ML20059A491

Control Room Habitability Following Potential Barge Shipment Accident of Hazardous Chemicals

ML20059A491
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	08/13/1990
From:	Rossi B TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML20059A489	List: ML20059A486 ML20059A491 ML20059A495 ML20059A499
References
MD-Q-900046, MD-Q-900046-R, MD-Q0000-900046, MD-Q0000-900046-R00, NUDOCS 9008230085
Download: ML20059A491 (12)

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This calculation provides a TVA Browns Ferry Nuclear Plan't calculation coversheet'and calculation nu, pber to Bechtel Report ' Toxic Barge Study, Task TSD N049, Rev. 0,' (B22 900523 201). This study was I performed by Bechtel to evaluate control room habitabHity for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant following a potentlal barge shipment accident of hazardous chemicals on the Tennessee RNor The analysis performed to prepare this study is attached.

Of the chemicals evaluated, Chlorine, Benzene, Ethyl benzene, Toluene, Vinyl acetate, and Acrylonitrile were determined to pose a potential threat to the control room operators following a barge accident on the Tennessee River. With the exception of cNorine, these chemicals can be detected by smell by the control

. room operators in suffielent time to don protective equipment without experiencing any physical Impairment.

Because of the massNe quantity of cNorine that can be transponed by barge past Browns Ferry, a

, probabilistic analysis should be performed using the result from this analysis whic's show that a barge accident less than 5.5 km from the control room results in unacceptable concent, ations.

This calculation provides a TVA calculation number to an authorized Bechtel analyse and as such the technical accuracy and format as prescribed by NEP 3.1 was not vertfled.

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- cal.CULATION DESIGN VERIFICATION (INDEPENDENT REVIEW) FORM l O

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Bechtel g2a9bm2.52o,

- 1501 Freeman Dme Ashena Ambame 356114

, (205) 233 5600 '

. May 23, 1990- .

'l Project Engineer-Tennessee Valley' Authority i

-Post Office Box 2000, A10-EDB-BFN.. t Decatur, Alabama 35602 Attention:. J. D. Hutson (D2-EDB-BFN)

TVA Contract 72163A -

Bechtel Job 19106 T0XIC BARGE STUDY TASK TSD-N049. REV. O BFT 90/1345 In accordance with Section'III, Deliverables under Proposal 0-A of-

.TSD-N049, Rev. 0, we are forwarding the the results of.the Toxic Barge Study to TVA Nuclear Engineering for your.use. ,

' ' Very truly yours, W. R. Woratchek ,

-Project Engineer .j Writtep Response Reg'd: No

.,4 WRW RES:ame

Attachment:

Toxic. Barge-Study

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AB-C-BFN).

H. E.- Cricler, w/1 (PAB-G-BFN) i D. E. Root, w/o-(A6-EDB-BFN) y '

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. I' P0gs'1 of 6-BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT T0XIC BARGE STUDY j

INTRODUCTION A study has been performed to evaluate control room habitability for the Browns- Ferry Nuclear Plant - (BFNP) following a potential barge shipment accident of hazardous chemicals on the Tennessee River. The^ analysis performed to pry are this study is included as an Attachment to this report.

RESULTS 1

.of the chemicals that are shipped on the Tennessee River near the BFNP, nine of them are potentially hazardous to the control room operators. Chemicals that are transported on the Tennessee River l but pose no threat to the control room habitability due to their benign chemical properties or extremely high toxicity limit are 1 identified below and were not further evaluated.

Nitrogenous fertilizers (their impact is enveloped by the 2400-ton nitrogen barge which is evaluated)

Ethanol (judging by its chemical properties, a 1500-ton ethanol barge accident is n'ot expected to produce a concentration outside the control room air intake that exceeds the lownr value of its toxicity range (5,000 -

10,000 ppm - Sax,1979)' )

Residualavailable fuel oilfor(nofuel threshold limit oil and is value toxic only (TLV).

through is. oral I:

l routes (CHRIS, 1978)# )

l- Caustic soda (no threshold limit value (TLV) is available for caustic soda and is toxic only through oral routes (CHRIS, 1978))

