ML20055A378

Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law & Form of Order

ML20055A378
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	07/15/1982
From:	Sherwin Turk NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD)
To:
Shared Package
ML20055A376	List: ML20055A375 ML20055A378 ML20055A379 ML20055A380
References
NUDOCS 8207160225
Download: ML20055A378 (30)

Text

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s 7/15/s2 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE AT0f11C SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Docket No. 50-382 (Waterford Steam Electric

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Station, Unit 3)

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NRC STAFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND FORM 0F ORDER f

Tha NRC Staff (" Staff") submits these proposed findings, conclusions of law and form of order pursuant to the Licensing Board's instructions issued upon the close of the hearing session on May 12, 1982. Therein, the Licensing Board scheduled the filing of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and recommended that "the Staff and Joint Inter-venors should wherever possible incorporate by reference Applicants' proposed findings with which they really do nt;t disagree." Tr. 4023.

Accordingly, the Staff has identified Applicant's proposed findings 1/

with which it does not disagree, has modified or deleted certain other l

of Applicant's proposed findings,2/ and has proposed additional findings 1/

" Applicant's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Brief in the Form of a Proposed Initial Decision" (Part II,

" Findings of Fact"), filed June 11, 1982.

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Wherever the Staff has modified Applicant's proposed findings, the l

insertion of new language is signified by underlining, and the deletion of language is signified by brackets.

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B207160225 820715 PDR ADOCK 05000382 O

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apart from those filed by Applicant.

In addition, the Staff has proposed conclusions of law and a form of Order without reference to the conclu-sions of law and Order proposed by Applicant.

I.

FINDINGS OF FACT A. Background 1-4.

The Staff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference herein Applicant's proposed findings Nos. 1-4.

B.

Synergism 5.

The Staff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference herein Applicant's proposed finding No. 5.

6.

The low level radiation of concern to Joint Intervenors is that which will result from the releases of radioactivity from Water-ford 3 during normal plant operation. The releases of radioactivity from a nuclear plant during normal operation are estimated prior to the plant's operation. The estimates must demonstrate that with installed equipment the licensee can maintain releases below the dose design objectives established by NRC and set out in 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appen-dix I.

Applicant has performed calculations which demonstrate to the NRC Staff's satisfaction that routine releases for Waterford 3 operation will be within Appendix I levels. The NRC Staff has conducted its own assess-ment and arrived at the same judgment, although it calculated doses which differed to an insignificant degree from those projected by Applicant.

Hamilton, et al., at 3-4; Branagan, at 2-4.

See generally Staff Ex. 1, 5 5.9 and Appendix J (Tables J-5 and J-6).

7-13.

The Staff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference herein Applicant's proposed findings Nos. 7-13.

C.

Emergency Planning and Preparedness 1.

Public Education and Information (Contention 17/26(1)(a)3_/

14-17. The Staff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference herein Applicant's proposed findings Nos. 14-17.

18.

Prior to the hearing, a draft public information brochure had been provided (though not formally submitted) to the NRC. Perrotti, at 6; Tr. 3884 (Perrotti).

[] FEMA has not yet received a draft of the brochure, and the brochure has not yet been reviewed or approved by either fella or the NRC Staff. Benton and Lookabaugh, at 4.

Tr. 3884 (Perrotti);

Tr. 3852 (Grimes); T:. 2880, 2874 (Benton). Similarly, there has not yet been a review of the content of the signs which will be posted in public places. Tr. 3853 (Grimes).

19. The brochure will be mailed to [ ] area residents annually, although this method of distribution has not yet been identified in the plans. Benton and Lookabaugh, at 4; Tr. 3926-27 (Perrotti).

Brochures will be distributed in bulk, or posters containing such information will be provided, to area industries, hotels, motels, post offices, libraries

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The Staff adopts and incorporates by reference herein footnotes 1-6 and 8 set forth in Applicant's Findings at pp. 66, 73, 80, 87, 97, 102, and 116, except to the extent that each of those footnotes states that FEMA witnesses Benton and Lookabaugh testified for the NRC Staff.

In each instance, the phrase "for the NRC Staff" or "for the Staff" should be deleted.

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and other public areas. The information will also be provided.in local

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telepho'e directories. Azzarello, et al., at 7; Myers, ff. Tr. 2258, n

4 at 4-5.

20-23.

The Staff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference herein Applicant's proposed findings Nos.' 20-23.

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24. Based on the Staff's review of the Applicant;!s onsite

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emergency plan, the Staff has concluded that the public information >

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.I program meets the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 50,(pppendix E, 6 IV.D.2 and the criteria of NUREG-0654. ' The implementation,of the k

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public information program will be reviewed and evaluated by the NRC Staff during the Emergency Preparedness 'Ipplementation. Appraisal ty'be s'

, / 's conducted later this year.

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25. The Staff will assure that the brochure and. tie poster have..

t been submitted for review and approved by FEMA' and/of th/ NRC Staff, [ ].

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• that the public information materials have,actua}1y been distributed, j

[ ] and that the public education and,information progran mee.ts the i

Commission's requirements prior to issuance of a full power license.

i Perrotti, at 7; Tr. 3853 (Grimes).

