ML20044B717
| ML20044B717 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 05/16/1980 |
| From: | Malsch M NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19290F683 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-92-436 SECY-A-80-071, SECY-A-80-71, NUDOCS 9303030209 | |
| Download: ML20044B717 (69) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMWSSICN i;u.
ADJUDICATORY ITEM May 16,1930 SECY.A 80 71 CO M N...ilfiS..J Q ly.J..sR ACTION c.
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To inform the Ccnmissicn of the der.ial of rec.ues:
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to stay is,s.uance of the Operating license fer this
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a Review Time l
Ex;1res:
Mcy 23, 1980 (as pre icusly extended;.
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1 Discussien:
On Augus: 3, 1979, Alfred and Ilean:r C: leman
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2.206 to stay iss.;ance cf the :perating licer.se for this facility and cenduct an ad.'udica: cry hearing on several contenti:ns regarding plant cperaticn.
(A::achten: 1).
The petitien was amended and supplemented en Augus: 31, 1979;'
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Nuclear Reac*cr Regula 'en denied the pe-':icn
't and on the sane day the Occ..issier e.r:ted the
- t issuance of a license fer fuel iced'r.g and Icw Power testing of this facility.
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The issues raised by pe-itier.ers' ::n:tnti:ns and the Direc:cr's ras;cns 2s are su..ari:ei information in this re:ord was dekted in accordance with the frecdom of Inforrnation 1.
Need for ;cwer was deterrir.ed :n
-h-rasis Act, exemptions
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of inadequa e Oa'eula;i:ns.
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Colerans have n:: provided sn. z;.e:1.fi:
! ' act:
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9303030209 921125 PDR FOIA OILINSK92-436 PDR t
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inferr.atien on projected pcwer needs.
- n the atsence of significant new infornaticn which would clearly mandate a change in the original deterninat$on of need, there is no basis for reopening the record in this preceeding.
See, ::-79 a, 9 ::.:.: 552 (1979).
2.
Failure to consider in the cost / benefit analysis information reEarding capacity, maintenance, and operating costs for similar facilities.
Costs are relevant cnly if an environmentally preferable alternative is available.
- See, 1EC 155, 162 (1973).
In the ALA3 458,,
FES, staff concluded that no envircnmentally preferable alternatives were P railab2 e.
Moreover, staff calculated that the cost of power produced by this facility will be less than the cost of producing pcwer by coal and oil-fueled facilitics.
3 Failure to act on informaticn regarding unrosc1ved safety issues.
Safety related infor=ation from-operating reactors is continually monitored and' '~
assessed to determine dr.-intediate antion i
is necessary.
If Staff determines that a safety issue affecting several plar.ts dces net prohibit operation pending its resciution, then that issue is treated as a generic safety isLae.
Generic safety issues for this faci 14ty have been reviewed in accer-dance with ALAB 444, and the evaluation of these issues will be addressed in a supple-nent to the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) which will be issued prior to any decision on whether to grant the full power license for this facility. 1/
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Supplement h to the SER was considered by the Commissica on Aoril 16, 1980.
That supplement cencluded that Salem Unit 2 can te eperated prior to resolution of generic safety issues undue risk to the public health and safety.
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Failure to consider the effect2 of the. pending adjudicatic 4
regarding the proposed expansien of the Unit I:o.
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fuel pool at Salem Unit i
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App reise; whic:-
js The Environmental Irpac: evaluated the preposed expan y
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I aise fuel pcc1 for Saler Unit Q
addressed the proposed identical expansion spent p
Unit !!c.
6 fuel pool for Sale k{
the environ-cf the spent Staf f has deterr.ined thatirrects ass:ciated with the 2.
fuel porls mental Tg expansions of the twc spent ~.oreover, because l.9 insignificant. fuel pocis will te expanded p
will be in an ider. ical
.anr.er, the safety evalua-the two spent j
i shows tha:
tion fer the pool fcr Unit 2 will also expansion of the poc1 for Unit 5
be acceptable. 2f ad Failure to require an independer.tceparate wa 5
Unit :o.
2.
l The Salem fire protecticn systen is adequate *:RC
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of scheduled ncdificatiens cotr' *ted -to by and will reet I
F.creover, the s. sten's design permits the separate ! nntenan:e, of the applicant.
and the fire nain Icep for each plant,
prevents a sinF e failure frcr it; airing l
both the primary and backup fire ;rctection
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systems.
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1:RC Task Force Re er endati:ns arisincStudy of the Accid 6.
frem Lessons Learned:
TMI and other corrective acticns shoul at be l
startup of this facility.
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icn tc e n-ine In DD-c0-19, the Director, !!ER stated his intentfuel pcci pr; eedinr
!!c. I spent gardir.r the sr<:nt the cutcote of the Salem Unitand to take any further approp 2/
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2.
fuel pool at Salem Unit i
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y TMI related requirements for near-term operating license applications have been developed from all available studies and have been separc.ted into two categories:
those required prior to fuel load and low power testing and those required prior to operation above five percent power.
NRC evaluatic.3 of the applicant's responses to TM1 related requirements will be presented in Supplement Number 4 to the SER. -3/
7.
Failure to consider for the operation of Zalem Unit No. 2 varicus causes of shutdowns and forced power reductions for Salem Unit No. 1; 4/ and to apply to Salem Unit No. 2 lessons learned from Reportable Occurrences at Salem Unit No. 1.
i Salem Unit No. 2 cperating procedures are based on Salem Unit No. 1 operating procedures as modified by operating experience.
The Office of Inspection and Enforcement (I&E) verifies that corrective measures for Salem Unit No. I are applied to Salen Unit No. 2 where applicable.
7a.
Failure to require retrofit on the' basis of lessons learned frcm incidents at Davic-Oesse Unit No. 1-and in Switherland.
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The Lessons Learned Task Force has described a number of actions whic.; will deal with events such as these.
These will be imposed on the applicant as explained in the response to Contention 6.
i 8.
Failure to consider the alternative of converting Salem Unit No. 2 to natural gas or coal.
In the FES, the NRC determined that the alternatives of ccal and natural gas were not reasonably available.
Even if they 1/
See footnote 1 above.
1/
The reasons given included:
equipnent failure, maintenance or refue Ing, regulatory restrictions, operator training
- test, and licensing examination, administrative, and-operational error.
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were, the sunk ccsts in the essentially completed Salem Unit No. 2 inply that the costs of such a conversion wculd te cut-weighed by the benefits.
9a.
Failure to explain discrepancies ir the i
reported existence of geologic faults in the vincinity of Artificial Island, site of Salem Unit No. 2.
Reviews of site geology and seismology by the Atomic Energy Commission, United States Geclogical Survey (USGS), and U.S.
l Coast and Geodetic Survey led to the conclusion in 1968 that there were no j
identifiable geologic structures which could be expected to localize earthquakes in the vicinity of the site for Salem Unit No. 2.
Subsequently, in 1972-73 Dr. Spo13arici of the Delaware Geologic Survey reported faulting in the area.
These faults were extensively investigated by the staff in connection with site studies for the Summit Nuclear Power Station; and the Staff concluded, after receiving advice from the USGS, that these faults were not capable.
Because the existence of these faults did not alter the original cenclu-sion regarding seismic safety at the site for Salem, the Staff did not diseass them' in the SER for Salem's operatint license.
Still later in 1976, Dr. Spc13aric interpreted satellite photographs to infer the existence of a fault in the Delaware River near the I
Salem site.
Dr. Spoljaric believes that this fault is equivalent to one of the fault systems he described earlier in 1972-73 Accordingly, Staff believed that the conclusions based on the site studies for Summit are still valid.
9b.
Failure of the NEC staff crder for seismic inspection of 29 reactors to include reactor centainment structure, fuel hand-ling facilities, and spent fuel facill:ies.
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The NRC Staff order r-: carding seismic inspection of 29 reac:crs pertained only l
to the specific r.atter of design of safety related piping.
NRC's review of the seismic design of all safety related structures for Salem Unit No. 2, including the containment structure and fuel building, is contained in the Safety Evaluation Report and its supplements.
Supplement h i
to the SER will include evaluations of unresolved issues and the Staff's conclusion i
that matters related to the seismic design of Category I structures are resolved.
Thu seismic design for the spent fuel handling system and spent fuel facilities for Salem Unit No. 2 is identical to the i
.esign of these facilities for Salem Unit No. 1.
Staff has determined that the fuel l
proposed modification of the spent i
pool for Salem Unit No. 1 is acceptable-and, thus, concluded that these facilities are also acceptable for Salem Unit No. 2.
9c.
The KRC has been unable to determine the-width, depth, extent, and cause of cracks i
in the containment for Salem Unit No. 2 secause of sandblasting by the. licensee f
prior to URC inspection.-
't The applicant sandblasted the: containment surface at the crack pattern-areas to remcVe a coating of Medac covering.the concrete surface.
This sandblasting weathered edges of the cracks, thus prevent-l' inc precise measurements of their widths.
However, additional measurements yielded valid data.
Investigation of crack growth during pressurization shewed that l
excessive crack growth was limited to the surface of the containment.
Additional tests by the applicant have been evaluated 3
by the NRC.
Some cracks exceeded acceptable width limits, but were determined to be shallow surface cracks and were not induced by excessive rebar strains.
Accordingly, l
Staff has determined that the containment i
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I 1s capable of withstanding pcstulated pressure leads with no adverse effect on its functional integrity.
10.
Failure to consider Class 9 a:cidents.
The Ccmmission did not require discussien of the envirenrantal effects cf Class 9 accidents when the :-nvironmental impacts of Salem were assessed.
Since then, the Commissicm has directed the Staff to bring to the Commission's attention any individual case in which the Staff believes that the environmental effects cf Class 9 accidents should be considered. 5/
Accordingly, Staff has reviewed the Salen facility to termine if there are any special circum-
- e.nces whien might warrant evaluation of a Class 9 accident.
Four i.atter-were considered:
novel reacter desi., ability o
to interdict releases from a core =elt accident, proximity of the plant to man-made or natural ha:ards, and high population density in the vicinity of the proposed site.
Salem is similar in design to several other light water reactors.
Groundwater contaminated by radioactive releases following a core melt wculd take
~8 ronths to reach the Delaware River.
Thus, Staff believes that Salem's siting does not present a special circumstance.
Moreover, even if this liquid pathway fo"'
release is later determined to require interdiction, several methods are available to accomplish it.
No natural hazards have t
been identified near'the plant; and in a recent decision on hazards due to water traffic on the Delaware River, the Appeal Board concluded the probability cf such accidents was too low to require modifica-tion of the Hope Creek facilities te withstand such hazards. 6/
!!nally, current and proj ected population densities in the site vicinity are not in excess of the population level trip pcints cf F.egulatory Guide 4.7.
In /iew of these circumstances, 1
1/
CLI-79-9, 10 NRC 257, 262-63 (1979).
6/
ALAB-518, 9 NRC 14, 37 (1979).
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E il the Director concluded that there are no crecial circur.stancer associated with Ealen Uni: 1:o. 2 which would require
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censideration of Class 9 accidents.
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Martin G. lialsen Deputy General Counsel At:2cPmer.ts:
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Fetitien for review Petition amendment and supplement 1
Eirec;cr's Denial Comissioners' cements should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.!
