ML20147B845
| ML20147B845 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 01/27/1997 |
| From: | Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20147B843 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-96-351 NUDOCS 9702040015 | |
| Download: ML20147B845 (6) | |
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,, JUN 01 '95 09:39 EDO , P.2/3
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MEMORANDUM TO: File ,
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FRON: James M. Taylor : , 'i Executive Director for Operations,1 .
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SU8 JECT: DROP IN VISIT.- PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC lAND GASc,(Pdf&G) ' ~ ;
SALEM UNITS 1 & 2 . .
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On May 24,1995, at 2:00 p.m., Messrs. J.. Ferland,' JChief Executive Officer,
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! and L. Eliason, Chief Nuclear Officer (CN0 , of PSE&G,: met. with:. Messrs. J.
l Taylor, J. Milhoan,' R. Zimmerman, L. Chand er, and J. Grobe of the NRC to N- "
1 discuss improvement efforts at Salem Units 1 and 2. ~~'F' I "
l l- The following topics were discussed: ., , - ' '
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PSEAG has added Dr. Forrest Remmick to the Board of Directorsjand Dr. j Remmick has been assigned to the Nuclear oversight, Committee.t % Nuclear ~
4 plant status; [is discussed extensively at every monthl)9 Boa,rd , .
n meeting.
Four experieniced former nuclear executives have been added..to..the '
NuclearSafetyReviewCommitteewhichreportstothe2BoardiofDiNetors
- monthly. ; a ., c I
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l In early May '1995, PSE&G submitted its Impact Plan!for. Salem to the'
- staff. The Plan is promoting an integrated effortito[ .
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Develop [, improvement strategies (Nay"- u Implement Intervention Effort (June .
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Implement Strategies (June through September)\ .
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f Facility operation will be significantly improved before refueling outage in September.*
Full implementation of the plan will ?take.12 to 18
months.
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! They have put;in place a core set of new managers"Who are.ac' ting as
" change agents" to facilitate resha ing the organization. The.vnst.
- majority of the staff are out of th denial mode and recog~nize"that -
change is necessary to improve. ; -
They are " reconstituting" and improving virtually ~every 'se'gment of the l organization and they are still recruiting forf several key managers. .
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One very significant effort is underway in tAe system engineering with a ' ;
1 new level of commitment and accountability in system ownershipc They~ 1 will focus on ,the " System Health" of eight major systems firsteincluding CVCS, service water, feed water, steam, circulating' water, diesel' generators, and reactor control. These systems account for over 90 j
percent of the problems over the last year.
, l They are planning to upgrade the feedwater control system to a. digital ,
- system during the next outage.
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Jtfi 01 '95 09:40 EDO , P.3/3 t
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l and rewarding results, not activity.The CN0 is meeting weekly '
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! Mr. Eliason committed to 8 meet again with Mr. Taylor ~on the p prog ess of..his improvement p.m. effort; befor the September outage. '. The meetingiended "at 3:15 No regulatory decisions were requested.or provided. '
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DATE SENT: 11/13/91 DATE SIGNED:
ITEM SENT: PRESS RELEASE NO. I-91-77 1
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SUBJECT:
NRC STAFF SENDS AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM TO SITE OF A TURBINE FAILURE AND ELECTRIC GENERATOR FIRE AT SALEM NUCLEAR POWER PLANT NEAR SALEM, NJ.
The attacned itemt s) was/were sent :n tne aoove date to the following individuals:
The Honorable Bob Graham /cc: Senator Alan Simpson The Honorable Philip Sharp /cc: Representative Carlos Moorhead The Honorable Peter Kostrayer/cc: Representative John J. Rhodes ADDITIONAL ADDRESSEES INCLUDE:
Sen. Bill Bradley Sen. Frank Lautenberg Rep. William Hughes
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! 7, UNITED STATES '
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- i, Or' FICE OF GOVERNMENTAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, REGION I
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- 475 Allendale Road, King of Prussia, Pa.19406
+.... i Te!. 215 337-5330 }
Novenber 9. 1991 No. !-91-77
Contact:
Karl Abrahan 1
HRC STAFF SENDS AUGMENTED INSPEC110N TEAM TO SITE OF A TURBINE FAILURE AND ELECTRIC GENERATOR FIRE AT SALEM NUCLEHR PouER PLANT NEAR SALEM NJ.
