ML20062K537

Post-hearing Submittal Re Contentions.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20062K537
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	08/10/1982
From:	Eddleman W AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8208170253
Download: ML20062K537 (18)

Text

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DOCXETED Uy.RC .;

August 10,.1982 l UNITED STATES OF AERICA NUCLFAR REGUIATORY C OtGIISSION '82 AEG 13 di:64

Til:E :P 5EC?iir.:v Before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING 30ARD I$fg[M Re: CP&L and NCEMPA, Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, Dockets 50-400 and 50-401 0.L.

POST-HEARING SUBMISSION OF WELLS EDDLEMAN, AUGUST 10, 19821 Contention 8A is straightforward, especially in light of the DC Circuit Court's refusal to rehear the NRDC v. NRC case. I understand that Court has lifted its stay of the original Order, and thus Table S-3 is invalid. 8B likewise has basis in NRC translation $20 and Cohen's radictoxicity-of-nuclear-fuel-cycle-products being above that of the carent i

ores for 11 million years is now referenced to the "igford article (the best reference I could get fren the Sierra Club 3adioactiveWasteCamuaign,mysource)DernyJuly22 letter to George F. Trowbridge. 8(c) etails the failings of the AE C modeling. I did not feel it necessary to provide more cites since NRC admitted these models were used, in the 11.11 79 Washington i

Post article re NRC translation 520. 8(Ii)Vis clear -- the ?PC

1. f used the lower absorotion values for radionuclides, not the highest or higher ones, which would be the conservative, sucroach. Again, I

NRC translation 520, particularly the " tables and figures, show As authorized by pages h11-k12 of transcript of special prehearing conference July 3kx 13-14, 1982 and Judge Kelley's transmittal of same dated July 27, 1982, served July 28, 1982 (to my former address), Docketing & Service copy receitred July i 30, 1982; original not yet received as of August 9, 1982.

4Ref SC p.37 end sec.6.1; "Tutoriun Umweltshhutzz" Paraneter study of 1978, IFEU, Heidelberg, as cited,and ref. at o.1hh l .f.* Ref '8D above. Sec. 6.2 pp 37-55,p911-112; pp 91,51,hl,hh,h8.

I 8208170253 820810 PDR ADOCK 05000400 O PDR Ob y

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. this. Re 8E I provided Apolicants attorneys, Staff attorneysz, and each Board member with a copy of Gofman's Radiat'on and Hunan Health (1981) for their use. In sum, it baffles me how this highly specific contention is so unacceptable to Staff and Annlicants.

Contention 8 relates to nuclear fuel cycle effects as a whole, not just the operating effluents (Contention 37) and spent fuel (contentions 2h-28, 6h, etc).

C6ntentions 1 and 2 miE ht be deferred til the emergency plans exist.

Cdntention 1 goes to the inadequacy of offsite nonitoring, especially as it relates to informing emergency planners of what radioactive material is escaping offsite and where it is. NC DHR, as cited, is having to cut back emergency responder traxining.

CP&L has a vice president on the radiation urotect"on commission

( ORPC) of North Carolina and has done nothing to correct or imp"ove this situation. I think that 's enough basis. 'The rest has logic :

the TLD's offsite can't give real-tine information. E'.,an if CP&L's mobile monitors work as they argue, they can't be but one or two ulaces at a time.

inadecuate Contention 2 is that the Harris plant nonitors are ikktfaghikx <

i and refers to pn TMI-60-62 in Vol 20 of the FSAR, since anended after the contention was filed. The pressurized-ionization j (or equivalent) isotone identification canability has been urged on the NRC by its own consultatimmt s and I assumed it was a i

matter of common knowledge not requiring additional documentation.

I am nown handicaoned in digginE up my files on these coints since I am under doctor's orders not to lift aKything of significant weight, which includes most of

! A As% A kat W Wir"'f% 15og files I an unable to search.

g of kws. F h4 gap kor bid ape s was ausstame M %(W y pe e ho&-

At the end of the special prehearing conference each of them l edd said they had access to it independently, and returned their cocies ' 4jkr to me, though I made it clear tney could keen them and welcome.

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I must therefore rely on memory and what's on tcp of the files.