Triday, May 23, 1980._
Comission Staff Offic,e coments, if any, should be submitted to the Comissioners NLT May 21, 1980, with an 'information copy to the Office of the Secretary.
If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and coment, tha Comissioners and the Secretariat should be aoprised of when coments may be expected.
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i These documents forwa-ded to our LPDR are not necessarily t public. Therefore, we are f ti=ely because of backlog in the NRC file rcon. affidavits, annual reports, f not privileged to hearin6 transcripts, I, rate hearings, and si=ilar doc =ents because zer.y are costly and j even awa e some of these the =ajority of the public are not L documents are available, r;ventually, at the library. If Sale was Root, we would never have seen not a designated Public Docunen: 14, 1979 in Washington the transcript on the Hearing held on June ~~ tefore the Nuclear Regulatory Cernission reca-ding licensing Salec This docunent was r eceiv(d in the litrary within the j Unit N o. 2. i Resea-ch of additional documents avail-last tw o or th r e e w e ek s. A partial listing able in the IJOR has ta. ken censid erable time. of reference do: cents are attached.- Additionally, we have been involved as intervenors in 2 Decket No. 50-272 Proposed Issuance of Amendment to Facility fuel Operating License No. DPR-70, propcsed expantien of spent 786-253 Unit Nc.1 ad intervenors in Docket No. p.1 at Sale: Atir.ntic Elvtric Co:pany Phase II Rate Increase Request. Ou particular concern of relevance in this proceeding is NFED, ECCNCt".ICS (cost / benefit analysi s), and potential health, saf ety and environ = ental problems associated with storage and possible release of radioactive w iste products centained in fuel rods stored at a. multi-nuclear corplex, spent It is our belief that there is no other =eans of bringing these tatters to the Commission's attention for investigation. ---~ j The licensee has made its case and alleged justificatbn for licensing Sal: Uni t No. 2 and, therefore, the record and filed f documents should stand on their own merits for the Licensee and l s for the nake of this pe tition precludes the taking of additional testi=ony and affidavits fro: the licensee. j CONTEETIONS 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Cc= mission has failed to act on i infor=ation already known to it regarding projected needs for the FJM Grid. The actual assu=ptions used, criculation, performed and results obtained t; justify licensing Sale: Unit No. 2 are l ) ambiguous and inadequate. 2. The Nuclear Regulatory Co==ission has failed to act on infor:ation already known to it regarding projected plant capacity, =aintenance, and operating costs for similar-facilities - (cost / benefit analysis). 3 The Nuclear Regulatory Co==iss1on has failed to act on f inf6r:ation already known to it regarding unresolved safety issues. "Public safety is the first, last and a per:anent consideration in any decision on.the issuance of a construction permit or a license to operate a nuclear facility." Power Reactor Development Corp. l v. International Union of Electrical Radio and Pechine Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 402, 81 S. Ct 1529, 1532 (1961). 4 The NRC has failed to consider the outstanding sjudicatory ) hearing on Sale = Unit No.1 with regard to expansion of the spent l fuel pool, as it pertains to expansion at Sale = Unit No. 2 located at a =ulti-nuclear complex. t 1 ? 5 The Nuclear Regulatory cc :ission has failed to require an " independent" and separate ' fire protection" water backup system for Sale: Unit No. 2. 6. The reco :endations from the NRC Task Force contains r i 23 reco::endations for administrative and design changes to Sale: Unit No. 2, proposed requirements arising frc: "le s s on s-l e arne d " study of accident at TMI. These should be completed prior to licensing and cotzercial start-up as well as additional 1 corrective acticn on potential defects. 7 The NRC has failed to consider the
- enu for disaster" track record of Sale: Unit No.1 as it relates to known shutdowns
{ and power reductions (forced) for the follcwing reasons: l A. Equipment Failure 5. Maintenance or Test C. Refueling ^ D. Regulatory Restriction E. Operator Training and Li ter.se Exar.ir.atien F. Administrative G. Operational Error i H. Other I as it affects the performance of Saler Unit Nc. 2. A o di ti cr. ally e the NRC has failed to recommend changes to Salen Unit No. 2 as a result of " Lessons Learned" at Sale: Unit No. 1 centioned { operating status and " Reportable Occurrences" as filed in License Event Reports (LER's) since fuel loading 1976 to date. This corrective action as a result of " Lessens Learned" frc: Salem Unit No.1 should be co pleted prior to licensing and ces ercial startup of Sale: Unit No. 2. L. RELIEF REOLESTED The Licensee should be notified as follows: They should be required to suspend testing operations. 1. They should be required to postpone operations for 3-5 2. yea-s, at which time a license application will be reviewed by the Co=issien. This request for adjudicatory hearing is to be liraited to known facts in the NRC's possession and related to the issues rai s ed. Our intent is to prove to the Consission there is cause for reasonable doubt as to the i=ediate need for Generating capacity fron Salen Unit No. 2 and reasonable cause for delay to backfit, retrofit or upgrade to current technology and nechanical soundness, without any detrimental effects to the ratepayers or the PJM Crid electric generation needs. We respectfully request the Co=ission admit us as / interveners, direct that evidence be taken on the above contentions and nold a public hearing in the County of Salen, New Je.sey, City of Salen. Dated: M k, 1970 e h. 'n Al' red C. Coleman, Vr. G _,/$r*pCn YM Eleanor . Coleman Sworn and Subscribed to before ) 1 me this p dayofk 19*/9 . nja Y U M NB.'C Of t.C,v 2xn
- 2 ' " H as M TJ,Litt
\\ i n PARTI AL LISTINO OF RESOURCE DOCUMENTS (6 0 l 1. " Discussion of Power Needs of Pennsylvania-New Jersey-0 lf Maryland NRC Public Hearing, June 14, 1979, pages 1-23 (2:45 p.m.) l and pases 1-35 (3: 15 P.n.). s 2. Transcript 226th General Meeting Advisory Con:ittee en h Reactor Safeguards, February 8,1979, pages 1 128. m( n 3 Monthly OperatinS Reports Starting with August, 1976 to }4 date, sub=itted conthly by Licensee. L g L 4 Menthly NUREG-0020 Operating Units Status Report. ~ 5 Licer.see's correspondents, February 13, 1979, q q R.L. Mitti to Mr. Olan D. Parr: May 4, 19?? R.L. Mitti to Vr. Olan D. Per: 6. Anr.ual Reports for current and past years for PSE&G, PE. t DEEL and AEC. 7. Stock Frospectu,s for PSEaG,PE,DP&L and AEC. 8. Rate Cases for PSE43 PE, DP&L and AEC. l 9. Final Er.vironmental Impact State =ents A. Sale: Units No. 1 and No. 2 3. Hope Creek Units No. 1 and No. 2 C. Draft Oyster Creek D. Forked River 10 Olan D. Parr's letter, April 19, 1975 and October, 1975. PSE&G answer, Subject Request for Additional Financial Infor:ation Concerning Sale: Unit No. 2. 11. Olan D. Parr's letter, April 23, 1979 to PSE&G. Subject Steam Generator Channelhead Cracking. i 1 12. Fire Protections Reportable Occurrence 79-27/017 Occurrerto d c t r-t,?= '-?'~'=-
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h ~ '*- C****~~~" "~ ( WA%4cMCwrcwt-a .h&%WM UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULA'"0RY COMMISSION r 8 In the Matter of Docket No. 50-311 FU3LIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & Froposed Issuance GAS COMPANY of Operating License a a Nuclear Generating (Sale: Station, Unit Fo. 2) 3 l AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PETITION ENSING_ SED:INO ISSUANCE OF AN ORDEP TO SHOW CAUSE A fully familiar with all the state =ents contained 1. Ia l in the attached Petition Seeking Issuance of an Order to Show ) Unit No. 2. To the best of Cause 2_nd Stav Licensine of Sale: tained cy knowledge, infornation and beli 2f, the statements con / submitted in good faith and not therein are true and accurate, i submitted fer the purpose of delaying adjudication of th s 7 within proceeding. f V.y wife and I, together with our three children (ages i3 2. j live at 35 K" Drive, Pennsville, New Jersey 3 11, 14 and 15), Our in a one-stery ranch style house, which we own.
- CSD7C, hose is located about ten elles north of the Sahn Station, near 4.
