ML20045D095
| ML20045D095 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 06/17/1993 |
| From: | POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045D080 | List: |
| References | |
| GL-81-12, JPTS-92-004, JPTS-92-4, NUDOCS 9306250320 | |
| Download: ML20045D095 (41) | |
Text
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g Attachment I to JPN-93-042 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFN...QN CHANGES ADDITION OF REMOTE SHUTDOPJN P..NEL LCOS AND SURVEILLANCE REQU!RF?aENTS i
(JPTS-92-004) i i
i i
New York Power Authority JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Docket No. 50-333 DPR-59 9306250320 930617 PDR-ADOCK'05000333 P
JAFNPP o
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS i
TABLE OF CONTENTS fiLQR 1.0 Definitions 1
LIMITING SAFETY SAFETY LIMITS SYSTEM SETTINGS 1.1 Fuel Cladding integrity 2.1 7
1.2 Reactor Coolant System 2.2 27 SURVEILLANCE LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION REQUIREMENTS 3.0 General 4.0 30 3.1 Reactor Protection System 4.1 30f 3.2 Instrumentation 4.2 49 A. Primary Containment Isolation Functions A.
49 B. Core and Containment Cooling Systems -Initiation and B.
50 Control C. Control Rod Block Actuation C.
50 D. Radiation Monitoring Systems - Isolation and initiation D.
50 Functions E. Dry vell Leak Detection E.
53 F. DELETED F.
53 G. Recirculation Pump Trip G.
53 H. Accident Monitoring instrumentation H.
53 1.
4kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage Trip 1.
53 J. Remote Shutdown Capability J.
54 3.3 Reactivity Control 4.3 88
)
A. Reactivity Limitations A.
88 B. Control Rods B.
91 C. Scram insertion Times C.
95 D. Reactivity Anomalies D.
96 3.4 Standby Liquid Control System 4.4 105 A. Normal Operation A.
105 B. Operation With Inoperable Components B.
106 C. Sodium Pentaborate Solution C.
107 i
3.5 Core and Containment Cooling Systems 4.5 112 A. Core Spray and LPCI Systems A.
112 B. Containment Cooling Mode of the RHR System B.
115 C. HPCI System C.
117 D. Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)
D.
119 E. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Systern E.
121 Amendment No. [,1%,1[4,1p, I
JAFNPP e
LIST OF TABLES Table Iilla EaD2 3.1-1 Reactor Protection System (Scram) Instrumentation Requirement 41 3.1-2 Reactor Protection System Instrumentation Response Times 43a 4.1-1 Reactor Protection System (Scram) Instrument Functional Tests 44 4.1-2 Reactor Protection System (Scram) Instrument Calibration 46 3.2-1 Instrumentation that initiates Primary Containment Isolation 64 3.2-2 Instrumentation that initiates or Controls the Core and Containment 66 Cooling Systems 3.2-3 Instrumentation that initiates Control Rod Blocks 72 3.2-4 (DELETED) 74 3.2-5 Instrumentation that Monitors Leakage Detection Inside the Drywell 75 3.2-6 (DELETED) 76 3.2-7 Instrumentation that initiates Recirculation Pump Trip 77 3.2-8 Accident Monitoring instrumentation 77a 3.2 9 Primary Containment Isolation System Actuation Instrumentation 77e Response Times 3.2-10 Remote Shutdown Capability Instrumentation and Controls 77f l
l 4.2-1 Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for PCIS 78 4.2-2 Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Core and Containment 79 Cooling System 4.2 3 Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Control Rod Blocks 81 Actuation 4.2-4 (DELETED) 82 4.2-5 Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Drywell Leak Detection 83 4.2-6 (DELETED) 4.2-7 Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Recirculation Pump Trip 85 Amendment No. h,)d,1M,1[1,1[3, V
D ETELED Y
LLAN PP O
I N
T 1
F N
5 A
E J
TN I
2 5
1 5
S E
GA P
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JAFNPP 3.2 (cont'd) 4.2 (ccot'd)
E.
Drvwell Leak Detection E.
Drywell Leak Detection The limiting conditions of operation for the instrumentation instrumentation shall be calibrated and checked as indicated in that monitors drywell leak detection are given in Table 3.2-5.
Table 4.2-5 F.
(Deleted)
F.
(Deleted)
G.
Recirculation Pumo Trio G.
RecirculaSon Pumo Trio The limiting conditions for operation for the instrumentation Instrumentation shall be functionally tested and calibrated as that trip (s) the recirculation pumps as a means of limiting the indicated in Table 4.2-7.
consequences of a failure to scram during an anticipated transient are given in Table 3.2-7.
System logic shall be functionally tested as indicated in Table 4.2-7.
H.
Accident Monitorina Instrumentation H.
Accident Monitorino Instrumentation The limiting conditions for operation of the instrumentation Instrumentation shall be demonstrated operable by that provides accident monitoring are given in Table 3.2-8.
performance of a channel check and channel calibration as indicated in Table 4.2-8.
l.
4kv Emeroency Bus Undervoltace Trio 1.
Not Used The limiting conditions for operation for the instrumentation that prevents damage to electrical equipment or circuits as a result of either a degraded or loss-of-voltage condition on the emergency electrical buses ara given in Table 3.2-2.
Amendment No jd, 53
(.
~ ~.
I JAFNPP l
. 3.2 (cont'd) ~
4.2 (cont'd) l
- J.
Remote Shutdown Capability J.
Remote Shutdown Canability The remote shutdown functions in Table 3.2-10 shall be Instruments and controls shall be tested and calibrated as operable.
indicated in Table 3.2-10.
1.
With one or more required functions inoperable, restore the required function to operable status within 30 days or be in hot shutdown within the'next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
2.
' The provisions of Specification 3.0.D are not applicable.
i 4
1[6,1[0,1[1, l;
Amendrnent No.
j. -
=
=
JAFNPP 3.2 BASES (cont'd) the specification are adequate to assure the above criteria are (Si providing information to the operators that will enable them met. The specification preserves the effectiveness of the to determine the potential for a breach of the barrier to system during periods of maintenance, testing, or calibration, radioactivity release and if a barrier has been breached; (4) and also minimizies the risk of inadvertent operation; i.e., only furnishing data for deciding on the need to take unplanned one instrument channel out of service.
action if an automatic nr manually initiated safety system is not functioning properly or the plant is not responding properly Flow integrators are used to record the integruted flow of to the safety systems in operation; and (5) allowing for early liquid from the drywell sumps. The leak rate is calculated by indication of the need to initiate action necessary to protect dividing the integrated volume pumped out of the sumps by the public and for an estimate of the magnitude of any the time between sump pump operations. The resultant leak problem.. This instrumentation conforms with the acceptance rate value, which is expressed in gallons per minute, is criteria of NUREG-0737, NUREG-0578, and NRC Generic compared to the acceptance criterion specified in Specification Letter 83-36 and includes Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2 3.6.D.
Type A variables.
For each parameter monitored, as listed in Table 3.2-8, by The Emergency Bus Undervoltage Trip System transfers the 4 comparing the reading of each channel to the reading on kv emergency electrical buses to the Emergency Diesel redundant or related instrument channel a near continuous Generators in the event an undervoltage condition is detected.
surveillance of instrument performance is available.