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26. Based on the foregoing findings, Oncontroverted by direct evidence, and subject to FEMA approval of the public information_ ;

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brochure and posters and Staff confirmation of distribution within the plume EPZ of the approved brochures and posters, the. Board' finds that 7

s the provisions for not"ving residents of evacuatien procedures are J

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ddequate.

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2.

Evacuation Time Estimate and Adequacy of Roads (Contention 17/26(1)(b))

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f 27-35. The Staff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference herein Applicant's proposed findings Nos. 27-35.

36. Populations were converted to the number of evacuating vehicles in several ways.

Permanent residents were apportioned to vehicles based on latest available data for auto availability, and projected 1982 popu-lation. Transient populations were converted to evacuating vehicles based on 0.709 vehicles per person. School children were assumed to evacuate by bus, assuming 60 persons per bus. The overall approach used tgdetermine the number of evacuating vehicles is reasonable and makes ma$momuseofavailabledata. Urbanik, at 4-5.

The number of vehicles 1

used to transport persons without vehicles and the elderly and handi-capped was not included in the total number of vehicles ~ reflected in the study, but those numbers are small and do not affect the overal' time needed to evacuate the general public. Tr. 2766-67, 2775 (Urbanik);

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. Tr.42484-86 (Twine).

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37. The Staff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference herein i

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l Applicant's proposed finding No. 37.

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38. Applicant's evacuation time estimates are based on two scenarios -- clear weather and adverse weather (a heavy, continuous rainstorm of 2 inches per day, which would result in reductions of 7

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vehicle speeds and of the capacity of intersections from 15% to 25%).

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Ev'acuatio9 is assumed to take place during the daytime on a weekday.

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l The daytime scenario is the most conservative, since the population is l

somewhat higher and more dispersed (i.e., at work, in school, etc.)

• during the day. Other problems, such as transporation availability and i

traffic volumes on the roads at the time of evacuation, are also more serious during the daytime. Applicant Ex. 4, at 5-6; Tr. 3003 (Twine).

39. The estimated time to evacuate the entire plume EPZ is five hours and fifteen minutes in clear weather conditions and seven hours and thirty minutes in adverse weather conditions. Applicant Ex. 4, at 3.

These evacuation times place Waterford 3 approximately "in the middle" or somewhat above the median relative to other nuclear power plants.

Applicant's evacuation time estimate study included several assumptions more conservative than the Staff's consultant would have used [ ].

Tr. 2776-77, 2779-80 (Urbanik).

40. The Staff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference herein Applicant's proposed finding No. 40.

41. The Staff's consultant determined that Applicant's evacuation time estimate study is responsive to and in compliance with NUREG-0654, and that the estimates generated delineate a re6sonable range of times required to evacuate the Waterford 3 plume EPZ. Urbanik, at 5.

Based on that evaluation, the Staff found that Applicant's evacuation time estimate study meets the criteria of NUREG-0654 and is acceptable.

Staff Ex. 5, at 13-3; Perrotti, at 8.

42. The Emergency Preparedness / Civil Defense Directors of l

St. Charles and St. John the Baptist Parishes concur in Applicant's evocuation time estimates. Lucas, at 6; Madere, at 10-11; Tr. 3006 (Twine).

Both the onsite and offsite emergency plans incorporate the Applicant's evacuation time estimates. Applicant Ex. 1, Appendix B; Applicant Ex. 3, Encl. I at 162, and Encl. 2 at 328.

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43.

Emergency Preparedness / Civil Defense Directors of St. Charles and St. John the Baptist Parishes consider the existing road network adequate for evacuation in the event of an emergency at Waterford 3, within the time frame set forth in Applicant's evacuation time estimates, though they have recommended additional roads for emergency evacuations in general [ ].

Tr. 2995-96, 2783-85, 3029 (Madere); Tr. 2996-97, 2790-93 (Lucas).

43A.

In the event of an evacuation, panic and mass hysteria are not likely to occur or cause traffic snarls; rather, orderly and cooperative behavior may be expected. Tr. 2840-41, 2843-44, 3028-29 (Tw:ne);Tr. 3027-28 (Lucas, Madere); Tr. 3807-08 (Grimes). The likelihood of panic and hysteria was considered by the joint FEMA /NRC Steering Committee in drafting NUREG-0654, and the criteria in NUREG-0654 take this issue into consideration. Tr. 2914-15 (Benton);

Tr. 3794-97 (Grimes).

NUREG-0654 criteria (such as those relating to the public education and information program and regular notification to offsite officials of plant emergencies which do not require evacuation) are designed to minimize public anxiety and panic and are likely to have this effect, for instance, in reducing the likelihood of " spontaneous evacuation" whereby persons might evacuate without being directed to do so. Tr. 3796-97, 3800-02, 3805-07, 3811, 3837-38, 3844-45 (Grimes).

44.

Further, the FEMA witnesses have independently reviewed the adequacy of the proposed evacuation routes.

In their evaluation, they reviewed Applicant's evacuation time estimate study, attended a briefing by Ebasco on the evacuation time estimate study, interviewed the Emergency Preparedness / Civil Defense Directors for the two risk parishes, l

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considered the comments of the Federal Highway Administration's representative on the Regional Assistance Committee ("RAC"), and made personal observations of the road network in the area. Based on their evaluation, they concluded that the roads are adequate for evacuation purposes. Benton and Lookabaugh, at 5-6.

