ML20054J357

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Response Opposing Ucs/Ny Pirg 820604 Motion for Reconsideration of Commission Ruling Allowing Interim Operation & for Issuance of Show Cause Order.New Evidence More than 6 Months Old.Exhibits & Certificate of Svc Encl
ML20054J357
Person / Time
Site: Indian Point  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 06/21/1982
From: Brandenburg B
CONSOLIDATED EDISON CO. OF NEW YORK, INC.
To:
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8206280532
Download: ML20054J357 (23)


Text

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O.' viEq UNITED STATES OR AftERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ..

c< :1:28 Before the Commissioners:

Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman John F. Ahearne James Asselstine -

Victor Gilinsky Thomas M. Roberts and Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board:

Louis J. Carter, Chairman Oscar H. Paris Frederick J. Shon

____________________________________x In the Matter of  : Docket Nos. 50-247 SP

50-286 SP CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF  :

NEW YORK, INC. (Indian Point,  :

Unit No. 2)  : June 21, 1982 POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF  :

NEW YORK (Indian Point,  :

Unit No. 3)  :


x LICENSEE'S RESPONSE TO UCS/NYPIRG'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF CO!! MISSION RULING ALLOUING INTERIM OPERATION AND FOR ISSUANCE OF A SHOW CAUSE ORDER AGAINST LICENSEES ATTORNEY FILING THIS DOCUMENT:

Brent L. Brandenburg CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC.

4 Irving Place New York, New York 10003 (212) 460-4333 8206280532 820621

{DRADOCK 05000247

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMt1ISSIO!1 Before the Commissioners:

Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman John F. Ahearne James Asselstine Victor Gilinsky Thomas M. Roberts and Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board:

Louis J. Carter, Chairman Oscar H. Paris Frederick J. Shon


x In the Matter of  : Docket IIos. 50-247 SP

50-286 SP CONSOLIDAT ED EDISON COMPA11Y OF  :

NEW YORK, INC. (Indian Point,  :

Unit No. 2)  : June 21, 1982 POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF  :

NEW YORK (Indian Point,  :

Unit No. 3)  :

____________________________________x LICE!3SEE'S RESPONSE TO UCS/NYPIRG'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF COMMISSION RULING ALLOWING INTERIM OPERATION AND FOR ISSUANCE OF A SHOW CAUSE ORDER AGAINST LICENSEES Preliminary Statement Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (" Con Edison"), licensee of Indian Point Station, Unit No. 2, hereby responds to the June 4, 1982 UCS/NYPIRG motion for Reconsideration of Commission Ruling Allowing Interim Operation and for Issuance of a Show Cause Order.

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The present motion is yet another in a long series of attempts by UCS/NYPIRG to close two licensed, operational plants which save licensees' consumers hundreds of millions of dollars annually. Now, after failing in at least five" a Movant UCS/NYPIRG, along with other intervenors herein, have been lobbying for years for the closing of the plants.

Its first entry into the legal arena was the filing of a petition with the Commission in September, 1979 to close Indian Point Units 2 and 3 and to decommission Unit 1.

The Commission denied the immediate shutdown request and instead, inter alia, directed that the present investiga-tory hearing be held and that a Staf f task force examine operation of the plants. After thorough study, the task force reaffirmed the safety of the plants, and recommended their continued operation. Task Force Report on Interim Operation of Indian Point, SECY-80-283 (June 12, 1980).

By its January 8, 1981 Order, the Commission adopted that recommendation, thus once again rejecting UCS/NYPIRG's efforts to close the plants.

NYPIRG followed that decision with a letter to staff dated April 1, 1981, which again sought to close the plants, this time for purported failure to comply with emergency planning regulations. The Staff denied the request pursuant to 10 CFR S2.206, also noting that the Commission itself had reaffirmed its interim operation order on April 7. 46 Fed.

Reg. 28261 (May 26, 1981).

Undaunted, NYPIRG forwarded a letter to the Commission dated July 24, 1981, again requesting that the plants be closed for alleged emergency planning inadequacies. This request was also denied , as confirmed by letter of the Commission's General Counsel dated December 11, 1981.

In October, 1981, UCS/NYPIRG attempted to circumvent the Commission by filing a petition in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals seeking extraordinary relief, including continuing appellate court jurisdiction over emergency planning at Indian Point, comprehensive revision of the Commission's emergency planning rules and procedures, and a possible shutdown of the plants. UCS/NYPIRG argued , as it does herein, that the Commission's so-called "120-day clock" (see 10 CFR S50.54(5)(2)) for resolving emergency planning deficiences was ineffective.