The system has two levels of protection: (1) degraded voltage protection, and (2) loss-of-voltage protection. Degraded The recirculation pump trip has been added at the suggestion voltage protection prevents a sustained lov in condition of ACRS as a means of limiting the consequences of the from damaging safety-related equipment. The graded unlikely occurrence of a failure to scram during an anticipated voltage protection has two time delays. A short time delay transient. The response of the plant to this postulated event coincident with a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) and a longer falls within the envelope of study events given in General time delay to allow normal plant evolutions without Electric Company Topical Report, NEDO-10349, dated March, unnecessarily starting the Emergency Diesel Generators. The 1971.
loss-of-voltage protection prevents a more severe voltage drop from causing a long term interruption of power. Time delays Accident monitoring instrumentation provides additional are included in the system to prevent inadvertent transfers due information which is helpful to the operator in assessing plant to spurious voltage decreases. Therefore, both the duration conditions following an accident by (1) providing information and severity of the voltage drop are sensed by the Emergency needed to permit the operators to take preplanned manual Bus Undervoltage Trip System.
j actions to accomplish safe plant shutdown; (2) determining j
whether systems are performing their intended functions-Amendment No. [,%, [4, %,
j SS 1
-1 JAFNPP 3.2 BASES (cont'd)
The remote / alternate shutdown capability at FitzPatrick is 4.2.J.2, the operability of the transfer switches will be provided by a remote shutdown panel (25RSP) and five demonstrated when the remote / alternate shutdown control alternate safe shutdown panels (25 ASP-1, 25 ASP-2, 25 ASP-functions are tested.
3,25 ASP-4, and 25 ASP-5). These panels are used in conjunction with the Automatic Depressurization System The remote shutdown instruments and control circuits covered (ADS) relief valve control panel (02 ADS-71) adjacent to by this LCO do not need to be energized to be considered 25RSP, the emergency diesel generator (B & D) control panels operable. This LCO is intended to ensure that the instruments (93EGP-B and 93EGP-D) opposite 25 ASP-3, the reactor and control circuits will be operable if plant conditions require building vent and cooling panel (66HV-38) near 25 ASP-1, and the use of the remote shutdown capability. Performance of-instrument rack 25-6 opposite 25RSP. All of these locations the instrument check once every 31 days ensures that a gross are linked by communications and are provided with failure of instrumentation has not occurred and is intended to emergency lighting, ensure that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each instrument channel calibration.
This Remote Shutdown capability provides the necessary instrumentation and controls to place and maintain the plant in As specified in the surveillance requirements, an instrument a safe shutdown condition from a location other than the check is only required for those instruments that are normally control room in the event the control room becomes energized. Performance of this surveillance provides uninhabitable due to a fire or other reason.
assurance that undetected outright instrument failure is limited to 31 days. The surveillance frequency is based upon plant Not all controls and necessary transfer switches are located at operating experience which indicates that channel failure is the remote / alternate shutdown panels. Some controls and rare.
I transfer switches will have to be operated locally at the i
switchgear, motor control centers, or other local stations.
Surveillance Requirement 4.2.J.2 requires that each remote shutdown transfer switch and control circuit be periodically J
Operability of the remote shutdown instrumentation and tested to demonstrate that it is capable of performing its control functions ensure that there is sufficient information intended function. The requirements of this section apply to available on selected plant parameters to place and maintain the isolation / transfer functions on the panels listed in Table the plant in a shutdown condition should the control room 3.2-10 and on panels 25 ASP-4, 25 ASP-5, and 66HV-3B. 'This become inaccessible. The instrumentation and controls demonstration is performed from the remote shutdown panel installed on the remote / alternate shutdown panels are listed in and locally, as appropriate. This will ensure that if the control Table 3.2-10. This table does not include the isolation / transfer room becomes uninhabitable, the plant can be placed and switches for the control functions on the remote / alternate maintained in a shutdown condition from the remote shutdown shutdown panels. As specified in Surveillance Requirement panel and the local control stations.
l Amendment No. 366,1[,1
,1)d,1/1, 60
i JAFNPP TABLE 3.2-10 REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS MODE IN WHICH MINIMUM MINIMUM FUNCTION INSTRUMENT / SWITCH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED NUMBER (INSTRUMENT OR SWITCH)
LOCATION MUST BE OPERABLE FREQUENCY OF DIVISIONS 1.
RHR Service Water Flow (Loop B) 2bRSP A
B, C 1
(10F1-134) 2.
RHR Service Water Pump Control 25RSP A
D 1
(10P-1 B) 3.
RHR Service Water Heat Exchanger Outlet Valve 25RSP A
D 1
Control (10MOV-89B) 4.
RHR Service Water to RHR Cross-Tie Valve 25 ASP-1 A
D 1
Control (10MOV-148B) 5.
RHR Service Water to RHR Cross-Tie Valve 25 ASP-1 A
D 1
Control (10MOV-149B) 6.
RHR Flow (Loop B) 25RSP A
B, C 1
(10F1-133) 7.
RHR Discharge Pressure (Pump D) 25RSP A
B, C 1
(10PI-279) 8.
RHR Pump Control 25RSP A
D 1
(10P-3D) 9.
RHR Heat Exchanger Bypass Valve Control 25RSP A
D 1
Amendment No.
77f l
JAFNPP TABLE 3.2-10 REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS MODE IN WHICH MINIMUM MINIMUM FUNCTION INSTRUMENT / SWITCH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED NUMBER
' (INSTRUMENT OR SWITCH)
LOCATION MUST BE OPERABLE FREQUENCY OF DIVISIONS
- 10. RHR Inboard injection Valve Control 25RSP A
D 1
- 11. RHR Heat Exchanger Steam inlet Valve Control 25 ASP-1 A
D 1
- 12. RHR Heat Exchanger Vent Valve Control-25 ASP-1 A
D 1
- 13. RHR Heat Exchanger Outlet Valve Control 25 ASP-1 A
D 1
- 14. RHR Pump D Torus Suction Valve Control 25 ASP-2 A
D 1
- 15. RHR Pump D Shutdown Cooling Suction Valve 25 ASP-2 A
D 1
Control (10MOV-15D)
- 16. RHR Pump P-38 Minimum Flow Valve Control 25 ASP-2 A
D 1
- 17. RHR Heat Exchanger Inlet Valve Control 25 ASP-2 A
D 1
- 18. RHR Outboard injection Valve Control 25 ASP-2 A
D 1
Amendment No.
779 g
JAFNPP TABLE 3.2-10 REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS MODE IN WHICH MINIMUM MINIMUM FUNCTION INSTRUMENT / SWITCH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED NUMBER (INSTRUMENT OR SWITCH)
LOCATION MUST BE OPERABLE FREQUENCY OF DIVISIONS
- 99. RHR Heat Exchanger Discharge to Torus Valve 25 ASP-2 A
D 1
Control (10MOV-21B)
- 20. Torus Cooling isolation Valve Control 25 ASP-2 A
D 1
- 21. DW Spray Outboard Valve Control 25 ASP-3 A
D 1
- 22. ADS & Safety Relief Valve A Control 02 ADS-71 A
D 1
(02RV-71 A)
- 23. ADS & Safety Relief Valve B Control 02 ADS-71 A
D 1
(02RV-71 B)
- 24. AD9 & Safety Relief Valve C Control 02 ADS-71 A
D 1
(02RV-71 C)
- 25. ADS & Safety Relief Valve D Control 02 ADS-71 A
D 1
(02RV-71 D)
- 26. ADS & Safety Relief Valve E Control 02 ADS-71 A
D 1
(02RV-71 E)
- 27. ADS & Safety Relief Valve G Control 02 ADS-71 A
D 1
(02RV-71 G)
' Amendment No.
