ML20054F307

Proposed Findings of Fact,Conclusions of Law & Brief in Form of Proposed Initial Decision.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20054F307
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	06/11/1982
From:	Churchill B LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
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NUDOCS 8206160056
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'a2 Ja i4 A:0:05 Ih _ h, > j'I}Gi s uh n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )

)

LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-382

)

(Waterford Steam Electric )

Station, Unit 3) )

APPLICANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND BRIEF IN THE FORM OF A PROPOSED INITIAL' DECISION SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE Bruce W. Churchill ,

Ernest L. Blake, Jr.

James B. Hamlin Delissa A. Ridgway Counsel for Applicant 8206160056 820611 PDR ADOCK 05000382 G PDR

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"S2 0 ! i4 s!0 :05 June 11, 1982 e  !? -

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.a ra.s UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )

)

LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-382

)

(Waterford Steam Electric )

Station, Unit 3) )

APPLICANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND BRIEF IN THE FORM OF A PROPOSED INITIAL DECISION SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE Bruce W. Churchill Ernest L. Blake, Jr.

James B. Hamlin Delissa A. Ridgway Counsel for Applicant

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. OPINION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 1 A. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 B. Synergism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 C. Emergency Planning and Preparedness . . . . 25

1. The Emergency Plans. . . . . . . . . . 25

2. The Regulatory Framework . . . . . . . 28

3. The Respective Roles of The NRC Staff, FEMA and The Board . . . . . . . . . . 29

4. The Contentions . . . . . . . . . . . 33 (a) Public Education and Information . . . . . . . . . . . 33 (b) Evacuation Time Estimate and Adequacy of Roads . . . . . . . . 36 (c) Public Alert / Notification System . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 (d) Command Decision Structure . . . 43 (e) Evacuation Drills . . . . . . . . 46 (f) Transportation for Special Populations . . . . . . . . . . . 48 (g) Potassium Iodide . . . . . . . . 56 D. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 II. FINDINGS OF FACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 A. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 B. Synergism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 C. Emergency Planning and Preparedness . . . . 66

1. Public Education and Information . . . 66

2. Evacuation Time Estimate and Adequacy of Roads . . . . . . . . . . 73

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3. Public Alert / Notification '

System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

4. Command Decision Structure . . . . . . 87 l 5.. Evacuation Drills . . . . . . . . . . . 97 l

6. Transportation for Special Populations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

7. Potassium Iodide . . . . . . . .. . . 116 I

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 i

IV. ORDER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 1

APPENDIX A -- Direct Testimony Received into Evidence . . . . . . . . A-1 APPENDIX B -- Exhibits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1 i

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APPLICANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND BRIEF IN THE FORM OF A PROPOSED INITIAL DECISION I. OPINION A. BACKGROUND

1. Waterford 3 Nuclear Plant This is a decision on the application for an operating license ("OL") for the Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 ("Waterford 3"), filed by the Louisiana Power & Light Company

(" Applicant").

Following review by the Staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC Staff" or " Staff") and a public hearing before an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, the Construction Permit ,

for Waterford 3 was issued on November 14, 1974. Construction of the plant is now nearly completed; fuel loading is scheduled for January 1983.

Waterford 3 is located on the west bank of the Mississippi River, in St. Charles Parish, Louisiana, between the towns of Xillona and Taft, about 24 miles west of the City of New Orleans. Two fossil-fueled power plants, Waterford Steam ,

Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, are located about 2000 feet northwest of the reactor, and are owned and operated by Applicant. Waterford 3 will employ a pressurized water reactor

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l manufactured by Combustion-Engineering, and will have a maximum l

design thermal output of 3560 megawatts. '

2. Prc edural Background The application for an OL for Waterford 3 was filed with the NRC in September 1978, and was docketed for review on December 18, 1978. In January 1979, the NRC published a Federal Register Notice of " Receipt of Application for Facility Operating License; Availability of Applicant's Environmental Operating Report; Consideration of Issuance of Facility Operating License; and Opportunity for Hearing." 44 Fed. Reg.

125 (January 2, 1979). This notice provided an opportunity for any person whose interest might be affected by the proceeding to request a hearing and file a petition for leave to inter-vene.

Three intervenor groups -- Save Our Wetlands, Inc. and Oystershell Alliance (the " Joint Intervenors") and Louisiana Consumers' League, Inc. -- filed two separate petitions in response to the Federal Register Nos. ice. On April 26, 1979, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ("the Board") convened a special prehearing conference in New Orleans to permit identi-fication of key issues in the proceeding, take any steps necessary for further identification of the issues, consider the intervention petitions and establish a schedule for further t

actions in the proceeding.

! In September 19*/9, the Board admitted the two intervenor groups as parties to the proceeding, and ruled on the admis-sibility of the intervenors' contentions.1/ After entering into a Stipulation with Applicant meeting its concerns, Louisiana Consumers' League, Inc. withdrew from the proceeding, prior to the evidentiary hearing.2/ The Board originally approved the admission of 10 contentions advanced by Joint Interventors,3/ and subsequently admitted 6 additional conten-tions.$/ As a result of Joint Intervenors' withdrawal of 11 contentions,1! and the granting of Applicant's motions for summary disposition and dismissal,5/ two issues remained.

Contention 8/9, regarding synergism, and Contentions 17/26(1) and 17/26(2), regarding emergency planning, were tried in an evidentiary hearing.

1/ " Order" (September 12, 1979),

2/ " Order" (November 13, 1981).

3/ " Order (September 12, 1979).

4/ " Order" (January 11, 1980).

5/ " Order" (November 13, 1981).

6/ " Memorandum and Order (Granting Applicant's Motion to Dismiss Joint Intervenors' Contention 28)" (September 30, 1981); " Memorandum and Order (Granting Applicant's Motion for Summary Disposition of Joint Intervenors' Contention 22)"

(October 20, 1980).

The Board conducted a prehearing conference on March 24, 1982, and received oral limited appearance statements from members of the public on March 23, 24 and 25, 1982. The evidentiary hearings on synergism issues were conducted on March 24-26, 29-31, April 1-2, and May 10-11, 1982, with the Staff, Applicant and Joint Intervenors represented. The evidentiary hearings on emergency planning issues were con-ducted on May 3-7, 11-12, 1982, with all parties -- the Staff, Applicant and Joint Intervenors -- represented. In addition, an attorney representing the Federal Emergency Management Agency (" FEMA") participated with counsel for the Staff in the hearings on emergency planning issues, conducting cross-examination and presenting argument.

The decisional record of this proceeding consists of: the Commission's Notice of Hearing, 47 Fed. Reg. 4371 (January 26, 1982); the petitions and pleadings filed by the parties; the transcripts of tea hearing, including testimony of Applicant, the Staff and Joint Intervenors (see Appendix A) and the exhibits received into evidence (see Appendix B); and NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 (Rev. 1), " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" _

("NUREG-0654"), of which the Board took official notice (Tr.

2360).

This Board's jurisdiction is limited to a determination of findings of fact and conclusions of law on matters properly put into controversy by the parties to this proceeding. 10 C.F.R.

S 2.760(a).

3. Organization of the Initial Decision The Board's Initial Decision begins with the Board's Opinion, Part I of the Decision, which is largely comprised of discussion of the litigated contentions and their resolution, and includes a statement of the controlling law. Parts II and III of the Initial Decision are the Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Board's Order, authorizing the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to issue a full-power license for Waterford 3 upon the satisfaction of certain conditions, is Part IV of the Initial Decision.

B. SYNERGISM Joint Intervenors in their Contention G/9 asserted:

Applicant has failed to properly evaluate the cumulative and/or synergistic effects of low level radiation with environmental pollutants, known or sus-pected to be carcinogens.

At the hearing, testimony was presented by witnesses sponsored by Applicant, Joint Intervenors and the NRC Staff.

Applicant presented testimony by Leonard D. Hamilton, John J.

Mauro, Ralph Kenning, George B. Hutchison and Jacob I.

Fabrikant (Applicant's Testimony on Joint Intervenors' Con-tention 8/9 (Leonard D. Hamilton / John J. Mauro/ Ralph Kenning),

following Tr. 461 (hereinafter cited as " Hamilton, et al.");

Applicant's Rebuttal Testimony of George B. Hutchison on Contention 8/9, following Tr. 3411 (hereinafter cited as "Hutchison"); and Applicant's Rebuttal Testimony of Jacob I.

Fabrikant on Contention 8/9, following Tr. 3627 (hereinafter cited as "Fabrikant")). The NRC Staff presented testimony by Marvin Goldman and Edward F. Branagan, Jr. (NRC Staff Testimony of Dr. Marvin Goldman Regarding Contention 8/9, following Tr. 735 (hereinafter cited as "Goldman"); NRC Staff Testimony of Edward F. Branagan, Jr. Regarding Contention 8/9, following 2

Tr. 767 (hereinafter cited as "Branagan")). The Joint Intervenors presented testimony by Velma Campbell, Hemchandra Pandit, Irwin D. J. Bross and Carl Johnson (Sworn Testimony of l

1

Dr. Velma L. Campbell, following Tr. 1055 (hereinafter cited as

" Campbell"); Sworn Testimony of Dr. Hemchandra Pandit, following Tr. 1218 (hereinafter cited as " Pandit"); Sworn Statement of Dr. Irwin D. J. Bross, following Tr. 1342 (herein-after cited as "Bross"); and Sworn Testimony of Dr. Carl Johnson, following Tr. 1836 (hereinafter cited as " Johnson")).

We start by noting the scope of the contention itself and its thrust--a subject not in dispute among the parties but necessary to an understanding of our disposition of the issue.

Joint Intervenors' concern is that allowing Waterford 3 to operate will result in routine radioactive releases into the plant's environs whose effects when combined with the effects of existing carcinogenic pollutants in the area will cause impacts which have not been taken properly into account.2/ The effects, in Joint Intervenors' view, are cumulative and/or synergistic.

The low level radiation referred to in the contention is that resulting from Waterford 3's normal operation. Potential accident releases and releases from other portions of the uranium fuel cycle were not at issue.8/ Applicant does not 7/ The contention expressly refers to Applicant's failure to properly evaluate impacts. It is clear, however, that Joint Intervenors' quarrel is not merely with Applicant's evaluation but as well with the Staff's FES. In other words, the conten-tion is that certain impacts--perceived by Joint Intervenors to result if Waterford 3 is operated--have not been evaluated properly as required by NEPA (42 U.S.C. S4321 et seq.).

8/ While not directly at issue, upon inquiry by the Board Dr. Mauro confirmed that the effect on persons in the vicinity (Continued Next Page) l deny that during routine operation of Waterford 3, there will be radioactivity released in both gaseous and liquid effluents from the plant. These releases have been estimated by Applicant based on the design of Waterford 3's equipment and the characteristics of the plant site's meteorology, hydrology and geology. Tr. 490-91, 494-99 (Mauro); Branagan, at 2-3.

See generally Staff Ex. 1, Section 5.9 and Appendix J.

Detailed calculations have been performed of the expected offsite doses--both to the average population out to fifty miles, and to hypothetical individuals who are postulated to receive maximum doses, such as by obtaining drinking water directly from the plant's liquid effluent. Hamilton, et al.,

at 4-5; Tr. 498 (Mauro); Staff Ex. 1, Section 5.9 and Appendix J.

Applicant's radiological release estimates and calculated resultant doses to offsite individuals have been submitted to the NRC Staff and reviewed by the Staff. Additionally, the Staff has done its own estimates of releases and calculations of resultant doses. Under NRC's regulations (10 C.F.R. Part (Continued) of the Waterford site due to radioactivity from other compo-nents of the uranium fuel cycle (mining, milling, etc.) are infinitessimally small and would not, by any stretch of the imagination, add substantially to the effects from Waterford 3'c own releases. Tr. 713-14.

50, Appendix I), applicants fcr nuclear power plant licenses are required to demonstrate that a plant when operated can maintain its routine releases below established limits. These limits assure resultant doses to offsite persons are a small fraction of doses due to natural background radiation. See, e.g., Rulemaking Hearing (Appendix I), CLI-75-5, 1 N.R.C. 277, 291 (1975). Waterford 3's license will include technical specifications which bind plant operation in accordance with Appendix I limits. Hamilton, et al., at 4.

Applicant's and the Staff's calculations of Waterford's releases both demonstrate compliance with NRC's regulatory limits in Appendix I to 10 C.F.R. Part 50. The resultant average dose to offsite individuals will be less than 0.01 mrem per year. Id. at 5. For perspective, Applicant reports from its ongoing monitoring program of existing natural background radiation in the area of the plant site that existing natural levels average about 80 mrem per year with considerable variations, for example, a variation of about 20 mrem per year between two points only about a mile or two apart. Hamilton, et al., at 8. As further perspective on the dose due to Waterford 3's releases, Applicant points out that one can receive 2,000 times more dose than the average 0.01 mrem per year due to Waterford 3 simply by living in a brick house rather than a wooden house, or 100 times more simply by watching television. Id. at 7.

I

The effects of the radiological releases from Waterford 3 have been evaluated explicitly by Applicant and by the Staff.

Their evaluations, summarized by Applicant in its testimony and provided in detail by the NRC Staff in their FES and in testimony, were that the impact would be very small, even miniscule. See Hamilton, et al., at 10; Staff Ex. 1, p. 5-36; Goldman, at 3-6. Their evaluations were based on commonly accepted methodology and risk functions f0r low levels of radiation. Branagan, at 5 (dose calculational models); Tr. 492 (Mauro) (dose calculational models); Hamilton, et al., at 11 (risk functions); Goldman, at 3-9 (risk functions).

Joint Intervenors' witnesses, particularly Dr. Johnson and Dr. Bross, are at odds with Applicant's and the NRC Staff's methodologies for estimating the effects from Waterford 3's releases. Although neither Dr. Johnson nor Dr. Bross has himself evaluated Waterford 3 or its releases nor were they familiar with Applicant's or NRC's detailed evaluations of Waterford, both expressed skepticism of the accuracy and value of the techniques employed. Tr. 1365, 1372, 1377-79 (Bross);

Tr. 1848-54, 1885-87, 1905-07 (Johnson).

Dr. Johnson's skepticism stems from his generally negative view of NRC, industry, national and international standards-setting bodies and virtually all U.S. agencies which deal with nuclear hazards.1/ Johnson, at [ unnumbered] 10-11; Tr. 1961, 9/ One exception apparently is the Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS"). We note DHHS endorsed the Staff's (Continued Next Page)

1972-77 (Johnson). More specifically, his skepticism is based principally on his opinion that a study done by a Heidelberg group in Germany provides a better yardstick for calculating doses due to a power plant's releases, on his suspicion that NRC does not correctly report releases from its licensees' plants,10/ and on his view that biological monitors would provide a more accurate measurement offsite of releases from a plant. Johnson, at [ unnumbered] 7-8; Tr. 2018-19 (Johnson).

We are not persuaded that Dr. Johnson's skepticism is well founded. The Heidelberg Report cited by Dr. Johnson has not been accepted by any standards-setting body or agency in this (Continued) assessment of the impact due to releases from Waterford 3.

Tr. 1982 (Johnson). See Staff Ex. 1, p. A-13.

10/ Dr. Johnson focused on the transuranics, particularly plutonium. Much of his knowledge stems from his work on plutonium in the environs around a weapons plant in Colorado, and an EPA report of an older operating BWR in New Jersey.

Johnson, at [ unnumbered] 1, 3-4; Tr. 1862-63, 1856 (Johnson).

Dr. Johnson had done no calculations of Waterford 3's releases.

Tr. 1886 (Johnson). Dr. Mauro, however, at the Board's request, did provide information on the potential plutonium doses in the area around this plant due to plant releases. He compared the occupational maximum permissible body burden for Plutonium 239 of 0.04 microcuries as presented in ICRP-2 and the National Bureau of Standards Handbook 69 to the quantity of plutonium due to Waterford releases. He calculated that the total amognt of plutonium from plant releases would be 8.1 times 10 microcuries per year. Therefore, even if one person -

were to ingest all of the plutonium resulting from plant operation over an entire year, his dose would still be several orders of magnitude less than the annual maximum permissible body burden. Tr. 1284-86, 3723-24 (Mauro).

country. Tr. 1950-52 (Johnson). Dr. Johnson was not himself sufficiently familiar with the Report to explain the methodology used by its authors; he did not, for example, know what type of plant had been the subject of study, what the nature or quantity of releases were, or what meteorological assumptions had been used to determine dispersion of plant releases. Tr. 1948, 1952-54 (Johnson). His suspicion that NRC does not report its licensees' releases was just that--a suspicion. He had never conducted studies of the releases of any power plant, nor conpared release figures by NRC for a power plant with those of any other monitoring body covering the same period, even for the New Jersey plant which he specifically cited. Tr. 1853-54, 1911-12 (Johnson). Rather he relied on a Health Physics article which enumerated the dose rate conversion factors for exposure to radiation from 240 radionuclides which are present in some form and configuration at some point in the entire uranium fuel cycle, and assumed that they are all released routinely from power plants.

Johnson, at [ unnumbered] 11; Tr. 1868-69, 1937-39 (Johnson).

No evidence supports this assumption. As to the biological monitors, he had read an article by a Japanese researcher who reported on his work with the spiderwort plant (tradescantia).

Again, Dr. Johnson was not sufficiently familiar with the Japanese author's work to explain the basis for the author's faith in spiderworts. Tr. 1917-25, 1935-36 (Johnson).

Dr. Bress's views largely parallel those of Dr. Johnson.

He, too, is skeptical of virtually all governmental-institutions, industry and standards-setting bodies,and dismisses the currently accepted methodology for calculating doses from a plant's releases and assessing the impacts.

Tr. 1637-51 (Bross). All these techniques in his view are so much " mickey-mouse arithmetic." Tr. 1355 (Bross). As a statistician, Dr. Bross advocates that the better technique is to measure the impacts directly by epidemiological studies of those affected. There are, however, severe limitations which inhibit the ability with existing data and statistical methods to perform these cause and effect studies and arrive at supportable conclusions. Tr. 3432-36, 3448-51, 3456-59, 3464-66, 3480, 3483 (Hutchison); T,r. 3555, 3569-70 (Fabrikant);

Tr. 954-55 (Goldman). Despite the limitations, Dr. Bross with his strong convictions ne/ertheless has made several attempts to assess relatively low level radiation dose impacts.

Unfortunately his reported studies do not withstand scrutiny and he has been widely criticized by a variety of scientists and scholars in the field. Tr. 1604-10, 1615-20, 1625-31, 1634-37 (Bross); Hutchison, at 2-13, 29; Fabrikant, at 19-20.

To accept Dr. Bross's view, we must ignore the vast majority of ,

knowledgeable scientists' recommendations and virtually all the standards-setting bodies' present guidance. On the basis of the record in this proceeding, we are not prepared to do so.

The best data and supportable conclusions about dose effects at >

very low doses such as those resulting from Waterford 3's routine releases appear to be based on observed effects at fairly high doses which are extrapolated to the lower doses.