By Order dated December 15, 1981, the Court dismissed UCS/NYPIRG petition, after first having ruled against UCS/NYpIRG from the bench.

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l previous attempts to close the plants, UCS/NYPIRG has' filed an eleventh-hour motion for reconsideration of the Commission's January 8, 1981 order, and for issuance of a show cause order i l

against the licensees.* UCS/NYPIRG brings its motion at investigatory hearings on a number of issues related to Indian i Point -- including whether NRC emergency planning requirements are satisfied -- are about to commence before the NRC Atomic Safety Licensing Board to which the UCS/NYPIRG motion is also addressed. Employing stale assertions, and evidently fearful that the upcoming hearings will fail to support their position, UCS/NYPIRG would presume upon the Commission and Board to make dispositive rulings on emergency planning issues before the very hearings designed to consider them have commenced.

Because intervenors ' "new evidence" is more than six months old, and because intervenors have grossly misrepresented the present state of emergency planning, this motion, filed on the eve of the investigatory hearing directed by the Commission, should be denied.**

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  • UCS/NYPIRG has also erred to the extent that its present motion seeks a show cause' order from the Board. The Commission's January 8 and September 18, 1981 orders herein clearly did not. delegate to the Board the power to close either plant,ibut instead simply permitted the Board to nake recommendations. 3
    • Intervenors Friends of he Earth /New York City Audubon Society (" FOE /Audubon") Westchester People's Action Coalition ("WESPAC"), and. West Branch Conservation ("

Association ("WBCA") have filed papers in support of the UCS/NYPIRG motion.

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I. UCS/NYPIRG's Evidence Does Not Warrant This Last Minute Motion UCS/NYPIRG's first piece of "new evidence" which it claims warrants the interruption of the hearing process mandated by the Commission is the supposed deficiencies in the Indian Point emergency plans as recorded by the Federal Emergency Management

' Agency's (FEMA's") Regional Assistance Committee ("RAC") in

( April 1981. USC/NYPIRG Motion at 3.* UCS/NYPIRG disingenuously neglects to mention that on August 24, 1981, based on a revised FEMA review, the Staff " conclude [d] that this issue has been

- resolved satisfactorily." L'etter from Boyce H. Grier, Director NRC Region 1, to George T. Berry, Powr .ority President and Chief Operating Officer (Aug. 24, 1981). (Exhibit "A"). Thus, the April 1981 RAC comments are hardly a legitimate ground for a motion.

UCS/NXPIRG's second piece of "new evidence" dates from Dec embe r,19,814 and consists of further RAC comments. Such evidence is also hardly'"new E 'in the context of this hearing, in which the Commission'h3 suggested deadline requires such L

a rigorous hearing schedule.

.I 3 Intervenors' months-long delay in filing this motion illustrates that their "new" information is not urgent,. and

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  • Presumably, his'isardferencetotheApril6, 1981 letter from Vincent Forde, Acting Regional Director, FEMA, to William C. Hennessy, Chairman, New York State Disaster Preparedness Commission. See_ Exhibit "A".'

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-s-certainly of fers no basis for disrupting the hearing process J

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to reconsider issues which the hearings themselves are designed to examine. UCS/NYPIRG's "new evidence" merely confirms that the FEMA's evaluations are part of the ongoing process of developing emergency plans for nuclear power plants.*

The UCS/NYPIRG Motion also purports to rely upon a FEMA Post Exercise Assessment, issued May 27, 1982, in support of its motion. The Assessment document details FEMA's comments on the radiological emergency exercise conducted at the Power

/

Authority's Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant on March 3,

..I 1982. FOE /Audubon and WESPAC, in their papers supporting the motion, are less than candid when,they claim that the Assess-ment's evaluation of nine functionai areas as weak constitutes

" substantial and significant deficiences." See Response in Support at 3. In fact, the exercise p' articipants also received 19 " good" ratings in 9 functional areas, and 23 " acceptable"

  • The support for UCS/NYPIRG's motion by FOE /Audubon and WESPAC is similarly inadequate. See FOE /Audubon and WESPAC's Response in Support of UCS/NYPIRG Motion for Reconsideration of Commission Ruling Allowing Interim Operation and for Issuance of a Show Cause Order Against Licensee's [ sic], and FOS /Audubon and WESPAC's Pre-sentation of Additional New Evidence (June 8, 1982)

(Response in Support).

