Letter Sequence Other |
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MONTHYEARML20069C9481983-03-14014 March 1983 Answer Opposing PASNY Motion to Strike KT Erikson Testimony. Testimony Relevant to Contentions 3.2 & 3.7 & Is Based on Erikson Personal Knowledge Project stage: Other ML20073E2841983-03-14014 March 1983 Review of Licensee Resolution of Outstanding Issues from NRC Equipment Environ Qualification SERs (F-11 & B-60), Oconee Nuclear Station,Unit 3, Technical Evaluation Rept Project stage: Other 1983-03-14
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Category:LEGAL TRANSCRIPTS & ORDERS & PLEADINGS
MONTHYEARJPN-99-029, Comment Supporting Proposed Rules 10CFR50 & 72 Re Reporting Requirement for Nuclear Power Reactors1999-09-20020 September 1999 Comment Supporting Proposed Rules 10CFR50 & 72 Re Reporting Requirement for Nuclear Power Reactors ML20212E4181999-09-15015 September 1999 Petition Per 10CFR2.206 Requesting OL for Unit 2 Be Modified or Suspended to Prevent Restart Until Reasonable Assurance That Licensee in Substantial Compliance with Terms of OL & Has Proper Consideration for Public Health & Safety JPN-99-022, Comment Supporting Proposed Rule 10CFR50 Re Requirements for Industry Codes & Stds1999-06-22022 June 1999 Comment Supporting Proposed Rule 10CFR50 Re Requirements for Industry Codes & Stds ML20202J6321999-01-20020 January 1999 Transcript of 990120 Meeting in Peekskill,Ny Re Decommissioning.Pp 1-132.With Related Documentation ML20198E9721998-12-21021 December 1998 Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed Activities. Orders That Wh Clark Prohibited for 1 Yr from Engaging in NRC-Licensed Activities JPN-98-052, Comment Supporting Proposed Rules 10CFR50,52 & 72 Re Changes,Tests & Experiments.Util Endorses & Supports Position Presented by NEI & Commends Commission for Initiative to Address Disconnects1998-12-21021 December 1998 Comment Supporting Proposed Rules 10CFR50,52 & 72 Re Changes,Tests & Experiments.Util Endorses & Supports Position Presented by NEI & Commends Commission for Initiative to Address Disconnects ML20198L2731998-12-21021 December 1998 Comment Supporting NEI Re Proposed Rules 10CFR50, 52 & 72 Re Changes,Tests & Experiments JPN-98-050, Comment on Proposed Rule 10CFR50 Re Monitoring Effectiveness of Maint at Nuclear Power Plants.Encourages NRC Staff to Withdraw Proposed Change & to Work with Nuclear Power Industry & Other Stakeholders to Accomplish Goal1998-12-14014 December 1998 Comment on Proposed Rule 10CFR50 Re Monitoring Effectiveness of Maint at Nuclear Power Plants.Encourages NRC Staff to Withdraw Proposed Change & to Work with Nuclear Power Industry & Other Stakeholders to Accomplish Goal ML20155F4561998-08-26026 August 1998 Demand for Info Re False Info Allegedly Provided by Wh Clark to Two NRC Licensees.Nrc Considering Whether Individual Should Be Prohibited from Working in NRC-licensed Activities for Period of 5 Yrs ML20238F5271998-05-20020 May 1998 Partially Deleted Transcript of 980520 Enforcement Conference in King of Prussia,Pa Re J Stipek.Pp 1-46 IA-98-261, Partially Deleted Transcript of 980520 Enforcement Conference in King of Prussia,Pa Re J Stipek.Pp 1-461998-05-20020 May 1998 Partially Deleted Transcript of 980520 Enforcement Conference in King of Prussia,Pa Re J Stipek.Pp 1-46 ML20238F5241998-05-0606 May 1998 Transcript of 980506 Enforcement Conference Held in King of Prussia,Pa Re Con Edison,Indian Point.Pp 1-75 JPN-97-037, Comment on Final Direct Rule Changes to Paragraph (H) of 10CFR50.55a Codes & Standards. Effective Date of New Rule Should Be Delayed Until Listed Concerns Can Be Resolved & Appropriate Changes Incorporated1997-12-0101 December 1997 Comment on Final Direct Rule Changes to Paragraph (H) of 10CFR50.55a Codes & Standards. Effective Date of New Rule Should Be Delayed Until Listed Concerns Can Be Resolved & Appropriate Changes Incorporated ML20148M6471997-06-19019 June 1997 Comment Opposing Porposed NRC Bulletin 96-001,suppl 1, CR Insertion Problems ML20133N0511997-01-0505 January 1997 Comment Opposing Proposed Rule 10CFR50, Draft Policy Statement on Resturcturing & Economic Deregulation of Electric Util Industry ML20149M4621996-12-0909 December 1996 Comment Opposing Proposed Rule 10CFR50 Re Draft Policy Statement on Restructuring & Economic Deregulation of Electric Utility Industry ML20077G3481994-12-0808 December 1994 Comment on Proposed Rule 10CFR2,51 & 54 Re Nuclear Power License Renewal ML20070P0561994-04-19019 April 1994 Comment Supporting Proposed Rule 10CFR50 Re NRC Draft Policy Statement on Use of Decommissioning Trust Funds Before Decommissioning Plan Approval ML20029C5771994-03-11011 March 1994 Comment on Proposed Rule 10CFR20 Re Draft Rule on Decommissioning.Informs That 15 Mrem/Yr Unreasonably Low Fraction of Icrp,Ncrp & Regulatory Public Dose Limit of 100 Mrem/Yr ML20059C3031993-12-28028 