ML20094J897

Comments on ASLB Chairman Gleason Dissent in Recommendations of Special Proceeding.Significant Risk Reduction Already Accomplished at Facility.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20094J897
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	08/13/1984
From:	Brandenburg B CONSOLIDATED EDISON CO. OF NEW YORK, INC.
To:	NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
SP, NUDOCS 8408140493
Download: ML20094J897 (12)

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,03 ( - p UNITED STATES T N4 ERICA titX' LEAR IEEULATORY CCM4ISSION BEEVRE TIE GMiISSIONERS: $U Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman '

'Ihomas M. Ibberts James K. Asselstine g $@ f4 Frederick M. Bernthal OE136 Lando W. Zech, Jr. 'Cfjg

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In the Matter of

) Docket Nos.

CONSOLIDATED EDISON C01PANY T 50-247-SP NEW YORK, DC. ) 50-286-SP (Indian Point, Unit No. 2)

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POER AUTHORITY T 'HE STATE OF NEW ERK ) August 13, 1984 (Indian Point, Unit No. 3)

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X CON IDISON'S CortMES 01 TIE LICENSDG BOARD CHAIINAN'S DISSEIE IN TIE RE00ffE0ATIONS T 'I1E INDIAN POINF SPECIAL PROCEEDDG Consolidated Edison Conpany of New York, Inc. (" Con Edison"), licensee of Indian Point Unit tb. 2, submits these carents pursuant to the Conmission's Order of July 30, 1984. 'Ihat Order permitted the parties to the Indian Point Special Proceeding to subnit cunents on the dissenting views of Chaiman James P. Gleason as set forth at pages 433-35 of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's October 24, 1983 Recommendations to the Comission. Con Edison wishes to emphasize that Chainnan Gleason's dissent, which is the only subject addressed in these coments, does not indicate broad areas of disagreement anong the Board members, the IEC Staff or the licensees. All of these parties 840

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appear to concur in the Board's unanimous conclusion that the continued

[ - operation of the Indian Nint units poses ro undue risk to the public and that l the early fatality arri delayed cancer risks posed by Indian Point are a very smil fraction of the ron-nuclear tackground risks to which the population around Indian Ibint'is exposed. Licensees and Staff further concur with the Board's conclus' ion that such major nodifications to the plant as filtered vented containments and separate containments are not warranted.

'Ihe majority of the Board urged adoption l . of a severe accident standard for same l sites more stringent than that established by the NBC's existing body of regulations, to which Chairmn Gleason procerly objected.

In its orders of Jantury 8 and September 18, 1981 the Oxmission asked the Licensing Board to m ploy probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques to evaluate the risk of serious accidents at Indian Point. We do not believe that

the Conmission intended to imply any inadequacies in the safety levels achieved i

by the licensecs' compliance with all of the licensing requirements immwvi by NBC on operating reactors generally. Instead, the Conmission in essence said "take the Indian Ibint plants in their present state and location, and tell us

- using the only quantitative discipline we are aware of, PRA - what the risks of the plants are under the existing, in-place ' background' level of licensing regulation." The Comission's orders went on to say that the Board could also develop a record on further safety measures not required by existing NBC regulations if it appeared that they might be effectim in reducing risk.

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.. .. p 01 airman Gleason differed with the other Board nembers as -tn the logical step proocsses the majority followed in concluding that at least one

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sudi measure was appropriate and should kn revelai to the Commission for inposition.on this one site. . As its rationale for proposing that the Indian T Point licensees be required to implement a safety assurance program, the Board majority suggested that certain unspecified "high consequence" accidents could occur at the Indian Point, Zion, Limerick and Salm sitea (Recmmendations at 105), and without regard to the extremely low probability or likelihood that these accidents could occur, it was therefore preferable for the hPC to require a further safety measure at Indian Point that is not required anywhere else.

The majority in affect said " forget how unlikely it is that a serious accident-could occur, and just focus on low bad the mnsequences could be." As maiman Gloason noted, this was just what the Board had been asked not to do by the Comission's initial orders, as well as its supplemental orders of July 27, 1982 and Septaber 17, 1982. The Comission's consistent guidance throughout

[ the pro cding had emphasized that consequences should only be mnsidered in l conjunction with their associated probabilities.

Chaiman Gleason also appears to have faulted the majority's logic in at least two other respects, and in both instances Con Edison is in agreement with the Chairman. First, by definition risk consists of the product of multiplying two cmponents: the probability of the event occurring, and the consequences should the event occur. If one's goal is to assess risk, then an understanding of both elements is essential, and if either one is missing then i

risk simply cannot be assessed. Pbr purposes of safety planning, it matters very much whether events of potential significanoe occur once in a decade or

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!. j once in 100,000 years. Chaiman Gleason properly faulted the majority's proposal to make nomentous decisions about exceeding current NRC recralations on a site-by-site basis while purposely ignoring the likelihocri that the accidents of concern might occur.

