ML20055F189
| ML20055F189 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 06/27/1990 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20055F187 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9007160055 | |
| Download: ML20055F189 (13) | |
Text
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Jg .*r a NUCLEAR REGULATORY C3MMISSION '
- , s f usMNGTCN D.C. eta 65 L \....f i SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION 1
SUPPORTING AMENDMENT N05. AND TO FACILITY OPERATING i LICENSE NOS. NPF-39 AND NPF-85 I
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY LIMERICK GENERAT1HG STATION. UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-352 AND 50-353
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1 By letter dated November 17,1989, PhiladelphiaElectricCompany(PEcoor the licensee) reouested an amendment to Facility Operating License Nos.
NPF 39 and NPF-85 F r t % Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. <
These proposed amendmenu would change the Technical Specifications (TSs) l for Limerick 1.and 2 to: a) remove surveillance requirement ($R) s.l.3.5.b.2 L (and the associated footnote) which requires Control Rod Drive (CRD) scram accumulator check valve testing once per 18 months and specifies test acceptance criteria, b) modify Limiting Condition for O 3.1.3.5.a.2.a to allow the reactor operator twenty (20)perationminutes to(LCO) restart l I-
" a tripped CRD pump provided that reactor pressure is greater than or equal to 900 psig or if reactor pressure is less than 900 psig, the operator will imediately place the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position and c) change the 18 month scram accumulator pressure sensor' channel calibration (setpoint), SR 4.1.3.5.b.1.b. from "970 plus or minus 15 psig" to " equal to or greater than 955 psig."
2.0 BACKGROUND
Limerick, Unit I was shutdown for the second refueling outage from January 11, 1989 to May 15, 1989. On May 9, 1989, prior to startup, the licensee performed surveillance tests on the control rod drives as required by the TSs.- One of the TS surveillances (4.1.3.5.b.2) specifies that at least once per 18 months each control rod scram accumulator shall be determined operablebymeasurIngandrecordingthetimeforupto10minutesthat .
eAch individual accumulator check valve maintains the associated i accumulator pressure above the alarm set point with no control rod drive pump operating. During the surveillance tests on May 9, 1989 of the 185 CRD accumulator check valves,17 of the check valves did not maintain hydraulic control unit (HCU) accumulator pressure above the low pressure i alarm setpoint of 970 psig for the test time interval of 10 minutes (LER l 1-89-012). The data acoutred from performine this and previous surveillance c
tests of the check valves was not used to make any operability judgements, but was used for trending purposes to schedule preventive maintenance.
During a review of the surveillance test data results on Jur.a B.1989, the ;
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NRC resident inspector cuestioned the station's interpretation of the TS requirement. The inspector's interpretation was that the results of the surveillance tests should te used to determine the operability of the accumulator for the associated HCU rather than trending for maintenance.
(InspectionReports 50-352/89 10, Section 4.1 and 50-352/89-12 with notice ofviolationandPEcoresponseofAugust?9,1989). At the time this was identified, Limerick, Unit I was operating with normal system pressure.
At system pressures above 600 psig, reactor pressure provides adequate energy to insert the control rods without the assistance of the accumu.
lators, so there was no safety issue with respect to the 17 malfunctioning check valves. To resolve the issnediate questinn nf operability, we issued a temporary waiver of compliance on June 9,1969. On June 10, 1989, the licensee requested a change to the TS surveillance requirement on the accumulator check valves to note that the requirement was only applicable when reactor vessel pressure is at or below 600 psig. This change was apprnved by Amendment No. 31 to License No. NPF-39 on July 10,1969. In the application of June 10, 1989, the licertee agreed to review all of the TS serveillance test requirements on the CRD scram accumulators. The TS changes prcpesed in this subject application of November 17, 1989 are the result of the licensee's reassessmert. .
