ML20040E282
| ML20040E282 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 01/29/1982 |
| From: | Blum J, Holt J NEW YORK UNIV., NEW YORK, NY, PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, NEW YORK, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20040E283 | List: |
| References | |
| *EP-I(A), *EP-I(B)(1), *EP-I(B)(2), *EP-I(B)(3), *EP-I(B)(4), *EP-I(B)(5), *EP-I(B)(6), *EP-I(B)(7), *EP-II(A), *EP-II(B), *EP-II(C), *EP-III(A), *EP-III(B), *EP-III(C), *EP-III(D), *SD-IV(A), *SD-IV(B), ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8202040127 | |
| Download: ML20040E282 (92) | |
Text
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l 4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA O'y NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0>94ISSION 000 m -
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BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 82 FEB -2 f.11 :33 v'
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In the Matter of )
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CONSOLIDATED EDIS0N COMPANY OF NEW YORK ) Docket Nos. S0-247 SP (Indian Point Unit 2) ) 50-286 S
) & e POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ) January 29, 9 (Indian Point Unit 3) )
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Q H 4 N UCS/NYPIRG RESPCNSE 'IO OMECTIONS 'IO UCS/NYPIRG CINTENTIONS F [BY '
NRC STAFF, POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK AND CON ED Filed:
for Union of Concerned Scientists for New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc.
Jeffrey M. Blum, Esq. Joan Holt New York University Law School New York Public Interest j 423 Vanderbilt Hall Research Group, Inc.
I 40 Washington Square South 5 Beekman Street New York, New York 10012 New York, New York 10038 (212) 598-3452 (212) 349-6460 q) 5 C>3 5
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1 a INDEX Page INTRODUCTION 1 I. RESPONSES TO GENERAL OBJECTIONS AND PROCEDURAL MATTERS A. Contentions related to accident consequences need only allege that the probability of the relevant accident scenarios is greater than zero. 2 B. The UCS/NYPIRG Contentions are site-specific and raise safety issues related specifically to Indian Point; the fact that an issue may arise elsewhere does not disqualify a contention. 4 C. The UCS/NYPIRG Contentions comply with the specific standards for this proceeding. 5 D. Consideration of emergency planning cannot be limited to the issue of compliance with NRC/
FEMA guidelines. 7 E. Accident consequences and emergency planning should be the first order of business of this investigation. 7 F. The board should not disturb the voluntary l partial consolidation of UCS and NYPIRG 9 II. RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS Contention I-A: Failure of Indian Point Emergency Plans to Conform to FEMA /NRC Guidelines 10 Amendment to Basis 8 25 Amendment to Basis 9 26 Amendment to Basis 14 29 Amendment to Basis 16 31 Amendment to Basis 19 32 Contention I-B(1): Human Responses During Radiologi-cal Emergencies 33 l
l Amended Contention I-B(1) 35
-ii-I Page '
Contention I-B(2): Unreliability of Evacuation Time Estimates 40 Amendments to Bases 4,5,6,7 and 8 44 Contention I-B(3): Inadequate Consideration of the Full Range of Accident Scenarios 46 Contention I-B(4): Insufficient Integration of, and Criteria for, Protective Actions 49 Contention I-P(5): Severe Health Consequences Before Implementation of Protective Actions 53 Amended Contention I-B(5) 55 I Contention I-B(6): Necessity of Established 1 Maximum Acceptable Level of Exposure for the General Public 57 Contention I-B(7): Need for Promotion of an Awareness of the Importance of Emergency Planning 61 AmendedContentionI-B(7) 62 Contention II-A: Necessity of Extension of Present Plume EPZ Because of Accident Consequences 64 Contention II-B: Local Response Needs and Capabili':ies Requires Extension of the Present Plume EPZ 69 l Contention II-C: Inadequate Ad Hoc Measures Beyond Present Plume EPZ ~~~ 71 l Contention III-A: Necessary and Feasible l
Improvements in Emergency Planning for Indian Point 74 Amended Contention III-A 76 Contention III-B: Possible Accident Scenarios at Indian Point Would Result in Early Deaths and Serious Health Consequences 81 Amended Contention III-B 82 l
Contentions III-C and III-D: Necessity of l 84 Extension of Present Plume EPZ l
Withdrawn 85
-iii-Page Contention IV-A: Consequences of Possible Accidents At Indian Point So Severe that Shutdown Is Required 86 Contention IV-B: Consequences of Preventive Shutdown 88 Withdrawn 88 e
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM41SSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
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CONSOLIDATED EDIS0N COMPANY OF NEW YORK ) Docket Nos. 50-247 SP (Indian Point Unit 2) ) 50-286 SP
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POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK )
(Indian Point Unit 3) ) January 29, 1982 UCS/NYPIRG RESPONSE 'IO OBJECTIONS 'IO UCS/NYPIBG CONTENfIONS FILED BY NRC STAFF, POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK AND CON EDISON j
On December 31, 1981 the Nuclear Regulatory Ocmnission Staff, i
(bnsolidated Edison, Inc. (Con Edison), and the Power Authority of the l State of New York (PASNY) filed various objections to the contentions of l
intervenors in this proceeding. PASNY's objections, like its previous filings, are in the nature of 'a general, scattershot approach, the limited
[ usefulness of which is self-evident. The filings of Con Edison and the NRC Staff, alth, ugh in many instances without merit, at least provide a useful framework for further discussion of the proceeding's unique and cxxplex issues.
'Ihe Staff and the licensees raise several general objections that l
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i e reflect significant misroading or misunderstand 1ng of the purposes of this proceeding and of the Cm mission's goals. We will address these general natters first and then turn to each of the objections to specific UCS/NYPIRG contentions. In sme instances where we have found criticisms to be valid or where we believe further information would be helpful to the Board, we have amended the contentions or provided additional factual bases. For the nost part, however, the contentions and their supporting bases are sufficient as previously filed.
I. RESPONSES 'IO GENERAL OBJECTIONS AND PIOCEDURAL MATTERS A. Contentions related to accident consequences under question 1 need only allege that the probability of the relevant accident scenario is greater than zero.
The nest prevalent general attack on the UCS/NYPIRG contentions and those of other intervenors is that the contentions address only accident consequences and do not present specific accident scenarios or allege probabilities that such scenarios will occur. According to 03n Edison, for exanple, footnote 5 to question 1 in the Comnission's
- Order of September 18, 1981' requires contentions to address both pro-bability and consequences so that the Ca mission can make an ultimate finding of overall risk.
l Throughout its filing Con Edison also applies this argument to contentions raised under issues other than Question 1 or Question 5. Those arguments are inappropriate because the footnote applies only to Question 1, and by extension to Question 5. Other questions implicitly re-quire discussions of consequences but not probability. For example, Question 4 asks, " are there other specific offsite emergency procedures that are i
feasible and should be taken to protect the public?" 'Ib answer this question one must at least refer to consequences of possible accidents. The NRC's emergency planning rule, 10 CFR E E 50.47, 50.54, and Appendix E to Part 50 , requires that the public be adequately protected against possible accidents. It does not make emergency plaraing requirements contingent upon a demonstration of specific accident probabilities.
I
Con Edison misses the point of the Cmmission's directive. The directive that probability and consequances both be considered is not intended to inpose a specific format on contentions, but rather to guide the Board in canpiling the rec]rd on the seven questions.* h Cmmission does not in footnote 5 require each contention to address both points. Practical considerations alone prevent such a conclusion. h Cm mission is undoubtedly aware that the enormous cost of extensive probabilistic risk assessment studies would preclude the participation of all mmb es of the public with respect to these matters. Inter-venors' principal concern is that there be a thorough airing of consequences of possible acciMnts at Indian Point and of strategies for mitigating those consequences. 'Ihe Cmmission has adopted an adjudicatory format and called for public participation. It could not have intended to establish a participation threshhold that would have the effect of excluding the public.
UCS/NYPIBG and other intervenors contend that consequences of possible accidents must be addressed regardless of specific pInhahiiity estimates for three reasons. First, such estimates are methodologically flawed and lack suf-ficient validity to justify ignoring possible major consequences. Second, as nentioned previously, assessing the adequacy of energency planning depends upon estimating the consequences of worst case accidents, not upon knowing specific accident probabilities so long as these are above zero. Third, the consequences of possible major accidents at Indian Point are so enormous that they are totally unacceptable.**
- Question 1 and footnote 5 in the Cmmission's Order are preceded by the state-ment: "In developing the record of the proceeding, the Board should address a series of questions as follows..." (Emphasis added.)
- Sandia Laboratories has proposed to the NRC use of the " mini-max" technique of risk analysis:
This technique involves the calculation of the consequences of certain events separate from their probability, keeping in nund that at same point the consequences will be intolerably severe, even at en extremely low probability. SAND 79-0396, at 3.5, p. 64.
e .
The Ca mission has stated that its " primary concern is the extent to which the population around Indian Point affects the risk posed by Indian Point," Conmission Order of January 8,1981 at 7, and this is inter-venors' primary concern as well. To exclude expert testinony relevant to the Camission's questions, on the grounds that this testinony is not maied by prohahi1ity estimates (which intervoaiors consider specious) muld violate the plain intent of the Ccmnission's Order as well as urpair the hearing process.
The most that can be required of UCS M IRG is a demonstration that any accident scenario addressed has a probability greater than zero.
Indeed, UCS/NYPIRG will present testinony describing the consequences of a range of accident scenarios, each with a probability greater than zero, including several described in the Peactor Safety Study. See, Amended (bntentions III (B) and III (C), infra.
B. The UCS/NYPIRG contentions are site-specific and raise safety issues related specifically to Indian Point; the fact that an issue may arise elsewhere does not disqualify a contention.
Con Edison argues generally that this is a strictly site-specific proceeding in which only safety issues unique to Indian Point Units 2 and 3 can be addressed. Con Edison Objections, p. 4. This argument leads logically to absurd conclusions and would effectively nullify the Comnission's Order. Con Edison would allow the proceeding to deal only with unusual valves and other design features that are unique to Indian Ibint. It would negate any possibility of comprehensively examining either accident consequences or the current state of efforts to mitigate those consequences at Indian Point.
UCS/NYPIRG agrees that this proceeding is to be site-specific to Indian Point. Our responses on particular contentions will demonstrate that all of our contentions meet this standard. Here we enphasize that
a contention is site-specific to Indian Point if it concerns Indian Point-related aspects of what may otherwise be generic issues, or if it is impor-tant to the Board's consideration of Indian Point hazards. For exanple, it is proper to criticize the use of a 10-mile inhalation pathway EPZ in the Indian Point area because the site's population density and pat + imine topographic characteristics make that size of the EPZ especially inappro-priate at this site. The acceptability of 10-mile inhalation pathway EPZs at other sites is a separate issue that is not challenged in any of our contentions.
The fact that an issue may arise elsewhere does not disqualify a contention. As in other licensing proceedings, the Board may accept generic issues when "the generic issue has safety significance for the particular reactor under review," and "the fashion in which [the licensee _7 deals with the matter is unsatisfactory." Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), AIAB-444, 6 NRC 660, 773 (1977), Potcznac Electric Power Co. (Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), AIAB-218, 8 AEC 79 (1974) . The UCS/NYPIRG contentions meet these standards and would be admissible even if class-ified as generic.
C. The UCS/NYPIRG contentions cmply with the specific standards for this proceeding.
The NBC Staff in particular enphasizes that the Ccmnission has adopted specific standards for admitting contentions to this proceeding.
In general, the Board is directed to admit contentions which will
" contribute materially" to answering the designated issues or "which seem likely to be important to resolving the Ccanission's questions."
Ebotnote 4, Order of September 18, 1981. With respect to any proposed alditional safety measures not referenced in the Director's decision of
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February 11, 1980, contentions are admissible if they are likely to bear cn the existence of a substantial risk to the public health and safety that could be significantly alleviated by the aMitional measures.
We agree with the Staff that the Comission has established such stan-dards , which are met by the UCS/NYPIBG contentions. We disagree with (bn Edison's argument that these standards constitute scme sort of " super-particularity" threshold. Con Edison Msorandum at 10-13. Nowhere does the Cmmission indicate that particularity is one of its special mncerns in this proceeding. Rather, just as the Cmmission has stated, the ques-tion is whether a contention will contribute materia'ly or be likely to be important in resolving the Conmission's questions. 'Ihat would be true of a contention that singly helped frame pertinent issues or of one that raised an issue not certain to be adequately addressed by the licensees or Staff.
The standards in this proceeding are unusual in that they grant broad discretion to the Board to admit and formulate contentions without being bound by the relevant provisions of 10 CFR Part 2. The Ca mission's concern with focusing the proceeding on its seven questions suggests that the threshold test for admissibility of contentions is in scue sense inversely proportional to a contention's degree of relatedness to one of the questions; contentions directly related to a question are scrutinized less rigorously than those with a relationship that is not imediately apparent. UCS/NYPIRG recognizes the Board's time constraints and the need for an efficient prrvwyling. At the same time, however, the Board's task here is to gather the full range of information necessary to answer the Cmmission's questions.
UCS/NYPIRG present only contentions which have a close nexus to the Ormission's Questions, and which will contribute materially to answeiing those questions. Additionally, we have provided substantial bases which
8 D will assure the Board that our participation is meaningful and which alerts the Staff, the Licensees, and other parties on the scope of
.our concerns and our positions. We have not offered an exhaustive listing of our bases, and we have not detailed all evidence which will- .
. be offered in support of our contentions.
D. Consideration of emergency planning cannot be limited to the issue of coupliance with NRC/FDR guidelines.
'Ihe NRC Staff repeatedly atL:myi.s to limit UCS/NYPIIG contentions on emnergency planning to the question of canpliance with NRC/FDR guide-lines. Yet, the Comnission's Order defining the issues cognizable in this hearing invites the consideration of smu.yacy planning inprovements apart from NRC/FDR gnielalines.
Ca mission question 4 asks:
What inprovements in the level of arau.vacy planning can be expected in the near future, and on what time schedule, and are there other specific offsite emergency p1.ucalures that are feasible and should be taken to protect the public? (enphasis midad)
Further, contentions that do in ~ fact challenge NRC/FDR regulations are admissible whenever they relate to one of the Seven Ccmmission Questions.
See instructions of Frederick J. Shon and Oscar H. Paris, ~ J.J., Pre-Hearing (bnference, December 2, 1981, Transcript, pp.98-101. ,
E. Accident consequences and emergency planning should be the f p t order of business of this investigation.
Public concerns about the health, environmental and econcxnic consequences of possible accidents at Indian Point, and the adequacy of emergency plans to mitigate these consequences dictate that these matters be addressed separately frcun and prior to consideration of accident i
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probabilities. Con Edison would prefer that plant risk come first, however, and that rrost aspects of emergency planning be relegated to a
" time available" basis at the end of the proceeding. Con Edison Objections at 14. This proposal perhaps reflects the licensee's attitude toward em r-gency preparedness. It certainly is not designed to expedite the hearings.
The licensees have indicated that their probabilistic risk assess-nent study is not yet available, and the Staff's review of it is "not due for cxxupletion until sumer 1982." NUR1rr-0850, Preliminary Assessment of (bre-Melt Accidents at Zion and Indian Point Nuclear Power Plants, Volume 1, pp.1-4 (November,1981) .
There is no reason to delay until sumer, however, the presentation of testinony on accident consequences and emergency planning. Consequence predictions for a variety of possible accident scenarios are properly considered independently of the theorectical probabilities postulated for those accidents. Furthermore, evaluation of current emergency plans does not depend upon probability estirrates, but rather on a knowledge of predict-able consequences for a range of possible accident scenarios occurring under a variety of atmospheric conditions at the Indian Point site.
The Conmission, in its September 18, 1981 Order, expressly authorized the Board to " establish whatever order of presentation it deems best suited to the proceeding's investigative purposes." Footnote 4, Cmmission Order. UCS and NYPIRG urge the Board to respond to the concerns of intervenors and of the general public by scheduling hearings on accident consequences and emergency planning at the earliest possible date.*
- The majority of speakers at the recent Lunited Appearance Sessions in West-chester and Rockland Counties were critical of the emergency plans for Indian Point and expressed serious reservations about the possibility of effective evacuation.
F. 'Ihe Board should not disturb the voluntary partial consolidation of UCS and NYPIBG.
Neither UCS nor NYPIBG is willing to agree to a cmplete consolidation of the two groups. Neither organization has authorized representation by the other, notwithstanding the close cooperation between the two. UCS and NYPIRG have sought to save time and facilitate the progress of the hearings by pre-paring joint subnissions. However, each party nust retain separate spokes-persons to adequately represent its different interests.
We are comnitted to avoiding repetition in order to expedite this proceeding and do not intend to exercise our right to speak separately when a matter has been adequately addressed by another party.
II. RESPONSES 'IO SPECIFIC ORTBCPIONS 'IO UCS/NYPIBG CONTENTIONS UCS/NYPIRG respond in the following.pages to Objections to each of their contentions. Several contentions have been amended in response to objections and for clarity. Three contentions have been withdrawn.
In responding to objections, UCS/NYPITG has made every effort to meet and exceed the standards established by the Comnission for the framing of issues in this pr W ing toward the end of facilitating the progress of the hearing.