Secondly, the Board majority made its reccrnendation for further efforts to reduce risk in the fa of a record which the Board itself unanimously found to demonstrate an exceedingly low level of risk for the plants as is. The NPC Staff testified that a rigorous examination of safety IcVels showed that the contribution to risk of early accidental death posed by serious reactor accidents at Indian Point is roughly 2.5 parts per rtillion of the background risk averaged over a 50-mile radius of the plant, or 0.0000025 percent of the overall risk of accidental death in the vicinity of the site.

Recomendations at 64. Staff also determined that the contribution of severe accidents at Indian Ibint to the incidence of delayed cancer fatalities within 50 miles of the units was roughly 11 parts per million, or 0.00001 percent of the overall backgrouM cancer fatality risk. Reccmendations at 66. 'Ibe Board unanimously concluded tlut "the average annual early fatality risk and delayed cancer fatality risk, as calculated by PRA, are very small fractions of the ccupeting background non-nuclear risks." Pecommendations at 108.

With the hearing record clearly establishing that the risk of Indian Point was this low corpared to other risks, mairnan Gleason could rot understand how multi-million dollar excursions beyoM existing NRC safety requirements could pssibly be justified. As he put it, "the reccrenndation seems to suggest an absolute and rot the adequate protection called for by the Atomic Energy att. It also tends to ignore an extensive body of rtyulation

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s. thaE has been enacted for the safe opera. tion of nuclear power facilities which produce such low probabilities of accidents." Reccmnendations at 433.

Con Edison wholeheartedly. agrees. Whether high consequence accidents can occur or rot (see below), the fact remins that the nest ophisticated quantitative ranking of the'public health risks confronting persons in the vicinity of Indian Ibint demonstrates that the plants do not contribute

.significantly. Great uncertainty.in the PRA results can be conceded and this bottom line does not change. 'this being the case, substantial additional expenditures to drive the risk even lower simply cannot be justified.

The record before the Board does tut support tlw presumption of the majority that high conseauence accidents might occur.

The Board majority's initial premise in reaching its ultimte conclusion to recumend inposition of an additional safety measure at Indian Point and three other sites was that " dangerous, low probability accidenrs . . . could, as staff testimony has shcun, result in fatalities that ntanber in the hundreds or thousands." Reconnendations at 107.

Con Edison does not believe that the hearing record supports the

majority's premise. Dcpert testirony offered by licensees at the hearings established that the anount of radioactive material which would be released in t

the event of a severe accident would be significantly less than had been

- supposed in earlier risk estimtes such as the 1974 Reactor Safety Study (RSS). These witnesses offered testinony regarding data from Three Mile Island and a number of other actual accidents as well as prior research and experihtal data which confirmed that physical and chemical processes would

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.. . p reduce the amount of radionuclides that could be released. 'Ihe witnesses presented their om estimates of realistic source tems for the dominant accident sequences at Indian Point. Licensees' experts concluded, inter alia, that there would be no early fatalities from any accident scenarios at Indian Point, and that latent fatalities would be such that the consequences of even a

" worst case" accident would be similar to other, large-scale industrial accidents.

The Staff's witness testified that the NRC had no data or information I

which were inm nsistent with licensees' testimony on the release of radioactive mterials. He also testified that the RSS methodology for source term calculation as uso:1 in Staff testimony leads to overestimates of risk.

On this uncontroverted record, which as a legal matter the Board was not entitled to ignore, Con Edimn subnits that there is simply no basis for concluding that " dangerous" accidents with fatalities "in the hundreds or thousands" might occur at Indian Point. Since the Board majority's decision to urge a further safety neasure proceeds from such an unsupprted assumption, as proposed by Chairman Gleason it should be discarded by the Cctriission.

Chaiman Gleason appropriately opposed a proposal to bias the IRC's safety emphasis towards accidents presumed to be of high mnsecuence.

After making unsupported assumptions as to radionuclide behavior, which led to the conclusion that high consequence accidents might occur, the mjority then made a leap of logic to conclude that nuclear plants located in more densely populated areas in the northeastern United States should be made safer than others. Even assumiry that the safety assurance program reconmended L

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by the Board majority nay be successful in reducing Indian Point risk even lower (which is without support in the record), the net result would be that persons living in the vicinity of Indian Point would enjoy a " safer" plant than persons living near a plant in another area, where such a program was not required.

It was this dilenna which was of particular interest to former Cor1missioners Hendrie, Ahearne and Gilinsky in the Ccmnission's discussions throughout 1980 and 1981 on the proper focus for these hearings. Ormissioner Hendrie in particular questioned the wisdan arxl the legality of a regulatory approach that would require reductions in the aggregate, societal risk around operating plants locatal in nore densely populated areas, when the inevitable consequence of such a tulicy would be to make the risks to individuals living in the vicinity of various plants more unequal, because sone safety measures would be required at a few sites but not others.