,N. We have lived here for about six years, b t.".e Delaware River. G and have no present intention of moving. } I a:. e= ployed by the Du Pont Corporation of Wilmington, [4 3 Delawa e, cs a Distributor and Custo=er Service Supervisor
- i recponsibilities for the sale and distribution of Du Pont paint 7il i
I am a graduate of Rutgers products fer international sales. p Al so, I ar. a where I tajored in economics. "- i e a s '. t r. d l = Ys kbh Y k 5 1 licensed real estate sales =an/ broker r.nd licensed insurance solicitor / broker in the State of New Jersey. I engage in real estate and insurance on a part-ti=e basis, mostly in the i Sale: County area. 4 Our interests, together with the interests of others a similarly situated, potentially are affected by Public Service Electric and Gas Co:pany (the Licensee) application and the lack or failure of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to J analyze infor:ation already known, will adversely affect our i i electric bills and create a needless economic hardship premat urely. 1 5 Our interests, tegether with the interests of others l sinilarly situated, potentially are affected by the licensee's Amendment No. 42 due to the prospect, as yet undetermined, of increased daily exposure to radiation releases fro = a multi-t nuclear facility, tege-2er with the risk of exposure to signi- { ficantly higher levels in the event of design, construction. ^ i or operational errors in the proposed expansion. These j interests also extend to our children, prospective grandchildren, i i together with friends and relatives who tight be expected to i visit with us. 1 d 6. Additionally, our interests, tegether with the interests 1 of others similarly situated, potentially are affected by public recognition of hazards, real or suspected, regarding a nulti-l 4 nuclear center and nuclear fuel storage at the Sale: installation which reasonably could be expected to affect property values and business activity wthin the vicinity.. i se.Mk *&S ' -" %se mk &aam i. I e 7 Finally, our intere st s, tcgether with that of others j sicilcly situated, ca not feasibly be protected in any reasonable ( other than by our om active intervention and participation. g
- canner, 4
E. In conclusion, due to cur close pro:.inity to the facili?f, *
- c p ential hazards of no::al or accidental releases of radiation j
r .: curselves, on children, relatives, and friends, and the con-P A c urert ri d: cf adverse economic inpacts, our health, safety, and g welf a-e a e aff ected by the licensee's application which is the w ^1 s u t," e r Of th e proceeding, f '{ T Da*ed. '#X h'[I, 1979 q y 3N &Wh1 3, Alfpd C. Cole =an, Jr.V ( S f & r9 /V /!W Eleanor G./Coleman / 5-:r and Subs:ribed to befere it : A Y da;. 04<f,1979 r cf re E k /6 a Me v_v d. Q.,, 5 % - '( D MCY "I :e r
- w A art E
r P 5 l i l L ,t I 3 h [h[kdIkiI$'.EY![@ $7diSidi6@MIDihEhiiWM*ramata==e -- I a S,, 9 7 Y D k- __. -'j - t / ATTACHMEh'T 2 6 = O i . ~ ~ TN ~ ~- 2 ggy 6DIO UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COP.XISSION '01.c g o 4 In the Matter of PUBLIC SERVICE ELSCTRIC & Decket No. Sc-311 GAS COMPANY Proposed Issuance of Operating (Salem Nuclear Generating License CPPR-53 j Station, Unit No. 2) 1 Y PETITION SEEKING ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE d PKUEST TO STAY LICENSING - MOTION TO AMEND PETITION 1 Alfred C. Cole =an, Jr. and Eleanor G. Cole =an (husband } and wife) hereby petition the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to amend our Petition Seeking Issuanca of an Order to Show Cause and Rr. quest to Stay Licensing of the Sale: Nuclear Generating Station Unit No. 2. The authority for this request is granted by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as anended (the Act) and the regulation in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 2 730 Motions. Additional research and investigation has uncovered substa.ntive information wh5 eh should be considered during your deliberation. ADDENDUM NO. 7A 7A. The Nuclear Regulatory Cottission has failed to require the licensee and/or the manufacture of reactor / I cteam generators to retrofit, as a result of testing. evaluating and ar.alysis fro: " lessons learned" fro: the e U ~ + 1974 incident in Switrerland (Westinghouse Reactor) and Davis-Besse Unit No.1, Ohio (Licenree Toledo Edison Co. - Docket No. 50-346). ADDITIONAL CONTENTIONS 8. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has failed to require of the licensee cost-benefit analysis and consideration of alte'rnative conversion of Salem No. 2 to natural gas or coal. (Final Environ = ental Impact Statement - Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311 - April,1973 - Pages 10 Alternatives,10-1 through 10-17 and 12-9 (12Q ) and 12-16 (12X). The NRC has failed to require in their analysis of " Request for Additional Financial Information Concerning Unit No. 2" (NRC request to PSE&O, April 18, 1976 - Olan D. Parr to R. L. Mittl) the alternative of conversion to natural gas or coal. The NRC has failed to~ review and cc pel' lice'nsee to 9 explain apparent discrepancies in seismic findings by Dames & Moore for PSFAG and Deltarva Power ' and Light Co. (Sunmit Nuclear Plant - Delaware) as it relates to the effect of a possible earthquake. The final Safety Analysis Report reflects there is no earthquake f ault in the Yleinity of Artificial Island, site of Salem Nuclear Generating Station No.1 and 2. This appears to be in contrast to the study and findings t of the University of Delaware which states there is a fault d h down the middle of the Delaware River. This study is available g ( to the NRC Staff. The NRC Staff order for seistic inspection j f of 29 reactors failed to include ~ reactor contain=ent structure, i fuel handling and spent fuel pool facilities. This must be I { determined prior to licensing Sales Unit No. 2. (Attach =ent - 5 t Article from "Today's Sunbeam," August 24, 1979) The NRC is N w already aware of the condition of the containment building g 1 (reactor) (cracks - NRC inspection report) and is unable to 1 determine width, depth, extent or cause because of sand j 3 blastins by licensee prior to NRC inspection. q di 10. The NRC has failed to require the licencee to consider I i evaluate, and analyze the possible eff ects of a Class 9 accident s for the Salem Nuclear Generatin6 Station. y 3 Refer Final Environmental 1: Pact Statement (FEIS) dated j l April,1973. page 7-1 paragraph starting with, "The applicant's b report has been evaluated, using the standard accident assumptions 1 and guidance issued as a proposed amendment to Appendix D of CFR 1 P,ar t 50 ty the cocaission on Decenter 1,1971. Nine classes....~ q 2 Purther refer to Table 7 1, page 7-2 (FEIS), Classification of l 1 Postulated Accidents and Occurrences, Class 9 0 Hypothetical i I sequence of failures more severe than Class 8.0 - Not considered. 1 i ) f c As a result of a request (under Freedom of Information ~ f to NRC) to the NRC I received correspondence on August 22, 1979 (FOIA-79-288) referring to PSE&G's correspondence dated a Nove=ber 12, 1973, which was sut=itted as A en:iment Nc. 25 to the applicatiens under Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311. Referrin5 to Exhibit V, Page 1, Board of Directors, January 16, f 7[ 1968 (Public Service Electric & Gas Company), the chairman f: stated that,...in discussions with the Advisory Comnittee on d Atomic Thergy [ Reactor Safeguards and the staff of 'S f k Commission (present NRC) it was indicated they were unwilling k 2 to recommend that the Ato:ic Ene gy Con-issien issue a license at this time for the construction of nuclear units at the proposed site of Burlington Nuclear Generating Station because of its proxicity to densely populated areas (with emphasis), and that accordingly the Company (PSE&G) has investigated i 1 alternative sites.' Further
- ...instead on a tract of land of approxi=ately 700 acres, in Lower Alloways Creek Township, Salem County, New Jersey (Artificial Island)."
There is no question that the Staff of the Adviscry 5 h Con =ittee on Reactor Safeguards and staff of the Atomic Energy Commission did, in fact, consider an hypothetica; sequence of -u. l i I f ailures nore severe than a Class 6, a- " extraordinary occurrence. " Tne licensee's anendnent was considered and accepted by the Staff ( AEC-NRC) based en their.(NRC) consideration of pcpulation density and its effect (Class 9 accident - greater than a Class 8) on the safety and welfare of the people living in the vicinity of h e a l t r., I the then, proposed Burlington Nuclear Generating Stations No. on the east bank of the Delaware River on the boundary be-and 2,
- -een Burlincien City and Burlington Tcwnship, Burlington County, i
\\ New Jerse. The change in location, based on poruittien density, to Artificial Island (low population) is an adnission on the part of the bEC (previously AEC) of hypothetical accident greater than a Class E. Even the "so-called" low probability of Class 9 was ) J sufficient to change the siting of the-Burlington facilities to Artificial I sland, Lower Alloway s. Creek,_ Salen County. -... -. i Until Karch 28,1979 (Three-Mile Island Unit-No. ' 2), an - incident er wcrst-possible-case accident had not been considered pessible (Clacs ?), yet the NRC Staff has concluded, ...the Staff j nenetheless concludes that the accident at Chree-Kile Island was a l Clast 9 accident (NRC Staff Response to Board Question No. 4, j dated August 2L, 1979, Docket Nc. 50-272 signed by Counsel for NRC Sta!!, ?erry M. Sni th).* We hereby file a Motion to Anend and add Contentions 6, 9 and 10 because of substantive infornation received after the original petition was subnitted on August 2, 1979 Date 2 3I 7i I VAlfred C. ColeWa.. ,e mimt sumguuius ~ delay salem L start E 9hv =, - y, f n, _ t,,, t.,_,1 - e, .,r.,,.m, e..m, ~ - s 4 N* m ge,s.m, , _ -. -.r, ^ d E ? [ scenrihng to Pubbr 5er vire and Electric b,' f "g M y s LOWEft At10 WAYS CilEEU-nn and Gas IP5EMD re sgu,h esma n 3, '[}/. .j teepmeng of the shut down Salem I (p '.*g['".,'y,}f i Patrkk Wheeler, UnIbre the analysis en g %,, J r,* h '? /- treetne will be delayet one onewe time, "snvolved a n't lengthy process,' company employees eenduct Wheeler said tempany tettencians and J p'y a d et Nurlear lleguistory Commissienerder. eutsnle consultents =cte werhang erver. .p j* ed inspretiews. lime on the proprvt h /j .h W h ecotter shut denen k twely A;wil, The pipes, for the rnost pert, supply .Y p [I and bed been schebini to re bort mio etmling water to the resttot, snel range ,f d I t 'r L y y eFestenn 4 June. Ilut a serves of i in site Iroen one inc h in thr re f eel in din. 'r met". WheTice said ,j % %y b mecherweal problems rer ging from Company estimates on how muih E '. ' /. t*chen control etwh to torn fuel f l I E essembly s. trope have sevnet times money the shutebwn h costing ron-9' .,, d h-Jg L w j delayed the ornity, thh Jime until et sumers ranges from D00,0ig rm.000 a 4N..fMD les4 m6d Octrybee, day, depemimg an where the replace-a -*g t ) Selen I ts smnas n reerters in the ment enregy n comine from, erut how 4_ g0 4N,; fM h eeuritty bese.jt esked to thut down in much eleitricity is in demand / twdn to urwiergo testing in order to De first penblem etiwevered si the s g determwie their etMhty to =ttratand reactor since it shut down for refueling / .? ri . / ~ ,i 'f,,., [ earthrpunes was in May, when tempany employen u NM O The more h similec to a NitC cedered discovered straps used in held the inel ,,. i i , ',g, shutAwn of five nuclear reactors in 8" m bhes in piece had accidently 6" February. De Nnt ee* red the rese. bivame torn it was remehed by reptse. I f Inr1 to tiew down heesuse of errers in ing the assembhes with ine n sit egn wilh hy i c*wnt#rt etw$es,or tweeme estimates of
- "e that had been scheduled for
.I '8 estivt. ie e.rir u m e. n, -,ea. g, 4 carthrysake prvbab4hty =ere too tv,ser removal. a m.n.ir,i,.,,vo..e o.eur, ( *,. g see e roumn. s.,e ive, brnien, Coni,a g "y process within the teatter. When the Jp , e(ig etids regulate the stwed'of the fisston 2 I rods are fully insetted, the procen y p '/ i j the reactne nFrates at full spref 4){g f sines When they are fully withdrawn, 7 Cfl De benken enutent rents were repieced 'j [ with new ones frem the Saleir il trac. g \\j %u f3 j ID'. g **d 'G [ In late June, erects were discovered in the hnes that feed weler to the stesm s'." e*=.. *, n. ., o r, geviermints llenteril in the restler Att EARTIIQUAKE TESTING-The re4pening of Salem i four pipetinn =ere recently replaces delayed by an NRC ordered testin f y sund 1he mmi tren.i prot.icm w., nian of highly e.ihnatine mnicetai dnvu,cr. earthquakes' Above' PSE&G spokesman Patrick Wheeler points at el b igrd in a pipe tra.hng truen the g gYPC 0g P Pc5 and their straps which will be exammed in the test ~ I r eat-f or's enre to e inrge tank enntammic ing. The picture, however, shows not Salem I, but its identical twin, ..ler met iturmg refuchnc The pen, n..un iat i.eh n td in be.ie n m annta Salem II. '"a.1 f.y a f ault y fitie r, was limbrd c..! e nuen et 4 r< =m s,a. ) s 't i i f I; h I t h B 6 } v 3 w / / ATTACH 72NT 3 w m S f s*(
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- >. g t e ee 5 - i h } = . [ 5 i e 4 i e ? I c I i; .f 4 1 t 1 i t i f ,v --0 ,-,.. a s c og% UNITED ST ATEs NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5 { W ASHING T ON, D. C. 20555 %,..U g APR 16 ISSO Docket No. 50-311 Mr. Alf red C. Coleman, J r. Mrs. Eleanor G. Coleman 35 "K" Drive Pennsville, New Jersey 0B070
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Coleman:
This letter is written in response to your petitions, dated August 3,1979 and August 31, 1979, requesting the Commission to stay the issuance of the operating license for Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 2 pending the resolution of ten contentions. For the reasons set fcrth in the enclosed " Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206" your request is hereby denied.
A copy of this determination will be placed in the Comission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
20555 and at the local public docurent room for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 2, located at Salem Free Public Library,112 West Broadway, Salem, New Jersey 08079.
