ML20054M760
| ML20054M760 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/12/1982 |
| From: | Sedky C KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8207140376 | |
| Download: ML20054M760 (25) | |
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00CMETE0 UiMC e
e2 J'1? P137 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION "
6 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
)
In the Matter of )
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Do-:ket No. 50-322 0.L.
) (Emergency Planning (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) Proceedings)
Unit 1)
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I RESPONSE OF SUFFOLK COUNTY TO OBJECTIONS OF LILCO AND OF NRC STAFF TO FIRST AMENDED CONSOLIDATED EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS Pursuant to the Board's Order of April 20, 1982 and 10 C.F.R. S2.714, Suffolk County, the Shoreham Opponents Coalition (SOC) and the North Shore Committee Against Nuclear and Thermal Pollution (NSC) filed their First Amended Consolidated Contentions on July 6, 1982. A substantially final draft of such contentions was furnished in advance to LILCO and to the NRC Staff (the " Staff"). These parties have furnished Suffolk County with their proposed objections to the consolidated con-tentions.
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The Staf f objected on various substantive grounds to con-tentions EP 1, EP 3, EP 8, EP 13, EP 14 (in part) , EP 17, EP 21,1/ EP 22, EP 23, EP 24, EP 26, and EP 27.2/ LILCO objected on substantive grounds to EP 1, EP2 G, EP SB(1), EP 8 B, EP 26 and EP 27. LILCO also filed non-substantive objections to various other contentions which, LILCO suggests, ought to be consolidated as one or more separate contentions. We will address below each of the contentions as to which substantive objections were made. We will address, separately, the desira-bility of making the format changes sought to be imposed on the County by LILCO.
A. The Substantive Objections Objections to EP 1. Both the Staff and LILCO object to EP 1 on the ground that the County has allegedly failed to show how or why local conditions within Long Island are rele-vant to the formulation of an adequate emergency response plan by LILCO. There is no assertion by either party that the con-tention fails to apprise them of what the County seeks to 1/ EP 21 is a SOC contention and SOC will, presumably, file its own response.
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-2/ LILCO also objected to "NSC 1 (EP)(1)" and "NSC 2(EP)(1)",
both of which are now included in EP 20 of the consolida-ted contentions. These two items are NSC contentions and NSC will, presumably, file its own response.
litigate. Instead, both parties appear to disagree with the premise underlying Suffolk County's contention EP 1: namely, that LILCO, as the nuclear facility licensee having.one of the
" primary responsibilities for emergency response,"[10 C.F.R.
550.47(b)(1)] should, in formulating its emergency response plan, take into account such real world conditions as (i) where people live; (ii) where people work; ( iii) what kinds of shel-ter people have (taking single-story frame houses and multi-story brick condominiums as opposite ends of the spec-trum); (iv) what people are told about an emergency; (v) who tells them; (vi) how people will actually respond to notifica-tion of an emergency; (vii) how such factors as geography, to-pography, and weather conditions will impact how people actually do what they decide to do af ter hearing of a nuclear accident; and (viii) what physical access, and ease of access, people will actually have to roads, bridges, transportation f acilities and other means of ingress and egress.
Fundamentally, EP 1 contends that LILCO f ailed to take l
real life local conditions into account in formulating its own plan. If LILCO disagrees with contention EP 1 and believes that local conditions have been taken into account, the condi-l tions it considered and the means by which the plan accounts for such conditions is a litigable issue over which reasonable I persons may differ. Conversely, if LILCO maintains that it can l
ignore any or all of the real world conditions in the formulation of its plan, that issue, too, is susceptible to resolution af ter an evidentiary record is established from which a determination can be mad'e as to (a) what local condi-tions af f ect the adequacy of the plan and how they affect it; and (b) whether the plan adequately accounts for those condi-tions. These are questions of proof, however, and have no bearing on the question now before the Board: namely, whether EP 1 fairly apprises LILCO, the Staff, and the Board as to what the County seeks to litigate. Suffolk County submits that EP 1 meets that standard.
