ML20059A499
ML20059A499 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Browns Ferry ![]() |
Issue date: | 05/29/1990 |
From: | Hayes F TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20059A489 | List: |
References | |
XD-Q-900003-R, XD-Q0000-900003-R00, NUDOCS 9008230087 | |
Download: ML20059A499 (14) | |
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[l fit)0_Frequencyofch)erineconcentretioninthecontrolRocain l Plant /Unt%'
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senmaa of the famielty Limit but to a tr Accident '
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_l9al/ent l Chlorine. k m. conteel - preamancy Pre llity t
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I lDeterminetheprobabilisticfroweney Preparede*e* j~p y l
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limit due to a berge accident.
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l ABSTRACT: [These calculations contain an unverified assumption (s) that must be verified later.
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-l The frequency of ch)orine concentration in the control room et the Browns Perry Nuclear _ Plant (BFN) In l eacess of the toxicity limit due to a berge aceldent was conservatively calculated to be 8.0E-7 events /yr.
- l:This value accounts for chlorine transportation to the site from possible wind directions
-l along a 7.1 mile segment of the tennessee River and conservatively includes all Pasquill stability
-t-lcbses. ~ This estimate is conservative in that it approximates the freovency of chlorine released l det to 4 barge accident being transported to the BPN site.
The frequency that the lchlorineentersthecontrolroomandincapacitatestheoperatorsshouldactuallybeless l-thantheestimatedfrequency.
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Justification (orplain belowh Method 1:
In the design review nothod,, justify the technical adegusty of the sintlar to another, heed on accepted handbook sensitivity studies included for confidence, etc.).
7.ethod 2:
In the alternate calculation method, identify the pages where the alternate calculation has been included in the calculation package and esplain why this nothod is adequate.
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In the qualification test method, identify the QA documented calculation and esplain. source (s) where testing adequately denenstr
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5/J9 /90 CONTENTS litt PURF085................................................
1 MET 50DOLOGY.............................................................
1 ASSUNFTI0NS.............................................................
1 DSSICN INFUT CATA...........................................
2 COMPUTATIONS AND ANALYSES...............................................
3
SUMMARY
OF RESULTS......................................................
7 CONCLUSIONS..........................................
7 REFERENCRS..............................................................
8 FIGURE 1: Tennessee River in Vicinity of BFN............................
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The purpose of this analysis is to determine.the probabilistic frequency of a chlorine concentration in the control rosa at the Browns rarry_ Nuclear riant (BrNP) in excess of the toxicity limit due to a barge accident (r ference 1).
N Methodology, c
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. The freg'sency, Fg (events /yr), of a chlorine concentration in the control room at BrN in excess of the toxicity limit due to e barge accident is calculated i
using:
r,.Ir y (i) r. r.t, r,.,
<2>
r y
where r. frequency of a chlorine concentration in the control room at BFN gl in excess of the toxicity limit due to a barge accident in shipping channel segment 1 (events /yr)
)
Fq. frequency of a chlorine barge accident occurring Vithin shipping l
channel segeant 1 (events /yr)
Pr conditional probability of a chlorine release given that a chlorine barge accident has occurred P,
conditional probability that a chlorine release in shipping channel g6-segment i is transported to the JFN control room air intakes.
4 Assumptions:
- 1. The failure mechanism for a chlorine release is assumed to be a barge collision or grounding. ' - other failure mechanisms are considered.
- 2. Because current barge k M dent data specific to the Tennessee River System
' l is not available (reference 2), generic data based on nationwide inland vatervey statistics from reference 3 is utilised. This data source is specifically referred to in reference 4. The use of generic nationwide statistics in evaluating the frequency of explosions-near nuchar power plants.(including barge explosions) when an adequate plant-specific data base is not available has been endorsed in reference 5 by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Based on this information, use of the generic natienvide accident data in reference 3 in this analysis is deemed acceptable.