Tr. 941, 953-55 (Goldman); Fabrikant, at 11-12; Tr. 3660-66 (Fabrikant). While the disputes concerning the shape of the dose-response curve are legion, we do not discount the fact that the vast majority of experts in the field believe linear-ity provides a conservative view for standards-setting purposes and the actual effects are less. Hamilton, et al., at 11-12; Tr. 718-19 (Hamilton); Fabrikant, at 10-12; Tr. 941, 953-54 (Goldman); Tr. 3660-66 (Fabrikant). Since both Applicant's and the NRC Staff's assessments of impact for Waterford 3's radiological releases have their bases in linearly derived risk functions, we find their evaluations of the effects to be proper and conservative.

Our discussion to this point has not taken into account the specific potrntial for synergistic and/or cumulative effects alleged by Joint Intervenors. We now focus on this issue and the evidence of record on it.

The concern of Joint Intervenors is that the releases from Waterford 3 will not cause merely additive effects, but in combination with other existing carcinogens in the area of the plant will cause multiplicative effects. The impact, in other words, will be greater on individuals exposed both to existing chemical carcinogens in the area and to radiation from Waterford 3 than one would anticipate due to the sum of the 1

effects of each acting alone. Hereinafter, we refer to this multiplicative effect as " synergism," as the parties have done for the most part throughout this proceeding.

To have even the potential for synergism to occur between radiation and chemical carcinogenic agents, both must be present. No witness was provided who had sampled, studied or evaluated atmospheric or Mississippi River concentrations for known or suspected carcinogens in the area of Waterford 3.

Joint Intervenors did, however, present a local family physi-clan who had read studies of cancer causes and a report on .

cancer rates, both incidence and mortality, conducted in the New Orleans area. Campbell, at [ unnumbered] 5-7. The data bases and cause and effect relationships between particular cancers and particular carcinogens and the sources of those carcinogens are disputable. Tr. 652, 660-64, 666-67, 670-72, 675-76, 679, 685 (Hamilton). While some observed and reported cancers may be attributable to the presence of carcinogens in the area of the plant site and these carcinogens may be due to  ;

environmental pollutants, it is not clear--indeed, no one testified and no exhibit was introduced to show--that the concentration of existing pollutants in the area, known or suspected to be carcinogens, is sufficient to support syner-gism, even assuming there are the requisite levels of radioac-tivity present and that synergism in fact occurs.

The NRC Staff's position provided by their witness Dr. Goldman, a Professor of Radiobiology at the University of California at Davis and Director of the University's Laboratory for Energy-Related Health Research, was that data do not presently exist to alter cancer risk estimates for the levels of radiation exposure due to Waterford 3, based on a synergism between chemicals and radiation. Goldman, at 1, 15. While he noted that synergism has been observed under laboratory conditions u ing radiation at very high doses and dose rates, Dr. Goldman was aware of no convincing data to suggest that there is a real synergistic effect of low level radiation exposures in combination with putative chemical carcinogens.

Goldman, at 14-15.

Applicant's witness Dr. Hamilton, who has been involved in assessing radiation risks for 35 years and currently heads the Biomedical and Environmental Assessment Division in the National Center for Analysis of Energy Systems at Brookhaven National Laboratory, was of the opinion that given the ex- .

tremely low level of releases from Waterford 3, the effect of their addition into the environment, including any synergism s

I which occurred, would be miniscule. Hamilton, et al., at 9-10.

He reasoned that if synergism does in fact occur at low levels of radiation, it is presently occurring between the existing environmental pollutants and the existing natural background radiation. Id. at 10, 14-15. Indeed, the cancer incidence statistics cited by Joint Intervenors must necessarily reflect any synergistic interaction between the environmental carcino-gens in Southeastern Louisiana and natural background radiation of about 100 mrem per year. Id. Waterford 3 will add an average of only about 0.01 mrem per year--an exceedingly small fraction of the existing natural background radiation. Id. at

5. Such a minute addition to the existing radiation levels could have only a correspondingly minute additional effect and will not measurably increase the synergistic interactions that, by hypothesis, are already occurring in the environment. Id.

at 10, 15. Furthermore, the radiation released by Waterford 3 will even be smaller than the variation in natural background radiation from place to place in the area around the plant.

Id. at 8. As a result, any additional synergistic effects caused by radiation released from Waterford 3 will be corre-spondingly even smaller than those induced by such local variations in natural background radiation and completely undetectable, if they occur at all.11/ Like Dr. Goldman, 11/ Although lack of detectability does not necessarily translate into no effect, the fact that naturally occurring (Continued Next Page)

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Dr. Hamilton was aware of studies which reported synergism between chemical carcinogens and radiation at very high levels--radiation doses millions of times greater than Waterford 3's releases and at dose rates billions of times greater than the dose rates resulting from Waterford 3's releases. Id. at 13-14. Dr. Hamilton, however, cited no studies which demonstrated synergism at any doses within several orders of magnitude of Waterford 3's very low levels.

Moreover, he pointed out that all studies of chemical carcino-genesis in animals or cells are necessarily carried out in the presence of natural background radiation. Id. at 14. Thus, the results obtained in all these experiments (which purport to measure effects of chemical carcinogens alone) already include any synergistic effects of the carcinogenic chemicals with low-level radiation at a dose rate due to natural background radiation (and far exceeding the dose which will result from Waterford 3's releases). Id.; Tr. 715 (Hamilton).

(Continued) variables alone are sufficient to mask any effect that occurs is indicative of negligible impact. See, e.g., Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-78-19, 7 N.R.C. 969, 1026 (1978); Philadelphia Electric Company, et al. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-640, 13 N.R.C. 487, 547 (Opinion of Dr. Buck and Dr.

Johnson dissenting with respect to Part VIB).

Three of Joint Intervenors' witnesses provided their views on the potential for synergistic effects. See Pandit, supra; Bross, supra; Johnson, supra. All three were of the opinion that synergism between Waterford 3's releases and existing chemical carcinogens will result. None, however, could cite a study which supported the view that synergism will occur at these very low levels of radiation.

Joint Intervenors' witness Dr. Pandit likened Louisiana to Love Canal where he feels it is most likely that a synergistic reaction took place in the population exposed to buried chemical wastes and to weapons program radioactive wastes also buried in northern New York State some distance from Love Canal. Pandit, at (unnumbered] 5. His view was unsupported by any evidence or study. Tr. 1238 (Pandit). He demonstrated little knowledge of potential synergism in the area of Love Canal, and provided no basis for applying the Love Canal experience to the Waterford 3 setting. Tr. 1231-38 (Pandit).

Dr. Bross on behalf of Joint Intervenors too thought that synergistic effects would result from Waterford's operation.

Although he was aware of no study to support his opinion, Dr. Bross based his views on his understanding of what has occurred in the U.S.S.R.12/ Bross, at (unnumbered] 10-12. Dr. _

12/ In addition to the U.S.S.R., Dr. Bross referred to Love Canal, like Dr. Pandit, and to synergistic effects in connec-tion with two studies of combinations of individuals' exposure (Continued Next Page)

Bross testified that in Russia, there has been an upswing in infant mortality which he assigned to a synergistic effect between Russian nuclear power plant releases and chemical carcinogens from other Russian industry, strung like beads along common river systems. Id. Dr. Bross relies for his postulate about Russian infant mortalities on two articles which appeared at some time in the newspaper. The first apparently reported an increase in Russian mortalities; the second, sometime later, provided reasons for the increase, attributed to a Russian statistician. Tr. 1563-64, 1567, 1746-47 (Bross). Dr. Bross's entire opinion stems from these articles. He has never studied Russia's nuclear industry, its river system, its pollutants, its infant mortalities or reporting systems, and thus was not in a position to apply these elements to comparable parameters in the United States setting generally, or Waterford in particular. Tr. 1565, (Continued) to radiation, but not to chemical carcinogens. As for Love Canal, Dr. Bross himself characterized the prospects that synergism occurred there as " speculative." Bross, at (unnum-bered] 18. As for the two other studies, involving in one instance statistical analyses of differing combinations of radiation exposure to both parents prior to conception, and in the second instance, exposure of either parent before pregnancy or exposure of the mother and fetus during pregnancy, we do not see these studies as bearing on the question of synergism at issue here and thus do not reach the questions raised con-cerning Dr. Bross's views of these two studies. See Bross, at (unnumbered] 12-13; Tr. 3657-59 (Fabrikant).

1572-79 (Bross). He did nothing to substantiate or investigate the two newspaper articles and the conclusion he inferred from the articles. Tr. 1564, 1569-71 (Bross). Based on the scant evidence regarding what may be a problem in Russia and the

total lack of evidence regarding that possible problem's application to the instant case, we reject Dr. Bross's theory as being of no meaningful assistance to the Board in resolving the synergism issue.

Dr. Johnson was Joint Intervenor's third witness to address synergism. His testimony on synergis.m consisted of the bald statement that a synergistic effect in Louisiana can be expected. Johnson, at (unnumbered] 10. While he testified that "[t]here have been several publications addressed to this general problem area," he was able to recall only two. Id.;

Tr. 1897, 1933-34 (Johnson). The first was a study of uranium miners who smoke, which has little or no application to the issue here.11! The second was a study of mammary gland cancers 13/ The question of effects on miners who smoke repre'sents an entirely different problem from the issue of concern to Joint Intervenors regarding Waterford's releases. The dose received by miners is estimated to be as high as six to seven thousand rem to the lung (Tr. 3651 (Fabrikant)), orders of magnitude ,,

higher than doses combined from all isotopes released from ,

Waterford. Dr. Johnson's cited data showed higher cancer incidences in miners who smoke, but he did not know how much

! was attributable to smoking alone. Tr. 1891 (Johnson). And, finally, Dr. Fabrikant, one of the authors of the most recent BEIR Report, BEIR III, pointed out that the BEIR Committee!had determined that a once-held suspicion that synergism occurred in uranium miners who smoke was no longer thought accurate (Continued Next Page)

in rats where the radiation dose (like those cited by Applicant's and the Staff's witnesses) was millions of times greater than the doses from Waterford's releases and the dose rate was billions of times greater as well. See Tr. 1934 (Johnson).

r No witness provided an assured response to the question the Board asked of all of them--are there studies of chemical o /

carcinogens and radiation combinations which define the appropriate extrapolative curve with varying dose? See

' '( ' T r . 715-17 (Hamilton); Tr. 987-89 (Goldman); Tr. 3653 (Fabrikant); Tr. 2025-26 (Johnson). The witnesses obviously most familiar with studies of this type, however--Dr. Goldman, Dr. Hamilton and Dr. Fabrikant--all doubted that synergism occurs at low levels of radiation, Dr. Goldman expressing the view that scientists have found it very difficult to attain enhanced effects (synergism) even when specifically attempting to do so with drugs and radiation at very high doses and dose rates. Tr. 716-19 (Hamilton); Tr. 945, 952, 987-89 (Goldman);

. \

Tr. 3656-57 .'

(Fabrikant).

\

l (Continued)

- "the data no longer support the view that radiation and l cigarette smoking act in a multiplicative fashion in defining l the cancer risk." BEIR III at 268, cited at Tr. 1934-35.

l There is no controversy among the BEIR Committee members on

[' this question. Fabrikant, at 23.

3 1 .

!t Y y/

I t

In sum, then, the evidence on synergism boils down to this: (1) Both radiation and chemical carcinogens need to be present in individuals to cause a synergistic effect to occur between them; (2) the types and amounts of chemical carcinogens in the Waterford 3 area are not well defined, and while existing cancer rates may be attributable to environmental pollutants, including carcinogens, it is not c ' ear that chemical carcinogens are present in sufficient amounts to support synergism with radiation from Waterford 3; (3) syner-gism has been observed in laboratory studies where the amounts of radiation and the amounts of chemical carcinogens have been controlled; in all reported instances of observed synergistic reactions, the amount of radiation involved was millions of times greater and the dose rate of exposure billions of times greater than the average doses calculated to result from Waterford 3 releases; (4) there is no evidence of synergism between chemical carcinogens and radiation at, or even approaching, the very low levels of radiation to be emitted from the Waterford plant; and finally, (5) no studies seem clearly to suggest a curve for extrapolating the effects from the very high radiation levels where effects have been observed to the extemely low levels of radiation at issue here.

Under these circumstances, we are unable to conclude with assurance that synergistic effects will result between existing

chemical carcinogens in the area of Waterford 3 and the low levels of radiation which will be released during the plant's normal operation. In all likelihood, synergism will not occur, but we doubt that this can be proven with great assurance based on current scientific knowledge and evaluative techniques.11/ In any event, we are able to resolve confidently the concern raised by Joint Intervenors. As Dr. Hamilton observed, our inability to define with precision whether synergiam occurs at very low levels of radiation and to quantify it does not foreclose our ability to place an upper bound on the effect and, assuming it occurs, characterize the impact. We are persuaded of the logic in Applicant's position that in view of the very low levels of releases anticipated from Waterford 3, particularly when viewed in relation to the existing natural background and the variations in natural background, synergistic effects, if any occury will be truly miniscule. We therefore find that Applicant's and the Staff's assessment of the impacts associated with Waterford 3's routine releases of radioactivity, including synergism, has been appropriate.

14/ We note that in a prior NRC case, another licensing board on the evidence before it found no synergistic effects between radiation.and pollutants at the levels near those projected for the dose rates due to that plant's releases. Duquesne Light Co., et. al. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2),

LBP-74-25, 7 A.E.C. 711, 730-31 (1974).

C. EMERGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS

1. The Emergency Plans Emergency planning for Waterford 3 has been guided by two general principles. The first recognizes that effective planning is largely an educational activity. Emergency planning is much more than the preparation of written plans, which are not ends in themselves; instead, planning properly focuses on the education of those who may be involved in emergency response, anticipating events and problems, identifying resources, and developing efficient and effective responses utilizing available resources.

The second related principle acknowledges that planning is a continuous activity -- a process, not a product. The development of a written plan at a particular time is only one part of the total planning process. Indeed, written plans are "living documents," which by their very nature must be periodically updated to reflect significant developments resulting from the ongoing planning process. Thus, the planning process for Waterford 3 will continue throughout the operating life of the Waterford 3 plant.

The radiological emergency response plans for Waterford 3 consist of two separate and coordinated emergency plans. The onsite plan, known as the "Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station Emergency Plan" (the "Waterford 3 Plan"), is developed and implemented by Applicant. The Waterford 3 Plan provides direction for the response of onsite personnel to emergencies varying in severity from minor personnel injuries to situations involving real or potential offsite hazards. Because the Joint Intervenors' contentions in this proceeding related to the evacuation of, and administration of potassium iodide to, the general public, the hearing focused almost exclusively on the offsite plans. The onsite plan is relevant only to the extent it interfaces with the offsite plan within the scope of the Joint Intervenors' contentions.

The offsite plan is the " State of Louisiana Peacetime Radiological Response Plan, Annex J, Appendix 7, Louisiana Preparedness Plan for Emergency Operations" ("the State Plan"). to the State Plan is specific to Waterford 3, and incorporates the individual radiological emergency response plans of St. Charles Parish and St. John the Baptist Parish (" Parish Enclosures"). The Waterford 3 plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone (" plume EPZ") -- discussed in greater detail below

-- lies totally within the State of Louisiana, and encompasses parts of both Parishes within a radius of approximately 10 miles of the plant.

The State Plan provides direction for the response of State and Parish offsite organizations to an accident at a fixed nuclear facility within or affecting Louisiana. The plan establishes responsibilities and response procedures for departments of state government to assure technical and resource support to affected areas. The Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division

("LNED") developed the plan, in coordination with other organiza-tions and support from Applicant. LNED is the lead State agency for the technical anaylsis of and response t'o an accident. The Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness ("LOEP") is the lead State agency for coordination of general state level emergency plans and programs. LOEP coordinates all phases of disaster operations, including the emergency response of designated State agencies, FEMA, and other states, when appropriate.

The Parish Enclosures provide direction for the responses of St. Charles and St. John the Baptist Parish offsite organizations to an accident at Waterford 3. The Parish Enclosures detail actions to be taken by local response organizations for the protection of persons within affected areas of the Parishes.

They establish responsibilities and response procedures for departments of Parish goveritment and other local response organizations, including Parish officials, emergency pre-paredness/ civil defense, law enforcement, fire and rescue, schools, transportation, public works and industry. Each Parish Emergency Preparedness / Civil Defense Director, acting as the chief of staff for the Parish chief executive, is responsible for ,

directing and coordinating protective response to an accident at Waterford 3. St. Charles and St. John the Baptist Parishes, in

conjunction with LNED and in coordination with other State organizations, and with support from Applicant, developed the Parish enclosures for incorporation into the State Plan.

2. The Regulatory Framework Both the Waterford 3 Plan and the State Plan (including the Parish Enclosures) were developed in response to the Commission's emergency planning regulations. The emergency planning regula-tions are intended to provide a comprehensive framework for public protection in the event of a serious radiological-emergenc . The Commission's requirements are set forth in 10 C.F.R. S 50.47 and in Appendix E to 10 C.F.R. Part 50.

NUREG-0654, prepared by a joint committee of staff from the NRC and FEMA, provides guidance on how the requirements of the emergency planning regulations can be fulfilled.

The single most important concept in the Commission's emergency planning regulations is the " plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone" or " plume EPZ." The plume EPZ is defined as an area "about 10 miles" in radius around the reactor.

Its exact size and configuration are to be determined by local conditions, such as demography and access routes. 10 C.F.R.

S 50.47(c)(2). The 10 mile radius for the plume EPZ was adopted because in the most significant respects it envelops the antici-pated consequences of a range of accidents, from the minor to the most severe. Accordingly, the basic emergency planning

requirements are directly related in the regulation to the plume EPZ. For example, a licensee must demonstrate that the appropri-ate State or local officials have the capability to provide early notification of an emergency to the public within the plume EPZ.

Similarly, the requirements for the development of protective actions, including evacuation, are also focused on the public within the plume EPZ.

Emergency plans must meet 16 separate standards articulated in the emergency planning regulations. In addition to the requirements for provisions for emergency notification and implementation of protective actions, the standards require i provisions for clear definition of responsibilities, adequate l staffing, establishment of a standard emergency classification and action level scheme, prompt communications among response f organizations, public information programs, emergency facilities and equipment, offsite radiation monitoring and assessment capability, and periodic drills of response capabilities. 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b)(1)-(16). Each of the 16 standards set forth in 1

the Commission's regulations is addressed by specific criteria in NUREG-0654.

! 3. The Respective Roles of The NRC Staff, FEMA and The Board The Commission's emergency planning regulations require that an applicant for an operating license submit its emergency plan, as well as the plans of State and local governments within the plume EPZ, to the NRC. No operating license is issued unless the Staff can make a favorable overall finding that the integration of onsite and offsite emergency planning "provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." 10 C.F.R.

S 50.47(a)(1).

The Staff's overall finding on the state of emergency preparedness within the plume EPZ is based on (1) a review of FEMA findings and determinations as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented, and (2) the NRC Staff's assessment as to whether the applicant's emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented.

10 C.F.R. S 50.47(a)(2). In making its determinations with respect to the adequacy of the emergency plans submitted by an applicant, the NRC Staff applies the 16 standards articulated in the Commission's emergency planning regulations, as well as the associated criteria set forth in NUREG-0654. 10 C.F.R.

S 50.47(b).

