ML20040D752
| ML20040D752 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 01/26/1982 |
| From: | Raynard Wharton CARSTENS, A.S., WHARTON, R.J. |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8202020218 | |
| Download: ML20040D752 (32) | |
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RICHARD-WHARTON s
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CLINIC UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO
E ALCALA PARK SAN DIEGO, CA 92110 Attorney for Intervernors' Carstens et al.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the 11atter of
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Docket Nos. 50-361 OL.
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50-362 OL SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY,
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(San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, )
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INTERVENORS' CARSTENS ET AL. EXCEPTIONS TO THE INITIAL DECISION (10 C.F.R. 2.762 (a) )
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di Intervenors' Carstens et al. takes exception to the Licensing u_
Board's initial decision of January 11, 1982 mailed on January 12, 1982 and received by IntervenorsCarstens et al. on January 14, 1982.
On January 15, 1982 an order was issued " Supplementing Missing Pages of Partial Initial Decision".
Pages 80-82 were inadvertently left out of the copies mailed to the service List.
These copies of pages 80-82 were received by the attorney for Intervenor on January 19, 1982.
By a way of preliminary exception to the ruling itself Intervenors' object to said ruling on the basis that it does not comply with Section 2.760 in that it fails to delineate all the 503 D
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facts judicially noticed and-relied on in making.the decision and it fails to set forth the time within which exception to the decision and a brief in support may be filed, the time within which briefs in 1
support of or in opposition to exceptions filed by the party may be filed and it fails to state the date when the iriitial decision may.become final, all as required by 10 C.F.R., Section 2.'60 (c) (2) and (4).
Intervenors' Carstens et al. further state that the Licensing I
Board erred in finding or ruling that:
(1) the multivolume document k'nown as the "FSAR" and the Applicantsthree volume Environmental Report are to be admitted into evidence both fer'what the[~are and, purport to be and as sub-stantive evidence of the matters. addressed in them despite the fact that they are hearsay and are being admitted evidence without sponsors and without setting forth*the authorg of the documents.
(See trans. p. 946 and 947 lines 1 through 11) (
(2) The Board erred in not allowing Intervenorsi to question any of the applicants' witnesses,as to which portion.of\\the FSAR s
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.See trans. p. 1010).
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they' wrote 'or participated in preparing.
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(3) 'The Boa'rd erred in n'ot allowing Intervenors to question the expert witnesses for the Applicaht as to the amount.[of poney a
they have received from the Applicants for consultationiand s
testimony.
(See trans. p. 786 lines 9 through 11)
(4) The Board erred in ruling that'the In,tervqnors could not question Applicants'.
s witness 1 Jay Smith regarding wrench tectonics.
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(See trans. p. 866).
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(5) The' Board erred in allowing testimony regarding the offshore zone of deformation being segmented and igmring the fact that there was an explicit finding on this point.by the Licensing Board in 1973 hearings and by denying Intervenors' motion to strike.
(See trans. p. 1055)
(6) The Board erred in not allowing the Intervenors to ques-tion Dr. Ehlig regarding the structural relationship between the Cristianos fault, the Newport Inglewood OZD fault zone and the Whittier-Elsinore fault zone.
(See trans. p. 1105 lines 16 through 20)
(7) The Board erred in refusing to strike the testimony of Applicants' witnesses McNeil, Idress and Wright.
(See trans.
p.
1696)
(8) The Board erred and greatly prejudiced the Intervenors' ability to present their case by forcing the Intervenors to present their direct examination of D.'. Kennedy out of turn and without warning to Intervenors which greatly prejudiced the Intervenors in that they were not able to prepare for direct examination of a very reluctant witness.
(See trans. pp. 2206 through 2218)
(9) The Board erred in admitting the testimony of Dr. Beihler and the exhibits attached to Dr. Beihler's written testimony into evidence regarding activity on the Cristianito's fault while at 4
the same time excluding and not allowing the Intervenors to intro-4 duce any evidence regarding activity on the Cristianito's fault.
(See trans. p.
3296 through 3393).
(10) The Board erred in sustaining Applicant's objection to t
Intervenors request that Dr. Beihler draw error bars around certain events on the Cristianito's fault.
(See trans, p.