The Commision, in adopting the planning criteria of 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b), " concluded that adequate emergency prepared-ness is an essential aspect of the protection of the public i
health and safety." 45 Fed. Reg. 55404 (1980). No responsible planner would dispute that the whole point of emergency plan-ning is to plan for humans. Clearly, consideration of likely human behavior and responses is relevant, if not vital, to the development of a plan designed to protect the public. Human behavior and response to emergencies are a function of where the af f ected persons reside, their response options, their ac-j tual and perceived responsibilities to others, their education and knowledge of facts relevant to the emergency, their socio-economic level, their perception of danger to themselves and
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1 others, their familiai relationships, their attitudes toward nuclear power and the particular plant in question, their per-ception of the credibility of the source of emergency informa-tion, and their tendency to follow others' behavior. To ig nore these factors, and to plan instead in a vacuum, produces only a paper plan at best, not one that is impl emen table , and 10 C.F.R. 550.47(a)(2) requires a finding by the NRC that each plan be " capable of being impl emen ta ted . "
Contrary to the Staf f's assertion, accounting for local conditions would not " require a f ar reaching search for every local condition or population characteristic which may present some minute impediment to an emergency response." (Staff Objections, 1, emphasis added). This proceeding has no place for such hyperbole. The County does not seek the impo es ible .
It seeks only that ostensibly responsible organizations such as LILCO and the NRC Staff take the matter seriously in order to assure that local conditions which have a bearing on LILCO's and the Staf f's obligations be evaluated and taken into account. A few examples should suffice to demonstrate the County's point:
- 1. The Staff states that EP 1 presents "no basis why local building materials should be considered in recommending that sheltering be the protective action." The County respectfully suggests that the basis for such a contention is s el f-ev id ent : a recommendation that people stay in their houses if they live in structures that furnish little or no protection from radiation would clearly be unreasonable.
- 2. The protective action recommendations of LILCO, as required by 10 C.F.R. S50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654, Item J, are meaningless unless LILCO has ascertained how people are likely to respond to news of an emergency. One would think that the Three Mile Island experience demonstrated that point rather dramatically. If people are going to evacuate irrespective of what they are asked to do, then LILCO has an obligation, the County contends, to tailor its protective action recommenda-tions to the best possible local information on how people are likely to respond. Similarly, demographic, topographical, and geographical conditions are of critical importance in recom-mending protective actions -- particularly in Long Island, whose shape prevents radial dispersion and whose residents in the East End communities are severely constrained in evacuation al terna tives . If it is indicated that large numbers of the public will voluntarily evacuate upon first notice of an emer-gency, then, at a very minimum, public education and informa-tion programs must be developed and implemented so as to deal with the significant consequences and implications of this fact.
- 3. Local conditions are also of critical importance to LILCO's obligation to furnish evacuation time estimates as re-quired by 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, and NUREG 0654, Item J8. These estimates would clearly be af fected by (a) an un-timely voluntary evacuation of persons that disrupt the opti-mum evacuation routes and schedules; (b) topography, demogra-phy, weather conditions, and geography; and (c) such real world phenomena as traffic congestion on main arteries, feeder roads, and residential streets and drive, ways. Again, this is espe-cially true in the case of Long Island, which is a narrow strip I l
of land having limited transportation arteries, where the likely flow of human masses will be heading only in one direc-tion -- to the West -- and where bottlenecks on main arteries or feeder roads may cause a virtual gridlock effect on vehicu-lar traffic.
- 4. Additionally, how people actually perceive emergency ins truc tio ns , notices, and dangers, not to mention the credibi-lity of the source of the information, must be evaluated and accounted for in LILCO's planning for public education and no-tification. See 10 C.F.R. S50.47(b)(5) and (7) and Appendix E IV D(2) and (3); NUREG 0654 Items E and G. Thus, for exam-ple, it is essential that public information and education be keyed to minimizing the spread of rumors during an emergency; that sirens be where people likely to respond are located; and that signs be placed in such places and with such content that they actually help people to prepare for and respond to an emergency.
- 5. Even such characteristics of LILCO's plan as accident assessment and monitoring are affected by local conditions which LILCO and the Staff have shied away from considering.