December 1993 Comment Supporting Petition for Rulemaking PRM-21-2 Re Definition of Commercial Grade Item ML20045H8751993-07-19019 July 1993 Comment on Proposed Rule 10CFR55 Re Exam Procedures for Operator Licensing.Supports Rule ML20045F2451993-06-28028 June 1993 Comment on Proposal Re Radiological Criteria for Decommissioning NRC-licensed Facilities.Opposes Proposed Criteria ML20044F5681993-05-20020 May 1993 Comment on Draft Commercial Grade Dedication Insp Procedure 38703,entitled Commercial Grade Procurement Insp. Endorses NUMARC Comments Dtd 930517 JPN-02-034, Comment Supporting Proposed Rule 10CFR50.54 Re Receipt of Byproduct & Special Nuclear Matl1992-07-0606 July 1992 Comment Supporting Proposed Rule 10CFR50.54 Re Receipt of Byproduct & Special Nuclear Matl JPN-91-021, Comment on Proposed Rules 10CFR71,170 & 171, Rev of Fee Schedules;100% Fee Recovery. Endorses NUMARC Comments. Approx 300% Increase in NRC Fees for FY91 Will Have Major Impact Upon Operating & Maint Budgets of Plants1991-05-13013 May 1991 Comment on Proposed Rules 10CFR71,170 & 171, Rev of Fee Schedules;100% Fee Recovery. Endorses NUMARC Comments. Approx 300% Increase in NRC Fees for FY91 Will Have Major Impact Upon Operating & Maint Budgets of Plants JPN-91-005, Comment Re SECY-90-347, Regulatory Impact Survey Rept. Util Concurs W/Numarc Comments.Analysis of Info from NUREG-1395 Insufficient to Complete Evaluation.Root Cause Analysis of Seven Themes Listed in SECY-90-347 Recommended1991-01-28028 January 1991 Comment Re SECY-90-347, Regulatory Impact Survey Rept. Util Concurs W/Numarc Comments.Analysis of Info from NUREG-1395 Insufficient to Complete Evaluation.Root Cause Analysis of Seven Themes Listed in SECY-90-347 Recommended ML20066G4411991-01-23023 January 1991 Comments on Proposed Rule 10CFR2,50 & 54 Re Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal.Substantive Typo in 901015 Filing on Behalf of Licensee Noted ML20058G6341990-10-30030 October 1990 Comment Opposing Proposed Rule 10CFR26 Re fitness-for-duty Program JPN-90-068, Comment Supporting Proposed Rule 10CFR51 Re Renewal of Nuclear Plant OLs & NRC Intent to Prepare Generic EIS1990-10-22022 October 1990 Comment Supporting Proposed Rule 10CFR51 Re Renewal of Nuclear Plant OLs & NRC Intent to Prepare Generic EIS ML20065H7541990-10-15015 October 1990 Comment Re Proposed Rules 10CFR2,50 & 54 on Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal.Commission Assessment of Four Alternatives Should Be Expanded to Include Not Only Safety Considerations But Other Atomic Energy Act Objectives JPN-90-067, Comment on Proposed Rules 10CFR2,50 & 54 Re Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal.Endorses Comments Submitted by NUMARC1990-10-15015 October 1990 Comment on Proposed Rules 10CFR2,50 & 54 Re Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal.Endorses Comments Submitted by NUMARC JPN-90-052, Comment Supporting Petition for Rulemaking PRM-50-55 Re Revs to FSAR1990-07-0909 July 1990 Comment Supporting Petition for Rulemaking PRM-50-55 Re Revs to FSAR JPN-90-050, Comment on Proposed Rule 10CFR55 Re Operators Licenses Mod for fitness-for-duty.Proposed Rule Will Place More Stringent Restrictions on Licensed Operators & Unnecessary1990-07-0202 July 1990 Comment on Proposed Rule 10CFR55 Re Operators Licenses Mod for fitness-for-duty.Proposed Rule Will Place More Stringent Restrictions on Licensed Operators & Unnecessary ML20012C6491990-03-0909 March 1990 Comment on Proposed Rule 10CFR50, Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against PTS Events. Any Utilization of NRC Proposed Application of Reg Guide 1.99, Rev 2,would Be Inappropriate W/O re-evaluation by NRC ML20005F6521989-12-13013 December 1989 Comment on Proposed Draft Reg Guide DG-1001, Maint Programs for Nuclear Power Plants. Util Concurs w/industry-wide Position Presented by NUMARC & Offers Addl Comments ML20246P6061989-07-0707 July 1989 Comment Opposing Proposed Rule 10CFR50, Acceptance of Products Purchased for Use in Nuclear Power Plant Structures,Sys & Components. Significant & Independent Industry Efforts Already Underway to Address Issue ML20245K1941989-06-16016 June 1989 Comment on Proposed Rules 10CFR50,72 & 170 Re Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel in NRC-Approved Storage Casks at Nuclear Power Reactor Sites JPN-89-008, Comment Opposing Proposed Rule 10CFR50 Re Ensuring Effectiveness of Maint Programs for Nuclear Power Plants1989-02-27027 February 1989 Comment Opposing Proposed Rule 10CFR50 Re Ensuring Effectiveness of Maint Programs for Nuclear Power Plants ML20235V9011989-02-24024 February 1989 Comment Opposing Proposed Rule 10CFR50 Re Ensuring Effectiveness of Maint Programs for Nuclear Power Plants. Supports NUMARC Position.Proposed Rule Will Hinder Important Initiatives to Improve Maint JPN-88-063, Comment on Proposed Rule 10CFR26 