A copy will also be filed with the Secretary of the Ccruission for its review in ace.ordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the Ccrrnission's regulations.
Enclosed for your infcmation is a copy of the notice that is being filed with the Office of the Federal Register for publication.
Sincerely, A
e:;W Harold R. Denton, Diretor Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Encl osures :
1.
Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.205
- 2. federal Register Notice
DD-80-17 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
~
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
t t
IntheEatterof PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS
)
Docket No. 50-311 l
)
l COMPANY, El AL.
(Salem Nuclear Generating
)
Station, Unit No. 2)
)
DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206 31, 1979, Mr. and By petitions dated August 3,1979, and August Mrs. Alfred Coleman requested the Nuclear Regulatory Comission to t
l stay the issuance of the operating license for Salem Nuclear Generating The Station, Unit No. 2 pending the resolution of ten issues.
Colemans' petition has been treated as a request for action under 10 CFR 2.206 of the Cent.ission's regulations.
Notice of receipt of the petition was published in the Federal _ Recister, 44 FR 50932 (August i
30,1979).
Af ter consideration of the infordation submitted in the Colemans' l
requests and evaluation of the issues raised, I have determined that i
each has been adequately resolved. Consequently, the Colemans' request i
for a stay of the issuance of the operating license for Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2 is denied.
A copy of this decision will be placed in the Comission's Public Docoent Room at 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20555 and at the local public doccent room for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2, located at Salem Free Public Library,112 West Broadway, Salem, New i
Jersey 0M79.
Kirold R.
enton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation i
.s e,
cc sn s, u.ev1sca p
t DD-80-27 i
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i
NUCLEAR RECULATORY COMMI5510P 0FFICE CF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION HARDLD R. DENTON, DIRECTOR In the Matter of
)
)
PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANf, ET AL. )
Occket No. 50-311 (Salem Nuclear Generating Station,
)
~i Unit No. 2)
)
DIRECTOR'S DENIAL OF REQUEST CNDER 10 CFR 2.206 By petition cated August 3,1979, and a supplement filec on August 31, 3979. Alfred C. Coleman and Eleanor G.-Coleman requested that the issuance of
-t the operating license for Salem ~ Nucle'af Ge irating Station, Unit No. 2 be
^
stayed until various questions they raise, set forth in te'niententions, are i
~
resolved.
They also requested that an adjudicatory hearing be held to consider the issues raised in their contentions.
The Coleman's petition has been treated as a request for action under 10 CFR 2.205 of the Commission's regula-tions.
Notice of receipt of the petition was published in the Federal Register, 44 Fed. Reg. 50932 (August 30, 1979).
Each of the Coleman's contentions are dealt with, in turn, below.
t i
I i
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4
-2
,,;ontentions 1, 2 and B
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(1) The Nuclear Regulatory Comission has failed to act on infomation already known to it regarcing projected needs for the PJM grid. The actual ass' ptions s
used, calculations perfomed, and re:ults obtained to justify licensing Salem j
Uni No. 2 are ambiguous and inadecuate.
(2) The Nuclear Regulatory Comission has failed to att on infomation already known to it regarding projected plant capacity, maintenance, and operating costs for sirilar facilities (cost / benefit analysis).
(E) The' Nuclear Reculatory Comission has failed to require'of the licensee cost-benefit analysis and consideration of alternative conversion of Salem i
No. 2 to natural gas or coal.. (Final Env nmental Impact Staterent - Docket Nos. SD-272 and 50-311 - April 1973 - Pages 10 Alternatives,,10-1 through l
10-17 and 12-9 (12A and 12-16 (12X)). The NRC has failed to require in their analysis of " Request for Additional Financial Infor:r.ation Concerning Unit No.
2" (NR: request to PSE&S, April 18, 1978 - Olan D. Parr to R. L. Mittl) the alternative ef comersion to natural gas or coal.
Response
All three of these contentions appear to be related to the Comission's obliga-tions under the National Enviror.r. ental Policy Act of 1959 (NEPA):
need-for.
po er, operation and r.aintenance costs, cost / benefit eralyses, and consideration of the alternative of conversion to natural gas or coal,
g m-m
....._m 4
3 1
NEPA requires balancing of environmental costs against the expected bent' ts of i
a major federal actions which significantly affect the environ ent befcre the actions are taken.
"Need-for-pcwer" is a shorthand expression for a prirerf aspect of the benefit" side of the cost-benefit balance which NEPA mandatet in considering the licensing of a nuclear power plert.E "A nuclear plant's f
principal ' benefit' is of course the electric power it generates.
- Hence, absent some 'need for power', justification for building a facility is i
probl ema ti ca l. Duke Power Com:any (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2),
l ALAB-355, 4 N;iC 397, 405 (1976).
j The Comission has re:ognized, bewever, that uncertainty is inherent in any pre-diccion of the need for or demand for the elettricity to be generated by a nuclear J
plant.
"[E]Very prediction has an associated uncertainty and 1
...long range forecasts of this type are especially uncertain in that they are affected, by trends in usage, increasing rates, derographic changes, industrial growth or decline, the general state of the economy, etc. These factors exist even beyond the uncertainty that inheres in demand forecasts: asst.cptions on continued use from historical date, range of years considered, the area considered, extrapolations from j
usage in residential, cornercial, and industrial j
sectors, etc."
Carolina Power & Licht Company (Shearon Harris Nuclear power Plant, Units 1, 2, 3 & 4), CL1-79-5, i
9 NRC 609, 610 (1979).
As the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board has stated, "[g]f ven the legal responsibility imposed upon a public utility to provide at all times adequate, i
reliable service - and the severe consequences which esy attene upon a f ailurc I
i to discharge that responsibility - the most that can be required is that the 2
t i
If Public Service Co. of New' Hampshire (Seabrock Station, Units 1&?), A13E-422, 6 hRC 33, 90 (1977).
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o i
b
.I fc-e:Est te a reescratie one in the light of what is ascertainable at the time I
Karsas Gas & Electric Co :env (Wo'f Creek Generating Station. Unit 1),
r::e."
)
l a;:5-462, 7 N:: 320, 32E (1978; (ci'e ion critted).
I
}
In the cosrse of fulfilling this obligation under NEPA, the Conmission staff
/ for Salem Units 1 & 2 which con-f prepared an Enviror. mental Ir;act Statement ciuded inat the p;-er to be generated by the facilities was reeded to reet the e
ao;1itants' future de.Tands for electric power. 3/ No environmentally preferable
[
L I
altercatives were founc to te available S/ and the results of the cost / benefit i
{
analysis for the Salem f acilities found that the environmental costs of the fa-k 5
cility were outweighed by the tenefits to be derived from the facility.5/The C
r therefore, made a good f aith assessment of the need for the Salem Commissite, l
facility beset on the information available to it and considered possible alter-no:ives to the construction and operation of the facility.
the Cole.ans are requesting that the Conrission re-c;en the need-for-power Scw
?
deterrination and its consideration of alternatives.
Previous Director's Decisions l
l have set forth the standard which is followed in consideration of such a request, i
information presented represents a significant new environ-i.e., whether the new nentel ir;act er information which would clearly mandate a change in the i
r Final En$iro. rental Impact Statement, Dc:ket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311,
~2/
Salem N; lea-Generating Station, Units 1 & 2. April 1973.
-3/
FES, su;ra, Section 9.6.
l 4/
TES, s u:ra. Section 10.1.
El FES, su;"a, Section ii.
1 l
l
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g y y
~.a.
F.
9 f
Comission's original detemin~ation of the reed for the f acility anc ne en t;t-ance of the nuclear generation alternative.6/
4 h
The Colemans aave not submitted any specific information on projected netc, or costs of operation of Salem Unit 2 versus other, e.g., coal or natural gas, facili-j Rather, they merely assert that the Comission has failed to act on infor-ties.
maticn known to it regarding costs and need for power and failed to recuire the is l
licensee to do a cost-benefit analysis on the alternative of converting Salee l
Unit 2 to natural gas or coal.
1 While the exact nature of their assertion of failure to act en infomation regard-ing costs of similar facilities is unclear, it should be noted th:t under the Atomic Energy'Act, Congress did not make this~ agency responsible'for assessing whether a proposed nuclear plant would be the nest financially advantageous way for a utility to satisfy its customers need for power.E Furthemore, under our NEPA obligations, cost is relevant only to the extent an environmentally prefer-If one does exist, then costs are considered to deter-able alternative exists.
mine if they outweigh the environmental advantages to be gained. N The staff has applied this standard in previous Director's denials under 6/
See, e.o., Public Service Company of Indiana (Marble Hill
~
Nuclear Generating (Station, Units 1 & 2), DD-79-10,10 NRC 129 (1979)
Georcia Power Co.
9 NRC 562 (1979). The staff believes that this standard is consistent with NEPA and is appropriate in considering under 10 CFR 2.206 petitions to reopen the record in a proceeding in light of the well-recognized need for See Greene County Plannino Board v._
finality in the administrative process.
FPC, 559 F.2d 1227,1233 (2d Cir.1976), cert. cenied 434 U.S.1066 (1976);
'develand Electric 111uminatine Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2),
ALAS-443, 6 NRC 741, 750-51 (1977).
Consumers Power Co-pany (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAS-458, 7NRC 155, 7/
see also_ virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Ar.na Nuclear 162 (1978);
~
Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-584, Docket Nos. 50 33 ESP, 50-3395P, 511o Do. at 1016. (March 24,1950).
i i
In the Environnental Impact Statement, the staff concluded that the alternatives of coal and natural gas did not reasonably exist.E Even assuming they reason-,
ably exist, when the sunk costs of the essentially completed Salem Unit 2 facility are considered,5! it would be extremely difficult to find that the benefits to be derived from converting the plant would be outweighed by the i
costs of such an action. Moreover, as set forth below, the staff has concluded
'that an already constructed r.uclear unit is cheaper to operate than existing fossil fuel units because of lower fuel, operation and maintenance costs.
i i
The 1980 nuclear fuel cost for Salem Unit 1 is estimated at 4.3 mills / kilowatt hours (kWh). b The 1980 operation and maintenance cost is estimated at 2.0 mills /kWh.El The Public Service Electric and Gas Company's 1980 average fuel cost for an oil unit is 29.34 mills /kWh for a coal unit it is 14.7 mills /kWh.E The 1980 a ferage operation and maintenance cost for an oil. unit is 5.9 mills /kWh while the coal unit's average 1980 operation and maintenance cost is 4.32 mills /
kWh.1 The 1980 weighted average fuel con for the oil and coal baseload units l
9] FES, supra, Sections 10.1.5 and 10.1.6.
l 10/ Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2),
~
CLI-77-8, 5 NRC 503, 530-6 (1977).
,1_1/ Unifem Statistical Reports - Year Ending December 31, 1978 - for Public Service Electric and Gas Company, April 24, 1979, Schedule XIX.
12/ "A Procedure for Estimating Non-Fuel Operation and F,aintenance Cost for Large Steam-Electric Power Plants " ORNL/RM 6467.
13/ Unifom Statistical Reports, supra.
3 14/ " Steam Electric Plant Construction Cost and Annual Production Expenses 1977" DOE /EIA-0033/3(7).
4 i
is 23.07 mills /kWh and the weighted operation end maintenance cost is 5.22 mills /kWh.