77h l
JAFNPP TABLE 3.2-10 REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS MODE IN WHICH MINIMUM MINIMUM FUNCTION INSTRUMENT / SWITCH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED NUMBER (INSTRUMENT OR SWITCH)
LOCATION MUST BE OPERABLE FREQUENCY OF DIVISIONS
- 28. ADS & Safety Rolief Valve H Control 02 ADS-71 A
D 1
(02RV-71 H)
- 29. Safety Relief Valve F Control 02 ADS-71 A
D 1
(02RV-71 F)
- 30. Safety Relief Valve J Control 02 ADS-71 A
D 1
(02RV-71J)
- 31. Safety Relief Valve K Control 02 ADS-71 A
D 1
(02RV-71 K)
- 32. Safety Relief Valve L Control 02 ADS-71 A
D 1
(02RV-71 L)
- 33. Main Steam Line Drain Outboard Isolation Valve 25 ASP-2 A
D 1
Control - (29MOV-77)
- 34. Drywell Temperature 25RSP A
B, C 1
(68TI-115)
- 35. Torus Water Temperature 25RSP A
B, C 1
(27TI-101)
- 36. Torus Water Level 25RSP A
B, C 1
(23LI-204)
Amendment No.
77i l
JAFNPP TABLE 3.2-10 REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS MODE IN WHICH MINIMUM MINIMUM FUNCTION INSTRUMENT / SWITCH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED NUMBER (INSTRUMENT OR SWITCH)
LOCATION MUST BE OPERABLE FREQUENCY OF DIVISIONS
- 37. Reactor Vessel Pressure Rack 25-6 A
B, C 1
- 38. Reactor Vessel Water Level Rack 25-6 A
B, C 1
(02-3Ll-58A & O2-3LI-85B1)
- 39. Reactor Vessel Water Level Rack 25-51 A
B. C 1
- 40. HPCI Steam Supply Outboard isolation Valve 25RSP A
D 1
Control (23MOV-16)
- 41. HPCI Outboard Isolation Bypass Valve Control 25 ASP-2 A
D 1
(23MOV-60)
- 42. HPCI Minimum Flow Valve Control 25 ASP-2 A
D 1
(23MOV-25)
- 43. CAD B Train inlet Valve Control 25RSP A
D 1
D 1
Control (27AOV-129B)
- 45. Reactor Water Cleanup Outboard Isolation Valve 25 ASP-2 A
D 1
Control (12MOV-18)
Amendment No.
77j l
JAFNPP TABLE 3.2-10 REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS MODE IN WHICH MINIMUM MINIMUM FUNCTION INSTRUMENT / SWITCH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED NUMBER (INSTRUMENT OR SWITCH)
LOCATION MUST BE OPERABLE FREQUENCY OF DIVISIONS
- 46. Emergency Service Water Pump B Control 25 ASP-3 A
D 1
(46P-2B)
D 1
Control (46MOV-101B)
- 48. ESW Pump B Test Valve Control 25 ASP-3 A
D 1
- 49. Bus 11600 Supply Breaker Control 25RSP A
D 1
(71-11602)
D 1
(71-10604)
- 51. Bus 10400-10600 Tie Breaker Control 25 ASP-3 A
D 1
(71-10614)
- 52. Unit Substation L16 & L26 Feeder Breaker Control 25 ASP-3 A
D 1
(71-10660)
- 53. Bus 12600 Supply Breaker Control 25 ASP-3 A
D 1
(71-12602)
- 54. Breaker 71-10614 Synchronizing Check Control 25 ASP-3 A
D 1
- 55. EDG B Control Room Metering Check Control 25 ASP-3 A
D 1
Amendment No.
77k l
JAFNPP TABLE 3.2-10 REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS MODE IN WHICH MINIMUM MINIMUM FUNCTION INSTRUMENT / SWITCH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED NUMBER (INSTRUMENT OR SWITCH)
LOCATION MUST BE OPERABLE FREQUENCY OF DIVISIONS
- 56. EDG B Engine Start /Stop Control 25 ASP-3 A
D 1
- 57. EDG D Control Room Metering Check Control 25 ASP-3 A
D 1
- 58. EDG D Engine Start /Stop Control 25 ASP-3 A
D 1
- 59. EDG B Governor Switch 93-EGP-B
'A D
1
- 60. EDG B Synchronizing Switch 93-EGP-B A
D 1
- 61. EDG B Load Breaker 71-10602 93-EGP-B A
D 1
- 62. EDG B Motor Control 93-EGP-B A
D 1
l
- 63. EDG B Frequency Meter 93-EGP-B A
B, C 1
- 64. EDG B Voltage Control 93-EGP-B A
D 1
- 65. EDG B Emergency Bus Meter 93-EGP-B A
B, C 1
- 66. EDG B Incoming Bus Meter 93-EGP-B A
B, C 1
- 67. EDG B Running Bus Meter 93-EGP-B A
B, C 1
j
- 66. EDG D Governor Switch 93-EGP-D A
D 1
- 69. EDG D Synchronizing Switch 93-EGP-D A
D 1
Amendment No.
7 71 l
\\
JAFNPP TABLE 3.2-10 REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS MODE IN WHICH MINIMUM MINIMUM FUNCTION INSTRUMENT / SWITCH SURVEILLANCE RE ~ UIRED NUMBER (INSTRUMENT OR SWITCH)
LOCATION MUST BE OPERADLE FREQUENCY OF DIVISIONS
- 70. EDG D Load Breaker 71-10612 93-EGP-D A
D 1
- 71. EDG D Motor Control 93-EGP-D A
D 1
- 72. EDG D Frequency Meter 93-EGP-D A
B, C 1
- 73. EDG D Voltage Control 93-EGP-D A
D 1
- 74. EDG D Emergency Bus Meter 93-EGP-D A
B, C 1
- 75. EDG D Incoming Bus Meter 93-EGP-D A
B, C 1
- 76. EDG D Running Bus Meter 93-EGP-D A
B, C 1
NOTES FOR TABLE 3.2-10 A.
This instrument / control shall be operable in the RUN and STARTUP/ HOT-STANDBY modes.
1 B.
Perform instrument check for each required instrument that is normally energized (i.e., not requiring manual transfer / isolation fcr operation) once per 31 days.
C.
Perform instrument channel calibration for each required instrumentation channel once per operating cycle.
D.
Demonstrate each required control circuit and transfer switch is capable of performing the intended function once per operating cycle.
Amendment No.
77m l
Attachm nt 11 to JPN-93-042 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES ADDITION OF REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL LCOS AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (JPTS-92-004) 1.