45. The evacuation time estimate study realistically demonstrates that, given the present roadway network, evacuation of all or a portion of the Waterford 3 plume EPZ is an implementable protective response available for consideration by Parish officials should a radiological emergency occur at Waterford 3.

The decision to undertake evacuation, either as the only protective response or in combination with other protective actions, is one which must be made in light of conditions as they exist at the time of the emergency. The evacuation time estimate will be a valuable tool to assist officials of the risk Parishes, the State and Applicant in making that decision.

[] Twine, at 6, 8; Tr. 3091 (Twine).

46. Based on the foregoing findings, uncontroverted by direct evidence, the Board finds that the evacuation time estimate study l

complies with applicable regulations and guidance, and that the roads and highways which would be used in an evacuation in the event of an accident at Waterford 3, within the time frame set forth in that study, l

are adequate to support such an evacuation.

l 3.

Public Alert / Notification System (Contention 17/26(1)(c))

47-51. The Staff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference herein Applicant's proposed findings Nos. 47-51.

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52. The objective of the acoustic study was to develop and establish a siren system that meets the design objectives and acceptance criteria in Appendix 3 of NUREG-0654.

The actual siren locations were selected after onsite inspection. Siren sound levels have been calculated, through the use of a computer model, to provide siren coverage of 60 dbC, which would produce a level of at least 10 dbC above the assumed average daytime ambient background, in accordance with the target level criterion specified in NUREG-0654. A description of the siren system and its analysis for compliance with NUREG-0654 criteria is provided in a document prepared by Acoustic Technology, Inc., entitled

" Verification of the Siren Alert System For Waterford 3 Nuclear Power Station" (Applicant Ex. 5). Azzarello, et al., at 10; Applicant Ex. 5, at 1 and 4.

53. The sirens will be placed to provide a minimum 60 dbC coverage of the populated areas within the plume EPZ, and will therefore provide the capability for an instantaneous alert signal to essentially all of the population throughout the plume EPZ. Azzarello, et al., at 10.

In addition, major industries, hospitals, nursing homes, private schools and the public school system will be notified directly from the respective Parish Emergency Operations Centers ("E0Cs") by radio, tone-alert receiver, or telephone. Azzarello, et al., at 11.

River traffic on the Mississippi will be notified through the Port of New Orleans Coast Guard facility; air traffic, except for emergency purposes, will be closed down over the area through an agreement with the Federal Aviation Administration and notification through its Houston regional office. Myers, at 7.

54. The Staff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference herein Applicant's proposed finding No. 54.

55. When a decision is made to recommend protective action to the public, the public alert / notification system will be implemented by Parish officials. Activation of the siren system will take place from the Parish E0Cs, with the Sheriff's offices as a back-up. Local residents will be cued to tune to local radio and cable TV stations for specific information about the protective actions to be taken.

EBS will also be activated to broadcast prepared messages providing information to the public on an area-wide basis.

Azzarello, et al., at 11-12.

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the event that the local radio and TV stations, located in or near the plume EPZ, are not functional, the EBS and other means are available to provide emergency information to the public. Tr. 2299-2301 (Lucas, Madere).

56. The risk Parish Emergency Preparedness / Civil Defense Directors are responsible for conducting at least one complete system test and EBS activation each year, quarterly growl tests, and silent tests every two weeks. The respective Parish officials must certify the performance of these tests. Azzarello, et al., at 12. The sirens will be tested at regular intervals to assist in educating the public as to the sirens' function and as to what actions they should take upon hearing the sirens in an emergency. Tr. 3025-26 (Madere).

57. Applicant's [] conceptual design of its alert / notification system was submitted for FEMA's evaluation.

FEMA reviewed the proposed warning plan in accordance with FEMA Civil Preparedness Guide (" CPG")

1-17 (March 1,1980), " Outdoor Warning Systems Guide," pursuant to

NUREG-0654, Appendix 3.

FEMA has also reviewed Applicant's report,

" Verification of the Siren Alert System For Waterford 3 Nuclear Power Station" ( Applicant Ex. 5). Based on the findings from that review, FEMA has concluded that it appears that the system proposed by Applicant will satisfy the criteria for that portion of the plume EPZ for which it is designed, and will adequately warn the populace. Benton and Lookabaugh, at 6.

58. The only possible reservations FEMA expressed with respect to its conclusion were the hearing impaired and persons working in any facilities where the ambient background noise levels may preclude their hearing the sirens. Benton and Lookabaugh, at 6.

In addition, FEMA withheld final approval of the warning system until all systems are installed, tested and evaluated in accordance with FEMA procedures.

Benton and Lookabaugh, at 7.

59. The Parishes are identifying and preparing rosters of hearing impaired persons who might not hear the siren warning system.

Perry',

ff. Tr. 2262, at 11; [] Tr. 2985 (Lucas); Tr. 2988 (Madere).

Implementing procedures in both Parishes will include provisions for notification of such persons by methods such as phone calls to neighbors and notification by fan-out warning teams, fire personnel and other emergency workers.

Perry, at 11.