KING CF PEUSCla. FA- - The Nuclear Pesulatur9 Canoission st af f l to,.isht araanized a.i 6aanented inspection Tean (AIT) to be at the Salen Nuclear Power plant first thing Sunday nornios to find out how and why a fire occurred in the Salen Unit 2 t.urbine electric seneratur, whir.h was 1 heavily danaged when blades broke from t.he turbine and penetrat.ed the l
, turbine's outer shell short!9 before noon Saturday (11/9/91). l The nuclear reactor itself was undamaged. It shut. down autenatical19 and was stable. There was no release of radiation fron the plant. and there were no serious injuries. One suard was treated at t.he scene for snoke inhalat inn.
At 12:10 p.n. Saturday, Public Service Electric and Gas Compang of New Jerse9 reported to t.he NRC fron the Salen P. control roon that i
workers had heard a loud noise and had seen fire coning cut of t.he Unit. {
2 stean-driven turbine electric generat.or about 11.i0 a. n. The plant.
declared an " unusual event.' the least serious of NEC's energency J
classifications. When the fire. which was extinguished in about 15 ninutes, and the smoke had cleared, the conpany briefly escalated the !
enersency to an " Alert," because workers found hole 2 in the t.urbine j casins, indicatins objects had broken throush to the outside. When no i significant danase war found outside from t.he flying pieces. the i
" Alert" was almost inmediate19 reduced b9 the conpany back to an j
" unusual event.'
The utilit9 told the NRC it has beaun an inquiry into shst could have caused the turbine blades to fly of f and do the danase it. observed.
The NRC's seven nenber Alf, led by a Sect. ion Chief fanitiar wit.h reactor operations, includes specialist.s fran NRC Reaion I and fron NRC )
Headquarters in Rockuille. MD. On the Lean are specialists in turbine controls and turbine naterials. in non-destruct.ive lastina, and in electrical engineering.
Such AIT's nornally t.ake 9 to 6 da9s to do the field work at the site, then review the 1indings and issue a report wit.hin 30 days.
Salen Unit 2 was operating at. full power. The electric generators at nuclear power plants, as well as at fossil-fueled piants, are cooled by hydrogen gas, and is appears that. the h9drogen sus and lobricating oil supplied to turbine hearings was what. burned. That fire was extinguished by a conbination of water and carbon dinxide Jeluge 39stens. and the response of the station fire brigade, which included the guard. Lower Alloways Township fire fighting forces also responded j to the plant's call for help, but the fire was exti suished j quick 19, before the of f -site fi: e departnent. entered the protect.ed area j uf t.he plant.
The States of New Terrey and Delaware have been inforned of this J t
event. I
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DATE SENT: 11/27/91 DATE SIGNED:
ITEM SENT: PRESS RELEASE
SUBJECT:
NOTE TO EDITORS AND STATION ASSIGNMENT EDITORS REGARDING I THE SALEM NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 1 l
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l The attached item (s) was/were sent on the above date to the l following individuals:
! The Honorable Bob Graham /cc: Senator Alan Simpson The Honorable Philip Sharp /cc: Representative Carlos Moorhead The Honorable Peter Kostrayer/cc: Renresentative John J. Rhodes l
ADDITIONAL ADDRESSEES INCLUDE:
Sen. Bill Bradley Sen. Frank Lautenberg Rep. Wiliam Hughes l
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j' "%, UNITED STATES i
.! ' : . 1 ' i, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
% 5 OFFICE OF GOVERNMENTAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, REGION l
\' . ,/ 475 Allendale Road, King of Prussia, Pa 19406 Tel 215-337-5330 Novenber 27. 1991 NOTE: TO EDIT 0ftS AND STATION AE;SIGNMEtif EDITORS i
KING OF PRUSSIA, FA--The Nuclear Regulatory Connission's Ausnented Inspection Tean (AIT). which was sent to the Salen Nuclear Power Plant near Salen, NJ. on Novanbec 10. 1991 to look into the circunstances of a fire in the olant's turbine uenerator the day before, will hold a nestins with Public Service Electric and Ges Conpany of New Jersey on Tuesdag. December 3. 1991, at I p.n.
