accordingly.

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i APPENDIX H Letters of. Agreement and Supporting Emergency Plans 6

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eo,em LETTERS OF AGREEMENT Hood General Hospital 6

-Hood County Sheriff Hood General Ambulance Service Somervell County Sheriff

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Glen Rosc/Somervell County Volunteer Fire Department and Rescue-Ambulance Service Radiation Management Corporation Texas Department of Health Texas Department of Public Safety Department of Energy / Energy Research and Development Administration Squaw Creek Parki Inc.

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. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations l

Texas A&M University t

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,CPSES/EP SUPPORTING EMERGENCY PLANS (1) Hood County Emergency Operations Plan and Manual of 6

Emergency Procedures Source: County Government (2)

Somervell County Emergency Operations Plan and Manual of Emergency Procedures Source: County Government (3) State of Texas Emergency Management Plan Scurce: Texas Department of Health (4) Westinghouse Emergency Response Plan Source: Westinghouse Electric Corporation Water Reactors Division (5) Squaw Creek Park Procedure for Response to Incidents at Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Source: Squaw Creek Park Inc.

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Institute of Nuclear Power j

Operations a

1820 Water Place Atlanta, Georgia 30339 Telephone 404 953 3600 t

September 28, 1982 3

1 Mr. R. A. Jones Manager, Plant Operations Texas Utilities Generating Company P.

O.

Box 2300 Glen Rose, Texas 76043

Dear Mr. Jones:

This letter is written to confirm INPO's support of the Comanche Peak Nuclear Station in the event of an emergency.

This support will be in accordance with the provisions stated in the

" Emergency Resources Manual" (February 1982) published by INPO.

In order to be of maximum assistance to Texas Utilities i

Generating Company during an emergency, INPO requires a copy (preferably controlled) of the Comanche Peak emergency plan and requests that it be notified of actual and exercise emergencies at the " alert" and higher levels.

Sincerely, l

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6t P. W..Lyon,' Director Radivlogical Protection &

Emergency Preparedness Division PNL:jky Enclosure ggg cc: Billy R. Clements CC \\ ('( '

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TEXAS A&M UNIVER'SITY COLLEGE STATION, TEXAS 77843

.)

Offde of RAoiot.ocicA1. SArm-Febr uar y 2, 19'P 3 (713) 845-1361 Mr.

R.

A.

Jones Manager, Plant Operations Texas Utilities Genersting Company P.

O.

Fox 2300 Glen Rose. TX 76043 Deer Hr. Jones:

This is in response to your letter requesting that

-Texas A&M act as a back-up laboratory for Comanche Peak Stean Electric Station.

I have discussed your. request with our Nuclear Science Center staf f and can say that we agr ee to act as a back-up laboratory.

11e do not have all the procedures involved actually in use now but we do have the necessar y equipment, we will discuss the procedures involved with your staff and will be ready to do environmental samples, gamma analysis, pH, chlorides, boron, dissolved oxygen, end conductivity.

If you have further requests or desire more information feel fr ee to contact me at an y tine.

Sincerely..

/,

A l

R.

D.

Neff, D.

Professor of Nuclear Engineering RON*da j

ec Mr. Don Feltz j

Nuclear Science Center l

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FEB 071983 wwa:va.

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APPENDIX K List of Emergency Plan Procedures K-1 MARCH 8, 1983

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-,7 LIST OF EMERGENCY PLAN PROCEDURES Procedure No.

Title EPP-101 Preparation of Emergency Plan Procedures EPP-102 Review, Update and Control of the Emergency Plan EPP-104 Emergency Preparedness Drills and Exercises EPP-105 Notification'of Offsite Officials Pending Flood or Failure of Squaw Creek Reservoir Dam EPP-107 Maintenance and Inventory of Emergency Equipment and Supplies

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EPP-109 Duties of the Emergency Coordinator EPP-112 Duties of Emergency Response Personnel EPP-113 Corporate Support _

EPP-114 Offsite Support and Assistance EPP-115 Release of Emergency-Related Information to the Public I

EPP-116 Emergency Repair and Damage Control EPP-121 Recovery and Reentry EPP-201 Assessment of Emergency Action Levels and Plar.