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES The proposed changes to the James A. FitzPatrick Technical Specifications add remote / alternate shutdown Technical Specification requirements. The changes are detailed below.
Minor changes in format, such as type font, margins or hyphenation, are not described in this submittal. This type of change is typographical in nature and does not affect the content of the Technical Specifications.
Paae i. Table of Contents i
Replace the title for Section 3.2.F, " Surveillance Information Readouts," with the word " DELETED."
Add section identifier "4.2.1" to the Table of Contents for Surveillance Requirements.
Change page "54" to page "53 for Sections 3.2.E, 3.2.F, 3.2.G, 3.2.H, and 3.2.1."
Add Section 3/4.2.J entitled " Remote Shutdown Capability" with page number "54."
Paae v. List of Tables Add Table number 3.2-10 entitled " Remote Shutdown Capability instrumentation and Controls" with prge number "77f."
t Paae 51. Deleted Paae Replace the phrase:
"Pages 51-53 INTENTIONALLY DELETED" with "PAGES 51-52 INTENTIONALLY DELETED."
Paae 53. Soecifications 3/4 - 2.E. F. G. H. and 1 Move the contents of existing page 54 to page 53.
Insert Surveillance Requirement 4.2.1 with the words, "Not Used."
Attachment ll to JPN-93-042 SAFETY EVAU;ATION Page 2 of 7 Pace 54. Soecifications 3/4 2.J Insert new Specification 3.2.J entitled " Remote Shutdown Capability" which reads as follows:
"The remote shutdown functions in Table 3.2-10 shall be aperable.
- 1. With one or more required functions inoperable, restore the required function to operable status within 30 days or be in hot shutdown within the next 12 l
hours.
- 2. The provisions of Specification 3.0.D are not applicable."
l l
l Insert new Specification 4.2.J entitled " Remote Shutdown Capability" which reads as follows:
" Instruments and controls shall be tested and calibrated as indicated in Table 3.2-10."
l l
Paae 59 Bases Section 3.2 Move the contents of page 60 onto page 59.
Pace 60, Bases Section 3.2 l
Beginning in the left column of page 60, insert the following:
"The remote / alternate shutdown capability at FitzPatrick is provided by a remote shutdown panel (25RSP) and five alternate safe shutdown panels (25 ASP-1, 25 ASP-2, 25 ASP-3, 25 ASP-4, and 25 ASP-5). Those panels are used in conjunction with the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) relief valve control panel (02 ADS-71) adjacent to 25RSP, the emergency diesel generator (B & D) control panels (93EGP B and 93EGP-D) opposite 25 ASP-3, the reactor building vent and cooling panel (66HV-1 i
- 38) near 25 ASP-1, and instrument rack 25-6 opposite 25RSP. All of these locations are linked by communications and are provided with l
This Remote Shutdown capability provides the necessary instrumentation and controls to place and maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition from a location other than the control room in the event the control room -
i becomes uninhabitable due to a fire or other reason.
Not all controls and necessary transfer switches are located at the remote / alternate shutdown panels. Some controls and transfer switches will have to be operated locally at the switchgear, motor control centers, or other local stations.
l
.l Attachm:nt ll to JPN-93 042 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 3 of 7 Operability of the remote shutdown instrumentation and control functions ensure that there is sufficient information available on selected plant parameters to place and maintain the plant in a shutdown condition should the control room become inaccessible. The instrumentation and controls insta!!ed on the remote / alternate shutdown panels are listed in Table 3.210. This. table does not include the isolation / transfer switches for the control functions on the remote / alternate shutdown panels. As specified in Surveillance Requirement 4.2.J.2, the operability of the transfer switches will be demonstrated when the remote / alternate shutdown control functions are tested.
The remote shutdown instruments and control circuits covered by this LCO do not need to be energized to be considered operable. This LCO is intended to ensure that the instruments and control circuits will be operable if plant conditions require the use of the remote shutdown capability. Performance of the instrument check once every 31 days ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred and is inter'ded to ensure that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each instrument channel calibration.
As specified in the surveillance requirements, an instrument check is only required for those instruments that are normally energized. Performance of this surveillance provides assurance that undetected outright instrument failuro is limited to 31 days. The surveillance frequency is based upon plant operating experience which indicates that channel failure is rare.
Surveillance Requirement 4.2.J.2 requires that each remote shutdown transfer switch and control circuit be periodically tested to demonstrate that it is capable of performing its intended function. The requirements of this section apply to the isolation / transfer functions on the panels listed in Table 3.2-10 and on panels 25 ASP-4,25 ASP-5, and 66HV-38.
This damonstration is performed from the remote shutdown panel and locally, as appropriate. This will ensure that if the control room becomes uninhabitable, the plant can be placed and maintained in a shutdown condition from the remote shutdown panel and the local control stations."
Paaes 77f throuah 77m. Table 3.2-10 Insert a new Table 3.2-10, " Remote Shutdown Capability Instrumentation and Controls."
l
Attachm:nt ll to JPN-93-042 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 4 of 7 II.
PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES The proposed change to the James A. FitzPatrick Technical Specifications establishes a new Technical Specification Section for " Remote Shutdown Capability." This i
includes new Limiting Condition for Operation, Surveillance Requirements, and Bases Sections.
l The Authority committed (Reference 1) to prepare and submit Technical Specifications for the remote / alternate shutdown equipment. The new surveillance l
testing intervals were to be consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.22 (Reference 2) l guidelines as applied to FitzPatrick. Furthermore, the Authority committed (Reference i
- 3) to develop a periodic surveillance test procedure for the remote / alternate shutdown panels in conformance with the requirements of Generic Letter 81-12 (Reference 4).
Generic Letter 81-12 specified the information required by the NRC staff to complete its review of altemate shutdown capability in meeting the criteria of Section lil.G.3 of Appendix R. In Generic Letter 88-12 (Reference 5), the NRC reaffirmed its position requiring that remote /altemate shutdown surveillance requirements be contained within the Technical Specifications.
These proposed Technical Specification changes fulfill these commitments. The proposed limiting conditions for operation, surveillance requirements, and bases, are l
based on the improved Standard Technical Specifications (Reference 6).
l 111.
SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED CHANGER Remote / alternate shutdown capability at FitzPatrick is provided by a remote shutdown panel (25RSP) and five alternate safe shutdown panels (25 ASP-1,2,3,4, and 5). The remote shutdown panel and the first three alternate shutdown panels were installed in August 1985 and pre-operationally tested (References 7,8, and 9).
The two newest alternate shutdown panels were installed during the 1992 refueling outage and pre-operationally tested (References 10 and 11). The design included keylocks on the panel doors and anti-tampering switches in each panel to alarm in the control room when the panel doors are opened. These panels are used in conjunction with the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) relief valve control panel (02 ADS-
- 71) adjacent to 25RSP, the emergency diesel generator (B & D) control panels (93EGP B and 93EGP-D) opposite of 25 ASP-3, the reactor building vent and cooling panel (66HV 38) near 25 ASP-1, and instrumentation rack 25-6 opposite of 25RSP.
i All of these locations are linked for communications and provided with emergency lighting.