Re Fitness for Duty Program.Util Has Constitutional Concerns Re Proposed Random Testing Which Should Be Fully Addressed Prior to Rule Being Promulgated.Endorses NUMARC & EEI Comments1988-11-18018 November 1988 Comment on Proposed Rule 10CFR26 Re Fitness for Duty Program.Util Has Constitutional Concerns Re Proposed Random Testing Which Should Be Fully Addressed Prior to Rule Being Promulgated.Endorses NUMARC & EEI Comments ML20205L8521988-10-21021 October 1988 Comment Opposing Proposed Rule 10CFR20 Re Cleaning or Disposing of Nuclear Waste.Incineration of Radwaste Oil Should Not Be Allowed JPN-88-015, Comment Opposing Proposed Rule 10CFR50 Re Licensee Announcements of Inspectors.Rule Includes Requirement Contrary to Mgt Notification Practices.Rule Should Clarify Length of Time Applicable Once Inspector Arrives on Site1988-04-18018 April 1988 Comment Opposing Proposed Rule 10CFR50 Re Licensee Announcements of Inspectors.Rule Includes Requirement Contrary to Mgt Notification Practices.Rule Should Clarify Length of Time Applicable Once Inspector Arrives on Site JPN-88-002, Comment Supporting Proposed Rule 10CFR50 Re Proposed Policy Statement on Integrated Schedules for Implementation of Plant Mods.Concerns Re Schedule as License Amend Expressed1988-01-25025 January 1988 Comment Supporting Proposed Rule 10CFR50 Re Proposed Policy Statement on Integrated Schedules for Implementation of Plant Mods.Concerns Re Schedule as License Amend Expressed JPN-87-062, Comment on Proposed Rules 10CFR4,11,25,30,31,32,34,35,40,50, 60,61,70,71,73,74,75,95 & 110 Re Retention Period for Records.Proposed Changes Ineffective in Reducing Record Vol & Rule Remains Inconsistent & Complex1987-12-31031 December 1987 Comment on Proposed Rules 10CFR4,11,25,30,31,32,34,35,40,50, 60,61,70,71,73,74,75,95 & 110 Re Retention Period for Records.Proposed Changes Ineffective in Reducing Record Vol & Rule Remains Inconsistent & Complex JPN-87-053, Comment Supporting Proposed Rule 10CFR50 Re Revising Backfitting Process for Power Reactors.Minor Alterations Urged Re Conditions Under Which Backfit Needed to Assure Adequate Protection1987-10-15015 October 1987 Comment Supporting Proposed Rule 10CFR50 Re Revising Backfitting Process for Power Reactors.Minor Alterations Urged Re Conditions Under Which Backfit Needed to Assure Adequate Protection JPN-87-051, Comment Opposing Draft NUREG-1150, Reactor Risk Ref Document. Reduced Uncertainty in Risk Assessment Found to Be Significant W/Respect to NUREG-1150.NUREG Also Does Not Consider Value of Operator Actions.Addl Comments Encl1987-09-28028 September 1987 Comment Opposing Draft NUREG-1150, Reactor Risk Ref Document. Reduced Uncertainty in Risk Assessment Found to Be Significant W/Respect to NUREG-1150.NUREG Also Does Not Consider Value of Operator Actions.Addl Comments Encl ML20235Y9911987-07-20020 July 1987 Notice of Issuance of Director'S Decision Under 10CFR2.206 Re Emergency Planning for School Children in Vicinity of Indian Point.* Request to Suspend OLs Denied ML20151C5061987-02-18018 February 1987 Comment Opposing Proposed Rule 10CFR50 Re Licensing of Nuclear Power Plants Where State &/Or Local Govts Decline to Cooperate in Offsite Emergency Planning ML20093H6421984-10-15015 October 1984 Comments on Staff Presentation at Commission 841002 Meeting. Commission Should Conclude Proceedings Due to Inescapable Conclusion That Facility Safe to Operate & Poses No Undue Risk to Public.Certificate of Svc Encl ML20098D2721984-09-26026 September 1984 Comments on Commission 840905 Meeting Re Facilities,Per Sj Chilk 840911 Memo.Licensee Agrees W/Staff That Further Mitigative Features or Plant Shutdown Unnecessary Due to Low Risk.Certificate of Svc Encl 1999-09-20
[Table view] Category:PLEADINGS
MONTHYEARML20212E4181999-09-15015 September 1999 Petition Per 10CFR2.206 Requesting OL for Unit 2 Be Modified or Suspended to Prevent Restart Until Reasonable Assurance That Licensee in Substantial Compliance with Terms of OL & Has Proper Consideration for Public Health & Safety ML20094J7571984-08-13013 August 1984 Responses to 840730 Unpublished Order Directing NRC & Inviting Other Parties to Submit Views on Judge Gleason Dissent Re ASLB Recommendation Concerning Accident Probability.Certificate of Svc Encl ML20094J8781984-08-13013 August 1984 Response to Commission 840730 Order Permitting Comments from Parties Re Chairman Gleason Dissent to ASLB Recommendations to Commission.Certificate of Svc Encl ML20094J8971984-08-13013 August 1984 Comments on ASLB Chairman Gleason Dissent in Recommendations of Special Proceeding.Significant Risk Reduction Already Accomplished at Facility.Certificate of Svc Encl ML20084J8521984-05-0404 May 1984 Response Opposing New York Pirg (Nypirg) Petition for Suspension of Operation.Nypirg Fosters Discord Which Inhibits Coordination of Emergency Planning Efforts. Certificate of Svc