ML20044F928

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Forwards Submittal Supporting Accelerated Advanced BWR Review Schedule - LCO 3.10.11
ML20044F928
Person / Time
Site: 05200001
Issue date: 05/24/1993
From: Fox J
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To: Poslusny C
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 9306010207
Download: ML20044F928 (8)
v • d • e


Text

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GE Nuclear Energy cn o nectwiw

!?b ( Mt Avi" tut , un ex CA 9595 May 24,1993 Docket No. STN 52-001 Chet Poslusny, Senior Project Manager Standardization Project Directorate Associate Directorate for Advanced F-actors and License Renewal Office of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Subject:

Submittal Supporting Accelerated ABWR Review Schedule - LCO 3.10.11

Dear Chet:

We are proposing to add LCO 3.10.11 Low Power Physics Test, to allow for performing lower power physics tests for the initial core.

Please provide copies of this transmittal to Peter Hearn and George Thomas.

Sincerely, Y

Vack Fox Advanced Reactor Programs cc: Cal Tang (GE)

Norman Fletcher (DOE) p?003G hwin i

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31 BASES i 11 d SURVEILLANCE SR 3.10.h.1 and SR 3.10.h.2 (continued) f REQUIREMENTS u H  !

satisfied /according to the applicable Frequencies '

wu (SR 3.10.1L.1 and SR 3.10. 2), or the proper movement of 5at* control rods must be verified. This latter verification -l E E C .* (i.e., SR 3.10. 2) must be perfomed during control rod I-I"3 movement to pr ent deviations from the specified sequence. '

~auoEto These surveill ces provide adequate assurance that the o f *g k " specified test sequence is being followed.

E**EE, ou= - . ,

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= 08 .

  • 5 E ' *;; e3 sn 3.10.lt. 3 i

Lu Itg Periodic verification of the administrative controls y 2 2 d "

  • t- established by this LCO will ensure that the reactor is c #"STS3 EE, mg operated within the bounds of the safety analysis. The 7 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Frequency is intended to provide appropriate i o 'E "I t 5 u assurance that each operating shift is aware of and verifies 4

" g ** ; +> s ;c compliance with these Special Operations LCO requirements.

T o - o "

  • E t' 5; Eu:S U M .. *y*g,, SR 3.10%.4 3 "8 a E'" 5 :

g"o Coupling verification is performed to ensure the control rod c

s  ; a;g,,u; ,= is connected to the control rod drive mechanism ano will '

g 35*qy3g perform its intended function when necessary. The r

.  ;; x5 7 o g 7 verification is required to be perfomed any time a control I*"o g g ;; c '

n rod is withdrawn to the " full out' notch position or prior  ;

. oa to declaring the control rod OPERABLE after work on the -

0 '

' E

, g ", 2 Frequency is acceptable, considering the low probability M 3gcgcgv{ that a control rod will become uncoupled when it is not  :

e "t;**og 't=g o= ,u being moved as well as operating experience related to j g uncoupling events.  ;

D i wM) i REFER.ENCES 1. NEDE-24011-P-A4'S, General Electric Standard '

Application for Reactor Fuel, Supplement For United  !

States (as amended).

2. .A. Pickens (BWROG +a C.C. Lainas (NRC),

"Amendmen ctric Licensing Topical -

R -24011-P-A," Augus ,

i fs & W K S S h k/ StdE C^ IS %l hBWR/6 STS B 3.10-35 Rev. O, 09/23/92-

, . . - ~-- . .- - --

l

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l. oafs $ .

$8pf Test >:',.em; 3.10.5 i il 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS  !

il Lo:J n

((c.s 3.10 4 SHUTOCZ "A;tGI:i (5Dri) TgtyLMIg ,

i il t LCO 3.10.1 .

i The reactor mode switch position specified in Table 1.1 l position, and operation considered not to be 'l allow met: Ktesting, provided the following requirements,are Lowf0WCR.fdYSICJ '

a. 1. i LCO 3.3.2.1, " Control Rod Block Instrumentation,"

MODE 2 requirements for function 1.b of  !

Table 3.3.2.1-1, -l g -f H T  ;

03 g,cpPNIN

2. Confom ce to the approved control. rod sequence for L o the 19E tsse is verified by a second licensed j

operator. or other qualified member of the technical staff; b.

Each withdrawn control rod shall be coupled to the associated CRD;

c.  !

All control rod withdrawals [during out of sequence control rod moves) shall be made in notch out mode; itsd- i d.