(The majority of Public Service Electric and Gas Company's baseload capacity is generated by oil fired units.)15/
The staf f generally assumes using a 40 percent capacity fa: tor for the initial year of operation of nuclear plants, 65 percent for the second year and 70 percent for the third through the 15th years of operation.
It was also assumed that both nuclear and fossil fuel costs escalated at 10 percent per year and that operatien and raintenance cests escalated at 8 percent per year.
Based on these capacity f actors, Salem Unit 2 would be capable of producing 3.90 billion kWh of electricity the first year, 6.3 billion kWh the second year, and 6.8 billion kWh of electricity for the third through the 15th year.
If the equivalent energy is generated by existing oil and coal units, the economic penalty in increased production costs alo e would be 5??2 million in 1950 dollars for the first three years that Salem Unit 2 was not allowed to l
}
Actually, the staff believes the applicants would use Salem Unit 2 operate.
to replace its more expensive oil base load capacity and not a combination of oil and coal. The resulting economic penalties in 19B0 dollars for the first
~
three years, considering the replacing by oil fired units alone, would be In subsequent years the economic penalty would, in all probab-
$4B7 million.
ility, be even greater because even equivalent escalation rates impact more heavily on oil and coal which start at larger base values than nuclear Therefore, even in the highly unlikely event that denand production costs.
15/ Uniform Statistical Reports, supra.
i
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8 did not grow and Salem's output could be provided by existing units, the i
operation of Salen 2 would result in substantial production cost savings to the rate payers served by Public Service Electric and Gas.
Consequently, the Staff does not believe that the Colemans' petition and the j
information referred to therein represents a major new environmental impact or i
change in facts which would warrant re-opening consideration of the original NEPA analysis and its consideration of need for power alternatives and attendant j
cost / benefit analyses.
l l
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Contention 3 fi Trie Nuclear Regulatory Cereission has f ailed to act on information already p
"Fublic safety is tne first, known to it regarding unresclsed safety issues.
last and a permanent consideration in any decision on the issuance of a Po-er Reattor j
construction permit or a license to cperate a nuclear facility."
u i
International Unirn of Electrical Racio and Machine Workers,
,2 Developrent Corp.
v.
3 367 U.5. 396, 402, 81 5 Ct 1529, 1532 (1961).
h.
Ia h,q Response _
1e i
The NRC staf f continuously evaluates the saf ety requirements used in its 3
k Information related reviews against new infor:natica as it becomes available.
to t".e safety of nuclear pewer plants comes f rom a variety of sources including hy y
experience f rem cperating reactors, research results, ARC staf f and Advisory 0
architect / engineer J
Co-cittee on Reactor Safeguards safety reviews, and vendor, Each tirne a new concern or safety issue is identi-and utility design reviews.
fied f rom one or core of these sources, the need for icrediate action to
~~
This assesseent includes consideration cf assure safe cperation is assessed.
the generic implications of the issue.
Where it is concluded to be necessary, ircediate action is taken to assure i
safety, e.g., the shutdcwn of nuclear reactors cue to piping seismic desigr' 5
In other cases interie measures, such as t odifications deficiencies in 1979.
study of the issue to cperating procedures, may be suf ficient to allow further s
- le -
p prict to rak ir.c licensing decisitns.
In trost cases, he.ever the initial
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L indicates that imediate licensing actions or changes in licensing
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assess ent s
criteria are not necessary.
In any event, further study may be dee"ed
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k' appropriate to raie judg ents as to whether existing NRC staff requirements
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i should be nodified to acdress the issue for new plants or if backfitting is
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C apprcpriate for the long term operation of plants already under construction
.A or in cperatien.
g t
These issues are scretites called " generic safety issues" because they are fvl related to a particular c' ass or type of nuclear f acility rather than a
%m P
specific plant.
These issues have also been referred to as " unresolved safety (lo issues." Ho ever, as discussed above, such issues are considered on a generic pl h
basis cnly af ter the staff has rade an initial determination that the safety -
n significance of the issue does not prchibit continued operation or require '
licer. sing actions of the facility (s) under nrideration while the longer term t
a ceneric revie. is underway.
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L These lenger generic studies were the subject of a decision by the Atomic In Safety and Licensing Appeal Board of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Eend Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB 444, 6 NRC 760 at ??S (1977), the Appeal Board set forth the canner in which the staf f should deal with unresolved generic safety questions fcr a particular facility.
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The Appeal Board stated:
"In short, the board (and the public as well) should be in a position to ascertain from the SER itself -- without the need to resort to extrinsic t
documents -- the staf f's perception of the nature and extent of the relationship between each significant unresolved generic safety question and the eventual operation of the reactor under scrutiny.
Once again, t
this assessment might well nave a direct bearing upon the ability of the licensing board to make the safety findings required of it on the construc-tion permit level even thoegh the generic an;-er to the question remains in the offing.
Among other things, the furnished information would 1
likely shed light on such alternatively important considerations as whether (1) the problee has already been resolved for the reactor under _
study; (2) there is a reasonable basis for concluding that a satisf acto,ry solution will be obtained before the reactor is put in operation; or (3) the problem would have no safet'y implications until af ter several years of reactor operation and, should it not be resolved by then, alternative seans will be available to insure that continued operation (if permitted at all) wculd not pose an undue risk to the public."
J Since the issuance of the ALAB-444 the NRC has addressed this matter in its SERs (Safety Evaluation Reports) as they relate to specific applications.
l i
With respect to Salem Unit 2, we have reviewed the generic safety issues in accordance with U.AB-444 Our evaluation of this matter will be addressed in
. ~
i a supplement to the Safety Evaluation Report which will be issued prior to a decision to issue the operating liunse. 6 Cuntentien 4 The NRC has failed to consider the outstanding adjudicatory hearing on Salem l
Unit No. I with regard to expansion of the spent fuel pool, as it pertains to exransion at Salem Unit No. 2 located at a multi-nuclear complex.
Response
Public Service Gas and Electric Company has requested an amendment to the
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operating license for its Salem Unit 1 facility to provide additional storage capacity in the Salem Unit 1-spent fuel poo,1 (SFP).
That amendment as petitioner correctly stated, is currently the subject of an adjudicatory proceeding.
has Further, by letter dated April 12, 1978, the licensee submitted Amendment No. 42 to the Application for License for Construction and Operation of the Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2, which stated that the design changes proposed for the SFP at Salem Unit I would be made at Unit 2 as well.
In the course of evaluating the proposed spent fuel pool expansion for Unit 1 the Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation prepared an Environmental Impact 105ee Appencix C, Supplement No. 4. Safety Evaluation Report for Sales Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2, Docket No. 50-311, April _,1980.
13 -
I Appraisal (EIA) of the proposed amendment.
That EIA was issued on January 15, 1979. The Salem Station Final Environmental Statement (FES) which was issued in April 1973 considered the environmental impacts of the Salem Station rather than fo-Salem Unit 1 alone.
Since PSE&G has indicated it will make identical i
modifications to the SFP at Unit 2, the EIA addressed the cumulative environ-cental impacts of the expansion of both SFPs.
The Commission cencluded in the EIA that the Foi sn:nntal impacts associated with the proposed modificaticn to both facility spent fuel pools will not be 1
significantly changed from those analyzed in the FES for Salem Units I and 2 issued in April 1973.
Cor.sequently, the cumulative environmental impacts of the expansion of the spent fuel pools at the two Salem facilities have been l
adequately assessed.
With respect to the spent fuel pool expansion of Unit 1, our safety evaluation a
is presented in " Unit 1 Modification of Spent Fuel Pool Storage," dated January 15, 1979. We concluded that since the proposed modifications to the Unit 2 spent fuel storage and spent fuel pool facilities are identical to those at Unit 1, they are acceptable on the basis of the Unit 1 Evaluation.
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i Contention 5 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has failed to require an " independent" and j
separate " fire protection" water backup system for Salem Unit No. 2.
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Response
be have reviewed the Salem Nuclear Generating Station Units I and 2 fire This protection program and fire hazards analysis submitted by the licensee.
subnittal, which was in response to our request for an evaluation of the fire I
protection program against the guidelines of Appendix A to BTP ABSCB 9.5-1,
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states that a common yard fire main loop may serve multi-unit nuclear power plant sites, if cross-connected between units.
Sectional control valves would For permit raintaining independence of the individual loop around each unit.
such installation, common water supplies may also be utilized with the water supply sized for the largest single expected flow.
For multiple reactor sites with widely separated plants (approaching I mile or more), separate yard fire ma n locps should be used.
i The Salem Units are not widely. separated plants and, therefore, do not require r
separate and independent yard fire main loops.
The fire protection water supply system is common to both units and consists of two full capacity diesel engine-driven fire pumps.
Each pump has a separate discharge header t
that is connected to the yard fire main loop.
Post type indicator valves have been provided to isolate them in the pumps' discharge headers in the yard loop and in the yat loop itself to provide sectionalization so that independence of the loop around each unit can be maintained.
The water supply source to the pumps is from two 350,000 gallon water tanks (each tank has 300,000 gallons dedicated to fire protection).
The fire suppression system with the greatest demand is the 1400 gpm deluge system (primary) plus the 2000 gpm for the
i ranual hose station (backup).
This 2400 gpm demand is within the cesign capacity of 2500 gpm for the system.
t In addition to t?e above. '.ce autcmatic sprinkler system and manual hose station h0se standpipe systems are fed by the main yarc loop with multiple connections to interior fire protection systems header.
Each sprinkler system and manual hose station has an independent connection to the fire protection header fed from two directions, therefore, a single f ailure cannot impair both i
the prima y and backup fire p.otectica system.
I Based on our review, we find that the Fire Protection Program for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station is adequate and with the scheduled modifications committed to by the applicants, will meet the guidelines contained in Appendix A to Branch Technical Position A5B 9.5-1 and the General Design Criterion 3
" Fire Protection."
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Contention 6 i
e The recommendations from the NRC Task Force contains 23 recommendations f or administrative and design changes to Salem Unit No. 2, preposed requirements arising f rom " Lessons-Learned:
Study of the Accident at TMI."
These should be completed prior to licensing and commercial start up as well as accitional corrective action on potential defects.
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Fesocese e
Ose-the past seseral months following the Three Mile Island accident, the NRC 3 taf f has been conducting an intensive review of the design and operational aspects of nuclear power plants and the emergency procedures for coping with potential accidents.
The purpcse of these efforts was to identify measures tnat should be taken in the short-term to reduce the likelihood of such accidents and to improve the emergency preparedness in responding to such events.
The TMI-2 related requirements for near-term operating license (NTOL) appli-caticr.s were initially identified in the January 5,1980 r,emorandum f rom the Executive Director for Operations to the Commissioners, "THI Action Plan Prerequisites for Rest;r.ption of Licensing " On February 6,1980, a revision of this list of requirerents based on the 11 test draf t of the Task Action Plans as of February 6,1980 was prepared and discussed with the Commission.
j These requirements were listed in two categories; those required prior to fuel load and low power testing operation up to five percent power (designated as FL) and those required prior to operation above five percent power (designated as FP).
i These requirements were developed from all available sources such as the recommendations of the Bulletins and Orders Task Fe. :e, the Presidential Commission to Investigate THI-2, and the NRC 5.pecial
- iry Group and those which resulted f rom the lessons learned IJSk Forca 5'-
orm Recentendations (NUREG-0578), and the Lessons Learned Task Force Fina: *rport(NUREG-0585).