Encl ML20088A4711984-04-0606 April 1984 Petition for Suspension of Operation to Relieve Unacceptable Risk to Area School Children.Issue of Emergency Planning for Schools Must Be Resolved.Certificate of Svc Encl ML20024C3731983-07-0707 July 1983 Memorandum Opposing Pirg of New York Motion for Reconsideration of Commission 830610 Order.Pirg Should Not Be Permitted to Relitigate Arguments Fully Considered & Ruled Upon by Commission ML20024C3761983-07-0707 July 1983 Response Opposing Pirg of New York Motion for Reconsideration of Commission 830610 Order.Motion Untimely, Identifies No Matters of Fact or Law & Improperly Raises New Issues.Certificate of Svc Encl ML20072E8211983-06-23023 June 1983 Response Supporting Pirg of Ny Motion for Reconsideration of Commission 830609 Decision,Permitting Facility Operation W/O Restriction Despite Continued Noncompliance W/Emergency Planning Requirements.Certificate of Svc Encl ML20072D6241983-06-22022 June 1983 Motion for Immediate Reconsideration of Commission 830610 Order CLI-83-16 Permitting Continued Plant Operation. Commission Did Not Consider Current Status of Emergency Planning in Decision.Certificate of Svc Encl ML20072H5781983-06-22022 June 1983 Request 2-wk Extension to File Findings of Fact for Commission Questions 3 & 4.Atty Familiar W/Case Resigned ML20072E8241983-06-22022 June 1983 Answer Opposing Intervenor Motion for Extension of Time to Submit Proposed Findings.Motion Is Attempt to Delay Hearings.If Intervenor Motion Granted,Exemption Should Apply to All Parties.Certificate of Svc Encl ML20072D6291983-06-21021 June 1983 Motion for Extension Until 830711 to File Proposed Findings of Fact.Time Needed Since Intervenors Filing Consolidated Findings & One Atty Suffered Death in Family. Certificate of Svc Encl ML20071P3111983-06-0303 June 1983 Response Opposing Friends of the Earth/New York City Audubon Soc Request to File I Levi Affidavit.Testimony by Affidavit Improper Since No cross-examination Possible.Certificate of Svc Encl ML20071L5421983-05-24024 May 1983 Response Opposing Licensee Motion for Reconsideration of ASLB Denial of Licensee Motion to Admit Dp McGuire Testimony Before Trial ML20023D9341983-05-20020 May 1983 Response Opposing Util 830509 Motion for Reconsideration. Deposition Inadmissible as Evidence Under Federal Rules ML20071G9761983-05-20020 May 1983 Motion for Leave to Submit Written Comments on NRC 830505 Order to Suspend Facility Operations.Deficiencies Determined to Be Significant by FEMA Are Not Sufficiently Deficient to Require Suspending Operations ML20023D0941983-05-13013 May 1983 Motion for Opportunity to Address Issues Outlined in Commission 830505 Order CLI-83-11 Establishing Procedures for Decision on Enforcement Action.Intervenor Entitled to Participate as Matter of Right.Certificate of Svc Encl ML20074A4541983-05-11011 May 1983 Motion for Extension of Deadline (to 830615) for Filing Corrections to Transcripts & Deadline (to 830624) for Filing Comments.Certificate of Svc Encl ML20074A4461983-05-0909 May 1983 Motion for Reconsideration of Ruling Denying Licensee Motion to Receive Dp McGuire Deposition Transcript Into Evidence. Licensees Entitled to Place Deposition in Record. Certificate of Svc Encl ML20073S8781983-05-0909 May 1983 Motion for Opportunity to Address Issues Outlined in Commission 830505 Order CLI-83-11,establishing Procedures for Decision on Enforcement Action on Emergency Planning Issues.Certificate of Svc Encl ML20073S8801983-05-0606 May 1983 Motion for Extension of Deadline Until 830627 for All Parties to Submit Proposed Opinion,Findings of Fact & Recommendations Re Enforcement Action on Emergency Planning Issues.Certificate of Svc Encl ML20204G2681983-04-27027 April 1983 Motion to Amend Svc List to Add Sp Wasserman & Delete P Chessin,Lr Schwartz & M Oppel.Notice of Appearance & Certificate of Svc Encl ML20073R3471983-04-26026 April 1983 Motion Requesting Initiation of Studies on Human Response to Radiological Emergencies,Risks to Individuals Living Near Site & Difficulty of Evacuation in Emergency ML20073R3531983-04-25025 April 1983 Motion Requesting Completeness of Record on NRC Questions 3 & 4 Re Emergency Planning Issues,Including Capability for Handling Phone Calls in Emergency Planning Zone During Emergency ML20069L1181983-04-22022 April 1983 Motion to Strike Selected Intervenor Testimony Re 830309 Emergency Exercise.Testimony Cumulative,Repetitive, Conclusory,Lacks Adequate Foundation & Irrelevant. Certificate of Svc Encl.Related Correspondence ML20069L2131983-04-22022 April 1983 Motion for Admission Into Evidence of EPZ Tour Documents, Exhibits CE-11,CE-11A & CE-11B ML20204G3251983-04-22022 April 1983 Motion to Strike Portions of 830309 Emergency Drill Testimony Under Commission Questions 3 & 4 Filed by Witnesses for Various Intervenors.Certificate of Svc Encl.Related Correspondence