Whethar the Connission's efforts to maintain nuclear plant safety from site to site should be directed towards equating individual risks, on the one hand, or aggregate societal risks, on the other, is perhaps a major policy question. It certainly appeared so to more than one Comnissioner mveral years ago when this proceeding was being established, although it seems to have become nore of a theoretical question as recent research on radionuclide behavior and source terms has gained broader acceptarx:e and virtually eliminated site-to-site variations in potential accident consequences.

Nonetheless, the Board majority - without any discussion of the issue at all

-- presumed that the nest appropriate safety direction for the Ormission to take would be to attspt to lower aggregate societal risk at scme sites. The l

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mjority's failure to acknowledge that such a policy would inevitably widen any differences between risks to individuals at various sites at the very least substantially weakens the proposal. Chairnan Gleason appropriately opposed it, stating that "the Board appears to be reccreending a new standard exclusively for Indian Point (and three other plants). . . . "

Rcwmendations at 433-34.

The Chairman's dissent correctly observed that risk reducing measures have already been inplemented at Indian Point, which was inplicitly disregarded by the majority.

In his dissenting views, Clairman Gleason objected to the rajority's reliance on a statement in the 1980 Task Force Peport* attempting to ocmpare plant and site risks separately at various plants. Chairman Gleason emphasized that "the Task Force Report was issued prior to the probabilistic risk assessments made to date on 14 or 15 nuclear power facilities, including Indian Point. . .. It is nore than likely that the probability of a further reduction in risk discussed by the Task Force has already been accomplished."

Pecamendations at 434.

The record before the Licensing Board clearly establishes that the accident risk posed by Indian Point has already been substantially reduced by voluntary licensee actions taken since the 1980 Task Force Report. lpon the cmpletion of the Indian Point Probabilistic Safety Study (IPPSS) in 1982, licensees infomed the conmission and the Board that on their own initiative they were making certain plant modifications at both units in order to take

• Report of the Zion / Indian Point Task Ebrce, NUREG-0715 (August 1980).

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• advantage of risk reduction masures identifid in the course of the study.*

'Ibese masures include structural modifications to reduce seismic vulnerability at both units, changes in electrical connections to certain safety equiprnt to reduce fire vulnerability at both units, and adoption of an anticipatory shutdown procedure to reduce hur-icane vulnerability at Unit 2.

Uncontested testimony in the hearings established that taken together, these measures substantially reducM the likelihood of a severe accident at Indian Point belos the already laa level which had existed previously. In fact, the Board itself unanimously concluded elsewhere in its Pc<:crnmendations that "at Indian Point significant safety improvemnts have been mde as a result of IPPSS and the Sandia review." Becmnendations at 40 n.19. Chairman Gleason was therefore correct in rejecting the mjority's reliance upon statemnts made in 1980, prior to the cmpletion of IPPSS and the making of the plant nodifications which inproved safety. It is indeed established fact that at Indian Point, significant risk reduction "has already been acccrplished," as stated by the Chairman.

Resp 3ctfully submitted, Dated: New York, New York Brent L. Brandenburg August 13, 1984 Assistant General Counsel CDNSOLIDATED EDISCN (X11PANY OF NEW YORK, IPC.

Licensee of Indian Point Unit 2 4 Irving Place New , New York 10003 (212 60-4600

• See Reconrundations at 46-47, and the thrch 5,1982 letter from John D.

O'Toole and J. Phillip Bayne to Harold R. Denton transmitting the IPPSS to the Commission.

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.- . j-CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE-I hereby certify that on the 13th day of August, 1984, I' caused a copy of Con Edison's Comnents on the Licensing Board Chairman's Dissent in the Reccumendations Of 'Ibe' Indian Point Special Proceeding Licensing Board to be served by first class mail, postage precaid, on:

Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman Docketirg and Service Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission Office of the Secretary Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccumission Washington, D.C. 20555 Iando W. Zech, Jr, Ccmmissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission Joan Holt, Project Director Washington, D.C. 20555 Indian Point Project New York Public Interest Research Thcmas M. Roberts, Ccumissioner Group U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission 9 Murray Street Washington, D.C. 20555 New York, New York 10007 James K. Asselstine,-Ccmmissioner Jeffrey M. Blum, Esq.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission New York University Law School Washington, D.C. 20555 423 Vanderbilt Hall 40 Washington Square. South Frederick M. Bernthal, Ccmmissioner New York, New York 10012 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission Washington, D.C. 20555 Charles J. Maikish, Esq.