1 1
Those reauire ents in the February 6,1980 list which resulted from the tesson>
Learned Task Force Short Tere Recommendations (NUREG-0576), and those resciting from the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) review of that cc:vment and the additional requirerents of the Director, Office of Nuclear Reacter Regulation, were previcusly approved by the Commission.
On September 27, 1979, a letter was issued transmitting these requirements to all pending operating license applicants.
On November 9, 1979, a letter clarifying these requirements was issued to all pending operating license applicants to assist in their understanding of our requirteents.
T'he respcnse of the Public Service Electric and Gas Co pany to our letters has been the subject of staff review since October 1979.
Meetings were neld with the applicants in Bethesda on Ncvember 20 and December 11, 1979, and February 26, 1980.
Site visits were made on January 10 and 11, and February 27, 1950 to check hardware installation, revies. proposed support centers, and to review specific administrative procedures relating to operating personnel and accident response.
In addition, for all the remaining items in the February 6,1980 listing of requirements, the staff anc the appifcants have had ongoing reviews and meetings concerning these requirements and the applicants' responses to these accitional items.
Further site visits were held, for example, the March 5-7, 1950 visit by a team headed by an Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement leader and composed of the NRR licenT[ing project r.anager, the Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement 3
site representative, and technical members from NRR.
They avaluated the l
onsite and of fsite support centers and their staf fing and the installed communi-This evaluatio'n tions system bet-een the plant and NRC Incident Response Center.
included the revie-of licensee canagement organization and managerial capabilities.
Our evaluation regarding Three Mile Island matters will be presented in Supple-cent Number 4 of the Salem Unit 2 Safety Evaluation Report which will be issued prior to a decision to issue the operating license for the Unit 2 f acility.II Contention 7 The NRC has f ailed to consider the " menu for disaster" track record of Salem Unit No. I as it relates to known shutdown and power reductions (forced) for the following reasons:
4 A.
Equipeent f ailure 1
B.
Maintenance or Test C.
Refueling D.
Regulatory Restriction E.
Operator Training and License Ext
. ion F.
Administrative G.
Operational Error H.
Other 17 See Part 11 of Supplement No. 4, Safety Evaluation Report, Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2. Docket No. 50-311, April __,1980.
unu_.
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as it af fects the performance of Salem Unit No. 2.
Additionally, the NRC has f ailee to recommend changes to Salem Unit No. 2 as a result of " Lessons -Learned '
at Salem Unit No I mentioned operating status and " Reportable Occurrences" as filed in License Event Reports (LERs) since fuel loading 1976 to date.
This corrective action as a result of " Lessons Learned" from Salem Unit No. I should be completed prior to licensing and commercial startup of Salem Unit No. 2.
Response
With respect to Salem Unit 1, actions for deficiencies identified by any means such as a reportable occurrence are manifested in one of two ways; design change or procedure modification.
These items are routinely verified for Salem Unit I through our Of fice of Inspection.and Enforcement inspection program.
In addition, inspection by our Office of Inspection and Enforcement has been con-ducted to verify that such correcti'e measures have been applied to Salem Unit 2.
The enclosed applicable portions of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement inspection reports 50-311/78-47 and 50-311/79-23 (Enclosure 2) are examples of such inspection effort.
It should be additionally noted inat the basis for tne Salem Unit 2 operating procedures has been the Unit 1 operating procedure, com-plete with all changes and iterations which have accrued from three years of use.
The Office of Inspection and Enforcecent inspection program has verified, through sampling inspection, that corrective eensures taken at Salem Unit 1 have been considered for applicability at Salem Unit 2 and where applicable, t
have been incorporated.
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Contenticr 7A The Nuclear Regulatory Commission ~has failed to require the licensee and/or the manufacturer of reactor / steam generators to retrofit, as a result of testing, evaluating and analysis from " Lessens Learned" from the 1974 incident in Switzerlanc (Westinghouse reactor) and Davis-Besse Unit No. 1, Ohio (Licensee:
Toledo Edison Company - DocLet No. 50-346).
Response
At Davis-Besse Unit No. I and at the, reactor in Switzerland of a Westinghouse i
design, both failures of the relief and/or safety valves to close resulted in small break loss-of-coolant accidents.
In both of these cases actuation of engineering safety features and an appropriate reactor operator action prevented the event from evo %ing into a situation similar to that experienced at Three Mile Island Unit 2, even though there were a nue.ber of sir.ilarities between
.t the Three Mile Island Unit 2 event and the events at these two reactors.
I In NUREG-0578, the NRC staf f's Three Mile Island Un t 2 Lessons Learned Task Force has disclosed a number of actions in the areas of design, analysis, and plant operations that will deal with the events similar to the ones that took place at Davis-Besse Unit No. I and at the Westinghouse designed reactor in Switzerland. The response to Contention 6 addresses the requirements wnicn have been imposed on the applicants and the staff's evaluation of the irclementation of those requirements.
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. 5:E&*eMNe tT? D 1 ]
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Contention 8
\\
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has failed to require of the licensee cost-benefit analysis and consideration of alternative conversion of Salem No. 2 to natural gas or coal.
(Final Environmental Impact Statement - Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311 - April 1973 - Pages 10 Alternatives, 10-1 through' 10-17 and 12-9 (12A and 12-15 (12X).
The NRC has failed to require in their I
analysis of " Request for Additional Financial Information Concerning Unit No. 2" (FTC request to PSE&G, April 18, 1978 - Olan D. Parr to R. L. Mitti) the 4
i I
alternative of conversion to natural gas or coal.
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Response
1 s
See response to Contentions I and 2.
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Contention 9 t
The NRC has failed to review and compel the licensee to explain apparent
)
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discrepancies in seismic findings by Dames and Moore for PSE&G and Delmarva
-)
l Power and Light Company.
(Summit Nuclear Plant - Delaware) as it relates to the effect of a possible earthquake.
The final Safety Analysis Report reflects:
I there is no earthquake fault in the vicinity of Artifical Island, site of Salte Nuclear Generating Station Nos. I and 2.
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i f
This appears to be in contrast to the study and finuings of the University of i
f l
I
1
.. I
. I This study is available to the NRC staff.
The NRC staff order for seismic inspection of 29 reactors failed to include reactor containment structure, 1
feel handling, and spent fuel facilities.
This must be determined prior to I
l licensing Salem Unit No. 2.
(Attachment - Article from "Today's Sunbeam,"
j i
August 24, 1979).
The NRC is already aware of the condition of the c;,ntainment l
building (reactor) (cracks - NRC inspection report) and is unable to determine width, depth, extent or cause because of sand blasting by tb licensee prior to NRC inspection.
Response
i The geology and seismology of the Salem site were reviewed during the construction permit stage by the U.S. Atomic Energy Comission (USAEC) staf f (now the NRC),
the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey (USC&GS), the seismological review group of which is now part of the USGS.
The conclusions from that review are summarized in the Safety Evaluation 4
Report for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 and 2 dated July 16,
~
1968.
In that report it was concluded that there were no idehiiflable geologic structures that could be expected to localize earthquakes in the site vicinity, and that 0.2g and 0.1g for the safe shutdown earthquake and operating basis j
earthquake would provide adequate earthquake protection for the plant.
i On Septee.ber 25, 1958 the Comission issued provisional construction persits for Units 1 and 2.
Subsequent to this action, in 1972 and 1973, Dr. N.
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Spoljaric of the Delaware Geological Survey. reported faulting along the Fall l
Zone in the Newark, Delaware area and in the Red Lion area.
Those faults were investigated by the staff in considerable detall in regard to the Sumit 1
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~ i Nuclear Po-er Station site studies.
As the result of its review of data from
~ these studies and based on advice from the"USGS, the NRC staff concluded that the oldest unf aulted strata overlying any of these f aults was at least 65 l
l million years old.
Therefore these faults are not considered capable within the meaning of the NRC seismic and geole,i. siting criteria, Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 and were not considered.,ignificant to the nuclear sites on Artificial Islar.d, which includes Salem 1 and 2 and H:pe Creek I and 2.
Because consideration of these f aults did. not alter the original conclusion regarding the seismic safety of Salem 1 and 2, the staff did not address specific geologic anomalies in the Safety Evaluation Report for the operating license of Salem 1 and 2, but simply restated the original conclusion.
In regard to the f ault down the middle of the Delaware River proposed by the University of Delaware, ~we assume that -you are referring to one of-the f aults discussed in a 1976 article by Spoljaric and others, entitled " Inference of Tectonic Evolution f rom LANDSAT-1 Imagery," which was published in Fnote-grametric Engineering and Remote Sensing, Vol. 52, No. 8, pages 2069-1082.
While this paper postdates publication of the Salem SER we have considered it and reviewed its significance. The fault in the Delaware River discussed in the referenced article, which is based primarily on the interpretation of LANDSAT-1 imagery, is believed by the authors to be equivalent to one of the fault systems described by Spoljaric in 1972 and 1973.
This fault system was investigated during the Sunnit site studies and shown to te at least 65 million years old.
Based on the results of that investigation, we see no reason to change our conclusion arrived at during the CP review, that is, there are no known geologic structures that could tend to localize earthquakes in the site vicinity, and the SSE of 0.2g and the OBE of 0.lg are acceptable.
I,
4 r
The NR: sta'f crcer regarding seismic inspection of 29 reactors was related to
__ the specific area of the design of safety related piping (Office of Inspection and Enfcrcement Eclietin 79-07, " Seismic Stress Analysis of Safety-Related Piping")
/,
arc does not include matters related to the seismic design of safety-related structures.
Our revie cf the seism;c design of all Category I (safety-related) structures
+
including the containment structure and fuel building is presented in Section 3.7 of the Safety Evaluation Report and section 3.7 of Supplement No. 3 to the safety Evaluation Report.
As stated in Section 3.7 of Supplement No. 3, we require adaitional information regarding the seismic design as it relates to (1) a comparison of the response spectra and damping values between those currently adopted by us and those adopted by the applicants; (2) a just. fica-8 tion of the use of a i 10 percent peak width increment; (3) criteria used for-the selection of lueped masses; and (4) cri pria used for e#ther coupling or
~
decoupling a subsystem to its supporting system.
In letters dated January 21, 1979 and February 6,1979, the applicants provided the necessary information.
On the basis of our review of these matters, we concluded that the information provided was acceptable and consider the matter related tc the seismic design of Category I structures resolved.
Ve have not issued a supplement to the SER since that time.
Our evaluation of these matters will be presented in a supplement to the Safety Evaluation Report prior to a decision concerning the issuance of an operating ifcense.
I'dee Supplenent 4, Section 3.7, Safety Evaluation Report for Sales Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2, Docket No. 50-311, April
, 1980.
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4 With respect to the fuel handling system and spent fuel pool facilities, our i
evaluation of the seismic design of this system ar.d facilities for Unit I is 1
p, resented in a safety evaluation related to the Unit I modification of the Spent Fuel Storage Pool dated January 15, 1979.