Inclusion of the new limiting conditions for operation, survell lance requirements, and i
bases section will not have any adverse safety implications. The addition of these sections to the Technical Specifications is in conformance with the NRC's intent to include administrative control of a plant's remote shutdown capability in the Technical Specifications. Safety benefits provided by these proposed changes to the FitzPatrick Technical Specifications include-i l
1 to JPN-93-042 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 5 of 7 an increase in safety by establishing positive control over the operability of the remote / alternate shutdown panels (i.e., Limiting Conditions for Operation), and an increased probability that the remote / alternate shutdown panels will perform as intended by testing them on a periodic basis (i.e., Surveillance Requirements).
Changing the Technical Specifications to provide operability and surveillance guidance for the remote / alternate shutdown panels does not in any way alter their operation or availability. These changes to the Technical Specifications do not alter the conclusions of the plant's accident analyses as documented in the FSAR or the NRC SER. These changes to the Technical Specifications fuifill an Authority commitment and meet the intent of the NRC's guidance concerning administrative control of the remote / alternate shutdown panels.
l IV. EVAt.UATION OF SIGNIF! CANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Operation of the FitzPatrick plant in accordance with the proposed Amendment would not involve a significant hazards consideration as defined in 10 CFR 50.92, since it j
would not:
- 1. involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The inclusion of remote / alternate shutdown panels is not considered in the original plant accident analyses. The proposed inclusion of the remote / alternate shutdown panels in the Technical Specifications will not affect the ability of these panels in performing their intended function. The use of a keylock and an anti-tampering switch to alarm in the control room provides security against unauthorized access to the panels. The probability of a fire requiring the use of these panels is not increased and the ability of plant personnel and fire protection equipment to detect and extinguish a fire is not affected. For a severe fire affecting the control room, the remote / alternate shutdown panels provide an enhanced capability to achieve and maintain a cold shutdown. The proposed inclusion of the remote / alternate shutdown panels in the Technical Specifications will not introduce any additional combustible materials or ignition sources into the plant.
- 2. create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from those previously evaluated.
The proposed inclusion of the remote / alternate shutdown panels in the Technical Specifications does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident or fire. The use of keylocks and anti-tampering switches to control access to these panels reduces the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from inadvertent operation. The proposed changes to the Technical Specifications provides additional capability towards mitigating the consequences l
l
l Attachment il to JPN-93-042 SAFETY EVAL.UATION Page 6 of 7 of a fire in the control room, relay room, or cable spreading room by a!!owing for the control and establishment of a safe condition for the reactor from an alternate location. Analyses have demonstrated that the plant can be safely shutdown and maintained in a shutdown condition assuming the loss of all equipment in any single fire area or zone.
i
- 3. involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
The proposed inclusion of the remote / alternate shutdown panels in the Technical Specifications provides additional protection against the possibility of a fire causing the loss of reactor control capability. The inclusion of limiting conditions for operation and survei!!ance requirements will not reduce any existing safety margins. These changes willincrease the reactor operators confidence in their ability to control the reactor under conditions requiring the evacuation of the control room.
V.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES The inclusion of the remote / alternate shutdown panels in the Technical Specifications will not affect the Firs Protection program or the environment. The insertion of additionallimiting conditions for operation, surveillance requirements and bases will not adversely alter or affect the ALARA program. It will provide additional guidance for running the plant in a safe manner and ensure the availability of the i
remote / alternate shutdown panels when required.
VI. C_QNCLUSION These changes, as proposed, do not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59. That is, they:
l
- 1. will not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident l
or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety l
analysis report:
- 2. will not increase the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a type different from any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report:
- 3. will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification.
The changes involve no significant hazards consideration, as defined in l
i l
l
Attachm:nt 11 to JPN-93-042 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 7 of 7 Vll. REFERENCES 1.
NYPA letter, J.P. Bayne to NRC, dated July 13,1982 (JPN-82-061)
" Reassessment of Fire Protection Features for Conformance to Appendix R to i
10CFR50."
2.
NRC Safety Guide 1.22, dated February 17,1972 " Periodic Testing of Protection System Actuation Functions."
3.
NRC Inspection 50-333/92-80, dated April 15,1992 ([[::JAF-92-110|JAF-92-110]]) " March 6-20 1992 - Special Safety Team inspection of Fire Protection Program."
4.
NRC Generic Letter 81-12, " Fire Protection Rule," dated February 20,1981.
5.
NRC Generic Letter 88-12, " Removal of Fire Protection Requirements from Technical Specifications," dated August 2,1988.
6.
NRC NUREG-1433 " Standard Technical Specifications in General Electric Boiling Water Reactors (BWR/4)," Revision 0, dated September 1992.
7.
JAF-SE-85-078, " Appendix R Safe Shutdown Preoperational Test for 25 ASP-3,"
POT-25A, dated April 8,1985.
8.
JAF-SE-85-085, " Appendix R Safe Shutdown Preoperational Test for 25 ASP-1
& 2," POT-25B, dated April 23,1985.
=
9.
JAF-SE-85-086, " Appendix R Safe Shutdown Preoperational Test for Panel 25RSP," POT-25C, dated May 2,1985.
- 10. NYPA JAFNPP " Isolation of Safety Relief Valves for Appendix R Fires,"
POT-02L, Revision 1, dated October 14,1992.
~
- 12. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Sections 7.2.3.G.k " Safe Shutdown from Outside the Control Room," 7.4.3.3
" Automatic Depressurization System Control and instrumentation," and 7.8
" Reactor Vessel Instrumentation," through Revision 5, dated January 1992.
- 13. James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Safety Evaluation Report (SER), dated November 20,1972, and Supplements.
l l
l i.
l Attachment lit to JPN-93-042 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE ADDITION OF REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL LCOS AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS MARKUP OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES (JPTS-92-004) t.
1 i
l New York Power Authority JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Docket No. 50-333 DPR-59
i JAFNPP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 Definitions P_agg 1
UMITING SAFETY SAFETY UMITS SYSTEM SETTINGS 1
1.1 Fuel Cladding Integrity 2.1 7
1 1.2 Reactor Coolant System 2.2 27 SURVEILLANCE I
UMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION REQUIREMENTS 3.0 General 4.0 30 3.1 Reactor Protection System 4.1 3 01 i
3.2 instrumentation 4.2 49 A.
Primary Containment isolation Functions A.
49
[
l B.
Core and Containment Cooling Systems - Initiation and B.
50 ll Control i
C.
Control Rod Block Actuation C.
50 D.
Radiation Monitoring Systems - Isolation and initiation D.
50 Functions
- 3 e
E.
Drywell Leak Detection F.
(Survemance information ReadouI' pg[p7gp E.
F.
,54" N j
G.
Recirculation Pump Trip G.
Je 5 3 ppy H.
Accident Monitoring Instrumentation H.
y 63 j
l.
4kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage Trip I.
p 53 I
"A 3.3 Reactivity Control 4.3 88 A.
Reactivity Umitations A.
88 B.
Control Rods B.
91 C.
Scram insertion Times C.
95 D.
Reactivity Anomalies D.
96 3.4 Standby Liquid Control System 4.4 105 A.
Normal Operation A.
105 B.
Operation With inoperable Components B.
