ML20044B727
| ML20044B727 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 07/18/1980 |
| From: | Malsch M NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19290F683 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-92-436 SECY-A-80-105, NUDOCS 9303030249 | |
| Download: ML20044B727 (91) | |
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WUCLE AR REGULATOi4Y COMMISSION WASHINGVON D. C. 30555 m18,1980 S E CY-A- 8 0- 106_
COMMISSIONER ACTION For:
The Commissioners From:
Martin G. Malsch, Deputy General Councel
Subject:
Director's denial of 2.206 relief (In the Matter of Public Service Company of New Hampshire)
Facility:
Faabrook Station, Units 1 and 2
Purpose:
To inform the Commission of the denial by the Director, NRR, of a petition requesting a show cause order relating to the f ailure of the NRC to require more extensi-'e emergency plans and consid-eration of the environmental effects of Class 9 accidents for the Seabrook facility.
Gy, j To recommend thht mJ Review Time Expires:
August 1, 1980 on May 2, 1979,'the Seacoast. Anti-Pollution League (SAPL) filed a petition with the Director, HRR, to issue an order to show cause why the construction perrtits for the Seabrook station should not be suspended or revoked.
There weze two reasons cited for the petition:
(1)
Failure of NRC to require development of an evacuation plan beyond the low popula-tion zone (LPZ) as part of the construc-tion permit proceedings.
Inbmatioiin this record was dE.'eted (2)
Failure of NRC to evaluate the consequences iTaccordance with thc PccCorn cf Information of a Class 3 accident in determining site tit l txcm%i:ns #_
evacuation beyond the low population suitability, including the necessity for FDl4_f2-9'T4 zone.
Contact:
David Smith, OGC 634-3224 q
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4 9303030249 921125 b*
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s Memoranda in favor of this request were filed by the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution (NECNP), on July 30, 1979; the State of New H ampshire, on October 12, 1979; and the Commonwealth of Hassachusetts, on November 16, 1979.
The request was largely premised on the assertedly changing attitudes of the Commission toward emergency plan-ning and the assessment of Class 9 accidents, as reflected in ongoing rulemaking proceedings.
In essence, SAPL was requesting that the construction permit proceedings be reopened to consider evacuatic) plans beyond the LPZ and the environmental effects of a Class 9 accident.
On February 11, 1980, the Director denied the petition for an Order to Show Cause, and refused to reopcn the construction permit proceedings.
Commissien review of the Director's decision is done under the " abuse of discret on" standard set forth in the Indian Point decision.
In the Matter of Censolidated Edison of New York, 2 NRC 173, 175 llS1S_L.r Contention 1 The Appeal Board correctly applied Commission policy as it existed in 1977 when it refused to requira the Seabrook utility to formolate emergency plans beyond the low population zone (LPZ).
However, since 1977, the Commission has sought to change the rules to extend the emergency planning zones beyond the LPZ.
A proposed rule to extend emergency planning to include emergency planning zones beyond the LPZ was published for comment on December 19, 1979, and a final rule to the same effect will likely be adopted in the near future.
The SAPL petition correctly states that in the I
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F proposed rule the Commission acknowledged that it j
was considering reopening already-issued construction !
permits.
4 4 Fed. Reg. at 7 517 0.
Thus, at the time l
of the Director's decision, Commi'ssion policy on j
reopening alre gyaissued construction permits was t
not yel clear,
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The Director-has acknowledged the ;eed for os l
expedited development of emerge".cy plans in certain-l cases.
Last December, the NRC staf f requested -
information regarding estimated evacuation times at Seabrook as well as other plants prisently under construction.
This information has not yet been i
received.
The Director stated in his denial,
'[t]hese estimates were requested so that the NRC can identify those ' instances' in which unusual-evacuation constraints exist and special planning-measures should be considered.
In some cases of extreme difficulty where a large population is at-risk, special facility modifications may also be cppropriate."
Director's Denial at'4.
Serious questions have been raised-by SAPL as to the feasi-j bility of evacuation at Seabrook due to the nearby beach with its seasonal population increases and limited roadway access.
See Letter to Commissioners from Rchert A. Backus, June 30, 1980, and accompanying affidavits.
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i Contention 2 l
The Director's response to SAPL's second contention j
is that the staff in effect did a Class.9. accident review in the Seabrook case, although it was not formally stated as such.
This so-called Class.9 review cam-in the form of UUREG-0501, the Seabrook alternative site study.
A study.of 22 alternative sites to Seabrook, NUREG-0501 was referred to' by the Appeal Board as "a voluminous report... of.
i perhaps unprecedented length".
9 NRC at 641.-
l This study concluded that while one site, Phillips l
Cc/ce,. was " marginally superior" to Seabrook, none -
of the. sites were "obviously superior", which would trigger rejection of the Seabrook site under the.
staadard used by the NRC in its NEPA site comparisonsd The Director claims in his denial that the staff's' I
thorough alternative site study satisfies the Class 9 snalysis required by NRC regulations at the time it was done.
(of course, this study was done before the Commission's recent Statement of Interim Policy was issued.)
The Director acknowledged that, while normally there was no need _to.do a NEPA review of Class 9-consequences,- the staff -had-the -.
duty to inform the
>mmission of individual cases.
in which special circumstances mandated such a j
review.
See Public Service -Company cf-Oklahoma
( Black Fox station, - Units -1 and.2 ),
ALAB-573, 10.,
4 i
NRC (December 7, 1979).
He further acknow- ~
1 edged that the Seabrook site exceeded the " trip.
points" of population density identified in the Standard Review Plan and Regu1 @ ry Guide.*
There l
is no dispute over this point./
gry.25' The Director refers to the staff brief to the O
Commission in the Of fshore Power Systems case.for
'l guidance on the type of analysis required when a special circumstance exists.
In that brief the
" Standard' Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis ' Reports -
for Nuclear Power-Plants.-- LWR Edition" (NOREG-75-087 ) September, 1975.
Also, " General Site Suitability Criteria for Nuclear. Power :
Stations", Regulatory Guide.4.7, Office of Standards. Development, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, November 1975.
I i
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6 5
staff stated that the "special consideration" required when population density trip points were exceeded consisted of "a consideration of population exposures for Class 9 accidents at the proposed site and alternative sites."
Brief, at 46.
In the case of Seabrook, no study of population exposures to radiation was done.
Rather, the staf f looked only at comparative population densities at the various sites.
The Director stated, "It is current staff practice to assess the relative differences in population exposures for Class 9 accidents between a proposed new site and the alternative sites through the use of population distribution and population density as a surrogate for accident consequences."
Director's Denial at 16.
- However, the Director conceded that merely measuring population distr ibution is a " crude measure" of accident risk and population exposure.
Since the Director's denial, the Commission has issued a new Statement of Interim Policy on Class 9 accident consideration.
Under the new Policy Statement the Commission decided not to open up all previously concluded construction permit hearings to require consideration of Class 9 accidents 4 Rather, the staf f was directed as follows:
y,
Bowever, it is also the intent of the Commission that the staf f take steps to identify additional cases that might warrant early consideration of either additional features or other actions which would pre-vent or mitigate the consequences of serious accidents.
Cases for such consideration are those for which a Final Environmental Statement has already been issued at the Construction Permit stage but for which the Operating License review stage has not yet been reacned.
In carrying out this direc-tive, the staff should consider relevant site features, including population density, associated with accident risk in comparison to such features at presently operating plants.
Staff should also consider the likelihood that substantive changes in plant design features which may compensate further for adverse site features may be more casily incorporated in plants when construction has not yet progressed very far.
45 Fed. Reg..at 40103.
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Conclusion:==
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- -.. Martin G. Malsch Deputy General Counsel i
Attachments:
1.
Director's decision 2.
Draft memo to EDO 3.
Draft Order extending time 4.
Letter to Commissioners from Robert A. Backus, June 30, 1990, with enclosures SAPL petition of May 2, 1970 Comissioners' cocrnents shouli be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. Friday, Ausqust 1,1980.
u Comission Staff Office coments, if any, should be submitted to the Comissioners NLT July 25, 1980, with an infonration copy to the Office If the paper is of such a nature that it requires l
of the Secretary.
additional time for analytical review and coment, the Co=nissioners
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and the Secretariat should be apprised of when coments tray be expected.
Distribution Comiss l,n i
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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W tr
't Docket Nos.:
50-443 4
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Robert A. Backus, Esq.
- +E 0'Neill, Backus and Spielman 116 Lowell Street 9
i Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 l
Dear Mr. Backus:
i On May ?,1979, you requested on behalf of the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League (SAPL) : hat the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation issue an Order to Show Cause to the Public Service Ccepany of New Hampshire (PSNH) why the construction l
permits for the Searock Station should not be suspended or revoked. As the
_ basis of its. request. SAPL cited:
l (1)- Failure of NRC to require development of an evacuation plan beyo d
~
the low population zone as part of the construction permit pro-d ccedings, and (2) Failure of NRC to evaluate the consequences of a Class 9 accident.
including the necessity for evacuation beyond the low population j
zone.
The New Engi and Coalition on Nuclear Pollution (NECNP) filed a me crandum in i
support of SAPL's petition on July 30, 1979.
The Cocrtonwealth of Massachusetts filed a remorandum of support on November 16, 1979. The State of New Hampshire i
filed a Statement of Position on October 12, 1979.
SAPL's petition and NECNP's.
and Sitssachusetts' supporting remoranda have been tre:ted under 10 CFR $2.206 of the Cocrr.ission's regulations.
Upon review of SAPL's and NECNP'a filings and of other relevant information, I have determined not to issee an Order to Show Cause tc PSNH concerning the construction permits. The reasons for this decision are fully discussed in the enclosed " Director's Decision under 10 CFR {2.205." Also enclosed is a copy of a Federal Re ister Notice regarding this decision that is being filed i
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'with the Office of the Federal Register.
A cer of this decision will be placed in the Cocrnission!s Public Docunent Room at 1717 N Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20555, and at the Exeter >
4 i
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[6 6 3 em b a f e &
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Robert A. Backus, Esq.
2-Public Library, Front Street, Exeter, New Hampr. hire 03833.
A copy will also be filed with the Secretary for the Comission's review in accordance with 10 CFR {2.206(c) of the Comission's regulations.
Sincerely, Af h Y Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nucleer Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
1.
Director's Decision Under 10 CFR $2.206 2.
Fe_deral Recister Notice cc w/ enclosures:
See next page.
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1 N-Public Se v cr Company of Nes Hampshire ecs:
i John A. Ritscher, Esq.
