ML20094J878

Response to Commission 840730 Order Permitting Comments from Parties Re Chairman Gleason Dissent to ASLB Recommendations to Commission.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20094J878
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	08/13/1984
From:	Colarulli P MORGAN ASSOCIATES, POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:	NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
SP, NUDOCS 8408140488
Download: ML20094J878 (14)

Text

I G.30 ..

UNITED STATES T NERICA

' v'N?P" D NUCIEAR RS3UIATORY CmMISSION BEFORE THE CDMMISSIONERS: 3 PS:06 Nunzio J. Palladino, Thomas Chairman M. Roberts U.^CcCFFgUg5ELr g ia

. James K..Asselstine BRl[hE'".

Frederick M. Bernthal Lando W. Zech,' Jr.

)

In the Matter of )

)

CONSOLIDATED EDISON CGPANY OF ) Ebcket Nos.

NEW YORK, INC. ) 50-247 SP (Indian Point, Unit No. 2) ) 50-286 SP

)

PGER AUIEORITY OF THE STATE OF )

NEW YORK ) August 13, 1984 -

(Indian Point, Unit No. 3) )

)

POER AUIHORITY'S RESPONSE TO THE CGMISSION'S ORDER OF JULY 30, 1984 The Power Authority of the State of New York (Power Authority),

licensee of Indian Point Unit No. 3, hereby responds to the Nuclear Regulatory Camission's (Ccmnission's) Order of July 30, 1984, which permitted coments fran parties to the Indian Point Special Proceeding regarding the dissent by Chairman James Gleason to the Atcmic Safety and Licensing Board's (Board's) Reccmmendations to the Ccanission. <

The Board majority recomended that the Comnission consider the potential consequences of low proba-

bility accidents at sites such as Indian Point, I Zion, Linerick, and Salem, were the consequences of a severe accident would be greater than at most -

other sites, and . . . require that the risk decrease as potential consequences increase l

Therefore, we reconmend that the Canmission factor 8408140488 840813 gon Anocn emogg g S()-

. I, l

1 into its deliberations the potential consequences I of a low probability accident at Indian Point . . . .

Recommendations to the Cmmission at 105 (Oct. 24,1983) (Reccamenda-tions). his proposal constitutes a new, undefined standard for the Indian Ibint. plants, and a limited number of other plants, that tes not examined or litigated during the Indian Point Special Proceeding.

Chairman Gleason dissented fran this recomnendation because it " singles out the Indian Point facilities to the exclusion of many other sites similarly situated [and) in effect raises again the question of considering consequences without their associated probabilities."

Recomendations at 433 (Dissenting Views of Judge Gleason).1 The Board majority's new standard ignores the Cmmission's focus ,

when this Special Proceeding was initiated: the Ccmmission in January 1981 directed the Board to assess the risk of the Indian Point plants and stated that it " intend [ed] to cmpare Indian Ebint to the spectrum of risks fran other nuclear power plants." Memorandum and Order, 13 N. R.C . 1, 6 ( 1981 ) .

As Judge Gleason recognized, tne Ccmnission repeatedly " restricted" the board fran considering consequences without probabilities.

Recmmendations at 433. When the Ccmnission directed the reconsider-ation of each contention in July 1982, it was because the Board had not <

required that contentions and subsequent testimony discussing a " release scenario must include a discussion of the probability of such a release

1. We Power Authority initially comented upon Chairman Gleason's dissent included in Licensees' Connents on the Reccmmendations of the Indian Point Special Proceeding Licensing Board at 29-32 (Feb. 6,1984).

for the specific Indian Point plants." Metrorandum and-Order at 16 (July.

27, 1982) (atphasis added) (July Order), aucting Order at 3-4 n.5 (Sept.

18, 1981). - "(I]n direct contradiction to the Ccumission's direction,"

the Boccd had not applied this instruction to "the preparation and filing of parties' testinony." July Order at 16.

Because an assessment of risk requires examination of both the probability and consequences of an accident, see Reccmmendations at 26, special consideration of_ low probability high consequence accidents does what the Ccmmission refused to permit the parties to do - it considers site-specific consequences without relating them to any probability, site specific or otherwise.

The Board majority proposes unlawfully and unconstitutionally to

- single cut Indian Ibint, and a limited number of other plants,1 for special treatment despite its own finding that "[t]he chance of a severe release here is probably no greater, and may be less, than elsewhere."