FEMA operates under proposed regulations. 44 C.F.R. Part 350. Those regulations include 16 " planning objectives" which exactly parallel the 16 " standards" incorporated in the NRC's regulations at 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b). See 44 C.F.R. ,

S 350.5(a)(1)-(16). Similarly, like the NRC's regulations, FEMA's proposed regulations explicitly reference the specific

criteria of NUREG-0654. See 44 C.F.R. S 350.5(b). Further, the ultimate finding to be made by FEMA appropriately corresponds to the ultimate finding which the NRC Staff must make; FEMA is to determine whether offsite plans and preparedness provide " reason-able assurance that appropriate protective measures can and will be taken offsite in the event of a radiological emergency."

Compare 44 C.F.R. S 350.5(b) with 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(a)(1). Thus, prior to the issuance of an operating license, FEMA and the NRC Staff must both make findings of " reasonable assurance," based on the same " standards" or " planning objectives," and supported by the same specific " criteria" in NUREG-0654.

The Board in this proceeding has a more limited task. It must make findings on the specific contentions raised by the Joint Intervenors, within the context of the standards and criteria discussed above. The scope of the findings which the Board must make is narrower than the broad range of findings required of FEMA and the NRC Staff because:

The contentions are limited to the adequacy of the plans for the distri-bution of potassium iodide ("KI") to the public, and to the pl'ans for evacuation of the public -- the contentions do not contest the adequacy of the provisions for protective actions other than evac-2 uation; The contentions challenge only specific aspects of evacuation, which are spelled out in the contention; and

With certain minor exceptions, the contentions deal primarily with the offsite emergency plan.

The Board must therefore determine whether the offsite emergency plan (and to some extent the onsite plan) meets, or there is reasonable assurance that it will meet, the standards articulated in 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b) and the NUREG-0654 criteria which are germane to the specific contentions before the Board.

In proposing to amend its emergency planning regulations to clarify that a full-scale emergency preparedness exercise is not required for a low power license, the Commission recently affirmed that "the findings on emergency planning required prior to licensing issuance are predictive in nature and do not need to reflect the actual state of preparedness at the time the finding is made." A licensing board is to find " reasonable assurance * *

• that there are no barriers to emergency planning implementation * * * "

, but that consideration "can be adequately accounted for by predictive findings." 46 Fed. Reg. 61134, 61135 (December 15, 1981).

Consistent with the concept of predictive findings in the emergency planning area, it has long been recognized in other areas of reactor regulation that not all matters need be definitively resolved on the hearing record. Certain matters may be left for Staff confirmation and verification following the hearings. Thus, where open items have been identified in l

l the plans, clear courses of action have been identified to resolve those items. With such an action plan in place, a finding of reasonable assurance on the overall state of emergency preparedness can be made, conditioned upon the items being resolved before a full power license issues.15/ Grimes, ff. Tr. 3792, at 3.

4. The Contentions

'e) Public Education and Information Joint Intervenors' Contention 17/26(1)(a) asserted that:

Applicant has failed to adequately make provi-sion, according to the Emergency Plan contained in Chapter 13.3 of the FSAR, for evacuation of individuals located within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone for the Waterford 3 site in the event of a serious reactor incident, as required by applicable NRC regulations, in that:

(a) the provisions for notifying residents of evacuation procedures are inadequate.

NRC regulations provide for the annual dissemination of information to the public within the plume EPZ concerning how they will be notified and what their actions should be in the event of an emergency. The pre-distributed emergency public information reinforces -- and is reinforced by -- the specific

, 15/ In the instant case, the NRC Staff and FEMA reviewed the '

open items on the record and concluded that they were straight-forward matters that could be left for post-hearing veri-fication by the Staff. Tr. 3951-61; Tr. 3966-70. The Board generally agrees with the analyses of the NRC Staff and FEMA.

l I _. __

information and instructions which would be given to the public at the time of an emergency. PF 15.

The Board received extensive testimony by Applicant, Staff, FEMA, State and Parish witnesses in support of the pre-emergency public education and information program for the Waterford 3 plume EPZ. No contrary evidence was introduced by Joint Intervenors. The testimony detailed both the content of the program and the means of dissemination. Both the onsite and offsite' emergency plans provide for a coordinated, compre-hensive public education program, addressing the needs of both the permanent and transient populations within the plume EPZ.

PF 17-19.

The principal means for providing specific emergency response information to the public prior to an emergency is a brochure which will be mailed annually to all residents within the plume EPZ. The brochure includes information about radiation, the proper actions to be taken in an emergency, special measures for the handicapped, and contacts for addi-tional information. PF 17-19.

The public education program also includes the posting of signs, decals or notices at public facilities. Emergency public information material also will be provided in local ,

telephone directories. Further, brochures will be distributed in bulk to industries, hotels, motels, post offices, libraries

and other public areas, to ensure adequate coverage of the

. transient population within the plume EPZ. PF 17-19.

In addition to these pre-emergency public education materials to be distributed, a more immediate and detailed public information program would be implemented in the event of a serious accident at Waterford 3. Following the Parish executives' decision to implement evacuation, the siren system would be sounded to cue the public to tune to a local broadcast station to receive information about the nature of the emergency and instructions for evacuation. PF 20.

Designated local radio and cable TV stations would broadcast a preprepared message including specific emergency information such as a description of the area to be evacuated and instructions on transportation assistance, evacuation routes, reception centers and shelters, and preparatory measures for leaving home. If school is in session, another preprepared broadcast mesage would provide information about evacuated school children. In addition to the preprepered messages, the Parishes will disseminate continuing emergency public information through the Parish Public Information Officers to the media. The Emergency Broadcast System will i

also be activated to direct listeners to the appropriate broadcast stations to receive detailed emergency information.

PF 21-22.

Subject only to a review of the public information brochure, FEMA has determined that the emergency plans ade-quately provide for notification of the public as to evacuation procedures. Based on the Staff's review of the Applicant's emergency plan, the Staff has concluded that the public information program meets the applicable planning standards.

PF 23-24.

The Staff will assure that the brochure and the poster have been approved by FEMA and/or the NRC Staff ~, and that the public information materials have actually been distributed prior to authorization above 5% of full power operation. The Board generally agrees with the determinations of FEMA and the Staff, and concludes that the emergency public information and education program is adequate, provided that the Staff confirms the dist ibution within the plume EPZ of the approved brochure and poster, as planned. PF 23-26.

(b) Evacuation Time Estimate and Adequacy of Roads Contention 17/26(1)(b) asserted that:

Applicant has failed to adequately make provi-sion, according to the Emergency Plan contained in Chapter 13.3 of the FSAR, for evacuation of individuals located within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone for the Waterford 3 site in the event of a serious reactor incident, as required by applicable NRC regulations, in that:

(b) the roads and highways necessary for such evacuation are inadequate.

Neither the regulations nor guidance of the NRC or FEMA requires any particular evacuation route capacity. Neither the NRC nor FEMA has requirements for maximum acceptable evacuation times. Nor do either FEMA or NRC regulations or guidance require the addition or upgrading of roads and highways for evacuation. PP 28-29.

However, licensees and state and local emergency manage-ment agencies are required to include, as part of their i emergency response planning, time estimates for evacuation of the population within the plume EPZ. The evacuation time estimates are for use by emergency response personnel charged with recommending and deciding on protective actions during an emergency. The time estimates provide decision-makers with additional information on which to base a decision as to the feasibility of evacuation under actual conditions. PF 30-32.

The Board received extensive evidence from Applicant, Staff, FEMA, State and Parish witnesses on the evacuation time estimate study which Applicant submitted to the NRC. No contrary evidence was presented by Joint Intervenors. The methodology used to analyze evacuation times is a mathematical simulation model which predicts the flow of vehicular traffic on the roadway system around Waterford 3. Detailed population estimates were made for permanent residents, transients, and special facility residents. These population figures were then converted to the number of evacuating vehicles. PF 33-36.

Applicant's evacuation time estimates are based on two scenarios -- clear weather and adverse weather (a heavy continuous rainstorm). Evacuation is assumed to take' place during the daytime on a weekday. The daytime scenario is most conservative, since the population is somewhat higher and more dispersed (i.e., at work, in school, etc.) during the day.

Other problems, such as transportation availability and traffic volumes on the roads at the time of evacuation, are also more serious during the daytime. The estimated time to evacuate the entire plume EPZ is 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 15 minutes in clear weather and 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> 30 minutes in adverse weather. PF 38-39.

The Staff's consulting traffic engineer independently verified the accuracy of the Applicant's evacuation time estimate, and concluded that Applicant's analyses are reason-able. He further datermined that the evacuation time estimate study is responsive to and in compliance with applicable guidance. Based on that evaluation, the Staff found Applicant's evacuation time estimate study acceptable. PF 40-41.

Waterford 3's evacuation times place it approximately "in the middle" relative to other nuclear plants, but Applicant's I study is based on several unusually conservative assumptions  ;

and so, in the words of the Staff's consultant, represents "an

upper limit" on the time necessary for evacuation. Though the k

Emergency Preparedness / Civil Defense Directors of St. Charles and St. John the Baptist Parishes have recommended additional -

roads for evacuations in emergencies at toxic chemical plants ,

in the area, they consider the existing road network adequate for an evacuation in the event of an emergency.at Waterford 3.

Further, FEMA has independently reviewed the adequacy of the proposed evacuation routes and, based on its evaluation, has concluded that the existing roads are adequate for evacuation purposes. PF 39, 43-44.

The Board agrees. The evacuation time estimate study realistically demonstrates that, given the present roadway network, evacuation of all or a portion of the plume EPZ is a feasible protective response available for consideration by Parish officials should a radiological emergency oqcur at Waterford 3. PF 45-46.

(c) Public Alert / Notification System Contention 17/26(1)(c) asserted that:

Applicant has failed to adequately make provi-sion, according to the Emergency Plan contained in Chapter 13.3 of the FSAR, for evacuation of individuals located within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway emergency planning zona for the Waterford 3 site in the event of a serious reactor incident, as required by applicable NRC regulations, in that: ,

(c) the evacuation warning system is inadequate.

NRC regulations require provisions for prompt notification to the public in the plume EPZ in an em;rgency. The design objective for a public notification system is to have the capability to complete the initial notification of the public in the plume EPZ within about 15 minutes. PF 48.

The Board received extensive evidence on the public alert / notification system for the Waterford 3 plume EPZ from Applicant, Staff, FEMA, State and Parish witnesses. None was offered by Joint Intervenors. The system consists of a combination of alert systems (fixed sirens, tone-alert receiv-ers, radios, mobile sirens and mobile loudspeakers), as well as the Emergency Broadcast System ('EBS") and local broadcast media. PF 49.

The backbone of the system is a network of 38 fixed .

location, rotating, radio-activated, battery-operatad sirens to be located in St. Charles and St. John the Baptist Parishes.

In developing the system, Applicant, through its contracting acoustic engineer and in coordination with the Parish Emergency Preparedness / Civil Defense Directors, identified the populated areas within the plume EPZ, conducted an extensive siren system acoustic study, and identified the locations for installation l of the sirens. PF 50-52.  :

The sirens will be placed to provide a minimum 60 dbC coverage of the populated areas within the plume EPZ, and will

therefore provide the capability for an instantaneous alert signal to essentially all of the population throughout the plume EPZ. .In addition, major industries, hospitals, nursing homes and schools will be notified directly from the Parish Emergency Operations Center ("EOCs") by radio, tone-alert receiver, or telephone. PF 53.

The areas not covered by sirens are wetlands, which are essentially uninhabited. Tone-alert receivers and radios will be used in hunting and fishing camps in the wetlands. State helicopters and boats are also available for wetlands notifica-tion. In addition, alert teams may be dispatched, as condi-tions indicate, to provide supplemental notification to hunters, fisherman or other transients who may be in the wetlands areas. PF 54.

When a decision is made to recommend protective action to the public, the public alert / notification system will be activated by Parish officials. Activation of the system will cue local residents to tune to local broadcast stations for specific emergency information, and EBS will be activated. PF 55.

FEMA has reviewed the design of Applicant's public alert / notification system, and has concluded that it appears that the system will adequately warn the populace. The only possible reservations FEMA expressed with respect to its I

I conclusions were the hearing impaired and persons working in any facilities where the ambient background noise levels may preclude their hearing the sirens. PF 57-58.

In response to FEMA's reservations, Applicant testified that the Parishes are identifying and preparing rosters of hearing-impaired personc who might not hear the siren warning system. Implementing procedures in both Parishes will include provisions for notification of such persons, by methods such as phone calls to neighbors and special notification by emergency workers. PF 59.

The major industrial concerns in both Parishes would receive early, direct notification of an emergency at Waterford 3, from the respective Parish EOC, by radio, tone-alert receiver or telephone. In response to the FEMA testimony, Applicant further explained that if siren tests reveal that background noise precludes hearing sirens in facilities which would not presently receive direct notification of an emergency, supplemental notification measures will be included in the implementing procedures. PF 60.

After the entire alert / notification system is inctalled, FEMA will field test and evaluate the entire system, as installed, and will prescribe any corrective measures necessary to provide assurance that the siren system meets the objectives for alerting the population stated in NUREG-0654, Appendix 3.

The Staff will require a demonstration that the system meets the regulations prior to issuance of a full power license. The Board concludes that the public alert / notification system is adequate, provided that the Staff verifies the capability of the installed system, as planned. PF 61-62.

(d) Command Decision Structure Contention 17/26(1)(d) asserted that:

Applicant has failed to adequately make provi-sion, according to the Emergency Plan contained in Chapter 13.3 of the FSAR, for evacuation of individuals located within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone for the Waterford 3 site in the event of a serious reactor incident, as required by applicable NRC regulations, in that:

(d) there is not an adequate command decision structure, including appropriate guidance, for commencing evacuation.

The Commission's regulations require the identification in emergency plans of the onsite and offsite authorities (includ-ing State and local officials) who will be responsible for taking necessary actions in the event of an emergency. The Board received extensive testimony from Applicant, Staff, FEMA, State and Parish witnesses on the command decision structures of Applicant, the two Parishes, and the State, which are detailed in the respective plans. Joint Intervenors offered no contrary evidence. PF 64-65.

l I

The onsite plan provides for prompt notification (within 15 minutes) of offsite agencies by Applicant's Emergency Coordinator. The Energy Coordinator will assess the emergency and simultaneously notify the two Parishes, LNED and LOEP of the emergency, via the operational hotline. The extensive information provided to the Parishes, LNED and LOEP will include the class of the emergency, information about the type of actual or projected release, and recommended protective measures. The Energy Coordinator bases his protective action recommendation upon his technical assessment of the accident and estimated dose projections. Applicant's choices of recommended protective actions are consistent within those established by the guidance of the Environmental Protection Agency. PF 67-69.

Upon receipt of the initial notification, the Parishes will implement the notification and mobilization procedures for Parish personnel and resources as determined by the class of emergency. Each Parish will activate its EOC and maintain continuous communications within the plant and the State agencies. PF 71.

LNED will activate its operational headquarters, and will make an independent assessment of the accident, using informa-tion supplied by the plant and the field monitoring team. LNED will in turn disseminate timely technical information to the State EOC, activated by LOEP, and to the Parishes. LNED will make a protective action recommendation, independent of Applicant's recommendation, which will be forwarded to the Assistant Secretary of the Office of Environmental Affairs

("ASOEA") for evaluation. Upon the decision of the ASOEA, LNED will notify the Parishes of the State protection action recommendation. PF 72-73.

Applicant's technical representative assigned to each Parish EOC translates technical information from the plant to assist the Parish chief executives in assessing pertinent aspects of the accident. The Parish EOC staff provides further input to help the chief executives assess the public's readi-ness to respond to an emergency. Based on the protective action recommendations of the State and Applicant, and with the advice and counsel of the Emergency Preparedness / Civil Defense Directors, the chief executives make the decision to evacuate or implement othe- protective actions. At the designated time, the public alert / notification system is activated, to notify the public of the protective action decision and to provide instructions to the public. PF 74-75.

The NRC Staff and FEMA have reviewed, respectively, the onsite and offsite command decision structures, finding them  ;

j generally adequate, but identifying several items requiring clarification, additional information or simple changes to the

. _ _ ___ - _ _ ~ - .

r emergency plans. Applicant's evidence indicated how the items will be resolved, and testimony by the Staff and FEMA indicated

.their confidence that the items would be r.esoltred without difficulty. The Board discusses these' minor items and their resolution separately in the findings. A balanced evaluation of the overall record provides reasonable assurance that an adequate command decision structure, including appropriate guidance for commencing evacuation, is in place. PF 76-84.

(e) Evacuation Drills i

Contention 17/26(1)(e) asserted that:

Applicant has failed to adequately make provi-sion, according to the Emergency Plan contained in Chapter 13.3 of the FSAR, for evacuation of individuals located within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone for the Waterford 3 site in the event of a serious reactor incident, as required by applicable NRC regulations, in that:

(c) the Emergency Plan fails to provide for i realistic and comprehensive evacuation drills, in that the provisions for moving

, individuals are not actually tested.

Each licensee is required to exercise emergency planning at least annually, with the participation of appropriate State and local govermment agencies. The Commission's regulations I further require a periodic " full-scale exercise which tests as much of the licensee, State, and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation" (emphasis supplied). PF 86.

FEMA also does not require the actual movement of the public in exercises -- in fact advises against it -- for numerous reasons. First, such. movement during drills would ,

result in unnecessary interruptions of daily activities and commerce. Second, it is unlikely that the entire plume EPZ q would be evaucated at any one time. Third,s such moveme t.would create a risk of accidents which cannot be just'ified for s exercise purposes. Fourth, there is no legal authority for directing evacuation of all persons, and without full partici-pation the exercise would be inconclusive. Fifth, in exercises where the public has been encouraged to participate in a realistic evacuation exercise, few have chosen to participate.

And, sixth, information pertaining to the evacuation of persons in past emergencies demonstrates that the populace can be evacuated in a timely manner. PF 87.

The Board received extensive evidence from Applicant, Staff, FEMA, State and Parish witnesses on the exercise and drill programs of Applicant, the State and the Parishes. No testimony was offered by Joint Intervenors. Both the onsite and offsite emergency plans detail the frequency, objectives, extent, functional areas, scenario content, observation and evaluation of exercises and drills. The full-scale exercise for Waterford 3 will involve the participation of Applicant and appropriate State and Parish agencies. The exercise will I

l

activate and test the notifications, primary communications, 4

accident assessment, data gathering, logistical support and protective response functions. In addition, school buses will be moved to simulate evacuation, although school children will J

not actually be transported. Federal, State and local observers will be placed at key locations to ensure that the exercise objectives are met and that any problem areas are identified for resolution. PF 88-91.

i The Board concludes that there are adequate provisions for

realistic and comprehensive exercises of the emergency plans, f

and that the plans will be adequately tested without movement of the general public. PF 92-93.

(f) Transportation for Special Populations

! Joint Intervenors' Contention 17/26(1)(f) asserted that:

Applicant has failed to adequately make provi-sion, according to the Emergency Plan contained in Chapter 13.3 of the FSAR, for evacuation of individuals located within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone for the Waterford 3 site in the event of a serious reactor incident, as required by applicable NRC regulations, in that:

(f) procedures are inadequate for evacuating people who are:

(i) without vehicles; (ii) school children; ~

(iii) aged or crippled; (iv) sick and hospitalized; (v) imprisoned; (vi) transient workers.

i

NRC regulations require the development of a range of protec-tive actions for the public within the plume EPZ. In this part of the contention, Joint Intervenors challenge the procedures for implementing one protective action -- evacuation -- with respect to certain special populations. The Board received extensive testimony from Applicant, Staff, FEMA, State and Parish witnesses on the adequacy of provisions toeffcuate ~

3, these special populations. No testimony was offered,by Joint i

Intervenors. The actual litigation of the contention' focused' r

predominantly on the adequacy of transportation resources,to "'

I

/

effect the evacuation of certain of the identifi'ei populations. ,

..L 3 (i), (ii) Persons Without Private Transportation : -

and School Children -

In the event of an evacuation, all persons without vehicles would be directed, by broadcast message, to pre- -

identified pickup points (listed in tha pre-distributed emergency public information brochure). From these pickup ,

points, the persons without private transportation would be -

transported by bus to reception centers outside the plume EPZ.