If the Board desires nore information I will be glad to suun17 it as so'on as I can. I recognize that more specific references are desigrable, but this nroblem cambe on me suddenly. I not4.ced it about 7 um 7/29, saw ny doctor 7/30 and the surgeon later that norning and had the oneration 8/2, the earliest nossible date.

Prior to this time I had been taking care of other nressinF work, including the CP6:L rate case and other work deferred to work more on this NRC proceeding orior to the special prehearing conference.

Thus, I was disabled just at the tine I had planned to do nost of the research (pulling exact cites from files, etc) for this submission. I am conolying with the order the best I can and net asking extension of tine to submit this since ,the doctor's orders now expire September 8 or thereabouts, which is a long delay.

I respectfully move and ksk the Boerd to inquire where a nore specific cite to a document already cited would help them and make a difference in their judgment on adnissibility of any

""*"$$)c ses 4 cts Owe's hea as cua sed ,%epel p

-h-Contention 7 is straightforward, with basis cited. The APS report referenced therein is cited better at p 225 re contention 115 Contentions 31 and 7h provide basis that the N9C Staff is not living up to 10 CFR 0.735 aus cited in July 22 '82 letter to Trowbridge. 10 CFR sect zero is cited at p.97 of the contentions at p. 97 The Sholly & Pollard testimony in sum :nort of same is clearly referred to. The Staff's f ailure to adec.uately check seismic installations, blueprints and modeling at Diablo Canyon is clearly referred to; the Anex meetin6 transcript from 4/7/82 was not available to me when the contentions were filed, but is easy to look up -- questions of Dr. Wilson is where it is.

This matter deserves airing.

Contentions 117 and 118 mi S ht be defer"ed untf1 there is an evacuation plan. If they are not, I only noint out that maps of the 10 mile sa ne around Marris take in US 64 and (subject to check on my menory) parts of US 1, both major highways on which hazardous substances are transnorted. <

No one can be exoected to list U2em all, and some, e.g. gasoline and explosives, are obvious. That wrecks can interfere with evacuations, and do occur, is obvious. Most of the roads are two-lane at least at many coints, as can be seen f rom the man.

Contention 11, amended since Harris has no PVC, las baiis in the cited work of Gillen & Clough, and logic. The FSAR and other documents do not address this nossibility. (as noted, n.50 of content?ons)

The Gillen-Clough work is new insformation sinc e CLI 2290-21 l

-g-and the other rules Aplicants cite (AETE pp 117 ff) were adopted.

Please note that re Contentiens 15-23,hl-E2,65,95,10h,11h, 3Ii j 6d j ,

126,126X,129 and others as the subject natter of then affects costs and benefits, a petit

• on and affidavtits under 10 CFR 2.75E is in , reparation. tu b Se I s tand by ny discussion of W "5and NC?. d ff1%

its L{G hlE4

}q(g) requirements for full and fair hearing on effect: including environnental degradat"on, unintentional or accidental effects, and costs, of operating or continuing to build SHr??. In particular, Harris 2 is not "substantially conpleted" by the criteria of McGui e, 9 NRC 409 (see 491 & note 4, 513). At p. 513 tha t Board stated as that Whinidah conpletion of 52 and 69% si of spring 1976 was the evidence, and found the units "substantially concleted" as of that decision date, 4-18-1979 (3 years later).3 Harris 2 is 4% conplete (NUREG-0030, vol. 5 #4) and cP&L cnairnan snith just recently testified to NCUC (Docket E-2 sub h4h, July 1982) that C?&L didn't need to make najor expenditures on that unit  ;

this year, and needed to retain the flexibility to build it.

He described Harris 3 and h in similar statenents in 3-2 sub h116 o

in 1981 prior to those units ' cancellation within a week of the notice granting the E-2 sub h16 rate increase.

Indeed, I do not concede that Harris 1 is "substantially completed" when most of the TMI action plan has not been arolied to it and it is only said to be 60% conolete. This is far shy of the 52 to 69% complete 3 years ago standard of xcouire, suora.

Completing Harris 1 will cost in excess of $500 million additional.

These matters will be addressed in the petition & affidavits.