Mr. W. C. Tallrr.an, President Repcs and Gray Public Service Company of 225 Franklin Street New Hampshire Boston, Massachusetts 02110 1000 Elm Street Fanchester, New Hampshire 03105 Ralph H. Wood, Esq.
c General Counsel Public Service Company of New Hampshire
._j 1000 Elm Street
==-e Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 Mr. John Haseltine, Project Manager Yankee Atomic Electric Company 20 Turnpike Road Westboro, Massachusetts 01581 Mr. Bruce B. Beckley, Project Maneser l
Public Service Company of New Hampshire 1000 Elm Street Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 Ms. Elizabeth H. Weinhold 3 Godfrey Avenue
-~~~ - ---~-----
Hampton, New Hampshire 03842 - ~~ ~----
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Robert A. Backus, Esq.
0'Neill, Backus, and Spielman 116 towell Street._ _
Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 tiorman Ross, Esq.
30 Francis Street Brookline, Massachusetts 02146 Karin P. Sheldon, Esq.
Sheldon, Harnon & Weiss 1725 I Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006 Laurie Burt, Esq.
Office of the Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division One Ashburton Pisce Boston, Massachusetts 02108 9
Public Service Company of New Hampshire
. g ces (centinvec)
E. Tupper Kinder, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General Of fice of Attorney General 208 State House Annex Concord, New Hampshire 03301 Snuel Chilk Secretary of the Comission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission
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Washington, D. C. 20555
=.
Alan 5. Rosenthal, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing /ppeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmission Washington, D. C. 20555 Dr. John J. Buck Atoraic Safety and Licensing hpeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cem ssion Westingtun, D. C. 20555 Michael C. Farrar, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing /ppeal E. cad U.S. % clear Regulatory Comission Washiriston, D. C. 20555 Iva n W.' Smith, Es q.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
[
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission L
Washington, D. C. 20555 Dr. Ernest Salo, Professor Fisheries ResearcS Institute - WH-10 College of Fisheries University of Washington Seattle, Washington 98195 l
The Honorule Roberta C. Pevear New Hampshire House of Representatives Conard, New Hempshire 03301
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. Public Service Company of New Hampshire l
h.[
ces (continued)
State House Annex Attn:
Assistant to the Director Office of Comprehensive Planning Concord, New Hampshire 03301 U.S. Environnental Protection Agency Attn:
EIS Coordinator Region I Office FK Federal Building Boston, Massachusetts 02203 Office of Selectman Town of Seabrook P. O. Box 456 Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874
/ttorney General State House Annex Ccncord, New Hampshire 03301 S
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UNITED STATE 5 0F Av. ERICA NUCLEAR REGULATCRY C0FMSSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACT 0t. REGULATION HAROLD R. DENTON, DIRECTOR 1
In the Matter of
)
PUBLIC SERVICE CCFPANY OF NEk' HAMPSHIRE
)
Docket Nos. 50-443 et al.
)
50-444 (Seabrcok Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206 By letter dated May 2,1979, Mr. Robert A. Backus on behalf of the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League (SAPL) transmitted a request pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 for en Order suspending or revoking Seabrcok Construction Permit Nos. CPPR-135 and CPPR-136.
On July 30, 1979, and November 16, 1979, the New England. Coalition on Nuclear Pollution (NECNP) and the Comonwealth of Mass-chusetts, respectively, filed memoranda in support of SAPL's request. 'By letter dated October 12, 1979, the State of New Hampshire filed a Statement of Position with respect to the. SAPL request. The relief regrested is premised on contentions that KRC has failed to.
1.
require development of an evacuation plan beyond the low population tone as part of the construction permit proceedings, i
and 2.
evaluate the consequences of a Class 9 accident, in determining site suitability, including the necessity for evacuation beyond the low population zone.
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STAFF RESPONSE TO CONTENTION 1 SAPL's first contention is that the Comission has effectively reversed 1/
i the holding of ALAB-390 by publish'n9 for public coment in the Federal Recister on August 23,1978 (43 FR 37473) a proposed rule which, if adopted, would requ'ra the staff to determine if " emergency planning, which may include
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plenning for evacuation measures, should extend to areas btyond the LPZ.
On the basis of this proposed rule SAPL requests that the feasibility of evacua-l tion beyond the LPZ be set down for determination et reopened construction i
permit pr oceedir.gs.
l 3
In a letter dated Neverter 21, 1979, the NRC Staff advised all licensees t
of prants under construction of additional staff requirements at the operating license. stage in the area of energency planning. These requirements, as pre-f sented in the joint EPA /NRC Task Force Report (NUREG-0396), were concurred in
-l and endorsed in the Comission's policy statement issued on October 5,1979, and published in the Federal Reoister on October 23, 1979 (44 FR 61123). The cajor recomendation of the report is that two Energency Planning Zones (EPZ's) l should De established around light water nuclear power plants. The EPZ for f
t 1/ The Appeal Board ruled in Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook i
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Station, Units I and 2), ALAB-390, 5 NRC 733, 747 (1977), that "under the a
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Comission's regulations in their present form, consideration is not to be given in a licensing proceeding to the feasibility of devising an emergency -
plan for the protection (in the event of an accident) of persons located i
outside the low population zone".
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' airborne exposure has a radius _oflout 10 miles; the EPZ for contarnineted food has a radius of about 50 miles. These recom,endations were based in part on Class 9 accident considerations.
On December 5,1979, the Comission approved proposed rules, amending
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10 CFR Part 50, for coping with emgencies at nuclear pcmer reactors.
44 FR 75167 (December 19, 1979).
The concept of dual EPZ's as defined in NUREG-0296 has been incorporated in the amendments, and will be required in the Emergency Plan of the licensee if the amendments are adopted as proposed.
The publication of these proposed rules in the federal Register supersedes the August 23, 1978 proposed rule change.
In its statenent acceepanying the publication of the proposed rules the Comission explicitly noted that it "is considering whether construction per-
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mits which have alrecdy been issued should'be recensidered because of the energency planning considerations of the (proposed rules).'
By letter dated Deceder 21, 1979, the NRC staff advised all pcwer reactor licensees, and all construction permit holders and applicants of j
the proposed rule and of regional workshops to be convened to discuss the j
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feasibility of the proposed rule, its impact, and the procedures for complying with its provisions.
In a letter dated Deceder 26, 1979, the NRC staff requested that all licensees of plants under construction provide information regarding estimated evacuation times by March 31, 1980. This request did not change 1
1
the position stated in the letter of November 21, 1979, i.e., that compli-ante with the additional requirerents need not be derenstrated until the operating license stage of review.
These estimates were requested so that the NRC can identify those " instances" in which unusual evacuation constraints exist and special planning measures should be considered. In some cases of extrcre difficulty where a large population is at risk, special facility modifications may also be appropriate.
Therefcre, pending receipt and evaluation of this information, adoption of the proposed rule, and guidance from the Commission on reconsideration of construction permits, it would be premature to reopen the Seabrook construction permit proceedings at this time.
STAFF RESPONSE TO CONTENTION 2 l
i SAPL's second major contention is that the extrerely low probability of '
the Class 9 accident occurrence has been undercut by the Commission's repudia-tion of the assessment risk values in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) and
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the
"(t)he Staff, in order to avoid 'the evaluation of the consequences of a Class 9 accident in the performance of its NEPA-2/review, appears to htye relied upon WASH-1400, the reactor safety study, rnre coenonly known as the Rasmussen Report." Contrary to SAPL's contention, WASH-1400 was not the basis for 4
evaluation of the consequences of accidents in the staff's NEPA reviews.
1 2/ National Environrental Policy Act of 1969 (Public Law 91-190,
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83 Stat. 852).
l
. Commission guidance on the consideration to be given to accidents in the environmental reviev, including Class 9 accidents, is found in the proposed Annex to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix D, which was published in the Federal Reciste. on Dect rber 1,1971 (36 FR 22851).
This Annex divided the spectrum of accidents, ranging in severity from trivial to very serious, into nine categories or classes.
It directed that "for cach class, except Classes 1 and 9, the environi.c?.tal consequences shall be evaluated as indicated".
Class 1 events were not to be censidered because of their trivial consequences, whereas in regard te Class 9 events the Annex states as follows:
Jhe occurrences in Class 9 involve sequences of postulated successive failures note severe than those postulated for estab-11shing the design basis for protective systers and engineered safety features. 1 eir consequences could be severe. However,
the probability of their occurrence is so small that their environmental risk is extremely low. Defensc-in-depth (multiple
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physical barriers), quality assurance for design, manufacture, and operation, continued surveillance and testing, and conserva-tive design are all applied to provide and maintain the required high degree of assurance that potential accidents in this class are, and will remain, sufficiently rerote in probability that the environmental risk is ertronely low. For these reasons, it is not necessary to discuss such events in applicants' Environmental Reports.3/
A nurber of developments have occurred since the publishing of the Annex in Deter 6er 1971 which have had significant bearing on accident consideration for both safety and environmental reviews. The following stecary of develop-meats reflects the evolutionary change in the NRC's policies in this area.
3/ A footnote in the annex states that such events also need not be discussed in the staff's Environmental Statements.
O
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f 6-(1) WASH-1400:
The publishing of the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400),
i first in draft form in August 1974 and in final form in October i
1975 has had an effect upon accident considerations with regard to nuclear power reactors. Although this was not the first study "6 ':
that examined consequences of 1arge radioactive releases, it was the fir st study to examine such events probabilistically and which I
attempted to arrive at an actual estimate of the probability of a
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l' core relt event.
Staff practice, in environmental inpact state-
[
nents, has been to refer to the WASH-1400 study because it reflected a new methodology to assess the risks of severe accidents.in a more quantitative fashion, but the staff has not relied on WASH-1400 I
findings in its environmental reviews..
(2)
Risk Assessrent Review Group:
In July 1977, the NRC organized the above group primarily to clarify the achievements and lirnitations of the Reactor Safety Study (RSS).
The results of this study, I
issued in September 1978, to the effect that the Review Group was unable to u.: ermine whe' her' the overall probability of a core-melt t
given in the RSS was high or low, have also been included in recent environnental assessments issued by the staff. On January 18, 1979, l
the Ccernission issued an "NRC Statement on Risk Assessment and the I
3 Reactor Safety Study Report (WASH-1400) in light of the Risk i
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Assessment Review Group Report [NURfG/CR-04003" in which was stated:
k,
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" Accident Probabilities: The Corrissicn accept's the Review Group Report's conclusion that absclute values of the risk s presented by WASH-1400 should not be used uncritically either in the regulatory precess or for public policy parposes and has taken and will continue to take steps to assure that any such use in the past will be corrected as appropriate. In particular, in l'.cht of the Review Group conclusions on accident pr obabilities, the Commission does not regard as re-11atie the Reactor Sa'ety Study's numerical estimate of the oserall risk of reacter accident."