Since the Unit 2 fuel handling i
system and spent fuel pool facilities are identical to the Unit I fuel handling system and spent fuel pool facilities, we conclude that they are acceptable on the basis of the Unit 1 Evaluation.
i With respect to the containment structural integrity test (CSIT) the Office of l
Inspection and Enforcement indicated in their report 50-311/78-51 that crack l
4 i
i patterns were located on the exterior of containtrent utilizing the test procedure l
and Regulatory Guide 1.18, Structural Acceptance Test for Concrete Primary i
Reactor Containments" requirements.
The area of eact crack pattern exceeded the Regulatory Guide 1.18 requirement oT 40 square feet. A grid network of one foot squares was supericiposed 'on the crack pattern area as an aid for
{
j transcribing crack details.
[
The inspection report (50-311/78-51) indicated that the applicants sandblasted the surface of the containment structure at the crack pattern areas to remove a coating of Medac in order to expose the actual concrete surface.
During the l
1 inspector's observations of the crack pattern areas, it was noted that the sandblasting operations hac weathered the edges of the existing cracks, thus j
saking it soc >ewhat difficult to obtain censistent crack width readings.
The inspectors alerted test personnel of their concerns in this area.
The inspectors further observed the initial crack survey at atmospheric pressure just prior to the start of pressurization and expressed their concern to the i
applicants about the methods being used to measure cracks.
In response the j
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a m1 iron c enn+.-t er avvit ion 1 traininc d *=r' c-r6 ->-- % u =-
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The report (50-311n8-51) f urther indicates that based on interviews, obs and in' dependent measurements performed, the inspectors felt that the test was conducted in accordance with the test procedure and that valid test data were obtained.
In the of fit.e of Inspection and Enforcement Report 50-311n9-10, it is indicat that the inspector reviewed the test records relative to the containment These final data were compared to the acceptance structural integrity test.
criteria stated in the final Safety Analysis Report and also to the results of the Salem Unit I containment structural integrity test.
With respect to crack measurements, it is stat 2d in the Office of Inspection and Enforcement Report that:
"The FSAR limit of 0.033 inches r.aximp crack growth during pressurization Of these f rom 0 psig to 54 psig was exceeded in a total of 39 instances.
39 instances, 30 were in the area of the equipment hatch and 6 were in The licensee elected to chip away the area of the personnel hatch.
approximately 1/8" of surface concrete in the area of 4 of these cracks This was accomplished at the r,aximum test to deternine th dr depth.
It was deterzined that in none of the 4 cracks pressure of 5/
.f g.
explored did the. rack width exceed 0.015 inches 1/8" deep into the con The FSAR limit of 0.020 inches r.exime residual crack growth after depres.
surization was etceeded in one instance in the area of the equipmer,t The licensee intends to explore this crack.
hatch.
The above results are not consistent with Unit 1.
However, the ISAR stated acceptance criteria for the containment structure is "... demonstration that the overall structure exhibits elastic behavior throughout the test range." The licensee feels, based on the values nf the other measurenents and the results of the crack exploration, that the containment structure did demonstrate elastic behavior and that the crack growth data is anomalous.
The displacement and strain ceasurement data examined by the inspectors appeared to support this conclusion.
The licensee will offer an explanaticn for the track growth in the final CSIT report.
The licensae has stated that the CSIT test results will be submitted by letter to NRR with an i
evaluation of the cracks."
i On April 2a, 1979, the Public Service Electric and Gas Company submitted to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) the report " Structural Integrity f
Tests, Unit 2 Contsinment, Salem Nuclear Generating Station" dated Februa y 26, 1979.
t We have reviewed the inforr,ation provided by the applicants and our evaluation regarding this matter is presented in the following paragraphs.
The applicants have tested the Salem 2 containment following the non prototype test requirements identified in Regulatory Guide 1.18, with some expanded measurerents which utilized already installed strain gauges.
These additional measurements were used to correlate test results between Units 1 and 2.
The verification of the containment design was made by comparing the measured displacceents and strains with the computed valees.
The applicants have shown l
i
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in the subject report that the measured displacements and strains were within
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The crack pattern tne acceptable range of their corresponcing computed values.
and widths were shown to be in general agreement with the computed values.
Some cracks exceeced the ecceptable widtn limit.
This problem was investigated by the applicants to determine whether these larger cracks might effect the structural integrity of the containment.
It was determined that these cracks i
were shallow surface cracks which were not induced by excessive rebar stra ns.
Eesed on the review of the information contained in the subject report, we 1
conclude t'at the applichnts have adequately demonstrated that the concrete containment is capable of withstanding the postulated pressure loads with ne adverse ef fects to its functional integrity and the subject test is judged acceptable.
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Contention 10 The NRC has f ailed to require the licensee to consider, evaluate, and analyze the possible effects of a Class 9 accident for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station.
The term " Class 9 accident" derives from the Commission's Deceober 1971, proposed rulecating on
- Consideration of Accidents in Implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1959," 36 Fed. Reg. (1971).
The proposed rulemaking would have added an Annex to Appendix 0 of 10 CFR Part 50, to set.forth the manner in which various categories of accidents should be taken into account in the environmental review.
In the preposed Annex, the
l 1
Commission divided into classec a theoretical spectrum of accidents ranging in severity from " trivial" (Class 1) to "very serious" (Class 9).
Each class of
~
accidents, except Classes 1 and 9, is required to be analyzed in environmental
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reports and statements.
According to the proposed Anner. Class 1 actice-ts need not be considered because of their trisial consequences.
Accidents within Classes 2 through 8 "found to have significant adverse enviror.eental effects shall be evaluated as to probability, or frequency of occurrence, to permit estir..ates to be mace of environmental risk or cost arising from accidents of the given class" 36 Fed. Reg. 22852 (1971).
With regard to "Clast 7 accidents, the proposed Anner states:
l "The occurrences in Class 9 involve sequences of postulated successive f ailure mere severe. than those postulated for the de:;ign basis for protective systems and enginee' red safety
~
features.
Their consequences could be severe. 'However, the probability of their occurrence is so small that their environrental risk is extremely low.
Defense in depth (multiple physical barriers), quality assurance for design, manufacture, and operation, continued surveillance and testing, and consers.ative design are all applied to provide and maintain the required high degree of assurance that potential accidents in this class are, and will remain, sufficiently remote in prot-ability that the environmental risk is extremely low."
36 Fec.
Reg. 2266 (1971).
Accordingly, the Annex does not require discussion of Class 9 accidents in environmen{al reports and statements.
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ggewams I
Although the Annex has never been formally adnpted by the Commission, the Comission noted upon publication that the Annex would be useful as " interim,
guicance" until the Comission took further action on the Annex.
36 Fed. Reg.
22E51 (1971).
Upon promulgation of 10 CFR Part 51 in 1974, the Comission stated that the adoption of Part 51 did not affect the proposed Annex, which was "still under consideration by the Comission." 39 Fed. Reg. 26279 (1974).
Reliance on the Annex has been upheld by decisions of the Comission's a!judi-catory panels and by Federal Courts.
See Offshore Power Systems (Floating Nuclear Po er Plants), CLI-79-S,10 NRC 257, 259 n. 6 (1979), and cases cited therein; Pennsylvania Power & Light Company (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Units 1 & 2), LBP-79-29, 10 NRC 586, 590 (1979).
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The Colemans no request the Director of NRR to reverse the Comission's j
existing policy and to require the Public Service Electric & Gas Co., to l
consider the possible effects of a Class 9" accident for the Salem Unit 2 ic facility.'
I ce not find such a course of action appropriate in light of the i
Comission's expressed intention in its recent decision in Offshore Power Systems, supra. Although the Comission ruled that consideration of Class 9 accidents was t
lIne staff has previously indicated in a Director's Decision under 10 CFR 2.206 l
that the f a-t that the Three Mile Island accident occurred will not itself cause the staff to institute a proceeding to consider generally the environ-mental effects of Class 9 accidents at a facility.
Public Service Corpjan of Indiana (Marbel Hill Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 & 2), DD-79-21, 10 MC 717 (Docket Nos. 50-546 & 50-547; Neverber 27,1979).
Although at least two Licensing Board panels have acknowledged, consistent with the i
proposed Annex, the admissibility of " Class 9 contentions" involving a specific l
accident sequence based on the Three Mile Island accident, these same Boards have recognized that general consideration of the consequences of Class 9 accidents at land-based reactors vould be inconsistent with Comission policy.
Metropolittn Edison Co.
(Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1), First Special Prehe : ring Conference Order (Restart Proceeding) Slip Op. at 11 (Docket No. 50-289, December 18,1979); Pennsylvania Power 7 Light Co., supra,10 NRC at 591.
I r
...w,,f m o n u m e w a m m.u-, - w m aa. u, m l
\\
proper in the environmental review of floating nuclear power plants, the Commission did not alter the status of the proposed Annex as the Comission's "dnterim guidance" pending completion of the rulemaking on the proposed Annex.
Moreover, the Comission expressed its intent "to complete the rulemaking begun by the Annex and to re examine Commission policy in this area." y.,
Slip. Op. at 9.
The Comission cautioned, however, that it was not " expressing any views on the question of environmental consideration of Class 9 accidents I
at land-based reactors," specifically r.oting that "[s]uch a generic action is more properly and effectively done thrcugh rulemaking proceedings in which all interested persons may participate." M.
In the meantime, the Comission requested in Of fshore Power Svstems that the staff:
"1.
Provide us with its recomendations on how the interim
~
guidance of the Annex might be rodified, on an interim basis and until the rulemaking on this subject is completed, to reflect development since 1971 and to accord core fully with current staff policy in this area; and 2.
In the interim, pending completion of the rulemaking on this subject, bring to our attention any individual cases in which it believes the environmental consequences of Class 9 accidents should be censidered." 10 NRC at 262-63.
- lhe Ccanission reaffirme'd this view in its recent decision P_ublic Service Corpany of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station Units 1 & 2), CLI-80 (Docket hos. 50-556 1
& 50-557, March 21, 1980).
m
__s-,
i on has-under consideration a proposed revised policy and pending The Commis consiceratien anc guidance by the Commission on the proposed policy, the staff Plans to withhold corrpletion of any unissued Environmental Impact State:ents on cases uncer current review.
We believe that the course of developing a revised general NRC policy on reciewing tne risks of nuclear accidents, taking into account the suggestions i
in t*e Lewis Committee Report and the lessons learned from the accident at Three Mile Island, will in the long run result in sounder reviews than if we attempted to supplement reviews for individual plants before the general l
policy was determined. Tt.e Commission itself has said, "[W]e did not believe that the NRC's generic policy on consideration of Class 9 accidents would properly oe ce eloped ruling on a case-by-case basis.
Such piecemeal considera-
~
tion is not a;propriate to such an important policy area, and we decline to ace: i suc* an acp-cach no.."
Public Service Company of Oklahoma (Black Fox St r. c, Urat> 3 & 2), CLI-80-E, Docket Nos. 50-556 and 53-557, Slip. Op. at N (v -cn 22, 19EC).
a is n c.c* u, he.ever, that the Com.ission also requested the staf f to j
i Tne st3 <
berission's attention "any individual cases in which it believes be ng t; the ine e.<irereertal cor. sequences cf Class 9 accidents should be considered."
C S Nee Pcwer Systems, supra. 10 NRC at 263.
See also Public Service C v;an, c' OC ahoma su;ra, at 3 & n.3.