FOE /Audubon and WESPAC's support for UCS/NYPIRG's motion is undercut by their admission that "no feasible emergency measures can protect against the long term consequences of a serious accident at Indian Point." Response in support at 6. Because FOE /Audubon and WESPAC claim that no level of emergency planning can be ef fective, their assertions a fortiori cannot support a motion premised upon the NRC's emergency planning regulations not being complied with.

d ratings in 10 functional areas. (See general Attachmen'. C, FEMA Post Exercise Assessment (May 27, 1982).) Intervenors obscure the fact that the very purpose of an exercise and critique is to identify as many deficiencies as possible so that corrections can be made. If anything, the FEMA 4

Assessment supports licensee's argument that emergency planning is a dynamic process, and that reasonabla assurance presently exists that the public could and would be protected in the event of a radiological emergency.

Indeed, the FEMA Assessment of the most important areas of emergency response was highly favorable. For example:

(1) "(alt the state level, all observed funtions were carried out well" (Assessment at p. 10);

(2) at the Indian Point 3 Emergency Operations Facility, all tested areas were rated from

" acceptable" to " good" (Assessment at p. 12);

(3) even in Rockland County, upon which intervenors have focused their criticism, "[c]apabilities for protection of the public were good" and

"[e]vacuation and decontamination were well demonstrated" (Assessment at p. 15).

The high marks given the State of New York are par-ticularly noteworthy since, pursuant to N.Y. Executive Law, Article 2-B, the State maintains primary responsibility for radiological emergency planning, and, in the event of a general emergency, the State would commit its extensive resources and coordination and management capabilities.

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Finally, the direct testimony filed by the Commission Staff and FEMA in the Indian Point investigatory proceeding --

which contains an overall review of emergency planning simply

-- contains few negative comments about the state of pre-paredness in either New York State or at Indian Point. Indeed, Staff witness Thomas Urbanik II suggests that the evacuation time contained in the emergency plan are even more reliable than the FEMA estimates, which enjoy a rebuttable presumption of validity in this proceeding.

II. The Rockland County Resolution Fails to Support Reconsideration or the Issuance of a Show Cause Order UCS/NYPIRG and its intervenor-supporters also rely upon a May 18, 1982 resolution of the Rockland County legislature, one of four counties within the Indian Point plume exposure path-way emergency planning zone. The Rockland County resolution is in f act a political gesture whereby the County has determined to develop its own radiological emergency response plan in-dependent of the State or the other counties. This resolu-tion has no meaningful effect on the County's ability to respond to a radiological emergency. Intervenors conspicuously fail to note several key provisions of the Resolution:

[T]he County of Rockland, through its Officer of Emergency Services, has and will continue to develop such~ plans (Disaster Preparedness Plans) as may be necessary to insure the health, safety and welfare of Rockland County citizens from all contingencies. . .

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... which program shall be funded by the County of Rockland, and be it further RESOLVED, that the Legislature of Rockland County fur-ther directs the county Office of Emergency Services to develop a plan in response to a potential nuclear acci-dent occurring at the Indian Point Facilities and to utilize all sources of information in preparing such plan to be presented to the Legislature of Rockland County by December 31, 1982, and be it further RESOLVED, that in the event of a nuclear occurrence at Indian Point Facilities, the Legislature of Rockland County hereby authorizes, empowers and directs its Gnairman, notwithstanding this resolution, to take any and all action in coordinating and cooperating with any and all Federal and State agencies to protect the lives and property of the citizens of Rockland County, Appendix, A, p. 2-3 to UCS/NYPIRG Motion. (Emphasis added.)

Rockland County's own reiteration of its intention to abide by the federal and state plans in case of an emergency, while continuing to develop its own plan, hardly creates what UCS/NYPIRG calls an " emergency preparedness vacuum" ( UCS/NYPIRG Motion at p. 4). Since Rockland County expressly intends to continue to use all of its resources in protecting life and l property in the event of an emergency, the resolution cannot l possibly have the adverse effects claimed by intervenors.