ML20069K6031983-04-20020 April 1983 Motion to Compel Deposition of FEMA Witnesses P Mcintire, J Keller,R Kowieski & RW Krimm & to Preclude Witnesses from Presenting Testimony at 830426-29 Hearings Outside Scope of 830309 Exercise.W/Certificate of Svc ML20073G0351983-04-12012 April 1983 Motion for Approval of Encl Stipulation Re Intervenor Observation of 830309 Radiological Preparedness Exercise ML20073G1271983-04-12012 April 1983 Motion for Extension to Submit Testimony on Contention 6.2. Expert Witnesses a Stewart,B Brazelton & D Bohning Will Not Be Able to Testify Until Late May 1983.Findings of Fact Should Be Due 10 Days After Testimony.W/Certificate of Svc ML20073G1461983-04-11011 April 1983 Further Response in Opposition to Licensee 830407 Motion to Impose Sanctions.Motion Unrelated to Discovery.Draft Testimony Privilege Not Waived by Submitting Testimony Early.Certificate of Svc Encl ML20073B7361983-04-0707 April 1983 Further Suppl to Motion to Impose Sanctions on Greater New York Council on Energy.Komanoff Comments on Study & Aug-Sept 1982 Version of Study Must Be Produced.Use of Oct 1982 Study Should Be Precluded.W/Certificate of Svc ML20073L6361983-04-0707 April 1983 Further Suppl to Motion to Impose Sanctions on Greater New York Council on Energy,D Corren & Energy Sys Research Group, Inc.Depositions & Ltr Support Conclusions of Intentional Frustration of Util Discovery Rights.W/Certificate of Svc ML20072R7441983-04-0101 April 1983 Response to New York Pirg 830329 Motion for Order Requiring Production of Documents Re 830309 Emergency Planning Exercise.Exercise Evaluations Sought Should Be Regarded as Privileged.Certificate of Svc Encl ML20073C6581983-04-0101 April 1983 Motion for Submission,Under Commission Question 5,of Bl Cohen 830124 Testimony on Commission Question 1.ASLB Refused to Admit Testimony Under Question 1 But Testimony Is Relevant to Question 5.Certificate of Svc Encl ML20072N2641983-03-25025 March 1983 Response Opposing Licensee Motion for Sanctions Against D Corren,Greater New York Council on Energy & Esrg,Inc. Council Did Not Intentionally Withhold Discoverable Matls. Clarifies Misunderstandings.Certificate of Svc Encl ML20069H5671983-03-24024 March 1983 Response to Licensee Motion to Compel Under Commission Question 6.Resources Unavailable to Develop Study on Health Effects.Parents Concerned About Indian Point Does Not Bear Burden of Proof.W/Certificate of Svc.Related Correspondence ML20072K0991983-03-23023 March 1983 Suppl to Motion to Impose Sanctions Against D Corren,Greater Ny Council on Energy & Energy Sys Research Group,Inc for Failure to Produce Oct 1982 Study, Economics of Closing Indian Point Nuclear Power Plants. Related Correspondence ML20072L4521983-03-21021 March 1983 Motion to Strike Portions of Testimony of Some Rockland County Witnesses on Questions 3 & 4.Testimony Conclusory & W/O Supporting Factual Basis.Foundation Does Not Exist for Factual Matl Introduction.Certificate of Svc Encl ML20069F5191983-03-18018 March 1983 Motion for Time to Present Evidence Re 830309 Radiological Emergency Response Planning Exercise.Presentation Needed to Complete Record.Certificate of Svc Encl ML20069F4861983-03-17017 March 1983 Motion to Impose Sanctions Against D Corren & R Rosen of Greater Ny Council on Energy & Energy Sys Research Group,Inc for Failure to Respond to Interrogatories.Certificate of Svc Encl ML20069B8281983-03-14014 March 1983 Motion to Strike Certain Intervenor Prefiled Testimony Under Commission Questions 3 & 4 Re Emergency Planning Filed on 830311.Licensees Denied Any Meaningful Right to Discovery from Witnesses.Certificate of Svc Encl ML20069D0141983-03-14014 March 1983 Response Opposing Licensee Motion to Compel Greater Ny Council on Energy Further Response to Interrogatories.Motion Inappropriate & Unnecessary.Interrogatories Were Unclear & Burdensome.Certificate of Svc Encl ML20069C9481983-03-14014 March 1983 Answer Opposing PASNY Motion to Strike KT Erikson Testimony. Testimony Relevant to Contentions 3.2 & 3.7 & Is Based on Erikson Personal Knowledge ML20069D0871983-03-14014 March 1983 Motion for Waiver of Requirement to Distribute Indian Point 3 Emergency Plan & Emergency Planning Implementation Procedures Document to All Parties.Plans Are Voluminous & Expensive to Produce ML20069D1441983-03-14014 March 1983 Motion to Compel West Branch Conservation Assoc & Parents Concerned About Indian Point Further Responses to Licensee First Set of Interrogatories Under Commission Question 6.W/ Certificate of Svc.Related Correspondence ML20069D0491983-03-14014 March 1983 Motion to Strike Selected Intervenor Testimony.Objects to Intervenor 830311 Witness List for Commission Questions 3 & 4,presenting 99 Witnesses in 5 Days.Testimony Is Cumulative, Conclusory,Hearsay or W/O Foundation.W/Certificate of Svc ML20071F0001983-03-11011 March 1983 Motion to Amend Svc List to Include AP O'Rourke,New Westchester County Executive.Certificate of Svc Encl ML20071E5321983-03-0909 March 1983 Response Opposing Intervenor 830228 Motion for Extension of Deadlines to Complete Record on Emergency Planning Issues in Commission Questions 3 & 4.ASLB Resolved Scheduling Question.Certificate of Svc Encl 1999-09-15