(3)
SECY 78-137, *pssessrents of Relative Differences in Class 9 Accident Risks in Evaluations of Alternatives to Sites With High Fopulation Densities":
The staf f reco79 ended to the Commission in SECY 72-137 on March 7,1978 that:
- (a) Pending con;1etion of the Connission's review of its reactor siting policy that the staff perform quantitative assess-rents of the relative differences in Class 9 accident consequences and risks in the review of alternative sites where the population density exceeds the values given in Reguletory Guide 4.7.*
- (b) That the Commission cor:1 der the appropriateness of issuing scme clarifying staterent to the effect that the proposed Annex 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix D applies to land-based LvR's of the type licensed during the last decade or so, and that rore detailed consi.deration of Class 9 accidents may be warranted for other types of sites or designs."
(4)
Report of the Siting Policy Task Force (KUREG-0625):
In August 1979, the Siting Policy Task Force recorrended that siting policy changes be made "To take into consideration in siting the risk associated with accidents beyond the design basis (Class 9) by establishing population density and distribution criteria". This report
(
.s.
recomended that population criteria act as a surrogate for Class 9 l
risks, and that site-specific Class 9 accidents should not be analyzed and weighed in the decisional process.
(5)
Ctenission Policy Statement: On October 5,1979, the Comission issued a policy statement, published in the Federal Recister en October 23,1979(44 FR 61123), endorsing the. guidance contained in a report issued in Deceder 1978, (" Planning Easis for the Develop-ment of State and Local Governmer.t Radiological Emergency Desponse Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Plants. A Report prepared by a U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission and U. S. Environ-mental Protection Agency Task Force on Emergency Planning")
( N'JR EG-0395 ).
In so doing the Comission said that "it is appro-pr f ate and prudent for emergency planning guidance to_ take into consideration the principal characteristics (such as nuclides re-leased and distances likely to be involved) of a spectrum of design basis and core melt accidents."
(6) SECY 79-594, " Class 9 Accident Considerations": On October 31, 1979, in response to requests by the Comissioners in Offshore Power
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Systems (floating Nuclear Plants), CLI-79-9,10 NRC (Septe der 14, 1
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4/
1979),
the staff submitted an information paper, SECY 79-594, entitled " Class 9 Accident Considerations". As stated in the paper, the staff is pursuing the following:
4/
In Offshore Power Systems, the Concission stated:
"Our grant of review in this proceeding was licited to the r, arrow Question certified to us by the Appeal Ecard and it is neither necessary nor appropriate for us to employ this particular adjudi-catory proceeding to resolve the generic issue of consideration of Class 9 accidents at land-based reactors. Such a generic action is more properly and effectively done through rulemaking proceedings in which all interested persons may participate.
Therefore, we are not today expressing any views on the question of environnental consideration of Class 9 accidents at land-based reactors which, as the Scard noted, present risks different in kind and perhaps in magnitude fr om those risks presented by ThPs. How-ever, we are concerned about this question and intend to complete the rulemaking begun by the Annex and to re-examine Commission policy in this area. To aid in that re-examination we ask our staff to:
i 1.
Frevide us with its recommendations on how the interim guidance of the Annex might be modified, on an interim basis and until the rulerating on this subject is completed, to reflect developments since 1971 and to accord more fully with current staff policy in this area; and 2.
In the interim, pending completion of the rulemaking en this subject, bring to our attention, any individual cases in which it believes the environrental consequences of Class 9 accidents should be ecnsidered."
0
.( Preparation of an interim policy staterent on accident risks under NEPA which include consideration of core melt events and which would withdraw the 1971 proposed Annex.
Preparation of recommendations for design features
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for all plants associated with core melt accidents.
Preparation of recommendations for rule raking to revise 10 CFR Part 100, to encompass considerations of the risks associated with core melt events." (p. 5)
The Cc mission stated in Offshore Power 5,rstems, supra, that it intends to handle the Class 9 issue by means of a generic rulemaking proceeding.
Pending the ostcome of the rulemaking, the staff is to bring to the Commission's attention individual cases in which the environmental consequences of Class 9 accidents should be considered. see, Public Service Company of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-573,- 10 NRC (December 7,1979).
To determine whether a particular case should be brought to the Commission's attention, the staff intends to apply the criteria set forth in the staff's l
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(.. 5/
brief to the Comission in Offshore Power Systems.'
In that brief the l
staff stated that "there is no need for a detailed NEPA discussion of Class 9 accident risks in nuclear power reactor licensing proceedings T_
unless the special circumstances of a particular case indicate that Class 9 accident risks may be unusually higher or of a different character than for the t.ypical land based nuclear power reactor. To date only three types of special circumstances have been identified that would trigger a detailed i
Class 9 accident evaluation:
a high population density for the proposed 6/
site (above the " trip points" in the Standard Review Plan and Regulatory
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Guide),
a novel reactor design (a type of power reactor other than a
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NRC STAFF'S ERIEF IN SUPPORT OF AFFIRMATIVE FINDING'ON CERTIFIED i
QUESTION (January 12, 1979)
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j This brief was submitted to the Comission after the Atomic Safety and i
Licensing Appeal Board granted Offshere Power Systems' request to certify the " Class 9 question" to the Comission on Septerter 29,1978. ' ALAB-500, i
BNRC 323 (1978).
l y
The certified question was:
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- Are Class 9 accidents a proper subject for consideraticn in the Staff's environmental statement on the floating nuclear power plant manufactur-ing license application?"
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" Standard Review Plan For The Review of Safety Analysit Reports For Nuclear I
Pcwer Plants - LWR Edition" (NUREG-75-087) Septercer,1975.
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' General Site Suitability Criteria for Nuclear Power Stations
- Regulatory Guide 4.7, Office of Sttndards Develepnent, United States
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Nuclear Regulatory Cocrnission, Noverber 1975.
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light water power reactor), or a combination of a unique design and a unique siting mode (a floating nuclear plant)."
(Erief at p. 47)
I have reviewed the Seabrook facility to determine whether any of r
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these special circumstances exist. As noted in Section 1.2 of the Safety 8/
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Evaluation Report, the nuclear steam supply syste-for each Seabrook unit will consist of a pressurized water reactor using a four-loop reactor coolant system b. sed on the design described in the Feference Safety Analysis
_9_/
Feport.
Since this report is referenced for several other facilities and since the particular design is basically similar to several othat reactor designs of the Westinghouse Electric Ccrporation lice sed for construction and operatien, the Seabrcok facility is a typical lig't water reactor facility i
and therefore it not a novel reactor design.
j In Offshore Pcwer Systems, the unique design and unique siting mode consisted of a nuclear power plant mounted on a floating barge. There l
would be no soil structure to retard the release and dispersal of activity ber.eath the plant following a core celt accident as would be the case for lend tased plants. The staff concluded that the nest likely populettori 8/
' Safety Evaluation of the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station Units Nos.1 end 2, Docket Nos. 50-443 and 50-444*, U. S. Atccic Energy Comission, Directore'e of Licensing, August 14, 1974.
9/
- Reference Safety Analysis Report (RESAR-3 Consolidated Version)**
Westinghouse Nuclear Energy Systems, Novenber 1973.
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( exoosure from the liquid pathway for a floating nuclear plant is signifi-cantly greater than for a land based plant because of the inability to interdict releases in the vicinity of the floating nuclear plant.
??
The Seabrook site is bordered on three sides by marshland which is part of the Hampton Harbor estuary. Hampton Harbor, a shallow lagoon behind the barrier beaches of Hampton Eeach and Seabrook Beach, is the r.earest surface water body which could be affected by liquid releases from a Class 9 accident.
Groundwater in the site area is gener ally a reflection of surface topcgraphy and is usually within 10 feet of the ground surface. The ground-water boves generally toward the-marsh areas at a rate of several tens of feet per. year.
If a Class 9 accident were to occur, the groundwater in the plant area would be fir st affected.
However, since the reactor building is located about 200 feet from the marsh at the closest point, it would likely require several years for groundwater to migrate to the estuary. Due to this slow rate of groundwater moverent, the staff concludes that there are no unusual features or special circumstances with regar d to the groundwater contamination interdiction characteristics of this site that would distinguish it from other land based light water reactor sites to the extent that, under the present Conmission policy, warrent consideration of environmental consequences of Class 9 eccidents.
i However, the task action plans contained in Draft NUREG-0650 (TMI Lessons Learned) as proposed to the Conmission, identify Task Action Plan III.E.1.4 as an in-depth study of liquid pathway interdiction, which is one of the special factors identified in Offshore Power Systems which might trigger
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further consideration of Class 9 events. Assuming Connission approval, Seabrock and all cther plants would be analyzed as part of Task Action Plan 111.E.1.4 If that thculd result in the liquid pathway being identified as a unique ccnsideretion at Seabrock, and the Commission's interim policy on Class 9 accident consideration has nct yet clarified the sitestion in this i
regard, methods of interdiction and mitigation will be identified. Based 10/
upon the.licuid pathaay study - a nd-pr eliminary di scussi ons-with-Argonne------ ----
I Nation:' Leberatory on liquid pathway mitigation' methods, the'st' ff be'ieves a
it is possible to interdict within the tire period identified above and reduce or prevent the migration cf contaminated groundwater to the marsh.
Several methods of mitigation, including pumping and construction of slurry walls te prevent mig-ation are available. However, site specific techniques, if required, will be identified as a part of the liquid path-way interdiction review.
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" Liquid Pathway Generic Study - Impacts of Accidental Radioactive
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Releases to the Hydrosphere from Floating and Land Based Nuclear Pcwer Flents,' (.LREG-0440) February 1978.
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? i In discussing the high petulation special circumstance, the staf fs brief in Offshore Power Systems notes that the "special attention" caller for by the 11/
Standard Review Plan and Regulatory Guide 4.7-~
in the case of sites exceeding the population level
- trip points" entails a corsideration of comparative popu-3 letion exposures for Class 9 accidents at the proposed site and alterrative sites.
i The ' trip points" apply to proposed new sites at the constrtction permit stage and wer e not evaluated nor prc;tsed for plants beycnd the construction permit stage.
t The consideration of population exposures for Class 9 accidents hcs been utilized by the staff in assessing the relative differences between the pro-f i
posed site and the candidate alternative sites. The censideration of population i
1 exposcre for Class 9 accicents is not used as,an absolut_e_ site-s_pecific criterion for eval.uating the suitability of a proposed site and sites are not necessarily
[
found unsuitable if they exceed the population density guidelines given in the Standard Review Plan and Regulatory Guide 4.7.