UCS/NYPIRG CONTENTION 1(A):
~
Failure of Indiar. Point Emergency Plans to Conform to FEMA /NRC Guidelines
-- (Related to Comission questions three and four)
Emergency planning for Indian Point Units 2 and 3 is inadequate to protect the health and safety of the public because the existing plans do not conforn to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, in that they do not neet any of the sixteen mandatory standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) .
Bases for Contention 1(A)
(1) 'Ihe sixteen substantive standards at 10 CFR 50.47(b) nust be met by each and every plan for which the standards are applicable. The language of 10 CFR 50.47(b) clearly states that "(t)he onsite and offsite mergency response plans for nuclear power reactors must meet the follow-ing standards...".
(2) Both NBC and FEMA regard al] 6 of these substantive standards as " essential for an adequate radiological emergency plan" (See, NUREG-0654, Rev. 1, November 1980, page 5).
(3) 10 CFR 50.47(b) (1) is not met because the emergency plans fail to delineate the relationships of the licensees, the State and gov-ernments, and support organizations to the total planning and response -
effort. Further, the emergency response organizations (including the licensees, Federal, State, and local governnents, and support organizations) have failed to fully document the existence of appropriate letters of agreement with support organizations and agencies; moreover, where letters of agreement are provided, they are outdated (nore than one year old), and fail to describe mutually agreed upon provisions for the exchange of in-formation relevant to the provision of such emergency measures and services (Appendix A, Indian Point Unit 2 Emergency Plan, December 1980) . Thus, there is no reasonable assurance that the emergency plans have been inte-grated into a functional, total plan, and there is no reasonable assurance that conflicts between the provisions of the various plans have been avoided.
(4) 10 CFR 50.47(b) (2) is not met because the licensees have failed to demonstrate that each person in the line of succession for the
" emergency coordinator" position is qualified and fully trained in order to adequately fulfill that role in an actual emergency. Further, the licensees have not cm mitted to meet the " minimum staffing requirements" of Table B-1 of NUREG-0654, Rev. 1, November 1980, pages 37-38. The licensees have not demonstrated the prapt availability of sufficient op-erational, maintenance, supervisory, technical support, and administra-tive personnel to adequately respond to an accident, including accidents which are beyond the design basis of the Indian Point units.
(5) 10 CFR 50.47(b) (3) is not met because the licensees have failed to make arrangements to participate in the Federal Radiological bbnitoring and Assessment Program (FRMAP), nor have the licensees denon-strated that they have made arrangements with any other support organiza-tion that has the same capabilities as FEMAP. In addition, the plans
generally fail to indicate in what time frames the expected emergency response support and resources will be available for implementation.
'Ihere exist no criteria in the plans for use in determining the nost ef ficient and nest productive use (in terms of protecting the public health and safety) of available services and resources sluuld such services and resources becczne wholly or partially unavailable or should such services and resources be inadequate to respond to a particular emergency situation. Further, adequate diverse ccumunications capabilities with all required off-site support organizations have not been provided to assure the availability of ccxmunications under such circumstances as loss of rormal power, technical problems with ccximercial telephone service, and adverse weather affecting normal ccxmunications systems.
(6) 10 CFR 50.47(b) (4) is not met because the licensecs have failed to establish adequate " emergency action level" (FE) criteria as provided for in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654, Rev. 1, November 1980. Further, the licensees have provided no basis upon which there can be reasonable assurance that their specified EAL's constitute a sufficient set of para-neters and action levels for all possible accidents. Absent such a basis, there can be no reasonable assurance that all accident sequences with off-site consequences will be timely recognized in order to permit the effectuation of the emergency response plans. In addition, there has been ro denonstration that the EAL's chosen by the licensees adequately account for the lead times necessary to implement protective actions which will be required in response to the emergencies which caused the EAL's to be exceeded (See, William W. Chenault, et. al. , Evacuation Planning in the 'IMI Accident, RS 2-8-34, January 1980, prepared by Human Sciences aesearch, Inc., for the Federal Emergency Management Agency; the report states that "(t) hose charged with the ' scientific' analysis of a hazard will frequently not take account of the lead times required to -
execute population protection measures. That is, they will tend to decide when a causal agent has become dangerous to people - without allowing for the time required to react to the threat and protect people."; page 44) .
(7) 10 CFR 50.47(b) (5) is not met because the prcunpt notifica-tion capability (as required at 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3) has not been fully implemented. Moreover, the licensees have not provided reasonable assurance that the prcrnpt notification system (even once it is fully installed) will be operable when it is needed in response to a radiological emergency at Indian Point Units 2 and 3 (there have been siren alerting system tests at several nuclear power plants in which a number of sirens have failed to function on demand). The content of EDS messages is insufficient to adequately assure proper response. Further, the pro-tosed prunpt notification system fails to provide adequate noMce to non-English speaking residents of the plume EPZ, to the deaf and hearing-impaired, the nembers of the population with learning disabilities, " latch-key" children, and other special populations. Further, the annual dis-tribution of emergency-related information required by Appendix E to 10 T R Part 50,Section IV.D.2., has not been performed, nor have the materials proposed to be distributed been publicly released, thus preventing any consideration of the adequacy of such materials.
(8) 10 CFR 50.47(b) (6) is not met because it has not been dmonstrated that sufficient and diverse conmunications capabilities exist between and anong the energency response organizations to assure effective criergency response under a range of conditions, including heavy traffic cri conmercial ccxmunications, adverse weather, and loss of norm 11 power
sources (See, Post Exercise Assessment - Exercise of the New York State and Oswego County Radiological Emergency Plans for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Station, September 30, 1981, attached to letter frcm Vincent Forde, Acting Regional Director, FH4A Region II to William C. Hennessy, Chairman, Disaster Preparedness Ccmmission State of New York).
(9) 10 CFR 50.47(b) (7) is not met because transients who may be in the plume EPZ during an accident are not adequately notified of the existing emergency response systen and what they are expected to do in a radiological emergency. Further, the public education program is not adequately developed; see above under 10 CFR 50.47(b) (5) . The number of transients for Westchester County alone is potentially ten to thirteen thousand persons (Memrandum dated February 18, 1981 from Joseph Caverly, Qxtmissioner to David Smith, Office of the County Executive) .
(10) 10 CFR 50.47(b) (8) is not mt because the licensees' cmergency response facilities (Technical Support Center, and Emergency Operations Facility) do not ccuply with applicable provisions of the regulatory guidance contained in WREG-0696. Further, there has been no demonstration by the licensees that these facilities are sufficiently equipped and staffed to prcmptly and adequately respond to an accident at Indian Point (including accidents which exceed the design basis of the Indian Point units) . In addition, there has been no demonstration that the emergency radiation mnitoring capabilities of the emergency response organizations (in terms of equipmnt and trained staff members) is suffi-cient to permit a prcxnpt and adequate response to such accident (See, Post Exercise Assessment, op. cit. , item I.8; also, Memrandum dated February 25, 1981 frca Calvin E. Weber, Assistant Comnissioner of Health to Anita S. Curran, Conmissioner of Health, Westchester County) . In NUREG-0396, the joint EPA /NRC Task Force on Dnergency Planning took the position that "(A)cceptable values for emergency doses to the public under the actual conditions of a nuclear accident cannot be predetermmed." The Task Force goes on to state, "The emergency actions taken in any individual case m a t be based on the actual conditions that exist and are pro-jected at the time of an accident." (NUREG-0396, December 1978, pages 2-3) .
If this is the case (and we take the position that this is an incorrect and inadequate position), then the adequacy of local accident assessment capabilities is an essential ccmponent of the emergency plans, since local governmnts will best know the real-time status of local conditions and capabilities. Indeed, the NBC has itself cited the licensee for Indian Point Unit 2 for "significant deficiencies" in its on-site emergency preparedness program, including " ineffective administration" of the program,
"(i)1l-defined emrgency organization and nonspecific assignment of personnel,"
" improperly equipped e m rgency facilities, and lack of on-site emergency equignent", and "(t)he existence of incomplete and deficient procedures for implementing the Emergency Plan" (See, letter dated August 21, 1981, frcm Boyce H. Grier, Director, NRC Region I, to John D. O'Toole, Vice President - Nuclear, Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.).
(11) NURa3-0396 takes the position that "(A)cceptable values for emrgency doses to the public under the actual conditions of a nuclear accident cannot be predetermined." The report goes on to state, "The energency actions taken in any individual case must be based on the actual conditions that exist and are projected at the time of an accident."
(See, NUREG-0396, op. cit. , pages 2-3) . If this is the case (and we take the position that this is inadequate and incorrect), then the adequacy of local accident assessmnt capabilities is an even mre essential ccmponent
of the emergency plan.
(12) 10 CFR 50.47(b) (9) is not met because reliance on the ARAC and MIDAS assessment systems has not been demonstrated to be sufficient for a range of accident conditions, including heated releases and a range of meteorological conditions and the local conditions present in the Indian Point area (i.e., the location in a " bowl," surrounded by high ground on almost all sites sme 600 to 1,000 feet high, topography which " decisively" influences the meterology of the area; Technical Beport #372.1, "A Micrmeteorological Survey of the Buchanan, New York Area - Sunmary of Progress to 1 Dem+nr 1955, Indian Point Unit #3, FSAR, Section 2.6). Further, it has not been daenstrated that sufficient accident assessment capabilities exist in the emergency response organ-izations to make rapid assessments of the potential magnitude and locations of radiological hazards caused by liquid and/or gaseous releases from Indian Point.
(13) 10 CPR 50.47(b)(10) is not met because the plans contain insufficient bases or criteria upon which to make choices of protective actions in the event of a radiological emergency at Indian Point Units 2 and 3. Further, the evacuation time estimates prepared by CONSAD Research Corporation and Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade and Douglas, Inc., are inade-quate for use in making protective action decisions (See, Contention 1(B) (2),
infra). In addition, it has not been demonstrated that sufficient thyroid protection is available to emergency workers in order for those workers to perform accident assessment and related emergency functions (See, Post 4
Exercise Assessment, op. cit., Item J.10.e). Further, a range of pro-tective actions has not been developed in that the plans rely primarily on evacuation and sheltering as protective actions for the plume EPZ. It has not been denonstrated that these two protective actions, either singly or in cmbination, will be effective in protecting the public health and safety in the event of an accident at Indian Point Units 2 and 3 (including accidents which exceed the design basis for these units). In addition, it has not been demonstrated that there are sufficient, adequate sheltering capabilities within the plume EPZ for all residents and transients; indeed, even the sheltering afforded by the structures within the plume EPZ varies considerably in effectiveness.
(14) 10 CFR 50.47(b) (11) is not net in that methods for per-nnnent record-keeping of emergency response personnel radiation exposures have not been included within the plans (See, Post Exercise Assessment, op. cit., Item K.3.a.). Further, there has been no demonstration that decontanunation facilities, equignent, supplies, and trained personnel to conduct such decontamination are available in sufficient quantity to adequately respond to an accident at Indian Point Units 2 and 3 (includ-ing accidents which exceed the design basis for these units). In addition, j it has not been demonstrated that emergency response organizations have adequate capabilities to assess doses to emergency workers while they are responding to such accidents, nor has it been denonstrated that there i
is a sufficient supply of prmptly available personnel dosimetry to respond to such accidents (See, Review of New York State Radiological Emergency
, Preparedness (REP) Plan, Section K, attached to letter dated April 6, 1981, l from Vincent Forde, Acting Regional Director, F M A Region II, to William
! C. Hennessy, Chairman, Disaster Preparedness Ccmnission, State of New York) .
! Further, it has not been demonstrated that sufficient means for radiological nonitoring of evacuees at relocation centers can be established in a timely and adequate manner.
(15) 10 TR 50.47 (b) (12) is not met in that existing hospital or other suitable medical facilities are not capable of caring for large numbers of irradiated and contaminated persons resulting frcm accidents at Indian Point (including accidents which exceed the design basis for the Indian Point units). It has also not been dertonstrated that there are sufficient transportation resources available to transport such irradiated and contaminated persons to available facilities, nor that such transportation can be acccxtplished in a timely manner given that an evacuation may be in progress concurrent with the need to transport such persons (See, Post Exercise Assessment, op. cit., Item L.4) .
(16) 10 TR 50.47(b) (13) is not met in that a method for periMim11y estimating the total population exposure is not set forth in the plans (See, Post Exercise Assessment, op. cit. , Item M.4) . Further, there is no guidance regarding the uses for such data in terms of the need to implment supplemental or aMitional protective actions. In aMition, recovery plans and procedures are not sufficiently detailed as to provide reasonable assurance that the public health and safety will be adequately protected. There are no action level criteria or other ob-jective criteria upon which to base decisions regarding the return of the general public to areas affected by a nuclear power plant accident at Indian Point Units 2 and 3 (See, Post Exercise Assessment, op. cit.,
Item M.1).
(17) 10 TR 50.47(b) (14) is not met in that the conduct of and planning for drills and exercises is not sufficiently detailed in the plans. There is no assurance that such exercises and drills provide a sufficiently realistic test of emergency plans and response capabilities. Indeed, to the extent that participan d in such drills and exercises have prior knowledge of the dates, times, and other details about such drills and exercises, such drills and exercises do not test preparedness, but rather provide only a minimal test of the ability of the involved organizations to follow procedures.
(18) 10 TR 50.47(b) (15) is not met in that training criteria for emergency response personnel are not adequately set forth in the plans, thus there is no demonstration that such training is adequate.
Accountability programs are not described in the plans to assare that the requisite training is in fact perceived by all necessary emergency response personnel. In fact,rtost of the necessary training has not yet taken place (See, Post Exercise Assessment, Its O.4.a through O.4.j) .
l (19) 10 TR 50.47(b) (16) is not Itet in that there is not sufficient assurance that the public will be adequately informed of re-visions to the emergency plans. There are no provisions for updating p1blic information programs. There are no provisions for updating evacuation time estimates to account for new construction, long-term unavailability of major routes due to repair work, or changts in popu-lation. Further, it has not been dettonstrated that the emergency response -
organizations possess sufficient expertise to properly utilize the evacu-ation time estimates given the actual conditions as opposed to the idealized conditions assumed for the purposes of the time estimate studies. There
- is no assurance that an adequate and appropriate level of preparedness l will be ttnintained for so long as the Indian Point units operate.
I I
i
UCS/NYPIIG Response to_ Objections g Contention 1(A)
Contention 1(A) relates primarily to the third question set forth in the Cmmission's Order of January 8,1981 (Camission Question Three) .
'Ihe question asks for the " current status and degree of conformance with NRC/FDR guidelines of state and local emergency planning." h con-tention refers to the sixteen mandatory requirenents of 10 CFR 50.47(b) ,
by which the current status of such planning must be judged. 'Ihese sixteen requirements are also found in the proposed FDR regulations for existing plants at 44 CFR 350.5(a), and in NUREG-0654, Part II, where clarifying gnidance is given for each requirement. Additional mandatory guidelines relating to the sixteen requirenents are found in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, at Section IV, " Content of Dnergency Plans."
This contention also relates to Cmmission Question 4, which involves improvements in the level of emergency planning that can be expected in the near future and the feasibility and necessity for other offsite energency procedures. To the extent that requirenents are established by 10 CFR 50.47(b), they should be met to protect the public. The question of whether or not they have been cmplied with has a bearing on what neasures need to be taken in the future and on whether it is feasible to achieve adequate energency plans for Indian Point.
'Ihese are made applicable to operating plants by 10 CFR 50.54 (q) .
See, Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), Docket No. 50-289-SP, Partial Initial Decision (filed December 14, 1981), Vol. II, p. 389, para. 1337:
Under the new emergency planning rules, licensees authorized to possess and/or operate a nuclear power reactor are to follcw and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the planning standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E. 10 CFR 50.54 (q) .
Objections to Contention 1(A)
- h Staff and PASNY have only general objections, while Con Edison l
has nore specific objections to the various parts of Contention 1(A). We address the Staff and PASNY objections below, and then turn to those bases cbjected to bv Oon Edison. We will use the numbering system adopted by Cbn Edison.
NRC Staff Objections to Contention 1(A)
The Staff does not object to the admission of Contention 1(A),
with the qualification that it be limited to the conformance of state and local plans and that UCS/NYPIRG specify the " portions of the State and local plans that do not satisfy" the sixteen requirements. (NBC Staff Besponse at 15-16).
'Ihe Staff's attempt to limit the contention to state and local canpliance, while ignoring the failings of the utilities who actually own the reactors, is absurd. h standards give the utilities primary responsibility for emergency planning in general, including coordination and cmmunication with state and local emergency response organizations.
Even a narrow reading of Question 3 would require a full examination of that interaction.- Moreover, Question 4 encmpasses the question of whether the emergency plans and proposed implementation ccuply with all necessary requirements.
h Staff's request for greater detail similarly misses the mark.
UCS/NYPIRG have recited with specificity the nineteen factual bases for contention 1(A) . h result is that all parties are on notice of the deficiencies alleged and the regulation or guideline to which the deficiency relates. h contention, with its bases, has thus framed the issues for resolution of Ccxmtission Question 'Ihree. No nore is I
required at the pleMing stage, and nuch less has been presented by the Staff and Licensees in their respective answers to the Ccanission questions.