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I Turning specified11y to the partial initial decision dated January 11, 1982 the Intervenors Carstens et al. state that the Licensing Board erred in finding or ruling that:
(11) Seismic activity generally decreases westward away from plate boundary and the coastal region around the San Onofre has experienced relatively moderate seismic activity during the past two centuries for which historic records of earthquakes exist.
(Finding I A.)
(12) The Board erred in finding that one of the disputed issues in the proceeding is whether the OZD is a single through-going fault or whether it is comprised of separate segments of faults in that such issue was stipulated to by the two remaining parties to the construction licensing hearing, namely the Applicants and the NCR Staff, and was a specific finding in the Licensing Board decision at the construction hearings and should not be subject-to relitiga-tion nor was it contemplated by the Intervenors that such an issue would be subject to litigation.
(Finding I A; found at end of second paragraph on page 3.)
(13) The Board erred in finding that "about one-half mile from the facility, the Cristianitos' fault is clearly expressed in the seacliffs.
The Cristianitos is the closest significant geologic feature to the site.
It proceeds inland in the seacliffs for about 25 to 30 miles and appears to die out about 1 mile offshore.
The Cristianitos has long been considered.to be inactive (Finding of facts I A, page 3 last paragraph, page 4 first paragraph).
(14) Large earthquakes only occur on preexisting faults (Finding of facts I B, second paragraph, page'5).
l (15) All parties'and the Board agreed that the centrolling i
feature for San Onofre is the Offshore Zone'of Deformation. (Finding
.of facts I B, pages 5 and 6)
I (16) The Board erre'd in finding that adherance to the response 1
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spectrum in the engineering and construction process is intended to insure that the reactors critical safety features would withstand t
the SSE determined for it.
Such finding goes to engineering and construction issues which were'not before the Board and which were specifically objected to by the Intervenors and which should not i
be considered for any purpose.
(See finding of facts, page 6 last,
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(17) The Board erred in finding that the geologic seismic characteristics of the controlling geologic feature were not deter-1 mined at the construction permit stage and erred in stating that the Applicants viewed the OZD as a series of separate faults and zones capable of producing only small earthquakes and erred in stating that the disagreement was resolved by the Applicants' stipulation-to the Staff's model but only for purposes of deter-mining the appropriate design spectrum.
l (18) The Board erred in stating that the actual geologic and seismic characteritistics of the OZD were litigated for the first time in this proceeding.
(19) The Board erred in stating bhat the stipulation and decision at the construction hearing was ambiguous language.
i (Finding of facts, page 8, last paragraph, page 9, first paragraph.)
(20) Intervencrs take exception to the Boards order of May 8, j
1981 in that it improperly excluded contentions proposed-by the Intervenors and Intervenors specifically object to the Board's' l
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finding that the Board's order of liay 8, 1981 adhitted four con-tentions substantially as agreed to by all parties.
(Finding of facts I D 2, second paragraph, page 11.)
(21) Intervenors specifically object to the May 8 order which ruled out a number of Intervenors proposed contentions.on various grounds.
(Finding of facts I D 2, page 12, first full sentence.)
(22) The Board erred in finding that "the regulations contem-plate that a comprehensive geologic and seismic review of the pro-posed reactor site will be conducted at the construction pern.it phare," with an " update approach sufficing at the operating licensing state."
(Finding of facts, page 13, first full paragraph, first sentence.)
(23) The Board erred in finding " apart from the possibility of newly discovered information, the geologic features of inter'est to the site, and previously reviewed, will not have changed from tens of thousands to perhaps millions of years, let alone a few years elapsing between the construction permit and the operating license stage."
(Finding of facts, page 13, last sentence, page 14, first sentence.)
(24) Intervenors object to finding of fact, footnote 27, found on page 13 in its entirety, more specifically,without limiting the scope of this objection, the Board erred in finding that the
' siting prov.isions do not apply to Applications for operating licenses.
It is Intervenors position that Applicants have an obligation to perform such further investigations as may be necessitated by discoveries of new information following issuance of the construc-tion permit to' insure the safety of the facility.
The Applicants in this case failed to meet that obligation. - _ _.
i (25) The Board erred in finding that the " geologic and' seismic-characteristics of the OZD, factors crucial to the seismic hazard at San Onofre, were not litigated at the construction permit stage.
(Finding of facts, page 15, first full paragraph.)