60. The major industrial concerns in St. Charles Parish and many industrial concerns in St. John the Baptist Parish would receive []

direct notification of an emergency at Waterford 3, from the respective Parish E0C, by radio, tone-alert receiver or telephone. Perry, at 12; Azzarello, et al., at 11, 22; Applicant Ex. 3, Encl. I at 105-10, and

Encl. 2 at 268-71; Benton and Lookabaugh, at 6.

If siren tests reveal that ambient background noise precludes hearing sirens in facilities which would not presently receive direct notification of an emergency, appropriate supplemental notification measures will be included in the implementing procedures. Perry, at 12.

61. The siren system will be installed and tested by the Parishes before Waterford 3 is operational. Tr. 2730, 2804 (Lucas).

In addition, after the entire alert / notification system is installed, FEMA will field test and evaluate the entire system, as installed, in accordance with the criteria in NUREG-0654, Appendix 3.

[] Benton and Lookabaugh, at 2, 6-7 [ ].

The NRC Staff will require that Applicant demonstrate that the alert / notification system meets tha requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, 5 IV.D.3 prior to issuance of a full power license.

Perrotti, at 10-11.

62. Based on the foregoing findings uncontroverted by direct evidence, and subject to Staff verification of the capability of the l

public alert / notification system, and subject to Staff verification of the ability of the warning system to alert the hearing impaired and persons working in industries where there is a high level of ambient background noise, the Board finds that the evacuation warning system is adequate.

4.

Coninand Decision Structure (Contention 17/26(1)(d))

63-66. The Staff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference herein Applicant's proposed findings Nos. 63-66.

67. The Waterford 3 onsite plan commits to prompt notification (within 15 minutes) of offsite agencies by the Emergency Coordinator.

Perrotti, at 12. The Emergency Coordinator will assess the emergency condition and simultaneously notify the risk Parishes, LNED and L0EP of the emergency. Azzarello, e_t_ al., at 13-14. An operational hotline located in the control room will be used to make the initial notifications; the hotline will be tested prior to operation of the plant. This sytem provides dedicated telephone links with the risk Parishes, LNED and L0EP. The onsite plan also describes various other emergency communication systems that are available to Applicant for notifying offsite authorities. Perrotti, at 13; Tr. 2815-16, 2817-18 (Azzarello); Tr. 3885 (Perrotti). A direct radio link exists as a back-up means of communication between Applicant, the risk Phrishes and L0EP.

LNED does not now share this capability (except via a telephone link), but has applied for an FCC license which would enable it to da so; FCC approval of that license application will provide /a backup communication system with independent failure characteristics as set forth in NUREG-0654.

Tr. 2800, 2802, 3008, 3011 (Myers); Tr. 3010 (Azzarello); Tr. 3012-13 i

(Madere).

68-73. The Staff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference herein Applicant's proposed findings Nos. 68-73.

74. Applicant's technical representative assigned to each Parish EOC facilitates the decision-making process by translating technical information from the plant to assist the Parish chief executive in assessing the pertinent aspects of the accident.

In addition, the Parish E0C staff provides input to help the Parish chief executive assess the t

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. public's readiness to respond to the emergency. Azzarello, g al.,

at 16. While the Parish officials should have a general appreciation of the consequences of a serious nuclear power plant accident, neither NUPEG-0654 nor fiRC regulations require that they possess a detailed tech-nical understanding of nuclear accidents which might occur, independent of LNED and Applicant's technical expertise. Tr. 2883 (Lookabaugh); Tr. 2908 (Benton); Tr. 2943, 2952 (Myers); Tr. 2957-58 (Madere); Tr. 3760-61, 3847 (Grimes); Tr. 3886-87 (Perrotti).

75. Based on the protective action recommendations of the State and Applicant, and with the advice and counsel of the respective risk Parish Emergency Preparedness / Civil Defense Director, the chief executives of the Parishes (the St. Charles Parish President and the St. John the Baptist Police Jury President) make the decision to evacuate or implement other protective actions. The governor reserves the right to declare a state of emergency and order an evacuation.

Azzarello, et al., at 12-13; Benton and Lookabaugh, at 7-8.

When deemed necessary, the Parish officials may act upon the State's or Applicant's recommendation alone. Tr. 2906-07 (Benton); Tr. 2954 (Lucas); Tr. 2958 l

(Madere). At the designated time, coordinated by LNED, each Parish will activate its alert / notification syste1, and L0EP will activate EBS, to notify the public in the risk areas of the protective action decision and to provide instructions to the public. Benton and Lookabaugh, at 7.

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76. The Staff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference herein Applicant's proposed finding No. 76.

77. The Staff has reviewed the command decision structure outlined in the onsite plan. Perrotti at 13-14. That structure is relatively similar to that of other plants which have been reviewed by the Staff although personnel titles differ in the various plants. Tr. 3917 (Perrotti). The Staff has requested clarification or additional informa-tion with respect to several items. Perrotti, at 13-14. The Applicant has committed to provide the requested information, however, the Staff has not yet reviewed or accepted the additional clarifications.

Tr. 2968-69, 2970-71 (Azzarello).