As indicated by the staff l
11/ Section C.3 of Regulatory Guide s.tates:
"If the pcpulation density, including weighted transient pcpulation, projected at the tire of initial operation of a nuclear power station exceeds 500 persens per square mile averaged over any radial distance out to 30 miles (curulative population at a distance divided by the area at that distance), or the projected populstion density over the lifetire of the f acility exceeds 1,00s eersons per square miles averaged over any radial distance out to 30 miles, special ettention should be given to the consideration of alternative sites with lower ro; slation densities."
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j criteria in Regulatory Guide 4.7 and ' described in the Pilgrim final environ-12/
rea.tal statement, a site that exceeds the population density guidelines
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can nevertheless be selected and approved if, on balance, it offers advantages compared with available alternative sites when all of the environ.. ental, safety, and economic aspects cf the proposed site and the alternative sites i
are considered.
11 is current staff practice to assess the relative differences in population exposures for Class 9 accidents between a proposed new site and the alternative sites through the use of population distribution and t
population density as a surrogate for accident consequences. Thqconse-cuences of radiological accidents, from minor or trivial releases up to and t
}.
including severe events, is directly related to the nurber of people sur-l
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~~ r oundins e particular site and to the distance of the population from the.---_.._ __ _
r uctor location.
The staff recognizes that the population distribution of
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a site is a relativcly crude measure of the risk associated with the accidental i
l re' eases cf r ecicactivity. The risk from any accidental releases would
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j depend not only upon the population distribution of a site but also upon many other f actors that would enter into the determination of the actual consequences of accident. Ho.ever, insight geined in the evaluation of i
the relative consequences of accidents in the Perryman alternative site study (SECY-78-137, Enclosure D) led the staff to conclude that L
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3 l?/ " Final Supplement to the Final Environmental Statement related to construction of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Stetton, Unit No. 2",
(NUREE--549)
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Yay 1979.
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(1) ti e relative differences in the population distribution between sites f
is a retsonable' measure of the relative magnitude of potential consequences, (2) relatively large differences in the population densities between two sites are required to exist before significant differences in accident risks would be expected to be discernible, and (3) the risk is not uniform
+
t for all ee:ters of the population regardless of distance from the site i
but is higher for those persons relatively close to the site and generally decreases with distarice away from the site.
The staff's findings in the Seebrook cese were published in NUREG-0501, "Seabrook Alternative Site Study," in Deter.ber 1978 end presented as direct testimony before the Appeal Board at a hearing in January 1979.
In this evaluation, the population distribution out to 30 miles for the Seabrook site was compared to the population distribution for each of the car'didete alternative sites. The staff found that with respect to population, three of the alternative sites hsd sigtsificantly lower population densities than the Seabrook site, i.e., Moore Pond, Shelburne and Phillips Cove.
This factor was brought forward for consideration in the overall balancing of all of the environrental and economic factors which entered into the comparison of each alternative site to the Seabrook site. The staff's conclusion was that upon consideration of an overall balancing of all of the factors, none of the alternative sites were "obviously superior" in comparison to 13/
the Seabrook site.
See, Public Service Cor pany of New Harpshire, CLI-77-8, SNRC 503 (1977).
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(on next page) f.
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]37-~ tee ~ conclusions reache n by the staff are as follows:
Moore Pond
- The socioeconomic factors and in particular the long transmission corridors through wilderness landscape are factors which weigh to the disadvantece of Moore Pond relative to Seabrook.
Envir onment al factors which weigh in favor of Moore Pond relative to Seabrook include low populatien density and lack of salt drift effects. The staff con-ciudes that the adverse factors are of greater magnitude than those i
which favor the site and that Mccre Pond is clearly and substantially disadvantaged relative to Seabrook for the siting of a nuclear power station." NUREG-0501, p. D-72.
Shelburne
'70ssible impacts on fish restoration programs, socioeconomic impacts, and in particular the need for long transmission corridors are all factors which weigh to the substantial disadvantage of Shelburne relative to Seabrook.
Environnental factors which weigh in favor of Shelburne relative to Seabrook are lesser effects of drift and Icwer p.cpulation densities. The Staff concludes that the comparative adverse impacts a.t Shelburne are.of, gr. eat.er magnitude than_the corpprative advar.tages and that this site is therefore clearly and substantially,..
inferior to Seabrook for the siting of a nuclear power station."
Id., pp. E-69, 70.
Phillips Cove
~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
'The residual environmental comparison at the two sites finally reduces to aesthetic, biological and low population advantages at Phillips Cove due to the probable absence of cooling towers and advantages at Seabrook due to shorter transmission corridors and less sociceconomic impact (other than aesthetic).
Because these factors are incommensurate and, therefore, cannot be contrasted directly, and because there are sone importent countervailing factors, the staff concludes that Phillips Cove is not clearly and substantially preferable to Seabrook.
However, the overall weight of evidence does tend to favor Phillips Cove because of the absence of aesthetic effect and drift problems and the staff concludes that Phillips Cove.is marginally superior to Seebrook."
Id. pp. F-69, 70.
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. In summary, although Seabroot exceeded the " trip points" of Regulatory Guide 4.7, as proposed in SECY 78-137, suora, the staff has already per-fermed the assessments of relative differences in Class 9 accident consequences in the Seabrook alternative site review.
I have determined for the reasons set forth above that there exists no adequate basis for instituting a proceeding to suspend er revoke the the Seabrook construction permits because of (1) f ailure of NRC to require development of' ag evacuation plan beyond the low population zone as part of the co'nstruction permit proceeding, and (2) failure of hRC to evaluate the consequences of a Class 9 accident including the necessity for evacuation beyond the 10w population zo'ne~. Accordingly, the request of 'SAPL is denied.
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A copy of this decision will be placed in the Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N. W., Was51ngton, D. C. 20555 and the local Public Docunent Room for the Seabrook Station located at the Exeter Public Library, Front Street, Exeter, New Hampshire. A copy of this document will also be filed with the 3ecretary of the Commission for its review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the Cont.ission's regulations.
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In accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the Comission's Rules of Practice, this decisien will constitute the final action e,f the Comission 20 days after the date of issuance, unless the Comis. tion on its own motion institutes the review of this decision within that time.
4 k
r Harold R. Denton, Director Office of fluclear Reactor Regulation i
Dated at Eethesda, Maryland, this lith day of Februe.ry 1980.
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cj \\ 7'/ / n, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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In the Matter of
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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF Docket Nos. 50-443 6
6 NEW KAMP5 HIRE, et al.
50-444 t <h (Seabrook Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2)
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NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF CIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 62.206 By petition dated May 2,1979, Robert A. Backus, on.behilf of the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League (SAPL) reques+ed that the Director, Office of Nuclear Peactor Regulation, issue an Order to Show Cause why Corstruction Fermit Nos.
CPPR.135 and CPPR-135 for the Seabrook Station, Unit Nos.1 and 2, should not ~
t be suspe,nded or revoked.
SAPL based its request on:
(1) Failure of NRC to"requir'e develojibent of an evacuatTon p1Tn biyond ~ ~ ~ " ~
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the low population zone as part of the construction permit pro-ceedings, and j
(2) Failure of NRC to evaluate the consequences of a Class 9 accident, including the necessity for evacuation beyond the low population zone.
Notice of receipt of SAPL's petition was published in the Federal Register (44 F. R. 32054 (June 4,1979)). On July 30, 1979, the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution (NECNP) filed a nemorandum in support of SAPL's petition.
On November 16, 1979, the Co=wnwealth of Massachusetts also filed a memorandum in support.
On October 12,197D, the Statt of New St.i!.11re filed a Stater 4nt of Fosition.
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.. f L';cn review cf the material sabtitted by SAPL, NECNP, and Massachusetts
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aad c;cn sceticeration of other. relevant informatier., I have determined not to isst.e ar. Order to Show Cause.
Accordingly, the requests of SAPL and NECNP are de-led.
A ccpy of the decision in this matter is available for inspection i
in the Comission's Public Document Room,1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, C. C. 20555, and in the local public document room for the Seabrook Station et the E >rter h51ic Library, Front Street, Exeter, New Her.pshire 03883.
A ccry of it -s decisien will also be filed with the Secretary for the Comission's re.ic,< in ecccrdence with 10 CFR {2.205(c) of the Comissior.'s reculations.
7 As proviced in 10 CF? b2.206(c), this decision will constitute the final
_ _. _ action of the Comission 20 days after the date of issuance'of the decision, l
unless the Comission on its own motion institutes a review of this decision within that time.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION HSb Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dated et Bethesca, Maryland, ttis 11th day of February 1980.
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OAfEILL BACKUS S PIE LM AN ATT O R N EYS AT LAW 4
TELEPHONE ~
116 LOWE LL ST R E ET M AN C H EST E R N EW H AM PS Hi"< E 03:05 603 E68 7272 June 30, 1980 l
John Ahearne, Chairman Victor Gilinsky, Com.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Coml Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC.
20555 Peter A.
Bradford, Com.
Richard T. Kennedy, Com.
U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Com.
U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555 In the Matter of Public Service Company of New Hampshire, et al I
(Scabrook Station, Units 1 & 2)
{
Docket Nos:
50-443, 50-444
Dear Ccmissicners Ahearne,
Eradford, Gilinsky and Kennedy:
I em writing on behalf of the Seacoast Anti-Pollution Leagt:e, an Intervenor in the Seabrook licensing proceeding before the NRC.
i i
Ar you know, the Seabrook f acility is currently under construc-l tion, although at a reduced schedule due to financial constraints, at a site just over 1 1/2 miles from Hampton Beach,. a population i
center which the Atomic Safety Licensing Appeal Board stated:
"Will be at times the most densely populated area in the State."
The site area has severe adverse characteristics not' only from !
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the point of view of the population density, but also in terms of the road network, ^with two out of the three ' roads that provide egress from the beach le'Eding" genera'11y westerly from the beach and toward the reactor site.
You new have before you the issue of whether or not to review '!
a decision made by Mr. Harold Denton,which denied a' request made by the Seacoast Anti-pollution League for a Show Cause. Order
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under 10 C.F.R. 52.206.
You have now on six separate occasions extended the time for deciding whether the Commission 'should take review of this Decision.
10 C.F.R. 52.2 06 (c) (1) indicates that a decision on review will normally occur within 20 days.
It is the purpose of this letter to respectfully suggest thatIn addits!
the time for Commission action on this matter is overdue.
we respectfully urge you, in your role as supervisozs of the regula- !
tory staff, to mandate immediate staff action on the issue raised by the request for a Show cause Order.
That request was filed, t
we would add, on May 2, 1979, well.over a year ago.