Urea, Potash, and Sulphate potash-(no TLV is available and no hazard label'is required by code of Federal Regulations during transport (CHRIS, 1978])

, 1

'n a Toxic Bargo. Study Page 2 of 6 The remaining chemicals transported on the.Tennesee River'that

• pose a potential threat to contol room habitability are discussed- l

'below. ,

' Chlorine -

The toxicity of-chlorine is 15 ppa for 2 minutes (Regulatory Guide 1.78). Results indicate that the chlorine concentrations .,

exceed 19' ppa within the first 15 seconds after'the arrival of f the chlorine puff inside the control room. The chlorine concentration.inside the control room reaches 859 ppm at 2 minutes after the arrival of the puff. Therefore, a chlorine barge accident (1200 ton) on the Tennessee River will have adverse effects on the control room operators.

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.A safe distance at which no adverse effects would occur to the control room operators as a result of a 1200-ton chlorine barge accident was estimated to be 5.5 km. At this distance, the accident will produce a buildup concentration of 14.5 ppm within the control room at two minutes after the arrival-of-the puff.

Nitrogen -

The nitrogen. concentrations inside the control room following a barge accident never exceed 4829 ppa. Nitrogen is not. toxic by itself. The main concern for nitrogen is its asphyxiation effects due to its replacement of oxygen, oxygen may be diminished to 2/3 of its normal percentage in air before q appreciable symptoms-develop, and this in turn requires the

. presence of a sidple asphyxiant in a concentration of 33% in the ,

mixture of air and gas (Sax, 1979). Since the maximum nitrogen ,

P concentration never exceeds 0.5% (< 33%) by volume inside the  ;

h control room, the nitrogen barge (2400 ton) accident will not L

l .cause any advarse effects on the control room operators.

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1 T:xic Barg3 Study Page 3 of 6

)

Xylene -

The toxicity limit for xylene is 400 ppa (Reg.: Guide 1.78). l However, the maximum xylene concentration.at the control room air intake is about 195 ppa after a rylene barge accident. As a-result of this small concentration, no adverse effects are q

-expected.on the control room operators. , ,

q Benzene - ,

The maximum benzene concentration at the control room air intake is about 2169 ppa. This concentration exceeds the benzene toxicity limit of 50 ppa (Reg. Guide 1.78). NRC requires that_a toxic chemical's buildup concentration inside a control room should not be greater than the toxicity limit within 2' minutes after the detection of the chemical so that the control room j operators-have enough time to don breathing apparatus (Reg. Guide 1.78). Thus, the buildup concentrations within the control room were estimated. The benzene odor threshold'value is 4.68 ppm

~

O (CHRIS, 1978). .The control room operators should be able to small this pollutant about 77 seconds after the arrival of the 1

plume. The concentration will not buildup to the toxicity limit _

il before 818 seconds, which is more than 12 minutes after the detection of the smell. As a result, the operators will have.

sufficient time to don breathing apparatus. Therefore, a-benzene

= barge accident (1500 ton) will have insignificant effects on the l control room operators.

Ethyl benzene-NRC does not provide a toxicity limit for this chemical. The maximum ethyl benzene concentration at the control room air 1 intake is estimated to be 252 ppa. This value is higher than a l) threshold limit value (TLV) of 100 ppa for a 8-hour weighted i

average (CHRIS, 1978). The TLV is defined as the concentration )

j of the substance in air that can be breathed for 5 consecutive 8-hour workdays by most people without adverse effect (CHRIS, 1978).

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Taxic B rgo study Page 4 of 6 l

The odor threshold value.for ethyl benzene is 140 ppa-(CHRIS,.

1978). Therefore, the control room operators will be able to detect this chemical about 103 minutes after the arrival of the ,

plume.- At 2 minutes after the detection, the buildup concentration is about 141 ppa. Although no data are available regarding the effect of chronic exposure,'it has-been found that a-concentration of 1000 ppa causes irritation to human eyes, and- ,

a concentration of 2000 ppa is extremely irritant at first,'then ]

causes dizziness (Sax, 1979). These toxic concentrations are extremely high compared to the concentration (150 ppm) that may l buildup in the control room more than two hours after detection.