(26) The Board and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.itself committed error in that the Commission issued a statement of policy and of conduct of licensing proceedings which interfered with the j
independence of the Licensing Board and caused a lack of opportunity i
to prepare for the hearings on the part of the Intervenors and created bias and prejudice on the part of the Licensing Board in that the Board was under orders to move the hearings along at an expedious pace and that such orders constitute undue influence on an adjudicative body.
Intervenors were severely prejudiced by this outside influence on the hearing board and the findings of the Licensing Board on page 16 actually evidences the extent of this l
prejudice.
Intervenors submit that this finding supports Inter-venors position that the undue influence of the NRC caused them to have insufficient time to prepare written testimony and as a result'could prepare written testimony for only 3 witnesses and had to subpoena 5 witnesses without benefit of written testimony.
(See finding.of f act, page 15, number 3, page 16, first full paragraph and footnote number 31.)
(26) The Board committed error in granting a motion to strike testimony and exhibits of an Intervenor witness who was called to prove the activity of the Cristianitos fault.
The Board erred in ruling that the evidence was based primarily on matters predating the 1973 construction permit proceeding and that its consideration
should therefore be f'oreclosed and that the witn'ess's presenta-tion lacked any probative value.
This error is especially signifi-cant in that the Licensing Board adopted an improper legal doctrine to exclude evidence regarding the Cristianitos fault.
The Inter-venors were not parties to the construction licensing state; the issue of the activity of the Cristianitos fault was not litigated in any way at the construction licensing stage and there was new evidence of activity on the Cristianitos fault.
The Board allowed the Applicants to present evidence regarding the inactivity of the Cristianitos fault.
(27) The Board erred in ruling that Richarc Simons was called as an expert in-seismology and in finding that it was not demon-strated that the witness, Richard Simons had relevant work experi-ence in seismology.
(Finding of f acts 4 (a), page 18, second para-graph.)
i (28) Intervenors hereby take exception to and state that the Board erred in each.and every finding found on page 18, 19 and 20 of their finding of facts listed more specifically as Finding I,
4 (a).
(29) The Board committed error in finding that the testimony of Richard Simons lacked P roba tive value.
(30) 'The Board erred in finding that the prior opportunities to litigate the capability of the Cristianitos fault at the con-struct. ion permit stage foreclosed litigation of that question in this operating licensing proceeding.
(Finding I 4 (b), pages 20, 21.) -
r (31)-The Board. erred in finding that the " m o's t rs'asonably inference to be drawn from this exclusive focus'on the OZD is that-the Intervenor at the construction permit stage made a conse'ious decision not to litigate the capability of the Cristianitos fault."
Given che' record that we have only sketched it is certain-that 7_
4 they actually knew quLte a bit about the Cristianitos and its seismic significance or lack thereof. "(See page 21, last paragraph, page 22 first paragraph.)
(32) The Board erred in finding that "we do not think tha,t the judicially developed doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel should be transplanted intact from the civil litigation of private rights to the Commission's publicly oriented licensing scheme."
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(See page 23, first-paragraph.)
I (33) The Board committed error and the Intervenors hereby take exception to the Board's findings regarding the requirenent of " Identity of Parties", and " Prior Adjudication" (see pages 24, 25, 26, 27, and 28 of the finding of facts) in its entirety in b
4 that these findings have no basis in law or in fact.
(34) The Board erred in ruling that "in the nuclear power licensing context, significant safety considerations are reviewed y
I by the Staff and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 4
whether they are raised or not by an intervenor.
With these, assurances of impartial review we believe it is enough to cause later foreclosure if, as here, the matter was known to and could hav.e been placed in issue before the construction permit board in
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a contested proceeding.
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(35) Intervenors' take strong exception to t'he e'rrors committed by the. Board whereby they have precluded Intervenor from intro-ducing competent testimony regarding. activity on the fault nearest to the reactor on the basis on a newly devised doctrine of " fore-closure" under circumstances where the present Intervenors have not had an opportunity to litigate the issue, where the issue was not litigated in any way at the co'nstruction licensing procedure, where there is new evidence of earthquakes occurring on the Cristianitos fault, and where the Board has allowed the Applicants to present evidence regarding activity of the Cristianitos fault.
At the same time, the Board has allowed Applicants to introduce evidence regarding the issue of the continuity of the O"D, which issue was decided at the construction license hearing, and which issue was specifically decided and set forth in the findings of fact, and which the issue was agreed to by stipulation of the parties and such parties are identical to the parties at the present hearing.