Reconmendations at xi (emphasis added).2 No basis exists in the record of the Special Proceeding for such singling cut of Indian Point. As Chairman Gleason observed, "even the expert witness for Intervenor, Union of Concerned Scientists, conceded on crcss-examination, that twenty-five (25) sites listed in his testimony had the potential for t

1. While the Board majority referred to the Zion, Limerick, and J Salem nuclear power plants, it is clear that other plants also rnay be i included in its proposed new standard.

2. In addition, licensees identified numerous design features which "could lead to lower frequencies of major releases frcm the Indian l

Ebint containment than frcm some others." Recomendations at 340-42. j l

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severe-consequences." Id. at 435. '

Chairman Gleason properly noted that the Board's proposed new standard "seems to suggest an absolute and not the adequate protection called for by the Atanic Energy Act." Id_.

d at 433. Congress authorized the Comission to license a nuclear power plant upon a finding that the

-facility "will provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public." 42 U.S.C. S 2232(a) (etphasis added). As the Comission has stated regarding this standard, Congress did not elaborate further on the neaning of " adequate protection," but it is reasonable to conclude that such a standard, as distinguished for exanple fran " absolute" protection, left roon for scme degree of health impact on the public ccmmensurate with the benefits of having a nuclear -

pcwr progran. "Adecuate" : rotection inclies a realistic iudament. W Any consideration of the role of low probability-high consequence accidents should be in a generic administrative proceeding. In its May 30, 1980 Order establishing the Special Proceeding, the Ccanission stated that it would conduct " generic consideration of the question of i

1. 46 Fed. Reg. 39,573, 39,580 (1981) (enphasis added).

khile the Catanission~ brings its best judgnent to the task of applying the phrases " adequate -

protection" or "no undue risk" to individual '

cases, we do not do so in a vacuum. A country that builds highways, that licenses airplanes, that regulates coal mines, has clearly not established "mro risk" or "mro deaths" as a legal or noral absolute.

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Id. at 39,580; accord Citizens for Safe Power, Inc. v. NRC, 524 F.2d T291, 1297 (D.D.C. 1975) ("[albsolute or perfect assurances are not - - -

required [by the Atanic Energy Act], and neither present technology nor public policy admit of such a standard").

. ._. ._-~_. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _

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5-l operation of reactors in areas of high population density." Order at 2,

.May

( 30, 1980) (enphasis added). 'Ihus the singling out of Indian Point without generic consideration is inappropriate.

Both the licensees and the NRC Staff presented extensive testimony

't at the Special Proceeding on the results of their ptobabilistic risk assessments (PRAs). 'Ihe record shows that the risk of the Indian Point plants is extremely low and well within the range of risk at other-operating ruclear plants. Staff testified during the Special Proceeding that, although PRA has weaknesses as well as strengths, it is the best means available to evaluate the risk of nuclear power plants. Tr. 7225-26 (Staff witnesses Rowsane, Blond), see Menorandum and Order,13 N.R.C.

at 6. Robert K. Weatherwax, witness for intervenors UCS/NYPIRG, noted '~

that PRAs afford the best models for deriving estimates of risk.

UCS/NYPIRG Testimony of Robert K. Weatherwax on the Indian Pcint Probabilistic Safety Study at 4. Additionally, the Ccunission has required PRAs of new plants and is using PRA methodology in its Interim Reliability Evaluation Program and its Reactor Safety Study Methodology Applications Program.

Acceptance of the new standard proposed by the Board majority could i result in the inplementation of such mitigative features as a filtered C

vented containment syste (FVCS)1 and, thus, ensure the continuation of i

4 d

1. A-filtered vented containment syste is a design intended to

. relieve excess pressure in the containnent by using filtration and stem condensation systes deliberately to release gases to the envirorsnent.

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~ the Indian Pbint litigation. This could occur despite the results of ,

both Staff and-licensees' risk analyses,1 and the Board's conclusion that "{tlhe chance of a severe release here is probably no greater, and may be less, than elsewhere."