Topography, geography, demography and likely traf fic conditions '
will all necessarily af f ect the ability of LILCO's monitoring teams to reach the monitoring points selected. The probability that very large numbers of persons will be sitting in unprece-dented traf fic jams should also be evaluated in considering whether additional or alternative methods such as mobile moni-toring (e.g., by helicopter teams) should be undertaken.
The Staff has casually discounted the effects of local conditions on LILCO's plan with the blithe statement that they "more properly relate to coordination with the County's plan."
In so doing, the Staf f's objection misses the point. EP 1 addresses LILCO's plan. The fact that local conditions will
- have to be accounted for in the " coordination" of the onsite and offsite plans is not relevant here. The point here is that the local conditions, which obviously are the same for LILCO and the County, must be a part of LILCO's plan.
Objections to EP 2(G). Although the Staff was evidently able to understand what the County seeks to litigate in conten-tion EP 2(G), LILCO claims that the contention does not " define precisely what large population groups are located outside the 10 mile zone, and precisely where those groups are located."
(LILCO Objections, 10). Coming from the proponent of an emer-gency plan designed to protect the public, and the utility selling electricity for decades to the population of Suffolk County, LILCO's claimed ignorance of what population the County is talking about is simply astonishing. Indeed, LILCO's ignor-ance of how Long Island's population is distributed is further -
evidence of its failure to account for local conditions af f ect-ing LILCO's obligations under the Commission's regulations.
In any event,, the thrust of contention 2(G) is unequivo-cal: Suffolk County contends that siren coverage (assuming, arguendo, that sirens are the appropriate notification device) must extend to populations which are contiguous to LILCO's 10-mile radius. The exact boundary at which it would be rea-sonable to conclude th'at siren coverage (or other notifica-tion) would not be necessary is something for LILCO to propose after it has first determined the demography and needs of the vicinity.
Objections to EP 3A. The Staff notes that it is confused by the thrust of this contention. The County suggests that the Staff's confusion stems from its selective recital of the authority upon which the contention rests. Admittedly, 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, Items IV E 5 through 7 describe provisions for handling onsite contaminated individuals; howe-s ver, 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(12) and NUREG 0654, Item M, also cited by EP 3A (but ignored by the Staf f) are not as restrictive. '
Rather, the latter provisions require that each response organ-ization arrange for adequate medical f acilities for treatment of contaminated individuals, with no distinction as to whether the casualties to be treated were sustained onsite or offsite.
Nowhere in the regulations is the applicant's responsibility for assuring adequate medical tr ea tmen t in the event of a radi-ological emergency restricted to onsite casualties. ,
Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that the regulations are '
so res trictive, the contention obviously states that LILCO has not adequately provided for treatment of personnel injured onsite. Therefore, the Staff's objection is without merit.
Objection to EP 5B(1). LILCO objects to this contertion _
1 on the basis that the County has failed to identify the " parti-cular local condition it alleges LILCO must consider" in eva-cuation time estimates. The County believes tha its response to this objection is uncompassed within the discussion which j relates to EP 1.
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Objection to EP 88. The Staff objects to EP 8 which as-serts that LILCO's public education program is deficient in the absence of an evaluation of the social and psychological pro-file d! (i.e. , characteristics) of the residents of Suffolk County. Without belaboring the points made in response to LILCO's and the Staf f's objecticins to EP 1, it is inconceivable that one would propose an educational program without consider-ing the charact9tistics of the individuals to be educated; the current state of knowledge of such persons; whether they have pertinent predispositions or bias; potential impediments to ef f ective education; whether certain groups might need special education; and other considerations that would influence the effectiveness of an education program. Furthermore, the County believes that LILCO must consider whether, in the event of a radiological emergency, individuals would be likely to behave in a manner obstructive of an ef fective emergency response.
Without knowing how the population is likely to behave, LILCO cannot tailor its education program to meet potential indivi-dual or group behavior which is counterproductive to the welfare of the population as a whole.
3/ In noting that LILCO has failed to recognize the " social and psychological profile of Suffolk County residents,"
the County means that LILCO has ignored, in developing its plan, those social, socio-economic, psychological and other such characteristics that may affect the behavior of Suf folk County's residents in the event of a radiological emergency.
