ML20044B724
| ML20044B724 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
| Issue date: | 07/16/1980 |
| From: | Malsch M NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19290F683 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-92-436 SECY-A-80-102, NUDOCS 9303030240 | |
| Download: ML20044B724 (24) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COW.alSSION g33) g W ASHitvCToN, o. C. 2055b d
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ADJUDICATORY euly 16, 1980 SECY-A-80-102 h
COMMISSIONER ACT!ON f
For:
The Cemnissioners Fron:
Martin G.
Malsch Deputy General Counsel
Subject:
DIRECTOR'S DENIAL CF 2.206 RELIEF (ICWA ELECTFIC LIGHT & PC'.'EP COMFA:W )
f, Facility:
Duane Arnold Energy Center
Purpose:
To inform the Connission of the denial by the Director, NPR, of a 2.206 petition related to,_the Mark I containment, and to 2
3 g-f recon =end' 2
23 3
i g
Review Tine Expires:
August 1, 1980 (as extended).
5 Discussion:
On April 9,
1979, three Iowa citizens' organizations requested the Director, NRE, to institute proceedings for the revoca. tion _ of j
Anendnent No. 4 6 o f ~th e Du a ne Ar no l'd' 6pe r a ~ ~i ng" _
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t license.
'Ihat anendnent revised the Duar:
=
f Arnold technical specifications to incorpor a*.e NRC requirements related to the containment l
systen.
The request was based on four considerations:
g a 1972 staf f nemo from Dr. Stephen Hanauer t
concerning the capacity of the Mark I contain-ment to function properly in the event of a trJamatica in tNs rt=d rcs dtM loss of coolant accident; an NRC letter, in ntxdr:c wdh tr.c F:c.tm c!Intmationdated February 28, 1976, acknowledging that J 4ct. c u._+.. _ s g'
the demonstrated safety of the Mark I containne nt j
.s.,
at Duane Arnold did not mee t th e staff's lj F0a _ f,2 Uf current definition of " sufficient margin" c:r.
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prescribed in Appendix A to Part 50, and a 3
notice dated March 22, 1978, granting the
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Duane Arnold containment system an exemptic::
f rom the requirements of Appendix A to Part 50; the deternination by NRC in May 1978, that th e 6
Contacts rtin G. Malsch, OGC T
5 I
GILINSK92-436 PDR 4
The Con-arcioners 2
o high pressure coolant injection system was inoperable, and the discovery of a primary l
coolant leak and pipe cracks in June 1978; j
and the' issuance by NRC, without an environ-mental impact statement, of what was alleged to be a " safety exemption" for the Duane Arnold Mark I containment system.
In responding to the petition, the Director first described the factual background of the Mark I containnent problem.
The Mark I con-tainment, like the Mark II and Mark III models which followed it, utilizes a pressure suppression concept.
In the event of a loss of coolant accident releasing pressurized stean into the air-filled upper portion of the containment, th e steam will be diverted th rough large pipes (called "downcomers")
into a pool of water in the lower portion of the containment, Where the steam will be condensed, thereby reducing pressure in the entire containment.
The Mark I containment, unlike the later nodels, utilizec a torus (doughnut-shaped) design for the pressure suppression chanber.
In the course of testing the Mark III containment, General Electric, the manuf acturer, became aware that it had underestinated the hydrodynamic " loads"
( stresses) which -could.be placed.on the pressure suppression pool and related structures in the event of an accident.
Specifically, the problem that was identified was that air f rom the upper portion cf the cont ainment would precede any steam through the downcomers i
into the pressure suppression pool.
This air would cause a slug of water to rise up and strike conponents in the pressure suppression ch ambe r.
(Dais problem, and the measures taken with respect to the Mark II containment, are discussed by Obe D.C. Circuit's decision in Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League
- v. NRC, 606 F.2d 1363 (1979).
The NRC staff required a reevaluation of the Mark I containment in light of this information, and a Mark I owners group was established, in cooperation with General Electric.
A short-term and a long-term program were established.
Th 2 Commissioners 3
The pcrpose of th e forner was to exanine th e containment system of each Mark I plant to verify its ability to function in the event of a design basis loss of coclant accident, and to verify that th e facilities as a whole could continue to operate safely pending th e completion of the long-term Mark I progran.
The purpose of the long-tern program is to determine design basis loads over the life of the facilities, and to restore the originally intended design safety margins for each Mark I containment systen.