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In this regard, we would call to your attention the importaat' !
fact that Mr. Denton's decision of February 11, 1980, on the evacuation issue did not actually deny the Show Cause Request,
- 3 o u rett so poBrot A P e c < t.s e F
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- N r e i 7 s m e a-r a 7 m r.
l vhich had been sought on the ground that no finding by any adjudicatory body within the NRC of the feasibility of evacuation, beyond the 1.25 mile icw population zone, had ever been made.
Rather, Mr. Denton candidly conceded that a demonstration of evaevabili.~ y beyond the LPZ now would appear te be required.
c However, he noted that, by z. letter dated December 26, 1979, from Mr. Brian K. Grimes, D'. rector of the Emergency Preparedness Program Office, requests for estimates of evacuation time by construction permitees, such as the Seabrook permittees, was pending.
According to Mr. Grime s' lette r, the esticates of evacuation time af ter notification were to be provided by March 31, 1980.
Mr. Denton therefore concluded, on page 4 of his decision, that the Show Cause request was " premature" until the time estirates were available, for these estimates would in his opinion assist in determining whether the Seabrook facility was a "special instance" which might under the proposed regulation require regulatory action prior to the operating license review.
The estimates of evacuation time requested in December by Mr. Grimes, and to have been furnished by the end of March, have not, to the kncwledge of the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League, been furnished to this date.
Indeed, Mr. Grimes, by a letter dated March lith, deferred the deadline for submission of the time estimate due to a claimed need for review by the General Accounting Office.
(Mr. Grimes states "GAO clearance normally takes.about 45 days.")
In the meantime, with no response to the important issues raised by the NRC, and with construction continuing, and therefore tending to foreclose options that might be pertinent to a solution, there have been further major developments.
First, it has now become known that the NRC's staff considers the Seabrook site to be one cf 12 " problem" fixed nuclear sites in the country.
A letter form Mr. John W. Macy, Jr., Director of the Federal Emergency Managerent Agency to Governor Hugh Gallen of lists the Seabrook site, along with Indian Point, April 22, 1980, Zion, and nine others as one which has "the highest population density within the 10 mile emergency planning zone or mutually agreed upon by FD'.A and NRC. "
Second, State Civil Defense of ficials have now publically conceded that the task of notifying 100% of the population within a five rdle area within 15 minutes of notification to State or local officials is impossible.
Yet, the 15 minute notification requirement is found in NUREG 0654 " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness Support of Nuclear Power Plants", Appendix 3.
Third, n.any local officials have now in sworn statements indicated their belief that evacuation within the time frame indicated in NUREG 0396, Table 2, is impcssible.
We includg as an attachment hereto affidavits from these individuals.
Fourth, the Commission has itself now recognized, in its Interim Policy Statement of June 9th, dealing with the closely related issue of Class 9 accident assessa.ent, that:
"It is also the intent of the Commission that the staff take steps to identify additional cases that might warrant early consideration of either additional features or other which would prevent or mitigate the consequences of serious accidents.
Cases for such consideration are those for which a final environmental statement has aircady been issued at the construction 7e mit stage but for which the operating license review stage has not yet been reached.
In carrying out this directive, the Staff shculd consider relevant site features, including population density, associated with accident risk in comparision to such features at presently operating plants.
Staff should also consider the likelihood that substantive changes in plant desien features Ghich naf cor pensate Yurther f or adverse site
?eatures nav be more easily incorporated in plants when construction has not procressed very far."
In short, the Comelssion now has a clear duty in this matter, in discharging its duty to protect the public health and safety, immediately review Mr. Denton's decision of February lith, for to it is inconsistent with the Commission's publicl y recognized duties to further delay consideration of this issue, or to pemit further staff delay.
The Commission should immediately recuire a Show Cause proceeding to be instituted, and should ir ediately require staff action to disclose, on the basis of presently available evidence, whether or not evacuation suf ficient to protect the public health and safety, and in light of developing regulatory requirements, can be effected.
It is undisputed that no finding that the presently required erergency planning zone for plume exposure, of about ten miles, can be safely and expeditiously evacuated has ever been made.
Indeed, as indicated by the enclosed affidavits, esent indications are that this is not feasible.
In the absence. of a finding of feasibility, construction should not be permitted to continue at the site, for as the Commission' - June 9th Interir i licy T~.4 also inclu$e, as illustrative of the ).
crn at the Seabrook site,-photo-graphs of traffic and the teach cr:MS takr the Errpton Police Chief, Mr.
Riert Mad., cri Menorial Ihy Heckend,19"
h j
h Statement recognizes, this construction is intending to j
foreclose options that may be important for protecting i
the public health and safety.
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Very truly yours, b
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Robert A. Backus Attorney for Seacoast Anti-Pollution League l
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CERT 2FICATF OF SERVICE
. Jane 30, 1950 I,
Robert A. Backut, certify that I have mailed, postage prepaid, first class or airmail of the within to Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing i
Atomic Safety'and Licensing Board Panel Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission i
Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555
!.I Dr. John H. Buck Office of the Attorney General :
Atomic Safety and Licensing 208 State House Annex Appeal Board Concord, New Hampshire 03301 U.S. Nuc' ear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Karin P. Sheldon, Esquire Sheldon,Harmon,Roisman&Weish Michael C.
Farrar, Esquire Suite 506 Atomic Safety and Licensing 1725 I Street, N.W.
Appeal Boerd Washington, D.C.
20006 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7
Washington, D.C.
20555 Dr. Ernest O. Salo
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Professor of Fisheries Research!
Ivan W.
Smith,' Esquire Institute Atomic Safety and Licensing College of Fisheries Board Panel University of Washington.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Seattle,- Washington-96195 Washin5 ton, D.C.
20555 l
Dr. Kenneth A. McCollum Joseph F. Tubridy, Esquire 1107 West Knapp Street 4100 Cathedral Avenue, N.W.
Stillwater, Oklahoma 74074 Washington, D.C.
20016 t
Dr. Marvin M. Mann Frank Wright, Esq.
A.omic Safety and Licensing Assistant Attorney General Board Panel One Ashburton Place U.S. Nuclear Reguletory Commission Boston, Massachusetts 02108 Wa:nington, D.C.
20555 l
Edwin T. Reis, Esquire Assistan: Chief Hearing Counsel Office of the Executive Legal Director r
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washingtor., D.C.
20555 9
9
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4 John Ahearne, Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C.
20555 Peter A. Bradford, Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Victor Gilinsky, Corr.issioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Richard T. Kennedy, Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co:rmission Washington, D.C.
20555 Leonard Bickwit, Esquire Of fice cf the General Counsel U.S. Nuclear ReEulatory Cor.nission Washington, D.C.
20555 Thomas Dignan, Esq.
Ror.as & Gray -
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225 Franklin Street Boston, Massachusetts 02110 s
'Robdrt A. Backus
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I AFFIDAVIT OF DIANA LAMONTAr;NE j
1.
My name is Diana Lamontagne, I reside in Hampton, and I am l
a Selectren.
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2.
In my opinion,no evacuation of Hampton can be affected within i
i a reasonable tin.e, should this be necessary because of a nuclear i
disaster.
3.
My concerns are that many of the officals, such as our police and fireren, who will have t o be in charge of evacuation may them-i selves want to leave the area in the event of a nuclear disaster.
I am concerned about the children in our schools, about the i
i prospect of looting in the event of evacuation, about the l
reception our people might have in the destination areas, if I
i there has been evidence of contamination, and the length of tire j
it might be before people could return Eb their homes.
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4.
The.e is no reasonable evacuation plan for the Town of l
Hampton, and I persona 11y doubt.that it is possible to, develop i
one that will have any reasonable chance of success.
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<n a, _s
/h.,,( 2 g[9 Diana Lamontagne -
g DATE:
State of New Hampshire County of l
i Personally appeared the aforerentioned Diana Lamontagne l
and made oath that the above statements subscribed by her are l
true to the best of her knowledge and belief.
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Before re,
'f Y V
Justice of the peace i
l
t AFFIDAVIT OF JAY TANZER 1.
My name is Jay Tan::er, I am the Civil Defense Director for the Town of Hampton.
I believe the Town of Hampton is now approximately 10,000 people.
Hampton, however, does l
include Har:pton Beach, one of the most heavily populated j
places in the State of New Hampshire, and the location of New Hampshire's most popular state park, Hampton Beach State Park.
2.
Hampton Beach is within two miles of the Seabrook reactors, and access to the beach, which is a barrier beach is provided by only three roads.
One of these roads, Route 286, would not be available for evacuation of Hampton Beach, since it is my understanding the plan would be to close the Hampton Harbor Bridge, so that piople south of the tridge, in Seabrook,.
could evacuate southerly.
8 3.
Route 1A, which goes north from Hampton Beach, isa
..._j very heavily congested road.
The only other road providing access to the Beach is Route 51, also known as the Exeter/Hampton t
Egressway, which proceeds in a generaly northwesterly direction.
It also has a
- choke" point which is the bridge over the Tide Mill Creek.
3 4.
The Town of Hampton has at this point no evacuation plans.
In my opinion bei such a plan can begin to be developed the l
Town must have a dediuted radio, communications system, available throughout the day, and also an emergency warning center.
In my opinion the people of the Town cannot be protected without these 1
I l
I w
u e
l basic requirements.
I believe Ehe total cost of the siren l
I warning system could,be S98,000.
At the present time we have just one siren.
I al'so think we need a so-cal' led " slave" r
radio station as part of our communications system.
5.
There are approximataly 57 miles of town roads in the Town of Hampton, there is a nursing home and there are elderly that would r.eed assistance in evacuating.
People of this i
sart would have to be approached by " block wardens".
6.
In my opinion, Hampton Beach presents the most difficult problem for evacuation in the Town of Hampton.
I do not believe you can evacuate Hampton Beach in a reasonable time without more roads providing access to t he Beach.
7.
In addition, I believe that no evacuation plan can be i
said to be adequate, if you do not have a drill or test of that plan.
I do not mean by this that you need to actually l
cause people to leave.
However, I do believe that you have i
i to have your energency personnel t rained and tested.
This also of course 'will require funding, whichIhie Town lacks.
<4?
DATE:
D T n er State of New Hampshire County of Personally appeared before me the aforementioned Jay Tanzer and made oath that the statements subscribed by him are true to the best of his knowledge and. belief.
i Before me, Jhstice of the Peace
AFFIDAVIT OF LESTER BLACKWELL 1.
My name is Lester Blackwell, and I reside at 18 Union Street in Exeter, New Hampshire.
I am a retired flight engineer and I expect to be named Civil Defense Director of the Town of Exeter.
2.
My - 'ition is an unpaid position and nry budget is S1,200, and ::v.
De going to $1,800.