106 C.
Sodium Pentaborate Solution C.
107 3.5 Core and Containment Cooling Systems 4.5 112 A.
Core Spray and LPCI Systems A.
112 B.
Containment Cooling Mode of the RHR System B.
115 C.
HPCI System C.
117 D.
Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)
D.
119 E.
Reactor Core isolation Cooling (RCIC) System E.
121 v
Amendment No.,2f,141X [
{
I JAFNPP LIST OF TABLES Table Title Page 3.1 1 Reactor Protection System (Scram) Instrumentation Requirement 41 j
3.1-2 Reactor Protection System Instrumentation Response Times 43a l
4.1 1 Reactor Protection System (Scram) Instrument Functional Tests 44 4.1 2 Reactor Protection System (Scram) Instrument Calibration 46 l
3.2-1 Instrumentation that Initiates Primary Containment isolation 64 l
i 3.2-2 Instrumentation that Initiates or Controls the Core and Containment 66
{
Cooling Systems
)
32-3 Instrumentation that initiates Control Rod Blocks 72 l
32-4 (DELETED) 74 32-5 Instrumentation that Monitors Leakage Detection Inside the Drywell 75 32-6 (DELETED) 76
~I
\\
3.2-7 Instrumentation that initiates Recirculation Pump Trip 77 32-8 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation 77a 3.2-9 Primary Containment o.olation System Actuation instrumentation 77e f
y f
Response Times Y
421 Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for PCIS 78 42 2 Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Core and Containment 79 Cooling System 4.2-3 Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Control Rod Blocks 81 Actuation 4.2-4 (DELETED) 82 42-5 Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Drywell Leak Detection 83 4.2-6 (DELETED) 42-7 Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Recirculation Pump Trip 85 v
Amendment No. 26,jg,1)d.1)d, [
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'M JAFNPP 3.2 (cont'd) 4.2 (cont'd)
E.
Drvwell Leak Detection E.
Drvwell Leak Detection The limiting conditions of operation for the instrumentation Instrumentation shall be calibrated and checked as indicated in that monitors drywell leak detection are given in Table 3.2-5.
Table 4.2-5 F.
(Deleted)
F.
(Deleted)
G.
Recirculation Pumo Trio G.
Recirculation Pumo Trio The limiting conditions for operation for the instrumentation Instrumentation shall be functionally tested and calibrated as that trip (s) the recirculation pumps as a means of limiting the indicated in Table 4.2-7.
consequences of a failure to scram during an anticipated i
transient are given in Table 3.2-7.
System logic shall be functionally tested as indicated in Table 4.2-7.
1
?
H.
Accident Monitorino Instrumentation-H.
Accident Monitorina Instrumentation The limiting conditions for operation of the instrumentation Instrumentation shall be demonstrated operable by that provides accident monitoring are given in Table 3.2-8.
performance of a channel check and channel calibration as indicated in Table 4.2-8.
I 1.
4kv Emeraency Bus Undervoltaae Trio 1.
Not Used The limiting conditions for operation for the instrumentation that prevents damage to electrical equipment or circuits as a result of either a degraded or loss-of-voltage condition on the ph[6
. emergency electrical buses are given in Table 3.2-2.
b 6. C Chy' Code *s.Fa~
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Amendment No. jVI,
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53 ob
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3.2 (cont'd) 4.2 (cont'd)
Drywell Leak Detection fE.
Drywell Leak Detection The limiting conditions of operation for the instrumentation that instrumentation shall be calibrated and checked as indicated in monitors drywell leak detection are given in Tablo 32-5.
Table 4.2-5
(
F.
(Deleted)
F.
(Deleted)
U G.
Rocirculation Pump Trip G.
Recirculation Pump Trip, The limiting conditions for operation for the instrumentation that Instrumentation shall t>= functionally tested and calibrated as trip (s) the rocirculation pumps as a means of limiting the indicated in Tabic 42-7 consequences of a failure to scram during an anticipated transient are given in Table 32-7.
System logic shall be functiona!!y tested as indicated in Table 4,2,7, H.
Accident Monitoring Instrumentation H.
Accident Monitoring Instrumentation The limiting conditions for operation of the instrumentation that provides accident monitoring are given in Tablo 32-8.
instrumentation shall be demonstrated operable by performance of a channel check and channel calibration as indicated in Table 1.
4kv Emergency Bus Undervoltago Trip 4.2-8.
I The limiting conditions for operation for the instrumentation that prevents damage to electrical equipment or circuits as a result of either a degraded or loss-of-voltago condition on the emergency electrical buses are given in Table 32-2.
Moy8 f 44 g w
/
0 a
Insert sap Dove k P Y g 1.n Se r f,..
c Amendment No.196,1;id u
JAFNPP 32 BASES (cont'd) the specification are adequate to assure the above critoria are met. The specification preserves the effectiveness of the system during periods of maintenance, testing, or caiibration, and also minimizes the risk of inadvertent operation; i.e., only one instrument channel out of servico.
how integrators are used to record the integrated flow of liquid from the drywell sumps. The leak rate is calculated by dividing the integrated volume pumped out of the sumps by the time between sump pump operations. The resultant leak rato value, which is expressed in gallons por minuto, is compared to the acceptance criterion specified in Specification 3.6.D.
For each parameter monitored, as listed in Table 324, by comparing the reading of each channel to the reading on redundant or related instrument channel a near continuous surveillance of instrument performance is available.
con hn h n,a oS pp G0 here-Amendment No. 36, % p4 59 m
v, JAFNPP 32 BASES (cont'd)
The recirculation pump trip has boon added at the suggestion The Emergency Bus Undervoltago Trip System transfers the 4 of ACRS as a means of limiting the consequences of the kv emergency electrical buses to the Emergency Diesel unlikely occurrence of a failure to scram during an anticipated Generators in the event an undervoltage condition is detected.
transient. The response of the plant to this postulated event The system has two levels of protection: (1) degraded voltage falls within the envelope of study events given in Genoral protection, and (2) loss-of-voltage protection. Degraded Electric Company Topical Report, NEDO-10349, dated voltage protection prevents a sustained low voltage condition March,1971.
from damaging safety-related equipment. The degraded Accident monitoring instrumentation providos additional v Itage protection has two timo delays. A short !ime delay information which is helpful to the operator in assessing plant coincident with a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) and a longer timo delay to allow normal plant evo!utions without conditions following an accident by (1) providing information nooded to permit the operators to take preplanned manual unnecessarily starting the Emergency Diesel Generators. The actions to accomplish safe plant shutdown; (2) determining I ss-of-voltage protection prevents a more severo voltage drop whether systems are performing their intended functions; lan causing a long term interruption of power. Time delays (3) p.oviding information to the operators that will enable them are included in the system to prevent inadvertent transfers due to dolormine the potential for a breach of the barrier to to spurious voltago decreases. Therefore, both the duration radioactivity release and if a barrier has been breached; and severity of tho voltago drop are sensed by the Emergency (4) furnishing data for deciding on the need to take unplanned Bus Undervoltage Trip System.
action if an automatic or manually initiated safety system is not functioning properly or the plant is not responding properly to the safety systems in operation; and (5) allowing for early indication of the need to initiato action necessary to protect the public and for an estimato of the magnitude of any problem.