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Rockland County's planning for a radiological emergency substan-tially unaffected, and the State of New York, which mdintains l

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primary responsibility for radiological emergency planning and for the maintenance of the written State and county plan documents, is completely unaffected.*

III. Intervenors Again Seek to Circumvent Established Procedures As on prior occasions, intervenors seek to circumvent the Commission's procedures. Recognizing that emergency planning is a process, 10 CFR 550.54(s)(2) allows licensees

  • Nor is there likely to be any coordinational problems between Rockland County's emergency preparedness and the other affected governmental units while the County is preparing its own plan, because the County has expressed its intention to follow the provisions of the present county plan in the interim. By letter dated June 4, 1982, New York Disaster Preparedness Commission Chairman William C. Hennessy advised FEMA that:

" Staff also advised by the Chairman and other members of the [Rockland County] legislature that the present plan would be used if an accident wereto occur. On the basis of the resolution and statements made by Rockland County officals, I believe that the four county level of preparedness remains adequate."

A copy of the June 4, 1982 Hennessy letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". Even if the Rockland County Reso-lution had substantive impact, FEMA has in the past noted that isolated instances of uncooperativeness by state or local governments would not seriously affect overall radio-logical emergency preparedness. See, e.g., NYPIRG's July 18, 1981 Legislative Memorandum (Attachment 1 at 5) to Governor's Bill Jacket for S-7122 (Exhibit "C" hereto) ("[T]he number of these [ isolated instances] does not .... seriously affect the progress of preparedness development at this time).

four months following a formal notice in which to correct deficiencies. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed its confidence in this procedure by dismissing UCS/NYPIRG's petition for review last December. Intervenors renewed and wastef ul ef forts to bypass 10 CFR Part 50 reflect a continued misapprehension of the emergency planning process, a continued willingness to mischaracterize and disrupt the Commission's on-going emergency preparedness programs, and a continued disregard of the Commission's regulations.

Conclusion:

For the reasons set forth above, the "UCS/NYPIRG mo-tion..." should be denied in all respects.

Respectfully submitted, b b BrbXi U. Brahdenbu'rg CONSOLIDATED EDISON C .4PANY OF NEW YORK, INC.

Licensee of Indian P int Unit 2 4 Irving Place New York, New York 10003 (212) 460-4333 Dated: New York, New York June 21, 1982

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' s, a.- ,-./;jl Occhet Nos. 50-333 2 Ib6I 50-256 P:wer Authority of the State of New York James A. Fit: Patrick Nuclear Pcwer Plant /

ncian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant ATTN: Mr. George T. Eerry President and Chief C;erating Officar 10 Colum::us Circle New York, New York 10019 Gentlemen:

Sy letter dated April 21, 1981, I transmittec :: you a : ;y of a letter fr:m the ederal Emer ency Management Agency (FEMA) Cated Acril 23, 1981 anc its atta:ned letter from FEMA to the New York State Disaster Preparedness C.:

ission da.ed April 6, 1951. The attachments to the April 6, 1931 letter listed numerous deficiencies in the New Yort State and local emergency res;ense plans for the area around your reactor site.

The enclosed letter from FEMA dated August 19, 1981. refers to the defi:iencies in the aferementioned April 6,1931 letter. FEMA concludes that

" ne cresent state of clanning is generally adecuate te carry out the

' responsibilities of the State and local government in the case of an accident I at these sites". We therefore conclude that this issue has been resolved satisfactorily.

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om.. w m e., e,- s%, u u,.o. v.~,,., ..., om, s,.m.~i s- uw LEGISLATP/E MEMORANDUM

Contact:

Ellen Spilka (212)349-6460 Re: S 7122 A?! ACT to amend the executive law and the public service law, in relation.to raciological emergency. preparedness and making,an appropriation therefor L..._....- --

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  • Since the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island, NYPIRG has been deeply concerned over the inadequate state of emergency preparedness for radiological accidents in New York State. Our organization has followed closely the development of federal guidelines and regulations for emergency planning for accidents at nuclear generating facilities; the preparation of emergency plans to protect the public around New York's 5 operating reactors; and the NRC/ FEMA review and approval process, not only with respect to New York State and local plans, but also as this process has been applied elsewhere (for example, for the newly licensed Salem facility and for Three Mile Island).