Despite the fact that all the elements of collateral estoppel and res judicata were and are met regarding the issue of length and the cont,inuity of the offshore zone of deformation, the Board allowed testimony regarding the separation of the OZD and in fact ruled that the OZD was not a through-going fault but rather was a segmented fault and that the earthquakes on such fault are com-mensorate only with the segments and not with the total length as previously. decided at the construction licensing stage.
As regards to that section of the finding labeled as II. Sum-mary of Decisions of Major Seismic Issues, the Licensing Board erred in finding or ruling that:
(36) Historic Se'ismicity o'f the OZD in term's of large earth-quakes.(MS 6 or greater) is sparse.
(Finding of facts II B, page 30.)
(37) The Applicants and Staff maintain the OZD is only about 240 kilometers long and that it is segmented in three discrete sections.
(38) The Intervenors point to some ambiguous language in the Staff's safety evaluation which can be read to imply the OZD was then viewed as a single fault.
However, the Staff's testimony in this case rejects that interpretation.
It is clear in any event that the construction permit board did not make findings about the characteristics and length of the OZD.-
The great weight of the evidence in this proceeding refuted the single through-going fault theory of the OZD.
(Finding of facts, page 31, second para-graph.)
(39) There was no evidence to show two fault zones had ever been involved in a single seismic event.
(Finding of facts, page 32, second paragraph.)
(40) The Board rejects the proposed connection between the OZD and the Vallecitos-San Miguel fault system.
(Finding of facts, page 32, last paragraph.)
(41) The Intervenors take exception to the finding entitled Magnitude Maximum Magnitude by Slip Rate Method, starting on page 33 and ending on page 35 in its entirety and more specifically takes exception to the finding found on page 35, first paragraph, last sentence, that "using this slip rate, the maximum earthquake prediction for the OZD would be Ms7.
The Board views this Ms7 as conservative.
(42) Intervenors state that the Board committed error in their findings entitled Magnitude Maximum by Fault Length Method on pages 35 through 37 inclusive in its entirety and more specif-ically state that the Board committed error in finding that:
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(a)
On faults comparable to the OZD the values are around 7 or below (page 36).
(b)
If we assume a 240 kilometer fault length for the OZD then'using Slemmons equation to compute a magnitude for 15%, 22% and 30% rupture, we arrive at magnitudes of 6.74, 7.0 and 7.2 respectively (page 36).
(c)
The Board believes that Slemmons analyses are conservative as they were presented (page 36).
(d)
Addition of another standard of deviation to his calculations would be unwarranted (page 36).
(e)
We believe that the fault length method reinfor-ces the determination reached under this slip rate method--that the Ms7 is an appropriately conservative maximum magnitude earthquake for the OZD (page 36).
(f)
In summary, the Board finds based upon the geologic and seismic characteristics of the OZD, in-cluding its length, that Ms7 is the maximum magnitude earthquake that could occur on the OZD.
It is.within the meaning of the regulations, the safe shutdown earth-quake for the San Onofre site (page 37).
(43) Regarding Finding C entitled Stronc Ground Motion found on pages 37 through 43, Intervenors state that the Licensing Board erred in finding or ruling that:
(a)
Intervenors did not present studies showing motion that could be expected at the SO area from a Ms7 or Ms7.5 ear,thquake (page 38).
(b)
That Dr. Allen considered the available data sufficient to make predictions about strong ground motions relevant to SO (page 38).
(c)-
In all cases, the design perimeters were greater than those predicted by the regression analyses indicating an additional margin of safety in design (page 38).
(d)
The Board concludes that these emperical studies have substantial probative value.
They were independently conducted, produced consistent results, and withs tood the test of cross-examination (page 39).
(e)
We nevertheless believe that the available data provides an adequate basis for the conclusions reached.
(44) In the Findings of the fact starting on page '39 entitled Theoretical Modelina Studies, the Board erred in finding that:
(a)
None of the cross-examination questions appeared to suggest f undamental flaws in the model; rather they seem to relate to refinements that might be made.
In any event, the Applicants had responsive answers to all questions that were raised.
(FOF page 40 first 1). '
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(b)
It is particularly significant that the results of the modeling studies were validated against near field recordings of several California earthquakes in the distance relevant to SO.
(FOF page 40'end of first full t).