The meeting, at which the AIT will give its preliminary findings to the uti1it 9, wiii be in the site Procesa ng Center Buiidins. on the Artificial Island access road to Salen site (at the fork, bear risht) in Lower Allowa9s Creek Towoship The meeting is open to observation by the pub 1ic.
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[anuo 'o g UNITED STATES
.,t I o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIMilON
- WASHINGTON, D. C 20665
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%*****M May 13, 1992 CHAIRMAN LThe Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510-0802
Dear Senator Biden:
This is in response to your letter of April 2, 1992, concerning the November 9, 1991, turbine generator failure at the Salem Generating Station. In particular, you raised several thoughtful concerns largely with the NRC's decision to mitigate a civil penalty assessed against the licensee, and with the NRC's regulatory activities in general as they relate to the Salem facility.
Be assured that the NRC's chief concern resulting from this event has been and remains that the event was preventable and that the underlying'causes could potentially affect nuclear safety under other circumstances. The decision to mitigate the penalty is not an indication of diminished concern by the NRC of the significance of the event.
Enclosure 1 contains additional informatica concerning mitigating factors under our Enforcement Policy relating to the November 9 event and the issues you raise. Mitigation is intended to encourage actions on the part of the licensee that will identify deficiencies and root causes of events and which help to prevent recurrence of events. For example, the Salem licensee identified one of the root causes of the November 9 avant and is implementing procedures to correct its process for tracking commitments. While the NRC is satisfied, at this point, that appropriate actions are underway to ensure that underlying causes are being addressed and to prevent events of similar nature, the NRC will monitor the licensee's efforts closely and will not hesitate to take any future actions appropriate to effect necessary changes in operations or attitude. ,
Enclosure 2 addresses NRC's requirements as they relate to safety-related equipment and non-safety-related equipment with specific references to our actions at Salem. Your letter raises a number of issues concerning the scope of NRC's regulations in general. For example, the problem with the binding of solenoid valves, which you cited in your letter, involves equipment not subject to NRC's quality assurance requirements. The Commission and the NRC staff have periodically examined our role in overseeing balance of plant systems and components. We have A10hW%i4%~ 7sy.
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l adopted a maintenance rule requiring licensees to establish l l programs to monitor the effectiveness of maintenance activities !
including balance of plant equipment but this rule is not yet in j
! force pendi.ng development of supporting implementation guidance. l l We continue to develop probabilistic methods intended to measure l l the contributions of systems and components - " safety-related" l or not -- to risk. ,
These evolving activities and others already in existence, like the SALP process and the team inspection programs, help ensure l
that activities in the balance of plant area which could impact on safety are not ignored but receive appropriate attention.
The NRC is committed to ensuring that the lessons learned from l the November 9 event are fully understood and that corrective actions are taken to address the deficiencies identified; we will j keep you and your staff informed of the licensee's corrective actions.
Sincerely, l
Ivan Selin r 1
Enclosures:
l 1. Mitigating Factors
- 2. NRC Regulatory Requirements -
j Salem l
l MITIGATING FACTORS The staff's decision to mitigate the penalty is not an indication of diminished concern by the NRC of the sig..ificance of the event. Mitigation is intended to encourage actions on the part of the licensee that will identify deficiencies and root causes of events and which help to prevent recurrence of events. This enforcement action was in conformance with the provisions of the Enforcement Policy and reflected an appropriate exercise of l judgment for the circumstances of the case.
l l The mitigation is not given for reporting the obvious, but for getting to the root cause of the event. In this case, the licensee identified the failure of its staff to communicate and l
correct the results of the testing of the turbine performed on l
October 20, 1991, which is one of the root causes of the event and is the basis of the violation at issue. Therefore, some mitigation was warranted for the licensee's root cause identification effort.