In calculating the loads for the short-term program, the staff used all applicable test data from both domestic and foreign reactors, and small scale tests on a nodel segment of a Mark I suppression chamber.
Th e short-tern program focused on components judged to be critical in the event of a loss of coolant accident; the long-tern program would exanine ec mponent s judged not to be critical to the maintenance of the integrity and proper functioning of the containment.
Where appropriate, the short-term progran review led to increased.
safety margins; onelway of ach'ieving thi s wa s to require diff6rential preisure to be maintained between the upper porti_on of the enntainment to reduce @' pre =sure supprossion chamber, and - th e (drywell)
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ydrodynanic I c ss in the so as event of a loss of coolant accident.
At th e end of the short-term program, the staf f determined that all the Mark I plants, including Duane Arnold, could continue to operate safely while the long-term program was being completed.
With respect to the petitioners' allegations, the Director, NRR, concluded th at -- Steve Hanator's 1972 memorandum notwi thstanding -- the pressure suppression concept for containment design is safe (a judgment in which Dr. Hanauer concurs, according to the Director).
The D2 rector found that the short-term program, and its assessment th at the containnent of each Mark I is able (by a factor of two) to withstand the loads created by a postulated loss of coolant accident, provides adequate assurance of safety while the lona-term progran is being conducted.
The Cornisisoners 4
9 To the petitioners' NEPA clain, the Director replied th a t the grant of an exemption.from
. Appendix A to Part 50 did not af fect the integrity of the containnent system, and thus required no environnental impact statement, envireppental aporaisal, or negative declara-tion n.
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s To the assertion that problems with the high pressure injection system, primary coolant leaks, and pipe cracks indicate that a loss of coolant accident is not an unlikely event, the Dir Jctor replied that the short-term program did not assume that such an accident was unlikely.
Ra th e r, the evaluation assumed the possibility of a loss of coolant accident.
The Director pointed to redundant safety systens th at provided the capacity for emergency core cooling even during the period identified by the petition, in which the high pressure injection system was inoperable.
- Finally, the Director described the neasures taken to replace cracked pipe safe-ends, and prevent such cracking in :the-f ut re,. a nd. to a s s e s s. -
pipe cracks caused by stress, corrosion.
Wi th regard to the latter, the Director cited the conclusion of NUREG-0531, Investigation and Evaluation of Stress-Corrosion Cracking in Piping of Light Water P.cactor Plants (February 1979) that even through-wall pipe cracks need not cause unstable crack growth, leading to excessive loss of coolant, during plant operations.
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(SY.b 1
1he Co--issioners 6
N. [)
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Reccmmendation:
i Martin G. Malsch Deputy General Counsel
Enclosure:
April 9,.1979 Petition Ltr from H.
Denton to J. Magers (CURE) dtd 2/13/80 Comissioners' coments should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b Wednesday, July 30, 1980.
Comission Staff Office coments, if any, should be submitted to the i Comissioners NLT July 23, 1980, with an information copy to the 0.(f.ce of the Secretary.
If the paper is of such a nature that it req 61res' additional time for analytical review and content, the Comissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when coments may be expected.
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C CM.r5 NOM, Citiaans Ucited.for Respenaible Ener7y (CORE),
Cortunity Act.ica Research Group (CARG), and Icva Public Interest.
7esearch Group (:P:RO) a.d req;ests the Director cf Naclear Reacto';
regula tice pur s e a.nt to 10 C.T.R.
2.202 to s uspend Licens e Amend-
- r. e n t 9c. 46, *xark 1 Centsia.mant Short Term Program" for the Doane c
Arnold I.ner7y Centar (OsEC), Do:ket 10-3 31, Licens e DPR-4 9, eperateg by Icva r.lectric Light and P:wer co pany (II:.PC), Central Icva Pcwe l
Coeperative, and Cern Belt Cooperative until an Environnen* al 2epec' l
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sta ta= sat if filed f er this ' a=e ed ent.
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Reascos for this action are as follows :
- 1) Is Septecer 1972, a mencranden was sent by Dr. Stephen E.
3 Ea na u e r o f th an the A tomic Ene rgy Ccmi s s ion (AEC) e ta f f to nine - -
et.har high officials of the Atc.
