IR 05000312/1981036

From kanterella
(Redirected from ML20040E770)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
IE Insp Rept 50-312/81-36 on 811201-31.Noncompliance Noted: Failure to Have Reactor Protection Sys Drawings That Accurately Reflect Plant Conditions
ML20040E770
Person / Time
Site: Rancho Seco
Issue date: 01/21/1982
From: Canter H, Obrien J, Thomas Young
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20040E768 List:
References
50-312-81-36, NUDOCS 8202050340
Download: ML20040E770 (8)


Text

.

.

I U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION V

-

Report No. 50-312/81-36 Docket No. 50-312 License No. DPR-54 Safeguards Group Licensee:

Sacramento Municipal Utility District P. O. Box 15830 Sacramento, California 95813 Facility Name:

Rancho Seco Unit 1-Inspection at: Herald, California (Rancho Seco Site)

Inspection Conducted:

December 1-31, 1981

,

&74+(d_

,-

/" b Inspectors:

.

Enior R d t 'Inspep;or Date Signed Hafvey L. Canter, b. b. h

/-S/-D Jefin' 0'Brien, Unig Reside Infector /

Date Signed

-

b M

/'

'

Approved by:

'

Reactor Projticts Section 2, Date Signed T. Young, Jr., Chief, Project Reactor Operatio0s ranch Summary:

Inspection between December 1 and 31,1981 (Report No. 50-312/81-36)

Areas Inspected: Operational Safety Verification; review of plant operations; maintenance observations; surveillance observations, Licensee Event Report follow-up; follow up on items of noncompliance;

l follow up on Headquarters requests; and, independent inspection effort.

The inspection activities involved 157 inspector-hours by the Resident

1 Inspectors.

Results: Of the eight areas inspected, one item of noncompliance in one area was identified (failure to have drawings that accurately reflect the plant conditions, Paragraph 9).

8202050340 820122 PDR ADOCK 05000312 O

PDR

..

-.

-

_. _

_

.

-

-

-

- _ _,,. _

,

_

..

.

.

-

.

.. ~

.

.

j

~

.

.

DETAILS

,

]

1.

Persons Contacted

  • R. Rodgriguez, Manager Nuclear Operations P. Oubre', Plant Superintendent D. Blachly, Operations Supervisor
  • N. Brock, Electrical /I&C Maintenance Supervisor D. Cass, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor Q. Coleman, Quality Assurance' Engineer
  • R. Colombo, Technical Assistant G. Coward, Maintenance Supervisor
  • S. Crunk, Associate Nuclear Engineer D. Elliott,-Quality Assurance Engineer D. Gardiner, Senior Chemical & Radiation Assistant H. Heckert, Quality Assurance Engineer

,

  • J. Jewett, Quality Assurance Engineer
  • F. Kellie, Assistant Chem. and Health ~ Physics Supervisor
  • J. King, Acting Operations Supervisor i

V. Lewis, Site Project Engineer-

  • R. McQuade, Quality Engineering Associate R. Miller, Chemistry / Radiological Supervisor T. Perry, On-site. Quality Assurance Supervisor
  • S. Rutter, Quality Assurance Engineer L. Schwieger, Quality Assurance Director-
  • L. Stephenson, Supervising Engineer, Generation Engineering Department

.

  • B. Thomas, Site Public Affairs
  • T. Tucker, Planner / Scheduler
  • W. Wells, Senior Administrative Assistant
  • D. Whitney, Engineering and Quality Control Supervisor B. Wichert, Mechanical Engineer W. Wilson, Senior Chemical & Radiation Assistant The -inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the engineering, maintenance, operations and quality assurance (QA) organizations.
  • Denotes those attending the Exit Interview on December 30, 1981.

'

2.

Operational Safety Verification

l Rancho Seco was brought on line on December 4, 1981, and stayed on line through the end of the inspection period. The inspectors observed

!

control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted

dicussions with control room operators. An inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed clearance records and verified proper return-to-service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards,

!

fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance i

requests had been initiated for equipment in need of repair or rework.