Inposition of such a mitigative system at this time would conflict.

with the Ccmnission's current backfitting regulation, which requires a sinwing of " substantial, additional protection which is required for the public health and safety" before the addition of any new "systen" may be ordered at an operating plant. 10 C.F.R. S 50.109 (1983). Addi-

1. The licensees' use of Bayes' Theorem in the Indian Point ,

Probabilistic Safety Study (IPPSS) was appropriate because it is a ~

mathematical formula that provides a method for ccmbining generic industry data, plant specific data, and judgments based upon expert opinion in a mathematically rigorous way. Staff's estimates are based in part on IPPSS as well as upon a different mathematical approach. As the Board noted, Staff's results "did not differ markedly" frcm those of IPPSS. Reconmendations at 44; see Tr. 8797-98 (Staff witness Rowsane).

Moreover, during the initial preparation of IPPSS, and in the period following its initial publication, the Power Authority has made many improvements to Indian Point Unit 3 based upon the analyses in IPPSS. In addition, research presented by licensees during and subsequent to the hearings has shown that the WNSH-1400 source terms are overly conservative by at least a factor of 1000, and that consequence analyses using revised source terms show that there are no early fatalities by virtue of the low amount of fission products released to the environment at contairment failure and that latent fatalities are a factor of 1000 smaller than those calculated with WP6H 1400 source tenns. Licensees' Testimony of William R. Stratton, Walton A. Rodger, .

and Thomas E. Potter on Question One (Stratton, et al., Testinony on Question One). Ongoing research supports these conclusions. See, e.o., .

Risk Management Associates and New York Power Auttority, Source Term Safety Assessment, Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant (July 10, 1984)

, (presented to the Advisory Ccmmittee on Reactor Safeguards, Subccmittees on Class 9 Accidents and on Indian Point, July 23, 1984). Use of more realistic source terms has a great impact on the low probability /high -

consequence accident because the maximum number of consequences is directly related to the amount of fission products that can reach the envirorment.

i tionally, in its backfitting policy statement, the Commission signaled ,

an intention to nove away fran the present backfitting regulation and to inplement-interim rules relating to "each staff-proposed requirement that involves a new staff position or a change .in an existing Staff position" with respect to the licensee. 48 Fed. Reg. 44,173, 44,174 (1983). A draft NRC Manual Chapter 0514 on backfitting states that Staf f nust prepare, on a plant-specific basis, a description of each prcposed new requirement, including "a statement of how the requirement would improve safety." 49 Fed. Reg. 16,900,16,902 (Apr. 20,1984).

Objections by licensees to the inposition of backfits would require that Staff assess the costs and benefits of the proposed requirenents. Id_.

at 16,904.

Testimony by Staff and licensees' witnesses, with which ttie Board concurred, showed that mitigating features such as a FVCS are not necessary because of the already low risk of the Indian Point plants.1 No FVCS exists in any American conmercial nuclear power plant. Tr. 6841 (Staff witness J. Meyer); Bley/ Richardson Testimony on Contentions

1. Licensees' Testimony of Dennis C. Bley and Dennis C. Richardson on Contentions 2.l(a) and 2.l(d) at 26 (Bley/ Richardson Testinony on Contentions 2.l(a) and 2.l(d); Direct Testimony of Frank Rowsone and Roger Blond Concerning Conmission Question Five [C] at 13-15; Recan- ,

mendations at v, 151.

Additionally, overestimation of source terms results in over-statement of early fatality risk, disprogortionately so for densely populated sites. Tr. 12,611 (Staff witness Bernero); Licensees' '

Testinony of Thomas E. Potter on Canmission Question Five at 11. Using realistic source terms, there would be no early fatalities fran an accident at Indian Point, even if no one evacuates or takes shelter for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Stratton, et al. , Testimony on Question One at 62, 64a (Figure 2); see Licensees' Testinony on Canmission Question One and Board Question 1.1 and Contention 1.1, at 125-27.

2.l(a) and 2.l(d) at 9. We relevance to the Indian Ibint plants of the.

FVCS at two non-ccmmercial test reactors in the United States and to the future installation of an FVCS at several European reactors was not

. established in the extensive record of this proceeding. See Tr. 6402-03; 6841-42, 6874 (Staff witness J. Meyer). It is clear that a proposed INCS could not withstand the scrutiny of the cost benefit analysis which would be necessary.1 Mitigative devices, such as a FVCS, will not reduce the maximum consequences of a postulated accident; rather, a FVCS would nerely lower the already low probability of that level of consequence occurring.