This instrumentation conforms with the acceptanco criteria of NUREG-0737, NUREG-0578, and NRC Generic Letter 83-36 and includes Regulatory Guido 1.97, Revision 2 Type A doV6 ff h ser+ "E" Amendment No. tiid,120, pd, lad 60
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JAFNPP TABLE 3.2-10 REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS MODE IN WHICH MINIMUM MINIMUM FUNCTION INSTRUMENT / SWITCH. SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED NUMBER (INSTRUMENT OR SWITCH)
LOCATION MUST BE OPERABLE FREQUENCY OF DIVISIONS 1.
RHR Service Water Flow (Loop B) 25RSP A'
B, C -
.1 (10F1-134) 2.
RHR Service Water Pump Control 25RSP A
D 1
(10P-1 B)
- 3.
'RHR Service Water Heat Exchanger Outlet Valve 25RSP A
D 1
' Control (10MOV-898) 4.
RHR Service Water to RHR Cross-Tie Valve 25 ASP-1 A
D 1
Control - (10MOV-148B) 5.
RHR Service Water to RHR Cross-Tie Valve 25 ASP-1 A
D 1
Control (10MOV-149B) 6.
RHR Flow (Loop B)
~25RSP A
B, C 1
~ (10F1-133) 7.
RHR Discharge Pressure - (Pump D) 25RSP A
B, C 1
(10PI-279)
-?
8.
1 (10P-3D)
. 9.
RHR Heat Exchanger Bypass Valve Control 25RSP-A D
1 I
Amendment No.
77f l
i
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/2 t
JAFNPP f
TABLE 3.2-10
~
REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS i
MODE IN WHICH MINIMUM M!NIMUM FUNCTION INSTRUMENT / SWITCH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED NUMBER j.
(INSTRUMENT OR SWITCH)
LOCATION MUST BE OPERABLE FREQUENCY OF DIVISIONS -
1
- 10. RHR inboard injection Valve Control 25RSP A
D
-1 (10MOV-258)
- 11. RHR Heat Exchanger Steam inlet Valve Control 25 ASP-1 A
D 1
- 12. RHR Heat Exchanger Vent Valve Controi 25 ASP-1 A
D 1
- 13. RHR Heat Exchanger Outlet Valve Control 25 ASP-1
- A D
1 i
(10MOV-12B) i
- 14. RHR Pump D Torus Suction Valve Control 25 ASP-2 A
D 1
- 15. RHR Pump D Shutdown Cooling Suction Valve
- 25 ASP-2' A
D 1
Control (10MOV-15D) l
- 16. RHR Pump P-3B Minimum Flow Valve Control 25 ASP-2
- A D
.1 (10MOV-16B) i
- 17. RHR Heat Exchanger inlet Valve Control 25 ASP-2 A
D 1
(10MOV-658) l i
- 18. RHR Outboard injection Valve Control 25 ASP-2 A
D
-1 (10MOV-278) k q
Amendment No.
-.--a a
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=
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e JAFNPP TABLE 3.2-10 REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS MODE IN WHICH M!NIMUM MINIMUM FUNCTION INSTRUMENT / SWITCH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED NUMBER (INSTRUMENT OR SWITCH)
LOCATION MUST BE OPERABLE FREQUENCY OF DIVISIONS
- 19. RHR Heat Exchanger Discharge to Torus Valve 25 ASP-2 A
D 1
Control (10MOV-218)
- 20. Torus Cooling isolation Valve Control 25 ASP-2 A
D 1
- 21. DW Spray Outboard Valve Control 25 ASP-3 A
D 1
- 22. ADS & Safety Relief Valve A Control 02 ADS-71 A
D 1
(02RV-71 A)
- 23. ADS & Safety Relief Valve B Control 02 ADS-71 A
D 1
(02RV-71 B)
- 24. ADS & Safety Relief Valve C Control 02 ADS-71 A
D 1
(02RV-71 C)
- 25. ADS & Safety Relief Valve D Control 02 ADS-71 A
D 1
(02RV-71 D)
- 26. ADS & Safety Relief Valve E Control 02 ADS-71 A
D 1
(02RV-71 E)
- 27. ADS & Safety Relief Valve G Control 02 ADS-71 A
D 1
(02RV-71 G) d f6 Amendment No.
h 77h l
(;
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V.;i/
i JAFNPP TABLE 3.2-10 REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS MODE IN WHICH MINIMUM MINIMUM FUNCTION INSTRUMENT / SWITCH SURVEILLANCE REQUIREQ NUMBER.
(INSTRUMENT OR SWITCH)
LOCATION MUST BE OPERABLE FREQUENCY OF DIVISIONS t
- 28. ADS & Safety Relief Valve H Control 02 ADS-71 A
D 1
(02RV-71 H)
- 29. Safety Relief Valve F Control 02 ADS-71 A
D 1
(02RV-71 F)
- 30. Safety Relief Valve J Control 02 ADS-71 A
D-1 (02RV-71 J)
- 31. Safety Relief Valve K Control 02 ADS-71 A
D 1
(02RV-71 K)
'1
- 32. Safety Relief Valve L Control 02 ADS-71 A
D 1
1 (02RV-71 L)
- 33. Main Steam Line Drain Outboard Isolation Valve 25 ASP-2 A
D 1
Control (29MOV-77) i
- 34. Drywell Temperature
~25RSP A
B, C 1
(68TI-115)
- 35. Torus Water Temperature 25RSP A
B, C 1
(27TI-101)
- 36. Torus Water Level 25RSP A
B, C 1
(23LI-204) j d
90.{f/ '
Amendment No.
77i g
4 1,
s ___
1
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j JAFNPP TABLE 3.2-10 REMOTE SHUTDOWN OAPABILITY INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS MODE IN WHICH MINIMUM MINIMUM FUNCTION ~
INSTRUlWENT/ SWITCH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED NUMBER (INSTRUMENT OR SWITCH)
LOCATION MUST BE OPERABLE FREQUENCY OF DIVISIONS
- 37. Reactor Vessel Pressure Rack 25-6 A
B, C 1
- 38. Reactor Vessel Water Level Rack 25-6 A
B, C 1
(02-3Ll-38A & O2-3LI-85B1)
- 39. Reactor Vessel Water Level Rack 25-51 A
B, C 1
- 40. HPCl Steam Supply Outboard Isolation Valve 25RSP A
D 1
Control (23MOV-16)
- 41. HPCI Outboard Isolation Bypass Valve Control 25 ASP-2 A
D 1
(23MOV-60)
- 42. HPCI Minimum Flow Valve Contrni 25 ASP-2 A
D 1
(23MOV-25) s
- 43. CAD B Train inlet Valve Control 25RSP A
D 1
D 1
Control (27AOV-1298)
I
- 45. Reactor Water Cleanup Outboard Isolation Valve 25 ASP-2 A
D 1
i Control (12MOV-18) 3 6
Amendment No.
77J g
L
(33 f]
o Lif
- ?