Our monitoring and research has led us to the following conclusions, which we urge the Governor to consider before signing into law the radiological emergency preparedness bill now before him:

1. Major life-threatening accidents, once deemed " incredible" by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, are now considered possible at nuclear generating facilities. flYPIRG is particularly concerned about the possibility of such an accident at the trouble-ridden, aging, unreliable operating reactors at Indian Point, especially since the October 1980 flooding accident at Unit 2 and the NRC's admitted concerns over possible embrittlement of that unit's reactor vessel.
2. NYPIRG considers the federal flRC/ FEMA guidelines for emergency planning grossly inadequate to guarantee real protection for the public in the event of a majcr nuclear plant accident. Furthermore, we regard the Final NRC Emergency Planning Rule as so riddled with loopholes as to offer little hope of strict enforcement.
3. The FEMA /NRC review and evaluation process now underway across the country already provides ample proof that wholly inadequate emergency plans are receiving only cursory scrutiny by these agencies and are being hastily approved (" rubber stamped") in spite of containing many major deficiencies (see enclosed NYPIRG ieport on Current Problems in Emergency Planning Around Nuclear Power Plants).
4. The federal agencies are enforcing neither the letter or the spirit (intent) of the new emergency planning requirements, and e officials of these agencies have indicated by public statements that they do not intend to shut plants down because of inadequate emergency plans.
5. If the public is to be guaranteed anything more than token protection frcm radiological disasters, that will be only because state and local governments The New Ycru Puche Ir terest Pesearch Group. Inc. (NYP'AG) es a not-for-pret.t. norcart' san research and advocacy crganizat:cn estachshed.

directec and saccrtec cy New York state ccHege and t nners:ty stucents. NYPIAG's statt cf lawyers researerers. sciennsts anc crganizers

  • crus witn stucerts arc crer c tizens. ceve.cc+ng c.t recsruo ssuas and snaping puche ocucy. Censumer prctect:en. higrer education. erergy. fisca:

resoces.t.uity. pontica reform ano sociai tustice are NYPtPG s pr.nc: pas areas et concem.

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page 2 have the authority to require (before formal submission of their plans) that emergency preparedness go ceyond the federal guidelines and regulations in order to provide adequate protection for their citizens.

If, however, the states and localities accept the federal guidelines as sufficient and go no further than meeting those guidelines, the public will remain inadequately protected in the event of a nuclear plant disaster.

It was ?!YPIRG's hope that the State Legislature and the Governor would take the possibility of nuclear disaster more seriously than they have, and would have undertaken an extensive program of research and legislation to provide the pro-tection flew Yorkers and their neighbors in bordering states deserve.

Instead, what we have witnessed (except in some counties where local officials have raised questions about workability, nuts-and-bolts, etc.) is a willingness only to meet NRC/ FEMA guidelines in writing plans that go no further, and acting as though all that matters is pleasing these agencies rather than providing real protection for the public. An obvious case in point is that the New York State plan includes no special consideration of the need for more than ad hoc emergency measures for densely populated communities such as flew York City. It seems ob-vious to us, and to many ordinary citizens with whom we have spoken, that , in the absence of extensive planning for regions such as NYC, there can only be ad hoc disaster in the wake of any nuclear emergency. Anyone who believes that people in southern Westchester or New York City will not take to the roads in a massive self-evacuation if they learn that measures are being taken to protect people closer to Indian Point, is simply not facing facts. And to be unprepared for this possibility is irresponsible.

NYPIRG has consistently-argued that for emergency planning to be meaningful, it must be based on site-specific characteristics that take into account factors such as population density, wind and weather patterns, road and transportation conditions, geographic factors, etc. It makes no sense to us to follow unifom guidelines that are not tailored to the specific characteristics of each reactor site. What may work for a sparsely populated region with an adequate road system, may not work at all for a region such as that surrounding Indian Point. Further-more, planning criteria based on the discredited probability and consequence estimates of the old Reactor Safety Study (based en only one year of nuclear plant operating experience and systematically biased as it is) are greatly suspect.

Before signing any bill into law that will enable NRC and FEMA to rubber stamp state and local off-site emergency plans for New York, we believe the Governor should seek enabling legislation to require site-specific consequence studies for New York State's nuclear reactor sites. Such studies would enable the State and local disaster pre-paredness officials to develop and adopt emergency planning guidelines that would meet the needs of each plant site in terms of its particular characteristics and problems. This is what has been done in California (see enclosed NYPIRG testimony, February 12, 1981 before the Assembly Special Committee on Nuclear Power Safety, especially pages 11-12).

Because the enablina legislation now before the Governor is likely to result in the formal submission, "imolementation" and acproval of grossly inadeouate emergency plans to protect New York State residents, NYPIRG urges the Governor not to sign it into law in its present form.