78. The Staff has requested clarification with regard to distinguishing between the primary and backup means of emergency communi-cation. Perrotti, at 13. Applicant has proposed language to clarify in the onsite plan that the Operational Hotline will be used as Applicant's primary communication link with LNED, L0EP, and the risk Parishes, with the commercial telephone system as a backup. As a second backup, Civil Defense radio will be used to notify L0EP and the Parishes. Applicant l

Ex. 8.

While the Staff has not yet reviewed or accepted this proposal, it l

l is confident that Applicant will be responsive to.its request for further l

clarification that the primary and backup means of communications have independent vulnerability characteristics. Tr. 2969-70 (Azzarello);

l Tr. 3900 (Perrotti).

79. The Staff has requested that. Applicant include in its emergency plan a description of its "offsite emergency notification system." Perrotti, at 14. Applicant has committed to include such a description in its onsite plan (Tr. 3895-96 (Perrotti)), and has pro-posed specific language to the Staff which -- based on a brief review --

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appeared to the Staff to be satisfactory, although the Staff reserved final judgment on this description until it has had an opportunity to l

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m review it in greater detail. The resolution of this matter should be straightforwa rd. Tr. 3896-97 (Perrotti).

80. The Staff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference herein Applicant's proposed finding No. 80.

81. The Staff has further requested additional information as to the training to be provided for Corporate Command Center ("CCC")

personnel. Perrotti, at 14.

Included among these persons is the Emergency Director, who heads the CCC and provides recommendations and support to onsite emergency personnel, and who, under normal operating conditions, supervises the E0F director. Tr. 3902, 3907-08, 3911-13 (Perrotti). Applicant has conmitted to provide the requested informa-tion, and has proposed specific language to the Staff for inclusion in the onsite plan. Tr. 3903 (Perrotti); Applicant Ex. 8.

The Staff has not yet reviewed or accep'ted the proposed language. Tr. 3917 (Perrotti).

82-83. The Staff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference l

herein Applicant's proposed findings Nos. 82-83..

84. Based on the foregoing findings, uncontroverted by direct evidence, subject to verification by the Staff that adequate information and/or clarification has been provided to resolve the items listed in findings Nos. 76 and 78-82, supra, the Board finds that there is an adequate command decision structure, including appropriate guidance, for commencing evacuation.

5.

Evacuation Drills (Contention 17/26 (1)(e))

85-86. The Staff hereby adopts'and incorporates by reference herein Applicant's proposed findings Nos. 85-86.

87. Similarly, NUREG-0654 does not provide for the actual movement of the public during evacuation drills. See generally NUREG-0654, Criteria N.1-b.

Nor does FEMA require the actual movement of the public during drills, since: (1) such movement during drills would result in unnecessary interruptions of daily activities and commerce; (2) it is unlikely that the entire plume EPZ would be evacuated at any one time; (3) such movement would create a risk of accidents which cannot be justified for exercise purposes; (4) there is no legal authority for directing evacuation of all persons for exercise purposes, and without full public participation the exercise would be inconclusive; (5) in observed exercises where residents of the plume EPZ were given the opportunity and were encouraged to participate in a realistic evacuation, they have not in fact chosen to participate; and (6) based on information pertaining to the evacuation of persons for other emergencies in the past, there is evidence that the populace can be evacuated in a timely manner. Benton and Lookabaugh, at 8-9.

88-93. The Staff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference herein Applicant's proposed findings Nos. 88-93.

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Evacuation of Special Population Groups (Contention 17/26(1)(f)

94. The Staff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference herein i

Applicant's proposed finding No. 94.

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A.

Persons Without Private Transportation and School Children

95. The Staff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference herein Applicant's proposed finding No. 95.

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96. There are 2583 residents without transportation in St. Charles Parish, which -- based on a loading factor of 75% of capacity for a 60-passenger bus -- will require the use of 57 buses. Perry, at 2.

Similarly, there are 3194 residents without transportation in St. John the Baptist Parish, which will require the use of 71 buses. Perry, at 3.

Alternatively, using a loading factor of 40 persons per bus, about 143 buses would be required for both risk Parishes. Tr. 2413 (Twine).

The number of buses specified herein represents a conservative estimate.

Benton and Lookabaugh, at S 97-98. The Staff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference herein Applicant's proposed findings Nos. 97-98.

99. There are 8215 school students in St. Charles Parish within the plume EPZ, which -- based on a loading factor of 60' students per bus

--will require the use of 142 buses.

Perry, at 3-4.

Similarly, there are 8736 school students in St. John the Baptist Parish within the plume EPZ, which will require the use of 148 buses.

Perry, at 4.

The number of students was derived from consultations with risk Parish school boards and are lower than the projected figures contained in the evacuation time estimate study. Tr. 2370-73, 2381 (Perry); Tr. 2384, 2387-88 (Twine). The loading factor of 60 students per bus is slightly higher than the loading factor of 56 used in the evacuation time esti-l mate study; use of that lower loading factor would result in a slightly l

greater number of buses being required to transport school childre.n.

l Tr. 2386-87 (Lucas); Tr. 2387 (Madere); Tr. 2388, 2392 (Twine).

100. St. Charles Parish has 94 school buses, and St. John the Baptist Parish has 44 school buses.

[] Perry, at 4-5.