This is for fixed costs associated with civil defense, such as telephone, maintenance of the generator, and our warning system, consisting of four or five sirens.
3.
I do not know, and I do not believe anyone knows, the time required to evacuate the Town of Exeter.
My initial impression is that it will take 3 ') ran at $10 an hour to provide necessary traffic control.
The total cost cannot be estimated.
WYs - Ys.-
DATE:
Tester Blackwell
~ *'
State of New Hampshire County of Personally appeared the aforenontioned Lester Blackwell and made oath that the statenents subscribed by him are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.
Before re, 8
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d Justige of.the Peace i
i l
,e' AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW CHRISTIE 1.
My nave is Andrew Christie and I am the Chief of Police in Hampton Falls, New Hampshire and have resided here and served as Police Chief for five years.
2.
I believe that to evacuate this town, which is largely rural, would take approximately 10 to 20 people, and, if everybody had previously been given exact information on what to do and where to go, it would take perhaps 6 to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
3.
The Harpton Falls police force consists of, in addition to ryself, four special officers, all of whom are out-of-town, and one of whom is 'a lobster fisherran.
I do not knov where we would get the manpower necessary to supervise a-evacuation.
4.
I think the only feasible way to notify people an evacuation would be necessary would be to go fran door-to-door.
We do.have one siren, which can be heard for perhaps a quarter-of-a-mile,
_ and would cover 10 or 15 per cent of the families at best, I would estimate.
5.
I believe a phamdtet, containing detailed information on evacuation, should be provided to every household in town.
I also believe that we would need additional sirens and co.mmunication equiprent, which could be very expensive.
6.
There are 28 miles of road in this town, with five intersections on Route 88 alone.
As a practicci matter, I don't believe an evacuation in the event of a r jor nuclear disaster could ever be rade to work.
DATES /??Alifb 0{ I$50 1:W Andrew Christie
s 1
5 County of Personally appeared the afortrentioned Andrew Christie and r.ade oath that the state.ents subscribed by him are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.
Before re, w
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Justiceofthefeace i
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i AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT MA?If 1
i 1.
My name is Robert Markf and I am the Chief of Police of l
i Harpton.
1 2.
I am concerned about my responsibilities as Chief of l
Police in the event a nuclear evacuation of Hampton was r
required.
3.
I believe the most difficult problem for Hampton would be the evacuation of Hampton Beach, should this become necesst.ry on a day when there is peak usage of the beach.
I have photo-
{
graphs taken on May 27, 1979, showing the traffic approaching I
Earpton Beach at approximately 10 in the torning.
These photo-graphs show that' the Exeter/Hrspten Expressway, the major route to and from the Beach, although it is one lane of traffic in each direction, being used by two solid lines of approaching traffic, stretching as far as the eye can see.
The second l
lane of approaching traffic is using the shoulder, which
(
I understand might have to be reserved for of ficial vehicles and emergency use.
}
I 4.
I am aware that fire equipment can take from one to two hours to 9t from Hampton Beach to Route 1 on a peak beach day, i
althovo)
. sis is only a distance of approximately two miles.
It has tak sn me as much as 1 1/2 hours to go a mere six blocks in the beach area in early July of 1979.
I agree with the l
Affidavit of Mr. Tanzer that it is not possible to evacuate the Beach in a reasonable time without additional roads.
5.
I have 27 full-time of ficers in the police force.
The Fire Department has 31 firemen, 8 on duty at a time.
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J.t 2-State of New Earpshire County of I691@,
Personally appeared before me the aforerentioned Robert Marky and made oath that the staterents subscribed by him are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.
I Before re, A
&m Jus *Me of the Peace f
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AFFIDAVIT OF SANDRA GAVUTIS 1.
My nare is Sandra Gavutis and I an a Selectmen in the Town of Kensington, New Hampshire, the center of which is approximately 5 or 6 ndles from the site of the Seabrook nuclear plant.
The population of Kensington is approximately 1,200 people.
2.
On March 13, 19 80, by voice vote at Town Meeting, che citizens of Kensington voted that eva.cuation of the Town of Kensincton in the event of a nuclear disaster was impractible, and to oppose the use of any Town funds for this purpose.
3.
Neither I, or to my knowledge, either of the other two Selectmen of the Town of Kensingten have ever been contacted by a representative of the Public Service Company of New Hampshire with regard to the evacuation problem in our town.
4.
Our Civil Defense Director, Andrew J. Mertinooke is a i
volunteer, and the Town lacks any. budget or resources to properly plan for an evacuation.
5.
The Town contains three schools, en elementary school, a kinder garten and a nurse ry school.
There are also in Kensington r.any one car f amilies, where the principal wage earner may be away from here during working hours.
6.
The Kensington police force consists of four men, all part-tire.
The Chief of Police is a truck driver, who cannot be counted on to be available at all times.
Also,.there is no ges.:rol communications system available in Kensington, only police radios.
7
o
- i 7.
In the event an evacuation was necessary, I believe the police, assuming they could be made available pro =ptly, would have to go door to door to notify inhabitants.
This would be necessary because Kensington is a rural co== unity.
8.
For the above reasons, I do not believe that an evacuation of the Town of Kensington is feasible within the time frame during which a radioactive plume might cover this Town, which l
I understand, according to Table II of NU!-IG-0396, might be on the order of one to four hours.
Q91bft
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dit DA~T: @w.[. 7 Sandra Gavutis i
State of New Ha:npshire County of hMb Personally appeared the aforerentioned Sandra Gavutis and nade oath that the statements subscrioed by her are true to the
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best of her knowledge and belief.
Before ne, 4
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il.uttice of tp Peace l
J. Ct.Agg jactrs. Jes':e c: tr.e Peste L'.y Cemrms oa [8&'e5 D"*Ct*' 8* 3 l
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I an at the mocent 1.
My name is tenald Chick and I am the Exeter Town Manager.
the Acting Cf<!1 Oefense Director, but hold this positica ig name only.
dec%
2.
To the best cf my recollection, I have had not centactegrom Public Service f
Cocpany, builder cf the Seabrook nuclear power plant, about evacuation planning.
t I have had no indication of what the ti=e f rame would be for an evacuation, or the personnel or equipment that would be required.
3.
No action has been taken by the Selecteen of Exeter with regard tu an evacua-tion plan. I have, however, received an annex prepared by New Hampshire Civil Defense, indicating generally the evaucation routes that would be used in this area.
I don't have any idea how long an evacuation of Exeter would take, maybe 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> l
4.
or esybe a week.
I would assume there veuld be some panic a=ong the population, j
5.
I also do not believe that the tax payers of Exeter should pay for an evacuation caused by the Seabroek nuclear plant. A fund should be established by charges to 1
i the users of the electricity from the plant to cover'any evacuation caused by the i
Plant.
l Ij'utf n
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Donald Chick l
1 l
DATE:
i i.
State of New Ha:pshire l
County of Rockingham l
d Personally appeared the af orementioneo. Dcnald Chick and made oath I
1 that the statecents subscribed.by him are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.
Before se,
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~ Notary Public gX'
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AFFIDAV3T OF WILLI AM MARSTON
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1.
My name is William lhrston, and I reside in Hampton Falls, l
New Hampshire, where I an a rember of the Board of Selectmen.
I I live on Brown Road, and I am a dairy f armer with a herd of approximately 55 dairy cattle.
2.
I do not believe that the Town of Hampton Falls is in any way equiped to handle a major disaster at the Seabrook nuclear power plant, which is sited within two rdles of the village center.
The population of Hampton Falls is around 1,400 to 1,500.
There is also a camp ground, many of whose patrons are i
Canadians, who may not speak English.
3.
I have had no contact from Public Service Company negarding evacuation planning, and no indication of the time in which an evacuation might have to be accomplished.
4.
The Town has no evacuation plan, and has voted, at Town Meeting, not to expend public funds for this purpose.
.m 5.
In my opinion, the Town of Ham'pton Falls is ill-equiped to be evacuated in the event of a nuclear disaster, and lacks the resources and personnel to prepare for such an event.
l i
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A //k%d/k% 1 1
am Marst'on'/
~
DATE:
i l
State of New Hampshire County of Personally appeared the aforementioned William thrston and made oath that the statements subscribed by him are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.
Before me, i
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O N'E t L L DACMUS S PICL M AN ATT on N C Y S AT-t AW c__
815 LOW E LL ST R C CT T E L E *
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MANCHESTER NEW H AM PS HIR C 03:05 Go3 C-Ge 7272
. f s;
May 2, 1979 i
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Mr. Harold Denton W
NM-hg"
'I Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation g
U.
- 5. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20053 O-RE:
In the Matter of Public Service Company of j
NH, et a l.-
i (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
Docket Nos. 50-443, 50-444
Dear Mr. Denton:
t t
I am enclosing for your information an additional Request l
for a Show Cause Order in regard to the Seabrook construction I
permits.
j i
This request, on behalf of the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League, is not made lightly.
It was clearly foreshadowed in i
my letter to you of March 12, 1979, in which I indicated my l
concern about the failure to investigate the consequences.of a Class 9 accident in the Seabrook site review.
i That concern, of course somewhat further stimulated by events at Three Mile Island, prompts the present request.
l Very truly yours,-
-l y
=
Robert'A. Backus 3
RAB/sid j
Enc.
I l
cc:
All Persons on Service List i
i 1
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UNITED STATES OT AMERICR
.L NUCLEAR REGULATORY COKMISSION g\\Sggk
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TO:
DIRECTOR OP NUCLEAR RIACTOR REGULATION
~*
RE:
cot 2STRUCTION PERMITS CPPR-135 t,,
CPPR-136 o,4 L In the Matter of i
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF
)
Docket flos. 50-443 NEW HAMPSilIRE, et al.
)
50-444
}
(Seabrock Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
}
REQUEST FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY CONSTRUCTION
?ERMITS FOR THE PROPOSED NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AT SEA-BROOK SHOULD NOT BE SUSPENDED OR REVOKED This request for an Order to Show Cause is made on behalf of the Se'acoast Anti-Pollution. League, 5 Market Street, Portsmouth,'
New Hampshire, 038.01. an. Intervenor in the above captioned.
The relief requested is -an order to show Cause why the Seabrood construction permits should not be suspended or revoked because of:
1.
Failure of RRC to require development of an evacuation plan beyond the low population zone as part of the construction permit proceedings, and 2.
Failure of NRC to evaluate the consequences of a Class 9 accident, including the n e c e s aity for evacuation beyond the low population tone.
BACKGROUND OF THE EVACUATION ISSUE l
The Application for Seabrook construction permits was docketed i in July of 1973.