The Staf f has reviewed information concerning 19e Saler f acility to determine whether "special circunstances" l
I
_,. _ w ~. - -. u m e _
- -., e I
- )
4 t
exist which might warrant a detailed Class 9 accident evaluation.
The results i
of the staff's review follow:
I i
As notec in Section 1.2 of the Safety Evaluation Report.22 the nuclear steam
[
supply system for each Salem unit will consist of a pressurized water reactor i
using a four-loop reactor coolant system.
The Salem facility is a typical light water reactor facility similar to several other reactor designs of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation licensed for construction and operations, j
f and therefore is not a novel reactor design.
j I
i i
2 In Offshore Power Systems, the unique design and unique siting mode corsisted j
of a nuclear pc*er plant mounted on a floating barge.
There would be no soil i
t 21 The staf f's review is similar to one undertaken in a recent decision uncer 10 CFR 2.206, in which the staff reviewed information concerning the Seatrook Station in light of the special circumstances identified in the staff's brief to the Commission (dated January 12,1979) in Offshore Power Systems.
Public i
Service Co. of New Harpshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2)
DD-80-6, Docket l
2 hos. 50-443 & 50-444, Slip. Op. at 10-12 (Feb. 11, 1980).
In the brief sub-4 mitted in Offshore Power Systems, the staff listec three special circumstan:es:
"To date, only three types of special circumstances have been identified that would trigger a detailed Class 9 accident j
evaluation:
a high population density for the proposed site (above the trip points in the Standard Reblew Plan and l
d Regulatory Guide), a novel reactor design (a type of power j
reactor other inan a light water power reactor), or a com-i bination of a unique design and a unique siting mode (a floating nuclear plant)." Brief at 47.
i See also Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants - LVR Ecition, NUREG-75-067 -(Sept. 1975); General Site t
Suitability Criteria for Nuclear Pe=er Stations, Regulatory Guide 4.7
{
(Nov. 1975).
In Public Service Co. of Oklahoma, supra, at 3, the Commissier.
noted in addition to these three criteria that proximity of a plant to j
a " man-race or natural hazard" might also represent "the type of exceptional case that might warrant additional consideration."
I 22" Safety Evaluation of the Sales Nuclear Generating ~ 5tation Units 1 and 2.
Doctet kos. 50-272 anc 50-311", U.S. Atomic Energy Come.ission, Directorate
{
of Licensing, October 11, 1974.
i 1
y i
structure to retard the release and dispersal of activity beneath the plant following a core melt accident as would be the case for land based plants..
The staff concluded that the most likely population exposure from the liquid pathway for a floating nuclear plant is significantly g-eater than for a land based plant because of the inability to interdict releases in the vicinity of the floating nuclear plant.
The Salem Nuclear Generating Station is located on Artificial Island, a man-made 4
w This peninsula in the Delaeare River estuary in Salem County, New Jersey.
estuary is the nearest surface water body which could be affected by liquid release from a Class 9 accident.
The nost likel,' grounhater path to the estuary would be through a permeable sand layer approxi. ate 1y 30 feet below the surface. Ground-ater velocity is
~
conservatively estinated to be about 3 feet per day.
-?j 1
The time for contaminated liquids, generated by a postulated core-melt accident, I
r to travel the groundwater pathway (approximately 780 feet) to the estuary would be in excess of 8 renths. Due to this 31w rate of groundwater movement, I
the staff concludes that there are no unusual features or special ciremtances with regard to the ground ater contamination interdiction characteristics of t
this site thet would distinguish it from other land based light water reactor sites to the extent that, under the present Comission policy, would warrant 4
?
consideration of environ. ental consequences of Class 9 accidents.
I
1 i
. However, the Task Action Plans contained in Draft NUREG-0660 (THI Lessons Learned) as proposed to the Commissi6n, identify Task Action Plan'III.D.2.3, liquid pathway interdiction (an in-depth study of one of the special factors of Class 9 events). Assuming approval of this plan, Salem and all other plants would be analyzed as part of Task Action Plan III.D.2.3.
If that should result in the liquid pathway being identified as a unique consideration at Salem, and the Commission's interim policy on Class 9 accident consideration has not yet clarified the situation in this regard, nethods of interdiction and mitigation will be identified.
Based upon the Liquid Pathway Study and preliminary discussions with Argonne National Laboratory on liquid pathway mitigation methods, it is possible to inter-I dict within the time period identified above and reduce or prevent the migration of contaminated groundwater to the river.
Several methods of mitigation, including pumping and construction of slurry walls to prevent migration are available. However, site specific techniques if reaufred, will be identified as a part of the Liquid Pathway Interdiction review.
t On the question of proximity to r.an-rade or natural hazards, the Staff concluded, in Section 2.2 of Supplement 1 to the Safety Evaluation Report, on the basis of its analysis of site characteristics, that the site was acceptable relative o
. o to seismology, geology and foundations.
The Staff also concluded that the probability of dar. age to safety-related portions of the nuclear pcwer plants on Artificial Island due to accidents occurring to waterborn com.erce involving hazardous cargoes on the Delaware River was sufficiently low that these accidents need not be the bases for the design of the Salem facility. 4 In a recent decision which considered the issue of hazards due to water traffic on the Delaware River for the Hope Creek facilities, which are also located on Artificial Island, the Appeal Board concluded that there need not be any modift-cation to the design of those facilities to accomodate possible hazards.25 Moreover, conditions were included in the construction pennits for the Hope Creek facilities which require reports to the Comission periodically of any changes in actual or projected traffic on the Delaware River.26 These reporting requirements will-provide infonr.ation directly relevant to Salem t
Unit 2 and will keep the Corrnission infomed of any changes that might affect the above conclusions, i
With regard to the high population sp-cial circtestance, the staff's brief in Offshcre Pcwer Systeas noted that the "special attention" called for by the 2bupplement 1 Safety Evaluation Report, Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Docket No. 50-311, June 28, 1976, Section 2.5.
See also the response to Contention 9 herein.
Suppleeent 1, Safety Evaluation Report, Salem Nuclear Generating Station
~
Docket No. 50-311, June 28, 1976, Section 2.2.
25 Public Service Electric and Gas Company, et al. (Hope Creek Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-518, 9 hRC 14, 37 (1979).
Id. at 39-40
Standard Review Plan and Regulatory Guide 4.7, in the case of sites exceeding the-population level " trip points" entails a consideration of comparative population exposures for Class 9 accidents at the proposed site and alternative sites.
The " trip points" apply to proposed new sites at the construction permit stage and were not evaluated nor proposed for plants beyond the construc-tion pemit stage.
The consideration of population exposures for Class 9 accidents has been utilized by the staff in assessing the relative differences between a proposed site and candidate alterr.ative sites.
The consideration of-population exposure for Class 9 accidents is not used as an absolute site-specific criterion for evaluating the suitability of a proposed site and sites are not necessarily found unsuitable if they exceed the population density guidelines given in the Standard Review Plan and Regulatory Guide 4.7.
As indicated by the staff criteria in Regulatory Guide 4.7 and described in the Pilgrim final environmental statement. O a site that exceeds the population density guidelines can nevertheless be selected and approved if, on balance, i
it offers advantages compared with available alternative sites when all of the environnental, safety, and economic aspects of the proposed site and the alternative sites are considered.
275ection C.3 of Regulatory Guide states:
"If the population density, including weighted transient pcpula ion, projected at the time of initial operation of a nuclear po e-station exceeds 500 persons per square mile averaged ever any radiai distar.ce out to 30 miles (cumulative population at a distance divided t,3 tt:e area at that distance), or the projected population density over the lifetime of the facility exceeds 1,000 persons per scuare e les averaged over any radial distance out to 30 miles, special attentior I
should be given to the consideration of alternative sites with lower population densities."
- 28. Final Supplement to the Final Environmental Statement related to construction of Pilgria Nuclear Power Station Unit No.
2,"
(huREG-549)
May 1979.
s.
38 e
It is current staf f practice to assess the relative differences in population exposures from a Class 9 accident at a proposed new site and the alternative 4
~
sites, using population distribution and population density as a surrogate for accident consequences.
The consequences of radiological accidents, from minor l
or trivial releases up to and including severe events, is directly related to the number of people sorrounding a particular site and to the distance of the i
population from the reactor location.
The staf f recognizes that the population distribution of a site is a relatively crude measure of the risk associated with the accidental releases of radicactivity.
The risk from any accidental releases would depend not only upon the population distribution of a site but l
also upon many other factors that would enter into the determination of the actual consequences of the accident.
However, insight gained in the evaluation
}
1 of the relative consequences of accidents in the Perrysan. alternative site i
study (SECY-78-137. Enclosure D) led the staf f to conclude that (1) the relative differences in the population distribution between sites is a reasonable J
reasure of the relative magnitude of potential consequences, (2) relatively
]
large dif ferences in the population densities between two sites are required to exist before significant differences in accident risks wovid be expected to be discernible, and (3) the risk is not uniform for all members of the population
,1 d
regardless of distance from the site but is higher for those persons relatively
?
close to the site and generally decreases with distance away from the site.
I n
4 1
i The 1970 population density in the vicialty of the Salem site was less than 100 persons per square mile within F,iles, and was about 320 persons per square mile at 30 miles.
Population projections for the year 2000 indicate t
t 39 that the population density is expected to increase to about 130 persons per square mile within 10 miles, and td a value of about 450 persons per square mile at 30 miles.
Based on these data, it is clear that the population density in the vicinity of the Salem site does not exceed the population level " trip points" of Regulatory Guide 4.7, and that the population density cannot, therefore, be considered to be a special circumstance that would trigger a detailed Class 9 accident evaluation.
CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing analysis of the Contentions, I have determined that each has been adequately resolved.
Consequently, the Colemans' request for a stay of the issuance of the operating license for Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2, is denied.
A copy of this decision will be placed in the Concission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N.V., Vashington, D.C.
20555 and in the local Public e
Docusent Rooms for the Salem Unit 2 facility located at Salem Free Public Library,112 Vest Broadway, Salem, New Jersey 08079.
A copy of this decision will also be filed with the Secretary for review by the Commission in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c). of the regulations of the Cor. mission.
I I
6 i
] /,
L v s..
i "ey 29, 1980 CORRECTION NOTICE
_TO ALL COPY HOLDERS OF SECY-A-80 DIRECTOR'S DENI AL OF 2.206 RELIEF (IN THE FATTER OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORf!IA AT BERKELEY)
DD-80-15 AND SECY-A-80 DIRECTOR'S DENI AL OF 2.206 RELIEF (IN THE MATTER OF PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY)
DD-80-17 (COMMISS.0NER ACTION ITEMS)
THE ATTACHMENTS C0!iTAINED Ifl THE SUBJECT PAPrRS HAVE BEEN If ADVERTE*lTLY INTERCHAN7ED.
COPY HOLDERS ARE RE00ESTED TO CORRECT THE FAPERS BY REARRANGING THE ATTACHMENTS.
.=.,
THE SECRETARIAT information in this record was de:eted in accordance with the Fredcm of In!0rmation Act, excnto!!;ns j_
g.J.
49 I
As provided in 10 CFR 2.205(c), this decision will constitute the final action f
of the C: mission twenty (20) days af ter the date of issuance, unless the Comission en its own motion institutes the review of this dettsion within that time.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM'il5510N 4
.aro d enton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this/taday of Acril, 1980 5
h