3 It is worth noting those concletion cercentares were based on $939 nillion for both units, ibid at 514. Duk'e testified (NCrc Docket E-7 sub 314, Aug-Sept 1981) that the 2 units had by then cost $1642 million. McGuire #1 by itself was ratebased at a total c ost of $962,692,000 in that case, see Order of NCUC,

{12,1982._

The following apolies to all Eqdlena The Staff urges that my definit.ons, netc h+*P+deno.n i ti . I refer you to pages 11-12 of my 5-lh suuplement, p.21 (I) and p.248 (3).

This anounts to about 3 pages of infbrmation as to why and hou the definitions and addenda and incorocrations by reference are intended to be used, and that such is connon nractice of lawyers.

are The FSAR is such a docunent, as in CP&L's dx contracts with NC5NPA ,

(NCUC Dockets E-2 sub h36 and E-kh,1981) obviously relevant here sinc e they make NCEM?A co-Apulicants, are another. The FSAR contains

" references" which do not even specify any docunent or any author, e.g. ARTE says Tp.123) i re steam generators "the extensive testing and favorable operating experience described in the FSAR" --

which, when you look in the FSAR, turns out to be statenents that operations and current evaluations are favorable, withcut namin6 the authors or titles or anything else about nost if not all of said " documentation" referenced. My pages 22-27 and 240-2h8 contain the bulk of my definitions and addenda. Cross-reference to numbered contentions was all I could do under time pressure, but an index to contentions was provided on 5-lh. I intend that to be useful and see no reason why CP&L and N7C Staff can incornorate by reference and define things and I can 't.

Re contentions 24-28, 6h, 65 and others on radioactive waste transport, I adopt the arguments of CEANGE/ELP/ Read and CCNC as ny own.4 They show the NRC has taken sabotage seriously in other cases. You should here. And the co sts anuly under NEPA.

I supplied more detailed references re info on waste accidents Iou"$ksE"bk$kbptkh"SkehraESubfke$nikoFf1%haast!!1*"f>*!"il%2h*

k joingt "Brief on Spent Fuel Transportation" 4 August 1982

Contention 80 is straightforward and logical: Rainout means moare of a plume of radiocative material (routine or accidental release) can fall onto a given point (or be washed by it) than NRC and CP&L modeling assune. Thewefove, compliance with 10 i

CFR 20.106 exposure limits is not assured.

Contention 30, re radioiodine doses and the need for notassiun iodide (KI) available to nearby ponulation, may be deferred. If not, it should be adnitted based on Takeshi Seo's estinate of radio-iodine releases possible (per what he analyxzes to have happened at TMI -- what nay have hancened i s surely possible ) . The loEic of providing KI protection to day care centers, hosnitals, prisons, schools and work crews in li Eht of the cited ER-based wind sneeds and times to cover 10 and 50-mile distances (for direct exposure and for food exposure) resp ectively, is clear.' If the nossible  !

radiciodine release occurs and such protection is not already excessive in place, aremm+ radiation exeosure to occulations at higher risk (e.g. inf ants, thos e in day care) or who cannot be evacuated in the sho*t ti es available ( e .g . peenla in honnkitals & nv$ sons) e is a realistically likely consequence. This is no challenge to the 10- and 50- mile distances. Nor is CP&L's nonitoring equinnent (ARTE p 149) relevant. What gets out is relevant. The section beginning "do not assure that active and effective (KI)"... (contns

p. 95) is another part separate fron inadequate monitoring. I.e.

this contention is that CP&L hasnot done a,b,c,d,e etc. Even if CP&L did a,b,c that's irrelevant to d,e etc. The contentien clearly talks about radiciodine releases with respect to the KI issue. ,

Although Ton Baxter for Apclicants says it's OK to defer Contentions 9 and 43, Staff says they lack basis, 9's vague and 43 has no issue to litigate. So if not deferred, electrical

1. 9 should stand since it specifies thejequirnent qualification problen (will the safety equienent dom its job & the isolation of containment be effective?) and points out that the FSAP is inadequate on these points. He the SEP., etc, this contenti on can be deferred until they are issued.

1. 43 can readily be rearranged to say "CP&L lacks safe nanaEenent capability for Harris because of the connany's insufficient acts to assure environnontal qualification of safety-related electrical equienent and testing thereof."

(h3 may have been nerced if so niease ignore this1h /

3' Contention 44 is similar to 43 and refers s'cecifically to C.E.