During the period of J aconse review, the HRC i
1 Regulatory Staf f took :ho pocition.. which it 175 r.s tntained throuprl N._
. h the proceeding in the above captioned, that demonstration of the ability to evacuate persons beyond the low population zone was within the jurisdiction of the Staf f to require in a construction permit proceeding.
over objection by the Applicants, the issue of evacuation feasibility beyond the LPZ was admitted as an issue in contention before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, and was the tabject of extensive evidentiary hearings in June of 1975.
Erwever, in the Initial Decision, LBP 76-26, the Licensing Board specifically declined to rule on the contested issue of the feasibility of evacuation beyond the LPZ, and particularly of Hampton Beach, for two reasons.
Firs't, the Board held that the anticipated radiological doses likely to be received as the result of_a design basis accident should be treated 'rcalistically" rather than
- conservatively."
When so treated, the' Board found that the likely doses would be 1
well below those doses for which protective action would be recommended under the protective action guides.
Thus the Board held:
"That evacuation of the area within about five elles of the Seabrook station vould become advisible, or necessary, only in the event of an accident whose consequences are substantially greater than and less probable than those rea sonably to be expected from a design basis accident."
G Ed' h
I i
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=E The Licensing Board furthe: held, in a supporting Opinion, i
that in any event the Commission's regulations did not intend t
any requirement for a demonstrati. of protection of persons j
bra.nd the LPZ.
I r
... Appendix E should not be read as requiring consid-i eration by a licensee of protective measures beyond the l
LPI, but that so far as design basis events are concerned, 1
the several safety features in a plant should be credited with reasonable protection of populations outside the LPI.*
l In short, the Licensing Board's decision held that a demonstration of the feasibility of protective action, primarily 1
meaning evacuation, was only required for the LpI, a circle it j
I held was properly drawn at a radial distance of 1.5 miles from the reacters, and which did not include within its orbit Hampton Beach or the other barrier beaches.
As a result, the Licensing Board did not resolve the conflicting testime.,y about the feasibilij of evacuating persons more than 1.5 miles from the reactors, such as persons on Hampton and the other beaches.
l l
Appeals from the Licensing Board d,ecision were taken to the I
d Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board by the Intervenor New l
a t-
]
England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution, the Attorney General _ of j
New Hampshire, and by the NRC staff itself.
The Appeal board l
l 91sposed of the evacuation issue in ALAB-390, April 3,1977, in j
a manner contrary to the Sta f f's position.
The Appeal board i
i held:
i
'That, under the Commission's regulations in their j
prezent f o rm, cons ideration ' n
.o'. to be e.ven in pa a lice ns i n; pr:ce* M - /
3.' n f e :. S i ' '.
- y c i J rn t 'JS I
yp an emergency plan fer the Jrctee loc. (.n chs evmut of l
an secadent; et persans.ucate: L.t a de 6!e Je. 1*rvlL-l tion tore."
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Because of the ruling that the regulations did not pe rmit consideration of persons outside the LPI in the event of an accident, the Appeal Board did not need to, and did nnr.,
consider the propriety of treating the radio-logical consequences of a design basis accident on "realis-tic" ra ther than " conservative" assumptions, as had been done by the Licensing Board.
In a concurring opinion, Appeal Board member Farrar stated:
"I believe there is much to be said for the view, pressed upon us here, that consideration need be given to the feasibility of protecting people located outside (as well ar inside) a reactor's low population zone from radiological hazards in the event of a serious accident."
Mr.,Farrar went on to point out that the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety had stated, in a December 10, 1974 letter reviewing the Seabrook Application:
~
"Because of the proximity of the Seabrook station to the beaches on the coast and because of the nature of the road network serving the beachez, the Applicant has given ea rly attention to the problem of. evacuation.
The Committee beli re s, however, that_further attention needs to be given to evacuation of residents and transients in the vacinity even t hou g h they maybe outside the LPZ."
(Emphasis supplied by Mr. Farrar.)
In a subsequent Appeci Board decision, reviewing other aspects of the Initial Decision in the Seabrook proceeding, ALu-4 2 2, the Appeal Board further held that the LPZ for Se a brook s hould be red uc ed f r om 1. E tr 1. 25 mil e s, ba s ed upon E
e CO T'
a
. ~
c=W the Appeal Board's finding that the Licensing Board had erred in treating Portsmouth, New Hampshire, approximately 11 miles from the reactor, as the population center distance.
~
Contrary to the Applicant's and Staf f's position, the Appeal l
Board held that the appropriate population center distance was Hampton Beach, since:
"There is no doubt that, at peak periods there, j
in excess of 25,000 people will be found in a densely populated arca--indeed, no one disputes I
the clain that this area will be at times the most densely populated area in the State."
The effect of this holding, however, was merely to reduce the area in which the Applicants were held to have a duty to demenstrate an ability to protect persons in the event of an accident, since the Appeal Board adhered to its ruling in ALAB-390 that NRC regulatf.ons did not permit consideration of evacuation of persons outside the low population zone.
On September 21, 1978, the NRC's Office of Standards Development notified NRC licensees that the Commission was, in effect, reversing the holding of ALAB-390 by means of a l
proposed rule.
"The proposed changes to the Commission's Part 50, Appendix E, would recuire an applicant to consider i
l anergency planning beyrd the low population zone....'
l The proposed rule, designated to provide ' interim guidar.ce,"
and published in the Pederal Pegister on August 23, 1978 provides:
"The extent to which emergency planning, which may include evacuation neasurer, wou?.c extert te a rsa L beyord the LPZ woul d be ba s e d 2%
- 5.s :.1e = -. fe.at e ? f of :),e ar.ialty, E;c and the physicial and po::ulatic!. chrxt.er veist ic h
,f ths land surrounding the plur.t :ite. Os cil 42 iha e.esptable protectivt cerirn crito::s oc alepvC by f tttral, alate and loce) aut t.cr' t ie r. "
t The Notice to Licensees also stated that, "Where a construction pennit has been issued, the emergency plans will be revieved at che operating license stage."
In su:=ary, it is clear that at the present ti:ne:
l.
No determination of the feasibility of protecting persons beyond the Seabrook LPZ, 1.25 miles from the reactors, by evacuation or otherwise has been made.
'2.
The reason for not req iring such a demonstration, l
de lac.k of regulatory authority to do so, has been expressly repudiated by the Commission in promulgating the proposed rule.
3.
The alternate basis for not requiring proof of the feasibility of evacuation beyond the LP2, the use of " realistic" rather than "conscrvative" radiological dose a s su nptions, has never been reviewed or approved by the Appeal Board or
. the Commission, or even ende: sed by the Staf f.
4.
The issue of evacuation must be dealt with, in any proposedSeabrook_ plant.{nglicensestageforthe event, during the operat 1%e Soabrook ccnstriction pemits, it shcr.21d be roted, are still ret firal.
l They are u M.er chillenge before th_- Tirst Circuit Court of 7ppee's as to the Ctrreission's discharge of its daties as to altemative sites, ad trder cM11mpe in the ss. e Co.:rt with regard to the Ctrmission's treatment of the nuclear waste issue, rcw perding before the District of Colu-bia Court of 4 peals en re-a:d.
In adiition, a seist.ic issue at the Seelro::A site ausits possible Cczmi=sim revi tqcn cer:pletion of Appeal R>ard rmber Parrar's full dissent en this subject.
(soe Aus422 ard the N4 u%'s oc6er of Septais:: 15, 1977.)
e er=}
. L A..
BACKGROUND OF THE CLASS 9 ACCIDENT ISSUE In its Safety Evaluation Report and Final Environmental Statement, consistent with established practice, the NRC Regulatory Staff declined to consider the consequences of the so-called Class 9 accident. (FES 7-3)
A Class 9 accident is, by definition, an accident that involves the failure of engineered safety features, and includes such scenarios as a core meltdown with consequent breach of containment.
The Staff, in order to avoid the evaluation of the consequenced of a Class 9 accident in the performance of its NEPA review, appears to have relied upon WASH 14 00, the reactor safety study, more commonly known as the Rasmussen Report.
(FES Chapter 7)
The Licensing Board, in adopting the Staff's view that no consideration need be given 'to the class 9 accident, rel'ied upon the proposed annex t'c Appendix D to 10 C.F.R. Part'5 '. The
~
~
- ~
~
proposed annex admitted tha t "the consequences (of a Class 9 i
accident) could be severe."
However, the annex also state' that
[
"the probe.bility of their occurrance is so small that the environmental risk is extremely low."
However, in the Initial Decision, the Licensing Board, although adopting the Staff's position tha t no consideration of a Class 9 accident was required, added:
"With regard to accidents larger than those considered i
in safety evaulations it is cle:ar that evacuation in the event of a Class 9 accide:nt would be desirable, and indeed in rome erses nacesserf.'
(Citing MAi.4 14 00)
- e. -
Since th: In! *.f.o1 Occinien.
hr,.
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tr ft.:. eftsine
(
to cons ~dsi thi co:,siquencas of e C*. s.- 3 aceAdene, trat is r
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the assumption of extremely low probability of this occuret sce, has been severly undermined by action of both the Comm:ssion and of the Regulatory Staff.
First, in Regulatory Guide 4.7, the Staff had long ago recognized that sotae guidance for implementing the requirer.ents of 10 C.F.R. Part 100 was appropriate.
Regulatory Guide 4.7 provides that:
" Areas of low population density are preferred for nuclear power station sites.*
The Regulatory Guide goes on to provide as follows:
"If the population density, including weighted transient population, projecticn at the tin.e of initial operation of a nuclear power station exceeds 500 persons per square mile averaged out over any radial distance out to 30 miles (cumulative population at a distance divided by the area at that distance), or the projected population density over the lifetime of the f acility exceeds 1,000 _
persors per sqqare mile averaged out ove,r any radial distance out to 30 miles, special attention should be given to the consideration of alternative iltes with
~
lower population densities.*
In December 1978, in NURIG-0 5 01, e n t i tl ed " rW~~ S t a f f Testimony Related to Alternative Sites'to Seabrook I and II,'
the Sta f f for the first time presented evidence of population densities at Seabrock averaged out over a radial distance of 30 miles.
This study showed that the " trip levels"of Regulatory Guide 4.7 were excecded both in 198 0 three years prior to the start of plant operation, and in 2020, near the and of plant operation, at most radial mile markers.
The staf f's testimony further showed that none of the 61:.erna tive sica n be hg canvassed i
??-
15 in de tall by tra Stat t bad popu' A t t or densitier a s h.8 th as
- 6. hose
)
. 1 c.
at the proposed Seabrook site.
r:nally, prior to the releas-of 1:URE -0501, but unknown to counsel fo.r the person making this request, the Staff had f
changed the ;cs; tion it had taken bef ore the Licensing Board
)
where at had contended that the consequences of a class 9 i
acesdent need not be considered.