101. Only a total of about 429 buses would be required for an evacuation, even if the entire plume EPZ were evacuated, school was in session, and no buses were re-used. Tr. 2530, 2531-32, 3018 (Perry).

The risk Parishes already have 138 buses. Perry, at 4-5.

Evacuation scenarios contemplate the possibility that buses may make return trips, if necessary.

Perry, at 6-8.

102. Two thousand three hundred ninety-six (2396) buses have been identified in the support parishes, far more than are needed to supplement the risk Parish resources for the evacuation of school children and persons without private transportation. These buses include resources from school boards, parish governments and municipal bus systems in East Baton Rouge, Ascension, St. James, Orleans, j

Jefferson, La Fourche and Tangipahoa Parishes, and could be brought to the risk schools and pickup points within one or two hours or less.

j Perry, at 5; Tr. 2259-60 (Perry). Buses from the support parishes would be driven by their regular drivers to the extent they are willing to do so, as will be learned during training sessions to be conducted by the State. To the extent they are not willing to drive into the risk l

parishes, support parish emergency workers might drive, or support parish bus drivers will be asked to drive their buses to the plume EPZ boundary and risk Parish emergency workers will drive the buses from there. Tr. 2522, 2558-63, 2619-20 (Madere); Tr. 2567-68 (Perry).

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103. FEMA reviewed the adequacy of the offsite emergency plans with respect to evacuating school children and persons without private transportation.

FEMA concluded that, except as to the current lack of adequate arrangements for supplemental transportation resources from support parishes, the emergency plans adequately provide for the evacua-tion of school children and persons without private transportation in an emergency.

[ ] Benton and Lookabaugh, at 10,11; Tr. 2871 [ ] (Benton).

104. The risk Parishes have long-standing mutual aid agreements with many of the support parishes, pursuant to which the parishes have historically shared resources with one another in times of emergency.

Tr. 2989-91 (Madere, Lucas). Moreover, since the time the offsite emergency plans were developed the risk Parishes have been working constantly, and continue to work, on developing accurath resource []

inventories.

Perry, at 2.

Written agreements with the support parishes for the supply of transportation resources, specific to an emergency at Waterford 3, are being finalized. LOEP has actively assumed responsi-bility for arranging for support parish transportation resources.

Perry, at 5; Tr. 2991 (Madere). The letters of agreement will be provided to the NRC. Tr. 2974 (Azzarello).

FEMA will review the arrangements for supplemental transportation resources to ensure their adequacy. Tr. 2871 (Benton).

105. Based on the foregoing findings, uncontroverted by direct evidence, and subject to the provision to the Staff of signed letters of agreement for the supply of support parish buses for the evacuation of school children and persons without transportation, and FER 's review thereof, the Board finds that the procedures for evacuating school children and persons without private transportation are adequate.

B.

Aged and Handicapped Persons and Sick and Hospitalized Persons 106. The Staff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference herein Applicant's proposed finding No. 106.

107.

Blank applications, published in the newspaper, will request identification of the aged and handicapped who may need special assistance in an evacuation. Tr. 2982-84 (Madere, Lucas).

In addition, self-addressed, stamped postcards will be enclosed with the pre-distributed public information brochure to further encourage individuals such as the aged and handicapped requiring transportation assistance to notify the Parishe; of their special needs in advance of an emergency.

Azzarello, et al., at 21-22. Also, local social service organizations will be asked to provide the names of handicapped persons in need of special assistance. Tr. 2983, 2986-87 (Madere).

108. Rosters of aged and handicapped persons who need transportation assistance have been prepared, with the assistance of social service agencies and organizations.

Efforts to assure complete-ness of the rosters are ongoing. These rosters will be maintained in the Parish E0Cs, and will be updated semi-annually.

In an evacuation, the Parish Health and Medical Officers, in conjunction with the Transportation Officers, will use vans, buses and other available resources to evacuate aged and handicapped residents. Azzarello, et al.,

at 22; Perry, at 9; Tr. 2473-84 (Perry); Tr. 3041 (Madere); Tr. 3043 (Lucas). Most of the non-ambulatory aged and handicapped can be trans-ported from their homes to the designated pickup points in buses and vans, then evacuated via bus to reception centers with other persons

without private transportation.

Perry, at 9.

Azzarello, et al., at 19.

When an individual's condition so warrants, that person may be trans-ported directly from his home to the reception center. Tr. 2505 (Madere).

109.

In St. Charles Parish there are approximately 100 aged g handicapped persons who may need transportation assistance in an evacua-tion; of these persons requiring assistance, approximately 65 persons are over the age of 60. Tr. 2456 (Perry). There are approximately 150 such persons in St. John the Baptist Parish; of these, approximately 130 persons are over the age of 60. Tr. 2456-57 (Perry). As pertinent information is obtained about the special needs of these people, specific arrangements and procedures are being developed. Perry, at 9.

110. To the extent their transportation needs cannot be met by risk Parish vans and ambulances, arrangements are being'made for resources from neighboring parishes. These transportation requirements l

will be minimal. As a practical matter, these are the types of people who are most likely to be transported by friends and neighbors in an emergency, so actual requirements are expected to be less than indicated.