" Doc" Murphy's 8-20-74 neno re inadequate fire protection / cable l

installation at nuclear plants includf ng Brunswick, nonconcliance with CLI-81-12 (I understand the Court of Anpeals for DC has upheld the NRC, which then gave CP&L a compliance delay usince i CP&L had not conplied while suing MRC. This is in contrast to the " rules and rules and you're bound by then until the court orders the N9C to overturn then and the NFC acts on sudd order" standard usually anplied to intervenors. Anplicants are allowed i

to not conoly with safety standards while suing to overturn sane. ) .

My point is that CP&L's failure to upgrade fire protection at Brunswick, and to see that it was built properly in dae first niace, casts doubt on CP&L's ability to and connitnent to safely build I and operate SENPP. CP&L's 8-year delay since Murphy, construction inspection chief of Region II, NBC, noted the problen, shows what the problem is with CP&L.

-9 Re contention 136 (bald eagles / endangered species act)

Applicants raise information they sent the ERC June 3 as an objection to my June 5,1982 filing of this. Given the l; to 6 weeks it takes the access'on lists telling that such in."o even exists to get to the LPDR (3 to 6 weeks to the PDER in Washington for Harris, as I observed June 9 and 10 nersonally), how could I know same? Applicants noint out that Section 7D of the Endangered Species Act was adepted in 1978 (after the Harris CP issued) but say the tine to consider it was at the CP stage.

That is warped logic, and the Staff's argument is identical.

They clain it's a site suitabili ty issue, when I asked that habitat be provided elsewhere to nake un for the loss. (I've tried to settle some cententions with CPEL re effects on fish from heat, for similar adjustnents they could take, but they have declined to nake any changes.)

Hartsville, 7 N9C k3hl, see at 342, (ALAB-463) requires tnat F ederal agencies (e.g. NRC) take such a ctiob necessary to insure that actions audacrized by then (e.g. constructing SHNPP) do not jeopardize the continued existence of endangered species (e.g. bail eagles). The Appeal Board goes on to require that all effects be considered (on endangered species) regardless of whether a party raises then, to require consultation with DCI (Intericr) and other a5encies. All of this is ahter the CP, and this case is the first ornortunity I know of to deal with it.

He contention #87, NRC's July 16, 1982 Statement of Policy on psychological stress (which Jud6 e Kelley sent to me) seens to say that you can't consider fear of nuclear accident unless a_,n accident like TMI has already happened at a given site. Since Harris is not yet operating, if you exclude the decision to build

the plant, no mafor nuclear accident has occurred there yet.

A spent fuel handling accident could hannen before connercial operation begins, if d.is Board should approve shipment of high9 level nucle'a r waste as spent fuel rods to the Harris site.

The NRC appears to be ordering its Boards to ignore psychological stress everywhere except at Three Mile Island. I think, however, that stress here was induced by TMI also (as stated in Contention

87) and that such an accident could " recur" elsewhere with equal seriousness. (Surely the NRC does not nean to say that only an accident identical to the TMI-2 accident need be feared. ) In this regard, the Board Notification introduced at the 1979 renand Harris hearings on CP&L nanaEenent capability has a graph of rankings of each nuclear unit in various areas. CP&L's Brunswf.ek plant ranks significantly lower than TMI*2 and is one of the inxmina lowest in the nation. If NRC really intended to devote more resources to preventing accidents, its July 16 position might nave basis. Evidence, e .6. the diversion cf resources from safety work and TMI-action work to licensing in 1981-82, the UCS testimony cited re contention 7h, tells me otherwise. <

, NEPA provides for considerat!on of unintended effects --

nuclear accidents and psychological stress are just such.

I oresume I'm being invited to withdraw #87, but I'd rather have it ruled on and aopeal if necessary.

The arguments advanced against #53 (that Harris is inimical to the connon defense and security because it's a temptinE target) lead me to question whether there can be an meaningful record on, or judgment for, a finding that the plant 's coeration is OK under lo CFR 2 appendix A VIII(b)(6) if such contentions are inadmissible.6 ,N ayM I note here my great disturbance at NRC's recent guidance e.g. in Sumner to Boards not to conduct sua sponte review or safety issues?