Intervenor UCSAYPIRG identified Barseback, a Swedish boiling water

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reactor, as being scheduled for installation of a FVCS by 1986, and '-

reconmended this type of INCS for the Indian Point plants.2 However, no plant-specific analysis has been performed applying this concept to Indian Point, see Bley/ Richardson Testinony on Contentions 2.l(a) and 2.l(d) at 9,19; Tr. 6192 (UCS$YPIRG witness Thcupson), and even UCS A YPIRG admitted that such application could require nore research.3 Tr. 6224 (hatpson). Significantly, no FVCS design has been

1. W e cost of this mitigating device, which has not been shown to reduce the already low risk of the Indian Point plants, has been a estimated at as much as S100 million. Power Authority's Proposed Findings of Fact (Canmission Ouestions One and Two) No. 449,

2. UCS$YPIRG Testimony of Gordori R. Thcznpson and Steven C. Sholly -

on Canmission Question Lo, Contentions 2.l(a) and 2.l(d) at 12,15-16,

3. There are significant differences between Barseback and the -

Indian Ibint plants. Barseback is a boiling water reactor with a pressure suppression type of contairunent while the Indian Point plants are pressurized water reactors with large, dry containments. The Indian .

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perfected to the point that the potential for it causing containant -

failure has been evaluated successfully or even evaluated as to the amount of engineering effort necessary to eliminate the failure potential of a FVCS system. Tr. 6388 (Licensees witness Bley). Fran an engineering perspective, therefore, it is not presently clear that such mitigating devices are feasible. These and other problems will have to be explored further if such devices are actually proposed.

CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Ccenission should adopt Chairman Gleason's dissent and reject the Board majority's proposed new standard, which was not examined or litigated during the Indian Point Special Proceeding. -

Point plants, therefore, have totally different containment pressures and volums fran Barseback. Tr. 6380 (Licensees witness Richardson).

'Ihe volume of the Barseback containment was estimated to be less than one-half that of the Indian Point containments, which is particularly significant because, for a given containment strergth, the smaller the containnent, the earlier the containent is likely to fail. Tr. 6199-200 (UCS/NYPIRG witness thcznpson). Moreover, the decision to install a FVCS at Barseback was rM le withcut an adequate assessent of its risk reduction capability. Tr. 6391 (Licensees witness Richardson).

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Respectfully subnitted, ,

l Charles % rgan, Jr.

Paul F. Colarulli Joseph J. Levin, Jr.

lORGAN ASSOCIATES, GARTERED 1899 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 466-7000 Stephen L. Baum General Counsel Charles M. Pratt Assistant General Counsel POER AUIHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Licensee of Indian Point Unit 3 -

10 Columbus Circle ~

New York, New York 10019 (212) 397-6200 Bernard D. Fischman Michael Curley Richard F. Czaja David H. Pikus SHEA & GOULD 330 Madison Avenue New York, New York. 10017 (212) 370-8000 Dated: August 13, 1984 a

+ -~

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,

Before the Commissioners:

Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman 00(gg7g Thomas M. Roberts USA James' K. Asselstine Frederick M. Bernthal Lando W. Zech, Jr. 'gy ASO 13 PSI: 06

[Ohkkk n% tit.:

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y BR hck

. In the Matter of )

)

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF ) Docket Nos.

NEW YORK, INC. ) 50-247 SP (Indian Point, Unit No. 2) ) 50-286 SP

)

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF. ) August 13, 1984 NEW YORK )

(Indian Point, Unit No. 3) )

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on the 13th day of August, 1984, I caused a copy of Power Authority's Response to the i' - Commission's Order of July 30, 1984, to be served by hand on those marked with an asterisk, and by first class mail, postage prepaid, on all others:

i l

• Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman

• Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal

( Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 l

• Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts

• Commissioner Lando W. - Zech, Jr.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555

• Commissioner James K. Asselstine Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

_ _ ,m.. . , . . ,-. v , _ , , ,v w

1,. . -i, James P. Gleason, Chairman . Charles M. .Pratt, Esq.

Administrative Judge. Stephen-L. Baum, Esq.

Atomic Safety and Licensing. Board Power Authority of the 513 Gilmoure-Drive State of New York Silver. Spring, Maryland 20901 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 Mr. Frederick J. Shon Administrative ~ Judge Janice Moore, Esq.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Counsel for NRC Staff U.S. Nuclear. Regulatory Office of the Executive Commission . Legal Director

,- Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 20555 Washington, D.C.

Dr. Oscar H. Paris Administrative Judge Brent L. Brandenburg, Esq.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Assistant General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Consolidated. Edison Company Commission of New York, Inc.