PF 95.

Each school district within the plume EPZ has an emergency .

plan, which includes provisions for radiological emergencies.

If an evacuation were required while school was in sessian, -

- /.

students attending schools within the risk area would be I bused

/

')

/

/

~

' f.\ ,

to centers outside the plume EPZ, where they would be picked up by their parents. Students attending schools outside the risk area but who live within the risk area would remain at school until picked up by their parents. The pre-distributed brochure and the public information message for broadcast at the time of an evacuation instruct parents not to call the schools or attempt to pick up their children at their schools, assuring parents that protective actions are being taken for their

, children and directing them to meet their children at specified

'. centers outside the plume EPZ. PF 97-98.

The Board received extensive evidence on the numbers of school children and persons without private transportation in-g

(- the plume EPZ, as well as the number of buses available within the EPZ to transport those populations. Only a total of 429 buses would be required for an evacuation, even if the entire plume EPZ were evacuated, school was in session, and no buses were reused. The two Parishes already have 138 buses, and have identified 2396 additional buses in neighboring support parishes -- far more than are needed to supplement the risk Parish resources. These buses from support parishes could be brought to the risk schools and pickup points within one or two hours or less. PF 96,99-102.

FEMA reviewed the provisions in the emergency plans for the evacuation of school children and persons without private transportation. FEMA concluded that, with adequate arrangements for supplemental transportation resources from support Parishes, the emergency plans adequately provide for the evacuation of school children and persons without private transportation. PF 103.

The two risk Parishes have longstanding mutual aid understandings with the support parishes, pursuant to which the parishes have historically shared resources with one another in times of emergency. In addition, since the completion of the plans reviewed by FEMA, the two Parishes have been preparing detailed resource inventories, and are finalizing written agreements with the support parishes for the supply of trans-portation resources. These letters of agreement will be provided to the NRC. FEMA will review the arrangements for supplemental transportation to ensure their adequacy. The Board concludes that the provisions for the evacuation of school children and persons without private transportation are adequate, provided that signed letters of agreement for the supply of supplemental buses are provided to the NRC, as planned. PF 104-05.

(iii), (iv) Aged and Handicapped Persons and Sick and Hosoitalized Persons Each of the risk Parishes has appointed a Health and Medical Officer who will coordinate the evacuation of the aged and handicapped non-ambulatory residents who require transpor-tation assistance. There are approximately 100 such residents in St. Charles Parish, and approximately 150 in St. John the Baptist Parish. Rosters of aged and handicapped persons who need transportation assistance have been prepared, with the assistance of social service agencies and organizations.

Efforts to assure the completeness of the rosters are continu-ing, and the rosters will be updated semi-annually. Blank applications published in the newspapers, as well as self-addressed, stamped postcards enclosed with the predistributed public information brochure, will further encourage individuals such as the aged and handicapped to notify the Parishes of their special needs in advance of an emergency. PF 106-09.

In an evacuation, the Parish Health and Medical Officers, in conjunction with the Transportation Officers, will use vans, buses and other available resources to evacuate aged and handicapped residents. Planning provides for the use of 15 .

vans and 15 ambulances to evacuate the home-bound aged and handicapped in St; John the Baptist Parish, and for the use of 10 vans and 10 ambulances for the same population in St.

Charles Parish. Most of the nonambulatory aged and handicapped r

can be transported from their homes to the designated pickup points in buses and vans, then evacuated via bus to reception centers with other persons without private transportation. PF 108-10.

There are four health care facilities within the plume EPZ

-- each Parish has_a hospital and a nursing home within its risk area. These facilities have incorporated detailed procedures for evacuation by ambulance and bus into their emergency management plans, and the numbers of ambulances, buses and vans needed for evacuation has been determined.

Support health care facilities prepared to receive evacuated patients / residents of the risk area facilities have been identified and provided with evacuation support procedures for incorporation into their support facility disaster plans. PF 111-14.

Buses to support the evacuation of hospitals, nursing homes, and the home-bound infirm will be obtained from the same large pool of buses available to support the evacuation of persons without private transportation. The risk Parishes themselves own a number of vans, in addition to the privately owned vans within those Parishes, and there are more than enough vans available from support parishes to meet the needs  ;

identified by the risk Parishes. In addition, 80 ambulances are available to the risk Parishes within one-half hour -- far in excess of the total needed to support an evacuation of hospitals, nursing homes and the home-bound infirm. PF 115.

FEY.A reviewed the provisions in the emegency plans for the evacuation of the hospitals, nursing homes and the home-bound infirm. FEMA concluded that, with adequate arrangements for supplemental transportation resources from support parish ambulance services, the emergency plans adequately provide for the evacuation of health care facilities and the home-bound infirm within the plume EPZ. PF 116.

However, the Sheriff's dispatcher in each of the risk Parishes, as a regular procedure, has the authority to directly dispatch all ambulances within 25 miles; thus, special agreements are arguably unnecessary for their use in the event of an emergency at Waterford 3. Nevertheless, the two risk Parishes are finalizing written agreements for the supply of ambulances to supplement their own resources. These letters of agreement will be provided to the NRC, and FEMA will review the arrangements to ensure their adequacy. The Board concludes that the provisions for the evacuation of hospitals, nursing homes and the home-bound infirm are adequate, provided that signed letters of agreement for the supply of supplemental ambulances are provided to the NRC, as planned. PF 117-18.

(v) The Imprisoned There are two jails within the plume EPZ -- one.in each i

Parish. The St. Charles Parish Jail has an average daily census of 30 persons, while the St. John the Baptist Parish Jail has an average daily census of 25 persons. In an emergency, the risk Parish Sheriffs are responsible for the protection of prisoners incarcerated in the respective Parish jails. Prisoners will be evacuated by police cars or bus.

Agreements have been reached with the sheriffs of neighboring parishes for the confinement of evacuated prisoners. PF 119-20.

FEMA has reviewed the plans with respect to the evacuation of the imprisoned. Based on its review, FEMA concluded that the plans adequately provide for the evacuation of prisoners.

The Board agrees. PF 121-22.

(vi) Transient Workers In the event of an evacuation, private automobile would be the principal means of transportation for persons working in the plume EPZ. Transient workers without private transporta-tion, like risk area residents without private transportation, would be directed to pre-designated pickup points, where they

~

would be bused to reception centers outside the plume EPZ. The peak industrial / commercial population of the plume EPZ has been determined, and has been converted to a number of evacuating

vehicles. The evacuation time estimate demonstrates that the existing roadways will accommodate the traffic so that evac-uation can be accomplished in a timely manner. PF 123-25.

FEMA has reviewed the plans with respect to the evacuation of transient workers. Based on its review, FEMA concluded-that the plans adequately provide for the evacuation of transient workers. The Board concurs. PF 126-27.

(g) Potassium Iodide Contention 17/26(2) asserted that:

i l Applicant has failed to adequately make provi-sion, according to the Emergency Plan contained in Chapter 13.3 of the FSAR, for distribution and/or storage of potassium iodide in accordance with accepted public health practice in loca-tions which are readily accessible to affected individuals as protection against thyroid irradiation.

It has long been assumed that the principal radioactive isotope released in a reactor accident is Iodine-131 ("I-131"),

along with other radioiodines. When radiciodines are inhaled or ingested, they tend to accumulate in the thyroid, and are metabolized into organic iodine compounds which may reside in the thyroid long enough to cause local radiation damage. A radioprotective drug such as potassium iodide ("KI") can be administered to curtail the accumulation of radiciodines by the thyroid. The Joint Intervenors advocate the administration of KI to the general public within the plume EPZ in a radiological emergency and, to ensure tha timely availability of the drug, e its predistribution to individual members of the general public. PF_129-30.

The policy of the State of Louisiana is ;o make KI available for use by emergency workers and institutionalized persons within the risk area in an emergency. .However, the State does not plan to administer KI to the general public; instead, the State will rely on other protective action options

-- such as sheltering or evacuation -- in the event of a j serious emergency. PF 131-32.

The State's KI policy was developed by the ASOEA, with the assistance and concurrence of the State Health Officer, a physician. In developing its policy, the State took into consideration the risks of KI administration to individuals who might be allergic the drug, the problems inherent in the distribution of KI, the false sense of security which the availability of the drug might foster, the limitations on the availability of KI, its relatively short shelf life, the likelihood that it would be needed, and the cost of the drug.

The risks attendant to predistribution of the drug -- i.e.,

improper storage causing loss of potency of the drug, and the increased chance of misadministration (overdose or ingestion in the absence of need for the drug) -- make the case against predistribution of KI particularly compelling. PF 134-44.

i Present uncertainties as to the amount of radiciodine which might be released in an accident further support the State's policy. Recent research comparing consequence estimates used in risk assessment with actual results of accidents and large scale experiments has indicated that the radioactivity (including I-131) actually released to the environment in an accident has been substantially overesti-mated. S im i.l a r ly , there is an ongoing debate among experts as to the toxicity of radioiodine to the thyroid. PF 145-46.

The multiple uncertainties associated with the KI issue are reflected in current Commission policy, pursuant to which the NRC Staff is to:

1. Continue to work with appropriate Federal agencies, i.e., FEMA, FDA and EPA, to address the uncertainties in the use of KI by the general public and possible alterna-tive respiratory protection strategies.

2. Press on with source term technology studies **

• to a point where the Commission can adequately consider the potential impact on -- among other regula-tory matters -- alternative protective actions for public use in a nuclear plant emergency.

The Commission has expressly reserved judgment on the advisa-bility of recommending even the stockpiling of KI for the general public. PF 147-48.

The Board steps lightly in areas such as this one, where the State has balanced the risks associated with exposure to radiciodine against factors such as the incidence of allergic and adverse reactions to KI, the logistical problems of KI administration, and the availability of other protective action options, and has made a public health policy decision at the State level not to provide'for the distribution of KI to the.

general public in the event of a radiological emergency. Even based on its own independent consideration of the cited factors, the Board is not inclined to overrule the State's public health policy decision and order that provisions be made for the distribution of KI to the general public in the event of an emergency.

Counsel for the Joint Intervenors (who presented no testimony) characterized KI as something to which the public is

" entitled," and criticized the State for " depriving" the public of KI. However, there was no evidence of the distribution of KI to the general public residing near a reactor in any state other than Tennessee. While it is conceivable that compre-hensive federal guidance, applicable to all operating reactors, may at some point in the future recommend the administration of KI to the general public in an emergency, there clearly is no current " accepted public health practice" providing for KI use by the general public. The Board concludes that the State's public health policy on the subject is well-founded and consistent with the guidance of FEMA and the NRC. PF 149-50.

D. CONCLUSION The matters examined during the evidentiary hearing which are not discussed in this Opinion were considered by the Board and found either to be without merit or not to affect the Board's decision herein. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which are annexed hereto are incorporated in the Opinion.

In preparing its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Board reviewed and considered the entire record and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law proposed by the parties. Those Proposed Findings not incorporated directly or inferentially in this Initial Decision are rejected as being unsupported by the record of the case or as being unnecessary to the rendering of this decision.

Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, it is this day ordered that the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation is authorized to issue an operating license to Applicant for Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, subject to compliance with the conditions as stated.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT A. BACKGROUND ,

1. This Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") proceeding involves the application filed by Louisiana Power & Light Company (" Applicant") for an operating license for the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3.("Waterford 3"), a-commercial nuclear power plant under construction on the Mississippi River, some 24 miles west of New Orleans, Louisiana.

2. Following Applicant's submittal of its application to operate haterford 3 in September, 1978, and NRC's'public notice of receipt of the application in January, 1979, three groups of individuals requested that a public hearing be held to consider the application and petitioned to intervene in the proceeding.

Their requests were granted. Two of the groups, Save Our Wetlands, Inc. and Oystershell Alliance, were admitted jointly as one intervening party (" Joint Intervenors"). The third group, Louisiana Consumers' League, Inc., was admitted individually as a second intervening party.

3. Prior to hearing, the Louisiana Consumers' League withdrew as a party.

4. An evidentiary hearing was conducted in March, April and May of 1982. Parties to the hearing were Applicant, Joint

Intervenors and the NRC Staff. The parties presented. evidence on two areas of concern placed in issue through contentions raised by Joint Intervenors -- the adequacy of certain aspects of emergency preparedness planning to cope with an accident at Waterford 3 which results in releases of radioactivity offsite, and the adequacy of evaluations of the effects due to routine releases of radioactivity from Waterford 3 interacting with existing pollutants in the area.

B. SYNERGISM l

5. Joint Intervenors contended that Applicant has failed to properly evaluate the cumulative and/or synergistic effects of low level radiation with environmental pollutants, known or suspected to be carcinogens. Hamilton, et al., at 1.

6. The low level radiation of concern to Joint Intervenors is that which will result from the releases of radioactivity from Waterford 3 during normal plant operation.

The releases of radioactivity from a nuclear plant during normal operation are estimated prior to the plant's operation.

The estimates must demonstrate that with installed equipment the licensee can maintain releases below regulatory levels established by NRC and set out in 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix I. Applicant has performed calculations which demonstrate to the NRC Staff's satisfaction that routine releases for i

l Waterford 3 operation will be within Appendix I limits. The NRC Staff has conducted its own assessment and arrived at the same judgment. Hamilton, et al., at 3-4; Branagan, at 2-4.

See generally Staff Ex. 1, S 5.9.

7. The environmental pollutancs of concern, known or suspected to be carcinogens, are those from sources other than Waterford 3 which are present regardless of the nuclear plant's operation. Little evidence addressed specifically the quantity or quality of these pollutants. Evidence was presented on cancer rates of persons in the New Orleans area and some of these cancers may be attributable in part to existing carcino-genic agents in environmental pollutants in the area.

Campbell, at (unnumbered] 5-8. It is not clear, however, that environmantal pollutants are present in quantities sufficient to support synergism with radiation from Waterford 3 during normal cperaticn. Tr. 677-73, 683-85 (Hamilton).

8. The Applicant in an Environmental Report and the NRC Staff in a Final Environmental Statement have assessed the impact on the public of routine radioactive releases from the plant. Hamilton, et al., at 3-4; Branagan, at 1-4; Sraff Ex.

1, S 5.9. The releases and resultant doses are small.

Hamilton, et al., at 6-7, 10; Branagan, at 3. The effects of a the releases are minimal or r,.nexistant. Hamilton, et al., at 10; Goldman, at 3, 14.

9. _The effect of concern to Joint-Intervenors is the possible synergism or multiplicative effect of radioactivity, caused by introducing low-level' radiation from Waterford 3's routine radioactive releases into the environment, interacting with chemical carcinogens which already exist in the area due to other industry, i.e., the concern that exposing an individual to radiation as well as to existing carcinogens will result in an impact greater than the arithmetic sum of the anticipated ef fects on individuals f rom each substance acting alone. See, e.g., Johnson, at [ unnumbered] 5, 10.

10. Synergism has been observed in studies of animals exposed to chemical carcinogens and radiation. The radiation levels employed in these studies have been millions of times greater and the dose rates of exposure billions of times greater than the levels of radioactivity which will be released from Waterford 3 during normal operation and the resultant dose rates. No synergistic effect between chemical carcinogens and radiation at the very low le'els to be released by Waterford 3 has ever been demonstrated. Hamilton, et al., at 13-14; Goldman, at 10-15; Tr. 942-45, 987-89 (Goldman); Tr. 3653-57 (Fabrikant).

11. Synergistic effects between radioactive releases from Waterford 3 during routine operation and existing carcinogens in the Waterford 3 environs in all likelihood will not occur.

The levels of radioactivity to be released by Waterford 3 during routine operation will result in doses which are a small fraction of the doses individuals receive from background radiation. The doses from Waterford 3 will be less even than the variations in the background rad ation in the immediate vicinity of the Waterford plant site. Even if' synergism were to occur, the impact would be miniscule and may in fact be zero, encompassed in the impact occasioned by chemical carcino-gens acting with existing natural background radiation to which everyone is continually exposed. Hamilton, et al., at 10, 14-15; Goldman, at 3, 14-15.

12. Neither Applicant nor the NRC Staff explicitly took synergism into account in its report assessing the doses which will result from Waterford 3's releases. Tr. 530 (Mauro);

Staff Ex. 1, p. 9-4. To the extent any synergism at all occurs, however, the impacts are encompassed in the conserva-tism inherent in having applied linearly-derived risk estimations (which totally ignore repair mechanisms) to these very low doses. Hamilton, et al., at 14-15; Tr. 716-19 (Hamilton).

13. We find that Applicant has not failed to properly evaluate the cumulative and/or synergistic effects of low level radiation with environmental pollutants, known or suspected to be carcinogenr. These effects, if any occur, will be truly negligible, encompassed in the conservatism inherent in using linearly-derived risk functions for assessing the impacts at very low levels of radiation to be released by Waterford 3.

C. EMERGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS

1. Public Education and Information1! (Contention 17/26(1)(a))

14. Joint Intervenors' Contention 17/26(1)(a) asserted that:

Applicant has failed to adequately

[ make provision, according to the l

Emergency Plan contained in Chapter 13.3 of the FSAR, for evacuation of individuals located within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone for the Waterford 3 site

, in the event of a serious reactor

( incident, as required by applicable

! NRC regulations, in that:

l' (a) the provisions for notifying residents of evacuation procedures are inadequate.

1/ Applicant's evidence on this contention included the testimony of Robert G. Azzarello, an engineer-nuclear with emergency planning responsibilities, employed by Applicant; Alexis Tsaggaris and Ronald J. Perry, of Energy Consultants, Inc., engaged by Applicant to assist in emergency planning; Robert W. Myers, of the Nuclear Energy Division ("LNED") of the Office of Environmental Affairs, Louisiana Department of Natural Resources; John M. Lucas, Emergency Preparedness Director for St. Charles Parish; and Bertram P. Madere, Civil l Defense Director for St. John the Baptist Parish. FEMA Emergency Management Officer Albert L. Lookabaugh and Emergency Management Specialist John W. Senton testified for the Staff based on their review of the offsite emergency plans. The Staff also presented the testimony of Donald J. Perrotti, an Emergency Preparedness Analyst with the NRC Staff, who reviewed the Waterford 3 onsite plan. The Joint Intervenors presented no direct evidence.

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15. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, S IV.D.2 requires that emergency plans provide for yearly dissemination to the public within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone

(" plume EPZ") of basic emergency planning information, such as the methods and times required for public notification and the protective actions planned if an accident occurs, general information as to the nature and effects of radiation, and a listing of local broadcast stations that will be used for dissemination of information during an emergency. Signs or other measures shall also be used to disseminate to any transient population within the plume EPZ appropriate informa-tion that would be helpful if an accident occurs. Specific criteria contained in MUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 (Rev. 1), " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" ("NUREG-0654"), further specify that information should be provided to members of the public within the plume EPZ at least annually on radiation, on how they will be notified in the event of an emergency, on what their actions should be, and on contact points for additional information. Perrotti, ff.