As to corrective actions, the fact that the licensee failed to implement its earlier commitment to replace the solenoid valves, i as detailed in the cover letter to the Notice of Violation, was of concern to the NRC. However, rather than being a case in which a licensee ignored a commitment, the NRC's Augmented Inspection Team found a significant flaw in the method used by the licensee to track such commitments which contributed to that failure. Enforcement action was not taken for this failure because it did not constitute a violation of the Commission's requirements -- the solenoid, not being safety-related equipment, was not subject to the Commission's quality assurance requirements. Nevertheless, the licensee is implementing procedures to correct this process. The staff will be monitoring l these corrective actions.
I As to the licensee's past performance, the last two years of i
performance are normally considered in evaluating this factor.
l On balance, NRC assessment of this licensee's performance up to the November 1991 event was found to warrant one half o.f the mitigation allowed under that civil penalty adjustment factor.
t In that regard, the most recent SALP report noted improvements in l control room communications and conduct of operations.
With respect to the prior notice factor, although the licensee had prior notice of problems with mechanical binding of identical solenoid valves in Unit 1, no adjustment on this factor was i
j Enclosure 1 I
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2-1 warranted because the primary focus in this case was the performance of.the NRC licensed operators on October 20, 1991, rather than the maintenance of the solenoids. The failure of i operators to respond to the deficient test results on October 20, i 1991, was viewed as the most significant reason that this event l was not prevented by the licensee. I A civil panalty was not assessed by the NRC staff based on its 1 evaluation of these mitigation factors. Although a civil penalty !
was not assessed, a Severity Level III violation is a matter of l significant regulatory concern and may adversely affect a licensee's Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) ratings, or result in escalation of future prop 6 sed civil ;
penalties due to past poor performance.
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NRC REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS - SALEM -
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" Safety-related" equipment is that equipment used in conjunction with the nuclear steam supply system which is relied upon.to ensure the integrity of the reactor cool. ant pressure boundary, the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe !
shutdown condition, and the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could cause undue risk to the health and safety of the public. "Non-safety-related" is everything else in the balance of plant. Some of the non-safety-related equipment is very useful both in avoiding an emergency '
and in dealing with one, but it is not iuself necessary for reactor safety. ,
The Commission periodically examines the extent to which it should oversee balance of plant systems and components. For example, our recently adopted rule (10 CFR 50.65, adopted July 10, 1991) requiring licensees to establish programs to monitor the effectiveness of maintenance activities explicitly recognizes that inclusion of balance of plant equipment in the l program is necessary and proper. Equipment to be monitored l includes r.on-safety-related components: 1) relied upon to mitigate accidents; 2) whose failure could prevent functioning of safety related equipment; and 3) whose failure could cause a reactor scram or actuation of a safety related system.
Under current rules and practice NRC does not routinely review or approve the design detail nor the operational procedures for non-safety-related equipment, nor is it routinely inspected by NRC, except with respect to the effect such equipment may have on the overall safe nuclear operation of the facility. For example:
NRC reviews the design of the turbine to the extent of assuring that the nuclear reactor and other nuclear safety equipment is protected against turbine missiles by orientation or otherwise; NRC reviews features of the turbine and its auxiliary i equipment to the extent of assuring the nuclear reactor and safety-related equipment are protected against potential fire hazards from such balance of plant equipment.
4 Enclosure 2
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Y adopted a maintenance rule requiring licensees to establish programs to monitor the effectiveness of maintenance activities including balance of plant equipment but this rule is not yet in I force pending development of supporting implementation guidance.
We continue to develop probabilistic methods intended to measure the contributions of systems and components - " safety-related" l or not -- to risk.
l l These evolving activities and others already in existence, like l the SALP process and the team inspection programs, help ensure that activities in the balance of plant area which could impact on safety are not ignored but receive appropriate attention.
The NRC is committed to ensuring that the lessons learned from
! the November 9 event are fully understood and that corrective actions are taken to address the deficiencies identified; we will keep you and your staff informed of the licensee's corrective 1 I
actions.
1 Sincerely, I Ivan Selin I
Enclosures:
- 1. Mitigating Factors
- 2. NRC Regulatory Requirements -
Salem l
i KR - Approved JC - Approved / edit FR - Approved / edit GD - Approved w/ edits Originating Office: ED0/0E Ref: CR-92-074 Commission Correspondence
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f & XM" forc N ending development of supporting regulations. We continue to de lop probabilistic methods intended to measure the contri gtions of systems and components - " safety-related" or not -- t risk.