Pur s u ant to th e Tr e ed ota o f In f or-:
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natice Act, the Ocien' of Ccncer..ed Scientists obtained a ccpy o*
this memorandez. At the time of this comeran *2m, Dr. Eaca uer was a sanier c= bar of the AIC Regulatcry staff and a chie* technicg1 advisor. Oto Esnauer =e torande= pcsed serious questiers as to 3
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whether the "pressu,re suppression contain.e:t* systass 1.n bciling vstar reseters were structurally safe enough to functica effective 1l ca the occurrance of a 1 css-ct-coolant-accidset.
Dr. Eanswer con-eiudad tha t the Co. aral Electric s ub-pr es s ure suppres sica type ecc..
taimeet systers were inferior to " dry
- type such contair.eants.
.Es-1 rece= ended a coratorius on *1cer. sing for rep,Otof g with thg gg
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l systen. Prior to the release of t.Se Eanauer ca:crardum, critical i
state ents in the dec=ent were su;;tessed by the raclear Re7ulator; I
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Cc ::.is s ion (AC). Cnly af ter the House cf Representatives Comitted l
on the Interior de.anded the rele ase o' the AIC respenses to the l
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=enerandum was the full text disclosed. The respense of now Chair- ;
I r.an of the K"AC, Jceeph Bendria, that while he reccqnizes the defi-
.i ciencias of GI contairarnt systems, the future of the nuclear Induso try is at stake.
Stating the "the acceptance of pressure suppressii:;
- containcient concepts by.all alemats, of the nuclear fie'd* vos j
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- fl.rmly.i=hdded in the conventional wisdens*, Chairsan Bandrie i
advis ed agains t the discentinuance of 1.icensing the GI nc4el as it !
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- could well h the end of nuclear pcvar* and *vould generally create store turmcil than I can stand thinking about*.
When the Eendrie t
c'esorand We finally released, Daniel Tord, Director of the Union
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8 of Concerned Scientists, voiced criticism ef the way the menorandum '
was handled
- Dr. Eendrie's reorandum i$dicates that the nuclear
- regulatory process has been perverted by officials who are more
. interested in pretecting tae nuclear industry trors criticism than in protecting the public health and safety." Without citing any
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r eeidence, Chairsan Eendrie agrees that hi's words and his actiona could be read as such, but these are not his beliefs.
- 2) On Tabruary 28, 1978 Victor Stallo, Director of Division of Cperating Reactors, issued a letter to all beilding vater reactor l licenses. This letter ackncviedged tAst the.urrent Mark 1 pressure suppression contaicrent system failed to cceply with oc require =es@
vhich require a ' sufficient mrgin of safety
- in the General Design Criteria for *Contaianent Design Basis
- in 10 C.T. A. 50, Appendix A.
Within this netice is the fo11cving:
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- he ccenission has deternined that the greeting of this * {
axesption will no't result in any significant santon. ental impsj and that pursuant tn 10 C.t.K. 51.5 (d ) (4 ) ar envir raental is.;
g pact statenant or negative declarat:ca and environ ental iepect j
' appraisal need not be preparef vtth this action.*
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tien vas a) the letter to'the licensee, dated Tebruary 28, 1978, a
ar.d b) FUR.cs-0406,
- Mark 1 Contain=ent short Tern Program safety *
- Evalua tion *. In Ju.ly, 1978, NUFE -C478 *A Technical Update on' Pressure Suppression Type Contair:. ants in use in U.S. I.ight water r
Jteactor Nucles.r Power Plants *. Neither of thes e documents, hcvever, 'i 4
suffice as an environmental i= pact required by the Naticnal Environ r, ental Protection Act (NEPA). No cost / benefits or risk assessneat I
was cenducted. 2 RO offielels ecnf ucted the asalysis cader 'the I
onlikely evert
- of a Icss of cociar.t accident. EPCI failed on May 3, 1978. On May 19, 1972 the Eigh Pressure Ccolant Injection vos
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t e s ted a nd wa s da t e.~im ed not to work.
on June,14, 1978 six motheds of testing at t.he DAEC revealed I
that there was a 3-4 gallon-per-minute leak in the primary coolant, i
t Three days later, due to'an electrical relay evitch prcblem, the
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raactor ves shut ocwn. During the shutdcwn, it vee discovered that j
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a crack appeared near the reactor vessel where the "sa fe ' ends' weld
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,to the. ecirculation loop -p'pe. V5utsequently, similar flaws were j
i discovered in all other sue!. safe end fc:gings.