Nevertheless, arrangements are being made to transport all on the l

rosters.

Perry, at 9-10.

Planning provides for the use of 15 vans and 15 ambulances to evacuate the home-bound aged and handicapped in St. John the Baptist Parish, and for the use of 10 vans and 10 ambulances for the same population in St. Charles Parish. Tr. 2504 (Madere); Tr. 2524 l

l (Lucas).

Elderly persons who do not own their own vehicles and do not l

require special assistance are included among the figures for the popula-l tion without vehicles. Tr. 2463-64 (Twine); Tr. 2468 (Madere).

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111. The Staff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference herein Applicant's proposed finding No. 111.

112. These health care facilities have incorporated protective action response-procedures for fixed nuclear facility accidents into their emergency management (disaster) plans. Benton and Lookabaugh, at 13; Azzarello, g al., at 20-21; Applicant Ex. 3, Encl.1 at 198-200, and Encl. 2 at 357-59.

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113. Support health care facilities prepared to receive evacuated patients / residents of the risk Parish facilities have been identified.

[ ] Benton and Lookabaugh, at 13, 15; Azzarello, et al., at 21.

114. The Staff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference herein Applicant's proposed finding No. 114.

115. Buses to support the evacuation of hospitals', nursing homes and the home-bound infirm will be obtained from the same large pool of buses available to support the evacuation of persons without private transportation. Perry, at 10,11. St. John the Baptist Parish has three 12-person vans (Tr. 2494 (Madere)), St. Charles Parish has eight vans at its disposal (Tr. 3023 (Lucas)), which includes three vans owned by the Parish as well as a number of privately owned vans (Tr. 2496-2500 (Lucas)); and there are many more vans available from support parishes to meet the needs identified by the risk Parishes. Perry, at 10; Tr. 3023 (Lucas); Tr. 3045 (Madere).

53 ambulances are listed in the Parish plans, of which 46 come from other jurisdictions. Benton and Lookabaugh, at 12, 14-16.

However, there may be as many as 80 ambulances [ ] avail-able to St. Charles and St. John the Baptist Parishes within one-half hour.

[] Perry, at 10.

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i 116.

FEMA reviewed the adequacy of the offsite emergency plans with respect to the evacuation of health care facilities and the home-bound aged and handicapped.

FEMA concluded that, except as to the current lack of adequate arrangements for supplemental transportation resources from the support parishes, the emergency plans adequately provide for the evacuation of health care facilities and the home-bound aged and handicapped within the plume EPZ.

[ ] Benton and Lookabaugh, at 12,14,15,16; Tr. 2871-73 (Benton).

117.

[] The Sheriff's dispatcher in each of the risk Parishes, as a regular procedure, has the authority to directly dispatch all ambulances within 25 miles. Perry, at 10.

Further, the risk Parishes have longstanding mutual aid agreements with many of the support parishes, pursuant to which the parishes have historically shared resources with one another. Tr. 2989-91 (Madere, Lucas). Nevertheless, since the time the offsite emergency plans were developed the risk Parishes have been working constantly, and continue to work, on developing accurate resource inventories.

Perry, at 2.

Written agreements with transportation pro-viders are being finalized. L0EP has actively assumed responsibility for arranging for support parish transportation resources. Perry, at 5; Tr. 2991 (Madere). Letters of agreement are being negotiated for the l

provision of ambulances, buses, and vans, and will be provided to the NRC. Tr. 2507, 2517-19 (Madere); Tr. 3046 (Lucas); Tr. 2974 (Azzarello).

FEMA will review the arrangements for supplemental transportation resources to ensure their adequacy. Benton and Lookabaugh, at 16; see generally, Tr. 2870-73 (Benton).

118. Based on the foregoing findings, uncontroverted by direct evidence, and subject to the provision to the Staff of signed letters of agreement for the supply of support parish vehicles for the evacuation of the aged and handicapped and persons in nursing homes and hospitals, and FEMA's review thereof, the Board finds that there are adequate procedures for evacuation of the aged and handicapped, and persons in nursing homes and hospitals.

C.

The Imprisoned 119-122. The Staff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference herein Applinot's proposed findings Nos. 119-122.

D.

Transient Workers 123-127. The Staff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference herein Applicant's proposed findings Nos. 123-127.

7.

Potassium Iodide (Contention 17/26(2))

128. The Staff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference herein Applicant's proposed finding No. 128.

129.

It has long been assumed that a principal radioactive isotope released in a reactor accident is Iodine-131 ("1-131"), along with other radioiodines. When radiciodines are inhaled or ingested, they tend to accumulate in the thyroid and are metabolized into organic iodine com-pounds which may reside in the thyroid long enough to cause local radia-tion damage. Mauro, ff. Tr. 3135, at 2; Applicant Ex. 7; see generally, Staff Ex. 1, % 5.9.2.

Such exposures could, in a most severe accident, exceed the EPA's protective action guides. Tr. 3146-47, 3153 (Mauro).

130.

In the event of a radiological accident, a radioprotective drug such as potassium iodide ("KI") can be administered to curtail the accumulation of radioiodines by the thyroid.

In effect, the iodide saturates the iodine transport system, deterring entry of radiciodine.

Mauro, at 2; Applicant Ex. 7.