In addition to the above, NYPIRG finds the following unacceptable in S 7122:

1. The fees to licensees are wholly inadequate to cover the costs of equipment, l

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flYPIRG -

page 3 administration, contractual services, maintenance, emergency personnel

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training, implementation, and testing of the state and local emergency plans, particularly for the region arcund Indian Point (where cost estimates run into the millions of dollars).

2. Licensees should not be pennitted to pass costs for emergency planning onto their customers, since the plans submitted to date provide more protection for the investments and dividends of utility shareholders than they do for public health and safety.
3. Though mentioning testing as a cost factor, this bill provides no speci-fic requirements for emergency plan testing. A plan that exists only on paper, or which has been " exercised" only with respect to very limited components, cannot be assumed to be workable. The sorts of exercises required by the federal agencies are farcical and should not be accepted -

by the Governor as adequate to judge the workability of emergency plans within this state. Provision must be included in emergency preparedness legislation for frequent and extensive testing of as many aspects of the -

plans as can be carried out without endangering the public. Because of the rapid turnover of state and local personnel, it is essential that training and testing gaps not occur, and the only way to guarantee this is the actual" participation of all emergency personnel in regular and frequent drills.

4. The bill's limitation of radiological accident as applying only to accidents occuring at nuclear electric generating facilities, is wholly unacceptable to tiYPIRG. The State should require and implement planning for non-commercial reactor sites, radiological waste dumps, and, most importantly, transportation accidents. In light of the recent decision of the Department of Transportation to supersede local bans on transpor-tation of nuclear wastes, it would .seem incumbent on the State to extend radiological emergency protection to tiew Yorkers endangered by such transports.
5. One of the major lessons learned during the aftermath of the Three Mile Island accident, and a factor repeatedly stressed by experts in disaster planning, is that in order for emergency measures to work smoothly it is absolutely essential that the public believe its sources of information.

This matter of credibility has been raised time and time again by public officials and citizens who simply do not trust the utilities (particularly Con Edison because of their shoddy record at Indian Point) to provide full, complete, and timely information to off-site officials and the public. For this reason, it is essential that the state and local emer-gency officials have independent accident assessment capability, both off-site and on-site. tlYPIRG does not believe that the public will be adequately protected as long as it is largely dependent on the nuclear utilities for information about plant emergencies. The present .legis-lation lacks any provision for on-site, independent accident assessment by a highly qualified, specifically trained public representative.

t4YPIRG, as yo'u know, favors the immediate closing of the Indian Point nuclear plants-and the rapid phase-out of tiew York's other operating reactors, and opposes the construction and licens.ing of Shoreham. It:is our view that as long as major radiological accidents are possible, the only real protection for the public is prevention . Nevertheless, as long as nuclear plants are still operating in our state, the public is entitled to maximum, not minimum, emergency planning. The legislation now before the Governor guarantees only that there will be some planning; it does not go nearly far enough. We fear that it will not accomplish real protec-

. tion for the public, but will permit NRC/ FEMA approvai of inadequate, unworkable emergency plans that will spell disaster if New York is ever faced with a major

NYPIRG -

page 4 accident at one of its nuclear plants.

NYPIRG urces the Governor not to sien this legislation and to submit new lecis-lation tnat will enable the state to orovide a level of protection for the public beyond tnat deemed "adeouate" by federal clanning officials wno still do not believe that nuclear accidents can happen -- even af ter Three Mile Island.

l The New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc 5 Beekman Street Naw York, New York 10033 encs.

July 18, 1981

a . .

ATTACHEN'2 1 (from) FEMA responses to ciuestions from Senate Succommittee on duclear Iagulation, Corsaittee on Environmerm and Puolic Works. Pages 4 tnrougn 6 of letter dated April 14,1981.

U: to tne present time, FEMA nas ceen acle to rescon: to tne NRC witncut causing any cocumentec celays, out this is true only ce:ause the major

nrus: =f reviews imoe: e: in tne schecules of 10 CFP Part 50 is just seginning to surface. The key policy matter over wnich FEMA has had little or no :.nfluence is the NRC's plan for enfor:ing tne mass of precare: ness relatec a:tions for tne 49 sites now operating, for wnich implementation was Oue Acril 1, 1981, anc tne 22 units and associate: sites preparing for licensing in CY 1981 anc CY 1982. With all of this 0:ncurrent activity superi== sed on ciner cbligations- for the non-p0wer NRC materials licensees, an: for c ner Feceral facilities of the DOE and DOD, there is little likeline:c tNat FEMA can ecmplete its reviews with existing staff anc financial resources cef re tne end of CY 1982. It is imp::rtant to note that under existing arrangements for using FEMA findings and determinations, these reviews must ce in the hancs of the NRC staff some five to seven contns before any ic0encing nearing can start, an: even under tne projected rule enanges proposed by NEC, some 12 to 15 months before tne final NRC action on a full power license.

