ML20070D390

Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Resident Insp Repts 50-317/90-30 & 50-318/90-30.Corrective Actions: Periodic Review of All Site Personnel,To Identify Responsible Behavioral Supervisors,Initiated

ML20070D390
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	02/20/1991
From:	Schwartz G BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9102280241
Download: ML20070D390 (5)

Text

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, B ALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC CHARLES CENTER . P.O. BOX 1475

• BALTIMORE. MARYLAND 21203 February 20,1911 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

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SUllJECT: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant L Unit Nos.1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 Reply to Notice of Violation NRC Resident inspection Report Nos. %317M)-30 and 50-318?x)-30 (October 30,1990, to November 1,1990)

REFERENCES:

(a) U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Letter from James 11. Joyner to G.Dowell Schwartz, Jr.

Dated: January 21,1991 Gentlemen:

Reference (a) forwarded Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Region i Notice of Violation based on NRC Inspection Nos. 50-317/90-30 and 50 31&%30, dated January :1,1991. The violation involved failure to produce written procedures that required fitness for duty (FFD) training and retraining for contractor / vendor supervisors.

Additionally, documentation was not as allable to preside evidence that contractor / vendor supervisors had received the required training within three months after initial supervisory assignment.

The Baltimore Gas and Electric Company's (BG&E's) response to the Notice of Violation is provided in an enchisure to this letter. Also enclosed is BG&E's response to the Notice of Unresolved items.

Should you have any further questions regarding this matter, we will be pleasni to discuss them with you.

Very Truly Ycurs,

,h. # r '

O. Dowell Schwart7, Jr. y Vice President GeneralServices Division

Enclosures:

(1) Response to Notice of Violation (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-317/90-30 and 50 31&%30)

(2) Response to Unresolved items (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50 317/90-30 and 50-318,W30)

(3) Letter from G.C. Creel to SJ. Chilk, dated October 29,1990 cc: D. A. Brune, Esquire J. E. Silberg, Esquire f R. A.Capra, NRC p D. G. Mcdonald, J r., NRC T. T. Martin, NRC L. E. Nicholson, NRC l4[D f

R.1. McLean, DNR

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Ddcument Control Desk February 20,1991 Page 2 bec: G. V. hicGowan C.11. Poindexter G. C. Creel J. A.Tiernan/A.J.Slusark hl.J. h1iernicki W. R. Corcoran C.11. Cruse /P. E. Katz R. C. DeYoung R. ht. Douglas /R. F. Ash R. P. lleibelfr. N. Pritchett C. P. Johnson R. R. Keimig (NRC)

C, C. Lawrence, Ill/A, R. Thornton W. A. Thornton/E, I. Baurereis'ht. C. Gavrilas R. B. Pond, Jr/S. R. Iluxbaum, Jr.

L B. Russell /J. R. Lemons G. L. Adams (2)

A, B. Anuje J. E. Baum J. J. Connolly R. E. Denton G. L Detter G. J. Falitmta L. D. Graber D. V. Graf B. S. hiontgomery R. E, Nagel P. A. Pieringer M. L Stone J.11. Walter L O. Wegner J. P. Dennett R. C. Dernoga A. S. Endler L P. Gibbs S. R. Guarnieri, M.D.

l T. J. Floffman M. D. Milbradt l M. D. Rind G. B. Brosan W. A. Butler J. T. Carlson

( K. R. Costello

!; C. W. Ilart, Sr.

i J. A. Ilolleman l R. P. Leonard l- K. A. Lombardi l C. A. Mayes L. S. Nolan J. W. Ross, Jr.