Administration of KI prior to exposure to radiciodines is required to obtain maximum protection, although some protection is afforded by post-exposure administration of the drug.

Tr. 3196-98 (Myers). While KI is presently unavailable except with an expiration date of December 1982, any unavailability is temporary and should not influence policy determination. Tr. 3891-92 (Perrotti).

131-133. The Staff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference herein Applicant's proposed findings Nos. 131-133.

134. The State's KI policy was developed by the Assistant Secretary of the Office of Environmental Affairs, Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, with the assistance and concurrence of the State Health Officer, Sarah M. Braud, M.D.

In developing its policy, the State took into consideration certain reported risks and problems associated with the pre-distribution and usage of KI as a protective action option for the general public. Myers, at 11; Tr. 3174, 3181-87 (Myers). Those reported risks and problems are the subject of ongoing consideration by various federal agencies, including the NRC. See, e.g.,

Staff Ex. 6; Staff Ex. 7; Applicant Ex. 9.

The State's KI policy could change upon receipt of further federal guidance. Tr. 3190, 3201 (Myers).

135-146.

[ Deleted]

147. The [ ] uncertainties associated with the KI issue are reflected in recently expressed Commission policy, pursuant to which the NRC Staff is to:

1.

Continue to work with appropriate Federal agencies, i.e.,

FEMA, FDA and EPA, to address the uncertainties in the use of KI by the general public and possible alternative respiratory protection strategies.

2.

Press on with source term technology studies * *

• to a point where the Commission can adequately consider the potential impact on -- among other regulatory matters -- alternative protective actions for public use in a nuclear plant emergency.

The Commission has expressly reserved judgment on the advisability of recommending the stockpiling of KI for the general public. Applicant Ex. 9, at 1.

148. The Staff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference herein Applicant's proposed finding No. 148.

149. While it is conceivable that comprehensive federal guidance, applicable to all operating reactors, may at some point in the future recommend the administration of KI to the general public in an emergency, there clearly is no current " accepted public health practice" providing for KI use by the general public. Tennessee is the only state in which KI has been distributed to the general public residing in the vicinity of a nuclear plant.

[ ] Mauro, at 8; Tr. 3169, 3212 (Mauro); Tr. 3212 (Myers).

150. Based on the foregoing findings, uncontroverted by direct evidence, the Board finds that there is no currently accepted public health practice favoring the distribution of KI to the general public in a radiological emergency, and that the State of Louisiana's public i

health policy on the subject is not inconsistent with the guidance of FEMA and the NRC.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1.

The Board has considered all of the documentary and oral evidence presented by the parties on the contentions raised by Joint Intervenors and the questions raised by the Licensing Board. Based upon a review of the entire record in this proceeding and the proposed find-ings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the parties, and based upon the findings of fact set forth herein, which are supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence in the record, this Board has decided all matters in controversy and reaches the following conclusions.

2.

Subject to the satisfaction of the conditions set forth below, j

the state of onsite and offsite emergency preparedness provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Waterford 3 in l

accordance with the Comission's emergency planning regulations.

1 3.

Subject to the satisfaction of the conditions set forth below, the Waterford 3 onsite and offsite emergency response plans meet the l

l requirements of the emergency planning standards of 10 C.F.R. 6 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 C.F.R. Part 50.

4.

Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Q 2.760a and 10 C.F.R. 9 50.57, the Director of Nuclear Regulation should be authorized to issue to the l

Applicant, upon making requisite findings with respect to matters not l

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embraced in this initial decision, and subject to the prior satisfaction of the conditions set forth below, a license authorizing operation of the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3.

III.

FORM 0F ORDER 1.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Commission's rules and regulations, based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth in this Initial Decision, and subject to the conditions set forth below, the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation is authorized, upon making requisite findings with respect to matters not embraced in this Initial Decision in accordance with the Commission's regulations, to issue to Applicant Louisiana Power and Light Company a license for a term of not more than forty (40) years, authorizing operation of the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, at steady-state power levels not to exceed 3560 megawatts the rmal. Such license may be in such form and content as is appropriate in light of such findings, provided that such license is consistent with the Conclusions of Law set forth herein.

2.

Issuance of the aforementioned operating license shall be subject to the prior satisfaction of the following conditions:

a.

The Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, in consultation with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, shall confirm the publication and distribution within the plume EPZ of public information brochures and posters in accordance with the criteria set out in NUREG-0654.

b.

The Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, in consultation with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, shall verify the capability of the installed prompt notification system in accordance with the design objectives set out in NUREG-0654, Appendix 3, and shall insure that it, or other means, are capable of providing prompt notification to the hearing impaired and to persons working in areas where there is a high level of ambient background noise.

c.

The Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, in consultation with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, shall review and determine the adequacy of signed letters of agreement which are to be provided for the supply of support parish transporta-tion resources for the evacuation from the plume EPZ of school children, persons without transportation, the aged and handi-capped, and persons in nursing homes and hospitals.

d.

The Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, shall verify that the items relating to emergency planning, as set forth in findings 76 and 78-82 herein, have been properly resolved.

Respectfully submitted, sG Sherwin E. Turk l

Counsel for NRC Staff Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 15th day of July, 1982.

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