3.0 EVALUATION The licensee is proposing three changes to the TSs as described in the introductory paragraph above. Our evaluation of the changes is sumarized below. The CPD system is described in Section 4.6.1 of the Limerick Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). For each control rod, there is a hydraulic control unit (HCU). The PCU package includes two vertical cylinders, a serem water accumulator ard a scram accumulator nitrogen cylinder. The latter is pressurizet from a nitrogen charging beeder. As stated in the FSAR, the scram accumulater stores sufficient energy to fully insert a control rod at lower reactor pressures. At higher vessel pressures, the accumulator pressure is supplantet by reactor vessel pressure. The accumulator is a hydraulic cylincer with a free-floating pisten. The piston separates the water on the top fror'the nitrogen below. A check valve in the accumulator charging lire is intended to prevent loss of water pressure in the accumulator if supply pressure is lost. The check valve is located above the twn eccumulaters as shown in the attached Figure 4.6-8 from the FSAR. The performance of t,hese check valves is the focus of this safety evaluation.
Curing normal plant operation, one CRD supply pump is operating at all times and the other pump is maintained in standby. The operating pump mtintains the required pressure in all 185 control rod scram accumulators such that the accumulators contain sufficiert stored energy to ensure the complete insertion of all control rods in the required time at any reactor pressure. However, when reactor pressure is close to, or at fuP operating pressure, reactor pressure alone will insert the control rods in the recuired time. The storec energy in the accumulators may assist in
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. 3 i accelerating the control rods initially, but this assistance is not necessary to ensure a successful scram, in fact, reactor pressure alone is sufficient to fully insert all the control rods at a reactor pressure as low as 600 psig.
1 At a reactor pressure of less than 600 psig, reactor pressure alone may I not be sufficient to fully insert all the control rods in the required l time.. Therefore, the scram accumulators must contain sufficient stored energy to ensure a complete scram under these conditions. With a supply pump operating, accumulator pressure is maintained and a successful scram is assured. However, assuming that the charging pressure from the supply i pump is lost, the accumulators alone must retain sufficient eneroy to complete a scram upon demand. The ball check valves in the accumulator charoing lines will prevent a rapid loss of accumulator pressure when the suppiy pump is lost, if the balls properly seat, l
l SR.4.1.3.5.b.2. which the licensee is preposing to delete, presently i l reouires measuring and recording the time for up to 10 minutes that each l indivHual CRD scram accumulator ball. check valve maintains the associated accumulator pressure above the alarm set point with no contrel rod drive pump operating.
As'part of our evaluation the staff has reviewed the requirements on the CRD hydraulic system in the TS for all domestic BWRs, including surveillance ;
requirements on the pumps, valves and instrumentation. There are 38 '
operating PWFs in this country 19 of which have " custom" T5s and 19 with 1 some version of the "BWR Standard TSs."
l l Wone of the older BWRs have a similar requirement in the T$s for testing the check valves. This includes Big Rock Point. Brunswick 1 and 2 Cooper. Dresden 2 and 3 Duane Arnold, Fitzpatrick, Hatch 1 and 2, la$alle 1 and 2. Milestone 1. Monticello. Nine Mile Point 1. Oyster Creek, Peach Bottom 2 and 3. Pilgrim. Quad cities 1 and 2. Vermont Yankee, and Browns l Ferry 1. 2, and 3.
In the late 1970's, and early 1980s, the staff was giving increased attention to CRD hydraulic systems in NTOL reviews due to cracking detected in some CRD return line nozzles (NUREG.0619, "BWR Feedwater Nozzle and Control Rod Drive Return line Nozzle Crack kg." November 1980),
the
("BWR failure Scram ofDischarge half of the control System Safety rodsEvaluation."
to scram at Browns1,1980 December Ferry.) , Unit 3 assessment of whether there would be adeounte flow if the CRD hydraulic system was the only available emergency high-pressure water source to the core as was the case during part of the Browns Ferry, Unit 1 fire and several-incidents at operating BWRs during which both the CRD pumps became temporarily disabled. Revision 3 to NUREG.0123 " Standard Technical Specifications for General Electric Boiling Water Reactors (BWR/5).
issued Fall 1980, included as Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.5.b.2:
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- Verifying that the accumulator pressure (and level) remains above the alarm set point (s) for greater than or equal to 20 minutes with no control rod drive pump operating."