In sme instances, the deficiencies in the State and local plans that form the bases for Contention 1(A) are cmissions rather than partial or inadequate inclusions. In those instances, at least, UCS/NYPIRG cannot be held to inform the parties of the portion of the plan which should con- <
tain the information,. but does not.
In all instances, the non-conformance of the plans with the guidelines is explicitly stated in the bases. Any further specification required by the Staff is raMily available in the cross-reference between the State and local plans and the regulations that are found at the beginning of Volume I of the plans.
PASNY Objections to Contention 1(A)
PASNY objects to Contention 1(A) on three grounds: (1) that a challenge to the adequacy of mergency planning goes beyond Ccmnission Question 3, (2) that the contention lacks sufficient particularity unless the bases ar, considered to be part of the contention, and (3) that claims that the utilities have " failed to denonstrate" cmpliance or adequacy in a particular area do not constitute bases for the contention. PASNY
@jections, pp. 21-22. The first objection is patently absurd. The others are invalid, although not embarrassingly so.
Question 3 asks "the current status and degree of conformance with NBC/FDIA guidelines." Our claim of inadequacy is simply a characterization of that status and failure to conform. It is hardly beyond the scope of j
the question.
Since the bases provide the required particularity, as discussed above,
L the contention is admissible. We do not object to their being considered part of the contention. However, they would not limit the scope of the contention to the extent that other relevant points are presented in testinony, parHmlarly if those points derive frm discovery responses.
PASNY's argument that it may have met scrne of the sixteen standards has no bearing on the admissibility of the contention, since that is the issue to be litigated.
Without identifying them, PASNY objects to bases for Contention 1(A) that state that the licensees have " failed to demonstrate" cmpliance with particnlar requirements. Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, Section IV, in its mandatory guidalines for emergency plans, requires the licensees to include information in their plans sufficient to "dertonstrate" conformance with the sixteen requirerents and all other aspects of Appendix E. In light of this requirenent, an allegation that the dertonstration has not been made is, by itself, a sufficient bases.*
UCS/NYPIRG would like to point out that the Regional Assistance Ccr mittee uses similar phrases in its critique of the plan at Attachfrent 2,
~
4 for exanple, ll l
"It is not clear frcxn the plan. . ." (F.1.a.)
"'Ihe plans have not provided for. . ." (F.1.b.)
" Specific information concerning...are not provided." (F. 2. )
" Specifics are not provided. . . " (G.4ib'. )
"The plan does not provide information on. . ." (G.4.c.)
"'Ihe (plans) do not address. . ." (J.10.d. )
"There is no mention of..." (K.3.a.)
"'Ihere is no provision in the plans for. . ." (N.l.b.)
There are only so many ways to point out clear m missions in the plans.
l I
l l
l i _ _ _ __ __ _
Further, the licensees themselves are uniquely privy to and the best source for all relevant information. Therefore the Board cannot expect intervenors to be more specific ab mt the licensees' failures than to note-the absence of the required demonstration in the emergency plans themselves. _
Con Edison Objections to Contention I-A Con FA1en concedes the propriety of Contention I(A) 'and bases 1-3,
~
~
but objects to bases 4-19, which correspond to the requirements of 10 TR 50.47 (b) (2) -(1b) . (Con Edison Objections, p.55) .
Six objections appear repeatedly in Con Edison's ccmnents on bases 4-19. UCS/NYPIRG responds generally to each of these objections below.
- 1) Con Edison objects to references in the bases to the guidance provided in NUREGs 0654 and 0396, on the ground that NUREGs provide guidance to licensees but are not licensing requirements or regulations,
@jections to bases 4, 10, 11, in Con Edison's Objections, pp. 55-56, 58-59.
Ccmnission question three, to which contention 1(A) relates, asks the parties to respond to the " current status and degree of conformance with NRC/FDR guidelines of state and local emergency planning..." Cer--
tainly the guidance provided in the NUREGs is within the meaning of l " guidelines"in Ccmnission question three, and material to a resolution of that question. Whereas the failure to conform to the guidelines con-tained in the NUREG3 may be distinguished frcm a failure to conform to a rsluirement or regulation, the failure is no less important th the-crrnprehensive consideration of Ccmnission question three, and constitutes a valid basis for UCS/NYPIRG's contention.
- ~T . -
- 2) Similarly, bases that assert the failure of the licensees to provide for certain specific elements in the emergency plans are deemed objectionable by Con Edison on the ground that the language of the require-ment as stated in 10 CFR 50,47(b) does not explicitly call for such details.
(bn Edison's Objections to bases 5,8,9,10,12,13,14,16, and 18 at pp.
56, 57-58, 58-59, 59-60, 60-62, 63, 64.
Con Edison's meticulously literal rmaing of the sixteen requirem nts reflects the. licensee's reluctance to improve its emergency plans, which conform only perfunctorily, if at all, with NBC/FDR guidelines.
The specific emergency planning measures cited in the UCS/NYPIRG bases listed above are mndated in the guidance given in NUREG 0654 or in Appen-dix E to 10 CFR part 50. Con Edison's failure to include these measures in its plans is the concern of Ccmnission questions three and of this p W ing.
- 3) Con Edison objects to several bases as generic in nature and thus failing to ccruply with the aim of the Catmission that issues pre-sented in the Indian Point hearings be site-specific. Objections to bases 7, 9, 13, 17, at pp. 56-57, 58, 60-61, 63-64.
As noted in the Introduction, Point B supra, at pp.4-5 , con niison misunderstands the Ccmnission's and UCS/NYPIRG's focus on the status of the emergency plans formalated specifically for Indian Point.
Each of the bases for Contention I-A relates ~to a particular problem with these plans. Whether that problem may also exist at another plant is not the concern of UCS/NYPIRG and does not disqualify the contention.
- 4) Con Edison ccmplains of the phrase that appears in several bases: "it has not been demonstrated." Objections to bases 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 18, at pp. 57-62, 64.
As noted more fully above in the response to PASN'I's Objections to Contention I-A, the phrase is found in the regulations which require that emergency plans "contain but not necessarily be limited to infor-nation needed to dmonstrate empliance" with the factors listed in Appendix E and with 10 GR 50.47 (b) (1) - (1b) . Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, Part IV: " Content of B urgency Plans." *
- 5) Con Edison finds that several UCS/NYPIRG bases supporting (batention I-A constitute an attack on NRC regulations and objects to these bases on that ground. Objections to Bases 7, 9,13,17, at pp.
56-57, 58, 60-61, 63-64. -
'Ihe bases emplained of do not, in fact, challenge NBC/FDR regu-lations or guidelines. Even if that were the ' case, however, these diallenges are addressed directly to Cmmission Questions 3 and 4. See remarks of Judge Shon and Judae Paris, Pre-Hearing Conference, Dec. 2, 1981, i
transcript pp.98-101, and general discussion in Introduction, Point D Fj. 8 .
Con Fdison's more frequent objection to the bases of Contention I-A, as tell as to the other contentions, is that an accident scenario must be described before consequences of an accident can be the subject of any con-tention. Objection to Bases 6, 10,~ 11 12, 13, 14, and 15 , on 99 56, 59-62.
Basis 4_, M g 50.47 (b) (2)
- . Con Edison challenges Basis 4 as requiring cmpliance with NUREG-0654, t which is not a regulation. Objections, p. 55. We recognize that a NUREG cbcument does not establish legal r@ements. However, in this and in
, other instances where Con Edison raises this objection, the NUREG constitutes
,T a factual basis derived frcm NRC/FDR guidelines to support the contention.
w = -w ..-y u- -
s..,w,_ ,, _-__._m_ _ - -.-._
In this case, Part II ( B) of NUREG-0654 indicates what are considered to be minimum staffing levels for safety and supports our argument that such levels are necessary to cmply with the regulations.
Basis 5,10 CFR 50.47(b) (3)
Con Edison's objection here is similar in that it argues there is no mquirement to participate in the FEMAP. Objections, p. 56. Again, we agree that there is no such specific requirement. Rather, the FEMAP consti-tutes a factual basis for our contention that interaction with and accmo-dation of the state and local mergency response teams is inadequate. 'Ihe ERMAP represents a level of achievment and affort that nust be reached to conply with the regulation and guidelines. See, NUREG-0654, Part II, C, p.40.
Basis 6_,10 CFR 50.47(b) (4)
Con Edison challenges Basis 6 on the ground that projecting " lead times" somehow requires the identification of accident scenarios, and therefore an allegation of the probability of those scenarios. Objections, p. 56. To the contrary, this basis raises a fundamental flaw in Indian Point's emer-gency planning that exists regardless of which accident scenario would require mergency response. Since the Ccmnission's regulations require emergency planning within the plume pathway EPZ regardless of potential accident scenarios, intervenors can hardly be required to describe such sce.w ios as a pre-requisite to discussion of emergency planning.
For accidents beyond the design basis of the plant, this contention relates to those scenarios identified in UCS/NYPIRG's consequence analysis.
Sae, amended Contention III (B) .
l l In aMition, the Ccanission has specifically requested that the Board l
l attenpt to determine "the minimum number of hours' warning for an effective L - - - -
evacuation of a 10-mile quadrant at Indian Point." Accordingly, the Ommission itself has specifically directed that the " lead times" issue be considered in this prrwwHng.
Basis 7,10 CFR 50.47(b) (5)
Con Edison challenges Basis 7, related to the inadequacies of pro-Insed notification procedures, on the following grounds:
- 1. Claiming inadequacy of the prmpt notification ,
systen as "not appropriate."
- 2. The basis is not site-specific.
- 3. A claim that non-English speaking people and others must be considered is a challenge to the Cm mission's regulations.
- 4. The "special populations" claim is not site-specific.
(bjrtions,pp.56-57. Con Edison fails on all counts. Neither 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(5) nor any other regulation can be satisified by the filing of inadequate procedures. 'Ihe adequacy challenge is valid under that regulation and under the Comnission's request for the current status and degree of conformance of emergency planning.*
The inadequacy of the notification system at Indian Point received some attention in the Review of the Regional Assistance Cmmittee issued
. Decenber 31, 1981, subsequent to the filing of UCS/NYPIRG Contentions.
UCS/NYPIRG amend Basis 7 to include the following cmments frmt the Ibview, Attachment 2, p. 6:
E.5.: The CRERPs do not satisfy the planning guidelines regarding the dissemination of information to the public using the EBS.
E.7.: The draft announcements are not adequate neither in nurrber nor ~oontent (sic) to meet the emergency needs for people within the Indian Point EPZ.
i
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7 Second, the issue is not whether the Indian Point prmpt notification system is any different frun those at other reactors, but whether it is adequate for the Indian Point site. It could not be more site-specific.
Even if the system is exactly the same as those at other reactors, that fact alone would prcbably demonstrate its inadequacies due to the population densities and other unique aspects of Indian Point.
'Ihird, the "special populations" argument would be a challenge to Ormission regulation only if the regulation specifically precluded it or established a par +imlar mechanism for addressing it. It does neither.
'Ib the contrary, it requires messages and notifications to the public, but it in no way defines or limits which groups of the public are to be addressed. UCS/NYPIEG believes that nonral, healthy, English-speaking adults are not the only ones who need protection.
Finally, the question is not whether there are greater numbers of "special populations" in the Indian Point area thatn elsewhere, but whether those populations reside near and are protected at Indian Point. The fact that they may or may not be protected elsewhere is irrelevant to the status of emergency planning at this facility.
Basis 8_,10 CFR 50.47 (b) (6) 4 10 CFR 50.47(b) (6) requires the establishment of provisions for prmpt ccumunications among emergency response organizations. Basis 8, I
which challenges the sufficiency of those provisions, particularly under adverse conditions, is perceived by Con Edison to be outside the regulation in that Con Edison is not required to demonstrate its capabilities, or to nake provision for adverse conditions. Objections,pp.57-58.
We have addressed the first argurent in the general responses to Con Ed Objectionis at point 4 and in response to P1LSNY's Objections, supra p.18. Con
Edison nust demonstrate that the required notification provisions exist.
7b do so, it must denenstrate that the provisions reflect actual capabilities, not simply paper conformance. Con Edison's argument on this point would destroy the Comnission's effort to investigate the status of emergency planning at Indian Point.
The December 31. 1981 Feview of the Regional Assistance CcxTmittee, Attachment 2, cites the inadequacy of emergency ccatmunications procedures cn nuny points. It states at F.1.b. that, "The plans have not provided for ccrmunications between contiguous States and counties in the 50-mile ingestion exposure pathway." Criticism at F.1.e. requests indications of how ccxmunications with Federal agencies will be acccxnplished. Further problems with ccumunications are cited in this review with reference to field monitoring teams, hospital and nobile support units, and radio and land lines. UCS/hTPIRG amend Basis 8 to include the above-mentioned PAC cxrments.
As with its argument on "special populations," Con Edison's suggestion that it need not consider adverse conditions is invalid. The regulation does not limit the required provisions to periods of sunshine and good wather, or periods when telephone exchanges are not disrupted or overloaded.
It extends to all periods of reactor operation. Irdeed, as late as December 31, 1981, the RAC Review, Attachment 2, agrees with our assessment. For element F.1.b., it states, " provision for all alternate ccxmunications links between states and counties has not been clearly demonstrated."
Even if Con Edison and PASNY would ccxnnit to shutting dc,*n Indian Point during adverse weather conditions and similar situations, back-up means of crxmunications would still be required by Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, at IV (D) (9) .
Basis 9,10 CFR 50.47(b) (7)
Con Edison's claims with respect to Basis 9 are similar to those with respect to Basis 7. Objections, p. 58. Its argument that transients are not covered by the regulation is similar to their "special populations" argu-ment. 'Ihe regulation does not exclude transients frm the "public." 'Ibe normal meaning of the wrd would include all persons reasonably expected to be in need of notification in the event of an accident. Transient popula-tions are foreseeable and thus covered by the regulation. Further, special procedures for transients are provided for in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, at IV(D) (2) and in NUREG-0654 Part II G(2) .
Indeed, the Regional Assistance Ccxtmittee in its December 31, 1981 Review found:
G.l. There are no specifics regarding the public information program for permanent and transient populations of the plume EPZ. What is the meth-odology to ensure that the public information program materials will be available to all permanent and transient populations." (enphasis added) .
Att. 2, p.8.
Con Edison's argument that listening to the local radio would be sufficient denonstrates that Con Edison does not understand the regulatory 1
requirement. 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7) regnires that periodic information be provided to the public so that people will know how they will be notified of the need for mergency responses and of the actions r. hey are to take.
'Ihe regulation refers to the radio as a means by which people will be noti-fied under 10 CFR 50.47(b) (5) when emergency actions are required, not as the i
neans by which the periodic information will be provided.
Con Edison's site-specific claim here fails as it does elsewhere.
l 'Ihe issue is the adequacy of planning for this site and the particulars of I
notifying transients and othen in the Indian Point area, not elsewtere.
t l
I
Bases 10 and 11,10 TR 50.47(b) (8) l Con Edison challenges these bases on the following grounds:
(1) that a NUREG does not constitute a regulation, and therefore is not a requirement, (2) that it has no obligation to denonstrate the adequacy of the facilities on which it relies, and (3) that the' bases do not include particular accident scenarios for which probabilities are provided.
Wjections, pp. 58-59. 'Ihe first point is true, but irrelevant. NUREG re-ferences are " guidelines" within the neaning of Cannission Question 'Ihree and provide factual bases even where they are not estacilshea as require-nents. Additional support is found at Appendix E to 10 TR Part 50.
The second point is incorrect, as discussed at length above. See, general responses to Con Ed Objections, 4), and responses to PASNY Objections, supra, pp. 17-19. 'Ihe third point is covered in Part I(A) of the Introduction, supra, pp.~2-4.
Basis g,10 TR 50.47(b) (9)
Con Edison challenges this basis on the ground that the regulation does not require a denonstration of empliance and that relevant accident scenarios have not been identified. Objections, pp. 59-60.
UCS/NYPIRG subnits that Appendix E to 10 TR Part 50, IV, E(2), does indeed require the denonstration of the adequacy of assessment systems as stated in Basis 12.
Relevant accident scenarios need not be described here, as is fully argued in the Introduction, Point I.A, suora, pp. 2-4. Further, since the (bmnission has required that accidents beyond the design basis be examined, this basis is valid for such accident scenarios as the Board exanunes pursuant to the Comntssion's order, regardless of whether UCS/NYPIRG present other scenarios. Even for those accidents given consideration in the
formaticn of NURID-0654 guihlines, the Dww=bl 31,1981 RAC Mview finds rachation assessment r'apabilities inadequate. Criteria I.7, 8, and 9 dis-cussing state ' field nonitoring capabilities, are all judged inaMquate.
Attachment 2, pp. 11-13. UCS/NYPIRG know of no formal statment by New York State regarding the use of potassium iodide as a protective action in a rad-iological mergency. It is our contention that the issue is therefore open for public discussion and scrutiry and certainly is not foreclosed on any perceived or real conflict in jurisdiction.