The inspector, by observation and direct interview, verified that the

,

physical security plan was being implemented properly.

!

.- --_-.. _. - _

..

.

.

-

.....

.

- -,

-

-

.

.

.

.

-2-The inspector examined plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions, especially in the Diesel Generator rooms which have been a source of concern because of oil leaks.

The inspectors verified implementation of radiation protection controls. They also walked down the accessible portions of the Auxiliary Feed System, the Emergency Power System, and portions of the High Pressure Injection System to verify operability.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in this area.

3.

Review of Plant Operations On December 11, 1981, the inspector observed a fire drill and submitted comments on his observations to the safety engineer. The inspector also verified that the licensee has a program for identifying and correcting discrepancies and that the equipment disrupted during the drill (emergency kits and lockers) were returned to the proper locations after the drill.

On December 15, 1981, the inspectors witnessed an Emergency Drill that was to test the Health Physics response to an event, in accordance with the approved Emergency Plan.

The inspectors comments on the drill were similar to those of the licensee and were discussed in a critique held shortly after the drill. The inspectors may review the published results of the drill and the licensees self-evaulation to determine if _the results were reviewed by licensee management and supervision. The inspectors may also follow up on corrective actions which may be initiated to correct identified deficiencies.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

4.

Maintenance Observations The inspectors observed portions of the maintenance activities listed below by work request number and verified that verk was accomplished in accordance with approved procedures; that work was accomplished by qualified personnel; that provisions for stationing a fire watch to oversee activities involving welding and open flame were complied with; and, that LC0 requirements were met during repair.

a.

WR66899 Rad-Monitor R15020 b.

WR66846 Control. Room Air Gas Monitor R15006 c.

WR54739 Weather Station d.

WR67743 Pipe Penetration Fire Stops (NRC S-2448)

e.

WR67713 Diesel Generator Leaks in Lube Oil Bypass f.

WR66770 RCP "A" Seal Return Line No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie _

-

.

'.

.

-3-5.

Surveillance Observations The inspectors observed portions of the below listed surveillance testing to verify that the tests were covered by properly approved procedures; that the procedures used were consistent with Technical Specification requirements; that minimum crew requirements were met; that test prerequisites were completed; that special test equipment

~

were calibrated and.in service; and that the test results were

-

accurate and adequate.

l!

a.

EM157 Fire Protection /Cardox Testing b.

SP203.05 G&F A&B DH Pump Venting

,

c.

SP200.10B Monthly Instrument Testing d.

SP200.10A Monthly CBAST Temperature Check

,

e.

SP200.02 Daily Instrument Surveillance f.

SP200.01 Shift Surveillance g.

SP200.03 Weekly Instrument Surveillance

[

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6.

Lic.ensee Event Report. Follow-up The resident inspectors performed an examination of the following Licensee Event Reports to ascertain whether additional inspection effort or other IE response is warranted, whether corrective action discussed in the licensee's report appears appropriate, and whether the information reported to the NRC appears to satisfy reporting requirements.

The event reports listed below appear to meet the above criteria and require no further follow up at this time. These items are CLOSED.

81-56 Loss of Redundancy for One RPS Channel 81-57 RPS Channel Instrument Drift Licensee actions committed to in each of the above~ listed Licensee l

Event Reports was verified to be complete or in progress.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified, i

i

!

,

I

_ _ _ _,

_

. _ _.,.. -. _. _.

..

. -. ~ -.

...

..

, - - _. ~.. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

- _. _ _. _.. _ _

-

.

.

-

--__.__ ~

_

_ _.

__

'

^

.

.

_a_

7.

Followup on Items of Noncompliance Item 81-29-01 CLOSED:

Diesel Generator Maintenance Procedure Inadequacies The inspector verified that the corrective action committed to in correspondence dated December 9,1981, Mattimoe to Engelken, was completed.