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On June.2,1978 Rchert Pollard of the Union of Concerned 1
scientists wrote a letter to tien Congressman Michael 31ouin. In "
r this l' ester, Mr. Pollard cla1=ed that, *under the waiver (axa ption),, ;
an icportant safety r.argin claimed when the plant was l'icensed, was s
cut pessibly in halfg* '"here are serious questions whether adequate i
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safety surgins axist as a result of this capricicus staff action.
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At issue 1.s the centair:sent systeca for these plants. In the event cf a ' nuclear accident, if this ' safety system does act work preparly, i
rad!ation could be released vhich would cause large scale 1ces of
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a life and 111 ness and hundreds of millir.As or even billions of dellars
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- ttte: 13, 1978 nctico was placed in the re ers! 7ee' ster d
that Ic a Electric !.ight and Pcvar C:vany et. al. t'.at the 3AEC w e
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granted a saf ety exe::;:tdon f or the Pressa:e supp:ession Contair.nent
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- sir.ce the a-cer.d-
- t was granted without public notice, o
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nent does act iavolve a significant he:ards c:nsideration.*
Ag61n under the NRC date.-mined that r.o anvitennestal inpact sta:erent
- his notics or.ly repeats the vague general Mr;A vas required.
syrtam
=conclusicas* of the previous sc positica on the containment c'.*RI, CARG, and IF:RG haraht Wh"CRE, for t.he above stated reascas,
pray that the Director of Fuelear Reactar Regulation will grant its' notion to suspend technical Arrendment *46 for the LAEC entil as filed.
Envirorcental ".rpact Stateccat is this Day of April,1979, Lated at Cedar Rapids, Icwa, Respect *ully s ub:.itted, e F. tnafsw
.ane E. P. agers Executive Director Citizens United for Respensible I:ergy 1342 30th street ces Moines, 2cvs 50311 Pal;.h Kegel Att.7 sy C.:rnra.ity A:tien Research C:-w y
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N Doeket No. 50-331 4
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~5 Ms. Jane E. Hagers Executive Director g
Citizens United for Responsible Energy to a/
1342 30th Street 2
Des Moines, Iowa 50311
Dear Ms. Magers:
This letter is in response to your petiticn on behalf of Citizens United for Responsible Energy in which the Corrunity Action Research Group of Ares and the Icwa Public Interest Research Group of Iowa City joined, requesting that the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation issue an order to suspend License Amend ent No. 46 (Mark 1 Containment Short Term Program) to Facility License No. DPR-49 for the Duane Arnold Energy Center.
Your petition, dated April 9, 1979, was received by the Comission on June 1,1979 and was acknowledged by letter of June 26, 1979.
The NRC: staff has reviewed the information relevant to your petition. We find no basis for suspending Amendment Ne. 46 to Facility License No. DPR-49.
For the reasons set forth in the enclosed " Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206,* your request is hereby denied..
A copy of this determination will be placed in the Cornission's Public Document Rocr. at 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.. 20555 and at the Cedar Rapids.
Public Library, 426 Third Avenue, S. E., Cedar Rapids, Iowa 52401. A copy will also be filed with the Secretary of the Cornission for its review in accorcance with 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the Comission's regulations.
Enclosed for your inforr.ation is a copy of the notice that is being filed with the Of fice of the Federal Register for publication.
Sincerely,
/ &cWW Harold R. Denton, Director Of fice of' Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
1.
Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206 f) fC b55I
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P 2.
Notice i
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See next page
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Februa ry 13, 1980 "s. Jene w gers a
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h Mr. Bill Welp L
Energy Projects Coordinator L
Icwa Public Interest Research Group Activities Center, I.M.U.
Mr. P.aiph Kegel il Connunity Action l
Resedrch Group Sox 1232 Anes, Icwa $1010 I
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i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 7
/ b' 77 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS51CN OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION t
i HAROLD R. DENTON, DIRECTOR h
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In the Matter of
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Icwa Electric Light & Power
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Docket No. 50-331 (10 CFR 2.206)
Company, et al.
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(Duane Arnoic Enery Center)
)
h DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206
.'ced by a postulated design basis LOCA; and (2) to verify that licensec ilark I BVR facilities could continue tc, operate safely, without undue risk to the health and safety of tne public, while a methodical, comprehensive LTP was being conducted. The objectives of the LTP are (1) to establish design basis (conservative) loads tnat are appropriate for the anticipated life (40 years) of each Mark I BVR f
f acility, and (2) to restore the original intended design safety margins for.
each flark I containment system.
-S-The loads for the S'P were defined by the application of all existing applicable test data, bott. domestic and foreign, related to the hydrodynamic
~
phonocena postulated to occur in a Mark I suppression char.ber.