These evol g activities and others already in existence, like the SALP pro ess and the team inspection programs, help ensure that activities in the balance of plant area which could impact on safety are not ignored but receive appropriate attention.
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The NRC is committed to ensuring that the lessons learned from the November 9 event are fully understood and that corrective actions are taken togaddress the deficiencies identified; we will keep you and your staff informed of the licensee's corrective actions.
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Ivan Selin
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Enclosures:
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- 1. Mitigating Factors \
- 2. NRC Regulatory Requirements -\
Salem \
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, JOSEPH R BIDEN, JR OtWWoHE
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i 11nited l25tates jEstnate u WASHINGTON. DC 20510-0802 l l .
April 2, 1992 i i i l
Dr. Ivan Selin l Chairman l l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l l Washington, DC 20555 )
Dear Mr. Chairman:
I am stunned by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) decision not to impose penalties on the Salem nuclear plant as a result of the turbine generator destruction in November, 1991. This decision appears to be based on a very i
restricted view of the turbine explosion, and can only reinforce the public's perception that the NRC fails to demand the highest level of safety.
It is an understatement to call the turbine explosion a serious event. Seventy-five million dollars in damage was incurred by the utility as a result of the explosion. The force of the explosion was strong enough to blast shards of turbine blades through the thick turbine casing and throw them up to three hundred yards away. In addition, steam generator tubes were shredded and a fire developed.
While the specifics of the blast are serious, perhaps the most disconcerting aspect of the explosion was that it was preventable. But your agency's decision to impose no penalties on Public Service Electric and Gas (PSE&G) appears to ignore this fact as well as.many others.
A review of actions and inactions, as documented by your own review team, that led to the accident shows many serious shortcomings in the operation of the Salem plant. First,_the 1 Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) sent to Salem after the i accident found that "PSEEG missed valuable opportunities to prevent the Salem Unit 2 turbine generator
- failure.... Insufficient priority and importance was as. signed to the verification of operability and replacement of solenoid valve at Salem Unit 2." !
In addition, the team found that the utility ignored earlier warnings of problems with'the solenoid valves. An ,
information notice sent by the NRC " identified several :
i solenoid valve problems, including applications in turbine i trip control systems....The NRC found Eg indication that the l licensee had directed any attention or priority to addressing l the implications of this information ... as of the date of this occurrence." (emphasis added) l -**!3% _- - _. ._ _ -.
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- Perhaps the most shocking aspect of the sequence of events is that the utility had found a similar problem at ,
another reactor at the same facility, the Salem 1 reactor. I The utility initially took on the responsibility to prevent a ;
problem at the Salem 2 reactor by promising the NRC to i replace the valves in question during fuel outage scheduled for May, 1991.
However, the_ inspection team found that " work _was deferred ... due to management decision that may have been caused by a deficiency in commitment tracking". No further )
explanation was provided as to why management decided to put I I
off. replacing the valves, what factors went into that decision, or why the NRC failed to detect that the valves were not replaced. j Finally, the inspection team documented that test results from October 20, 1991 showing that the valves were not working properly were ignored by supervisory personnel.
This was not the decision of a single person, but rather several personnel, including " licensed operators, a shift supervisor, a senior shift supervisor, and a senior l operations engineer." )
So, in summary, according to the inspection team sent in the aftermath of the accident, PSE&G 1) ignored warnings from the NRC that the solenoid valves were troublesome in other plants, 2) ignored the lessons of their own experience with the' valves, 3) failed to follow through on commitments to replace the valves, and 4) ignored test results which showed that the valves in question were not working properly.
With the findings of the inspection team's report, it is inconceivable that the NRC believes no penalty is justified.
The reasons provided for the absence of a penalty are not convincing.
In deciding not to impose any penalties, your agency noted that " corrective actions have been taken or olanned to prevent recurrence of such violations." (emphasis added) To be blunt, I see no basis for confidence in PSE&G's planned future actions in light of their failure to fulfill past commitments related to the valves.