That the issue is not settled is dertonstrated by the facts that the City of New York has taken a formal position in favor of the use of potassium iodide and that the State of Tennessee has not only expressed a favorable opinion but has pre-distributed the drug.
Even if there were a conflict between the NRC ard the State of New York on this issue, the Board would not be precluded frca considering whether the use of potassium iodide was essential to reasonably assure the protection of the health and safety of the population around the Indian Point sites. In that event, the Board would be ccmpelled to reemmend the shut-down of the plants, but would not have to simply accept the position of New York State.
- Fourth, Con Edison's " accident scenario" argument has been addressed in the Introduction, Point I-A, supra, pp. 2-4.
Fifth, there is no attack on the regulations here, because they do
- rot limit the range of protective actions that must be considered. In order to cmply with the regulation, the range developed by Con Edison must be adequate. s
(
Sixth, the site-specificity cm plaint is invalid here as it has been l
elsewhere. 'Ihe question is the effectiveness of the various potential i
protective actions for Indian Point.
l
Basis 13,10 CFR 50.47 (b) (10) con niison takes a shotgun approach to this basis. Me will address its argtunents in the order in which they are presented in their Cbjactions, yp. 60-61.
First, while 10 CFR 50.47(b) (10) itseM refers only to "goirklines,"
the gnirblines would be useless if not based on well-developed criteria.
Ibr that reason, NUREG-0654, Part II, J(9)-(ll) provides for the developnent of bases and criteria for choices of protective actions, at least for ensite workers. .
Second, the challenge to evacuation time estimates can hardly be consid-ered too broad when it identifies the specific studies at issue. 'Ihat is particularly true since Basis 13 also refers to the hirnan response difficulties that are the specific focus of (bntention I(B)(2).
'Ihird, Con Edison's cmplaints about thyroid protection requirenents are not well founded. We know of no authority for the argtrnent that the State of New York has disapproved of potassium iodide as a thyroid prophylaxis.
Basis 14,10 CFR 50.47(b) (11)
Con Edison challenges this basis on several grounds, stated on pp.
61-62 of its objections.
First, the Licensee argues that there is no requirement for permanent record-keeping to judge the extent of exposures, and therefore to determine how best to control radiological exposures. We refer Con Edison to NURH3-0654, Part II, K(3) and to the Decernber 31, 1981 Review of the Regional Assistance Ctmnittee which states at Attachment 2:
K.3.a.: "'Ihere is no mention of permanent dose recording devices in any of the plans.
Specify where dose records will be kept and for how long. It is unclear if the dosimeters are presently available on a 24-hour basis."
. . Semnd, acknowledging the validity of Con Edison's point that the 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11) does not extend to evacuees by its tems, UCS/NYPIRG ,
nonetheless notes that the RAC, in its Review, has sensibly included evacuees as among those who need to be monitored to determine need for decontamination.
IEC Review, Dece ber 31, 1981, Attachnent 2, K(5) (b) .
'1hird, contrary to Cbn Edison's claim, NUREG-0654, Part II(K) (5) establishes factual support for the allegation that W tamination capabil-ities and facilities are necessary for adequate emergency preparedness.
Ibrther, as we have previously shown, Con Edison is required to denonstrate actual emplianco. See, ep . 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, (3) and the Decmber 31, 1981 RAC Paview, which provides at Attachment 2:
K.5.b.: " Discuss decontamination stations, especially locations, facilities available, and waste disposal means."
Finally, the " accident scenario" challenge is addressed in the Intro-duction, Point I(A), supra, pp. 2-4.
Basis M,10 CFR 50.47(b) (12)
Con Edison's challenge to this contention is based solely on the l " accident scenario" argument. Objections, pp. 62-63. See, Introduction j
Ibint I(A), supra, pp. 2-4.
7 Basis M,10 CFR 50.47(b) (13) l Con Edison contends that the actions called for in Basis 16 are not
{ required since 10 CFR 50.47(b)(13) requires only general plans for recovery l
and reentry. Objections, p. 63. Cbn Edison appears to believe there is no i standard by which such general plans might be judged, and presumably would i
accept a recovery plan that sinply said everyone should go back hme and l
go back to work without worrying about radiation exposures. 'Ihat is
1 1
. . i i
clearly not enough.
'Ihere is a minimzn threshold that involves taking those acticns necessary to determine how to suceed and that provides criteria by which choices will be made. 'Ihat is all UCS/NYPIIG contends, and we have provided specific factual support. Additional support, however, is found in RAC Beview of Mr 31,1981, M(1), stating:
" Insufficient informaticx1 is furnished regarding assigrrnent of responsibility, criteria for reentry, and details on the long-term radiation and medical nonitoring programs." Att. 2.
NURDG-0654, Part II (M) (4) provides further factual basis for the need for a "nothod of periodically estimating total population exposure," and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E (IV)(H) explicitly requires the action level criteria referred to in Basis 16.
Basis 17,10 CFR 50.47(b) (14)
Con Edison attacks this basis as a challenge to NBC regulations and as non-site-specific. Objections, pp. 63-64. Con Edison is correct that this challenges the NRC regulaticns, but the challenge is within the scope permitted in this prMing. 'Ihe inadequacy of drills and exercises arises specifically frcm the unique population density and other characteristics of the Indian Point site, which is the reason the challenge is permitted in this case, and which answers the site-specificity cceplaint.
A particular concern, and one that is added as additional factual sup-port for Basis 17, is that there is no provision in the plans that would prohibit dissemination in Buchanan of accident scenarios that would inval-idate the drills, as recently occurred at the Calvert Cliffs Plant.
4
- - Basis 18,10 CFR 50.47(b) (15)
Cbn Miu's argtunent that it need not denonstrate ocupliance is invalid. Objections, p. 64. See general respcmses to @jections, 4) and responses to PASNY's Cbjections, supra, pp.17-19. Although not specific-ally required by the regulation, an accountability program is necessary to determine whether the training has been given. As the Decesuber 31, 1981 Review of the Regional Assistance Ocmnittee noted in Attactrnent 2:
0.5. 'Ihe (Plans) do not adequately provide for the initial and annual retraining of personnel with emergency response responsibilities.
The RAC Review camnent is wM to Basis 18 as additional factual support.
Basis 19,10 CFR 50.47(b) (16)
Con Edison's only claim here is that two aspects of the basis lack specificity. Objections, p. 64. In fact, both are quite specific.
The reference to " actual conditions" versus " idealized conditions" can be traced to the underlying evacuation time estimate studies, wtiich are in Cbn Edison's hands, and the allegation that there is no assurance of adequate ernergency preparedness in the long-term gives very clear notice.
'Ihe response would sinply be to denonstrate how long-term preparedness is assured. There is no mystery to the allegation.
i
UCS/NYPIRG CONTENTION 1(B)(1):
Human Responses During Radiological Emergencies (Related to Commission question three)
Emergency planning for Indian Point Units 2 and 3 is inadequate to protect the public health and safety because existing plans do not pro-vide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency, as is required by 10 CFR 50.47 (a), in that:
(1) The plans are based on unproved assumptions of human response during radiological emergencies.
Bases for Contention 1(B)(1)
(1) The "public" in the plume EPZ consists of hundreds of thousands of people who have different needs, situations, capabilities, and debilities. These factors have not adequately been taken into account in the development of the emergency plans for Indian Point Units 2 and 3.
(2) Hume response to hazards which involve the threat of coistamination has been repeatedly shown to be qualitatively different from response to hazards in which the extent of the danger is more imediately determined by human senses, and this has not been given adequate consideration in the fomulation of the Indian Point emergency plans; See, Prepared Testimony of Kai T. Erickson, Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No.1), Docket No.
50-289(RESTART).
(3) It is an unproved assumption that people will respond to radiological threats in the same way as people generally respond to other non-contamination hazards like fires and floods.
(4) It is an unproved assumption that family members will willingly evacuate or take other protective actions when separated without comunications from other family members, or will willingly allow schools, hospitals, nursing homes, or other institutions to assume care for children, invalids, or other family members, especially when the location, destination, or safety of the family members is not known (See, Erickson, op. cit.). .
(5) It is an unproved assumption that when public infomation pamphlets are finally distributed, that they will be read, understood, remembered, and kept in a location for easy access during emergencies, or that the infomation will be at all assimilated by those persons who do not speak or read English, by the blind, or by the learning-impaired.
(6) It is an unreliable assumption that the deaf will be able to promptly and adequately understand mass media protective action messages during a radiological emergency at Indian Point Units 2 and 3.
34_
(7) The evacuation from the area around Three Mile Island Unit 2 reactor which began on March 28, 1979, demonstrated that more than fifty times as many persons responded to advisories to evacuate as were requested to (approximately 144,000 persons actually evacuated, rather than the 2,500 for which evac'uation was recomended), that persons evacuated to an average distance of approximately 100 miles (which far exceeds any other evacuation in U.S. history from natural hazards), and that persons evacuating the area displayed a strong tendency to choose
" upwind" destinations (See. Donald J. Ziegler, et al., " Evacuation from a Nuclear Technological 'DTsaster," Geographical Review, Vol. 71. No.1.
January 1981, pages 7-9). There was no confinnation that the persons who were advised during that accident to shelter in fact did so; indeed, a very large proportion of those who were advised to shelter evacuated instead (sheltering was recomended for all persons within 10 miles who were not in the recomended evacuation categories of pregnant woment and young children, but nearly half of the population within 10 miles chose to evacuate instead; See, Ziegler, et. al., oo. cit.
page 7). None of these factors has been adequately consiTereTinThe emergency plans for Indian Point Units 2 and 3.
(8) Both the emergency plans themselves and the evacuation time estimate studies perfonned by CONSAD and Parsons Brinckerhoff fail to account for the " evacuation-shadow phenomenon." This phenomenon involves the tendency of an official evacuation advisory to cause de-parture of citizens from a much larger area than was officially intended.
Although this may be a minor consideration for natural hazards emergency planning, it may be a major consideration for nuclear power plant accidents due to the lack of geographic delineation of radiation hazards (See, Ziegler, et. al., Final Report on a Social Survey of Three Mile Island Area Residents, Department of Geography, MichiganTtate University, August 1979, pages 14-15, 29, and 47).
Objections of NRC Staff and Licensees to Contention 1(B)(1) l The Staff and PASNY share three objections to Contention 1(B)(1);
that 10 CFR 50.47(a) does not apply; that the contention may be an attack on regulations and thus not related to the Comission questions; and that the bases are too general. Staff Objections, p.16; PASNY Objections, p.24.
Con Edison also asserts that the contention may be an attack on regulations and that the bases are too general, in addition to its objection that the contention is not site-specific. Con Ed Objections, pp. 66-67.
In response to the objection that 10 CFR 50.47(a) is not applicable
to operating plants and thersfokis not apposite here, UCS/NYPIRG '
- amend Contention 1(B)(1) as follows, to reflect that appropriate citation:
Emergency planning for Indian Point Units 1 and 2 does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency, as is required by 10 CFR 50.47(b), (s)(2); and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, in that: 1) The plans are based on unproved assumptions of human response during radiological emergencies.
UCS/NYPIRG Contention 1(B>)(1) is based on " reasonable assurance" as the minimum standard to be met by the emergency plans in evaluating "the status and degree of confonnance with NRC/ FEMA guidelines."
Commission Question Three. " Reasonable assurance that adequate protect-ive action measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency" is the language of subsection (a) of 10 CFR 50.47, which, as indicated by the Staff and PASNY, is not applicable to an operating plant such as Indian Point Units 1 and 2. The same standard is found in subsection (s)(2) of 10 CFR 50.47, which applies to operating plants, but for which the deadline for compliance is proposed to be extended once again. See, NRC News Release 82-1, January 4,1982, NUREG BR/0032. Vol . 2. No.1.
It is contended that " reasonable assurance," as a minimum standard to be applied, is only slightly more rigorous than the nominal or per-functory standard of compliance implicit throughout the Staff's and the Licensees' objections to UCS/NYPIRG Contentions. Yet, the Com-mission's Order explicitly recognizes the especially critical needs of the dense population residing around the Indian Point sites for effective emergency planning.See Commission Order of January 8, 1981 at p6. The Licensees should not be heard to complain about meeting the regulatory standard of " reasonable assurance" in light 0f the extreme consequences which would result from inadequate
planning in such a densely populated area.
The Staff PASNY, and Con Ed share confusion whether the contention relates to deficiencies in the emergency plans or whether UCS/NYPIRG contends that emergency planning guidelines are inadequate. Staff Objections, p.16; PASNY Objection, pp. 24-25; Con Ed Objections, pp. 66-67.
In Contention 1(B)(1), UCS/NYPIRG question the methodology used by planners to fulfill the obligations of the Cicensees under FEMA /NRC guidelines in NUREG-0654 and NRC regulations at 10 CFR Part 50. The contention thus relates to Commission Question Three. There is no implied or express attack on the guidelines and regulations themselves.*
The NRC regulations do not define a limit of the human response assumptions on which the plans are to be fonnulated. Thus, a critique of the assumptions upon which conclusions are based, is not 'a challenge to regulations, but rather, a critical step in deter-mining meaningful confonnance of the plans with NRC/ FEMA guidelines.
In Contention 1(B)(1), we challenge the realism of the planners' assumptions about how emergency workers and members of the public at risk (or believing they are at risk) will react to a radiological emer-gency, and how these reactions will affect the efficacy of protective response provided for in the plans. By testing the conclusions in the plan, Contention 1(B)(1) will contribute materially to the resolution of Commission Question Three.
TheStaffandhjcenseesseean.attackonregulationswherevera contention cites an inadequacy in the effective, rather than nominal, confonnance of the plans to the regulations. By analogy, a contention that a required piece of equipment, although present and installed, was inadequate because of shoddy materials, improper design, and faulty implementing procedures, would appear to the Staff and the ]_icensees as an attack on regulations.
Finally, the Staff and 1.icensees all complain that the bases for the contention are too general to be useful.
The bases present specific omissions in the Indian Point plans by describing a range of human response factors that have been ignored or inadequately considered in the plans. References to the experience in evacuation at Three Mile Island provide authority for the bases insofar as that experience demonstrates the need for the consideration of human response factors in the emergency plans for Indian Point.
The bases submitted in support of the contention rely upon the one experience with evacuation in the context of a nuclear plant accident:
Three Mile Island. Having included the facts derived from that one relevant experience at Three Mile Island in the bases for the contention, UCS/NYPIRG have provided specific notice to the Licensees and Staff of their source of infonnation and of the nature of their source of infonnation aisd of the nature of the alleged fallacies in the assumptions on human response.
The problems at TMI.can only be magnified at Indian Point, where the popu-lation density and limited evacuation routes, provide the site-specific support for the compelling need to correct the deficiencies in the emergency plans.
UCS/NYPIRG address the objections of Con Edison to specific bases below:
Basis 1: Failure to take into account different needs, situations, capabilities, and debilities.
The objection made to this basis is that it is too general, since it does not define the " myriad of circumstances" encompassed by the basis.
Con Ed's Objections at 67.
UCS/NYPIRG appreciates the breadth of the problems inherent in pre-
- paring emergency plans for a human, that is to say, non-homogeneous pop-
, ulation. This first basis is thus directed to the failure of the emer-
gency plans to even recognize the diversity, much less to include adequate specific reasures for, the obvious categories of the disabled, the institutionalized, children, and separated families.
UCS/NYPIRG contend that a basic prerequisite to responsible energency plans is the identification of at least the most obvious groups of persons residing in the area of the site who have special needs.
Special measures to be taken to protect these groups in the event of an
'. emergency must then be set forth in the plans;or the Licensees must acknowledge that these people are ignored in the plans and considered dispensable in the event of an evacuation.
Bases Two, Three, and Four: Difference between radiological and other emergencies.
Con Ed objects to bases two, three, and four, "in that they allege a generic qualitative difference between radiological emergencies and other types of public emergencies." Con Ed Objections, at p. 67.
UCS/NYPIRG admit that these bases do allege such a difference, and provide the authority for the allegation. Otherwise, no response can be formulated to the objection, since Con Ed does not state why such an allegation is inappropriate.
Con Ed further objects to bases two, three, and four on the familiar ground that the same problem of anticipating human behavioral responses exists with regard to other sites.
Again, UCS/NYPIRG submit their contention with relation to the Indian Point sites only, and without comment on the implications of the allegations for other plants. Con Ed here again makes a generic ob-jection to a site specific contention, and cannot expect the Board to relieve it of its responsibilities pursuant to NRC/ FEMA gJidelines at
Indian Point where the population density and other site-specific character-istics render those responsibilities particularly significant. See Intro-duction, Point B, supra, at pp. 4-5, for further discussion of this often twpeated objection.
Bases Five and Six: Inadequacies in plan provisions for public infomation.
The complaint of Con Ed with regard to these bases is the non-site-specific objection discussed above with reference to bases two, three, and four.
UCS/NYPIRG submits the same response: that there may be problems with planning for effective public infonnation at other sites does not absolve Con Ed from its responsibility to the dense population in the area of the Indian Point site where evacuation routes are limited.
Bases Seven and Eight: Sel f-evacuation.
This proceeding and the Commission questions are premised on the need to insure that the first evacuation of the population around Indian Point will have been planned with the use of all available data, and particularly taking into account any experience that may be relevant to l
the Indian Point populations.