-IL-The point is that ixf an obvious defense / security issue like contention 53 cannot be raised, how can there be any neaningful findings that Harris is not ininical to the connon defense and security ? The i Falklands conflict, or Vietnan or Korea for that natter, make clear that attacks hannen without being called wars, among nations technically not at war.

Re contention #102: The radiation level expected (pre-TMI) for a design basis (Class VIII) accident was 10 R per hour.

CP&L's TMI-action plant radiation nonitors ton out of their range at 10 g/ hour. The contention is, this ranee isn't high enough, so CP&L can't adequately assess an accident of great severity, even though simnle stens like lead shielding could cure the peoblen.

1. 108 has been misinterureted as saying you have to stage a Class IX accident to test SENPP components under conditions such as you would reasonably expect in a Class IX accident. Hardly, but you need a good test facility and careful testin6 of Harris components not yest installed, or comnonents identical to those there (e.g. at VC Sumner, or at nanufacturing plants) under severe <

radiation, and other excected accident stresses. The technical parameters that need testing are laid out (p.215 . .. ) and once the relevant parameters of the devices are known, verification on-site (e.g. that the frequency response of a. pump for seismic and other loads, e.g. water hammers, is comparable as-ins talled to such response as-tested) can be accomplished. That is, the equipment should be qualified to assure shutting the plant down.

Note the "or" at the hth line on page 216. If testing fer Class IX conditions violates the rules, OK. But testing for Class VIII and lower would not violate the rules, and that part of the contention should still be admitted.

The second section of #102 (po216-217) concerns the failure to collect operating exuerience information on naned systems in order to avoid control systerm interactions that co uld cause severe accidents up to and including Class IX. Contention 107 is incorporated buy reference here: see especially 107(L) at pp 214-215 which gives a clear basis in Basdekas' h-29-82 presentation to d:e NRC. The statements of contentions h7-51 are incorocrated by reference in #107, and the withdrawal of those cententions or parts thereof was not intended to say they are invalid as basis for other contentions. Specific reference is also made here to NUREG-0606 Task A-17, systems interaction. Sinc e Harris is so old, it will necessarily recuire and be subject to more backfitting and more backfitting judgment, given its design pre-1971 and fabrication of components daen and since, and cons t*uctien, in an ever-changing regulatory environment. That is the special relation of Harris to this overall problem. I believe Harris ' 1h years from announcement to predicted in-service date, and its long delay (until 1978) in beginning construction, known facts, back this up. But my coint is it's just logical that Harris, beinF so old, is almost uniquely subject to more backfits and thus to more systens interaction problems. (That covers #107 too.)

1. 111 has basis in the statements of Dr. Hanauer of N9C, and NURCG-0585 That is, there is not assurance the safety systems at Harris will work, due to interactions. Again, Harris' being designed so long ago and much backfitted concound the problem and make the question particularly acclicable to this plan't.

1. 10 is, I believe, straightforward. These WCAPS are not

" illustrative" as Applicants blithely claim to the Board, but in most cases are the basis or hidden source of safety claims

throughout the FSAR. The problems on p.53 that Westinghouse can have are logical, based e.g. on my mzzz consulting exnerience.

But there is anodner major part of this contention: that NRC staff hasn't concleted its review of most of these WICAPS.

The result is that non-atproved analysic is out into some of the mcst imoortant parts' of the FSAR, e.g. re acef dent condit1cns (top of p.54 ) . Since the Board will not generally oversee the Staff's work unless it concerns an issue raised by an intervenor, I have raised this issue. Certainly the status of N"C review of these documents and NRC's conclusions as to their validity are important to the safety of SENPP. E.g. NEC may disapprove sone of them. Or there may be dissentinE NRC staff oninions of importance, which my experience with FOIA leads me to doubt the ability of any intervenor to uncover. If you ask, NFC rerlies, identify the specific doeurnents you think we're cover ng un (in effect). But if the basis of the FSA9 and Westinghouse 's own design analysis (i.e. these WCA?s) haven't passed N"C nuster, i

the whole " safety analysis" is a house of cards on an unknown foundation. This is certainly insufficient to suuport a reasonable .

finding that the Harris plant can cuerate safely. So the issue should be heard in the interest of a sound record in this troceeding. ,

References to making 2.is more specific by discovery are not adnissions it lacks adequate basis (the basis is right in the FSAR) but rather references to ERC's prodcedure for making contentions more specific after discovery, amending or revising then. '

FSAR 15.6 is referenced as basis for the fact that the " safety ,

analysis" for Harris which is (there & elsewhere in Sec. 15) often just a description of the WCAP conclusions. I lay out on p.55 sone of the questions that need answers re this matter.