In addition, the unstated amount of penalties was reduced to zero through a series of three "mitigations". The first reduced the unknown penalty by 25 percent because the utility told the NRC, on its own, that a turbine on the roof of_the building-had exploded, showering the facility with metal debris. To suggest that a utility can receive credit for reporting an event that would be impossible to hide is a ludicrous policy.
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Another mitigation redLced the unstated penalty by one-half because of "past pstformance in.the operations area specifically, reduction in personnel errors and overall control room performance...." I cannot fathom the reasoning behind this reduction since personnel errors and operating procedure failures clearly contributed to the explosion. And those errors were not the result of a single decision; they were a series of decisions spread out over several months.
I would also note that this seems to represent a recurrence of a problem cited by the NRC years ago. In a Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) report on Salem's performance in 1988, the report specifically noted "further' improvement in attention to detail ... is needed to reduce the frequency of ... missed surveillance tests."
In addition, a 1989 SALP overview of the Salem's operations found'that " reduced management and supervisory oversight of maintenance activities resulted in laxness in the implementation of the maintenance program....the long-standing nature of the (surveillance] problem and the j inability to promptly correct the problem indicates a weakness in mane.gement attention to this issue."
Based on the AIT report on last November's explosion, it appears this aspect of the plant's operation continued to be problematic. Yet your agency elected to reduce the penalties based on these shortfalls to nothing.
A third reason the penalty was zero was because "although you (Salem] had prior notice of potential problems with the mechanical binding of solenoid valves because of a similar problem at Unit 1 in September, 1990, no adjustment to the civil penalty is warranted because the primary issue involved in this case is the perfermance of the operators, rather than the maintenance of the equipment."
Again, this reasoning is remarkable. In effect, the NRC j
has said that-because Salem kept the plant from disaster and
- put ont the fire -- crucial goals to be sure -- the utility I
did its job. But this completely ignores the point that the explosion and fire could have and should have been prevented by the utility in the first place. Under the agency's reasoning, it is acceptable to court disaster, as long as the disaster does not actually occur. With regard to nuclear energy in particular, this appre s ach cannot improve weak public confidence in this already-troubled technology.
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But beyond the faulty reasoning, as I see it, used to reduce the penalty based on operations performance, I am at a loss to understand why your agency decided to ignore maintenance problems completely. The NRC and PSEEG both knew of problems with the valves. A calculated risk was taken in deferring replacement of the valves until the next scheduled shutdown, and a further risk was incurred when that replacement was pushed back to an even later scheduled shutdown. And yet any penalty related to maintenance of the i plant's equipment is simply swept off the table. I question i whether PSEEG should be so easily exonerated for their maintenance procedures in place leading up to the accident.
As you know, I have advocated an independent safety One reason I continue to board for the NRC for years. ,
advocate such a board is because of decisions like the absence of any penalty after the November accident. The ;
l inspection team process, already flawed in its structure, is turned into a complete sham when its findings are ignored and ;
t no changes are made in the plant or the utility. That is ;
what I fear has happened at Salem. l l In the aftermath of an accident at Salem in 1983, the l NRC planned similar inactions, in effect throwing up their l hands at any meaningful penalties. I managed to convince the l Commissioners at that time that their approach did not pass public muster. After reconsidering their decision, the Commission instead got tough on the utility, imposing the t l largest fine at that time -- $850,000.
One result was a wake-up call to Salem's management that procedures and attitudes had to change, and change they did.
l A few years later, top management had been overhauled, and
! Salem's operating record had improved dramatically.
Unfortunately, it appears that problems have returned.
But.the decision of the NRC to impose no penalty at all does nothing to force management to take another long, hard look at the operations.of the plant. The message of the NRC is that a turbine explosion is no big deal, at least not one big enough to rise to the level of penalties.
The turbine explosion and fire were the result of a breakdown of procedures, operations, training, and commitments at the Sc'.em plant. The NRC's decision to ignore the findings of its .avestigatory team is bad for residents around the Salem plant, and bodes poorly for meaningful follow-up to other accident investigations around the !
country. .
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I One disaster has occurred. It was preventable. I am very concerned that other disasters, also preventable, might be allowed to occur. I urge you to reconsider the NRC's actions to date with regard to Salem.
Sinc el Jo eph R. Biden, Jr.
U ited States Senator n - - -