. 3. The barge accident must occur within a 5.5 km (3.4 alle) radius of the plimt to produce the postulated hasardous condition inside the control roon (reference 6, page 2).
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- 4. Atmospheric characteristics utilised for estimating the chlorine plume transportation probabilities are based on site meteorlogical data for the period January 1977 through December 1979 in reference 7.
- 5. Given that a 6.8 mile radius around the plant is considered per assumption 3, all points along the river length within this radius are equally likely to be the site of the postulated barge accident.
- 6. A chlorine barge accident is no more likely to occur vithin the critical exposure distance than at any other point along the Tennessee River System.
This assumption is supported by data indicating that no commercial barge accidents occurred within a five mile radius of BFNP during 1984 and 1985 while 44 accidents (one with spillage) occurred on other portions of the system (reference 8).
- 7. Any chlorine barge accident with release is assumed to produce concentrations in the control room in excess of the toxicity limit given necessary meteorlogical conditions.
t' B. A sensitivity analysis to determine the effect of varying the meteor).ogical conditions (e.g., Pasquill stability classes) on the chlorine concentration in the control room was not performed. In addition, it c;ws been determined that chlorine releases are potentially hazardous to the control roos operators for all Pasquill stability classes depending on the proximity of the accident to the site (reference 9). Therefore, the frequency of a chlorine concentration in the control room in excess of the toxicity limit is calculated based on chlorine plume transport probabilities that are a) conditional only on vind direction and b) conditional on vind direction and Pasquill stability class.
- 9. The track length of a barge traveling through the critical exposure distance is measured along the " sailing line" as indicated in reference 10.
Design Input Data The barge accident frequency for any given barge on the river is provided in reference 3, page 68 as f - 1.8E-6 accidents / barge mile traveled.
This value indudes all types of accidents (e.g., groundings, collisions with l
docks, locks, bridges, and other craft, etc.).
The number of chlorine barge shipments past BPN per year is taken from reference 11. This value is n = 30 barges /yr.
M ference 8 provides the basis for the calculation of the conditional pubability of a chlorine release given that a :.nlorine barge accident has
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XD 00000 900003 Sheet 3 of 10 Prepared:
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- eceurred-(P,). This reference indicates that of 44 barge accidents occurring on-the Tennessee River System in 1984 and 1985, only one resulted in spillage (a frequency of 0.023 per accident).
The total percentage frequencies of vind direction and Pasquill stability class on which the conditional chlorine transport probabilities P are based u
are obtained from reference 7, Tables 2.3 3 through 2.3 10. This set of data is chosen because it was measured at a level (10.0 meters) which most closely j
corresponds to the 79 ft. (24.1 meter) height of the control room air intakes 1
above the Tennessee River (reference 6, calculation sheet 2).
i The segmentised path lengths dt of a barge traveling past BFN are obtained from reference 10, chart nos. 43 and 44.
e Computations and Analyses:
The frequency, F (events /yr), of a toxic chlorine concentration in the S
controlroomatkFNduetoabargeaccidentiscalculatedusing:
i F
F (1) g q
Pt " Iat, Pq
{
P (2)
L as previously defined in the Nethodology section.
l I. Calculation of Chlorine Barge Accident Frequencies F g for. Shipping Channel Segments rigure 1 depicts the location of the BFN site with respect to the i
Tennessee River. Arcs are drawn at the two points (labeled A and B) where i
an imaginary circle centered at the BFN site and with a radius of 3.4 miles (assumption 3) intersects the " sailing line" of the river. The portion of the circle containing the watervey is discretised into 22.5 degree (360 degrees divided by 16 vind directions) segments labeled 1 through 8.'For each shipping channel-segeant, the approximate distance d traveled by a
- barge along the " sailing line" is measured.-The results ar;e used in the following equation to calculate the frequency of a chlorine barge accident occuring within each segmentt fed n (3)
Fat a
L where f.
the frequency of a barge accident on the river I
(accidents / barge mile traveled) n = number of chlorine barge shipments past BFN per year (barges /yr) d; = distance as measured in Figure 1 for segment 1 (miles).