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s W UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION NI 17 gg 47 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
)
CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK ) Docket Nos. 50-247 SP (Indian Point Unit 2) ) 50-286 SP POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK March 14, 1983 (Indian Point Unit 3) )
OPPOSITION OF UCS/NYPIRC AND PARENTS CONCERNED ABOUT INDIAN POINT TO PASNY'S MOTION TO STRIKE TESTIMONY OF DR. KAI T. ERIKSON
.I I. The Testimony is Relevant to Contentions 3.2 and 3.7 Dr. Erikson's supplemental testimony relating to the findings of studies commissioned by Suffolk County, Long Island and which became Volume III of the Suffolk County Radiological Emergency Response Plan represents the most probative of all available evidence regarding human response to an evacuation (contention 3.2) and the problems of evacuating children (contention 3.7) . Whereas the Licensees' testimony submitted on that subject, the testimony of Drs. Lecker and Dynes, attempts to prove that human response to a radiological emergency will be the same as to any previous emergency, Dr. Erikson presents, in his testimony, the experience i
of Three Mile Island and that of the studies in Suffolk County the only available evidence about human response in a radiological emergency.
II. The Testimony is Based on Dr. Erikson's Personal Knowledge As Licensees concede, the Suffolk County study was accomplished with the help of Dr. Erikson, an accomplished sociologist . whose testimony on I 8303180217 830314 PDR ADOCK 05000247 O PDR @
- t
. =
the survey was accepted by the Suffolk County Legislature in January, 1983. A copy of that testimony is annexed hereto. Dr. Erikson's primary role in the study is documented by pages 30 and 35 of the testimony of Suffolk County Executive Peter Cohalan, also presented to the Suffolk County Legislature. A copy of those relevant pages is also attached.
Licensees do not dispute the authenticity of the document entitled Volume III of the Suffolk County Radiological Emergency Plan, but rather challenge only Dr. Erikson's competence to identify it and cmument on it.
The correct procedure is for the Licensees' attorneys to voir dire Dr. Erikson about his involvement in the draf ting and design of the study, in order that the Board can make its decision on the basis of the sworn testimony of Dr.
Erikson, rather than on the allegations of the lawyers for the Licensees.
WHEREFORE, UCS/NYPIRG and Parents Concerned About Indian Point request that the Hetion to Strike be denied; or, in the alternative, that a ruling on the Motion to Strike be postponed until after a voir dire of Dr. Erikson.
Dated: New York, New York March 14, 1983
@c -h- f AMANDA POTTERFIELD, ESQ.3 NYPIRG 9 Murray St., 3rd Floor New York, New York 10007 212-349-6460 On Behalf of Intervenors:
Union of Concerned Scientists New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc.
Parents Concerned About Indian Point ~
-- m -v- w m-
l TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUFFOLK COUNTY LEGISLATURE REGARDING EMERGENCY PLANNING 1 FOR THE SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION 3
BY Kai Erikson, Ph.D.
Professor of Sociology Yale University January 24, 1983
1 . -
TESTIMONY BY KAI ERIKSON, Ph.D.
I would like to speak today to a single concern that is crucial to any radiological emergency response plan - especially when evacuation may be called for.
The Draft Suffolk County plan -- and, indeed, every plan of its kind I am aware of -- relies upon personnel to respond i promptly to perform various kinds of emergency work in the event of a radiological accident at the Shoreham Nuclear Power P'lant.
There is a considerable body of evidence, however, to suggest that large numbers of people who are now counted on to aid in the evacuation of Suffolk County citizens in the areas surrounding the Shoreham plant will probably not be available in the initial stages of evacuation, if at all. And in their l
absence, we have no reason to suppose that the evacuation can be carried out successfully.
l It is not a question as to whether these emergency ;
l personnel are brave or responsible or loyal. It is a question as to whether their sense of obligation to their families l will outweigh their sense of obligation to the role assigned I i
them in the emergency response plan. Neither choice can be considered "right" or " wrong": both halves of the dilemma ;
involve the most noble of human feelings.