LaSalle Unit 1, was the first SWR to be licensed after the accident at TM1 2. As discussed in the staff's SER on LaSalle (NUREG 0519), there were several results from the preoperational testing that focused the staff's attention on the CRD hydraulic system. For LaSalle, General Electric calculated a flow rate of 180 gpm would be required to keep the core covered assuming loss of all other makeup systems to the vessel 40 minutes after shutdown. The app'iicant performed a preoperational CRD flow test and the test results indicated that the actual makeup capability was only 128 gpm, which was insufficient to meet the 180 gpm minimum recommendation of NUREA-0619. The staff recommended that the LaSalle TSs include the above surveillance requirement to verify that the accumulator pressure and level would remain above the alarm set points for at least 20 minutes with no CRD pump operation. Preoperational tests by the applicat:t also determined that, because of check valve leakage, accumulator deptessurization below the alarm set point could occur within three minutes. 4 discussed in Supplement 2 to the staff's SER ($$tt 2 to NUREG-0519) the applicant proposed an alternative to the surveillance requirement on the <ccumulator check valves. The applicant proposec installation, prior Jo startup after the first refueling outage, of an automatic reactor trip that would scram the control rods in the event of low control red drive pump discharge pressure.- The trip would be activated during startup and refueling modes only. The staff concluded that this proposal was acceptable, since the accumulators are only needed at lower reactor pressures. However, the staff's position was that the surveillance requirement on the accumulator check valves should remain in the TSs until the modifications were completed. Thus, LaSalle Unit I was the first EWR to include a surveillance requirement on the accumulator check valves. The requirement to test the valves for up to 20 minutes was, however, deleted. The same surveillance requirement for testing the accumulator check valve was also incorporated in the LaSalle, Unit 2 TSs when it was licensed. The reactor scram on low CRD pump discharge pressure modifications were subsecuently completed for both LaSalle Units
. I and 2. The surveillance requirement on the accumulator check valves was deleted from the Unit 2 TSs by Amendment No. 6 to License No. NPF-1B on December 17, 1984 and was deleted from the Unit 1 TSs by Amendment No.
33 to License No. NPF 11 on February 4, 1986.
The surveillance requirement on the accumulator check valves was included in TSs for those EWRs licensed after LaSalle, Unit 1 in 1982,1983,1984, and 1985. The plants included SusQuehanna Unit I which was issued a full power license on November 12, 1982 through Limerick, Unit 1 and River Bend, which were issued full power licenses on August 8. 1985 and November 1985, respectively. For all of these plants, the TSs required holding the pressure above the alarm set point for up to 10 minutes. The 10 minutes was the estimated time it would take to startup the standby CRD pump if the operating pump failed.
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1 As a result of the WTOL review for LaSalle, Unit 1. the staff initiated Generic issue No. 98 - CRD Accumulator Check Valve Leakage. The issue '
was not actively pursued. By memorandum dated August 13, 1984'from the ;
Chief. Auxiliary 5ystems Branch to the Chief, safety Program Evaluation i
tranch, the latter was requested to prioritize the issue. On February 19, 1985, the Director, NRR approved ' Dropping' this generic issue. The memorandum and evaluation supporting this action are enclosed to this safety evaluation. According to the staff who were involved in this assessment, the resolution of generic issue no. 98 was to have been the '
basis for removing the surveillance recuirement on the accumulator check valves from the T5s. On this basis., Hope Creek, Perry and Clinton, which -
were issued full power licenses on July 25, 1986 November 13, 1986, and ,
April 17,19B7, respectively, do not have the surveillance requirement '
on the check valves in their T$s. The recuirement is in the Limerick, Unit 2 T5s since the criteria was to have identical T5s for Units 1 and 2 insofar as possible.
Although the enclosed evaluation provides justification for removing the .
surveillance requirement on the accumulator check valves from the T5s.
the staff has performed a supplemental evaluation. As a result of these evaluations, the staff is proposing that the surveillance requirement be removed from the other 8 operating BWRs that have this requirement as part of the TS improvement Program.
Removal of SR 4.1.3.5.b.2 does not eliminate testing and maintenance of the scram accumulator check valves. Surveillance reovirement 4.0.5 in the T$s requires that inservice testing (IST) of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 pumps and valves shall be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code. The 15T program requires a reverse flow surveillance test of the scram accumulator check valves once per calender quarter if the plant is in Cold Shutdown. As a minimum, this requires testing of the check valves at least during every refueling outage (i.e., 18 monthsi. To verify that the ball check valves will properly seat, the supply pump is secured, the charging water header is depressurized and the accumulator pressure and low pressure alarms are monitored to verify that the valves have closed (are on their seats) on loss of pump flow. The IST test requires that the check valves maintain the pressure above the low pressure alarm setpoint for about 30 seconds whereas the surveillance requirement being deleted recuired maintaining the pressure for 10 minutes. The IST program demonstrates that the scram accumulator check valves are operable and are functioning. The IST program is the basic requirement that ensures the all valves in safety.