Tr. 3229, at 5; Benton and Lookabaugh, ff. Tr. 2864, at 3. See also 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b)(7); NUREG-0654, Criteria G.1, G.2.

16. The organization which bears responsibility for developing, coordinating and implementina the emergency

l preparedness public education program for Waterford 3 is the Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division ("LNED"), with the Applicant.

The risk Parish Emergency Preparedness / Civil Defense Directors and Public Information Officers are responsible for making recommendations and providing support to LNED for advance development of printed materials as well as advance development of prepared messages designed for dissemination via local news media and the Emergency Broadcast System ("EBS") at the time of an c.nergency. Senton and Lookabaugh, at 4.

1 i

17. Both the onsite and offsite emergency plans provide

for a coordinated, comprehensive public education program, addressing the needs of both the permanent and transient populations within the the plume EPZ. The pluns provide that the information disseminated annually will include information about radiation, contacts for additional information, protec-tive measures and the special needs of the handicapped. The plans further provide that the information supplied to perma-nent residents will included printed material suitable for retention such that it can be readily referred to in an emergency. In addition, the plans provide for dissemination of emergency response information to the transient population, through measures such as posting signs, decals or notices at -

public facilities. Perrotti, at 5-6; Applicant Ex. 1, at 6-33 to 6-34; Applicant Ex. 2, at 5-2 to 5-3; Applicant Ex. 3, Basic Plan, at 24-25. The State Plan provides for the inclusion in the brochure of the information specified in NUREG-0654.

Tr. 2865 (Lookabaugh).

18. Prior to the hearing, 3 draft public information brochure had been provided (though not formally submitted) to the NRC. Perrotti, at 6; Tr. 3884 (Perrotti). That brochure contained the pertinent information as specified in the emergency plans. Perrotti, at 6.

19. The brochure will be mailed to all area residents annually. Brochures will be distributed in bulk, or posters containing such information will be provided, to area industries, hotels, motels, post offices, libraries and other public areas. The information will also be provided in local telephone directories. Azzarello, et al., at 7; Myers, ff. Tr.

2258, at 4-5.

20. In addition to the pre-emergency public education materials to be distributed annually within the plume EPZ, a more immediate, intensive and detailed public information program would be implemented in the event of a serious accident at Waterford 3. See generally 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b)(5); 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. E, S IV.D.3; NUREG-0654, Criteria E.5, E.6, E.7. Following the Parish executives' decision to implement evacuation for a risk area, the Emergency Preparedness / Civil Defense Directors would sound the siren

system to alert the public at risk to the emergency, and to cue them to tune _o a local broadcast station to receive informa-tion about the nature of the emergency and instructions for evacuation. Azzarello, et al., at 7.

21. Special arrangements exist between each Parish and local radio and cable TV stations for provision to the public -

of detailed energency information. Azzarello, et al., at 8; Madere, ff. Tr. 2243, at 6-7, 8; Lucas, ff. Tr. 2246, at 4. In _

the event of an emergency, those stations will broadcast a pre-prepared evacuation message containing specific emargency information, including a description of the area to be evac-uated and instructions on transportation assistance, evacuation routes, reception centers and shelters, and preparatory _

measures for leaving home. If school is in session, another pre-prepared broadcast message will provide information on the destination of evacuated school children and instructions for meeting them outside the plume EPZ. Azzarello, et al., at 8; Applicant Ex. 3, Encl. 1 at 133, 139-43, and Encl. 2 at 300, 306-10. In addition to the pre-prepared broadcast messages, the Parishes will disseminate continuing emergency public information through the Parish Public Information Officers to the media, including local radio and cable TV stations.

Azzarello, et al., at 8.

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22. The Emergency Broadcast System ("EBS") will also be l activated to direct listeners to the appropriate broadcast stations to-receive detailed emergency information. Subsequent to the activation of the public alert / notification system, the Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness ("LOEP"), in conjunction with LNED, will coordinate the dissemination o#

continuing emergency public information over the EBS.

Azzarello, et al., at 8; Benton and Lookabaugh, at 5; Myers, at 5.

23. Subject only to a review of the public information brochure, FEMA has determined that the emergency plans ade-quately provide for notification of the public as to evacuation procedures. Benton and Lookabaugh, at 5.

24. Based on the Staff's review of the Applicant's emergency plan, the Staff has concluded that the public information program meets the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, S IV.D.2 and the criteria of NUREG-0654.

The implementation of the public information program will be reviewed and evaluated by the NRC Staff during the Emergency Preparedness Implementation Appraisal to be conducted later this year. Perrotti, at 6-7.

25. The Staff will assure that the brochure and the poster have been submitted for review and approved by FEMA and/or the NRC Staff, and that the public information materials

have actually been distributed prior.to authorization above five percent of full power. Tr. 3853 (Grimes). Thus, the Staff will ensure that the public education and information program meets the Commission's requirements prior to issuance of a full power' license. Perrotti, at 7.

26. Based on the foregoing fi.,dir.gs, uncontroverted by direct evidence, and subject.to Staff' confirmation of distribu-tion within the plume EPZ of the approved brochures and posters, the Board finds that the provisions for notifying residents of evacuation procedures.are' adequate.

2. Evacuation Time Estimate and Adequacy of Roads2 /

(Contention 17/26(1)(b))

27. Joint Intervenors' Contention 17/26(1)(b) asserted that:

Applicant has failed to adequately make provision, according to the Emergency Plan contained in Chapter 13.3 of the FSAR, for evacuation of individuals located within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone for the Waterford 3 site in the event of a serious reactor incident, as required by applicable NRC regulations, in that:

(b) the roads and highways necessary for such evacuation are inadequate.

28. Neither the regulations of the NRC or FEMA nor NUREG-0654 requires that any particular evacuation route capacity exist as part of an applicant's emergency preparedness capability. Perrotti, at 7-8. Neither the NRC nor FEMA has 2/ Applicant's main witness on this contention was Kevin P.

Twine, Supervising Resources Planner at Ebasco Services, Inc.,

engaged by Applicant to prepare an evacuation time estimate study for the Waterford 3 plume EPZ. Mssrs. Lucas and Madere also testified for Applicant. The Staff presented the testi-mony of Thomas Urbanik II, a transportation engineering consultant to the Staff, who reviewed Applicant's evacuation time estimate study at the request of the Staff. Donald Perrotti of the NRC Staff and FEMA staff members John Benton and Albert Lookabaugh also testified for the NRC Staff on the conformance of the onsite and offsite emergency plans, respec-tively, to NUREG-0654 critecia on evacuation time estimates.

Mssrs. Benton and Lookabaugh also testified generally on the adequacy of the road network. The Joint Intervenors presented i no evidence.

requirements for maximum acceptable evacuation times. Twine, ff. Tr. 2224, at 3.

29. Nor do either FEMA or NRC regulations or criteria for emergency plans require the addition or upgrading of roads and highways for evacuation. Twine, at 3.

30. However, in 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, S IV and in NUREG-0654, power plant licensees and state and local emergency management agencies are required to include in their emergency response plans time estimates for evacuation of the population within the plume EPZ. See NUREG-0654, Criteria J.8 and J.10.1. See also 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. E, S IV.

31. The methodology for preparation of the evacuation time estimates is specified in Appendix 4 to NUREG-0634.

Appendix 4 discusses several elements which the NRC and FEMA believe should be included in evacuation time estimate studies.

The considerations include: (a) an accounting for permanent, transient, and special facility populations in the plume EPZ; (b) an indication of the traffic analysis method and the method of arriving at road capacities; (c) consideration of a range of evacuation scenarios generally representative of normal through adverse evacuation conditions; (d) consideration of confirma-tion of evacuation; (e) identification of critical links and

\ need for traffic control; and (f) use of methodology and traffic flow modeling techniques for various time estimates,

consistent with the guidance of NUREG-0654. Urbanik, ff. Tr' .  ;

2743, at 3~ 4.

32. The evacuation time estimates are for use by t

emergency response personnel charged with recommending and <

deciding on protective actions during an emergency. Tne time .

estimates provide emergency response decision-makers with additional information on which to base a decision as to the feasibility of evacuation under actual conditions. Urbanik, at 6; Tr. 3850-51 (Grimes); Twine, at 4, 5-6, ~8; Applicant Ex. 4, Abstract.

33. Applicant, through contract with Ebasco Services, Inc., submitted an evacuation time estimata study, " Evacuation i

Time Estimate, Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit No. 3, Rev. 1" (Applicant Ex. 4), to the NRC on February 26, 1982.

Twine, at 4.

34. The m?thodology used by Applicant for analyzing evacuation times utilizes a mathematical simulation model which.

predicts the flow of vehicular traffic on the roadway system around Waterford 3. The model uses a special purpose simula-tion language entitled General Purpose Simulation System

("GPSS"), appropriate for a queuing problem such as an evac-uation. The methodology used is an acceptable approach identified in Appendix 4 to NUREG-0654. Urbanik, at 4.

\

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i i

35. Detailed population estimates were made for permanent residents, transients and special facility residents as specified in NUREG-0654. The population estimates were made for 1982, in accordance with NUREG-0654 guidance. Urbanik, at 4.

36. Populstions were converted to the number of evac-uating vehicles in several ways. Permanent residents were apportioned to vehicles based on latest available data for auto availability, and projected 1982 population. Transient populations were converted to evacuating vehicles based on 0.709 vehicles per person. School children were assumed to evacuate by bus, assuming 60 persons per bus. The overall approach usad to determine the r of evacuating vehicles is reasonable and makes maxi.num us; of available data. Urbanik, at 4-5.

37. Applicant's determination of roadway segment capac-ities is based on the Highway Capacity Manual, which is the standard reference used in the transportation profession to compute roadway capacities. Applicant's determination of roadway capacities is reasonable and appropriate. Urbanik, at 5.

38. Applicant's evacuation time estimatas are based on two scenarios -- clear weather and adverse weather (a heavy, continuous rainstorm, which would result in reductions of

_ _ _ _ _ m_ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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/

1

.a ,

f V

/

vehiclespeedsandofthedapacityofintersectionsfrom'15%-to '

25%). Evacuation is assumed to take place during the daytime'r on a weekday.

1 The daytime scenario is the most,conserv'atIve,W.

) ,

i J, * ;'

, y i>j_ .

since the population is somewhat higher and more1dispe.rsed' 3f 0 (i.e., at work, in school, etc.) during the day. Other . -)t

.1 ,,

problems, such as transportation availability and traffic '), ~

! volumes on the roads at the time of evacuation, are also more ,j l serious during the daytime. Applicant Ex. 4, at 5-6. ,

i l 39. The estimated time to evacuate the entire plume EPZ s

is five hours and fifteen minutes in clear weather conditions and seven hours and thirty minutes in adverse weather condi-tions. Applicant Ex. 4, at 3. These evacuation times place '

Waterford 3 approximately "in the' middle" relative to other j nuclear power plaats. Applicant's evacuation time estimate j study included several assumptions more conservative than the

! 5taff's consultant would have used; thus, Applican t's evac-uation time estimates represent "an upper limit" on the time ,

necessary for evacuation. Tr. 2776-77,.2779;80 (Urbanik). '

40. Tne Staff's consultant independently verified the accuracy of the Applicant's evacuation time estimates by performing several independent calculations of volume-to-capacity ratios to determine if any parts of the network appeared to require times longer than those indicated in Applicant's study. He concluded that Applicant's analysesrare reasonable. Urbanik, at 5.

41. The Staff's consultant determined that Applicant's evacuation time estimate study is responsive to and in compli-ance with UUREG-0654, and that the estimates generated delin-eate a reasonable range of times required to evacuate the Waterford 3 plume EPZ. Urbanik, at 5. Based on that eval-uation, the Staff found that Applicant's evacuation time estimate study meets the criteria of NUREG-0654 and is accepta-ble. Staff Ex. 5, at 13-3.

42. The Emergency Preparedness / Civil Defense Directors of St. Charles and St. John the Baptist Parishes concur in -

Applicant's evacuation time estimates. Lucas, at 6; Madere, at 10-11. Both the onsite and offsite emergency plans incorpotste the Applicant's evacuation time estimates. Applicant Ex. 1, Appendix B; Applicant Ex. 3, Encl. 1 at 162, and Encl. 2 at 328.

43. Emergency Preparedness / Civil Defens? Directors of St.

Charles and St. John the Baptist Parishes consider the existing road network adequate for evacuation in the event of an emergency at Waterford 3, though they have recommended addi-tional roads for evacuations in emergencies at toxic chemical plants in the area. Tr. 2995-96, 2783 (Madere); Tr. 2996-97, 2790-93 (Lucas).

44. Further, FEMA has independently reviewed the adequacy of the proposed evacuation routes. In its evaluation, FEMA i

reviewed Applicant's evacuation time estimate study, attended a briefing by Ebasco on the evacuation time estimate study, interviewed the Emergency Preparedness / Civil Defense Directors for the two risk parishes, considered the comments of the Federal Highway Administration's representative on the Regional Assist nce Committee ("RAC"), and made personal observations of the road network in the area. Based on its evaluation, FEMA concluded that the roads are adequate for evacuation purposes.

Benton and Lookabaugh, at 5-6.

45. The evacuation time estimate study realistically demonstrates that, given the present roadway network, evac-uation of all or a portion of the Waterford 3 plume EPZ is a feasible protective response available for consideration by Parish officials should n radiological emergency occur at Naterford 3. The decision to undertake evacuation, ?ither as the only protective response or in combination with other protective actions, is one which must be made in light of conditions as they exist at the time of the emergency. The evacuation time estimate will be a valuable tool to assist officials of the risk Parishes, the State and Applicant in making that decision. Urbanik, at 9; Twine, at 8; Tr. 3091 (Twine).

46. Based on the foregoing findings, uncontroverted by direct evidence, the Board finds that the evacuation time estimate study complies with applicable regulations and guidance, and that the roads and highways which would be used in an evacuation in the event of an accident at Waterford 3 are adequate to support such an evacuation.

3. Public Alert / Notification System ! (Contention 17/26(1)(c))

47. Joint Intervenors' Contention 17/26(1)(c) asserted that:

Applicant has failed to adequately make provision, according to the Emergency Plan contained in Cnapter 13.3 Of the FSAR, for evacuation of ,

individuals located within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone for the Waterford 'a site in the event of a serious reactor incident, as required by applicable NRC regulations, in that:

(c) the evacuation warning system is inadequate.

48. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, 3 IV.D.3 sets out tha requirements for prompt notification to the puolic in the area at risk in the event of an emergency. Pursuant to those requirements, the design objective for a public notification 3/ Applicant's evidence on this contention included the testimony of Mssrs. Azzarello, Tsaggaris, Perry, Myers, Lucas and Madere. FEMA Staff members Lookabaugh and Benton testified for the liRC Staf f based on their review of the offsite emergency plans. The Staff also presented the testimony of Mr. Perrotti of the NRC Staff, who reviewed the Waterford 3 onsite plan. The Joint Intervenors presented no direct evidence.

system is to have the capability to complete the initial notification of.the public in the plume EPZ within about 15 minutes, although the use of the prompt notification system is expected to range from those emergencies requiring immediate i public notification (i.e., within 15 minutes of the time that i

state and local officials are notified) to the.more-likely eveats where there is substantial time available for local officials to make a judgment on whether or not to activate the i

public notification system. The regulations provide that the responsibility for activating the alert notification system properly lies with the state and local governments, while the responsibility for demonstrating that such a system is in place rests with the Applicant. Perrotti, at 8-9. See also 10 1

C.F.R. S 50.47(b)(5); 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. E, S IV.D.1; NUREG-0654, Criterion E.6, App. 3.

49. The public alert / notification system for the Waterford 3 plume EPZ consists of a combination of alert systems (fixed sirens, tone-alert receivers, radios, mobile sirens and mobile loudspeakers), as well as the Emergency Broadcast System ("EBS") and local broadcast media. Azzarello, et al., at 9.

50. The backbone of the alert / notification system is a network of 38 fixed location, rotating, radio-activated, battery-operated sirens to be located in St. Charles and St.

l John the Baptist Parishes. When activated, the sirens will produce a 3-5 minute steady signal. Azzarello, 3t al., at 9.

The system design allows for either selective activation of individual sirens or activation of the entire system.

Azzarello, et al., at 10.

51. In developing the system, Applicant, throagh contract with Acoustic Technology, Inc. and in coordination with the risk Parish Emergency Preparedness / Civil Defense Directors, identified the populated areas within the plume EP2, conducted an extensive siren system acoustic study and identified the locations for installation of the sirens. Azzarello, et al.,

at 9-10.

52. The objective of the acoustic study was to develop and establish a siren system that meets the design objectives and acceptance criteria in Appendix 3 of NUREG-0654. The actual siren locations were selected after onsite inspection.

Siren sound levels have been calculated, through the use of a computer model, to provide siren coverage of 60 dbC, which would produce a level of at least 10 dbC above average daytime ambient background, in accordance with the target level criterion specified in NUREG-0654. A description of the siren system and its analysis for compliance with NUREG-0654 criteria is provided in a document prepared by Acoustic Technology, Inc., entitled " Verification of the Siren Alert System For m

E Waterford 3 Nuclear Power Station" (Applicant Ex. 5).

Azzarello, gt al., at 10.

53. The sirens will be placed to provide a minimum 60 dbC coverage of the populated areas within the plume EPZ, and will therefore provide the capability for an instantaneous alert

-__ signal to escentially all of the population throughout the

_{_

plume EPZ. Azzarello, it al., at 10. In addition, major

-[ industries, hospitals, nursing homes, private schools and the

_ public school system will be notified directly from the

~'

respective Parish Emergency Operations Centers ("EOCs") by

=-

, radio, tone-alert receiver, or telephone. Azzarello, et al.,

at ll.

54. The areas not covered by the sirens are wetlands which are essentially uninhabited. Tone-alert receivers and

'A

'3F radios will be used in hunting and fishing camps in the w

_jp wetlands. State helicopters and boats will also be used for d'

wetlands notification, through the Department of Public Safety w

3:7 and Department of Wildlife and Fisheries. In addition, alert

__ teams staffed by Parish and State personnel may be dispatched, W

L as conditions indicate, to provide supplemental notification to

,z-_ hunters, fishermen or other transients who may be in the

'_ wetlands area. Azzarello, gt al., at 11.

E 55. When a decision is made to recommend protective D

.2- action to the public, the public alert / notification system will

-W ._

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be implemented by Parish officials. Activation of the siren system will take place from the Parish EOCs, with the Sheriff's offices as a back-up. Local residents will be cued to tune to local radio and cable TV stations for specific information about the protective actions to be taken. EBS will also be activated to broadcast prepared messages providing information to the public on an area-wide basis. Azcarello, et al., at 11-12.

56. The risk Parish Emergency Preparedness / Civil Defense Directors are responsible for conducting at least one complete system test and EBS activation each year, quarterly growl tests, and silent tests every two weeks. The respective Parish officials must certify the performance of these tests.

Azzarello, et al., at 12.