The control room operators will have sufficient time to den I

breathing apparatus; thus, an ethyl benzene barge (1500 ton) accident is not expected to have significant adverse effects on l l

the control room operators.

l l

Toluene -

The NRC does not provide a toxicity limit'for this chemical. The maximum toluene concentration is estimated to be_759 ppm at the control room air intake and 411 ppa inside the control room after a barge (1500 ton) accident. The TLV of this chemical is 200 ppm (OSHA,1983)*, and the odor threshold value is. 0.17 ppm (CHRIS, 1978). Because of this low odor threshold value, the cont: col '

Troom operators are able to detect:this chemical almost instantly upon'the arrival'of the plume.- Within two minutes, the buildup concentration is only about 4.4 ppa. Therefore,.the operators have sufficient time to take the proper actions. Thus, a toluene barge (1500 ton) accident will not have adverse effects on the control room operators. -

Vinyl Acetate -

The NRC does not provide a toxicity limit for this chemical. The 1

maximum vinyl acetate concentration is estimated to be 3125 ppm 1 at the control room air inthke and 57 ppa inside the control room after a barge (2000 ton) accident. This concentration exceeds the TLV-of 10 ppm for vinyl acetate (CHRIS, 1978). i l

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Texic Barg3 Study ,

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The' odor: threshold value for vinyl acetate is 0.12 ppa (CHRIS, 1978). Because of this-low odor threshold value, tho' operators.

are able to. smell this chemical *1most instantly upon the arrival  ;

of the plume. At 104 seconds the buildup concentration within f the control room reaches the TLV value (10 ppm) . Although no. '

other limits'for health effects have been found for this chemical, comparing the concentration during an accident to a TLV l is very conservative. Two minuies following detection the.

buildup concentration is about 13 ppa (304 above the conservative long-term TLv value of 10 ppm). Thus, the operators have sufficient time to react and don protective equipment without adverse effects.

styrene -

-The NRC does not provide a toxicity limit for this chemical. The maximum styrene concentration is estimated to be about 74 ppm at the~contsnl room air intake. This value is less than a long- l term TLV of 100 ppm ,(CHRIS, 1978); thus, no adverse effects are expected on the control room operators during a 2000-ton barge accident. Beca,tse of this low control room outside concentration, the estimate of the concentration within the control room is not necessary.

Acrylonitrile -

The! maximum acrylonitrile concentration at the control room air-intake is estimated to be 7584 ppa after a barge-(4000 ton) accident. This value exceeds the toxicity limit of 40 ppm (Reg.

Guide 1.78).

The odor threshold value of acrylonitrile is 21.4 ppm (CHRIS, 1978). The operators are able to small the buildup of this chemical 207 seconds after the arrival of the plume. It takes about three more minutes for the buildup concentration to reach the toxicity limit (40 ppm) . Therefore, the control room operators have ample time to don protective equipment.

.o Tcxic Barga study ,

Page 6 of.6 81 i c0NCLDEIONS

'ofithe chemicals. evaluated,' the following chemicals pose a ,

potential threat to-the control room operators following a barge F / accident on the Tennessee River:

- Chlorine

- ' Benzene  ;

- Ethyl benzene

}

- Toluene

- Vinyl Acetate. 1

- Acrylonitrile l

With the exception of chlorine, the above identified chemicals ,

can be. detected by_ smell by the control room operators in $

sufficient time to don protective equipment without experiencing any physical impairment.

Because of the massive quantity of chlorine that can be '

-transported by barge past Browns Ferry, a probabilistic analysis should:be-performed using the. result from this analysis which shows that a barge accident less than 5.5 km from the control room results in unacceptable concentrations. j l

REFERENCES q

- l '. Sax, N.-I., Danaerous Pronerties of Industrial Materials,

'Sth Ed., Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1979

]

I 2.. CHRIS, Hazardous Chemical Data, U. S. Coast Guard, 1978

[

l' 3.. OSKA Safety and' Health Standards,.OSKA 2206, 29-CFR-1910, L 1983' 1

Toxic Barge Study (Bechtel Calculation M-2, dated 'l L

ATTACHMENT -

May 18, 1990)

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