Contrary to the Staff's assertion, the County does not seek an evaluation of the social and psychological characteris-tics of the population that will absolutely assure that emer-gency information is understood and will be responded to.
Rather, the County contends that such characteristics should b. '
considered to convert LILCO's education program from a mere mechanical response to a regulatory requirement into a meaning-ful program which meets the real world characteristics of Suffolk County's residents. The question is not a search for absolute assurances, as the Staff suggests, but rather for the ascertainment of.the best reliable data upon which planning for public education can proceed.
Objection to EP 13. The first part of EP 13 states in essence that LILCO has failed to develop a notification system that is consistent with the emergency classification and action level scheme set forth in NUREG 0654, Appendix 1. The Staff objects that the contention lacks specificity in that the County does not assert precisely where the inconsistencies lie.
The short answer to this objection is that the county is not oblig ated to search for and identify every inconsistency in LILCO's notification procedures. Rather, the burden is on LILCO to prove that its notification scheme meets applicable requirements. 10 C.F.R. 52.732. Moreover, Suffolk County's contention is no less detailed than the Staff's SER which states on this very point that LILCO's plan does no lect "the mutually agreeable bases for notification of the response organizations consistent with the emergency classification and emergency action level scheme set forth in Appendix 1 to NUREG 0654."
Additionally, the Staff objects to the County's contention s N
that the plan does not provide the contents of initial and fol-lowup messages to offsite authorities, claiming that such mes-sages would depend on the site emergency and on a number of other variables. In so objecting, the staf f ignores 10 C.F.B.
S50.47(b)(5) which recuires that "the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations has been esta-blished." Suffolk County's contention is simply that LILCO has failed to do that which the very language of the regulation requires it to do.
Objection to EP 14. The Staff states that it objects to EP 14 only if the contention addresses LILCO's f ailure to pro-l vide for the content of written messages intended for dissemin-l ation to the public, rather than merely referring to the lack of provision for such messages. Again, the Staff ignores the I
clear language of 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(5) which states that "the content of initial and followup messages to . . . the public" must be established. Furthermore, NUREG 0654, Item E.7 plainly l
s tates that "[el ach organization shall provide written messages l
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intended for the public, consistent with the licensee's classification scheme." In addition, Suffolk County refers the Staff to its own SER, Supp. I, 13.3.5.3D which states that LILCO's plan is deficient in that it fails to:
Provide copies of the written messages intended for release to the public in the event of a serious emergency.
Based upon these authorities, which the Staff has apparently overlooked, EP 14 is squarely consistent with regu-latory requirements. Thus, the Staff's objections to EP 14 are groundless.
Objections to EP 17. The Statt's objections to EP 17 stem from its assertion that the County has misread 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E IV F. However, it appears that it is the Staff instead which has misread that provision. Appendix E IV F states in pertinent part that:
. . . Each licensee shall exercise at least annually the emergency plan for each site at which it has one oc more power reactors licensed for operation. Both full-scale i and small-scale exercises shall be conducted and shall include participation by appropriate State and local government agencies as follows:
- 1. A full-scale exercise
( which tests as much of the
( licensee, State, and local I
emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory
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public participation shall be conducted;
- a. For each site at which one or more power reactors are located and licensed for operations, at least once every five years and at-a frequency which will enable each State and local government within the plume exposure pathway EPZ to participate in at least one full-scale exercise per year . . . . (Emphasis added)
As the foregoing provision clearly requires, LILCO must conduct full-scale exercises that will enable each State and local government within the plume exposure EPZ to participate at least annually.1/ The plain language of Appendix E IV F1 requires that each such full-scale exercise test as much of the licensee's plan (as well as the State and local plans) as is reasonably achievable. As EP 17 states, LILCO's plan lacks such a commitment and thus f ails to meet the applicable re-quirements of Appendix E. To the extent that NUREG 0654 is inconsistent with Appendix E, the latter, having the force of law, must prevail.