' TABLE 3.2-10 REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS 4
MODE IN WHICH MINIMUM MINIMUM FUNCTION INSTRUMENT / SWITCH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED NUMBER (INSTRUMENT OR SWITCH)
LOCATION MUST BE OPERABLE FREQUENCY OF DIVISIONS
- 46. Emergency Service Water Pump B Control 25 ASP-3 A
.D 1
(46P-28)
D 1
i Control (46MOV-101B)
- 48. ESW Pump B Test Valve Control 25 ASP-3 A
D 1
- 49. Bus 11600 Supply Breaker Control 25RSP A
D 1
(71-11602)
D 1
(71-10604)
- 51. Bus 10400-10600 Tie Breaker Control 25 ASP-3 A
D 1
(71-10614) l
- 52. Unit Substation L16 & L26 Feeder Breaker Control 25 ASP-3 A
D 1
(71-10660)-
- 53. Bus 12600 Supply Breaker Control 25 ASP-3 A
D 1
(71-12602)
- 54. Breaker 71-10614 Synchronizing Check Control 25 ASP-3 A
D 1
- 55. EDG B Control Room Metering Check Control 25 ASP-3 A
D 1
Amendment No.
k 77k
.l
r~ r i
hj J.
i i
JAFNPP TABLE 3.2-10 REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS I
MODE IN WHICH MINIMUM MINIMUM FUNCTION INSTRUMENT / SWITCH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED NUMBER (INSTRUMENT OR SWITCH)
LOCATION MUST BE OPERABLE FREQUENCY OF DIVISIONS
- 56. EDG B Engine Start /Stop Control 25 ASP-3 A
D 1
- 57. EDG D Control Room Metering Check Control 25 ASP-3 A
D 1
- 58. EDG D Engine Start /Stop Control 25 ASP-3 A
D 1
- 59. EDG B Governor Switch 93-EGP-B A
D 1
I 4
- 60. EDG B Synchronizing Switch 93-EGP-B A
D 1
- 61. EDG B Load Breaker 71-10602 93-EGP-B A
D 1
- 62. EDG B Motor Control 93-EGP-B A
D 1
- 63. EDG B Frequency Meter 93-EGP-B A
B, C 1
- 64. EDG B Voltage Control 93-EGP-B A
D 1
- 65. EDG B Emergency Bus Meter 93-EGP-B A
B, C 1
- 66. EDG B Incoming Bus Meter 93-EGP-B -
A B, C 1
i
- 67. EDG B Running Bus Meter 93-EGP-B A-B, C 1
- 68. EDG D Governor Switch 93-EGP-D A
D 1
- 69. EDG D Synchronizing Switch 93-EGP-D A
D 1
0 Amendment No.
(O' l
7 71
i[-
f
)
b 2.
JAFNPP I
TABLE 3.2-10 REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS MODE IN WHICH MINIMUM MINIMUM FUNCTION INSTRUMENT / SWITCH - SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED NUMBER (INSTRUMENT OR SWITCH)
- LOCATION MUST BE OPERABLE-FREQUENCY OF DIVISIONS
- 70. EDG D Load Breaker 71-10612 93-EGP-D A
D 1
i
- 71. EDG D Motor Control 93-EGP-D
.A D
1
- 7 2.
EDG D Frequency Meter 93-EGP-D A
B, C 1
- 73.. EDG D Voltage Control 93-EGP-D A
D 1
. 74. EDG D Emergency Bus Meter 93-EGP-D
'A B, C 1
- 75. EDG D incoming Bus Meter 93-EGP-D A
B, C 1
i-
- 76. EDG D Running Bus Meter 93-EGP-D A
B, C 1
I NOTES FOR TABLE 3.2-10 i
j
' A.
This instrument / control shall be operable in the RUN and STARTUP/ HOT-STANDBY modes.
B.
Perform instrument check for each required instrument that is normally energized (i.e., not requiring manual transfer / isolation for operation) once per 31 days.
C.
Perform instrument channel calibration for each required instrumentation channel once per operating cycle.
D.
. Demonstrate each required control circuit and transfer switch is capable of performing the intended function once per operating cycle.
-[
1 dpf i
Amendment No.
77m l
4 I~
INSERT " A" J.
Remote Shutdown Capability 54 INSERT "B" 3.2-10 Remote Shutdown Capability Instrumentation and Controls 77f l
INSERT "C" J.
Remote Shutdown Caoability The remote shutdown functions in Table 3.2-10 shall be operable.
1.
With one or more required functions inoperable, restore the -
required function to operable status within 30 days 'or be in hot shutdown within the next -12 hours.
l 2.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.D are not applicable.
1 l
INSERT "D" l
l J.
Remote Shutdown Caoability l
Instruments and controls shall be tested and calibrated as indicated in Table 3.2-10.
l-INSERT "E" l
l The remote / alternate shutdown capability at FitzPatrick is provided by a
~
remote shutdown panel (25RSP) and five alternate safe shutdown panels (25 ASP-1, 25 ASP-2,25 ASP-3,25 ASP-4, and 25 ASP-5). These panels are -
1
- +i.
used in conjunction with the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) relief valve control panel (02 ADS-71) adjacent to 25RSP, the emergency diesel generator (B & D) control panels (93EGP-B and 93EGP-D) opposite 25 ASP-3, the reactor building vent and cooling panel (66HV-3B) near 25 ASP-1, and instrument rack 25-6 opposite 25RSP. All of these locations are linked by communications and are provided with emergency lighting.
This Remote Shutdown capability provides the necessary instrumentation and controls to place and maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition from a location other than the control room in the event the control room becomes uninhabitable due to a fire or other reason.
Not all controls and necessary transfer switches are located at the remote /altemate shutdown panels. Some controls and transfer switches will have to be operated locally at the switchgear, motor control centers, or other local stations.
Operability of the remote shutdown instrumentation and control functions ensure that there is sufficient information available on selected plant parameters to place and maintain the plant in a shutdown condition should the control room become inaccessible. The instrumentation and controls installed on the remote / alternate shutdown panels are listed in Table 3.2-10.
This table does not include the isolation / transfer switches for the control functions on the remote / alternate shutdown panels. As specified in Surveillance Requirement 4.2.J.2, the operability of the transfer switches will be demonstrated when the remote / alternate shutdown control functions are tested.
The remote shutdown instruments and control circuits covered by this LCO do not need to be energized to be considered operable. This LCO is intended to ensure that the instruments and control circuits will be operable if plant conditions require the use of the remote shutdown capability. Performance of the instrument check once every 31 days ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred and is intended to ensure that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each instrument channel calibration.
As specified in the surveillance requirements, an instrument check is only required for those instruments that are normally energized. Performance of this surveillance provides assurance that undetected outright instrument failure is limited to 31 days. The surveillance frequency is based upon plant operating experience which indicates that channel failure is rare.
Surveillance Requirement 4.2.J.2 requires that each remote shutdown transfer switch and control circuit be periodically tested to demonstrate that it is capable of performing its intended function. The requirements of this section apply to the isolation / transfer functions on the panels listed in Table 3.2-10 and on panels 25 ASP-4,25 ASP-5, and 66HV-3B. This demonstration is performed from the remote shutdown panel and locally, as appropriate. This will ensure that if the control room becomes uninhabitable, the plant can be placed and maintained in a shutdown condition from the remote shutdown panel and the local control stations.