Given this cackgrounc, FEMA offers the following with res ect to the six sus-questions (a) tnrougn (f):

(a) Lack of acecuate resources?

At the time of the Presi ential Directive of Decemoer 7,1979, which among etner tnings, preposec 53.9 million in support of State plans develcoment.

tnere was a joint resolution in the Congress wnich did not allow action on FY 1980 supplementary requests until May 15, 1980. By the time S1.9 millien was appropriated in June 1980, the F) 82 budget submissions were alreacy under cevelopment and OMB budget directions gave little opportunity for FEMA to censicer a FY B1 supplementary appropriation. All other Federal agencies sup Orting FEMA's review process found themselves in the same position.

/

ATTACIMENT 1 5

As tnings stan: today, FEMA's request for ad itional staf f suomitted un:er tne previous Acm:nistration has ceen turne cown. Tne tne overall financial plan for FY 1951 leaves little cop :tunity for staff : resources reprogramming witneut jeccar y to tne civil cefense -

program. given hign priority by tne last Congress and the present Acm:nistration. Travel restrictions have impactec tnis activity greatly.

FE.<A will fin: it cifficult to meet its ocligation to ins NRC in a timely manner. Ine cueget cycle of State governments also makes tneir ability to meet NRC's sene:ule uncertain.

(} Late suomittals bv the ao licant?

TEMA nas no cirect relatiensnip with NRC licensees and has no way cf knowing tne causes of celay to a process as com; lex as the NRC 11:ensing pre ecure. FEMs reviews of State an: local preparedness un:er its own Rule 44 CFR Part 350 have been celaye by lack of resources en tne cart of 5 tate an: 10:al governments, many of wnien must icek to NRC 11 ensees f : financial an: material support in the cevelopment of tneir prepare: ness posture.

() Lack of :::ceration bv State or Iccal covernments?

FEMA is aware of is: lated instances wnere State anc/cr local governments are opposed te nuclear power in principle. Tne numoer of tnese cases coes'nct, nowever, sericusly affect the progres: cf prepare:-

ness cevel:pment at tnis time.

(d) Lack of Ocortination netween NRC and IEMA?

We celieve that there is goo: Operation as reflected in the Memoranoum of Uncerstanding (M3U), the work of the Steerinaw C:mmittee, an:

cay-to-cay staff contacts. Two points of misunderstanding, botn of wnien could affect FEMA's capacity to carry cut its role, have emerged. The first is tnat FEMA is being aske: by NRC for findings and ceterminations more frequently ano earlier than anticipated. Tne second is tnat FEMA has oeen working uncer the assumption that its review and approval pr cecure (ca CFR Part 350) woulc ce tne main veniele for oeveloping findings anc cete rminat ions . Insteac we are increasingly working outsice this procedure in creer t: :::1y witn NRC recuests uncer the MOU. Botn of these factors are neavily influenceo by tne question Of wnen TEMA fincings and determina-tions are recuired in the NRC licensing prc ess. Initially, based on NRC senecules, we uncerstocc that FEMA fincings anc determinations would be recuired close to the licensing cate, but we are finding that to satisfy NRC hearings.

tney are requirec up to la montns earlier to be inecrporatec into the staff Safety Evaluation Reo::t wni:n pre:eecs any hearing actien.

e v

e UNITED STATrS OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Commission and Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

______.---------------------------------------X In the Matter of  :

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC. : Docket Nos.

(Indian Point, Unit No. 2) 50-247 SP

50-286 SP POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Indian Point, Unit No. 3  : June 21, 1982

X i

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that I have served copies of " Licensee's Response To UCS/NYPIRG's Motion For Reconsideration Of Commis-sion Ruling Allowing Interim Operation And For Issuance Of A Show Cause Order Against Licensees" on the following parties by deposit in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, this 21st day of June, 1982.