(c)
The Board believes that the Joyner & Boore formula probably does not produce accurate predictions in the near field of large earthquakes.
(FOF page 41 first full 5).
(d)
The authors appear to concede that the report was biased against accu" ate predictions in the near field noting that "for distances less than 40 kilometers for earthquakes with Ms greater than 6.6 the prediction equa-tions are not constrained by data, and the results should be treated with caution."
(FOF page 41 first 1).
(45) The Board erred in finding that perhaps the greatest conservatism was represented by the fact that the design spectrum for 50 was taken directly from the instrumental spectrum directly from PGA data.
(FOF page 41 last full 1).
(46) The Board finds that some recent recordings of unexpectedly high vertical accelerations were not relevant to the safety to SO (FOF first full 5 second sentence).
(47) The record supports a finding that saturation probably does not occur at about Ms6.5 - 7.0 and that it probably would result in a moderation of peak ground acceleration in the near field.
(FOF page 42 first full t fourth sentence).
(48) The Applicants proved that the focusing phenomena, while a matter of some significance is not a grcat safety concern.
Moreover, -
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the special relationship between the San Onofre site and the OZD indicates that high degrees of focusing are.not likely to occur there (F0F page 42, last sentence).
As regarding F0F I B entitled Newly Discovered Geologic Features, Intervenors state that the Licensing Board erred in finding or ruling that:
(49) As matters developed", the contention regarding newly discovered geologic features was essentially uncontested (F0F page 43 first paragraph).
(50) The'A, B,
C, d features are minor features; there has not.
been significant movement on them for a long time probably about' 100,000 years.
(F0F page 43 third paragraph firs't sentence).
(51) These features have no safety significance for San Onofre despite the fact that they are located underneath the plant.
(Page 44, first sentence).
(52) Several other minor and newly discovered geologic features were also explored at the hearing.
However, the evidence was largely uncontradicted and the Board finds that these features are of no safety significance (Page 44, first paragraph).
Regarding Finding I E entitled The Cristianitos Zone of Defor -
mation Intervenors state that the Licensing Board erred in finding or ruling that:
(52)
"Dr's.
Greene and Kennedy coined the name Cristianitos Zone of Deformation."
Interveners specifically object to the charac-terization of Dr. Green and Kennedy naming the Cristianitos Zone of Deformation as " coined".
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(53) It became obvious that attempting to collect more data.
in the data void areas probably would not remove those labels from the map.
. Data voids do.not necessarily indicate a lack of data; rather the lithogoly and sediments in the ocean floor and electronics of the method. combined in such a way as to make data interpretation difficult or impossible.
(FOF page 45 first full 1). (Note:
Interyenors find this sentence nonsensical in that, for whatever the cause, the term data voids, as used in this context,reans lack of usable data.)
(54) The' Applicants carried out a massive research program which included both onshore and offshore gathering.
Analysis of 4-that data reveals in a convincing and professional manner that the-CZD is an area of relatively minor faults as compared to the OZD..
The faults associated with the CZD end at or below' the surface with no evidence of sea floor displacement.
No faults.of the CZD extcnd
'I on shore and the Cristianitos fault does not have a connection or structural relationship with ~ the OZD (F0F page 45).
(55) The evidence cupports the gonclusion that the last-1 displacement on the faults of the 'CZD occurred in Miocene times about 5 or 6 million years ago.
Thus, even assuming that the CZD
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m, and the OZD merge, as Greene and Kennedy concluded, the inactivity of the CZD means that this merger has no safety significance for San ono f re.
j Regarding III entitled Findings of Fact Intervenors',Carstens' et al. states that the Licensing Board erred in ' finding or ruling-
.that:
(56).The Applicants' proposed findings of fact begin with I
groups of. introductory.and background findings (AF 19-149)..Most of these findings are expressly adopted by the Staff and none of them are contested.
1.
(57)-The South coast region has not been an area of high seismic activity during either the instrumental or pre-instrumental historic period l dating back to 1769 (F0F III A.25, page 55).
(53) The Board-erred in its findings relative to wrench tectonics l-found on page 57, 58, 59 and 60 in findings 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 and 37 by discounting and downplaying the effect of wrench tec-tonics on the San Onofre region and more specifically erred in finding 36 where the Board states "the OZD does not fit into a wrench tec-tonic sys tam because 'o f its geologic evolution.