No other CORE ALTERATIONS are in progress .

e. -

.p, AgacroA 7tf&AmAL P0w&W $/%AftjAA[ $

APPLICABILITY:

h ve ro-y. racif o r c ov Luf femp'ra Tu rt L 13'c. (3 0u't*]q' MODE 5 with the reactor mode switch in startup/ hot standby position. i t

ACTIONS i

[

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION I COMPLETION TIME -;

i A. One or more of the i A.1 Place the reactor above requireeents not Inmediately I met. mode switch in the j

shutdown or refuel '

position. ,

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-t t

ftBWR?6 STS 3.10-19  %. O. C L'2 W

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'd Teg~%

3.10.E ' ,

if SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE _

FREQUENCY-si SR 3.1041 ----..-..-- - -..--NOTC--------- - '

Not recuired to be met if SR 3.10.

satisfied. 2 Perform the applicable SRs for LCO 3.3.2.1, According to Function 1.b.

the applicable SRs ,

k il SR 3.10.4.2

...----....-......N0TE------.---.d Not required to be met if SR 3.10.h.1 satisfied.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .g. . . . 7.g.g Verify movement of ntrol rods is in During control '

compliance with the approved control rod sequence for the ty t by a secord rod movement licensed operator or 'other qualified member of the technical staff.

n $

SR 3.10.g.3 Verify no other CORE ALTERATIONS are in progress. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> t (continued) i PBWRM STS 3.10-20 Re.. O, 0i/23/92

I Low Power !HV5

Ies t -?e f oc ' . =;

~ ~ ~

3 .10. L ,,

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (centinued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY II SR 3.10./.4 Verify each withdrawn control rod does not Each time tne go to the withdrawn overtravel position. control rod is-withdrawn to-

" full out'  !

position AND b

Prior to -

satisfying / f) )

LCO 3.10.1.b ,

requirement '

after work on control rod or CRD System that

.,, could affect ,

coupling #

I h**f SR 3.10. ll . f Verd y AGr%cTcA T t+ 6 KM A L fow & A 6 I *lo RTP. l 4

VB N E1 " V e f 'd t ( Q-^t Y

  • f I kmae i G tt 3.10. f t. L Coolon4 t e mp e cc+ u ct l is & 13 ' C. (30o'e=).

I i

i i

PBWRM STS 3.10-21 9: . O, 0;/n/;-2 i

er l Lou PotJM Pl*1c5 l 50nfm B3.10.(

ll B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS Low 80WEA PHySicJ li s B 3.10.( SiFJTDOZ F.ARCIN (50") Te M&A BASES Lav Pwar PblY'!c.5 BACKGROUND The purpose of this MODE 5 Special Operations LCO is to permit 388 testing to be perfomed for those plant configurationME which the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head is either not in place or the head bolts are not fully tensioned.

W P W ee B MSICS L o v P oder 00 /* -i-CD 3. i (SDM)," icQuiris th;t Ide M+e TESTS a r e p a r- 50sbede +n+s N ag f el ge ma,.at, o, son g, ,; rod formed to )#/*8^~ N b""""' 1, "~3HUIDCnn[Nb N"I" 2" 5 5 35 b $ 75 d*D, .

StrAtt f he f uhja- ((y] 1 ;bbM)rbr'tb b-k A8d*' MC""# th f3pe+ startup, fcl $.ing ref cling Perfoming the "..

Charact e risWcs '

test prior to startup requires the test to be performed of Ybt PEact*" CCft while in MODE 5 with the vessel head bolts less than fully

", ;p, tensioned (and possibly with the vessel head removed). ,

(t While in MODE 5, the reactor mode switch is required to be g in the shutdown or refuel position, where the applicable in; ti a L control roo

  • locks ensure that the reactor will not become flect riti cal . 12S8( tpy requiref the reactor mode switch to be in the startup or hot standby position, since ::r: it:r-

.- vi bCW E "" I seM*' e5Pcontrol rod *will be :2.

descr:tr:tiwad::p:t: withdrawn f:r th; Operations This Special porpe s LCO i O Y"" provides the appropriate additional. controls to allow 7

. withdrawing more than one control rod from a core cell Q ga r' # h r, L 3g R. - containing one or more fuel assemblies when the reactor y[sT8 vessel head bolts are less than fully tensioned.

(

Star +up ppf,n APPLICABLE Prevention and mitigation of unacceptable reactivity SAFETY ANALYSES excursions during control ro withdrawal, with the eactor mode switch in the startup or hot standby positio while in MODE 5, is provided by the In n dietc Range Monitor (MIO~ g U -y -

neutron flux scram (LCO 3.3.1.1, " Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation"), average power range monitor (APRM) neutron flux scram (LCO 3.3.1.1), and control rod block instrumentation (LCO 3.3.2.1, " Control Rod Block Instrumentation"). The limiting reactivity excursion during startup conditions while in MODE 5 is thep:rtr ! nd d.G eccident (CMAt.