57. Applicant submitted the conceptual design of its alert / notification system to FEMA for evaluation. FEMA reviewed the proposed warning plan in accordance with FEMA Civil Preparedness Guide (" CPG") 1-17 (March 1, 1980), " Outdoor Warning Systems Guide," pursuant to NUREG-0654, Appendix 3.

FEMA has also reviewed Applicant's report, " Verification of the Siren Alert System For Waterford 3 Nuclear Power Station" (Applicant Ex. 5). Based on the findings from that review, FEMA has concluded that it appears that the system proposed by Applicant will satisfy the criteria for that portion of the

4 plume EPZ for which it is designed, and will adequately warn

the populace. Benton and Lookabaugh, at 6.-

58. The only possible reservations FEMA expressed with respect to its conclusion were the hearing impaired and persons working in any facilities where the ambient background noise 1

3 levels may preclude their hearing the sirens. 'Benton and Lookabaugh, at 6.

i

59. The Parishes are identifying and preparing ' rosters of hearing impaired persons who might not hear the siren warning system. Perry, ff. Tr. 2262, at 11; Tr. 2476, 2477, 2478 i

j (Perry); Tr. 2985 (Lucas); Tr. 2988 (Madere). Implementing

]

i procedures in both Parishes will include provisions for f notification of such persons by methods such as phone calls to neighbors and notification by fan-out warning teams, fire personnel and other emergency workers. Perry, at 11.

, 60. The major industrial concerns in both Parishes would receive early, direct notification of an emergency at Waterford i 3, from the respective Parish EOC, by radio, tone-alert receiver or telephone. Perry, at 12; Azzarello, et al., at 11, 22; Applicant Ex. 3, Encl. 1 at 105-10, and Encl. 2 at 268-71.

If siren tests reveal that ambient background noise precludes hearing sirens in facilities which would not presently receive direct notification of an emergency, appropriate supplemental notification measures will be included in the implementing procedures. Perry, at 12.

61. The siren system will be installed and tested by the Parishes before Waterford 3 is operational. Tr. 2730, 2804 (Lucas). In addition, after the entire alert / notification system is installed, FEMA will field test and evaluate the entire system, as installed, in accordance with the criteria in NUREG-0654, Appendix 3. In cooperation with Applicant and State and Parish authorities, FEMA will take a statistical sample of the populace of all areas within the plume EPZ to assess the publi:'s ability to hear the alerting signal. FEMA will prescribe any corrective measures necessary to provide assurance that the ciren system meets the objectives for slerting the population prescribed in NUREG-0654, Appendix 3.

Benton and Lookabaugh, at 6-7; NUREG-0654, at 3-3 to 3-4, 3-13.

The NRC Staff will require that Applicant demonstrate that the alert / notification system meets the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, S IV.D.3 prior to issuance of a full power license. Perrotti, at 10-11.

62. Based on the foregoing findings uncontroverted by direct evidence, and subject to Staff verification of the capability of the public alert / notification system, the Board finds that the evacuation warning system is adequate.

4. Command Decision Structureb! (Contention 17/26(1)(d))

63. Joint Intervenors' Contention 17/26(1)(d) asserted that:

Applicant has failed to adequately make provision, according to the Emergency Plan contained in Chapter 13.3 of the FSAR, for evacuation of individuals located within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone for the Waterford 3 site in the event of a serious reactor incident, as required by applicable NRC regulations, in that:

(d) there is not an adequate command decision structure, including appropriate guidance, for commencing evacuation.

64. The Commission's regulations, at 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, S IV.A, set forth particular requirements as to the identification in emergency plans of onsite and offsite authorities (including State and local officials) who will be responsible for taking necessary actions in the event of an emergency. These include an identification of (a) onsite individuals who will take charge during an emergency, and who will be in charge of the exchange of information with offsite 4/ Applicant's evidence on this contention included the ,

testimony of Mssrs. Azzarello, Tsaggaris, Perry, Myers, Lucas and Madere. FEMA Staff members Lookabaugh and Benton testified for the NRC Staff based on their review of the offsite emergency plans. The Staff also presented the testimony of Mr. Perrotti of the NRC Staff, who reviewed taa Waterford 3 onsite plan. The Joint Intervenors presented no direct evidence.

{

authorities responsible for coordinating and implementing offsite emergency measures, as well as (b) the State and/or local officials responsible for planning for, ordering and controlling appropriate protective actions, including evac-uations when necessary. Perrotti, at 11. NUREG-0654 also includes specific criteria applicable to the command decision structure. NUREG-0654, at 31-33; Benton and Lookabaugh, at 7.

65. Section 5.1 of the Waterford 3 onsite plan describes Applicant's emergency organization, which consists of the Emergency Onsite Organization and the Emergency Offsite Support Organization. Perrotti, at 12. The State of Louisiana describes its command decision structure at pages 17-39 of the State Plan (Applicant Ex. 2). The command structure for St.

Charles Parish is set forth generally on pages 66-77 of Enclosure 1 to Attachment 1 (Applicant Ex. 3), with more specific responsibilities set out in the subsequent tabs.

Similarly, the command structure for St. John the Baptist Parish is outlined at pages 228-38 of Enclosure 2 to Attachment 1 (Applicant Ex. 3), with more specific responsibilities set out in the subsequent tabs. Benton and Lookabaugh, at 7.

56. In the event of an accident at Waterford 3, the Nuclear Operations Supervisor-Shift Supervisor ("NOS-SS"), who .

directs the onsite shift organization, will immediately implement the onsite emergency plan as required. The NOS-SS has the responsibility and authority for declaring emergencies until relieved by the Emergency Coordinator. Perrotti, at 12.

The Emergency Coordinator is charged with the command and control of all accident mitigation actions at the site.

Azzarello, et al., at 13. Among the responsibilities of the Emergency Coordinator which cannot be delegated is the de ision to notify and recommend protective actions (including e',1c-uation of people in the plume EPZ) to offsite authorities.

Perrotti, at 12.

67. The Waterford 3 onsite plan commits to prompt notification (within 15 minutes) of offsite agencies by the Emergency Coordinator. Perrotti, at 12. The Emergency Coordinator will assess the emergency condition and simultane-ously notify the risk Parishes, LMED and LOEP of the emergency.

A :ar?llo, et al., at 13-14. An operational hotline located in the control room will be used to make the initial notifica-tions. This system provides dedicated telephone links with the risk Parishes, LNED and LOEP. The onsite plan also describes various other emergency communication systems that are available to Applicant for notifying offsite authorities.

Perrotti, at 13.

68. The information provided to the risk Parishes, LNED and LOEP will include the class of emergency; the type of actual or projected release; estimated duration; estimates of

l quantities of radioactive material released and points and height of releases; chemical and physical form of released material; meteorological conditions; actual or projected dose rates at the exclusion area boundary; projected dose rates and integrated dose at the projected peak and at two, five and ten miles; sectors affected; estimates of surface contamination; plant emergency response actions underway; recommended emergency actions, including protective measures; and the prognosis for worsening or termination of the evcnt based on plant information. Azzarello, et al., at 14.

69. The Waterford 3 onsite plan provides guidance to the Emergency Coordinator as to the choice of protective action recommendation based on the type of emergency. Applicant's choices of recommended protective actions are consistent with those established in the EPA Manual of Protective Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, EPA-520/1-75-001.

Perrotti, at 12. The Emergency Coordinator bases a recom-mendation for protective action upon his technical assessment of the accident and dose projections estimated through computer analysis of readings from onsite radiological monitoring systems, and dose projections estimated from offsite radiolog-ical monitoring efforts by utility field monitoring teams.

Azzarello, et al., at 14.

70. Applicant's Emergency Offsite Support Organization is responsible for offsite emergency management activities and will provide assistance to or obtain assistance for the Emergency Onsite Organization as required. A description of the offsite organization, its duties and the time at which those duties are activated is set forth in the onsite plan (Applicant Ex. 1, at 5-20 to 5-33, Table 5.1). After the Emergency Offsite Organization has been activated, the duties of coordinating with State and local officials are assumed by the Emergency Operations Facility Director. Perrotti, at 13.

71. When the risk Parishes receive the initial notifica-tion, they will implement the notification and mobilization procedures for Parish personnel and resources as determined by the class of emergency. Each Parish will activate its Emergency Operations Center and will maintain continuous communications with the plant and with the State agencies to receive and evaluate updated information pertaining to the accident and recommendations from the plant and from State agencies. Azzarello, et al., at 15.

72. LNED will activate its operational headquarters in Baton Rouge, and LNED's Fixed Facility Response Team ("FFRT")

will conduct monitoring and sampling activities at predesig-nated sites in the plume EP3. LNED will make an independent assessment of the accident, using information supplied by the

Waterford 3 plant and the field monitoring data supplied by the <

FFRT. LNED will in turn disseminate timely technical informa-tion to the State Emergency Operations Center ("EOC")Lwhich will have been activated by LOEP, and to the Parishes.

Azzarello, et al., at 15.

73. LNED will make protective action recommendations based on its accident assessment, which includes dose projec-tions developed at LNED headquarters from offsite radiological monitoring information provided by the utility and by LNED's FFRT, and input from LNED radiation specialists. Azzarello, et al., at 15-16. LNED's accident assessment and protective action recommendation will be forwarded to the Assistant Secretary of the Office of Environmental Affairs ("ASOEA"),

located at the State EOC, for evaluation. Upon the decision of the ASOEA, LNED will notify the risk Parishes of the State protective action recommendation. Benton and Lookabaugh, at 7; l Azzarello, et al., at 16.

l

74. Applicant's technical representative assigned to each Parish EOC facilitates the decision-making process by trans-l lating technical information from the plant to assist the l Parish chief executive in assessing the pertinent aspects of l

! the accident. In addition, the Parish EOC staff provides input to help the Parish chief executive assess the public's readi-ness to respond to the emergency. Azzarello, et al., at 16.

l l

75. Based on the protective action recommendations of the State and Applicant, and with the advice and counsel of the respective risk Parish Emergency Preparedness / Civil Defense Director, the chief executives of the Parishes (the St. Charles Parish President and the St. John the Baptist Police Jury President) make the decision to evacuate or implement other protective actions. The governor reserves the right to declare a state of emergency and order an evacuation. Azzarello, et al., at 12-13; Benton and Lookabaugh, at 7-8. At the desig-nated time, coordinated by LNED, each Parish will activate its alert / notification system, and LOEP will activate EBS, to notify the public in the risk areas of the protective action decision and to provide instructions to the public. Benton and Lookabaugh, at 7.

76. FEMA reviewed the command decision structure set forth in the State Plan (including Attachment 1), and concluded that it was adequate, except that the Parish Plans should identify by title an official of Applicant at the Emergency Operations Facility (" EOF") who shall have the authority or responsibility to provide protective action recommendations to offsite authorities. Benton and Lookabaugh, at 8. Such a designation will be easily accomplished. Tr. 2869 (Benton).

77. The Staff has reviewed the command decision structure outlined in the onsite plan, and has requested clarification or

I additional information with respect to several items.

l l Perrotti, at 13-14.

78. The Staff has requested clarification with regard to.

distinguishing between the primary and backup means of l

emergency communication. Perrotti, at 13. Applicant has proposed language to clarify in the onsite plan that the Operational Hotline will be used as Applicant's primary communication link with LNED, LOEP, and the risk Parishes, with ,

the commercial telephone system as a backup. As a second backup, Civil Defense radio will be used to notify LOEP and the Parishes. Applicant Ex. 8. The Staff is confident that

! Applicant will be responsive to its request for further

! clarification that the primary and backup means of communica-l tions have dissimilar vulnerability characteristics. Tr. 3900 l . (Perro tti) .

l

79. The Staff has requested that Applicant include in its emergency plan a description of its "offsite emergency notifi-f cation system." Perrotti, at 14. Applicant has committed to l

l include such a description in its onsite plan (Tr. 3895 (Perrotti)), and has proposed specific language to the Staff l

which -- based on a brief review -- appeared to the Staff to be-satisfactory. Tr. 3897 (Perrotti).

80. The Staff has also requested additional information with respect to a diagram of the interfaces between the plant 1

site, corporate headquarters, local services support, and state and local governmental response organizations. Perrotti, at

14. Applicant has agreed to incorporate certain additional information into the diagram, but the Staff has requested further clarification. Applicant Ex. 8; Tr. 3897 (Perrotti).

The interfaces are already described in the onsite plan; the change to the diagram which the Staff has requested will be

" simple." Tr. 3898 (Perrotti).

81. The Staff has further requested additional informa-tion as to the training to be provided for Corporate Command Center ("CCC") personnel. Perrotti, at 14. Applicant has committed to provide the requested information, and has proposed specific language to the Staff for inclusion in the onsite plan. Tr. 3903 (Perrotti); Applicant Ex. 8.

82. Finally, the Staff has requested additional informa-

?

tion as to the duties of the Emergency Planning Coordinator, and as to the training to be provided to individuals responsi-ble for the planning effort. Perrotti, at 14. The Staff does not consider these items to be important aspects of the command decision structure, since they refer to the planning aspect of the emergency preparedness program and since the personnel involved are not part of the command decision structure in an actual emergency. Tr. 3901 (Perrotti). Applicant has proposed specific language to the Staff to resolve these items.

Applicant Ex. 8.

83. Subject to satisfactory resolution of these items, the Staff has concluded that Applicant's organization and provisions for command decision structure, including guidance for commencing evacuation, meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, S IV.A, and the criteria set forth in NUREG-0654. Perrotti, at 14. The Staff believes all the requested changes will be straightforward in nature and anticipates no problems. Tr. 3895 (Perrotti). Further, the Staff will ensure that each item is resolved prior to issuance of a full power license. Tr. 3899 (Perrotti).

84. Based on the foregoing findings, uncontroverted by direct evidence, the Board finds that there is an adequate command decision structure, including appropriate guidance, for commencing evacuation.

5. Evacuation DrillsE/ (Contention 17/26(1)(e))

85. Joint Intervenors' Contention 17/26(1)(e) asserted:

Applicant has failed to adequately make provision, according to the ,

Emergency Plan contained in Chapter 13.3 of the FSAR, for evacuation of individuals located within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone for the Waterford 3 site in the event of a serious reactor incident, as required by applicable NRC regulations, in that:

(c) the Emer.gency Plan fails to provide for realistic and comprehensive evacuation drills, in that the provisions for moving individuals are not actually tested.

86. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, S IV.F requires, in part, that each licensee shall exercise at least annually the emergency plan for each site at which it has one or more power reactors licensed for operation, which shall include partici-pation by appropriate State and local government agencies.

That provision further specifies that "a full-scale exercise which tests as much of the licensee, State, and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public 5/ Applicant's evidence on this contention included the testimony of Mssrs. Azzarello, Tsaggaris, Perry, Myers, Lucas and Madere. FEMA Staff members Lookabaugh and Benton testified for the NRC Staff based on their review of the offsite emer-gency plans. The Staff also presentod the testimony of Mr. Perrotti of the NRC Staff, who reviewed the Waterford 3 onsite plan. The Joint Intervenors presented no direct evidence.

participation shall be conducted" (empnasis supplied). 10 C.F.R. 50.47('o)(14) specifies that periodic exercises will be conducted to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities, periodic drills will be conducted to develop and maintain key skills, and deficiencies identified as a result of exercises or drills will be corrected. The NRC does not require that evacuation of individuals, whether mandatory or voluntary, be conducted as part of the required drills.

Perrotti, at 14-15.

37. Similarly, NUREG-0654 does not provide for the actual movement of people during evacuation drills. See generally NUREG-0654, Criteria N.1-5. Nor does FEMA require the actual movement of the public during drills, since: (1) such movement during drills would result in unnecessary interruptions of daily activities and commerce; (2) it is unlikely that the entira plume EPZ would be evacuated at any one tim 2; (3) such movement would create a risk of accidents which cannot be justified for exercise purposes; (4) there is no legal author-ity for directing evacuation of all persons for exercise purposes, and without full public participation the axercise would be inconclusive; (5) in observed exercises where resi-dents of the plume EPZ were given the opportunity and were encouraged to participate in a realistic evacuation, they have not in fact chosen to participate; and (6) based on information pertaining to the evacuation of persons for other emergencies in the past, there is evidence that the populace can be evacuated in a timely manner. Benton and Lookabaugh, at 8-9.

88. The Waterford 3 Plan (Applicant Ex. 1, at 8-4 to 8-8) and the State Plan (Applicant Ex. 2, at 13-1 to 13-5), includ-ing Attachment 1 (Applicant Ex. 3, Basic Plan, at 32-35),

detail the frequency, objectives, extent, functional areas, scenario content, observation and evaluation of exercises and drills. The full-scale exercise for Waterford 3 will be designed to exercise all major elements of the Waterford 3 Plan and the State Plan, including the Parish Enclosures, and will test as much of the plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation. Azzarello, et al., at 17.

89. The-exercise will involve the participation of Applicant and appropriate State and Parish agencies. The scenario will provide for an escalation of events such that all primary communications links will be exercised. Subsequent scenario events will require a simulation of activation of the

• alert / notification system, as well as an exercise of the decision-making process necessary to determine the appropriate protective response to be implemented. Headquarters and field emergency operations centers will be activated and staffed and their internal procedures and displays tested. Accident assessment, field sampling and radiological exposure control procedures will be tested. Scenario events will require that officials with authority to implement the plans provide direction and control for protective response operations and coordinate with one another in accordance with the. established emergency plans. Public information activities as well as control of recovery and/or reentry operations will also be simulated. Federal, State and local observers will be placed at key locations during the exercise to ensure that the exercise objectives are met rnd that any problem areas are ,

identified for resolution. Azzarello, it al., at 18.

8

90. In addition, during the Waterford 3 full-scale exercise, school buses will be moved to simulate evacuation, although school children will not actually be transported.

Madere, at 12-13.

91. Thus, the exercise will activate and test the natifications, primary communications, accident assessment, data gathering, logistical support and protective response functions. Myers, at 8. The objective of.such an exercise is to test the activation and mobilization of communications, emergency response personnel, and resources; the planned exercise will meet that objective. Lucas, at 7; Madere, at 12.

The actual movement of the public is neither necessary nor desirable in an exercise, particularly in light of the risk and inconvenience to the general public if required to participate in such drills. Myers, at S-9; Lucas, at 7.

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l

92. The emergency plans provide that exercises w'll be conducted in accordance with NRC regulations and the joint FEMA /NRC planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in NUREG-0654, and the Waterford 3 full-scale exercise will conform to the specific requirements of 10 C.F.R. 50.47(b)(14) and Appendix E, S IV.F, of the Commission's regulations.

Perrotti, at 15; Myers, at 9; Azzarello, et al., at 17, 18.

93. Based on the foregoing findings, uncontroverted by direct evidence, the Board finds that there are adequate provisions for realistic and comprehensive exercises of the emergency plans, and that the plans will be adequately tested without requiring movement of the general public.

d 4

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.m

6. Transportation for Special Populationsk/1/ (Contention 17/26(1)(f))

94. Joint Intervenors' Contention 17/26(1)(f) asserted that:

Applicant has failed to adequately make provision, according to the Emergency Plan contained in Chapter 13.3 of the FSAR, for evacuation of individuals located within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone for the Waterford 3 site in the event of a serious reactor incident, as required by applicable NRC regulations, in that:

(f) procedures are inadequate for evacuation people who are:

(i) without vehicles; (ii) school children; (iii) aged or crippled; (iv) sick and hospitalized; (v) imprisoned; (vi) transient workers.