related systems (including the scram accumulator check valves) are periodically tested, that identifies the need for maintenance, that demonstrates that the valves are installed properly and function as intended and that requires retesting following maintenance. The present surveillance requirement on the check valves which is being deleted is in addition to the tests performed on the same check valves by the IST program. Therefore, testing and operation of the scram accumulator check valves will continue to be demonstrated by the TS required IST program. !
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l The only difference between the two tests is that the SR assesses the leak tightness of the accumulator check valves for 10 minutes whereas the 1
15T test interval is about 30 seconds. The bases for the 30 seconds could not be determined. It was beyond the scope of the evaluation to :
determine what percentage of check valves in tWRs pass the 1$T testing but not the 10 minute leak test. While it is suspected that dirt may be one of the reasons some ball. check valves do not tightly seat, the staff did not review maintenance records to assess whether corrosion ard pitting may also be factors.
The CRD hydraulic system is described in Section 4.6.1.2.4 of the F$AR.
A very simplified drawing of the overall system. Figure 214 from the Gen,'ral Electric BWR Technology Manual, is attached. The CRD hydraulic ;
systein supplies and controls the pressure and flow to and from the drives through the HCUs. There is a HCU for each of the 185 control rods. Two drive water supply pumps pressurize the system with water from the condensate j
treatment system and/or condensate storage tank. Normally, only one supply p pump is operating with the other on standby. The supply pump maintains a nominal 1400 to 1500 psig in the charging water header. (The pressure is monitored in the control room and can range from about 1250 psig to 1510 psig.) As long as a supply pump is operating, the accumulators are not needed even at low reactor pressure, since the pump maintains the pressure upstream of the check valves discussed above. Thus, the leak tightness of :
the CR0 scram accumulator check valves is not a safety concern as long as '
one drive water supply pump is operating.
As discussed in the FSAR, at system pressures above 600 psig, reactor -
pressure provides adequate energy to insert the control rods without the assistance of the accumulators. Thus, during normal operation, the leak-tightness of the scram accumulator check valves is not a concern, since ,
the scram accumulators are not necessary to safely shutdown the plant.
Reactor pressure in excess of 600 ps',g is sufficient to fully insert a r control rod with a failed check valve. At 600 psig reactor pressure, the :
scram insertion time of an individual control rod with zero accumulator !
pressure would be within TS and design basis requirements. Also, the average scram time for all drives would continue to meet design require.
ments. Therefore, failure of an accumulator or accumulator check valve -
is not significant with respect to the ability to shut down the plant "
during normal operating conditions. If there were a loss of reactor pr, essure, the isolation actuation instrumentation would initiate a scram ,
before the pressure dropped to 600 psig due to MSIV closure (756 psig trip setpoint). Below 600 psig, the nitrogen accumulator would provide - i adeounte pressure to scram a control rod even if the charging water pressure was reduced and the check valve did not retain water pressure in the accumulator.
One of the other postuleted scenarios evaluated by the staff was loss of .
the operating CRD charging pump during startup when the reactor pressure is below 600 psig. As discussed previously, the nitrogen pressure in the accurulator is adequate to scram a control red even if the check valve is
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q L not holding and pressure in the header bleeds'down. Below 600 psig, the i
reactor is critical but all heat is being used to build up pressure. The 3 ftS1Vs cannot be opened to start warming up the steam linen until pressure is above-the 756 psig trip setpoint. If a CR0 pump were to fail during startup, the plant would be shutdown to repair.it. The check valves wculd not have to retain pressure in the accumulators for any significant
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length of ;ime to make the reactor suberitical.
With the assistance of the.NRC resident inspectors, the Limerick regulatory '
p' engineers and the Limerick CRD system engineer, the staff evaluated the- '!
w era 11 operation, maintenance and testing of the CRD hydraulic systems at l
Limerick. One werable CRD water supply pump maintains sufficient charging. ~
b water pressure to scram the control rods under all conditions, irrespective L
Le of whether the accumulator check valve functions es intended. Limerick is t
- one of the minority of plants that has TS requirements ca the CRD pumps.