E M

(EM) 191, Installation and Calibration of Emergency Diesel Generator Hydraulic Governor, was written covering, among other items, the method used to adjust the speed stop.

Also, maintenance engineers and technicians were notified of the new procedure.

No further items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

8.

Follow up on Headquarter's Requests During the month of December,1981, personnel from the NRC Headquarters in Bethesda, Maryland, requested information from the resident inspectors about the operation, design, and maintenance of the Rancho Seco power plant.

Information was obtained and transmitted to the NRC Headquarters concerning the Tower Crane use (Unresolved Item 81-20-01 ).

I No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

9.

Independent Inspection Effort Discussions were held between the residen't inspectors and operations,

'

security, and maintenance personnel in an attemp to better understand i

problems they may have which are related to nuclear safety. These discussions will continue as a standard practice.

On numerous occasions during the month of December,1981, the resident inspectors attended operations status meetings. These meetings are held by the Operations Supervisor to provide all disciplines onsite with an update on the plant status and ongoing maintenance work.

,

In addition to the above, independent inspection effort was performed on the following items:

a.

Inaccuracies on Reactor Protection System Drawings (Item 81-36-01)

I On December 16, 1981, while following up on a problem with the

"C" Reactor Protection System (RPS) pressure transmitter, the inspector discovered that Drawing N15.03-29, Revision 0, contained a schematic representation of a Foxboro, E11GM-SAE 1, Reactor Coolant Pressure transmitter, and a Foxboro, 610AT-0, power supply even though Westinghouse instruments are used. This was discovered via discussions with technicians and by review of the Master

,

l

.

i

_. -, - _,__ __. _ _ _,, - _ _

_ ~ - _ _ -. _ _ _ _.. _. _, _ _ _ _ _ _. _,

,. _

_

_ _ _ _. _ _. -

.

-

.

.

-5-Equipment List referenced Foxbora drawings for all four RCS pressure instruments. The'latter indicated Foxboro instruments even though all four pressure transmitters have Westinghouse Model Number 59-PH 4443-7 and the power supplies have Model Number 55PS2. These instruments were installed in,1974, as verified by a review of Field Change Package Number 81, and by discussions with personnel who designed and performed the work.

Upon further investigation, the inspector became aware of a number of errors to drawings which had been discovered in 1981, but which had not been processed via the Drawing Change Notice (DCN) route as described in ECP 1, Rancho Seco Configuration Control.

In response to the inspector's queries, a DCN package was put together and logged on December 24, 1981. On December 28, 1981, the inspector reviewed the package and noticed that the packace had an incorrect log number on the transmittal sheet (A3806 vice A3807); that fourteen drawings were on the transmittal sheet but fifteen drawings were in the package; and, that there were errors in the package which was put together to correct the original errors.

The most significant problems appeared to be with respect to inaccurate cable designations.

For example, Drawing N15.01-28, Revision 2, had a Cable Number 1RlPA06B which was to be changed to Cable Number 1RIPA06N. Likewise, on Drawing N.15.01-30, Revision 2, Cables 1RlPBlA and 1RlPB06B were to be changed to 1RlPBPlA and 1RlPB06N, respectively.

Drawing N15.01-31, Revision 3, required a cable designation of "AY" to be changed to "AT," and Drawing N15.03-9, Revision 0, showed a power range total flux indicator Channel NI-7 incorrectly designated as XI-00204 rather than XI-00404.

Finally, among other inaccuracies, Drawing N15.03-29, Revision 0, which was mentioned earlier as indicating Foxboro, rather than Westinghouse pressure transmitters and power supplies, did not have the correct change on the marked-up copy. The power supply designation had not been changed.

Therefore, upon implementation of DCN Package A3807, there would still be an error on the drawing. Similar errors existed on other drawings in the package.

Section VI of Appendix B to 10 LCR 50 states, in part:

" Measures shall be established to ontrol the issuance of documents, such as... drawings, incl..<*ng changes thereto, which prescribe all activities affect 19 quality."