And by finding that "the th'eory of wrench faulting is not applicable to the OZD at the present time".
Regarding the Board's general finding III B The Safe Shutdown i
Earthquake starting on page 61, the Board erred in finding or ruling that:
(59) "Although the site is located within one mile of the-Cristianitos fault zone, exposures of part of this fault at the coast and at the plano trabuca excavations made by the Applicants about 16 miles north of the coastal exposure, show that the overlying terrace deposits have not been offset by the fault at these locations.
All of the available evioence indicates that the Cristianitos fault is inactive when evaluated using procedures described in the proposed 10 C.F.R.
part 100 Appendix A.
(See finding III B4 page 62 to 63.)
(60) The Board erred in receiving evidence of the Applitant and relying on such evidence regarding the activity of 'the Cristianitos fault while at the same time foreclosing the Intervenors evidence regarding activity on the Cristianitos fault.
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(61) The Board erred in finding that the area of Southern California that includes the San onofre site has not been an area'of high seismic activity in historic times (F0F No. 16, page 67).
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(62) The Board erred in finding that the earthquake occurring on the Aqua Blanca fault in Baja, California in 1892 had a magnitude of 6.9 and that the fault system is believed to be related to the spreading of the Gulf of California rather than the San Miguel fault 4
one or other postulated extensions of the OZD into Baja, California
- (F0F 19,-page 69).
(63) The Board erred in finding that the largest historic earth-quakes of use in assessing the maximum earthquake on the OZD is
-Ms6.3, 6.5 and 6.5 in Southern California, and possibly Ms6.'8 in Baja, California (F0F 21, page 69).
(64) The Board erred in its discussion of the length and characteristics of the OZD in reconsidering an issue already decided at the construction licensing hearings, namely, that the OZD is a single throughgoing fault and erred in accepting evidence of the-segmentation of this fault and it erred in finding that the OZD is a segmented branching system of faults and folds and that the assump-tion of a rupture along its full length is speculative and unreasonably conservative. (F0F 22, page 70, No. 32, page 72)
(65)- The Board erred in its findings of fact regarding the
- offshore zone of deformation as found on pages 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, as found in finding 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39,_40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 and 51 in their entirety, and more specifically, the. Board e.rred in finding that the OZD is a segmented zone.and erred in referring to the Intervenors. lack of testimony regarding segmentation of the zone when the question of the throughgoingness-of the OZD was not at issue in this case but rather was decided at the construction licensing stage by ' stipulation of the two parties to-this case'and was incorporated in the findings of the construction -
licensing hearings.
(66) The Board erred in finding that earthquakes larger than LMs6.5-7.0 could not have occurred on the OZD with any regularity for the past 1 million years (F0F 53, page 78, 79).
(67) The Board erred in finding that the " Board-rejects the concept that the OZD continues into Baja, California and connects with the Vallecitos-San Miguel~ fault zone as found in finding 74 and Intervenors.specifically object to the Board adopting Applicants' proposed findings of fact 80-88 and Nos. 171-174, as set forth in the Board's finding of fact 75-87 (see F0F 74, page 83).
(68) The Board erred in concluding that the OZD does not connect to the Vallecitos-San Miguel fault zone and in rejecting Intervenors proposed F0F of No. 36 (see F0F 88, page 88).
(69) The Board erred in ruling th'at they.should not seriously consider the possibility of major earthquakes generated by the proposed and hypothetical extention of the OZD (see F0F 68, page 82).
(70) The Board erred in ruling that tha slip rate methodology-4 of determining maximum magnitude earthquakes which can occur on a given fault can be properly viewed as one of several approaches to determine the maximum magnitude earthquake (F0F 98, page 91).
i (71) The. Board erred in ruling that in the absence of evidence of large earthquakes (ms6.5 or larger on low slip rate / slip faults) the Board concludes that the 1933 Long Beach earthquake *may very well represent the near maximum earthquake possible on the NIZD.
"Ibus, though we have but a brief historic record the eviden-ce suggests strongly that it is an adequate historic record.for the slip rate method" (F0F 103, page 93).
(72) The Board erred in ruling I
l that the MEL and HEL are sufficient r,
to assist the Board in determining the SSE for San Onofre (F0F 105, page 94).
(73) The Board erred in finding.that figure EGH-M in the written testimony of Heath is a reasonable and conservative basis for establishing the MEL (F0F 106, page 94).