6/ Applicant's evidence on this contention included the testimony of Mssrs. Azzarello, Tsaggaris, Perry, Myers, Lucas and Madere. FEMA Staff members Lookabaugh and Benton testified for the NRC Staff based on their review of the offsite emergency plans. The Staff also presented the testimony of Mr. Perrotti of the NRC Staff. The Joint Intervenors presented no direct evidence.

7/ The regulations and guidance generally applicable to the development of provisions for protective actions (i.e.,

evacuation) include 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG-0654, Criterion J.9.

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1 l

l A. Persons Without Private Transportation and School Children

95. A Transportation Officer has been appointed for each Parish to coordinate the utilization of pre-identified trans-portation resources in an emergency. In the event of an evacuation, all persons without vehicles would be directed, by broadcast message, to pre-identified pickup points (listed in the emergency public information brochure), where they would be transported by bus to reception centers outside the plume EPZ.

Azzarello, et al., at 19.

96. There are 2583 residents without transportation in St. Charles Parish, which -- based on a loading factor of 75%

of capacity for a 60-passenger bus -- will require the use of 57 buses. Perry, at 2. Similarly, there are 3194 residents without transportation in St. John the Baptist Parish, which will require the use of 71 buses. Perry, at 3.

97. Each school district within the risk area has an emergency plan, which includes provisions for radiological emergencies. Provisions for the evacuation of school children in the event of an accident at Waterford 3 are summarized in each Parish Enclosure. Primary responsibility for the protec-tion and/or evacuation of school students in a radiological emergency, while school is in session, rests with the respec-tive school superintendents, who will receive advance notifica-tion of any protective action decisions, to enable early

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y . ,

mobilization of school transpor ation resources. Azzarello, et al., at 19-20.

98. If an evacuation is required, students attending schools witnin the risk area would be bused to centers outside the plume EPZ, where they would be picked up by their parents.

Students attending schools outside the risk area but who live within the risk area would remain at their schools until they were picked up by their parents. The pye-distributed emergency public information brochure and the emergency public informa-tion message which would be broadcast at the time of any evacuation instruct parents not to call the schools or attempt to pick cap their school children at their schools. The brochure and the broadcast message assure parents that protec-tive actions are being taken for their children, and direct the

\

parents to, meet their children at specified centers outside the disk arefa. Azzarello, et al., at 20.

99. There are 8215 school students in St. Charles Parish within the, plume EPZ, which -- based on a loading factor of 60 s

students per bus -- will require the use of 142 buses. Perry, at 3-4. Similarly, there are 8736 school students in St. John i the Baptist Parish within the plume EPZ, which will require the use of 148 buses. Perry, at 4.

100. St. Charles Parish has 94 school buses, and St. John the Baptist has 44 school buses. Additional buses will be supplied by neighboring support parishes. Perry, at 4-5.

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l l

101. Only a total of 429 buses would be required for an evacuation, even if the entire plume EPZ were evacuated, school was in session, and r.o buses were re-used. Tr. 3018 (Perry).

The risk Parishes already have 138 buses. Perry, at 4-5.

102. Two thousand three hundred ninety-six (2396) buses have been identified in the support parishes, far more than are needed to supplement the risk Parish resources for the evac-uation of school children and persons without private transpor-tation. These buses include resources from school boards, parish governments and municipal bus systems in East Baton Rouge, Ascension, St. James, Orleans, Jefferson, La Fourche and Tangipahou Parishes, and could be brought to the risk schools and pickup points within one or two hours or less. Perry, at 5; Tr. 2259-60 (Perry).

103. FEMA reviewed the adequacy of the offsite emergency plans with respect to evacuating school children and persons without private transportation. FEMA concluded thac, with adequate arrangements for supolemental transportation resources from support parishes, the emergency plans adequately provide for the evacuation of school children and persons without private transportation in an emergency. Perrotti, at 16; Benton and Lookabaugh, at 10, 11; Tr. 2871-72 (Benton).

104. The risk Parishes have long-standing mutual aid agreements with the support parishes, pursuant to which the

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parishes have historically shared resources with one another in times of emergency. Tr. 2989-91 (Madere, Lucas). Moreover, since the time the offsite emergency plans were developed the risk Parishes have been working constantly, and continue to work, on developing resources inventories. Perry, at 2.

Written agreements with the support parishes for the supply of transportation resources, specific to an emergency at Waterford 3, are being finalized. LOEP has actively assumed responsi-bility for support parish transportation resources. Perry, at 5; Tr. 2991 (Madere). The letters of agreement will be provided to the NRC. Tr. 2974 (Azzarello). FEMA will review the arrangements for supplemental transportation resources to ensure their adequacy. Tr. 2871 (Benton).

105. Based on the foregoing findings, uncontroverted by direct evidence, and subject to provision to the Staff of signed letters of agreement for the supply of support parish buses for the evacuation of school chC dren and persons without transportation, the Board finds that the procedures for evacuating school children and persons without private trans-portation are adequate.

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B. Aged and Handicapped Persons and Sick and Hospitalized Persons 106. Each of the risk Parishes has appointed a Health and Medical Officer who will coordinate the evacuation of the aged and handicapped non-ambulatory residents who require transpor-tation assistance. Benton and Lookabaugh, at 12; Azzarello, et al., at 21. The pre-distributed public information brochure requests that in an evacuation, such persons try to obtain rides with friends, neighbors or relatives, and reminds the general public to check on the needs of those they know who may need transportation assistance. Thise recommendations are reinforced by the emergency public information message for broadcast at the time of evacuation, which reminds individuals having private transportation to check on the needs of others who lack such transportation and asks that the Parish Emergency Preparedness / Civil Defense Office be notified of any special transportation needs. Azzarello, et al., at 21-22.

107. Blank applications, published in the newspaper, will request identification of the aged and handicapped who may need special assistance in an evacuation. Tr. 2982-84 (Madere, Lucas). In addition, self-addressed, stamped postcards will be enclosed with the pre-distributed public information brochure to further encourage individuals such as the aged and handi-capped requiring transportation assistance to notify the Parishes of their special needs in advance of an emergency.

Azzarello, 21 al., at 22.

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108. Rosters of aged and handicapped persons who need transportation assistance have been prepared, with the assis-tance of social service agencies and organizations. Efforts to assure completeness of the rosters ara ongoing. These rosters will be maintained in the Parish EOCs, and will be updated semi-annually. In an evacuation, the Parish Health and Medical Officers, in conjunction with the Transportation Officers, will use vans, buses and other available resources to evacuate aged and handicapped residents. Azzarello, et al., at 22; Perry, at 9; Tr. 2473-84 (Perry). Most of the non-ambulatory aged and handicapped can be transported from their homes to the desig-nated pickup points in buses and vans, then evacuated via bus to reception centers with other persons without private transportation. Perry, at 9.

109. In St. Charles Parish there are 100 aged and handicapped persons who may need transportation assistance in an evacuation. There are 150 such persons in St. John the Baptist Parish. As pertinent information is obtained about the special needs of these people, specific arrangements and procedures are being developed. Perry, at 9.

110. To the extent their transportation needs cannot be met by risk Parish vans and ambulances, arrangements are being made for resources from neighboring parishes. These transpor-tation requirements will be mitiaal. As a practical matter, 4

i

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~

f 4

(! l l

these are the types of-people who are most likely to be l

I transported by friends and neighbors'in an' emergency, so actual '

requirements are expected to be less than indicated. Neverthe--

less, arrangements are being made to transport all on the rosters. Perry, at 9-10. Planning provides:for-the'use of 15 vans and 15 ambulances to evacuate the.home-bound aged and handicapped in St. John the Baptish Parish, and for the use of 10 vans and 10 ambulances for the same population in St.

Charles Parish.- Tr. 2504 (Madere); Tr. 2524 (Lucas).

l 111. There are four health care facilities within the l

plume EPZ which might be affected by aniaccident at Waterford

3. There are two such facilities in St. Charles Parish -- St.

Charles Hospital, a 50-bed acute and chronic carc facility, and Luling Nursing Home, a 145-bed long-term care facility. The other two facilities are in St. John the Baptist Parish --

River Parishes Medical Center, a 102-bed acute and chronic care facility, and Twin Oaks Nursing Home, a 132-bed long-term care facility. Benton and Lookabaugh, at 13, 14-15.

112. These health care facilities have incorporated protective action response procedures for fixed nuclear facility accidents into their emergency management (disaster) plans. Benton and Lookabaugh, at 13; Azzarello, et al., at 20-21. These plans include detailed procedures for evacuation by ambulance and bus. Azzarello, et al., at 21.

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113. Support health care facilities prepared to receive evacuated patients / residents of the risk Parish facilities have been identified, and provided with evacuation support proce-dures for incorporation into their support facility disaster plans. Benton and Lookabaugh, at 13, 15; Azzarello, et al., at r 21.

114. The risk Parish Health and Medical Officers, with assistance from the Department of Health and Human Services, are responsible for providing transportation resources to support evacuation of health care facilities in the risk area.

Benton and Lookabaugh, at 14, 15. In an evacuation, St.

Charles Hospital would require 6 ambulances and 1 bus; Luling Nursing Home would require 10 ambulances, 4 buses and 1 van; River Parishes Medical Center would require 11 ambulances, 2 buses and 1 van; and Twin Oaks Nursing Home would require 10 ambulances, 3 buses and 1 vs.a. Perry, at 10-11.

115. Euses to support the evacuation of hospitals, nursing homes and the home-bound infirm will be obtained from the same large pool of buses available to support the evac-uation of persons without private transportation. Perry, at 10, 11. St. John the Baptist Parish has three 12-person vans (Tr. 2494 (Madere)), St. Charles Parish has eight vans (Tr.

3023 (Lucas)), as well as a number of privately owned vans (Tr.

2497-93, 2500 (Lucas)); and there are more than enough vans

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=

available from support parishes to meet the needs identified by the risk Parishes. Perry, at 10; Tr. 3023 (Lucas). In addition, 80 ambulances are available to St. Charles and St.

John the Baptist Parishes within one-half hour. This number is far in excess of the total that would be needed to support an evacuation of hospitals, nursing homes and the home-bound infirm. Perry, at 10.

116. FEMA reviewed the adequacy of the offsite emergency plans with respect to the evacuation of health care facilities and the home-bound aged and handicapped. FEMA concluded that, with adequate arrangements for supplemental transportation resources from support parish ambulance services, the emergency plans adequately provide for the evacuation of health care facilities and the home-bound aged and handicapped within the plume EPZ. Perrotti, at 16; Benton and Lookabaugh, at 12, 14, 15, 16; Tr. 2871-73 (Benton).

117. Special arrangements are not required for the use of ambulances from neighboring parishes. The Sheriff's dispatcher in each of the risk Parishes, as a regular procedure, has the authority to directly dispatch all ambulances with 25 miles.

Perry, at 10. Further, the risk Parishes have longstanding mutual aid agreements with the support parishes, pursuant to which the parishes have historically shared resources with one another. Tr. 2989-91 (Madere, Lucas). Nevertheless, since the

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time the offsite emergency plans were developed the risk Parishes have been working constantly, and continue to work, on developing resource inventories. Perry, at 2. Written agreements with transportation providers are being finalized.

LOEP has actively assumed responsibility for support parish transportation resources. Perry, at 5; Tr. 2991 (Madere). The letters of agreement will be provided to the NRC. Tr. 2974 (Azzarello). FEMA will review the arrangements for supplemen-tal transportation resources to ensure their adequacy. Tr.

2872-73 (Benton).

118. Based on the foregoing findings, uncontroverted by direct evidence, and subject to provision to the Staff of signed letters of agreement for the supply of support parish ambulances for the evacuation of the aged and handicapped and persons in nursing homes and hospitals, the Board finds that there are adequate procedures for evacuation of the aged and 1

handicapped, and persons in nursing homes and hospitals.

C. The Imprisoned 119. There are two jails within the Waterford 3 plume EPZ. The St. Charles Parish Jail has an average daily census

~

of 30 persons, while the St. John the Baptist Parish Jail has an average daily census of 25 persons. Benton and Lookabaugh, at 16.

h

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1 120. In an emergency, the risk Parish Sheriffs are responsible for the protection of prisoners incarcerated in the respective risk Parish Jails. Azzarello, et al., at 22.

Transportation arrangements for the evacuation of prisoners will be established by the Parish Sheriffs. The prisoners will be evacuated by police cars or bus. Benton and Lookabaugh, at 16-17. Agreements have been reached with the sheriffs of neighboring parishes for the confinement of evacuated risk Parish prisoners. Benton and Lookabaugh, at 17; Azzarello, et al., at 22. Further, if an evacuation is recommended but cannot be immediately accomplished, radioprotective drugs may ba administered to prisoners upon the order of the ASOEA.

Benton and Lookabaugh, at 16.

121. FEMA has reviewed the adequacy of of f site emergency plans with respect to the evacuation of the imprisoned. Based on its review, FEMA has concluded that the plans adequately provide for the evacuation of prisoners. Perrotti, at 16; Benton and Lookabaugh, at 17.

122. Based on the foregoing findings, .uncontroverted by direct evidence, the Board finds that the procedures for the evacuation of jail prisoners are adequate.

D. Transient Workers 123. The risk Parish Emergency Preparedness / Civil Defense Director or his designee is responsible for providing alert

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notification to industries (transient workers), for coordinating industry actions with those of the general public, and for coordinating industry resource requirements.

Procedures for accomplishing these responsibilities have been established for each class of emergency. Rosters of the major industries have been prepared and will be used to provide those industries with early notification of an accident at Waterford

3. This will give industries advance notice of the possible need for protective action. Azzarello, et al., at 22.

124. In the event of an evacuation, private automobile would be the principal means of transportation for persons working in the risk area. Benton and Lookabaugh, at 17; Azzarello, et al., at 22-23. Transient workers without private transportation, like risk area residents without priv ate transportation, would be directed to pre-designated pickup points where they would be bused to pre-designated reception centers outside the risk area. Azzarello, et al., at 23.

125. There is an estimated peak industrial population of 14,092 within the plume EPZ, including construction workers, which would generate approximately 9990 vehicles. There are also an estimated 23,757 commercial employees within the plume EPZ, who would evacuate via some 16,844 vehicles, for a total of 26,834 vehicles from industrial and commercial sources. The Evacuation Time Estimate demonstrates that the existing

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roadways will handle the traffic so that evacuation can be accomplished in a timely manner. Benton and Lookabaugh, at 17.

126. FEMA has reviewed the adequacy of offsite emergency plans with respect to the evacuation of transient workers.

Based on its review of those plans and the Evacuation Time Estimate Study, FEMA has concluded that the plans adequately provide for the evacuation of transient workers. Perrotti, at 16; Benton and Lookabaugh, at 17.

127. Based on the foregoing findings, uncontroverted by direct evidence, the Board finds tha. the procedures for the evacuation of transient workers are adequate.

I

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7. Potassium Iodides! (Contention 17/26(2))

128. Joint Intervenors' Contention 17/26(2) asserted that:

Applicant has failed to adequately make provision, according to the Emergency Plan contained in Chapter 13.3 of the FSAR, for distribution and/or storage of potassium iodide in accordance with accepted public health practice in locations which are readily accessible to affected individuals as protected against thyroid irradiation.

129. It has long been assumed that the principal radioac-tive isotope released in a reactor accident is Iodine-131

("I-131"), along with other radiciodines. When radiciodines are inhaled or ingested, they tend to accumulate in the thyroid 8/ Applicant presented the testimony of Robert W. Myers of LNED, who explained the public health policy of the State of Louisiana with respect to the distribution of potassium iodide

("KI") to the g2neral public for use in a radiological emergency. Mr. Myers testified with Dr. John J. Mauro, manager of the Ebasco Services, Inc. Radiological Assessment Department, who summarized the technical bases for present policies in this country on the use of KI as a thyroid blocking agent. Messrs. Benton and Lookabaugh of FEMA testified for the NRC Staff on the regulatory criteria for the use of KI by the general public as a thyroid blocking agent, and the application of those criteria to the Louisiana policy. The Staff also presented the testimony of Mr. Perrotti of the NRC Staff, who reviewed the Waterford 3 site plan for compliance with regula-tory criteria on the provision of KI to onsite workers during an emergency. However, the Joint Intervenors' contention addressed only the distribution or KI to the general public and did not challenge the provisions for the use of KI either by onsite emergency workers or by offsite emergency workers and institutionalized persons. Tr. 3268-69 (7ones). The Joint Intervenors presented no direct testimony on the KI issue.

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i and are metabolized into organic iodine compounds which may reside in the thyroid long enough to cause local radiation damage. Mauro, ff. Tr. 3135, at 2; Applicant Ex. 7.

130. In the event of a radiological accident, a radiopro-tective drug such as potassium iodide ("KI") can be adminis-tored to curtail the accumulation of radiciodines by the thyroid. In effect, the iodide saturates the iodine transport system, deterring entry of radiciodine. Mauro, at 2; Applicant Ex. 7.

131. The State Flan (including Attachment 1, which contains the St. Charles and St. John the Baptist Parish Enclosures) reflects the policy of the State to make KI available for use by emergency workers and institutionalized persons within the risk area in an emergency. Applicant Ex. 2, at 9-13; Applicant Ex. 3, Basic Plan, at 45-46, 47; Applicant Ex. 3, Encl. 1 at 154, and Encl. 2 at 320; 3enton and Lookabaugh, at 18; Myers, at 11; Mauro, at 3; Tr. 3184-87 (Myers).

132. The State Plan (including Attachment 1) does not provide for the administration of KI to the general public.

Thus, the State will not rely on KI as a protective action option for the general public, but will instead rely on other protective action options -- such as sheltering or evacuation

-- for protection of the general public in a serious

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radiological emergency. Applicant Ex. 2, at 7-2; Applicant Ex. 3, Basic Plan, at 47; Applicant Ex. 3, Encl. 1 at 154, and Encl. 2 at 320; Mauro, at 3.

133. NUREG-0654 does not require the use of KI for the general public. NUREG-0654 specifies that emergency plans are to include provisions for the use of radioprotective drugs, particularly for emergency workers and institutionalized person in the pluma EPZ, and that state and local plans are to indicate the method by which decisions on the distribution of such drugs to the ganeral public will be made in an emergency.

See NUREG-0654, Criteria J.10.e and J.10.f. FEMA's policy with regard to the use of KI for the general public is that the decision to distribute it to the general public is a matter of S' tate public health policy. Since the State of Louisiana does .

not intend to distribute KI to the general public, the State's plan is not inconsistent with NURT.G-0654. Benton and Lookabaugh, at 18.

134. The State's KI policy was developed by the Assistant Secretary of the Office of Environmental Affairs, Louisiana -

Department of Natural Resources, with the assistance and concurrence of the State Health Officer, Sarah M. Braud, M.D.

In developing its policy, the State took into consideration the risks of KC administration to individuals who might be allergic to the drug, the problems inherent in the distribution of KI,

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the fcise sense of security which the availability of the drug might foster, the availability of KI, its limited shelf life, the likelihood that it would be needed, and the cost of the drug. Myers, at 11; Tr. 3174 (Myers).