4/ The "at least once every five years" language obviously refers to the case where a licensee operates more than one reactor, thus assuring that the State and local govern-l ments will participate in "at least one full-scale exer-cise" per year, albeit with respect to dif ferent reactor sites. Since SNPS is LILCO's sole reactor, the only way to comply with the regulation is to undertake a full-scale exercise every year.
Objections to EP 22 and EP 23. The Staff has objected to EP 22 and EP 23 because they are allegedly not required by the Commission's regulations. Suffolk County rejects this argu-ment.
10 C.F.R. S50.47(b)(4), (8), and (9), Appendix E IV E2, and NUREG 0654, Item I, require that the applicant provide and maintain equipment, facilities, and systems that can assess and monitor plant parameters and the actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency. A Safety Parameter Display System is an essential part of any such system in that it provides the operator with the means to detect rapidly abnormal operating conditions within the plant. In the wake of the accident at TMI, NUREG 0737 made an SPDS a requirement spe-cifically designed to mitigate such conditions as existed at TMI. NUREG 0696 sets forth the specific requirements for an SPDS. LILCO has not met these requirements.
In addition, 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 13 plainly sets forth the general requirements that a plant pro-vide an adequate set of instrumentation. Since EP 22 and EP 23 state that neither the interim nor the permanent SPDS meets the requirements of NUREG 0696, the adequate instrumentation re-l quirement of Criterion 13 is not met.
Finally, the Staff objects that EP 23 lacks specificity, but fails to state what information the contention lacks. The i
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burden is on LILCO to demonstrate that its SPDS meets all requirements. The contention states, in essence, that LILCO has not met that burden.
Objections to EP 24. The County does not understand the Staff's objection to EP 24. That contention simply states that LILCO does not have complete and approved EPIPs as required by 10 C.F.R. S50.47(b), Appendix E, and NUREG 0654 II.P.7. Either LILCO has such EPIPs or it does not. While the LILCO plan at 4-12 lists the titles of various EPIPs, LILCO has not demon-strated that all such EPIPs exist and are approved as required.
No further specificity or basis is required.
Objections to EP 26. Both LILCO and the Staff object to EP 26, which concerns LILCO's failure to demonstrate that it has devised its plan and EPIPs with human factors principles in mind. The Staff objects that the contentions " lacks basis and specificity," while LILCO complains that the contention does not articulate what human factors principles and analyses are
. necessary or should be considered or what regulations require.
I l consideration of human f actors.
l l With respect to specificity and identification of preci-sely those human factors principles or analyses which LILCO has or has not cons id e r ed , it bears repeating that LILCO has the l burden of provir.g that it has met all emergency planning re-quirements. The County is not obligated to go forward with a
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listing of the areas in which the plan is lacking. If LILCO has incorporated human factors of principles of any sort into its plan, LILCO bears the burden of coming forward with that information.
Furthermore, it is simply not accurate to state that the regulations do not require an emergency plan to be developed with human factors principles in mind. By way of example, 10 C.F.R. 550.47(a)(2) states a plan must be found to be " capable of being implemented." Implementation of any plan will obviously be largely performed by humans beings, and human fac-tors will necessarily affect the capability of the plan being effectively implemented. Therefore, a plan must meet the six-teen planning criteria of 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b) bearing in mind that humans will perform the vital emergency functions descri-bed therein.
Objections to EP 27. The Staff and LILCO both object to EP 27 on the basis that a PRA/ consequence analysis is not re-quired by NRC regulations. While a PRA/ consequence analysis per sj! may not be required, a site-specific analysis of the range of consequences likely in the event of a severe accident at Shoreham, by way of PRA/ consequence analysis or some other f
l means, is necessary to inform those ind ividuals responsible for I
emergency planning of the specific consequences of a variety of j accidents that could occur at the SNPS. Absent such l
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information, those responsible for plan development and implementation will lack vital information with regard to pre-dicted actual plume direction and dispersal in the affected locality and the predicted potential radiological doses that various segments of the population would receive in the event of an accident. That information is extremely important and should be incorporated into LILCO's emergency planning efforts if LILCO's ef forts are going to be realistic. At present, there is no evidence available to the County to suggest that LILCO has appropriately prepared its plan for the specific ac-tual consequences that are predicted to result from a severe accident at Shorehom.