In this regard, UCS/NYPIRG cites, in bases seven and eight, the failure of the licensees to integrate into their emergency plans for l
Indian Point, infomation derived from the experience at Three Mile l
l Island, much of which may be important to evaluating the Indian Point l
plans. Learning from mistakes is not a popular cliche among nuclear licensees; learning from experience, though, is surely an implicit obli-gation and one that cannot be avoided under the rubric of Con Ed's l generic v. site-specific objection.
- - UCS/NYPIRG CONTENTION 1(B)(2):
Unreliability of Evacuation Time Estimates (Related to Enunission question three)
The time estimates for evacuation, which will be utilized to determine the feasibility of evacuation itself and the selection of appropriate protective actions, are based on the CONSAD Research Corporation and/or the Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade, Douglas, Inc.,
evacuation time estimate studies. These studies and the resulting evacuation time estimates are unreliable because they are based on unproved assumptions of human response during nuclear emergencies, and do not take into account the actual or planned preparedness levels of the State and Local response ,organizationsl In addition, the meth-odology utilized to perfonn these evacuation time estimates has not been verified experimentally and therefore the validity of the methodologies used in_ these studies is not known. Further, these studies are based on planning assumptions which differ from those actually used in the emergency plans.
Bases for Contention 1(B)(2)
(1) The studies assume that all people waiting in cars in traffic will behave cooperatively. The time estimates do not allow any margin for time delays caused by non-cooperative behavior in such situations.
(2) The studies assume that people will take the appropriate
" direct" route out of the area and will not make " extra" trips in other directions for personal reasons (such as making withdrawals from banks and savings institutions, going to schools to pick up children, going home from work before evacuating, or going to work locations before evacuating).
I* has not been demonstrated that such " extra" trips within the affected area will not be made, and the TMI-2 accident experience in fact demon-strated just the opposite.
(3) The studies assume that traffic flow outside the affected area (in the case of an evacuation of less than the plume EPZ) or out-side the plume EPZ (in the case of a total evacuation of the plume EPZ) will not impede the flow of traffic exiting the evacuating sectors. This assumption has not been demonstrated to be valid and the TMI-2 experience contradicts this assumption (See, Ziegler, et. al., op. cit., page 7; and Brunn, et. al., op. cit., pages 14-15, 29, and 47). Indeed, there are accidents (generally classified as PWR " atmospheric" accidents, in which the containment fails following or concurrent with core melt-down) in which the Protective Action Guidelines (PAG's) can be exceeded far beyond the present plume exposure EPZ (given a PWR atmospheric accident, there is a 10% " conditional" probability that the whole body PAG of 1 Rem will be exceeded at 200 miles, a 10% probability that the 5-Rem whole body PAG will be exceeded at over 100 miles, a 50% probability that the 1-Rem whole body PAG will be exceeded at over 100 miles, and a 50% probability that the 5-Rem whole body PAG will be exceeded about 50 miles; See, NUREG-0396, November 1978, Figure I-16, Page I-47).
Thus, there is a substantial probability that given the very accident which requires the most expeditious evacuation of the plume EPZ, persons outside the recommended EPZ will self-evacuate or be advised to evacuate.
(4) The studies fail to adequately account for accidents with such large releases that traffic control officers would be subject to large personal exposure to radiation or to pmvide for the contingency that no personnel will be able to stand in the open and direct traffic due to high radiation dose rates. In addition, it has not been demon-strated that there are sufficient numbers of trained traffic control per-sonnel available to effect the degree of traffic control upon which the studies rely.
(5) The studies assume different procedures for the evacua-tion of school children than the plans themselves actually call for.
(6) The studies have not taken adequate account of the special transportation needs of the handicapped and invalids, and the effect on the overall evacuation time that these special transportation problems will have.
(7) There are no provisions in the studies nor in the emergency plans for updating the evacuation time studies annually to reflect -changes in population, roadway network characteristics, and changes to the plans. *
(8) The time estimate studies are inadequate in that they do not adequately address local meteorological and climatological conditions which occur in the Indian Point area, particularly in tems of the impact of adverse weather conditions on the ability to perfom evacuations.
NRC Staff Objection _t_c.
o Contention 1(B)(2)
The Staff accepts this contention, but only as limited to its eight bases. Staff Objections, p.18 The Staff cites no regulation or NRC precedent, and we know of none, that would require that bases for a contention be exhaustively expounded.
See, Mississippi Power and Light (Grand Gulf) ALAB-130, 6 AEC 423, 426 (1973), where an Appeals Board reiterated that a contention need not be supported by evidence at the pleadings stage.
The Staff concedes that the bases " provide specificity for the contention." Staff Objections, at p.18.
Indeed, the eight detailed factual bases presented in support of the contention cover a broad spectrum of deficiencies relating to the evacuation time estimates. However, the bases do not purport to be
42-an exhaustive description of every deficiency, and UCS/NYPIRG should not be limited at this point to those deficiencies identified in the bases.
The process of framing the issues for resolution of the Comission ques-tions requires only that the parties be placed on notice of the alleged inadequacies in the contentions, and that there be at least some factual basis for the allegation. The Staff's effort to limit UCS/
NYPIRG here is a distortion of the notice purpose of the contention stage.
PASNY Objections to Contention 1(B)(2)
Ironically, PASNY objects that the bases are " inadequate factual bases" insufficient to meet the threshold requirement of the January 8 Order. PASNY Objections, p. 26.
UCS/NYPIRG have offered especially detailed bases supporting this contention, as conceded by the Staff, in recognition of the fact that the Comission has established a presumption in favor of the FEMA position on the single issue of time estimates. While admitting the necessity of greater specificity, UCS/NYPIRG submit it cannot be necessary to substitute alterna-tive estimates or methodology for those in the existing plans in order to i
overcome the presumption in favor of FEMA's position since, as the Staff notes, FEMA has not yet taken its position. Our showing of significant omis-sions in the infonnation upon which the plans' estimates are based is suffi-l l cient to require the Licensees to come forward with a justification for the l
failure to consider relevant information.
The bases for this contention do indeed dispute the validity of the l
assumptions on which the time estimates are based, and set forth the specific facts which have not been considered, e.g., time delays caused l
by non-cooperative behavior, extra trips to collect family, traffic flow l outside the affected area, exposure of traffic control officers, con-flicting procedures for school children, special needs of the handicapped ,
( - _ . _ _ -
- o lack of provision for updating the estimates, failure to address meteor-ological and climatological conditions.
These factual bases comprise a framewerk for a rational critique of the time estimates, provide detailed allegations sufficient to place the Licensees on ample notice, and preserve UCS/NYPIRG rights to cross-examine witnesses and/or present direct testimony to rebut the presump-tion in favor of the existing time estimates.
Con Ed Objections to Contention 1(B)(2)
Con Ed asserts four objections to this contention: that it is an attack of NRC regulations; that human response factors are not site-specific; that the contention is too vague; and that the contention fails to provide accident scenarios applicable to the claimed deficiencies in the emergency plans. Con Ed Objections, pp. 71-73.
With regard to the objections that the contention is an attack on NRC regulations and is not site-specific, UCS/NYPIRG refer the Board to the discussions in the Introduction on these subjects, supra at pp. 4-7, and to the responses to Objections to Contention I(B)(1), supra at pp. 33-40.
Our response to the objection here is that the contention does not attack the regulations, but the plans, and specifically, the infonnation used by the planners to reach their conclusion on time estimates. We do not address ourselves to other plans at other sites, but to the Indian Point plans and the time estimates contained therein.
The objection that this contention, which relates to Comission question three and not Comission question one, requires the postulation of accident scenarios, has been met in the Intoduction, supra, at pp. 2-4, and in Amended Contention III(B). Our specific response to that familiar objection in the
context of Contention I(B)(2) is that the Board need not link the deficien-cies alleged in the infonnation and assumptions underlying the time esti-mates to any particular accident in order to find that the time estimates are unrealistic.
The specificity of the factual bases is acknowledged by the Staff in their Objections at p.18, and noted in the above response to PASNY objec-tions. However, we respond more fully to con Edison's objections to speci-fic bases by offering the following specifics as amendments:
Basis 4: Inadequate Traffic Control Examples of locations where adequate traffic control is erroneously presumed in the plans are:
- 1) the traffic circle in Peekskill, ERPA 2, where U.S.6, 202 and Route 9 meet;
- 2) the point in ERPA 4 where 3 evacuation routes on Route 9 South are joined by 3 routes on Furnace Dock Road East, 2 routes on Kings Trolley Road and 1 route from Furnace Dock Road West;
- 3) the point in ERPA 22 where 10 evacuation routes proceeding south on Route 9 proceed under a bridge on a sharp curve and join 3 more routes at 9A.
Basis 5: Evacuation of School Children Examples of defects in the assumptions used in pre-paring evacuation time estimates are:
- 1) fifty-nine bus routes listed in the revised plans have no buses assigned to them;
- 2) no letters of agreement with private bus companies or with bus driver unions are included in the plans;
- 3) bus routes to congregate care centers have not been determined.
Basis 6: Transportation Needs of the Handicapped and Invalids:
- 1) There are not enough ambulances and specially equipped vehicles to evacuate the hospitals within the 10-mile radius.
- 2) There are no letters of agreement with private ambulance companies.
Basis 7: Need for Annual Updating of Emergency Plans See NUREG-0654, Part II, P(a)
Basis 8: Inadequate Consideration of Meteorological Conditions Examples of the " impact" of rain and snow will be to delay traffic, make some roads impassable, result in dangerous radiation exposures of evacuating and therefore unsheltered individuals.
\
UCS/NYPIRG CONTENTION 1(B)(3):
Inadequate Consideration of the Full Range of Accident Scenarios (Related to 6 mission questioii~three) o The emergency plans and proposed protective actions do not adequately take into account the full range of accident scenarios and meteorological conditions for Indian Point Units 2 and 3.
Bases for Contention 1(B)(3)
(1) Sheltering has been demonstrated to be useful for no more than a two-hour period in tems of protecting the public from inhalation doses [See, Testimony of Margaret A. Reilly, Department of Environmental Resources. Comonwealth of Pennsylvania, under cross-examination, transcript page 18,539, In the Matter of METROPOLITAN EDIS0N COMPANY (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No.1), RESTART . The minimum time in which evacuation could be effectuated is greater than this time period, much greater in many circumstances. The protective actions developed for persons at risk from the Indian Point reactors are limited to sheltering and evacuation. Therefore, there are accident scenarios (in combination with meteorologicalconditions comon to the Indian Point area) for which there are nu adequate protective actions to protect the pJlic health and safety.
(2) The emergency plans and protective actions do not adequate-ly address the special circumstance of precipitation occurring at the time of a release of radioactivity from Indian Point during an accident.
Such precipitation would " scavenge" radioiodines and radio-particulates from the plume very efficiently (See,, WASH-1400, Appendix VI, " Calculations of Reactor Accident Consequences," Section 6 and Appendix B), resulting in very different conditions than wtuld pertain to a case involving only dry deposition. These conditions have not been adequately addressed in the plans nor by the proposed protective action alternatives.
(3) The emergency plans and proposed protective action alternatives fail to adequately address the nature of the river valley and mountain system in the Indian Point area. The geography and geo-morphology of the Indian Point area is such that the Indian Point site is situated in a " bowl," surrounded on nearly all sides by high ground rang-ing from 600 to 1000 feet high; such topography has a decisive influence on the meteorology of the area, and, therefore, on considerations of accident consequences from Indian Point Units 2 and 3 (See, Technical Report #372.1, B. Davidson, op. cit., pages Q-5 to Q-6).
(4) The emergency plans and proposed protective action alter-natives fail to adequately address the conditions which would prevail during inversions or other adverse meteorology (such as prevailed during the early hours of the TMI-2 accident). Inversion conditions in the Indian Point area may be more comon than expected due to the geo-graphical and geomorphological conditions of the site area.
(5) The emergency plans and proposed protective action alternatives fail to adequately address the impact of snow and/or icing upon the ability of emergency response organizations and the general public to effectuate evacuation as a protective action.
- 47- . .
NRC Staff Objections tgt Contention 1(B)(3)
At page 19 of its Objections, the Staff objects to our Contention 1(B)(3) as inadmissible because it is not clear to the Staff which l guidelines are alleged to be violated.
1 This contention challenges another way in which the plans will fail to protect the public in a radiological emergency -- because a well-reasoned choice of protective actions for the public canr.ot be made without an examination (and guidance in the plans themselves) which takes into account the full range of accid?nt scenarios and meteoro-logical conditions for the Indian Point area. This information is an i essential part of the development of " guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency." 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). .See also NUREG-0654, Part II, (J) . -
With regard to the need for a range of protective meadores, the ;
NUREG-0654, Part I(H) guidance provides: "In some situations, there could ,
be a need for protective measures within short time intervals -- a half hour or perhaps even less -- after determination that a hazard exists."
i i
On the other hand, the Review of the Regional Assistance Committee of the energency plans for Indian Point find that the plans are limited to scenarios that assume radioactive releases that develop over a period of time. See, RAC Review, Dec. 31,1981; J(2), Attachment two, p.13.
PASNY Objections tgt Contention 1(B)(3)
- PASNY finds the supporting bases for 1(B)(3) inadequate in that we contend a wider range of protective actions is needed, but fail to offer further suggested protective actions. PASNY is reminded of its duty to demonstrate compliance with regulations under Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
/
y -
ee-
. . In the bases for I(B)(3), we assert that only two of these actions have been included in the plans. The plans have neglected consideration of the full range of protective actions, or combinations of protective actions which should be used in a given, particular, emergency situation.
Con Ed Objections to Contention 1(B)(3)
Con Ed's objections here are the usual " footnote 5" and non site-specific objections that have been discussed in the Introduction, at pp. 2-4, along with the claim that the contention is vague.
Con Ed appears to misunderstand the contention, which addresses the inadequacy of the protective actions proposed in the plans and the failure of the plans to pro' vide for a range of complicating weather factors that predictably affect the workability of the plans. The contention points to the inadequacies and omissions of protective actions necessary in the event of any accident at Indian Point, with its particular site characteristics of dense population and limited evacuation routes.
Con Edison's " accident scenario" argument has been addressed in the Introduction, supra, pp. 2-4.
The Licensee cannot avoid the requirements of the NRC/ FEMA regula-tions by insistence on a discussion of the probability of an accident
~
as a kind of ordeal by fire before the intervenors become eligible to address the gross deficiencies of the emergency plans.
"3.
UCS/NYPIRG COMNTICN I(B)(4)
Ir. sufficient Integration of, and Criteria for, Protective Actions (Helating to Canntssion Questions Three and Fbur)
. Ihe proposed protective actions that might be taken in the event of an accident at Indian Point Units 2 and 3 are not sufficiently inte-grated to assure that the proper action or mix of acticms is taken under particular accident conditions and there are inv%I uate criteria in the plans for determining which actions should be taken.
Ibses for Cbntention I(B) (4)
(1) The plans fail to contain adequate criteria for use in determining which protective actions are appiveriate in different accident conditions.
(2) The plans fail to address the point at which the relative nerits of sheltering are outweighed by the relative merits of evacuation, and the basis for detemining this transition point.
(3) The plans fail to contain adequate protective actions for accident scenarios and meteorological conditions that will require thy-roid prophylaxis and/or respiratory protection against radiciodines and/
or radio-particulates.
(4) The plans fail to consider the doses received by persons crossing radioactive plumes frcra Indiar. Point in following evacuation directions which may be inappropriate for the particular accident scenario, in naking " extra" trips (to join with family members, to go to the bark, or to obtain fuel), or in taking an alternative evacuation route which evacuees my choose on their own.
l NRC Staff Objection to Contention I (B) (4)
The Staff claims that this contention should not be admitted be-I cause we have failed to assert which rules or guidelines are not met, and have failed to show nexus to the Ccmnission's Question 3. Staff Ob-l jections, pp. 19-20.
Integration 'of protectim actions to assure that the proper action or mix of actions is i.aken under particular accident conditions, as con-l tended, ncst be planned for in order to fulfill 50.47 (b) (10); the provi-l sions, or lack of provisions in the plans for integration of protective
- actions nust be examined in order to assure that in an emrgency there is 1
" reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken." '1he inportance of successful integration of and criteria for protective actions is highlighted in the reomrnendations of the NRC 15ecial Inquiry Group in 'Ihree Mile Island: A Report to the Ctrrissioners and to the Public, NUREXi CR-1250 ('1he Bogovin Report), at pp. 1025-1026:
- 1. Each Federal, State, county, and local organization involved in erergency response must develop ccrplete, integrated emergency response plans which prescribe the organization, and its nodus operandi and which assure that proper information will be obtained and disserrinated by the agency so that it can discharge its responsibilities.
'Ibe issue of integration of protective actions is inportant to the resolution of Ccrrission Question Gree insofar as it reveals the failure of the plans to cxanform to 10 TR 50.47 (b) (10) and to hURD3-C654, Part II, J. 'Ihe contention further contributes materially to Ccrrission Question I. ur, since it describes necessary and feasible irprovements in the eTrgency plans.
