ML20057A263
Text
,
eu
. gw.
e.!
g f%)
.M % -
.h
.~ n
~*
Mercrandua For:
Hugh L. Thompson, Jr., Director Office of Muclear Material Safety and Safeguards James Lieberman, Director Office of Enforcament From:
William T. Russell Regional Administrator, Region !
Subject:
POLICY ISSUES RELATIVE TO TRAXSFER OF LICEXSD ACT!YITIES IN THE MATERIALS PROGRAM My staff has perceived an increasing tendency of licensees, both large and small users, to teminate or, rore frequently, transfer their licensed activities without abiding by the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 30.34
- 30. 36, a nd 30. 4 ).
Two particular types of problems are involved:
1.
A licensee terminates licensed activities, but does not so inform the NRC These sit,ations are usually detected long after the fact, and and the material often are not easy to locate.consecuently, are dif 2.
A licensee's business is sold,'and~ticensed' activities are assumed by th
^
~
new owner without notification of the NRC.
to resolve ~sinTi~these ' matters often involve ~ibandorse
~
licensed facility end transfer of the~ licensed material ~to another~ ginal
~
previously reviewed by the NRC. location, or the assumption of license
~
As before, this situation is usually detected after the fact, and activities involving the use of DC regulated sterial are already in progress.
While both of these problems have been experienced by the NRC (in cases suc as the Pesses Company and the Safety Light Corporation), the latter situation recently has been rore prevalent in Region I and we believe the issue deserves increased attention. The frequency of rergers, buy-outs the present economic environment, are retters which com and rajority stock i
regulatory preatse, i.e., that:
The NRC knows.those who possess and use radioactive raterials, has evaluated their capability and competency to handle such raterials; and these individuals have been made aware of their responsibility to perform licensed activities in accordance with the regulatory requirements.
i 9309130295 930030 PDR STPRQ ESGG
/
Wh.?
- .*
- 2
.., 4. 2-$.l
+
& to Hugh' L. Thompson 1 W
' ' ~
of radioactive sterial is severely eroded when th es Such is the case when we do not have current knowledge of the spec carry out the radiological safety program in accorda l
requirements.
of corporations owningAdditionally, the importance of mintaining accurat activities is necessary, controlling, or otherwise involved with licensed deccanissioning rule, and provide financial assurance for t awclear sites.
constraints and obtain written consent from the N transferring or terrinating licensed activities, licensees' ignorance of thi requirement and our failure in the past to hold licensees accountable s
for compliance in this regard ray be contributors to the failure to re-solve the atter as a licensing issue by requiring the comply.
For discontinue use of the raterial until the activity had been authorized b NRC license.
While we ray cite the successor company for unauthorized an possession and use, or the predecessor company for unlawful transfer not usually instituted enforcement action relative to 10 CFR 30 34(b) onc
, we have inrediate concern of licensing has been addressed.
evaluation prior to consent to the proposed transference propose the following for consideration:
Consequently, we
=
1.
q;- : w
, z.-
advising them of their regulatory responsibilities in t e,
with 10 CFR 30.34(b);the tra"nsfer of dwnership or control of licensed a 2.
notification, and describe the type of information req submitted; 3.
Revise the existing guidance (POLICY AND GUIDANCE DIRECTIVE F PROCESSING MATERIAL LICENSE APPLICATIONS relative to evaluation of licensees' submittals.
The current and stresses an evaluation of the nature of the transfer.
address determination of outstanding regulatory, safetyIt does not and financial ability of the successor company to ad enforcerent, or licensed activities.
., - q.,,x.s
=&
- i. -
f
..
- M to k gh L. 4hompson-
.& 6
S y
- .7
- ; 9 -
4 Establish the policy that regardless of the resolution of Ifeensing matters in these cases, en,forcement of 10 CFR 30.34(b) is requi addressed.
If it is determined that health and safety could have been cogromised by failure to give prior notice to the Commission, such violation should be considered for evaluation as Severity Level III and appropriate enforcement action initiated, it is our intent to take action as described in this particular recocuendation, as appropriate.
We believe that this issue is resolvable only if a very clear and consis message is pr oeiy worsen. ovided by the Connission.
If not addressed, this situation can offices and the NMSS technical staff,la an effort to assure that ou I have instructed my staff to submit be held in Atlanta, Georgia, Januarythis atter as an agenda topic a 10-11, 1989.
o 5afety Section C (346-5102).Our staff contact for this utter is John R. W OMet a2 Sjped 37
~.-.-. ~....:5:1t -
William T. Russell
.'..-- T e._. r: ".. i.c. p Regional Administrator ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~
cc:
Regional Administrators (RII, RI!!, RIV, RV)
Y. Miller, GPA/SLITP W. Pa rler, OGC S
S Rhi) e Joyner VJohnston 12
/88 12/jh88 12/13/88
- }
W-
- RI RA:RI rrez DH dy 2/;
88 1
12 '/88
,n Russell 12/g/88
a.
o t
The following comments are in response to Question No. 7 TRANSPORTATION INSPECTIONS Inspections against modules 86740 and 86740A by the materials staff are as follows:
Staff Hrs Inspections Hrs /Insp.
FY88 159 324 0.49 i
FY89 thru 2/15/89 24 51 0.47 8
We have been unable to obtain information from the 766 system to answer the question about the most typically observed violations in the transportation area.
However, the NM59 staff believe the most common violations to be lack of a certificate of c' ;11ance, lack of shipping papers and lack of documen-tation on the certificaticn of Type A packages.
i l
1
. - -