J. J. Volkoff l

.4 ENCLOSURE (1)

Response to Notice of Violation NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50 317/90 30 and 50 318/90 30

1. Description and Cause of the Violation Written procedures specifying the requirements for Fitness for Duty (FFD) training and retraining for contractor / vendor supenisors were not prmided during the inspection. Additionally, documentation was unavail-able to provide evidence that contractor / vendor supenisors had received the required t raining within three months after initial supenisory assignment, BG&E's procedures for contractor / vendor supenisor training have relied heavily on assigned BG& E access requestors who conduct supenisory behavioral observation.The requirements for t raining and retraining of BG & E supenisors are specified in the FFD Manual, as was noted during the inspection. Separate provisions were not detailed for contractorArndor supervisors, as those designated to conduct such supenisory behavioral observation were trained and retrained under i G&E's supenisory training program, Proceduralization of which contractors would be so designated was not specified but was leIt to individual BG&E supenisors and access requestors. The responsibility to identify supenisors for training promptly (within 60 days) after their assignment to supenisory jobs was specified in the FFD Manual and in the Supenisory FFD Lesson Flan.The cause for this weakness was the initial BG&E decision to utilize access requestors for behasioral observation in lieu of contract supenisors.

Documentation of those personnel who were trained as FFD supenisors was availabic during the inspection, however, no auditable list of candidates who should have received such training existed.The cause for this weakness was the newness of the FFD Supenisory Training Frogram and the failure to anticipate the desirability of clear, auditable records to document compliance <

II. Corrective Actions and Steps Which Will be Taken to Avoid Future Violations The following corrective measures have been taken to strengthen BG&E's supenisory FFD training of contractors and vendors:

1. _ All access requestors have been contacted to identify all personnel (BG&E and contractar) who are responsible for behavioral observation. These lists are under review and all previously untr.Jued behav-ioral observation supenisors will be trained by March 22,1991, t

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2. Periodic review of all site personnel to identify their responsible behavioral observation supenisors have _

been initiated.This will provide an auditable means to ensure that compliance is m intainco after March 22,1991.

3. The FFD Manual will be clarified with respect to contractor / vendor requirements by May 1,1991.-

4. Future initial unescorted access requests will require the identification of a Fitness for Duty supenisor.

Supenisors identified who have not received training will result in a request being forwarded to the Technical Training Unit.The appropriate access request forms and procedures are being modified to indicate this requirement.The access request form and associated procedures will be revised by August 20,1991,

5. As an added assurance, mechanisms in the procurement and contracting process are being developed to allow BG&E contract administrators to require contractors to pre identify supenisors with behavioral observation responsibilities. The contract administrator will have the option of requiring contract super-vision or assigning BG&E personnel to provide observation and oversight of the contract employees.

1

ENCLOSURE (1)

Response to Notice of Violation NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50 317/90 30 and 50 318/90 30 IV. Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved Review of all site personnellists and training of associated FFD supersisors will be completed by March 22,

.1991. This will assure we are in full compliance.

l 2

ENCLOSURE (2)

Response to Nottee of Unresolved items NRC Inspection Report Nos,50 317/90 30 and 50 318/90 30

1. _ UNR 50 317/90 30 02 and UNR 50 318/90 30 02 Unresolved item:

The Supervisor, Security Screening Unit is notified by the Random Drug Coordinator (RDC) of a positive drugiest prior ta teview and verification of the confirmatory positive drug test results by the M edical Review Officer (MRO). Upon receiving this notification, the Supenisor, Security Screening Unit temporarily suspends the individual's access pending MRO confirmation.

Response

10 CFR 26 currently requires that the Medical Review Officer (MRO) allow an individunl to discuss the results of a positive FFD test before administrative action is taken. BGAE does not consider our current policy of .

temporarily suspending access based on a confirmatory positive test result while awaiting this discussion as contradicting this rule. Current NRC rulemaking is under consideration which would specifically invoke the interpretation stated in this unreschcd item. BG&E has commented on this rulemaking by letter from Mr. George C.Crcel to Mr. Samuel Chilk,Sectetary of the Commission dated October 29,1900. A copy is attached as Enclosure (3) to this response. BG&E considers its current polin as appropriate, balancing the indhidual's rights while protecting the public's interest. BG&E does not considee (hat an Unresolved item is appropriate for an issue on which rulemaking is currently under evaluation.-

II.- UNR 50 317/90 30 03 and UNR 50 318/90 30 03

- Unresolved Itenn

- The licensee does not appear to have an effective method of tracking FFD supenisory training to ensure that 4

the method is effective.