PASNY's Objection p Contention I(B) (4)
PASNY, on the other hand, does not share the Staff's confusion about the relation between the contention and the Conmission Questions, but
! claims that 1(B)(4) is duplicative of 1(B)(2) and 1(B)(3), and that consideration of radioprotective drugs is beyond the scope of this proceeding. PASNY Objections, p. 29.
l PASNY, in its Objections, states the differences among UCS/NYPIRG Contentions 1(B)(2), (3), and (4). Whereas 1(B)(2) is directed to evacuation time estimates and routes, 1(B)(3) is directed to the range of l
protective actions needed for diverse accident scenarios and meteoro-logical conditions, and 1(B)(4) to the absence in the plans of provision for integration and criteria for protective actions. Authority is
conspicuously absent for PASNY's argument that New York State "has detemined not to approve" potassium iodide as a thyroid prophylaxis.
PASNY Objections, p. 30, with particular reference to basis three.
UCS/NYPIRG know of no fomal statement by New York State regarding the use of potassium iodide as a protective action in a radiological emer-9ency. It is our contention that the issue is therefore open for public discussion and scrutiny and certainly is not foreclosed on any per-ceived or real conflict in jurisdiction.
That the issue is not settled is demonstrated by the facts that the City of New York has taken a formal position in favor of the use of potassium iodide and that the State of Tennessee has not only expressed a favorable opinion but has pre-distributed the drug.
Even if there were a conflict between the NRC and the State of New York on this issue, the Board would not be precluded from considering whether the use of potassium iodide were essential to reasonably assure the protection of the health and safety of the population around the Indian Point sites. In that event, the Board would be compelled to recommend the shutdown of the plants, but would not have to simply accept the position of New York State.
Con Ed Objection to Contention 1(B)(4):
Again Con Ed objects that the contention is not site-specific, requires the description of an accident scenario and is vague. Con Ed Objections, pp. 77-78.
UCS/NYPIRG concede the redundancy of basis I with the contention, and eliminate that basis, re-numbering the other bases 1, 2, and 3.
The general discussion of the non-site-specific and " footnote 5" objections contained in the Introduction at pp. 2 -4 apply to this contention and are incorporated here.
Con Ed found the phrase "/in/sufficiently integrated" vague, yet bases 2, 3, and 4, which are now re-numbered bases 1, 2, and 3, each describe specific points in the course of a radiological emergency where the plans should, and do not provide for co-ordination of protective actions. The contention with its bases therefore satisfies the specificity requirement necessary for the framino of issues in relation to Commission Questions three and four.
UCS/NYPIRG CONTENTION I(B)(5) bevere Health Consequences Before Implementation of Protective Actions
( Related to Comission Questions Three and Four)
Contention 1(B)(5):
The accident consequences that would be suffered by the public in the area of the Indian point reactors _ before any protective actions could be or would be implemented in the event of a radiological accident at Indian Point Units 2 and 3 are unacceptable for some accidents (in-cluding accidents which exceed the design basis for the Indian Point units). Even if heroic measures are implemented in accordance with the abilities, training, equipment, and degree of preparedness of the State and Local emergency response organizations, the health consequences to the public from such accidents will include prompt fatalities, early fatalities, early and latent illnesses, fatal and non-fatal cancers, thymid nodules, and genetic defects.
Bases for Contention I(B)(5):
(1) In order for a protective action to be implemented, several key steps must occur in sequence. First, the accident sequence must manifest itself in some fonn which is recog-nized by the plant operators. Second, plant operators must promptly and correctly take note of the accident manifesta-tion (such as a control room alarm) and also assess the particular malfunction based upon the symptoms available.
Third, the operators must notify offsite errergency response authorities. Fourth, the offsite emergency response au-thorities must detennine which, if any protective action to implement. Fifth, the public must be notified of the emergency and what actions are required as a result of the accident. Sixth, the emergency response organizations and the public must implement the correct protective action.
Delay in any of these steps will increase both the likeli-hood that adverse consequences will not be avoided and the magnitude of those consequer.ces.
(2) It has not been established, in contradiction to 10 CFR 50.47 (b) (4), that appropriate " emergency action levels" (EAL's) have been established which will allow prompt recognition of the range of possible accidents at Indian Point Units 2 and 3 (including those accidents which exceed the design basis for the Indian Point Units 2 and 3 reactors).
No basis has been provided by the licensees to demonstrate that their sets of EAL's are comprehensive, and that the EAL's are ennunciated clearly to the plant operators.
Thus, there is not adequate assurance that accidents will be promptly recognized by plant operators, and that l
once it is recognized that an accident is in progress, that plant operators will correctly diagnose such accidents
54-in order to recommend the appropriate protective action (s).
(3) The emergency plans are in part based on the detection of radioactivity in monitored release pathways. This pre-cludes or limits knowledge of releases from unmonitored release pathways; such releases were a complicating factor during the TMI-2 accidents during which releases were occurring from portions of the plant not normally con-taining radioactivity but which contained such radioac-tivity due to the accident. Lack of knowledge about releases of radioactivity from unmonitored leakage path-ways could lead to an improper or inadequate protective action decision being made on an inadequate or incomplete data base.
(4) The licensees have not demonstrated compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2, thus compromising their ability to adequately monitor the course of acci-dents at Indian Point Units 2 and 3.
NRC Staff and Licensees' Objections to _ Contention I(B)(5)
The Staff argues that this contention is improper because the
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contention and its bases. bear co relation to Commission Question 3.
Staff Objections, pp. 20-21.
PASNY's objection to this contention is that 1) it fails to specify the accidents at issue; 2) raises a generic issue; and 3) l addresses the consequences without the probability. PASNY Objections, p.12.
l Con Edison asserts that this contention is not site-specific and is dependent upon particular accident scenarios. Con Edison Objections,
- p. 80.
UCS/NYPIRG, in response to those criticisms, amends the contention as follows:
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9 _ _ ~ - - 3_.____.,
I(B)(5) Severe Health consequences would be suffered by the public in the area of the Indian Point reactors before any protective actions could be or would be implemented in the event of a radio-logical accident at Indian Point Units 2 and 3 because of inadequate provisions ,
for reducing lead times.
Bases for Contention 1(B) (5):
(1) In order for a protective action to be implemented, several key steps must occur in sequence. Fi rs t, the accident sequence must manifest itself in some form which is recognized by the plant operators.
Second, plant operators must promptly and correctly take note of the accident manifestation (such as a control room alann) and also assess the particular malfunction based upon the symptoms available. Third, the operators must notify offsite emergency response authorities. Fourth, the offsite emergency response authorities must detennine which, if any, protective action to implement. Fifth, the public must be noti-fied of the emergency and what actions are required as a result of the accident. Sixth, the emergency response organizations and the public must implement the correct protective action. Delay in any of these steps is likely under the current status and degree of confonnance with NRC/ FEMA guidelines.
(2) It has not been established, in contradiction to 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(4), that appropriate " emergency action levels" (EAL's) have been established which will allow prompt recognition of the range of accidents at Indian Point Units 2 ar.d 3 (including those accidents which exceed the design basis for the Indian Point Units 2 and 3 reactors). No basis has been provided by the licensees to demonstrate that their sets of EAL's are cr>J;prehensive, and that the EAL's are ennunciated clearly to the plant operators. Thus, there is not adequate assurance that accidents will be promptly recognized by plant operators, and that once it is recognized that an accident is in progress, that plant operators will correctly diagnose such accidents in order to recommend the appropriate protectiveaction(s). .
Question 3 asks the status and degree of confonnance of the State and local plans with the FEMA /NRC guidelines and particularly requests what the minimum warning time for an effective evacuation of a 10-mile quadrant at Indian Point would be. Amended Contention I-B (5) is directed to the issue of minimum warning times and provides specific factual support for its allegation. For example, as is stated in bases one and two, delay in any of the steps of recognizing accident conditions and implementing protective actions will increase both the likelihood that adverse conse-quences will not be avoided and the magnitude of the consequences. In-appropriate emergency action levels (EAL's) have a particularly great potential for causing delay in the implementation of protective actions, as do EAL's which fail to take into account time needed to implement pro-tective actions.
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. . UCS/NYPIRG CONTENTION 1(B)(6)
Necessity of Established Maximum Acceptable Level of Exposure for the General Public (Related to Commission question four)
There is no objective basis for judging the adequacy of emergency planning for the Indian Point area in the absence of an established maximum acceptable level of radiation exposure for the general public as a consequence of reactor accidents.
Bases for Contention 1(B)(6)
(1) The public radiation dose guidelines in 10 CFR, Part 20 are inapplicable to nonnal operations and accident conditions.
(2) The exposure levels in 10 CFR Part 100 are not meant to indicate acceptable levels of exposure, but are rather design guidance against which the adequacy of siting and plant engineered safety features are assessed in the design review process used by the NRC Staff. These exposure levels are inapplicable to actual accident conditions, and are not meant to constitute acceptable dose limits for the general public under accident conditions (See, NUREG-0396, op. cit. , page III-9) .
(3) The Protective Action Guides (EPA-520/1-75-001, " Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents,"
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, September 1975) are not acceptable dose levels, but rather " trigger levels" for emergency planning decisien-making (See, NUREG-0396, op. cit. , page 4).
(4) There are no established criteria which can be utilized to judge the adequacy of emergency pl. '.ning which are objective in nature, i.e., no maximum acceptable evacuation time, no maximum accept-able radiation' dose levels, etc..
NRC Staff and Licensees' Objections M Contention 1(B)(6)
At page 21, the Staff asserts that our Contention 1(B)(6) is unclear, and finds two possible constructions for the contention which are 1) that we are challenging Comission regulations, or 2) ti at the contention is related to Indian Point plans, but that it is overly vague and ambiguous.
Staff finds the contention inadmissible.
PASNY and Con Edison, among other objections, also complain that the contention is an attack on NRC regulations. PASNY Objections, pp.30-31; t
Con Ed Objections, pp. 83-86.
UCS/NYPIRG concedes the attack on NRC regulations and submits that such an attack is within the scope of the Comission's Orders in this case, insofar as it relates directly to Question Four's invitation for improvements in emergency planning. See, Introduction, Point C, supra at pp. 5-7.
PASNY's Additional Objection M Contention 1(B)(6)
PASNY additionally claims that, " Maximum exposure levels for accident conditions already have been promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency and endorsed by the Comission." PASNY Objections,
- p. 30. This claim is simply in error. See, bases 1-3 supporting Contention 1(B)(6).
Con Ed's Additional Objection to Contention 1(B)(6)
Con Ed objects that this contention is not site-specific, and requires the description of an accident scenario. Con Ed Objections, at pp. 83-86.
Con Ed's complaint that Contention 1(B)(6) is generic may be i superficially appealing in that a particular radiation dose will pre-sumably have the same effect on the same type of individual anywhere.
In its footnote on e 31, PASNY objects to the "etc." at the end of the last basis for 1(B ) on page 30 of our contentions. We will strike the "etc.". PASNY's further footnoted claim that nuclear power plants, and Indian Point in particular, cannot be closed by the Comission because of inadequate emergency planning, and that "such considerations are unquestionably beyond the scope of this proceeding" is in defiance of the Comission's Orders' opening.
v 4
o - However, acceptable dose levels are essential for detemining acceptable and feasible emergency responses at Indian Point, and particularly for determining maximum pemissible evacuation times. Consideration of the effects of radiation is a necessary, integral part of evaluating both the sheltering and evacuation aspects of the emergency plans for Indian Point.
The purpose of the upcoming hearing, and therefore the underlying task of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, is to collect the most useful and relevant infomation of all kinds to detemine how dangerous Indian Point is and whether emergency plans are suff cient to cope with the consequences of an accident at Indian Point. In the absence of a standard by which to measure the need for protection, there can be no objective detemination whether the plans provide that protection.
Is emergency planning " adequate" if, for example, half of the population in the plume exposure pathway receives doses in excess of the PAG " trigger" levels during a radiological emergency? How much pro-tection of the public health from serious radiological accidents is
" adequate?" These are questions this Board must assess and answer in order to fully address the Commission's concerns on the societal and individual risk from the continued operation of the Indian Point reactors.
Contention 1(B)(6) serves to focus Board attention to the standards that FEMA and the Staff use to judge " adequacy" of emergency protective actions and emergency plans.
The Staff (and FEMA) may use an unpublished objective criteria for a maximum acceptable level of radiation exposure in accident conditions.
In this special safety investigation, we think it appropriate and necessary that the Staff (and FEMA) standards be available to all parties.
The intervenors should not be restrained from presenting the issue of the necessity of acceptable dose levels, an issue that falls squarely within the subject area of Comission Question Four, simply because it
could also be considered to be generic.
- Turning to Con Ed's third objection, that the contention requires the description of an accident scenario UCS/NYPIRG states the obvious:
the contention relates to the need for an objective measurement applic-able to any emergency and thus, by its terms, avoids the details of any particular accident.
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UCS/NYPIRG CONTENTION 1(B)(7):
Need for Promotion of an Awareness of the Importance of Emergency Planning (IElated to Conmission question fourT The NRC's attitude toward emergency planning, as it stands on its own and as it is reflected in the emergency planning attitudes of the licensees, their contractors, and Local and State emergency response officials, has caused and continues to cause a failure to perfonn emergency planning for accidents which are held by the NRC to be "not credible." In order for effective emergency plans to be created, NRC must promote an awareness that nuclear power plant accidents with sub-stantial offsite consequences are possible for Indian Point Units 2 and 3, and must be planned for.
Bases for Contention 1(B)(7)
(1) Finding by the NRC's Special Inquiry Group that the principal finding related to emergency planning is that the root cause of most of the inadequacies in governmental emergency response to the TMI-2 accident, and a contributory cause of all of the inadequacies, was the NRC's failure to promote an awareness that nuclear power plant accidents with substantial offsite consequences are possible and must be planned for (See, NUREG/CR-1250, Volume II, Part 3, pages 1046-47).
(2) An early draft of the TMI Action Plan (NUREG-0660) contained a chapter dealing with the attitude problem cited by the Kemeny Commission as its major conclusion, but later versions, including the final NUREG-0660 version, deleted this enapter without explanation.
(3) Although the Commission concluded in adopting new emergency planning regulations that "onsite and offsite emergency pre-paredness as well as proper siting and engineered design features are needed to protect the health and safety of the public" (See, 45 F.R.
55402, August 18,1980), the degree of change or practice has not been great. Emergency planning requirements are not pursued with the same degree of effort as plant hardware requirements. The same or similar standards are not applied to hardware, i.e., none of the emergency plan-ning-related hardware is required to meet safety-grade standards (for l
instance, alert sirens need not have redundant power sources and are not required to be environmentally qualified), nor are emergency planning-related hardware and procedures subjected to the quality control requirements as opposed to the manner in which plant engineered safety features hardware are handled. Emergency planning is not, in practice, viewed by the NRC Staff to be as important in protecting the public as siting and plant design. ,
NRC Staff and Licensees' Objections M Contention dB)(7)
The Staff finds that 1(B)(7) lacks any relevance to the Commission's r
+4 m M
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62-Questions. Staff Objections, p. 22.
PASNY complains that the contention cannot relate to a specific licensee, and that it is beyond the scope of this proceeding. PASNY Objections, pp. 31-32.
Con Ed lists four objections to this Contention:
- 1) the contention attacks the NRC, its personnel and regulations;
- 2) it is too generalized and non-specific;
- 3) it is not site-specific;
- 4) it presumes an obligation to promote an awareness of accidents with out describing the scenarios and their possibility.
Contention I(B)(7), although perhaps couched in unfortunate language, is the suggestion of an improvement in emergency planning that is feasible and necessary to the successful implementation of Indian Point emergency plans. As such it is related to Comission Question Four, and materially contributes to a comprehensive response to that question.
In order to more accurately reflect the intention of UCS/NYPIRG in submitting this contention and to meet the objections, we respectfully amend the contention to read:
CONTENTION I(B)(7)
The NRC, the licensees, their contractors, and local and State emergency response officials have failed to conduct meaningful emergency planning, as required by NRC/ FEMA guidelines, apparently on the belief that accidents are "not credible" and therefore need not be seriously planned for.
Promotion by the NRC of an awareness among the licensees and State and local officials of the importance of emergency planning at Indian Point and of the seriousness with which NRC
.y v.-
regards energency planning at Indian Point would result. in substantial improvements in the level of emergency planning at that site.
The bases for this contention remain the same.
The importance of the suggested improvement in emergency planning that would result from a greater awareness of the seriousness of the issues was underscored in the studies undertaken after the March 1979 .
accident at Three Mile Island. The Special Inquiry Group appointed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission made the following " principal finding" in its report on the inadequacies in governmental emergency response:
- a. Root Cause Finding The principal finding is that the root cause of most of the inadequacies in governmental emergency response, and a contributory cause of all of the inadequacies, was the NRC's failure to promote an awareness that nuclear powerplant accidents with substantial offsite consequences are possible and must be planned for. The NRC did not sufficiently emphasize emergency planning, nor did the NRC require an adequate State emergency plan as a condition for operation of a reactor. fihree Mile Island: A Report to the Commissioners and to the Public. NRC Special Inquiry Group, NUREG CR-1250, (The Rogovin Report), p.1046.