The TSs for-most BWRs have no operability or surveillance requirements on the CRD~ pumps. This is the case for Big Rock Point, Browns Ferry 1, 2,
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and 3, Brunswick 1 and 2. Cooper, Dresden 2 and 3, Duane Arnold, Fitzpatrick, b,
Hatch 1 and 2. Millstone 1, Monticello, Nine Mile point 1, Oyster Creek, oeach Bottom 2 and 3, Pilgrim, Quad Cities 1 and 2, and Vermont Yankee.
The pressure in the charging water header is shown in the control room from pressure indicating switch 46-1N600. The operators are alerted if there is a trip of the CRD pump or charging water low pressure. The operators..are also alerted if the pressure in any of the accumulators were g L
to drop below the alarm setpoint. This cannot occur as long as the CRD l pump is operating and pressure is maintained in the charging water header, j _There is a pressure switch in the charging water line to each accumulator
,, down:tream of the check valve, located adjact ' to the instrumentation L block at the base of the HCU. (See attached N r= 1 from the 1&C surveillance b,
E test procedure.) The alarm setpoint is listed in Section 4.1.3.5.b. of
-the TSs. One of the proposed changes is-to decrease the alarm setpoint from 970 to 955 psig. The functional and calibration requirements on-7"m these pressure switches are also specified.in the same section of the TSS.
These .TS requirements are implemented by Surveillance Test Procedures ST-2-047-400, Rev. 5. " Control Rod Drive Scram Accumulator Level and-Pressure Detector Calibration / Functional Test." If the operating CRD I; charging-pump was lost (which has not occurred at Limerick), there could L be a reduction in pressure in the charging water header during the time it t.akes the operators to' manually start the standby pump, if an accumulator check vahe was not fully seated, pressure in the accumulator could bleed L
L down. As soon as pressure in the accumulator reached 955 psig (in the coposed TSs), this would alarm in the control room. When a HCU
!- accumulator alarm condition occurs (either a low N, bottle or a high N water. level), the Main Control Room (MCR) reactor operators receive a ,
flashing accumulator trouble alarm indication on the Full Core Display panel in the MCR for the specific HCU (panel *00600). The reactor y operator must examine the Full Core Display to identify the specific HCU ;
accumulator thct is in alarm. Ary alarmed accumulator trouble alarm on 1
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!thEFull.CoreDisplaywillflashuntilthereactoroperatoracknowledges the alarm on:a' specific accumulator trouble alarm acknowledge button on the reactor console (panel *006031. This alarm condition 1s accompanied by an audible and flashing. annunciator alarm " Accumulator Trouble," in the MCR. The Reacter Operator must acknowledge the alarm on a general annunciator acknowledge button to silence the alarm noise and stop the flashing alern window. If a-second HCU accumulator alarm is received
-after the first alarm is acknowledged, the annunciator re-alarms and the operator must again acknowledge the alarm to silence the alarm noise and stop the flashing alarm window. The second HCU. accumulator trouble alarm also flashes on-the Full Core Display. This sequence is the same for multiple HCU accumulator alarms.
Therefore, adequate MCR indication exists for the operator to be alerted te multiple HCU accumulatnr trouble alarms.
The proposed TSs require that if more than one accumulator is inoperable and if no CRD pump is operating and if reactor pressure is less than 900. psig, the reactor mode switch is to be placed ,in the shutdown position.
Based on cur evaluation, the staff concludes that 1) the IST program will demonstrate that the CRD accumulator check valves are operable and that they are not leaking at an excessive rate and 2) the present surveillance reovirement for leak-testing the check valves for up to 10 minutes is not-necessary and can be deleted.
The second of the three TS changes requested by the licensee was to change the 18 month scram accumulator pressure sensor channel calibration (setpoint),
SR a.1.3.5.b.1'.b. from "970 plus or minus 15 psig" to " equal to or greater.
than 955 psig." A number of TS violations have occurred at operating nuclear 'o~
powet plants due to setpoint drift of the nitrogen accumulator As a result, General Electric Service Information Letter-($1L) pressure. sensors..