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.As documented previously in the Design input Data sections f.
1.88 6 accidents / barge mile traveled n = 30 barges /yr.
i As an exaeple, consider segment 1 through which a barge travels 3.0 miles.
The chlorine barge accident frequency for this segment is F., = fed, n F.,. (1.8E 6 accidents / barge mile traveled)(3.0 miles)(30 barges /yr)
. 1.6E-4 accidents /yr.
The barge travel distances (d ) and chlorine barge accident frequencies t
(F.g) for all of the segments (1) are tabulated below.
Table la Frequencies of Barge Accidents occurring within Given Segments Segment Barge Travel Distance Frequency of Chlorino Barge Accident i
(1) within Serment dt (mi) vithin Segment (Fot.) (events /yr) 1 3.0 1 68-4 2
0.3 1.6E 5 3
0.2
- 1. ht-5 4
0.1 5.4E 6 5
0.1 5.4E 6 6
0.2 1.18 5
)
7 0.7 3.88 5 4
8 2.5 1.48 4 Total 7.1 3.8E 4 II. Determination of the chlorine Release Conditional Probability Pr From the proceeding Design Input Data section Pr.
I release 0.023.
44 accidents This value is within the 0.02 to 0.05 range recommended in reference 12 (Table I on page 653) for the probability that a traffic accident involving hasardous materials vill result in explosion or release yurthermore, multiplication of the 0.023 release probability by tae 1.8E-6 accidents / barge mile traveled barge accident frequency yields a ;otal chlorine release frequency of 4.1E.8 releases / barge-mile traveled which
. closely corresponds to the 4.6E 8 accidents / barge mile traveled value (4.4E-8 + 1.6E-9 + 2.33-11) given in reference 3. Table 3 (page 70) for the moderate to extreme barge accident frequency. The calculated river-specific value is used.
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XD 00000-900003 sheet 5 of 10 Prepartd:
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g /M/W III. Calculation of the Chlorine Release Transport conditional Probabilities P i
g For any given location of the postulated barge accident, only a specific range of vind direction vill carry the released chlorine to the BFN site. A range of direction defines vinds from vithin a 22.5 degree arc, the sides of which form the boundaries of one of the river segments (see Figure 1). For example, consider segment 3. Only vinds from the VSV (toward the ENE) are considered to be capable of carrying chlorine toward the BFN site should the barge accident occur in this segment. The VSV range includes vinds from the VSV and 11.25 degrees to either side of VSV.
For a given vind direction, there may be only a fraction of time when the vind is stable enough to carry chlorine to the site without sufficient dispersal to result in control room concentration below the toxicity limit. Therefore, the conditional probability that a chlorine-release is transported to the BFN control room air intakes is calculated based on a) vind direction only and b) vind direction and Pasquill stability class (see assumption 8). Again consider segment 3 as an example. Reference 7, Tables 2.3 7 and 2.3 10 indicate that the total percentage frequencies of stability class E vind from the VSV and of a vind from the VSV 1rrespective of stability class are 1.43% and 4.04%,
respectively. Therefore, the conditional probability of chlorine transport to the BFN site given a release in segment 3 is 0.0143 for stability class E and 0.0404 disregarding stability class. The conditional chlorine transport probabilities for each of the river segments under consideration taken from reference 7. Tables 2.3 3 through 2.3-10 are listed below:
Table 2: Conditional Probabilities of Chlorine Release Transport to the BFN Site Segment Direction vind _ Conditional Probability Ip for Stabi1Lty Class l
(1) is from A
B C
D U
l 1
VNV 0.0020 0.0053 0.00$4 0.0309 0.0075 2
V 0.0012 0.0043 0.0030 0.0223 0.0189 3
VSV 0.0015
_0.0030 0.0025 0.0175 0.0143 4
SV 0.0009 0.0019 0.0019 0.0065 0.0046 5
SSV 0.00 0 0.0010 0.0010 0.0086 0.0083 l
6 S
0.00!a4 0.0056 0.0042 0.0260 0.0304 l
7 SSE 0.0068 0.0043 0.0034 0.0238 0.0286 L
8 SR 0.0156 0.0088 0.0056 0.0358
.0.0539
XD>00000 900003 sheet 6 of 10 Prepared: "
5/41 /1 0 Checkedt 8/Af/fp Table 2 continued i
t Conditional Probability Segment Direction vind Pe for Stability Class M
is from F
G All*
VNV i0.0010 0.0003 0.0523 2
V I 0.00.,8 0.0002 0.0514 3
VSV i 0.00.6 0.0004 0.0404 4_
SV I0.0012 0.0001 0.0176 l
5
$$V 0.0020 0.0011 0.0231 6
S 0 0098 0.0040 0.0857 7
SSE 0.0138 0.0102 0.0911 8
SF. __
0.0185 l 0.0067 0.1454 o Conditional probability of chlorine transport to site including all Pasquill stability classes.