In my field, sociology, we generally call this " role conflict," using the term to refer to situations in which j l
people are torn between two contrary feelings of responsi-bility and obligation -- in particular, the sense of duty 1
1 one feels as the member of a fardly and a parent, and the sense of duty one feels as the niember of an emergency team. l Most emergency plans gener: ally assume that virtually 1
everyone called upon will resolve the conflict in favor j i
of reporting to emergency duty. That assumption, it seems l
- to me, flies in the, teeth of common sense as well as what we know about human behavior in moments of crisis. ;
Who are we talking about? Police officers at the local, i county, and state levels will have extremely important roles to play in the event of an emergency, and we can take it more or less for granted that most of them will report. But the success of the emergency plan depends upon the active cooperation of many other people a.s well -- people to drive school buses and to accompany the children who ride them, people to staff the communications centers and the reception centers, people to monitor the spread of radiation and work with decontamination teams, people to drive ambulances and tow trucks and all the other vehicles that will have to be brought into play to transport the disabled and those without working vehicles of their own, people to repair roads and establish traffic control checkpoints and, in general, carry out the 1
j hundreds of other tasks that would, in a real emergency, be
.i required. What will these people do if an emergency is .
- declared at Shoreham and the neighborhoods in the vicinity of the plant are advised to evacuate?
.i
1 l
Now it has been common experience in other types of disasters that emergency personnel report as asked, and there are j those offering testimony to the Suffolk County Legislature who take great comfort from that finding. That comfort, however, is ill placed, for the situation we are discussing here in planning for a radiological emergency at Shoreham is quite different from the other kinds of human disasters.
In the first place, I know of no situations, anywhere, in which emergency personnel reported to duty without knowing that their families had been safely evacuated from the danger zone. The emergency plan that Suffolk County considers should not ask people to do that.
In the second place, as you heard a moment ago from Drs. Johnson and Zeigler, emergencies that involve widespread contamination in general and ionizing radiation in particular.
are different from the ordinary run of natural disasters and human. accidents. The evidence shows clearly that people are more afraid of radiation than they are of other potential sources of danger, and it is not hard to understand why.
t Radiation cannot be seen, touched, heard, smelled, tasted, or sensed in any other direct way, so people have no way of knowing whether or not they are being exposed to it. And, to make matters a good deal worse, people who suspect that they have been in the presence of radiation cannot know for j years -- for generations, even -- whether or not damage l
- has been done, and, if so, to whom.
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These uncertainties and apprehensions greatly increase ,
the odds that emergency workers with children or other family ;
- members at home will resolve the role conflict by turning to i
them before reporting to emergency duty. The fear that one's family may be in dang'cr has always been a compelling motive in human life, and that fear should be even greater when the potential danger is exposure to radiation. All the past experience from all the other emergencies of which we have information can provide no guide here -- for an emergency of i
this kind has never happened before in human history, except, as you have heard, at Three Mile Island.-
Some people cite the evacuation of Mississagua, Ontario,
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in November 1979, as an indication that large-scale evacuation can be carried out in a successful manner. But it is almost impossible to take comfort from that precedent once one knows what actually happened there. First, the emergency at Mississagua was created by chlorine gas, which has an exceptionally sharp smell, ratherithan ionizing radiation, which has none ,
at all. Being aware of that difference, both the Mayor of Mississagua and the Emergency Planning Coordinator of the Province of Ontario have publically and specifically warned
- that what happened there should not be used to predict what
- would happen in the event of a release of radiation from a t
nuclear power plant elsewhere. Second, the emergency at Mississagua began with an explosion in the middle of a -
Saturday night, and the evacuation began at 4:00 on a Sunday
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morning, when all schools and virtually all stores and
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i places of business were closed. Almost everyone was home.
Almost every family was already assembled. And it would be foolish to assume that the outcome of that emergency would have been the same if most of the young children had been away at school and most of the employed adults had been away at work. Third, the Missisragua evacuation was phased over a relatively relaxed period of more than 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />, and .that is a luxury we dare not assume in planning for a potential future accident involving radiation. -
The Radiological Emergency Response Plan Steering, Committee decided that studies of the people of Suffolk County themselves should be commissioned so that we do.not s need to speculate about or rely on the past behavior of people who live hundreds of miles away and have responded to circumstances wholly unlike the ones we must be prepared.for here.
You have heard the results of one of those studies from Drs. Johnson and zeigler. I would Ifhe to describe the -
results of two others, involving,the attitudes of volunteer firemen and school bus drivers whose cooperation will be _-
necessary for the success of any evacuation plan.
In the first study, 291 interviews were conducted by ~
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telephone with members of the five fire departments immediately surrounding the Shoreham plant, three of.which-have mutual aid arrangements with the Wading River Fire Department.
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- Roughly 60% of the members of those departnents were interviewed.
Ninety-eight percent of them were men. The firemen were asked the following question, among others:
Assuming that the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant is licensed and begins to operate, we are interested in knowing what you think you would do if there was an accident at the plant. Suppose that you were at work on a weekday morning and there was an accident at Shoreham. Everyone living with-in ten miles of the plant was advised to evacuate. -Volunteer firemen were expected to help with the evacuation. What do you think you would do first?
Sixty-eight percent of the firemen responded that they would first make sure that their families were safe, while 21% said they they would report first to the fire station. Many of the firemen who checked first with their families would then report to duty: 55% said they would do so relatively quickly --
assuming, of course, that they were able to reassure themselves of the safety of their families -- while 36% would not. More than two-thirds of the firemen, then, would not be available on an immediate basis, and more than a third would not be available at all because they felt drawn to a higher duty.