429, Revision 1, "HCU Accumulator Fressure Switches," issued January 18, 1988, recomends lowering the icw nitrogen pressure alarm setpoint of the scram accumulators to equal to or greater than 940 psig. This recomendation is-intended to
- maintain the validity of the alarm setpoint while reducing the risk of a TS violation which could occur due to setpoint drift. General Electric performeo a safety assessment to support the SIL and concluded that the slightly icwer setpoint still providad adequate notification to the MCR operators of loss of pressure in the accumulators. PEco has determined that GE SIL 429. Rev. 1 is applicable to Limerick, although they have not experienced a TS violation due to setpoint drift of the pressure sensor for the low nitrogen pressure alarm. The licensee is proposing-a TS change consistent with the intent of the GE SIL. However, the change they are proposirp is more conservative than the change recomended by GE in that the proposed alarm setpoint is equal to or greater than 955 psig.
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All BWRs have pressure and level alarms for each accumulator but most BWRs do not list the pressure setpoint limit in the TSs. Of the 14 BWRs other m' _
than Limerick that do list =the limit in the TSs, 10.have the 940 psig limit. recommended by GE. The 955 psig slerm setpoint proposed by Deco is~more conservative than that recommended by GE since it will result-in earlier detection'of decreasing pressure. The proposed change to the pressure sensor channel calibration is acceptable.
The third change to the TSs requested by the licensee was to modify LCO 3.1.3.5.a.2.a to allow the reactor operator twenty -(20) minutes to restart a-tripped CRD pump provided that reactor pressure is greater than or equal to 900 psig, if reactor pressure is less-than 900 psig the
.i- operator will imediately place the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position. As discussed previously, there are two CRD pumps, one of which c is operating and the other of which is on standby. The CRD pumps are located on the 201' elevation of the turbine building to have a positive suctien head from the condensate storage tanks located at ground level.
The_switchover from one pump to another is not automatic. An operator has to reposition various valves and manually start the standby-unit. Because 1
of the high reliability of the CRD pumps in BWRs, an automatic transfer arrangement has not been considered to be warranted. Limerick is one of the minority of TWRs that has an operability requirement for the CRD pumps-in the TSs. Twenty-t ber BWRs have no requirement.to.have an operable CRD' pump, even if a number of accumulators have been determined to be inoperable.
The.TS change proposed by the licensee is the.same as that approved for Fermi ?, Hope Creek and Perry. As discussed previously, at reactor pressures above 600 psip, system pressure alone is sufficient to scram the control rods. Having an operable CRD pump to' maintain pressure in the charging water header is not a significant safety concern while the plant is operating. The operators in the control room are immediately alerted if the operating CRD pump trips and/or if there is lowlpressure in the charging water system. With reactor pressure greater than 900 psig, the allowance of 20 minutes to restart a CRD pump is not unreasonable
'and is the time approved for three other PWRs. The proposal to trip the reactor if pressure is less than 900 psig and if no CRD pump is_in operation and there is more than one-inoperable accumulator is a-conservative
' reaction. The staff finds the proposed changes to the TSs acceptable.
4.0 ENV100NMENTAL -CONSIDEPATION-These amendments involve a change to a re:;uirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted-area as defined in 10 CFR part 20 and changes to the surveillance re W e-ments. The staff has determined that these amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluer.ts that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.-
The Comnission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public
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coment on such findire. Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility i criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to-10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement nor environ.
mental assessment need be prepared _in connection with the issuance of ,
these amendments.-
'5 0 CONCLUSION The Comission made a proposed determination that these amendments-involve h no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal' '
-Reo4 '"e (54 FR 51258) on December 13, 1989 and consulted with the.
foiE E L ith of Pennsylvania. No public coments were received and the i Comokmith of Pennsylvania did not have any coments.
p The staff has.conclu60d, based on the e0nsiderations discussed above, I L that: (11 there-is rea>0nable assurance that.the health and safdty of the L public will not be endangei*d by operation in the proposed manner. and L (2) such activities will be onducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations'and the issuance of these amendments will not-be inimical to ,.
the comon defense and the security nor to the health and safety of the y ,
public.
Dated:
Princical Contributors:
.NRC 1
Perb Williams, Reactor Engineer. R1 Larry Scholl. Resident inspector.
j!
Ron Ecrit, Generic issues. RES l Deco F Johnson. Licensing Engineer Dave _Neff, Cegulatory Engineer Mark Fuehrer, CRC System Engineer I
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