In addition, where sufficient test data did not exist for specific loading conditions, srall i
scale tests on a segment of a Mart I suppression chamber were performed to providq en estir. ate of the loading magnitude.
The hydrodynamic lord combinations were then specified for a typical (i.e., reference plant) Mark I suppression chamber.
Where structural analyses indicated a need, load variation functions were developed f rom test data and analytical models to define the loading conditions for specific suppression chamber configurations.
The staff review of the structural and mechanical components of the con-tainment systems, for the STP, focused on those components which were judged to be critical in terms of the capability of the containnent system to withstand the hydroqynamic loads associated with a postulated design basis LOCA and to perform its design function.
Structural elements were placed in a "non-critical *'
category only after analysis which demonstrated that the elements would not affect containment integrity and function. During the LTP all structural elements will be examined in detail.
During the STP review, whenever the structural safety margins were founo to be less than acceptable at an operating Mart 1 Ew'R facility, the safety margin' were required to be increased.
One of the methods used to accomplish this was to naintain a differential pressure of at least one pound per square inch between; ine drywell and the suppression chamber (torus) during reactor operation.
This l
noce of operation would have the effect of recucing the hydroqynamic loaos associated with the highly unlikely postulatec LOCA.
This condition remains
in ef fect for those f acilities where the licensees have taken credit for the load mitigating effects of such operation in the STP analysis of their plant's torus support system.
The staff reviewed the information provided by the Mark I Owners Group and by each licensee of an operating Mark I BWR facility and concluded that the objectives of the STP had been satisfied.
The staff concluded that licensed Ma rt I BWR f acilities, including D AEC, could continue to operate safely, without undue risk to the health and safety of the public, while the LTP is conducted.
This was the principle conclusion of the Mari I Containment Short Tere Program Safety Evaluation Report, NUREG-0408, published in December 1977.
Evaluation of Request The petitioners contend (Items (1) and (2) supra) that the Mark I contain-ment system may not function effectively upon occurrence of a LOCA and that the i
health and safety of the public may be compromised by the continued operatior, i
i of plants with this containment system.
1 The HRC staff has given careful consideration to the concerns identified in Dr. Hanauer's memorandum of September 20, 1972, as well as new safety con-cerns associated with pressure suppression containments that have been identified.
Based upon the reviews that have been performed, the staff, including Dr. Hanauer, has concluded that the pressure suppression concept for containment design is safe. See, A Technical Update on Pressure Suppression Type Containments in Use in U.S. Light Water Reactor Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0474, July 1978.
The basis for continued operation of plants for the Mark I STP assessment was that a minimum f actor of safety -*/ of at least two, in the weakest element of a Mart I suppression chamber structure, would be sufffetent to assure the functional performance of the containment during a limited period of time, while the methodical and comprehensive LTP is being conducted.
During the course of the STP, a number of plant-specific modifications were performed at DAEC as the need arose.
The conclusions of the STP are continually being reassessed as new inforration has ber me availatie daring the course of the LTP. The targeted completion date of the LTP, including any plant modifications necessary to restore the original intended design safety margins, is December
'9o0.
The petitioners contend (Items (2) and (4)) that the NRC did not comply with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1959 in that an environmental
~
icsact statement was not filed for licensing actions concerning the Mark I l
containrent system.
I l
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.5, ifcensing actions, for a nuclear power reactor with a full power license, which require the preparation of an environnental impact staterent (EIS) are those actions which the Comnission deter =ines significantly affects the quality of the human environment.
An amendment to a full power operating license mar require an EIS if it woule authorize a significant change i-tne types or a significant increase in the amounts of effluents or a significant ie. crease in the power level.
Eatio of the theoretical ultimate strength cf the containment to the calculated stress.
l
-B-i The exegtion dated March 22, 1978, and based on NUREG-0408 had no effect on the integrity of the contain::ent system; thus an environmental impact state-i t
i ment, negative declaration, or environmental i@act appraisal need not be prepared. 10 CFR 51.5(d)(4).