Litigation Division James P. Gleason, Chainnan 'Ihe Port Authority of New York Administrative Judge and New Jersey Atonic Safety and Licensing Board One World Trade Center 513 Gilmoure Drive New York, New York 10048 Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 Charles M. Pratt, Esq.

Mr. Frederick J. Shon Stephen L. Baum, Esq.

Administrative Judge Power Authority of the Atcmic Safety and Licensing Board State of New York U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 10 Columbus Circle Ccmnission New York, New York 10019.

Washington, D.C. 20555 Janice Moore, Esq.

Dr. Oscar H. Paris Counsel for NRC Staff Administrative Judge Office of the Executive Atanic Safety and Licensing Board Iegal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission Ccmnission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555

Paul F. Colarulli, Esq. Renee Schwartz, Esq.

Josett J. Iavin, Esq. Paul Chessin, Esq.

Susan Kaplan, Esq. Laurens R. Schwartz, Esq.

Morgan Associates, Chartered Mawaret Oppel, Esq.

1899 L Street, N.W. Botein, Hays, Sklar and Hertzberg Washington, D.C. 20036 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166' Ellyn R. Weiss, Esq.

William S. Jordan, III, Esq. Honorable Ruth W. Messinger Harmon and Weiss Member of the Council of the 1725 I Street, N.W., Suite 506 City of New York Washington, D.C. 20006 District #4 City Hall Charles A. Scheiner, Co-Chairperson New York, New York 10007 Westchester People's Action Coalition, Inc.

Greater New York Council P.O. Box 488 on. Energy Khite Plains, New York 10602 c/o Dean R. Corren, Director New York University Alan Latman, Esq. 26 Stuyvesant Street 44 Sunset Drive New York, New York 10003 Croton-On-Hudson, New York 10520 Joan Miles Ezra I. Bialik, Esq. Indian Point Coordinator Steve Iaipzig, Esq. New York City Audubon Society Environmental Protection Bureau 71 West 23rd Street, Suite 1828 New York State Attorner New York, New York 10010 General's Office

'IWo World Trade Center Richard M. Hartzman, Esq.

New York, New York 10047 Iorna Salzman Mid-Atlantic Representative Andrew P. O'Rourke Friends of the Earth, Inc.

Westchester County Executive 208 West 13th Street 148 Martine Avenue New York, New York 10011 Nhite Plains, New York 10601 Stanley B. Klimberg, Esq.

Andrew S. Roffe, Esq. General Counsel New York State Assembly New York State Energy Office-Albany, New York 12248 2 Rockefeller State Plaza Albany, New York 12223 Marc L. Parris, Esq.

Eric Thorsen, Esq. Atcmic Safety and Licensing County Attorney Board Panel County of Rockland U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Carmission 11 New Hempstead Road Washington, D.C. 20555 New City, New York 10956 Atonic Safety and Licensing Phyllis Rodriguez, Spokesperson Appeal Board Panel Parents Concerned About Indian U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Carmission Point Washington, D.C. 20555 P.O. Box 125 Croton-on-Hudson, New York 10520

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a . . . f-Honorable Richard L. Brodsky David R. Iawis, Esq.

Member of the Ccunty Iagislature Atcmic Safety and Licensing Board Westchester County Panel Ccunty Office Building U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccnmission hhite Plains, New York 10601 Washington, D.C. 20555 Zipporah S. Fleisher Michael D. Diederich, Jr., Esq.

West Branch Conservation Attorney-At-Law Association 11 South Highland Avenue (Route 9W) 443 Buena Vista Road Nyack, New York 10960 New City, New York 10956 Steven C. Sholly Mayor George V. Begany Union of Concerned Scientists Village of Buchanan 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.-

236 Tate Avenue Suite 1101 Buchanan, New York 10511 Washington, D.C. 20036 Judith Kessler, Coordinator Spence W. Perry.

Rockland Citizens for Safe Energy Office of General Counsel 300 New Henstead Road Federal Emergency Management Agency New City, New York 10956 500 C Street, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20472 David H. Pikus, Esq.

Richard F. Czaja, Esq. Stewart M. Glass Shea & Gould Regional Counsel 330 Madison Avenue Roan 1349 t ew York, New York 10017 Federal Emergency Management Agency 26 Federal Plaza Amanda Potterfield, Esq. New York, New York 10278 New York Public Interest Research Grcup Melvin Goldberg 9 Murray Street, 3rd Floor Staff Attorney New York, New York 10007 New York Public Interest Research Group Mr. Donald Davidoff 9 Murray Street Director, Radiological Emergency New York, New York 10007 Preparedness Group Empire State Plaza Jonathan L. Iavine, Esq.

Tower Building, Rm. 1750 P. O. Box 280 Albany, New York 12237 New City, New York 10958 Craig Kaplan, Esq.

Invinson, Mogulescu & Kaplan 9 East 40th Street New York, New York -10016 b Jn

' M ent L. Brandenburg

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