Response

Subsequent to its implementation of the current FFD program in January,1990, BG&E established require-l ments for supervisors and access requestors to identify those supervisors who needed supervisory FFD t_ raining.

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Additional measures to identify personnel needing such training through Nuclear Energy Division and Employee Senices Department policies were implemented on February 11,1991.These efforts have been supplemented by taking the corrective measures identified in Enclosure (1); Through thue actions, BG&E believes we have completed the steps to assure effective tracking of FFD training.  ;

111. UNR 50 317/90 30 04 and UNR 50 318/90 30 04 L . . -

Unresolved Item:

The deterrent effect of random testing is lost when testing is consistently done at the beginning of the shift (during backshift and weekend testing) since it nilows an indhidual to use drugs or alcohol during the remainder of the workshift without fear of being called for testing, other than for cause.

-- Response:

BG&E will modify its backshift and weekend testing procedures to permit testing personnel at other than the .

-beginning of the shift.These changes should meet both the requirements and the intent of the Rule.

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ENCLOSURE (3) Page 1 of 2 fxB ALTIMORE -

GAS AND ELECTRIC <

CHARLES CENTER

• P.O. ECX 1175

• BALTIMORE. M ARYLAND 21203-1475 cconce c. caceg v'e e Pes s.oc-t

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(J N 34 0*4 e 9 6 C-.ober 29, 1990 Mr. Samuel J. Chlik Secretuy of the CommI"lon i U. 5. Nucleu RegvJatory Com=iulon Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: Docketing and Services Bran:h n

SUBJECT:

Calvert Cliffs - Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos.-1 & 2; Decket Nes.- 50-317 & 50-318 10 CFR Part 26 - Fitness for Duty Propass - Nuclear Power Plant Pmennet

. Gentlemen:

The: proposed rale, 55 Federal Register 35648 - August 30, 1990, whleh would prohibit; licensees ' from tedng :any a: tion against an employee based solely on a preliminary positive drug '; test screen is, unne:essary and ' unwise.

Everyone - agrees that the overriding concern at any nuclear . facility is safety - :the safety of the - public the workers, the environment ud the plant itself. Any regulation which might raise doubts about the safety of the plant must be considered very cuefully.

Baltimer'e. Gas and Electric Company has- maintained, for over 10 yeus, a Company-wide Fitness for - Duty (FFD) Program which covers all of our employees. -Our program, in many tress, exceeds the minimum standards set by the NRC regulations. Our experience ' ,

with, and - the results- from ' cur- FFD program have been -very successful. Our program

. adequately prote:s - individual rights. At - the -.same time, it protects the worker, co-workers, the public and the environment from-potential harm which might be caused by an ledividual who preliminuity screened positive for drugs but is allowed to remain in the plant pending confirmation ' .of- the test results.

While the proposed regulation seems to be aimed primuity at random drug testing. as i' presently written, it would also affect other drug testing policies and procedures of the licensee. By adopting - this proposed rule, the Commission would severely limit Management's excre!se of business judgment as well as exposing the nucleu utility to an unnecessary risk. .

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Page 2 of 2 s

, Secretary of the Commbston October 29, 1990 Page 2 A licensee that grants a worker unescorted access to critical and/or crucial assas of a nuclear power plant despite having actus1 knowledge that the worker - has tested positive for illegal drug.s is tempting fate with potentially serious consequences.

As has often- been stated by the NRC, the licenset bears the ulthnate responsibility for the safety of the nuclear faellity. - The Ucensee should retain its - authority nad control over its workforce without being needlessly hampered or curtailed in carrying out that reponsibility. Traditional management prerogatives should be left to management and not to government regulations.

Finally, the existing provisions of 10 CFR Part 26 adequately safeguard and balance everyones' interests -in the drug ssretning process used by the nuclear power - ladustry. -

Adoption of the proposed change would merely confuse the issue anc provide lawyers the opportunity to lit! sate terms such as ' solely,'

• safety risk

• and " impairment."

Rejection of this proposn! would. leave employment decisions where they rightly belong, that is, within the discretion of =nnagement to achieve a proper balance of everyones' interests.

We do not agree with the proposed rulemaking.

Should you have any questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours,

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