6 Activation EPP-203 Emergency !!otification and Communications EPP-204 Activation of the Technical Support Center EPP-205 Ac,tivation of the Operations Support Center EPP-206 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility EPP-207 Activation of the News Center

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EPP-208 Control of Site Access EPP-209 Personnel Assembly and Accountability K-2

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LIST OF ENERGENCY PLAN PROCEDURES Procedure No.

Title EPP-210 Evacuation EPP-301 Computer Assessment of Radiological Conditions EPP-302 Manual Assessment of Radiological Conditions EPP-304 Protective Action Guides 6

EPP-305 Exposure Guidelines and Personnel Dosimetry During Emergency Conditions EPP-306 Use of Thyroid Blocking Agents EPP-307 Radiological Monitoring of Site Evacuees EPP-308 Transporting of Contaminated Injured Personnel EPP-309 Offsite Radiological ~ Monitoring 0

EPP-310 Onsite and In-Plant Radiological Surveys EPP-311 Post-Accident Sampling

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Within Five Miles m

g 0-5 495 272 0

/'

20 19.l27 44 52 %

N,E__

0 0

SE 0-5 2793 1535 1353 3Mi 15 42 50 62 70 2%

55 64 SW 0-5 430 236 450 150 gj 20 19 31 44 56

'7M 50 60 t'W 0-5 201 110 0

0 3

g?

20 15 23 40 48 80g0 0

0 g

y

n k

y s

M Within Ten Miles

$, z I2 s 44 NE 0-10 8389 4609 3444 c

15

'96 105 116 125 42 45 m

98 s)

SE 0-IC 4492 2468 1875 5

20 52 58 77-83 52 57,

,I SW 0-10 968 532 450 150 g}

15 26 37 46 57

18g, 50

, 61 b

-E 589 873 ig 20 26 33 Si 58 0

0 l

l

• upper number represents vehicles used by schools @ 20 persons per vehicle g

• • upper number represents normal conditions; lower, adverse conditions MARCH 8,198I i

\\

, em CPSES/EP o

s

~

APPENDIX P s

Cross Index to NUIEG-0654 P-1 MARCH 8, 1983

s q.

CPSES/EP

• .,1*

i)

CROSS INDEX -

CP.SES EMERGENCY NUREG-0654, SECTION II CPSES EMERGENCY PLAN PLAN PROCEDURE A-1.a 1.3 EPP-114 A-1.b 1.3 EPP-ll4 A-1.c 1.0 (Figure 1.1)

N/A A-1.d 1.2.3.1 EPP-109 A-1.e 1.2.7 EPP-109 A-2.a N/A N/A A-2.b N/A N/A A-3 Appendix H N/A A-4 1.2.7, 11.1.1.1 EPP-109 EPP-121 B-1 1.0 EPP-109

')

EPP-112 B-2 1.2.3.1 EPP-109 B-3 1.2' 3.1 EPP-109 B-4 1.2.3.1 EPP-109 B-5 1.2 EPP-109 EPP-112 B-6 Figure 1.1 N/A B-7 1.2.8 EPP-113 B-7.a 1.2.8 E,PP-113 B-7.b 1.2.8 EPP-113 B-7.c 1.2.8 EPP-ll3 l

P-2

..]

MARCH 8, 1983

a a.

..... ~

~

~.

CPSES/EP n

B-7.d 1.2.8 EPP-ll.3 B-8 1.3 EPP-il4 B-9 1.3, Appendix H EPP-ll4 C-1.a-c 1.2.3 1 EPP-109 C-2.a N/A N/A C-2.b 6.I1 N/A*

C-3 6.6, 6.7, 6.8 EPP-114 C-4 1.1.5, 1.2.8',

1.3, EPP-113 Appendix H EPP-ll4 D-1 1.1.2, 2.0 EPP-201 D-2 2.0 EPP-201 D-3 N/A N/A D-4 N/A N/A E-1 3.0 EPP-203 E-2 3.0 EPP-203 E-3 3.4 2PT-203 E-4.a-n 3.5 EPP-203 E-5 N/A N/A E-6 3.6 N/A E-7 3.7 EPP-304.