I now know I didn't have to say how I'd nursue it, but the clan looks OK to me, and I'd propose to get on with it.

-lh-

1. 120 is a straightforward charge that the accident missile analysis insufficiently addresses the oroblems of damaging or severing insulation, wiring, power sunnlies and other contrels (like air, it 's obvious) . I read CP&L's FSAS analysis and based this contention on it. I also suggest a solution, energy absorbing devices to protect the controls, wiring and power supplies and control lines. The reason there is this problem is thct a lot of the control lines, uower sunnlies, instrument lines etc whose failure can cause an accident, are not considered safety-related equipment. Thus CP6L 's analysis inadeo.uately addresses these (ignoring daem as non-safety). It also fails to assure that the power sunplies and controls to things like the control rods will work under shurapnel conditions inside containment. The proposed solutien would much reduce the nroblen . I think this issue should be heard --

it has all the elements of a contention, and is imnortant to safety.

1. 130 is like #47 but has not been w' thdrawn.

1. 131 I believe was discussed. If not, CP&L's nians to never let borated water reach the bolts / holes are not the sane as sayinC it won't hannen. The scenariox provided is lo6 1cal.

1. 119 I believe has Eained sone relevante since the TPC i

released its study on meltdown urecursors in July 1082. This contentien night have its last nart defe red unt'l there is l operating e:cperience at 7C Sunner. Or it .ight all be defe redt until the Staff puts out its Environmental statement.

I believe the joint steam generator contentions already adnitted includes the subject natter of IEE Info ?Totice 82-29 of July 23 '82 (nismailed by 130 to my forner address) so that ne new contentien based on its revelation (p.2) that loose CRD guide tube suoport pins etc can damage stean generators by

circulating through stean ecnerators, as occurred at rorth Anna 1 (a plant similar to narris, see E. FLaR) in May 1902 and can danage as much as 75% of the tube ends before being detected. I think it's appropriate to get this on the reccrd rather than file a secarate subnission on it. I will not cc ese any late resnonse by Acolicants or Staff if they don't notice this part. There is no intent to get this by then w/o notice.

1. 61A is on health effects of radon enics. ions fron uraniun mining to get fuel for Harris, has a very clear basis in Gofnan (cited to page 469) and Eepford's Feb 19, 1979 resuonse as cited.

Damage to lungs fron radon exnosure (and alpha irradiation generally) is obvious and urovides the link to lung diseases.

1. 62 says CP&L isn't in 'onoliance with ALA3A re radionuclide releases from tailings. The y have the sinole option to recuire such minimizatien in their 'ranlun contracts, since the Harris contracted uraniun supply is only into the mid-to-late 1980s.

ALARA is referenced to Appendix B of NUREG-0859.

1. 65 and tne 6-26-82 anenenent cover Daniel International's '

i failures elsewhere, which are relevant as are CP&L's failures l

at other plant 40 A'S MNagfwt COf abolsh-You don't beacone a new conpany when you work on a new plant. Rather, Daniel's base nat and other void defects j record ddowns a pattern of fouplups. This should be litigated to establish a sound record.

6 To be sure, I an noting this section by postcard te Charles Barth, lead counsel for URC Staff, and George F. TrowbridEe , lead counsel for Applicants, at their addresses of record in this croceedin6 l

. . l

1. 67: CP&L says there is no basis because there is likukely to be a disposal site. That's arguing the evidence. #67 is I

gakti clear: There is n3 present assurance that NC will have  :

a site or be in a conpact when Harris begins operatinE, producing  ;

low-level radwaste which must 'be safely diseosed of. ,

I

1. 68: One part is the lack of assured. disposal for radio- l active steam Eenerators from Harris. That can stand on its own (pp 172-73). Another is the filters and resins (n. 173). The section on page 174 gives basis and more than enough detail on the problem of leakage fron high-level waste disnosal sites.

If this is viewed a s an attack on the " waste confidence" rulenaking, best to defer it until a rule comes out.