To the extent that EP 27 was unclear as to the issues the County sought to litigate in contention EP 27, the County pro-poses that EP 27 be amended to read as follows:
"EP 27: Accident Assessment and Dose Assessment Models (SC, joined by SOC and NSC)
LILCO's plan does not prepare for the range of conse-quences likely in the event of a severe accident at the Shoreham plant. Such a plan should consider the type and timing of a release to the atmosphere (or other pathway), the magnitude of the release, and the I
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range of likely consequences of the release. LILCO has commenced, but has not completed, nor has the NRC reviewed, a PRA/ consequence analysis designed to provide the basis for the accident assessment and dose assessment models to be used by LILCO. The re-sults of the PRA/ consequence analysis are not re-flected in the LILCO plan and there is no evidence of other means, if any, used by LILCO to ensure the accuracy of the assessment models. Thus, Suffolk County contends that there is no assurance that LILCO has met the requirements of 10 C.F.R. SS50.47(b)(9) and (10), 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, and the planning criteria of NUREG 0654."
In any event, the issue of whether or not the Commission's regulations require a PRA/ consequence analysis has been ren-dered moot by LILCO's own conduct. Thus, according to the written testimony of one of LILCO's witnesc (Contention 7B Testimony of Robert M. Kascsak on Status and Use of Shoreham PRA, at 120), LILCO has prepared a PRA study "primarily to
. . . assess the Shoreham Emergency Plan by evaluating the l Shoreham specific response to these hypothetical accidents and their consequences." Accordingly, the relevance of such a study to the assessment of LILCO's plan is conceded by LILCO itself.
It ill-behooves the Staff and LILCO, therefore, to argue that I
an exis' ting analytical tool relevant to LILCO's emergency plan, such as the PRA study, should not be the subject of litigation in this proceeding. If the PRA study has been properly conduc-ted and the consequences of the study are adequately considered in LILCO's plan neither LILCO nor the Staff need have anything to fear. Conversely, if relevant portions of the PRA study are flawed and/or if the results of its consequence analysis are unaccounted for in LILCO's plan, the County respectfully sug-gests that these are matters directly relevant to this proceed-ing. In either case, the PRA/ consequence analysis is clearly relevant to the public's health and safety.
B. Consolidation As Suffolk County understands LILCO's objections, the ap-plicant has no substantive objections to any contentions other than those attributed to LILCO and addressed above. With re-spect to several other contentions, however, LILCO would prefer that they be re-drafted so that, for example, all contentions dealing with the ef f ects of a local condition such as traf fic congestion are lumped together (see e.g., LILCO Objections, 3-4). The County believes that a rational basis exists for the organization of the contentions in their present format and that undertaking a mechanical regrouping of contentions at this point is unnecessary and a poor use of scarce time.
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As filed, the consolidated contentions are organized to address specific obligations of LILCO under the Commission's regulations. Moreover, they address specific provisions of LILCO's plan. As such, the format selected for setting forth the parties' contentions is not without rational basis. The fact that a particular condition, such as traffic congestion or r ol e-co n fl ic t , is claimed to af fect more than one provision of the plan and/or more than one regulatory _ standard, is not a basis for requiring the contentions to be completely re-vamped.
Moreover, regrouping the consolidated contentions in a manner more to LILCO's liking would only create confusion.
While it would be true that all contentions dealing with traf-fic congestion would be grouped together, one would have to skip back and forth from one regulatory standard and/or plan provision to another, in order to comprehend fully the impact of the contention. Suffolk County submits that such a process would be more confusing than simply dealing with one plan pro-vision and/or regulatory standard at a time.
l Furthermore, any concern which LILCO may have ( and it has articulated none other than a stylistic preference) that evi-dence as to a particular condition -- e.g. , traffic congestion
-- should be presented only once at the hearing, such a concern is easily addressed by consolidating for trial those conten-
! tions which share a common nucleus of fact. Doing so is a l
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common practice which this Board has previously used during the course of the pending proceeding..