F-1.a 1.1.2 EPP-203 F-1.b

'4. 0 EPP-203 F-1.c 4.0 EPP-203 F-1.d 4.0 EPP-203 P-3 MARCH 8, 1983

CPSES/EP e

F-1.e 4.0 EPP-203, F-1.f 4.0 EPP-203 F-2 4.9, 10.3 EPP-203 EPP-308 F-3 12.2.1 EPP-104 G-1.a-d 5.0 N/A G-2 5.0 N/A G-3.a-b 5.0, 6.4 EPP-115 EPP-207 G-4.a-b 1.2.3.1, 5.0, 6.4 EPP-109 EPP-115 G-4.c 5.0. 6.4 EPP-115 G-5 5.0, 12.0 EPP-104 i

H-1 6.0, 6.1 EPP-204

}

H-2 6.0, 6.3 EPP-206 H-3 N/A N/A H-4 3.0, Appendix M EPP-203, EPP-204 EPP-205, EPP-206 EPP-207 H-5.a-d

. 6.0 EPP-201 H-6.*a 6,. 0 EPP-201 H-6.b 6.0, Appendix J EPP-201

.EPP-305 H-6.c 6.0, Appendix J I

H-T 6.0 EPP-107 H-8 6.0 EPP--201 P-4

)

MARCH 8, 1983

c_ _

~

CPSES/EP

~

H-9 6.0 EPP-107 EPP-205 H-10 6.0 EPP-107 H-11 Appendix J EPP-107 H-12 6.0 EPP-309 I-1 2.0, 6.0, 7.0 EPP-201 I-2 6.0, 7.0 EPP-201 EPP-310

- EPP-311

'I-3.a-b 6.0, 7.0 EPP-301 EPP-302 I-4 6.0, 7.0 EPP-301 EPP-302 I-5 6.12.5 EPP-201 I-6 7.2 EPP-302 1 6.0, 7.0, Appendix J EPP-309 EPP-310 I-8 4.0, 6.6, 7.0 EP.P-203, EPP-301 EPP-302, EPP-309 EPP-310 I-9 6.0, 7.0 EPP-309

~

I-10 6.0, 7.0, 8.0 EPP-301

• EPP-302 EPP-304 i

I-11 N/A N/A J-1.a-d 4.1.9, 8.0 EPP-209 EPP-210 J-2 8.0, Appendix M EPP-209 EPP-210 J-3 6.0, 8.0, 9.0 EPP-307 P-5 MARCH 8, 1983

s o

- w.

CPSES/EP n

'6.8, 8.0, 9.2, 9.3 EPP-209 J-4 EPP-210 J-5 8.0 EPP-209 J-6.a-c 6.0, 8.5, Appendix J EPP-107 EPP-306 J 8.6 EPP-304 J-8 Appen, dix N EPP-304 J-9 N/A N/A J-10.a-b Appendix F N N/A J-10.c 3.6 N/A J-10.d-l' N/A N/A J-10.m 8.0 EPP-304 J-11 N/A

~~

N/A i

J-12 N/A' N/A

")

L K-1.a-g 9.0 CPP-305 J

K-2 9.0 EPP-305 l

K-3.a 6.0, 9.0 EPP-305 K-3.b 9.0 EPP-305 K-4 N/A N/A K-5.a-b 9.2, 9.3 EPP-307 EPP-308 K-6.a-c 9.2 N/A j

K-7 6.0, 9.0' EPP-307 L-1 1.3._1.4, 10.0 EPP-308 L-2 6.0, 10.2 N/A P-6

)

MARCH 8, 1983 n

r

-= u

(

CPSES/EP

~

L-3 N/A N/A L-4 1.3.,1.3, 1.3.1.4, 10.2 EPP-308 M-1 thru M-3 11.0 EPP-121 M 6.0 EPP-301 EPP-302 N-1.a-b 12.1 EPP-104 N-2.a-e 12.2 EPP-104 N-3.a-f 12.0 EPP-104 N-4, 5 12.4 EPP-104 0-1 13.0 TRA-205 0-1.b N/A N/A 0-2 13.0 EPP-104

~-

TRA-205 0-3 thru 0-5 13.0 EPP-104 TRA-205 P-1 13.0 N/A P-2 thru P-5 Preface, 14.0 EPP-101 EPP-102 P-6 Appendix H N/A P-7 Appendix K N/A l

P-8 Page 1, Appendix P N/A P-9 14.0 EPP-102 P-10 14.0 EPP-102 EPP-203 I

l l

P-7 MARCH 8, 1983

.