IV. Calculation of the Frcquencies of Chlorine Concentrations in the Control Room in Excess of the Toxicity !.imit (Fg)
The frequency F. of a chlorine concentration in the control room in g
excess of the toxicity limit due to a chlorine barge accident in each shipping channel segment i is calculated using F
- Feg, P Pr gg.
(2) t For example, consider segment 3. From Table 1, the frequency of a chlorine barge ateident in this segment is F. 3 = 1.1E 5 events /yr.
The conditional probability of a chlorine release given that a barge accident has occurred taken from calculation section II is P = 0.023.
y The conditional probability that a chlorine release in shipping channel i
segment 3 is transported to the BFN site for Pasquill stability class D is obtained from Table 2. This value is i
l P
= 0.0175.
g i
Therefore, the frequency of a chlorine concentration in the control toom in excess of the toxicity limit due to a chlorine barge accident in shipping channel segment 3 is P
= (1.lE-5 events /yr)(0.023)(0 5 15) g
= 4.i.s 9 events /yr for Pasquill stability class D.
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tabulaIedbelow:
Table 3: Freqencies of Chlorine Concentrations in the Control Room in i
Excess of the Toxicity Limit Due to Barge Accidents in Various Shipping Chennel Segments Frequency for Pesou111 Stability Class (events /yr)
Serment A
B C
D i
E F
G All l
l 7.4E 9 2.0E-8 2.0E 8 1.lE-7 l 2.8E 8 3.7E 9 1.1E 9 1.9E-7 2
i4.4E 10 1.6E 9 1.1E-9 8.2R 9 ' 7.0E 9 6.6E 10 7.4E 11 1.9E.8 3
3.i lt-10 7.6E-10 6 38-10 6.4E 9 3.6E 9.4.0 l 10 1.05 10 1.08-8 4
1., E:,0 2.4E 10 2.4E-:,0 8.ls-10 5.7E 10 1.5 :-10 1.21-L1 2.2E -
1.2E. 0 1.?.E.10 1.2E :.0 1.lt-9 1.0E 9 2.5t 10 1.4E :,0 2.9E 9 6
1.4E-9 1.4E 9 1.1E 6.6E-9 7.7E 9 2.$E 9 1.0E-9 12.2E-8 7
5.9E 9 3.8E 9 3 0E-9 2.lE-8 2.5E 8 1.2E-8 18.98 9 18 08-8 8
5 0E-8 2.8E-8 1.8E 8 1.28-7 1.7E 7 6.0E 8 2.2E 8 14.7E 7 i
Jotal 6.6R 6', 5.6E 8 4.4E 8 2.7E-7 2.45-7 8 0E 8 3.3E.8 J8.0E 7 2
Su mary of Results:
The probabilistic frequencies of chlorine concentrations in the BFN control room in excess of the toxicity limit due to a chlorine barge accident are listed belov for each Pasquill stability class:
Table 4: Frequencies of Chlorine Concentrations in the Control Room in Excess of the Toxicity Limit due to a Barge Accident Pasquill Stability Class A
B C
D E
F G
All Frequency (cvents/yr) 6.6E 8 5.6E-8 4.4E 8 2.7E 7 2.4E 7 8.0E 8 3.3E.8 8.0E 7 The frequency of a chlorine concentration in the control room in excess of the toxicity limit due to a barge accident (from all possible vind directions) is 8.0E 7 events /yr, including all Pasquill stability classes.