!

i

.-,

-. - -. _.,.,, - -,.... _ - - -., _. -.

,, -...,.,,-

-., -,. -

_. -

. -

'

.~

'

-

-6-Quality Assurance Procedure 7, Revision 8, Configuration Control, states, in part:

" Changes to drawings are made in accordance with Rancho Seco Configuration Control Procedure, ECP-1...."

I Configuration Control Procedure ECP-1, Revision 3, states that it is the responsibility of three Department Managers to ensure that the personnel at the configuration control points enforce the requirements of ECP-1 for all jobs at Rancho Seco. These control.; points are defined as follows:

.

i.

Nuclear Operations Site Document Control (SDC)

l

!

ii. Generation Engineering

- Generation Engineering Control -(GEC)

iii.

Engineering

- Engineering Configuration Control (ECC)

i Section 4.3 of ECP-1 states, in part, that it is the responsibility of the Generation Engineering Department's Supervising Engineer to:

" Review DCN and correct as necessary or return to Design Engineer for corrections, additional DCN's, etc."

Contrary to the requirements mentioned above, there were inaccuracies found in drawings dealing with the Reactor Protection System.

Further errors existed in DCN Package A-3807 of a similar degree to those discussed above. The following drawings were included in

DCN Package A-3807:

N15.01-28 Revision 2 N.I. & Protection System

N15.01-29 Revision 4 N.I. & Protection System

-

N15.01-30 Revision 2 N.I. & Protection System

N15.ll-31 Revision 3 N.I. & Protection System

N15.01-32 Revision 2 N.I. & Protection System i

N15.01-33 Revision 3 N.I. & Protection System N15.01-34 Revision 3 N.I. & Protection System N15.01-36 Revision 4 N.I. & Protection System N15.01-45 Revision 2 N.I. & Protection System N15.03-9 Revision 0 Schem. Diag.-R.C. Pressure

>

N15.03-14 Revision 2 Schem. Diag.-R.B. Hi Pressure N15.03-24 Revision 0 Schem. Diag.-R.B. Hi Pressure N15.03-29 Revision 0 Schem. Diag.-R.C. Pressure N15.03-34 Revision 2 Schem. Diag.-R.C. Pressure N15.03-43 Revision 0 Schem. Diag.-R.C. Pressure These inaccuracies represent a Se erity Level 4 Violation (Supplement 1) in that, had inaccurate drawings been used to perform work on the Reactor Protection System, the potential i

existed to result in an actual occurrence (81-36-01).

I

!

---

-

., - -..

,

. - -. - - - -

_ - - - -. - - - - - -. -.

--..

..

.

.

'

'

.

-

-7-b.

Primary Side Heat Balance Accuracy On December 28, 1981, a resident inspector was informed of a

,

possible Licensee Event Report dealing with the accuracy of the primary side heat balance currently in use. The present heat balance method may have been in error enough to have affected computed thermal power, such that the plant may have operated

at a power level in excess of the license limit of 2772MWt, steady state.

The inspector has been monitoring core thermal output since December 6,1981, but needs more information to determine whether plant operations have been acceptable in this area.

Pending further analysis by the inspectors this item will remain unresolved (81-36-02).

,

No other items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

'

10.

Unresolved Item.

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. An unresolved item was disclosed

during the December 1981 inspection activity and is discussed in

'

Paragraph.9.b of this report.

11.

Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on December 30, 1981. He summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.

The licensee acknowledged.the inspectors comments on an item of noncompliance dealing with the accuracy of plant drawings (Paragraph 9.a, 81-36-01) and the unresolved item on primary side heat balance accuracy (Paragraph 9.b, 81-36-02).

i

,

i k.

.

-

y

.---.-_,

r,

_._.--_~,-..~m

r--+.

_ -,

,.---.,.--,,__.~.,,,.~-,i.,.,,_w-e

_. _ _.,

y-,.,

, _.... _.

-y

-, - a --.

-,.-.

-