135. Doses of KI which are higher than those which would be used for thyroid-blocking have been used widely for many years by physicians in the treatment of bronchial asthma and other pulmonary disorders. A variety of reactions has been reported in connection with this medically supervised use of KI. The incidence of reaction is considered, in general, to be diractly proportional to the dose and duration of therapy.

Mauro, at 4; Applicant Ex. 7. Accordingly individuals are caution 3 not to exceed the recommended dose for thyroid-blocking purposes,'and not to take the drug for periods of time longer than instructed. Applicant Ex. 6, at 2, 3; Mauro, at 4.

136. Possible side effects of KI include skin rashes, swelling of the salivary glands, and iodism (metallic taste, burning mouth and throat, sore teeth and gums, head cold symptoms and occasional gastrointestinal symptoms). A few people have allergic reactions with more serious symptoms.

These symptoms include fever, joint pains, swelling of the face and body and at times severe shortness of breath requiring immediate medical attention. Taking iodide may also (rarely) cause overactivity or underactivity of the thyroid, or

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enlargement of the thyroid (goiter). Applicant Ex. 6, at 3; i

Mauro, at 4.

137. Persons experiencing adverse and allergic re' actions to KI might vell have more difficultly obtaining prompt. medical attention in a radiological emergency than they would under normal circumstances. See generally Tr. 3209-10 (Myers).

138. The logistics of KI administration to the general public also militate against its use. Distribution to the public at the time of an accident would be very time-consuming, and might well involve radiological exposure to the public which would be required to leave shelter if the drug were dispensed from stockpiles. Mauro, at 4-5; Staff Ex. 7, at 5.

139. Predistribution of KI would preclude responsible control of the storage of the drug. XI must be stored at controlled room temperature, between 59 and 86 F, and is sensitive to both moisture and light. Applicant Ex. 6, at 2.

Predistribution would therefore involve the risk that the drug would be improperly stored, permitting decomponition and loss of potency. Mauro, at 5.

140. Predistribution of KI to the general public would also preclude responsible control of the time and manner of admini.-tr ation of the drug. Staff Ex. 7, at 5; Mauro, at 5.

If the drug were predistributed (and thus readily available at all times), individuals might -- on the basis of rumor or a

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misunderstanding of plant status -- take the drug spontaneously without being instructed to do so, thereby exposing themselves unnecessarily to the risk of allergic and adverse reactions and side effects from the drug. Similarly, predistribution would increase the chance that individuals would exceed the recom-mended dose (i.e., take several doses rather than just one).

Mauro, at 5.

141. Predistribution of KI would also involve a danger that children would accidentally ingest the drug in the absence' of any need for it, and quite possibly in doses exceeding the recommended dosage, thereby exposing themselves unnecessarily to risks (and, in the case of excessive doses, ncreased risks) of side effects and allergic and adverse reactions. Mauro, at

5. -

142. The availability of other protective action options

-- including evacuation, sheltering, and respiratory protection

-- as well as considerations of the effectiveness of KI, further contraindicate administration of KI (and especially its predistribution) to the general publ:c. In the e' rent of a serious radiological accident involv ag significant releases of radiciodines, KI could be effective in thyroid protection.

However, an accident resulting in significant releases of radioiodines would also involve significant releases of noble gases and radiocm iu~is, which would cause > hole body and lung

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(

exposures which are not mitigated by KI. A KI plan for the general public might instill a false sense of security, inhibiting effective evacuation or sheltering. Staff Ex. 6, at 2; Staff Ex. 7, at 4; Mauro, at 6.

143. There is also a question of availability of large quantities of KI for distribution to the public. Carter-Wallace Pharmaceuticals (which produces Thyro-Block, the only form of KI approved by the Food and Drug Administration for use as a thyraid-blocking agent in radiological emergencies) has ceased production of the drug, and now offers only Thyrc-Block tablets with an expiration date of December, 1982. Mauro, at 6.

144. There are also significant costs associated with KI.

The cost of KI is approximately 75 cents par unit (14 tablets).

Nor would the cost represent a one-time expanditute, since Thyro-Block has a shelf-life of only three years. Thus, all KI would have to be replaced at least every three years, whether it had been used or not. Mauro, at 7.

145. Present uncertainties as to the amount of radicio-dine which might be released in an accident further support the State's policy. Recent research comparing consequence estimates used in risk assessment with actual results of accidents and large scale experiments has indicated that the radioactivity (including I-131) actually released to the

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environment in an accident has been substantially overestimated. Mauro, at 6-7; Staff Ex. 7, at 4; Staff Ex. 6, at 2.

146. There is also an ongoing debate among experts as to the toxicity of radiciodine to the thyroid. Mauro, at 7. In light of the uncertainty on this subject, the American Thyroid Association has recommended that additional studies of the biological effects of radiciodine on the thyroid be sponsored to define the risk to the thyroid attendant to exposure to radiciodine. Staff Ex. 6, Encl. B, at 1, 4.

147. The multiple uncertainties associated with the KI issue are reflected in current Commission policy, pursuant to which the NRC Staff is to:

1. Continue to work with appropriate Federal agencies, i.e., FEMA, FDA and EPA, to address the uncertainties in the use of KI by the general public and possible alternative respira-tory protection strategies.

2. Press on with source term technology studies

• *

• to a point where the Commission can adequately consider the potential impact on --

among other regulatory matters -- alternative protective actions for public use in a nuclear plant emergency.

The Commission has expressly reserved judgment on the advis-ability of recommending the stockpiling of KI for the general public. Applicant Ex. 9, at 1.

148. It is the opinion of the NRC Staff, and of several medical advisors consulted separately, that:

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1. The utility of distributing KI to the general public for thyroid blocking in case of a reactor accident is "very questionable."

2. There is still some potential for side effects from KI which some medical authorities believe warrant further investigation, and may warrant limiting its use.

3. Additional guidance from the federal government is appropriate in order to aid states in developing their policy on the use of KI for the general public.

Staff Ex. 7, at 6; Staff Ex. 6, at 4.

149. While it is conceivable that comprehensive federal guidance, applicable to all operating reactors, may at some point in the future recommend the administration of KI to the general public in an emergency, there clearly is no current

" accepted public health practice" provid';g for KI use by the general public. Tennessee is the only ctate in which KI has been distributed to the general public residing in the vicinity of a nuclear plant. Weighing factors such as the risks of adverse and allergic reactions and side effects, the logistical problems of KI administration and the availability of other protective action options, the State of Louisiana's public health policy decision not to provide KI to the general public is well-founded. Mauro, at 8; Tr. 3212 (Mauro, Myers).

150. Based on the foregoing findings, uncontroverted by direct evidence, the Board finds that there is no currently accepted public health practice favoring the distribution of KI

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to the general public in a radiological emergency, and that the State of Louisiana's public health policy on the subject is consistent with the guidance of FEMA and the NRC.

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Board has considered all of the evidence submitted by the parties and the entire record of this proceeding. Based on the Findings of Fact set forth herein, which are supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence in the record, this Board, having decided all matters in controversy, con-cludes that, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 5 2.760a and 10 C.F.R.

S 50.57, the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation should be authorized to issue to the Applicant, upon making requisite findings with respect to matters not embraced in this Initial Decision, a license authorizing operation of the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3.

IV. ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Commission's rules and regulations, based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth in this Initial Decision, and subject to the conditions set forth below, the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation is author-ized, upon makina findings on all other matters specified in 10

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C.F.R. S 50.57(a), to issue to Applicant Louisiana Power &

\

Light Company a license authorizing full power operation of the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, for a term of not more than forty (40) years, at <.teady-state power levels not to exceed 3560 megawatts thermal.

Issuance of the aforementioned full power operating license shall be subject to the following conditions:

1. The Staff shall confirm the distribution within the plume EPZ of public information brochures and posters in accordance with the criteria set out in NUREG-0654,

2. The Staff shall verify the capability of the installed prompt notification system in accordance with the design objectives set out in NUREG-0654, Appendix 3.

3. Signed letters of agreement shall be provided to the Staff for the supply of support parish buses and ambulances for the evacuation from the plume EPZ of school children, persons l

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l l

l without transportation, the aged and handicapped, and persons in nursing homes and hdspitals.

3 Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE

-,, X-BMe WNchill L

- lJ' Ernest L. Blake, Jr.

James B. Han.lin Delissa A. Ridgway Counsel for Applicant 1800 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 822-1000 Da ted-: June 11, 1982 0

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1 l

l APPENDIX A DIRECT TESTIMONY RECEIVED INTO EVIDENCE Following Applicant's Testimony Transcript Page Applicant's Testimony on Joint 461 Intervenors' Contention 8/9 (Leonard D.

Hamilton / John J. Mauro/ Ralph Kenning)

Applicant's Testimony of Robert G. Azzarello, 2218 Alexis Tsaggaris, and Ronald J. Perry on Radiological Emergency Response Plans, Contentions 17/26(1)(a), (c), (d), (e) and (f)

Applicant's Testimony of Kevin P. Twine 2224 on Radiological Emergency Response Plans, Contention 17/26(b)

Testimony of Bertram Paul Madere on 2243 Radiological Emergency Response Plans Testimony of John M. Lucas on Radiological 2246 Emergency Response Plans Testimony of Robert William Myers 2258 on Radiological Emergency Response Plans Applicant's Supplemental Testimony of 2262 Ronald J. Perry on Radiological Emergency Response Plans, Contentions 17/26(1)(c) and (f)

Applicant's Testimony of John J. Mauro on 3135 the Use of Potassium Iodide as a Thyroid Blocking Agent Applicant's Rebuttal Testimony of George B. 3411 Hutchison on Contention 8/9 A-1

Following Applicant's Testimony Transcript Page Applicant's Rebuttal Testimony of Jacob I. 3627 Fabrikant on Contention 8/9 NRC Staff's Testimony NRC Staff Testimony of Dr. Marvin Goldman 735 Regarding Contention 8/9 NRC Staff Testimony of Edward F. Branagan, Jr. 767 Regarding Contention 8/9 NRC Staff Testimony of Thomas Urbanik II 2743 Regarding the Evacuation Time Estimate Study for Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Contention 17/26(1))

Federal Emergency Management Agency Testimony 2864 of John W. Benton and Albert L. Lookabaugh Regarding Emergency Planning (Contention 17/26)

NRC Staff Testimony of Donald J. Perrotti 3229 Regarding Emergency Planning (Contention 17/26)

Testimony of Brian K. Grimes, Director, 3792 NRC Division of Emergency Preparedness Joint Intervenors' Testimony Sworn Testimony of Dr. Velma L. Campbell 1055 Sworn Testimony of Dr. Hemchandra Pandit 1218 Sworn Statement of Dr. Irwin D. J. Bross 1342 Sworn Testimony of Dr. Carl Johnson 1836 A-2

APPENDIX B EXHIBITS IDENTIFIED ADMITTED NUMBER DESCRIPTION AT TR. PAGE AT TR. PAGE Staff Ex. 1 Final Environmen- 453 456 tal Statement Amended Tr. 458 related to the Further Correc-operation of tions Tr. 743-48 Waterford Steam Electric Sta.,

Unit No. 3, NUREG-0779 Staff Ex. 2 Safety Evaluation 454 456 Rpt. related to Amended Tr. 458 the operation of Waterford Steam Electric Sta.,

Unit No. 3, NUREG-0787 Staff Ex. 3 Safety Evaluation 454 456 Rpt. related to the operation of Waterford Steam Electric Sta., Unit No. 3, NUREG-0787, Supplement No. 1 Staff Ex. 4 Safety Evaluation 455 456 Rpt. related to the Amended Tr. 458 operation of Water-ford Steam Electric Sta., Unit No. 3, NUREG-0787, Supple-ment No. 2 Staff Ex. 5 Safety Evaluation Rpt. 2735 2738 related to the operation of Waterford Steam Electric Sta., Unit No.

3, NUREG-0787, Supple-ment No. 3 B-1

IDENTIFIED ADMITTED NUMBER DESCRIPTION AT TR. PAGE AT TR. PAGE Staff Ex. 6 SECY-82-77 Regarding 3130 3130 Use of Potassium Iodide for Thyroid Blocking, dated February 19, 1982 Staff Ex. 7 Testimony of Brian K. 3131 3131 Grimes, Dir., Division of Emergency Preparedness, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, before the Subcom. on Oversight and Investigations, Cmte. on Interior and Insular Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives Staff Ex. 8 Enclosure D to SECY-82-77, 3231 3235 P/50 On the Efficacy of (rejected)

Ad Hoc Respiratory Pro-tection During a Radiological Emergency Jt. Int. Pandit, Hemchandra, 1219 1219 Ex. 10 Biophysical Theory of Cancer. Unpublished.

Jt. Int. Johnson, Carl, 1837 1844 Ex. 14 " Cancer Incidence in an Area Contaminated With Radionuclides Near a Nucleat In-stallation," Ambio, Royal Swedish Acad-emy of Sciences, Vol. X, No. 4, 1981 Jt. Int. Johnson, Carl, 1837 1846 Ex. 15 " Contamination of Several Public Wa-ter Districts with Uranium by Liquid Waste Discharges from an Uranium Mine; and Development of a New Permissible Concen-tration Limit for Uranium in Drinking B-2

IDENTIFIED ADMITTED NUMBER DESCRIPTION AT TR. PAGE AT TR. PAGE Water." Presented to the Radiological Health Section of the Am. Pub. Health Assoc., Nov. 3, 1981 Jt. Int. Johnson, Carl, 1837 1846 Ex. 16 " Plutonium Hazard in Respirable Dust on the Surface of Soil,"

Science, Vol. 193, pp.

488-490, Aug. 6, 1976 Jt. Int. Bross, I.D.J., "A Sim- 1300 1336 Ex. 22 ple Mechanism for Synergism in Genetic Damage from Low-Level Radiation or Chemical Mutagens." Unpublished paper, 1982 Jt. Int. Bross, I.D.J., "Why the 1301 1336 Ex. 23 Assurances that the Water is ' Safe' have no Scientific Validity."

Testimony submitted to the N.Y. Assembly Committee on Environmental Conser-vation, Albany, N.Y.,

Nov. 19, 1981 Jt. Int. Bross, I.D.J., Letter 1301 1336 Ex. 24 to Ed., Health Physics, Sept. 16, 1981 Jt. Int. Bross, I.D.J., Dris- 1302 1336 Ex. 25 coll, D.L., " Direct Estimates of Low-Level Radiation Risks of Lung Cancer at Two NRC-Compliant Nuclear Instal-lations: Why Are the New Risk Estimates 20 to 200 Times the Old Estimates?"

Paper presented at Symposium on Effects on Humans of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation, B-3

IDENTIFIED ADMITTED NUMBER DESCRIPTION -

AT TR. PAGE AT TR. PAGE '

Yale University School of Medicine, May 14, 1981 Jt. Int. Bross, I.D.J., "A 1303 1336 Ex. 26 1980 Reassessment of the Health Hazards of Low Level Tonizing Radiation." Tr. of invited lecture pre- ,

sented at the Univ.

of Heidelberg, Heidel-berg, Germany, Oct. 29, 1979 Jt. Int. Bross, I.D.J., "A Dos- 1304 1336 Ex. 27 oge Response Curve for the One Rad Range:

Adult Risks from Diag-nostic Radiation,"

American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 69, No. 2, Feb. 1979 Jt. Int. Table A-2, Waterford 3 623 625 Ex. 29 Source Terms Jt. Int. Resume of Hemchandra 1343 1344 Ex. 31 Pandit App. Ex. 1 Emergency Plan-Louisiana 2173 2177 Power & Light, Waterford 3~ Steam Electric Sta.

App. Ex. 2 State of Louisiana 2174 2177 Peacetime Radiological Response Plan, Annex J, App. 7 to the La.

Preparedness Plan for Emergency Operations, Rev. 4, Feb. 1982 App. Ex. 3 Attachment 1, Waterford 2175 2177 3 Steam Electric Sta.,

State of Louisiana Peace-time Radiological Response Plan, Rev. 3, Sept. 1981 B-4

IDENTIFIED ADMITTED NUMBER DESCRIPTION AT TR. PAGE AT TR. PAGE App. Ex. 4 Evacuation Time Estimate 2175 2177 by Louisiana Power &

Light Co., Rev. 1, 1982 App. Ex. 5 Report and Verification 2176 2177 of the Siren Alert System for Waterford 3 Nuclear Power Station, Feb. 1982, Revised App. Ex. 6 Wallace Laboratories 2176 2177 Patient Package Insert for Thyro-Block (Potassium Iodide)

App. Ex. 7 Food and Drug Adminis- 2177 2177 tration Notice: "Po-tassium Iodide as a Thyroid-Blocking Agent in a Radiation Emergency" (43 Fed. Reg. 58,798)

App. Ex. 8 Letter to R.L. Tedesco, 2268 2268 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, from L.V.

Maurin, Louisiana Power

& Light Co., dated April 24, 19.82 App. Ex. 9 Memorandum for William J. 3129 3129 Dirks, Exec. Dir. for Operations, NRC, from Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary, NRC, Regarding SECY-80-257/257A -

Radiation Protection -

Thyroid Blocking, dated March 26, 1981 App. Ex. 10 FEMA Responses to 3820 3826 Licensing Board Questions (rejected) on Extent to which Panic and Psychological Stress Were Factored into NUREG-0654/ FEMA-Rep-1, on FEMA Data on Persons who Panic in Disaster Situations and on Documentation Available B-5

IDENTIFIED ADMITTED NUMBER DESCRIPTION _ AT TR. PAGE AT TR. PAGE l

to FEMA on Extent to Which Evacuees Respond to Instructions Perceived to be Contrary to Their Best Interests i

l B-6

- ~ ,

(-

e Junn 11, 1982 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -

^

Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board,o, v _ a i A!O:0-3 In the Matter of ) M . [r

} 3R: %

LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-382 '

)

(Waterford Steam Electric )

Station, Unit 3) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " Applicant's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Brief In The Form of A Proposed Initial Decision" were cerved upon those persons on the attached Service List by deposit in the United States mail, postage prepaid, this lith day of June, 1982.

/ 2L 02Am

'felissa 4 ~Rjdg@ay (

Dated: June 11, 1982 4

.e

i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM. MISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensine Board In the Matter of )

)

LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Doc %et No. 50-382

)

(Waterford Steam Electric )

Station, Unit 3) )

SERVICE LIST Sheldpn J. Wolfe, Esquire

~

Mr. Gary Groesch Administrative Judge 2257 Bayou Road Chairman, Atomic Safety and New Orleans, Louisiana 70119 Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Luke B. Fontana, Esquire Corrission 824 Esplanade Avenue Washington, D.C. 20555 New Orleans, Lopisiana 70116 Dr. Harry Foreman Atoric Safety and Licensing Adminstrative Judge Board Panel Director, Center for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Population Studies Co= mission .

~

. Box 395, Mayo . Washington, D.C. 20555 University of Minnesota --

Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455 Atc=ic Safety and Licensing .'

Appeal Board Panel Dr. Walter H. Jordan U. S. Nuclear Regulatory.

Adminstrative Judge Commission 881 West Outer Drive Washington , D. C. 20555 p Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830

- . Docketing & Service Section (3)

Sherwin E. Turk, Esquire , (4) Office of the Secreta::y Office of the Executive U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Lecal Director Cc=rission U.S.' Nuclear Regulatory Washington , D. C . 20555 Corrission Washington, D.C. 20555

.