Although the suggestion made in Contention I(B)(7) does not apply to an action to.be taken in the first instance by the Licensees, it does apply *to the need for actibn by the Licensees, which will apparently not occur until and unless the NRC takes i more aggressive stance toward Con Ed and PASNY in evaluating their cor.formance to NRC guidelines ~ for emergency planning.
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UCS/NYPIRG CONTENTION II( A):
Necessity of Extension of Present Plume EPZ Because of Accident Consequences (Relating to Comission Questions One, Three and Four)
The consequences of a severe radiological accident at Indian Point Units 2 and 3 would involve massive damage to the public health and safety beyond the current plume EPZ, so that effective emergency planning is required for that area in order to protect the public health and '
safety beyond the current plume EPZ.
Bases for Contention II(A):
(1) Releases of radioactivity from Indian Point Units 2 and 3 during.a ridiological accident w6uld contain large quantities of radioiodines and radio-particulates in many accident scenarios (See, WASH-1400, Appendix VI, "Calcula-tions of Reactor Accident Consequences," October 1975, Table VI 2-1 (page 2-5), and Table VI 3-1 (page 3-3).
(2) Such radiciodines and radio-particulates are efficiently scavenged from a plume by precipitation (including rain and snow) (See, WASH-1400, op_. cit., Appendix B).
(3) Precipitation occurring at some time following release and at some distance from the release point could cause
- scavsnging of significant'amou6ts of radioiodines and -
radioparticulates at distances much farther from the plant than the extent of the current plume EPZ, including the metropolitan New York City area.
(4) Even ignoring the scavenging effect and precluding precipi-tation, consequences from a PWR " atmospheric" accident such as is described in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) could result in doses exceeding the PAG's at considerable distances from the Indian Point site (see Contention I(B)(2), supra).
(5) Doses in such situations'sould be sufficiently high t6 require prompt protective action in order to adequately protect public health and safety.
(6) Given the extremely high population density in the New York City metropolitan area, it would be impossible to timely implement appropriate protective measures given the cir-cumstances described above.
(7) No plans exist beyond the plume EPZ except for control of agricultural products and drinking water supplies, and these measures are inadequate to protect the public health and safety in circumstances such as described above.
NRC STAFF and PASNY Objections g Contention II( A)
The Staff and PASNY find no connection between Contention II(A)and the Comission Questions. Staff Objections, pp. 22-23; PASNY Objections, pp. 31-32.
UCS-NYPIRG Contention II(A) alleges that the consequences of a severe radiological accident at Indian Point require effective emergency planning beyond the plume EPZ as currently delineated. It is important to the reso-lution of Comission Questions 1,3,and 4. It raises the question of accident consequences, which is an essential aspect of the overall risk analysis requested in Comission gestion 1. The area beyond the 10 mile EPZ is where the population density characteristics of the Indian Point plants, which are of primary importance to the Comission, become very significant.
It is here that the hazards of Indian Point become particularly critical.
Therefore, in order to address the questions of overall risks, it is necessary to examine the consequences raised in this contention.
l The c~ontention will also materially contribute to the determination of not only the number of hours warning required for an effective evacuation but whether such an evacuation is /easible at all -- issues raised by Comission Question 3. The contration further relates to Comission Question Three insofar as it asserts the failure of the emergency plans to adhere to 10 CFR 50,54(s) (1) in the apparently arbitrary adoption of ten miles as the appropriate plume EPZ and asserts planning deficiencies beyond the ten mile radius, a specific aspect of Comission Question Three.
We note that this contention would, in effect, expand the current plume EPZ as pennitted by NRC regulations, such that all relevant requirements would 1
apply, including particularly the sixteen standards of 10 CFR 50.47 (b).
None of those requirements has been complied with outside the current plume EPZ, based on the documents currently available, presumably because PASNY and Con Ed have assumed there is no need for such compliance.
The contention relates to Comission Question Four in that it suggests a necessary and feasible improvement in the emergency plans: the extension of effective planning beyond the ten-mile plume EPZ.
The NRC Staff and PASNY are simply wrong in objecting that the contention does not relate to Commission Questions. Indeed, the Board would be required to examine the adequacy of emergency planning beyond the 10 mile area even if UCSB4YPIRG had not raised this contention. The contention will make a material contribution to answe;ing the Comission's questions and should be admitted.
Additional PASNY Objections g Contention II(A)
In addition to the objection shared by the Staff, that the contention addresses no lack of confonnance with FEMA /NRC guidelines, PASNY objects that contention II( A) fails to describe probability and to specify con-sequences. PASNY objections, pp. 31-32. Con Edison shares the objection that the contention fails to describe probability. Con Ed Objections,
- p. 88.
The claim that contentions must all include probability calculations is discussed in the Introduction, Part IA, supra, at pp. 2-4 .
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. . In response to PASNY's request for greater specificity of consequences, UCS/NYPIRG asserts that consequences from serious radiological accidents which may be suffered by the population in the plume exposure pathway beyond the current 10-mile EPZ include prompt fatalities, latent or imediate illnesses, fatal or non-fatal cancers, thyroid nodules, and acute or chronic psychologici health impacts.
The Comission's mandate from Congress to protect the public health and safety is not limited to protection from prompt death. In this, the most densely populated reactor site, other health impacts will have statistically greater impact because of the larger potential number of victims.
PASNY also objects to an asserted lack of specificity in the tenn " severe radiological accident." Examples of severe radiolog-ical accident releases can be found in WASH-1400, Appendix VI, which is cited in the bases to the contention. See also, UCS/NYPIRG Amended Contention III(B).
Con Edison Objections to Contention II(A)
Con Edison argues that this contention constitutes.an attack on NRC regulations, that it is not site-specific because exposures at the edge of the EPZ would be the same as relevant accident scenarios. Con Ed Objections, p. 88.
The contention addresses the necessity of a larger plume emergency planning zone to meet the particular problems of the Indian Point site, and thus the failure of the Indian Point emergency plans to consider the factors listed in NRC regulations in detennin-ing the size and shape of the plume emergency planning zone. 10 CFR 50.54(s)(1) states, in pertinent part:
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The exact size and configuration of the EPZs surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor shall be detennined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries.
The NRC/ FEMA planning guides make clear that ten miles is simply a rough starting size for an emergency planning zone, and that a more precise size and shape are to be reached for each reactor by considering local conditions. See, NUREG-0396 at 14. Therefore, the contention does not challenge the regulations, but, once again, the failure of the plans to follow the regulations.
The contention is site-specific precisely because it depends upon the peculiar local characteristics. Due to the great population density, even if individual exposures at the edge of the EPZ were the same as at other plants, many more individuals would be affected at Indian Point, and the bottlenecks and other deficiencies caused by site-related characteristics would delay evacuation or other emergency responses so that individuals would be exposed for longer periods of time.
Accident scenarios are postulated at UCS/NYPIRG Contention III(B) and in WASH-1400, Appendix VI.
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UCS/NYPIRG CONTENTION II(B):
Local Response Needs and Capabilities Require Extension of Present Plume EPZ (Related to Comission Questions One, Three, and Four)
Local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, juris-dictional boundaries, and particularly access routes and the proximity of the metropolitan New York City area require substantially greater emergency planning beyond the present plume EPZ than currently exists or is contem-plated.
Bases for Contention II(3)
(1) Tne roadway network is strongly oriented in a roughly North / South direction, thus limiting the direction of evacuation for the majority of potential evacuees.
(2) Population density and absolute numbers increase dramatically in the direction of the New York City metropolitan-area.
(3) The direction of the roadway network and the direction of increased population density and absolute numbers of population are in the direction toward which winds frequently blow in the Indian Point area, thus strongly influencing the course of events in an evacuation.
(4) Consequences from accidents at Indian Point would be mani-fested at distances considerably farther from the site than the extent of the current plume EPZ (See, Contention I(B)(2)', supra).
(5) There is no basis for assuming that the New York City metropolitan area would permit the influx of large numbers of potentially or actually irradiated and/or contaminated persons evacuating from the Indian Point area.
(6) The topography of the Indian Point area (mountains and river valley geomorphology) will strongly influence emergency planning needs; this has not been adequately addressed in the present plans.
(See , Contention I(A), Basis 12, suora).
(7) The extent of affected areas and the population contained in those areas (as well as the numbers of facilities and special populations) increase dramatically with distance from Indian Point, thus necessitating detailed, advance emergency preparedness planning in order to provide adequate assurance of prompt protection of the public health and safety.
NRC Staff Objections g Contention II(B)
The Staff again argues that this contention is not related to any of the Comission's question. Staff Objections, pp. 22-23. We have answered that argument in the discussion of Contention II(A).
Contention II(B) is a companion to II(A) in that it also alleges that substantially greater emergency planning is required beyond the current plume EPZ, or stated otherwise, that the EPZ must be expanded.
In this instance, however, the allegation is based on the characteristics of the area itself rather than on the consequences that would be peculiar to the area. Both challenges are cognizable under 10 CFR 50.54(c)(1)'
We add here only that compliance with NRC/ FEMA guidelines depends upon the correct delineation of the plume EPZ, which is at issue in this contention.
PASNY Objections M Contention II(B)
PASNY complains of a lack of particularity and factual basis. PASNY Objections, p. 33. Both are provided through the identification of particular types of local characteristics, including inadequate roadways and the influences of mountain and river valley geomorphology. See also UCS/NYPIRG Contention I(A) and its bases.
Con Edison Objections g Contention II(B)
Con Edison repeats its site specificity and accident scenario goints, which fail for the same reasons as given in the response to the objections to Contention II( A). Con Edison Objections op. 89-91. In response to the claim that Basis 4 is an attack on the regulations, it is submitted that 10 CFR 50.54(s)(1) providos for determination of an EPZ based on factors including demography. At Indian Point, the demography would result in far greater consequences than is true elsewhere, for which reason the plume EPZ must be expanded.
UCS/NYPIRG CONTENTION II(C)
Inadequate Ad Hoc Protective Measures Outside The Current Plume EPZ (Related to Commission Questions One, Three, and Four)
Emergency planning for Indian Point Units 2 and 3 is inadequate to protect the public health and safety because the existing plans within the current plume EPZ do not conform with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 and Appendix E to Part 50, therefore there is no basis for assuming that such plans form an adequate basis for ad hoc protective actions beyond the current plume EPZ.
Bases for Contention II(C):
(1) Existing emergency plans fail to conform with the require-ments of 10 CFR 50.47(b) (1-16), 50.54(s) (2), and Appendix E to Part 50.
(2) Beyond the plume EPZ there are much larger numbers of persons at risk, much larger numbers of special facilities (such as schools, prisons, hospitals, nursing homes, etc.), and a much larger special population (invalids, hearing-impaired, vision-impaired, etc.) than within the present plume EPZ. There is no basis for assuming that ad hoc protective actions could be successfully implemented for the population at risk outside the present plume EPZ, especially considering that the existing plans within the plume EPZ are themselves inadequate.
(3) Some accident scenarios (including accidents which exceed the design basis for the Indian Point units), alone or in combination with adverse meteorology (such as inversions and/or precipitation),
will have adverse health consequences beyond the current plume EPZ (See , Contention I(B)(2)', suora).
NRC Staff Objections _to Contention II(C)
The Staff accepts the contention only as limited by its first basis relating to non-conformance of the plans for the current plume EPZ with NRC/ FEMA guidelines. Staff Objection, p. 24. This liantation renders the contention redundant with UCS/NYPIRG Contention I(A) and abrogates the point of the contention which addresses the inadequacies of planning beyond the current plume EPZ.
__ __ ___J
The contention and its bases 2 and 3 describe features of the Indian Point area which are especially problematic for the implementation of effective acl hoc procedures during a crisis, and thus specifically provide notice of the necessity of planning for the area beyond the ten-mile current plume EPZ.
The Staff fails to provide any rationale for its proposed limitation of the contention. Assuming, in the spirit of cooperation, that the Staff is confused about the relation of the contention to the Commission Questions, we refer the Staff to the response to that same objection made by the Staff to Contention II(A).
PASNY Objections To Contention II(C)
PASNY again objects simply that the contention is vague, (PASNY Objections, p. 35), an objection that once again lacks merit.
Contention IIC) builds on the details of UCS/NYPIRG Contention I( A),
which specify many deficiencies in the proposed plans for the current plume EPZ. Given these inadequacies of toe extensive plans for. the current plume EPZ, it follows that the ad hoc measures, on which the NRC/ FEMA guidelines rely for the area outside the plume EPZ, are not adequate to protect the public health and safety. See NUREG-0396, p. 16.
Con Edison's Objections to Contention II(C)
Con Edison argues that the contention is vague insofar as there is no connection drawn between the inadequacies of planning within the current plume EPZ and the consequent need for better planning outside the current plume EPZ. Objections, p. 92. The connection is obvious.
This contention, unlike II( A)and II(B) assumes the propriety of the present parameters of the plume EPZ, and, by reference to UCS/NYPIRG contention I( A), points to the inadequacies of the plans for that plume EPZ. Building on those inadequacies, UCS/NYPIRG draws the logical conclusion that, where planning is inadequate, ad hoc measures are by definition insufficient as noted above in the response to PASNY's objections above. ..
Thus, Con Edison's second objection, that the contention challenges NRC guidelines, (Con Edison's Objections, p. 92), hits the mark to the extent that it is contended that the absence of detailed, planning guidelines in the area outside the plume EPZ places in jeopardy the public health and safety. The propriety of challenging NRC/ FEMA guidelines in this proceeding has been demonstrated in the Introduction Point C, supra at pp. 5-7.
Finally, Con Edison posits its familiar " footnote 5" objection which has been met in the Introduction, Point I-A, supra, pp.2-4.
4
. _ . - _. - _ ~ .
4 UCS/NYPIRG CONTENTION III(A):
- Necessary and Feasible Improvements In Emergency Planning For Indian Point (Relating to Commission Questions Two and Four)
It is essential, although not necessarily sufficient, that the following emergency planning measures and protective actions be implemented or capable of being implemented within 10 miles (plume EPZ) of the Indian Point reactors in order to protect the public 4 health and safety in the. event of an accident at Indian Point Units 2 and 3. However, rone of the following measures have 'either been implemented, are now capable of being implemented, or are planned to be implemented:
- a. Potassium iodide must be provided in an appropriate form for all residents within the plume EPZ and a sufficient supply and adequate distribution system for transients within the plume EPZ must be provided.
- b. Adequate sheltering capability must be provided to all
- residents and transients within the plume EPZ.
- c. License conditions must be placed on the operating licensees for Indian Point Units 2 and 3 which prohibit i
power operation during periods when the roadway network becomes degraded due to adverse weather conditions.
Such conditions would include, temperature inversions, flooding, snowfall,'and icing on the roadways.
j d. License conditions must be placed on the operating licenses for Indian Point Units 2 and 3 which prohibit power operations with less than a fully operable com--
plement of safety-grade and/or safety-related equip-ment.
- e. The roadway network must be capable of being used to successfully evacuate all at-risk residents of the plume EPZ before the plume can reach them for the shortest plume arrival time.
- f. A filtered, vented containment system must be installed at Indian Point Units 2 and 3 to help prevent containment-failure by over-pressurization.
- g. A " core-catcher" must be installed at Indian Point Units 2 and 3 to provide additional protective action time in the event of a " melt-through" accident in which the reactor pressure vessel is breached by molten fuel.
- h. A separate containment structure must be provided into which excess pressure from accidents and transients can be relieved without necessitating releases to the environment, thereby
. reducing the risk of containment failure by overpressurization.
_ --- , , , . - .w.. . . . _ _ , ,, y
Bases for Contention III(A):
(1) Potassium iodide distribution for residents and transients in the plume EPZ would provide substantial protection against adverse health consequences caused by uptake of radiciodines.
(2) It has not been demonstrated that adequate sheltering capability exis;s in the plume EPZ for all residents and transients at risk during an accident at Indian Point Units 2 and 3. Such capability is necessary if sheltering is to be used as a protective action alternative for these plants.
(3) Plant operation should be prohibited during any .
weather conditions or combination of conditions which would impair the ability of the public to promptly evacuate the plume EPZ. Operation of the plants during such times is an unnecessary risk which is far outweighed by the benefits of prohibiting operation during these periods of time.
(4) In view of the magnitude of the risks posed by the operation of Indian Point Units 2 and 3, plant operation should not be permitted with any safety-grade or safety-related component in an inoperable condition. Operation during periods of time of inoperable
^
safety-grade or safety-related equipment reduces the margin of safety for the Indian Point Units 2 and 3 reactors; due to the risks posed by accidents at these reactors, it is necessary that the margin of safety be maintained as high as is feasible. Therefore, operation during degraded modes related to the operability of safety-grade or safety-related equipment should be prohibited.
(5) The present roadway network is incapable of supporting an evacuation in the time period provided from the initiation of an accident to the time the plume reaches persons at risk for the most limiting accident, thus the plant poses an unacceptable risk to the public health and safety which can onl'y be remedied by the requisite improvements in the roadway network.