With respect to Amenc ent No. 46, which the petitioners erroneously term-a " safety exe@ tion", there is also no need for an EIS. The Amendment placed ad ed restrictions en the operation of the reactor to ensure continued safety i
and integrity of the containment.
i The petitioners conteno (Item (3)) that the problem with the HPCI system, the coolant leak of several gallons-per-cinute, and cracks in the safe-encs f
imply that a LOCA is not en "unlikely event".
j i
ine load magnitudes used for the STP were predicated on an assumec 1.nstan-i ta,eous couble-enceo rupture of tne largest pipe in the primary system, as was j
- n.:'eted in the original design of the containment and all other safety related i
s.m. ems. The conclusion that containment integrity and function would be main-l ta nec in the event of a LOCA for the STP assessment was not contingent upon tne prcDability of the event. A LOCA was inceec considered and formed the Dasis j
l of tne evaluation.
Breaks of smaller size would result in less severe loading l
i concitions, and therefore, would result in " higher margins of safety".
i As requirec ey 10 CFR 50, Appendix K, there is redundancy.among the j
e ergency core cooling systems that prov_ide cooling of the reactor in the event of a LOCA. In the case of DAEC, this recuncancy is such that the HPCI system i
can De inoperaDie without seversely igacting the emergency cooling capaD111ty j
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. requirements. During the time frame cited in the contention, redundant i
ej emergency core cooling systems were operable and assured emergency cooling
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of the reactor in the event of a LOCA.
In June 1978, an inspection by DAEC personnel revealed a through-wall i
crack in one of the eight recirculation system inlet nozzle safe-ends.
Ultrasonic testing and radiographic examinations revealed lesser cracks in the ether seven safe-ends. The cause of the failure was intergranular stress-corrosion cracking.
All safe-ends have since been replaced with an improved design that should prevent cracking in the future.
See, " Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Supporting Amend. ment No. 47 to l
License No. DPR-49*, J anuary B,1979.
Additionally, the staff has required additional inservice inspection of the safe-ends to detect cracks should they occur.
In Investigation anE Evaluation of Stress-C rresion Crackin; in Piping of Licht Water Reactor Plants, NUREG-0531, February 1979, the NRC staff reviewed the safety aspects of intergranular stress-corrosion cracking and cencluded that, through-wall and lesser cracking can exist in coolant piping during plant operation, and not cause unstable crack growth and lead to excessive loss of c ool a nt.
- / Automatic depressurization system (\\DS) coabined with low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) ano core spray systems (C55).
, Conclusion i
For the reasons stated in this decision, I have determined not to suspend A,mendrent No. 46 to Facility License No. OPR-49 for the DAEC.
Accoroingly, the request f or tne petitioners is denied.
A copy of this decision will be placed in the Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, h. W., Washington,. D. C.
20555 and the local public l
cc:ument room for the Duar.e Arnoic Energy Center, located at the Cedar Rapids Pualic Library, 426 Third Avenue, 5. E., Cecar Repics, Iowa 52401.
A copy of this cecision will also be filed with the Secretary of the Cornission for its review in accorcance with 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations.
In accoroance with 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, tris oecision will constitute the final act' ion of the Commission twenty (201
- af s af ter the,date of issuance, unless the Commission on its con motion irstitutes review of this cecision within that tire.
/ N/d-lk k
Harold R. Denton, Director i
Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
- ctec at Bethesca, Marylanc
-1s 13th cay of February
,1980.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA f
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION HAROLD R. DENTON, O! RECTOR In the Matter of
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Iowa Electric Light & Power
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Docket No. 50-331 1
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Corpany, et al.
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NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR t
On July 6,1979, notice was puolisnec in the FEDERAL REGISTER (44 Fec.
Reg. 39548) that Citizens United for Responsible Energy (CURE), Community Acl Research Group, and Iowa Public Interest Research Group hac requestec that the
.l Director of Nuclear Reactc-Regulation orcer suspension of License Amencment-
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The Director' No. 46 to Licer.se No. OPR-49 for tne Duane Arnolo Energy Center.-
l After a-has treated this petition as a request for action uncer 10 CFR 2.206.
eview of the relevant information., the Director has.ceterr.inec that trere y j
l Accorciac13,-
-l nc casis for suspencing Acencrent No. 46 to License No. DPR-49.
the request by C"RE, et al. has been cented.
Copies of the Director's cecision are availaole fc inspection in sne.
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Commission's Public Doc. sent Room,1717 H Street, k. W., washington, D. C. 2v555, i
- Rapics, t
anc at the Cedar Rapios Puelic Liorary, 426 inirc Avenue, 5. E., Cecar A copy of this cecision will aise De fileo with the-Secretary of j
I owa 52401.
f tne Commission for review ey tne Commission in accorcance witn 10 CFR 2.Foo(c)
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of tne Commission's regulations.
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