1. 69 addresses the health effects of leakage from radwaste disposal. It is not an attack on a rulemaking, but rather seeks to litigate the health effects of effluents fron waste disposal, in the nanner allowed re Table S-3 in the past.

1. 71 is a test of how much analysis you need. Applicants' vaunted Appendix 311 B consists of an assumed ton temperature, basis tenperature, name of a computer code, diagran of certain fittings and cable s , an " illustrative" temperature curve, and a statement that the actual values for Harris are "in the process" of being worked out. That isn't analysis. That's engineering 3.S.

This contention is clear, its basis is that CP&L hasn't got enough basis for their claims, and it should be admitted so that this question (including the effect of accident conditions in addition to heat, as specified in the acontention re Class VIII conditions) l can be explored, and the evidence (if any) CP&L can produce I

to show specifics of analysis for these immortant safety systens!

viability at Harris; can be subjected to cross-examination and for counter evidence.

. s

1. 73 is clear enough. It should probably be deferred until CP&L submits a conplete resnonse to the TMI Action Plan.

1. 's 85 and 86 go together and are sufficiently clear.

It is not that CP&L's analysis doesn't exist. It 's that it 's incomulete, and conditions have changed since the CP stage, and CP&L hasn't taken sufficient neasures to nininize fish kills, which can occur based on its own data. Deficiencies i n CP&L's modeling are specified, e.g. at page 193

1. 88 may be deferred until the ES exists.

1. 92, say Applicants, does not denonstrate an ECCS deficiency with respect to 10 CFR 50 Aupendix K. But Appendix K (C.I.) says that a "spectrun of possible pipe breaks shall be censidered" No upper end is placed on this spectrum, but it shall include breaks and cracks with areas as la ge as the e oss-sect'on o*

the largest pipe in the systen (prinary coolant system). The reactor vessel head ajar is the equivalent of such a break in a different location. Nor does Appendix K set an uuper limit on the tenperature or pressure causing such an accident. Appendix l

K does not make a break of the largest primary coolant sys tem pine the upper end of the spectrum of breaks to consider. If it meant this, it could have said so .

1. 95 should be ddferred until the Es issues.

1. 101 has enough basis and specifics in it to stand. Fecall, l it doesn't have to be proved at this stage, l

i

1. 137 in part points out that training of Sh7TPP personnel for emergency response is deficient. Applicants gloss over that while arguing against the rest of the contention. Q4

1. 138, re the electrical drawings, addvesses aga'n the b g$,

W #

inadequate It's hard Grainformation nmy mhat's in wrong the FSpF w_thetcsoneg.yng o ided to you etiy gven {crg CA(g p

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATOFY ~ COMESSION In tne matter of CAROLINA PC'.iER & LIG;iT CO. Et al. ) Dockets 50-ECo Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 ) and 50M 01 o.L.

CERTIFICATE 0F SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of S U C, \ 0 , 192 7 3ORtT5 ttethh/

EAVE been served this M day of Roc,uC:T- 198 3 , by deposit in the US Mail, first-class postage prepaid, upon all parties whose names are listed below, except those whose names are marked with  ;

an asterisk, for whom service was accormlished by r

Judges Janes Kelley, Glenn Bright and James Cawter (1 cony each)

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board US Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Washington DC 20555 George F. Trowbridge (attorney for Applicants)

Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge (

1800 M St. NW '

l Washington, DC 20o36 4

Office of the Executive Legal Director Phyllis Lotchin, Ph.D.

Attn Docke ts 50-400/401 0?L. 108 3ridle Run ,

USNRC Chanel Hill

~ NC 2751h '

I Washington DC 20555

! Dan Read Docketing and Service Section ~ CEAUGE/ELP Attn Dockets 50-400/h01 o.L. Box 524 l Office of the Secretary Chapel Hill NC 2751h i USNBC Washington DC x 20555 Pat & Slater Newman CANP John Runkle 2309 Weynouth Court CCNC Raleigh NC 27612 ,

307 Granville Rd '

Chapel Hill Ne 2751E Travias Payne Edelstein & Payne Box 126h3 ,

Rale 15 h NC 27605 [

Richard Wilson, M.D. Certified by 729 Eunter St.

Apex NC 27502

. . _ . _ __ _