ML20150F950

Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 840803 & 870922 Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 3.1.1,3.1.2,3.2.1 & 3.2.2 Re post-maint Testing of All safety-related Components

ML20150F950
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	07/12/1988
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20150F943	List: ML20150F940 ML20150F950
References
GL-83-28, NUDOCS 8807190145
Download: ML20150F950 (2)

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UNITED STATES

! n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 WASHINGTON, b. C. 20555 7, t j

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OFFICE _0F NUCLEAR REA_CTOR REGULATION RELATED TO GENERIC LETTER 83-28 ITEMS 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, AND 3.2.2 POST MAINTENANCE TESTING (ALL SAFETY-RELATED COMPONENTS)

RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1 DOCKET N0: 50-458

1. _I_NTRODUCTION On February 25, 1983, both the scram circuit breakers at Unit I of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant failed to open upon an automatic reactor trip signal from the reactor protection system. This incident occurred during the plant startup, and the reactor was tripped manually by the operator about 30 seconds after the initiation of the automatic trip signal. The failure of the circuit breakers has been determined to be related to the sticking of the undervoltage trip attachment. Prior to this incident, on February 22, 1983, at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Plant, an automatic trip signal was generated based on steam generator low-low level during plant startup. In this event, scram circuit breakers also failed to open upon an automatic reactor trip signal. In this case, the reactor was tripped manually by the operator almost coincidentally with the automatic trip.

Following these incidents, on February 28, 1983, the NPC Executive Director for Operations (ED0), directed the staff to investigate and report on the generic implications of these occurrences at Unit 1 of Salem Nuclear Power Plant. The results of the staff's inquiry into the generic I implications of the Salem unit incidents are reported in NUREG-1000, "Generic Irrplications of ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant."

As a result of this investigation, the Commission requested (by Generic Letter 83-28 dated July 8, 1983) all licensees of operating reactors, applicants for an operating license, and holders of construction permits to respond to certain generic concerns. These concerns were categorized .

into four areas: (1) Post-Trip Review, (2) Equipment Classification and i Vendor Interface, (3) Post-Maintenance Testing, and (4) Reactor Trip  !

System (RTS) Reliability Improvements.

The third action item, Post-Maintenance Testing, consists of Action Items 3.1 and 3.2. This safety evaluation report (SER) addresses Action Items 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, and 3.2.2, "Post-Maintenance Testing (All Safety-Related Components)". The NRC staff's March 26, 1987 letter previously found that Gulf States Utilities' response to Items 3.1.3 and 3.2.3 were acceptable.  ;

II. REVIEW GUIDELINES This evaluation of the utility response was conducted using NRR review I guidelines which state:

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t a. The licensee shall submit a statement indicating that it has reviewed plant test and maintenance procedures and Technical Specifications to assure that post-maintenance operability testing of all safety-related components is required.

b. The licensee's statement should contain a verification that vendor recommended test guidance has been reviewed, evaluated, and where appropriate, included in the test and maintenance procedures or the Technical Specifications,

c. An unambiguous commitment should be obtained from each licensee that post-maintenance testing will verify component capability to perform all safety functions.

III. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION By letters dated August 3, 1984, and September 22, 1987, the licensee provided information regarding post-maintenance of safety-related components. During a telephone call on June 16, 1988, Messrs. D. N.

Lorfing, Senior Licensing Engineer, and R. J. King, Licensing Supervisor, provided clarification of statements made in the submittal.

The licensee stated that components of the Reactor Trip System and other safety-related components are required (as a minimum) to be demonstrated operable by performance of the applicSole Surveillence Test Procedures (s),

as required by Technical Specifications (TS). For control of corrective and preventative maintenance conducted on safety-related equipment not in the TS, post-maintenance checkouts such as Post-Maintenance Surveillance, or Functional Tests are performed as specified in Maintenance Work Requests.

The licensee has an ongoing review program, prescribed by a procedure, which ensures that any appropriate test guidance (as a result of vendor or engineering recommendations) is included in maintenance procedures or TS.

The procedure provides a uniform, systematic method for the review of documents which are generated offsite. The status of each review, through engineering and other applicable departments, is tracked until all required corrective actions are completed.

Administrative Procedures are provided to control and to document that post-maintenance operability testing ( any prescribed method of functional testing after maintenance is conducted) of safety-related components is conducted to assure they are operable and will perform all safety functions before being returned to service.

Based on our review, the staff concludes that post-maintenance testing of all safety-related components at River Bend Station, Unit I meets the review guidelines and is acceptable.

Principal NRC Contributor: G. Pick Date: July 12,1988 l