I
==
Conclusions:==
The calculated frequency of a chlorine concentration in tho control room at BFN in excess of the toxicity limit due to a barge acciden: (from all possible vind directions) is calculated to be 8.0E 7 events /yr, including all P: squill stability classes. This is a very conservative estimate e.s it approximates only the frequency of the chlorine approaching the site. The
. frequency that the chlorine enters the control room and in:apacitates the cperators vould actually be less than the estimated frequeacy as credit could be taken for any shift in the direction of the vind transperting the chlorine to the control room air intakes. In addition, there are barriers between the
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centrol' room air intakes and the river including the reacter building, turbine R
' building, cooling towers, and a large hill on the south to southwest side of j
the site (reference.13 and reference 14, page 8. Finally, the inclusion of all Pasquill stability classes in the frequency) adds conservatism in that-l O
vinds_of the less stable classes may disperse the chlorine to a non hasardous i
level.before it reaches the control room air intakes..For example, elimination l
of stability classes A through D as was done in reference 14 reduces the calculated frequency to 3.5E 7 events /yr. Reduction in the frequencies for j
segments 1, 7, and 8 vould result in the greatest reduction of the total frequency since.these segments compose most of the total (see Table 3).
References:
I
'1. Patrick P. Carier's memorandum to Richard J. McMahon dated May 9, 1990 (R08 900509 8:5).
- 2. Conversatto.is between Fredrick K. Hoyos (TVA NE/ RAS) and Don Vilkinson (U.S. Coast Guard, Nashville Tenn.), December 1989 - January 1990.
- 3. " Environmental Survey of Transportation of Radioactive Materialu to and '
fron Nuclear Power Plants" VASH-1238, December 1972.
- 4. " Assumptions For Evaluating the Habitebility of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release", Regulatory Guide 1.78, Revision 0, June 1974.
- 5. " Evaluations of Explosions Postulated to Occur on Transportation Routes I
Near Nuclear Power Plants", Regulatory Guide 1.91 Revision 1, February 1978.
- 6. " Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Toxic Barge Study", Bechtel Corp. Calculation
'i N 2 (B22.900523 201).
- 7. Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) section 2.3, j
amendment 6.
l 8._M. Ted Nelson's memorandum to L. Vang 1.au dated June 26, 1987 (381 '870630 025).
L
L (TVA NE/ RAS), and Dr. Y. J.1.in (Bechtel Corp.) on May 15, 1990 and l
between Fredrick K. Hoyos and Dr. Y. J. Lin on May 16, 1990.
104 Tennessee River Navigation Charts Paducah, Ky. to Knoxville, Tenn., U.S.
Army Engineer District, Nashville, Tenn., January !?80.-
j
- 11. H. Ted Nelson's memorandum to Phillip V. Hyatt dated December 1, 1989 (381 '90 0214 002).
l-
'12. Karl Hornyik, "Fanards to Nuclear Plants from Surface Traffic Accidents",
)
Nuclear Technology Vol. 25, April 1975.
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- 13. Brevns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Location of Structures Sheet'1, TVA drawing 10t201 01 R4.
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- 14. ' Probability of Chlorine Release from Barge Accident at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant", CD N0999 891395 R0 (BTNRAG2 001 RO) (381 '870720 050).
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