In the second study, 246 school bus drivers who work in th'e five school districts within ten miles of the Shoreham plant were also interviewed, this time by a self-administered questionnaire. Virtually all of the school bus drivers in that population were contacted. Seventy-seven percent of them were women. The drivers were asked essentially the same question that had been posed to the firemen: what
would you do first in the event of an advisory to evacuate?
Sixty-nine percent of the school bus drivers replied that they would not report to duty until they were sure that their families were safely out of the evacuation zone, while 24% replied that they would report immediately to the tasks assigned to them.
To put the matter in perspective, volunteer firemen were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "In the event of a nuclear emergency at Shoreham, a volunteer fireman must place duty to the fire department over duty to family." Seventy-seven percent of the firemen disagreed, and 17% agreed.
And a similar question was asked of the school bus drivers. In response to the statement "In the event of a nuclear emergency at Shoreham, a school bus driver must place duty to drive the school bus over duty to family,"
74% disagreed, and 12% agreed.
These are striking and important findings. They indicate in the sharpest way that it is reckless to assume that emergency personnel can be counted on to report to duty l
in a Shoreham emergency without assurances that their families are safe. Nor should we be surprised, for, if social and behaviorial scientists know anything, it is that people l
l instinctively turn first to the needs of their own offspring.
l James Cornell put it well:
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First, the basic unit of human life -- the family -- emerges as the single most l important force influencing behavior. )
Survivors rapidly turn their own anxiety l into concern for their kin. A person's l first regard is for saving family members, often at the expense of other victims or
! oneself. Ralph Linton has written, "In l Gotterdammerung . . . the last man will spend his last hours searching for his wife and child."
One thing more. Some may say that surveys of the kind I have been describing here can be wrong; can fail to predict what people will do at some time in the future. That argument
, has to be granted up to a point. Dr. Cole will address that point.
But it is extremely important to remember two things, especially when one is charged with the safety of hundreds of thousands of people.
'In the first place: the results of the two surveys I have reported to you constitute the only relevant information available to us on the subject of role conflict in Suffolk County. To say that those findings are unreliable is to say that people who live in this community cannot be trusted to know their own minds.
In the second place: even if the figures I have reported to you turn out in the long run to be inexact, the problem they address is nonetheless critical. If those figures are only half true, or even a quarter true, it is still difficult to imagine under present circumstances that an evacuation plan can be successful.
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In sum, any evacuation plan that takes for granted the readiness of local emergency workers to report for duty, regardless of family obligations, runs a high -- and, in my
- opinion, unacceptable -- risk of failure. Our research indicates that this risk is a real one in Suffolk County, and it must be dealt with before one can have a workable radiological emergency response plan.
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REPORT OF SUFFOLK COUNTY EXECUTIVE PETER F.* COHALAN CONCERNING RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS I IN SUFFOLK COUNTY 1
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February 16, 1983 l
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, s behavior both at Three Mile Island on Long Island. At Three Mile Island, the Governor of Pennsylvania issued an advisory that preg' nant women and pre-school aged children within 5 miles of the plant should evacuate. An estimated 2,500 persons with-in the five mile area around TMI fit that category; however, the studies of Drs. Johnson and Zeigler, as well as two other studies (Tr. 1100), revealed that over 144,000 persons liriag as far as 15 miles from the plant in fact evacauted. Tr. 1037, 1099; see also testimony of Dr. Stanislav Kasl, Tr. 1399.
This tendency for persons in a radiological emergency to evacuate in great numbers, though not advised to do so, has been labeled the " evacuation shadow phenomenon."
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i' Mindful of this occurrence at TMI, the Steering Committee commissioned a study to investigate whether such behavior might i
occur on Long Island in the event of an accident at Shoreham.
The study, conducted primarily by Drs. Johnson, Erikson, Zeigler, and Cole, consisted of a' random sample telephone survey of more than 2,500 Long Island residents. Dr. Cole's research firm, Social Data Analysts, administered the survey, the results of which are contained in Documents 4 and 5 of volume III of the County's RERP. The focus of the study was upon three nuclear accident scenarios posed to each interviewee. In Scenario One, each interviewee was asked what he or she would do if there was an official advisory that persons within a 5 mile radius of the plant should stay Ah
7F Drs. Erikson and Cole performed two surveys to determine to what extent, if any, the problem of role conflict might hamper the County's response to a radiological emergency. The first survey studied the attitudes of school bus drivers in Suffolk County, who would have a major role in evacuating school children and others from the EPZ. The second survey studied role conflict among volunteer firemen serving fire districts close to the Shoreham plant. During a radiological emergency, volunteer firemen would also be expected to perform various, evacuation duties *. ,
The details of the role conflict studies are contained in Volume III, Document 6 (" Responses of Emergency Personnel To A Possible Accident At The Shoreham Plant") . They reveal that 68 percent of the firemen surveyed indicated they would first care for the safety of their families and therefore would not be available for immediate emergency duty. About 36 percent indi-cated they would not be available at all. Tr., Jan. 24, 1983, Attachment C at 6. With respect to school bus drivers, 69 percent indicated that they would not report to duty until they Tr., Jan. 24, were certain that their families were safe. ,
1983, Attachment C at 7.
Highlighting the implications of these results for radio-logical emergency planning, Dr. Erikson concluded:
These are striking and important findings. They indicate in the sharpest way that it is reckless to assume that emergency personnel can be counted on to AL