Docketing and Service Branch Dr. Osacr H.. Paris Office of the Secretary Administrative Judge U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Atomic Safety and Licensing Commission Board Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington D.C. 20555 Louis J. Carter, Esq. Chairman Administrative Judge Mr. Frederick J. Shon Atomic Safety and Licensing Administrative Judge

Board Atomic Safety and Licensing 7300 City Line Avenue - Suite 120 Board Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19151 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Washington, D.C. 20555 Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Leonard Bickwit, Esq.

Washington, D. C. 20555 General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Janice !!oore , Esq. Charles J. Maikish, Esq.

Office of the Executive Litigation Division Legal Director The Port Authority of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory New York and New Jersey Commission One World Trade Center Washington, D. C. 20555 New York, New York 10048 Paul F. Colarulli, Esq. Ezra I. Bialik, Esq.

Joseph J. Levin, Jr., Esq. Steve Leipsiz, Esq.

Pamela S. Horowitz, Esq. New York State Attorney Charles Morgan, Jr., Esq. General's Office Morgan Associates, Chartered Two World Trade Center 1899 L Street, N.W. . 'New York, New York 10047 Washington, D. C. 20036 Alfred B. Del Bello Charles M. Pratt, Esq. Westchester County Executive Thomas R. Frey, Esq. 148 !!artine Avenue Power Authority of the State White Plains, New York 10601 of New York 10 Columbus Circle Andrew S. Roffe, Esq.

New York, New York 10019 New York State Assembly Albany, New York 12248 Ellyn R. Uciss, Esq.

William S. Jordan, III, Esq. Renee Schwartz, Esq.

Harmon & Weiss Paul Chessin, Esq.

1725 I Street, N.W., Suite 506 Laurens R. Schwartz, Esq.

Washington, D. C. 20006 Botein, Hays, Sklar & Herzberg 200 Park Avenue Joan Holt, Project Director New York, New York 10156 Indian Point Project New York Public Interest Stanley B. Klimberg Research Group New York State Energy Of fice 9 Murray Street 2 Rockefeller State Plaza New York, New York 1.0007 Albany, New York 12223 John Gilroy, Westchester Ruth Messinger Coordinator Member of the Council of the Indian Point Project City of New York New York Public Interest District #4 Research Group City Hall 240 Central Avenue New York, New York 10007 White Plains, New York 10606 Marc L. Parris, Esq.

Jeffrey M. Blum County Attorney New York University Law School County of Rockland 423 Vanderbilt Hall 11 New Hempstead Road Washington Square South New City, New York 10010 New York, New York 10012 Donald Davidoff, Director Radiological Preparedness Group Empire State Plaza Tower Building - Room 1750 Albany, New York 12237

d O

Joan Miles Alan Latman, Esq.

Indian Point Coordinator 44 Sunsent Drive New York City Auducon Society Croton-on-Hudson, New York 10520 71 W. 23rd Street, Suite 1823 New York, New York 10010 Richard M. Hartzman, Esq.

Lorna Salzman Greater New York Council on Friends of the Earth, Inc. '

Energy 208 West 13th Street c/o Dean R. Corren, Director New York, New York 10011 New York University 26 Stuyvesant Street Zipporah S. Fleisher New York, New York 10003 West Branch Conservation Association Atomic Safety and Licensing 443 Buena Vista Road Board Panel New City, New York 10956 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mayor F. Webster Pierce Washington, D. C. 20555 Village of Buchanan 236 Tate Avenue Atomic Safety and Licensing Buchanan, New York 10511 Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Judith Kessler, Coordinator Commission Rockland Citizens for Safe Washington, D. C. 20555 Energy 300 New Hempstead Road Richard L. Brodsky New City, New York 10956 Member of the County Legislature Westchester County David H. Pikus, Esq.

County Office Building Richard F. Czaja, Esq.

White Plains, New York 10601 330 Madison Avenue f New York, New York 10017 Pat Posner, Spokesman Parents Concerned About Amanda Potterfield, Esq.

Indian Point Box 384 P.O. Box 125 Village Station Croton-on-Hudson, New York 10520 New York, New York 10038 Charles A. Scheiner, Co-Chairperson Ruthanne G. Miller, Esq.

Westchester People 's Action Atomic Safety and Licensing Coalition, Inc. Board Panel P.O. Box 488 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory White Plains, New York 10602 Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Dated: June 21,'1982 New York, New York I NMLbh y toto 29 %

Patricia W. Johnson

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