In Staf f action document I
SEOY -7 8-13 7, Ma rch 7, 1973, the Sta f f pointed out that in certain cases. such As tt.c proposed Clinch River Breeder-Reactor f
and the float:ng nuclear p:wer plant, it had analyzed the l
consequences of a class 9 accident.
In SECY-78-137, the Staff
{
presented the following recome.endation for Commission actions l
- Fending completion of the Commission's review of its reactor siting policy, that the Staff
)
pe r f ore quanti ta t ive assessments of the relative i
differences in Class 9 accident consequences.and l
risks in the review cf alternative sites where' the proposed site exceeds the general population 9:1delines of Regulatory Guide 4.7.*
Thas, the Staff's pos: tion in the r;S a ppea r s to have been i
be:ame clear during the reopened ssbstantially modified, as hearings on alterr.ative sites held before the Appeal Board in January of 1979.
At this point, it appea rs that the Staff vo.id new requir e some evaluation of the consequences of a class 9 accident when a proposed site. as in the case of
(
t Seabrook, exce eds the ' trip levels" of Regulatory Guide 4.7 Second, the Commission has itself taken action which under-mines the prior staf f dee.istor. tc r.et evaluate the consequences i
of a Class 9 accident.
As orev.ous.; avir. tad eut, the Staff.
[
r-appar vatly, a.M t'.c Lic tas e nc 5cere e::ys teic:y. rd* t* 3 t ycn WASH 1400, t he PA snu s s er, Re,~. r t, t3 at.; Wrt 8.he tOnt8 9sion that l
i
-4 the consequences of a Class 9 accident need not be considered because the probability of its occurrence was "so 'small that
[its) environmental risk is extremely low."
On January 19, 1979, the Comission expressly repudiated the executive surn: nary of WASH 1400, t1 e Rasmussen Report, and further stated that:
" Absolute yalues of the risk presented by WASH 1400 should not be used uncritically either in the regula-tory process or for public policy purposes...."
The Corxnission added:
"In particular, in light of the Review Group's conclusions on accident probabilities, the Conmission does not regard as reliable the Peactor Safet) Studies riumerical estimate of the overall risk of reactor accident."
Thus, the staff decision not to require consideration of Class 9 accident consequences, insofar as it depended on NASH 1400's conclusions, is at this point without proper scientific or analytical foundation.
As a result, both the environmental and safety analyses of the proposed Seabrook site are incomplete at this time.
In sununary, it is clear that at the present time:
1.
No evaluation of the consequences of a Class 9 at Seabrook have been performed, even as to alternative sites.
2.
The evaluation of a Class 9 sceident consequance would' require, among other t.hir gs, considerstion of evacuation of persons beyond the low population i
sone, as the Licainsing Beard das held.
3.
No finding thet svww*i>*- f.n fossib.e bey :r.d the low pr.pe3 n t i on tr.s= Fr.s e"e: *:.m -M e by r-F t r ib.:n:1 ir the F tr br:M pJ.> car:/1n /.
Eca Ir.i'irJ Dncialm; Close. a. :ident,.
1 4.
Thn basin Mr nest : unsideriri che t Set s 11.ege*C.y e:tt.rawl y s rv ; r: runt;;* y of ts L
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occurrence, has been undercut by the Commi s sion's repudiation of the assessment risk values in the Rasmussen Report.
5.
The Staff has recognized the desirability of at Icast some analysis of the consequences of a Class 9 accident when population densities within 30 radial miles of the reactor exceed certain " trip levels," which levels are in fact exceeded at Seabrook.
l LEGAL At'T11'MITY This request is made pursuant to 10 C.T.R.
2.206.
In addition, it i s ina d e in reliance upon the duty of the Commission's Staf f to take appropriate action in the licht of evolving safety standards and newly developed information as set forth in such cases as Tt. Pierce Utilities Authority of the City of Ft. Pierce v. United States of. America and the !!uclea r Regulatory Comni s sion, No. 77-1925 and 77-2101, decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Distract o f Columbia. Ma rch 2 3, 1979.
DISCUSSIO!;
There as no doubt that Seabrook is today being constructed without any evaluation of a Class 9 accident and, in particular, without any de terr.ina tion that evacuation at this site of persons beyond the low population zone is practicable.
The issue raised by this request for an Order to Show Cause is whether this determination of practicality can be deferred, intended by the September 21, 1978
- Notice to Licenseen," to as the operating license stage.
It is the pocition of yvit rest's.t'.n.
the*. def arre l of this h
issue to tne overstina 11censa s t a rie to-Han om 8.n singti}stly (nappropriau, a V nrit :or.s ir.r.a r.t with (fie staff'n pr' ery l
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obligation to protect the public's health and safety.
]
This position is supported by the following reasons.
l First, all pe,rties to this proceeding have recognized that, in certain cases, evacuation beyond the LP: is appropriate' l
t as a siting question.
The NRC Staf f took this position consistently' L
during the licensing process.
Furthermore, counsel for the j
Applicant, Mr. Thomas G. Dignan, himself stated to the Licensing i
Board on June 18, 1975:
i "The issue in a construction permit hearing is feasibility, l
and what we are now getting is detailed questions on an evacuction plan, which I think has been uniformly testified i
doesn't exist yet.
The burden is upon us to show feasibility."
(Tr. 34'!1) r Second, the only bases for not requiring a damnnstration of evacuation feasibility beyond the LPT as part of a siting i
decision have been expressly :-ped sited by subsequent events.
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Thes*
ven*s are th* reve:=al of ALA3 390's' holding-that'the s
e age'ati.. s d_4d c *. provide for this authority by the promulgation ut the proposed rule amending Appendix,E, and the highly question-l able use of ' realistic" rather than " conservative
- assumptions as to radiological doses from a design basis accident.
Third, the consideration of evacuation, like any other issue, will be tainted by the spector of a completed plant, and billions of dollars invested, if the inquiry into feasibility is to await the operating license stage.
The issue will become l
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at that stage not feasibility, but rather one of making j
the best of a potentially bad, or impossible, situation.
j Tourth, the Seabrook site is now known to exceed staff i
J population guidelines, as set forth in Regulatory Guide 4.7, i
so the issue of evacuation is particularly appropriate for j
e consideration as a siting issue in this proceeding.
rifth, the Seabrook site is a particularly dif ficult one l
i in regard to evacuation because of the barrier beaches, which l
are at times extremely heavily populated.
These beaches are i
connected to major evacuation routes by only three highways, with very limited capacity, and two of which would lead evacuees generally back toward the reactorn.
Sixth, although EPA Protective Action Guidelines suggest evacuation would only be considered at dose levels of 1 to S i
rems whole body or 5 to 25 remsjphyroid, it is a fact that during G
the Three Mile Island event a partial evacuation was ordered by the Governor of Pennsylvania, at the suggestion of the i
Chairman of the NRC, when, according to published reports, doses only in millerems were detected in the environment.
i Nonetheless, it was based upon the values of the EPA RN3's, plus the use of " realistic" rather than " conservative
- dose.
]
i assumptions that enabled -the LJeansing Board to rule that, J
even if regulations permitted it, no consideration of evacuation i
beyond the LP1 was necessary for & desiyn basis accident.
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l CONCLUSION l
For the foregoing reasons, and in particular in light of the difficult physicial character of the proposed site, i
together with its high population densities, the Director of Nuclear Reactor T,egulations should im.ediately issue l
.t 9
show cause order pending a soundly b.ned detcmination a
i that 1
(1)
Evacuation of persons within the 30 mile area surrounding the proposed reactor is feasibic, and 3
(2)
Analysis of the consequences of a Class 9 l
accident finds the site still to be cceptable.
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Re spectf ully subenitted, i
SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE By Their Attorneys, O'NEILL BMKUS SPIELMAN i
2
-v w-i-
~ Robert A. Backus l
t j
May 2, 1979 I
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UNITED STATES Or AMr.RICA
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J NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO 12tISSION 3
v;l'51*
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CrnTIFICATr or stPrICr I hereby certify that the enclosed was mailed first class or air rail, postage prepaid to the following on j
thi s 2nd Day of May,19 7 9.
j 5
Feter Eredford, Commissioner Marcia E. Mulkey, Esq.
l Victor G111nsky, Commissioner Office of the Executive Legal Richard T.
Kennecy, Conmisssioner Director U.S.
Nuclear negulatory Commission.
Uss. Nuclear Regulatory Commission washington, DC 20555 Washingtor., DC 20555 i
t Sanuel Chilk E. Tupper Kinder, Esquire Secretary Assistant Attorney General l
C.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
Environnental Protection Division l
Washington, DC 20555 office of the Attorney General
[
208 State House Annex i
Alan S.
Rosenthal, Ch' airman
~ Concord, New Hampshire 03301 l
Atonic Saf ety and Licensing Appeal Board Karin P. Sheldon, Esquire U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Sheldon, liarmon & Roisman
- e s hi ng ton, DC 20555 1025 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005 l
Dr. 'ohn 11. Buck Atonte Safety.and Licensing Atonic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conniscion U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission
~
1:ashington, DC 20555 Washin6 ton, DC 20555
!-tichael C. Tarrar. Esquire Dr. Ernest O. Salo i
Atom 2e Safety and Licensing Professor of Fisheries Rossarch Doard Panel Institute U.S. Huelear Regulatory Commission College of Fisheries Haahington, DC 20555 University of Washington Seattle, Washington 98195 Ivan u. Cmith, Esquire l
Atomic Safety and Licensing Laurie surt, Es quire U.s e
r Regulatory Cunmission
'i* tgt Attorney General g,
Wa shing ton, DC 20555 totter, Massachadetts 92100 l
Dr. Marvin M. Hann gy g,,,. We t oi, duqu;;e l
Atomic Safety and Licersico g,, ;,q,,
y,,,.
,g soard Panel 10/s 14th isrte t, 9.k., Tin to 500 l
.$. Nuclear Regulatory CCan*.cmic,.
herrington, D 20005
.ishington, DC 7055-
A a.
J2.
_2 d e
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i 2-Thomas Dignan, Esquire g=
Ropes and Gray W
225 Franklin Street Boston, MA 02110 l
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Docket & Service Station Office of the Secretary Re gul a to ry Commi s s ion h ' ' '. k-
=A U.S. Nuclea!
20555 Fohert A Backus Washington, DC Jame s L.
Kelly, Esq.
Acting General Counsel t
Of fice of the General Counsel U. S. Nuclear kegulatory Comm.
Washington, DC 20555 Director of Huclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission l
Washington, DC 20053 is
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