Washington, D.C. 20555 4 Irving Place New York, New York 10003

• Docketing and Service Branch Of fice of the Secretary Ellyn R. Weiss, Esq.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission William S. Jordan, III, Esq.

Washington, D.C. 20555 Harmon and Weiss 1725 I Street, N.W., Suite 506 Joan Holt, Project Director Washington, D.C. 20006 Indian Point Project-New York Public Interest Research Charles A. Scheiner, Co-Chairperson Group Westchester People's Action 9 Murray Street Coalition, Inc.

New York, New York 10007 P.O. Box 488 White Plains, New York 10602 Jeffrey M. Blum, Esq.

New York University Law School Alan Latman, Esq.

423 Vanderbilt Hall 44 Sunset Drive 40 Washington Square South Croton-On-Hudson, New York 10520 New York, New York 10012 Ezra I. Bialik, Esq.-

Charles J. Maikish, Esq. Steve Leipzig, Esq.

Litigation Division Environmental Protection Bureau The Port Authority of New York New York State Attorney and New Jersey General's Office One World Trade Center Two World Trade Center New York, New York 10048 New York, New York 10047 Andrew P. O'Rourke Westchester County Executive 148 Martine Avenue White Plains, New York 10601

! , Andrew S. Roffe, Esq.

l New York State Assembly Albany, New York 12248

11 .,

Marc ^L. Parris, Esq. Atomic Safety and Licensing Eric Thorsen, Esq. Board Panel County Attorney U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission County of Rockland Washington, D.C. 20555 11 New Hempstead Road New City, New York 10956 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel Phyllis Rodriguez, Spokesperson U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Parents Concerned About Indian- Washington, D.C. 20555 Point P.O. Box 125 .

Honorable Richard L. Brodsky Croton-on-Hudson, New York 10520 Member of the County Legislature Westchester County Renee Schwartz, Esq. County Office Building Paul Chessin, Esq. White Plains, New Ycrk 10601 Laurens R. Schwartz, Esq.

Margaret Oppel, Esq. Zipporah S. Fleisher

,Botein, Hays, Sklar and Hertzberg West Branch Conservation 200 Park Avenue Association New York, New York 10166 443 Buena Vista Road New City, New York 10956 Honorable Ruth W. Messinger Member of the Council of the Mayor George V. Begany City of New York Village of Buchanan District #4 236 Tate Avenue City Hall Buchanan, New York 10511 New York, New York 10007 Judith Kessler, Coordinator Greater New York Council Rockland Citizens for Safe Energy on Energy 300 New Hemstead Road c/o Dean R. Corren, Director New City, New York 10956 New York University 26 Stuyvesant Street David H. Pikus, Esq.

New York, New York 10003 Richard F. Czaja, Esq.

Shea & Gould Joan Miles 330 Madison Avenue Indian Point Coordinator New York, New York 10017 New York City Audubon Society 71 West 23rd Street, Suite 1828 Amanda Potterfield, Esq.

New York, New York 10010 New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc.

Richard M. Hartzman, Esq. 9 Murray Street, 3rd Floor Lorna Salzman New York , New York 10007 Mid-Atlantic Representative Friends of the Earth, Inc. David R. Lewis, Esq.

208 West 13th Street Atomic Safety and New York, New York 10011 Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Stanley B. Klimberg, Esq. Commission General Counsel Washington, D.C. 20555 N,ew York State Energy Office 2 Rockefeller State Plaza Albany, New York 12223

i l '. . ;

Mr. Donald Davidoff Director, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Group Empire State Plaza Tower Bui-lding, Rm. 1750 Albany, New York 12237 Craig Kaplan, Esq.

National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee 175 Fifth Avenue, Suite 712 New York, New York 10010

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[

Michael D. Diederich, Jr., Esq.

Attorney-At-Law 11 South Highland Avenue (Route 9W)

Nyack, New York 10960 Steven C. Sholly Union of Concerned Scientists 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Suite 1101 Washington, D.C. 20036 Spence W. Perry Office of General Counsel Federal Emergency Management Agency 500 C Street, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20472 Stewart M. Glass Regional Counsel Room 1349 Federal Emergency Management Agency 26 Federal Plaza New York, New York 10278 Melvin Goldberg Staff Attorney New York Public Interest Research Group 9 Murray Street New York, New York 10007 Jonathan L. Levine, Esq.

P. O. Box 280 New City, New York 10958 '*%

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