For the foregoing reasons, the objections of the Staff and LILCO to the consolidated contentions should be overruled.
In the event that the Board determines to hear oral argu-ment on the objections to the consolidated contentions the un-dersigned counsel for Suffolk County intends to present the County's argument and respectfully advises the Board of coun-sel's unavailability on Wednesday, July 14, 1982 on which date the undersigned must appear at a previously scheduled court hearing.
Respectfully submitted, David J. Gilmartin Patricia A. Dempsey Suf folk County Department of Law Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788
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Herbert HI Brown /
Cherif Sedky Christopher M. McMurray KIRKPATRICK, LOCKHART, HILL, CHRISTOPHER & PHILLIPS 1900 M Street, NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036
UNITED STATES OF AME,RICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONg ,3 p ,
y BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD T2 JJ 12 P1 :37
)
In the Matter of ) g_ y
) [c,p m ; s a e.Cf LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) ERAN0n
) Docket No. 50-322 (0.L.)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that the " Response of Suffolk County to Objections of LILCO and of NRC Staff to First Amended Consolidated Emergency Planning Contentions" were served on July 12, 1982 by first class mail, except as otherwise noted, to the following:
Lawrence Brenner, Esq.* Ralph Shapiro, M3q.
Administrative Judge Cammer and Shapiro Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 9 East 40th Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission New York, New York 10016 4350 East-West Highway 4th Floor Bethesda, MD 20814 Howard L. Blau, Esq.
Dr. James L. Carpenter
- 217 Newbridge Road Administrative Judge Hicksville, New York 11801 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission W. Taylor Reveley III, Esq.**
4350 East-West Highway Hunton & Williams 4th Floor P.O. Box 1535 Bethesda, MD 20814 707 East Main St.
Richmond, Virginia 23212 Mr. Peter A. Morris
- Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Jay Dunkleberger 4350 East-West Highway New York State Energy Office 4th Floor Agency Building 2 i
Bethesda, MD 20814 Empire State Plaza Albany, New York 12223 Edward M. Barrett, Esq.
l General Counsel Long Island Lighting Company 250 Old Country Road Mineola, New York 11501 Stephen B. Latham, Esq.
l Twomey, Latham & Shea Mr. Brian McCaffrey Attorneys at Law Long Island Lighting Company P.O. Box 398 175 East Old Country Road 33 West Second Street Hicksville, New York 11801 Riverhead, New York 11901
'*By Hand
- By Federal Express
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' Marc W. Goldsmith Mr. Jeff Smith Energy R2cecrch Group, Inc. Shoreham Nuclear Powar Station 400-1 Totten Pond Road P.O. Box 618 Waltham, Massachusetts 02154 North Country Road Wading River, New York 11792 Joel Blau, Esq. MHB Technical Associates New York Public Service Commission 1723 Hamilton Avenue The Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller Suite K Build ing San Jose, California 95125 Empire State Plaza Albany, New York 12223 Hon. Peter Cohalan Suffolk County Executive David H. Gilmartin, Esq. County Executive / Legislative Suffolk County Attorney Building County Executive / Legislative Bldg. Veterans Memorial Highway Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788 Hauppauge, New York 11788 Ezra I. Bialik, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Assistant Attorney General Board Panel Environmental Protection Bureau U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission New York State Department of Washington, D.C. 20555 Law 2 World Trade Center Docketing and Service Section* New York, New York 10047 Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Washington, D.C. 20555 Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Bernard M. Bordenick, Esq.* Commission David A. Repka, Esq. Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wash ing ton , D.C. 20555 Matthew J. Kelly, Esq.
Staff Counsel, New York Stuart Diamond State Public Service Comm.
Environment / Energy Writer 3 Rockefeller Plaza NEWSDAY Albany, New York 12223 Long Island, New York 11747 Cherif Sedky, Esq.
Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Johnson & Hutchison 1500 Oliver Building Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222
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Chert?eMaak" KIRKPATRiCK, LOdKHART, HILL, CHRISTOPHER & PHILLIPS DATE: /k/f/52- 1900 M Street, N.W., 8th Floor Washington, D.C. 20036