(6) Filtered vented containment systems are capable of being constructed at Indian Points Units 2 and 3 to pemit controlled venting of the containment buildings during accidents to prevent pr mitigate overpressurization of the containment (See, UCLA-ENG-7775; December 1977, Post-Accident Filtration as a Means of Improvina Containment Effectiveness, B. Gossett, et. al., UCLA School of Engineerina and Applied Science, Project Director, David Okrent).
(7) A core-catcher would contain molten core material following vessel failure, and, in so doing, would provide an increase in the amount of time available to effectuate necessary protective actions before the containment would be breached by melt-through.
(8) Increasing the containment volume by providing a separate, large volume, leak-tight containment structure would provide for decreasing main containment pressure during accidents (See, NUREG-0850, Volume I, Preliminary Report, November 1981, page 3-99. )
Objections of NRC Staff to Contention III( Al The Staff finds Contention III( A) ambiguous in its present form and is confused about which of the Commission questions are addressed by the contention and its bases. Objections, p. 24.
The ambiguous nature of the contention is cured by deletion of the last sentence. The amended contention reads:
It is essential, although not necessarily sufficient, that the following emergency planning measures and protective actions be implemented or capable of being implemented within 10 miles (plume EPZ) of the Indian Point reactors in order to protect the public health and safety in the event of an accident at Indian Point Units 2 and 3.
Subsections and bases remain unchanged.
As the staff guessed, subsections (a)-(e) of Contention III(A) respond. to Commission Question four, since these subsections recite specific necessary and feasible improvements in the level of emergency planning. Objectiens, p. 25. Extensive research into the plans, from FEMA Regional Assistance Committee reviews, and interviews with State and local planners indicate that the plans contain many deficiencies, some of which are specified in UCS/NYPIRG Contention I(A). Contention III(A) subsections (a)-(e) suggested improvements related to those deficiencies.
As the Staff correctly states, subsections f,g, and h are onsite safety improvements and thus not within the scope of Commission Question
~-
4 j fo u r.' These three hardware items are expressly referenced in the Director's Order,of February 11, 1980 and are properly part of Question i
4 two; they are also the subject of proposed NUREG 0850, which the Staff is still-developing.
y PASNY Objections to Contention III(A) w PASNY asserts at pp. 16-17 of its objections that there is only one basis for Contention III( A). In fact, there are eight bases.
j .PASNY objects to subsections (d) (safety equipment) and (b) (sheltering) as not site-specific. Objections, pp.18, 51. Problems with the safety equipment at Indian Point are alleged at UCS/NYPIRG Contention I(B)(7),
Basis 3 . Inadequate sheltering at Indian Point is alleged in Contention
- I( A), Basis 13. These subsections of Contention III(A) relate to and i
incorporat'e those site-specific deficiencies.
Next, PASNY complains that the contention fails to specify risks.
Objections, p.18. This objection is inapposite to this issue. The i
improvements suggested here are necessary and feasible to emergency 4
planning as long as the probability of an accident at Indian Point is greater than zero. See Introduction Point I( A), supra, pp. 2-4.
PASNY specially objects to subsections (a)-(e) of Contention III( A).
Objections, pp 50-52.
- As to subsection (a), PASNY repeats the claim that the issue of l potassium iodide has been somehow preempted by New York State. This i
claim has been answered in responses to objections to Contentions I(A) and I(B) (4), supra, pp. 49-52.
Subsections (d), (c) and (e) are alleged to be vague and conclusory.
Objections, pp. 18, 52. The Staff has conceded that these subsections are i
t
, t
. r encompassed in Commission question four, if the ambiguity of the i contention is clarified as has been done. Staff Objections, p.24.
) Greater specificity than "(d) less than a fully operable complement of safety grade and for safety related equipment"; "(c) degraded roadway I equipment";and"(e): roadway network" is not required at the ;
contention stage.
i Con Edison's Objections to Contention III( A) i Con Edison's first objection would request a " showing" such
, as is required in the Comission Question 2 for measures which are not (
required by or referenced in the Director's Order. Since these measures I in Contention III(A)(g-h) are referenced in the Director's Order, no i
such showing is iaquired. Objections, p. 95.
With reference to subsection (a), Con Edison would have it that i
consideration of administering KI to the population surrounding Indian Point is a generic issue in their second objection to this contention.
i Objections, pp. 95-96. The licensee is referred to our general response l in the Introduction, Point I-B, supra, pp. 4-5 It suffices to note l
here that the fact that the issue of potassium iodide may be relevant to other sites does not preclude intervenors from raising the issue -
j specifically to Indian Point.
Con Edison complains that III(A)(b) is not site-specific. It is i
- obviously site-specific in its reference to "the plume EPZ." Con i
! Edison further objects that we lack specific and factual Lasis, assert-ing that we " stand the Commission's c,ntention practice on its head" (Objections, p. 97) by our use of the phrase "It has not been demonstrated i that adequate sheltering capability. exists..." Commission practice is
not so easily inverted. In this basis we focus parties' attention on the lack of radiologically and numerically adequate sheltering facilities to shelter the vast population pctentially affected by Indian Point accidents.. The contention suggests a remedy: provide adequate sheltering capabilities to all residents and transients within the (Indian Point) plume EPZ.
Con Edison reiterates the same senseless objections to Contention III( A)(c), and questions the relevance of this improvement to emergency planning to Question 4. Objections, pp. 97-98. This contention focuses on the possibility or impossibility of evacuation during various weather scenarios which the Board must certainly appreciate having cancelled hearings in January 1982 because of impassable road conditions close to the plant. Therefore, the contention fits squarely within the meaning of Question 4.
The December 31, 1981 RAC Review, Attachment 2 at J(9), provides this additional infomation on impassable roads:
"The vehicular evacuation times under adverse conditions for many ERPA's are much greater than the times for people to walk out of the EPZ. The circumstances under which vehicular evacuation ceases to be a viable protective action might be an appropriate inclusion for Appendix A."
and
" Discuss the conditions under which evacuation will no longer be a viable protective action, i.e. : inclement weather, short-term duration of a high exposure plume."
Con Edison objects at pp.' 98-99 to the teminology in Contention III( A)(d) as " vague", but in fact " safety-grade and/or safety-related equipment" is standard terminology with which the plant's operators must surely be familiar. Operation of the plants should not be permitted, we contend, when equipment so described is not functional.
) . .
4 Once again, the Licensee claims this conter"Da is not site-specific.
Yet, Contention III(A)(c-d) both refer directly to " operating licenses .
l l for Indian Point Units 2 and 3." Con Edison's complaints above are i repeated with respect to Contention III(A)(e) and again the Licensee 1 ,
l 1
fails apparently to comprehend normal, thoughtfully chosen English wo rds . Objections, pp.99-100. In addition, con Edison complains that this contention is a masked " risk" contention, and should meet
- Con Edison's version of the requirements of the Comission's Order
, footnote 5, concerning probability estimates. This contention states
! an improvement to emergency planning (improved roadway networks), and
)
is, again, squarely related to Question 4. The need for a road network that can handle evacuation plans requires only common sense; not probability estimates.
- Con Edison's complaints about the on-site emergency planning j improvements at Contention III(A)(f,g h) are
- that these improvements are on-site and thus not encompassed in Commission Question 4; that the subsections lack sufficient factual bases; and that the suggested
, improvements are genuine. Objections, p. 100.
l l The subsections relate to Commission Question 2, not 4, and are more than sufficiently specific to place the licensees on notice of the suggested on-site equipment.
The bases given for subsections (f), (g) and (h) refer to the '
authority upon which they are founded. The hardware items described in these subsections would provide greater protection for the residents around Indian Point, protection which is necessary at this uniquely
- hazardous site, where the density of the population compels the use i
of every k_nown safety device.
l -
UCS/NYPIRG CONTENTION III(B):
Possible Accident Scenarios At Indian Point Would Result In Early Deaths and Serious Health Consequences (Relating to Commission Question 1) i Under certain accident conditions, consequences within the present plume EPZ would be so severe that even heroic emergency measures would not be sufficient to protect the public health and safety from unacceptable immediate and long-term consequences, including prompt fatalities from acute radiation exposure, early and latent cancer cases and fatalities, thyroid nodules, and genetic defects. The deficiencies in the existing emergency plans within the plume EPZ are so deficient that there are no feasible
" interim" measures which can be implemented to correct these deficiencies.
Bases for Contention III(B):
(1) The emergency plans meet none of the sixteen required standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1-16).
(2) Thus, the deficiencies are pervasive and massive.
(3) There exist no feasible interim measures which could 2
sufficiently correct such pervasive and massive planning deficiencies.
(4) Under severe accident conditions, the impact of these present deficiencies would be greatly magnified in the form of large increases in consequences.
NRC Staff and Licensees Objections to Contention III(B)
J, The Staff objects that present contention is inadmissible for a variety of reasons, including vagueness and redundancy. Objections, p. 26.
PASNY also objects that the contention is redundant and fails to postulate accident scenarios. PASNY Objections, pp. 52-53.
Con Edison objects that the contention is redundant, is not site-specific, and it fails to postulate accident scenarios. Objections, p. 101.
UCS/NYPIRG amend the contention as follows:
Under a range of accident scenarios, including accidents which exceed the design basis, each accident having a probability greater
! than zero, early deaths and serious health consequences will result within the current plume EPZ and outside the current plume EPZ, even if existing emergency plans are successfully implemented.
Bases for Contention III(B):
(1) For example, preliminary studies indicate that, in event of a radioactive release such as those described in WASH 1400, Appendix VI, as a PWR-2 release, with Class D stability, 4 mile /second wind and rain, pers%s downwind within 4 miles will receive a radiation dose in excess of 200 rems within three to five hours of the onset of accide. ital conditions.
Time estimates for evacuations from much of the emergency response planning area designated in the State emergency plans as j "ERPA 2", is within a 4 mile radius of the reactors at Indian Point.
! Time estimates in the revised State plans for evacuations from ERPA 2 range from 3:20 to 12:40 hours.
l l Therefore, people will have received doses of 200 rems before they can be evacuated. Two hundred rems is considered a threshold dose at which some people will suffer early death.
(2) For example, preliminary studies indicate that, in the event of a radioactive release described in WASH 1400, Appendix 6 as a PWR-2 release, with Class D stability and 4 mile /second, downriver winds and rain, delayed cancer deaths in addition to thyroid cancer among one million exposed persons in New York City would be within 1,000 and 10,000 for the first day and 2,000 and 20,000 by the third day.
5 l
. - _______l
83-1 Serious health consequences would include thyroid nodules, genetic defects and acute and chronic psychological health impairments.
i (3) For example, preliminary studies indicate that, in the ,
event of a radioactive release such as those described in WASH 1400, Appendix VI as a PWR-2 release, land contamination and secondary ;
l contamination within and without the current plume EPZ will result in
! serious health consequences, including early and latent cancer cases
, and fatalities, thyroid nodules, genetic defects and acute and chronic l psychological health impairments.
1 I
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84 UCS/NYPIRG CONTENTION III(C) and III(D): '
Necessity of Extension of Present Plume EPZ (Relating to Commissions Questions Three and Four)
Contention III(C):
It is essential, although not necessarily sufficient, that the present plume EPZ be extended sufficiently to encompass the entire population which is at risk from all consequences of accidents at Indian Point Units 2 and 3, including not only prompt fatalities (upon which the present EPZ and plans are based), but also early and latent cancer causes and fatalities, thyroid nodules, and genetic defects. Further, this measure has not been implemented for Indian Point Units 2 and 3 and is not now being developed for implementation.
Basis for Contention III(C)
The present plume EPZ will only provide prior emergency planning coverage for a portion of those persons at risk for prompt fatalities.
This ignores the greater bulk of the consequences from severe accidents at Indian Point Units 2 and 3 which would result in much greater numbers of fatal and non-fatal cancers, thyro;d nodules, and genetic defects.
As such, the present emergency plans are inadequately based to adequately protect the public health and safety from accidents at Indian Point Units 2 and 3 (See, NUREG-0396, op. cit., pp.16-17, the EPZ's are sized to provide only for reduction of early severe health effects, thus implying the acceptability of some undefined level of deaths and, in addition, other consequences from severe accidents; See, NUREG-0396, also, at pp.1-34; in addition, pp.1-51 note that
" atmospheric" accidents could result in significant numbers of early fatalities and injuries").
Contention III(D)
The consequences of severe accidents at the Indian Point reactors (including accidents which exceed the design basis for Indian Point Units 2 and 3) represent an unacceptable threat to the public health and safety that is not limited to the present plume EPZ, but which extends to the New York City metropolitan area and beyond. Under certain accident conditions, the consequences would be so severe that even heroiec emergency measures would not be sufficient to protect the public health and safety from unacceptable imediate and long-tenn consequences, including prompt fatalities from acute radiation exposure, early and latent cancer cases and fatalities, thyroid nodules, and genetic defects. There are no feasible " interim" measures which can be adopted to remedy this situation.
1 . . . .
Bases for Contention III(D):
(1) Under certain meteorological conditions, including pre-cipitation following a significant release of radio-iodines and radio-particulates from Indian Point Units 2 and 3, the New York City metropolitan area would be subject to life-threatening levels of radiation exposure.
(2) There are not established radiological emergency plans for this area which would adequately protect the public health and safety in such circumstances.
(3) Given the massive emergency management problems faced in in this area due to the very high population density, there are no feasible " interim" measures that could be adopted to alleviate this situation and adequately protect the public health and safety.
(4) According to preliminary calucations performed by Dr.
Jan Beyea, given the present state of emergency preparedness, a PWR-2 accident as described in WASH-1400 would result in prompt and early fatalities and injuries out to at iedst five miles from the site if evacuation takes 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
i UCS/NYPIRG withdraws Contention III(C) and III(D) as redundant to Contentions II(A), (B), and (C), and Contention III(B).
e l
(
l l
l
UCS/NYPIRG CONTENTION IV( A):
Consequences of Possible Accidents at Indian Point So Severe That Shutdown Is Required (Relating to Comission Question 1)
The economic, environmental, safety, health, and other consequences of an accident at Indian Point Units 2 and 3 are so severe, and the threat to the public health and safety so great, that the reactors must be shut down regardless of the energy, economic, environemntal, or other consequences of a preventive shutdown.
Bases for Contention IV(A):
(1) The economic consequences of a severe accident at Indian Point Units 2 and 3 are extremely large, and far exceed the cost of building and operating the units. These costs arise from lost productivity, loss of land and other property, health-related costs (arising from fatal and non-fatal illnesses), contamination of water supplies and the consequent loss of drinking water sources, cleanup costs, and the loss of scenic and aesthetic resources.
(2) The safety and public health consequences of a severe accident at Indian Point Units 2 and 3 would be so large as to exceed the medical capabilities of the region and the nation as a whole to care for the many thousands of irradiated and/or contaminated persons.
(3) The environmental consequences of severe accidents at Indian Point Units 2 and 3 are very large, arising from contamination of the environment over a very large area, thus preventing access to or use of this area, and rendering it unsuitable for many forms of life. Con-tamination of water supplies would also be massive; indeed, the Indian Point site is underlain by fractured limestone which can have a' high penneability and low ability to absorb dissolvea radionuclides. In addition, the Hudson River, on whose shore the Indian Point Units 2 and 3 reactors are sited, is heavily used for commerce and recreation, and leads into the United States' busiest port (New York City). Not only would contamination of the Hudson River affect nearby areas, but beaches as far
, away as Coney Island and Rockaway Beach could be affected by contaminated sediments (See, NUREG-0850, Volume 1, Preliminary Report, op. cit., Appendix D).
NRC Staff Objections to Contention IV(A)
The staff accepts the contention as limited to bases one and three, but offers no explanation for its conclusion that economic and environmental
- s. 4 consequences are appropriate elements of risk whereas the safety and public health cnnsequences described in Basis 2 would be inappropriate.
UCS/NYPIRG submits that danger to public health and safety is indeed
.a significant element of any evaluation of the particular risks of Indian Point 2 and 3, which are intimately related to the site surrounded by such dense population with such limited evacuation possibilities.
Licensees *0bjections to Contention IV(A)
PASNY objects to the contention as beyond the scope of Question 6 and Con Edison asserts that the contention is related to no Commission Question.PASNY Objections, pp. 59-60; Con Edison Objections, p. 105.
The contention is related to Commission Question I as the Staff recognized.
PASNY also complains that the contention fails to discuss probabilities.
Objections, p. 60. This objection is answered in Point I-A of the Introduction, supra, pp. 2-4.
a..e UCS/NYPIRG CONTENTION IV(B)
Consequences of Preventive Shutdown Irrelevant The energy, economic, and other such consequences of preventative shutdown are irrelevant as a matter of law to the question of whether Indian Point Units 2 and 3 must be -hut down to protect the public health and safety.
I UCS/NYPIRG maintain the position stated in Contention III(3),
but withdraw the Contention since it does not present any litigable facts.
New York, New York Jeffrey M. Blum, Esq.
January 29, 1982 New York University Law School 423 Vanderbilt Hall 40 Washington Square South New York, New York 10012
({12 ,598-3452 ,
I Am a liHl l'
? ,;l Joa'n Holt New York Public Interest Research Group, Inc.
5 Beek,ian Street New York, New York 10038
( 12) 349- 460
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