Asb <>'+ h A ra w n L 5:~ror ( AWE)

(continuec) l P9WRNi STS B 3.10-32 6. O, 00/2S/02

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$.c s.,t Pcuer- ft4 Y3 [CJ ,

w l I 3

%C TgtfAm#,

B 3.10.5 Il r BASES gw6 . foe h ver PM W M APPLICABLE C d , analyses assume that the reactor operator follows  !

SAFETY ANALYSES prescribed withdrawal sequences. For tests performec *

(continuec) within these defined sequences, the analyses of References 1 '

h power PHYSICS and 2 are applicable. However, for some sequences developec or the SSR eg safety analys}es}o}ng, the control f References rod2patterns 1 and may notassumed be met. in the 4 b ^ Therefore, special 9 4 analyses, performed in accordance  !

k with an NRC a pproved methodology, are required to l

~ demonstrate t1at the M test sequence will not result in i pf unacceptable consequences snoulo a giK@ occur during the testing. For the purpose of this test, protection provided by the normally required MODE 5 applicable LCOs, in addition i to the requirements of this LCO, will maintain nomsl test '

operations as well as postulated accidents within the bounds of the appropriate safety analyses (Refs. I and 2). TuAW ,

addition to the added requirements for the )Rg, IREL , APRM, and control red coupling, the notch out mode is specifiec  ;

for out of sequence withdrawals. Requiring the notch out  :

mode limits withdrawal steps to a single notch, which limits inserted reactivity, and allows 3dequate monitoring of  ;

changes in neutron flux, which may occur during the test.  ;

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of 3 the NRC Policy Statement apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perfom certain operations sy appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is  ;

provided in their respective Eases.  ;

l. c w M 9 e r F H fS K S l LCO As described in LCO 3.0.7, compl' nce with this Special  !

Operations LCO is optional. gs while in MODE 2, in accordance wi}h,t;t Tablemay1.1-1, be performed without i

meeting this Special Operations LCO cr its ACTIONS. For  ;

tests performed while in MODE 5, additional requirements j must'be met to ensure that adequate protection against  !

potential reactivity excursions is available. Because I multiple control rods will- be withdrawn and the reactor will ,

potentially become critical, the approved control rod l withdrawal sequence must be enforced by the WR NM ,

(LCO 3.3.2.1, Function Ib, MODE 2), or must be verified by a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff. To provide additionas protection against an inadvertent criticality, control rod withdrawals that do (continuec)

BBWR/&STS B 3.10-33 Eww. O, 05/25/92 .;

p p /es e /HY!>TCS 5t[TestMoeMag

'~

B 3.10.3.

It BASES p a n3eA w i+ A A ra wa L s eguro c e rAstric+;m LCO not conform to the bon m # ti: ' t 5;., ;  ;;;;.:n::

(continued) specified in '.C0 3.1.6, " Rod Pattern Control" (i .e., out of sequence control rod withdrawals) must be made in the notched witndrawal mode to minimize the potential reactivity insertion associated with each movement. Coupling integrity of withdrawn control rods is required to minimize the glJkprobability of a Ca84 and ensure proper functioning of the withdrawn control rods, if they are required to scram.

Because the reactor vessel head may be removed during these tests, no other CORE ALTERATIONS may be in progress. This Special Operations LCO then allows changing the Table 1.1-1 reactor mode switch position requirements to include the startup/ hot standby position, such that the Sp61,tyts may be perfomed while ir, MODE 5. ( gfg,c PH SSW

,L w Pa u k V PfttH 1 C S APPLICABILITY These 3941* test

  • Spe 'al Operations requirements are only applicable'if'the 14s1s are to be performed while in MODE 5 with the reactor vessel head removed or the head a nd +8 I"# bolts not fully tensioned. Additional requirements during the res ct** these tests to enforce control rod withdrawal sequences j e(

gwer a Ad ( restrict other CORE ALTERATIONSfhrovidt protection against reorde r potential reactivity excursions. Operations in all other c.co t.e d te j MODES are unaffected by this LCO.

MPe ra.s,,,,,i ACTIONS AJ With one or more of the requirements of this LCO not met, the testing should be imediately stopped by placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown or refuel position.

This results in a condition that is consistent with the requirements for MODE 5 where the provisions of this Special Operations LCO are no longer required.

\\ II SURVEILLANCE SR 3.10 3.1 and SR 3.10.4.2 L W #*"

REQUIREMENTS --- M N D The control rod withdrawal ,,quencese during the ttiti may be enforced by the (LCO 3.3.2.1, Function Ib,'960E 2 requirements) or by a second licensed operator or other qualified member of the technical staff. As noted, either the applicable SRs for the (LCO 3.3.2.1) must be RWm (continued)

FBWR?ft STS B 3.10-34 Re,. O, 09/25/92

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