(74) The Board erred in concluding that the estimation of Ms7.0 for the NIZD is a conservative estimate based upon Heath's
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figure EGH-M and SER 2.5.1.10 (F0F 107, page 94).
(75) The Board erred in ruling that the Applicants were justi-fied in the elimination of Japanese data regarding slip rate /
magnitude in using the slip rate methodology because of the different tectonic environment in Japan (F0F 109, page 95).
(76) The Board erred in approving the elimination of data on slip rate from the San Miguel fault (F0F 11, page 950).
(77) The Board erred in ruling that deterministic findings are not available in the area of predicting magnitude of earthquakes (F0F 115, page 96).
(78) The Board erred in agreeing with the Applicants' rejection of Dr. Kennedy's estimate and adopting and incorporating by reference Applicant's proposed findings of fact 204-207 (F0F 116, page 97).
(79) The Board erred in ruling that there is no support in the record for the suggestion that an earthquake of magnitude. greater than Ms8 c.ould occur on the OZD (F0F 121, page 99).
(80) The Board erred and misstated the use of the mean plus 1 standard by stating that one must add and subtract.69 magnitude to the mean valud (F0F 122, page 99).
(81) The Board erred in ruling *that the many numbers of maximum magnitude eathquakes in. excess of Ms7 which are present on the' record - - -
are the result of adding one standard deviation to the mean value, I
approach the witness, Slemmons, declined for good reasons to use.
- an It is Intervenors' position that Dr. Slemmons in his testimony admitted that his method as used was not conservative and it was more appropriate to add 1 standard. deviation to the mean value.
4
. See F0F 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 133, 134, 136 and 137 which Intervenors hereby take exception to in their entirety as though fully set forth.
(82) Intervenors state that the Board erred in finding "in summary we have, in essence, rejected the thrust.and purpose of the.
Intervenors' proposed findings of fact and adopted those of the Staff and Applicant.
We have found based upon geologic and seismic characteristics of the OZD including its length that an-Ms7 earthquake an appropriate conservative maximum magnitude that could occur is on the OZD.
It is, within the meaning of the regulations,-the Safe Shutdown Earthquake for the San Onofre site (F0F 137, page 104).
In regards to Applicants' finding of fact III C entitled Evaluation of Strong Ground Motion, Intervenors Carstens et al.
state that the Licensing Board erred in finding or ruling that:-
(83) Mr. Wight's emperical regression analyses approach to.
determination of peak ground motion at San Onofre has substantial probative value.
And that the dcta and manner of its resolution provide a solid basis for the conclusions reached (F0F'17, page 114).
(84) The design spectrum is derived from-the instrumental spectrum by taking into account the characteristics of the structure to be erected such as embedment dimension, structural materials and the-like.
In the typical engineering pra.ctice, the design spectrum is lower than the instrumental spectrum because of the transfer of
energy between the structure and ground (F0F 19, page 115).
(85) The manner in which the. structure.would respond to the force is acting on it should be determined (F0F.20, page 115).
Dr. Idriss and Dr. Wight both restr'icted their data bases to similar site geology (F0F 23, page 117).
(86) The-mean and 84 percentile instrumental peak acceleration determined for Ms6.5 are.42 g'and.57g respectively.
Comparison of the 84 percentile instrumental spectrum derived using recorded data with the design spectrum showed that that spectrum exceeds the derived instrumental spectrum at all periods (F0F 23, page 118).
Comparison of the 84th percentile instrumental spectrum with the design spectrum shows that the design spectrum exceeds the former for-both Ms6.5 and Ms7 at all periods (F0F 24, page 118).
(87) The Board finds that the separate emperical' study directed by Dr. Idriss lends further support to the adequacy of a design spectrum (F0F 26, page 119).
(88) USGS Open File Report 81-365 authored by D.M._Boore and W.B. 'Joyner is the latest in a series of reports on continuing re-search by the USGS scientists.
(Note:
Intervenors ~ did not rely on USGS Open File Report but rather on its successor which has been submitted and accepted for publication by the Bulletin of the Seis-mological Society of America and which supercedes USGS Open File Report 81-365)(see F0F 27, page 119 and 120).
( 8 9 )' The Boore and Joyner model.. fails to predict the data at close distances for magnitudes near 6.5.
Therefore, extrapolations to larger. magnitudes probably overestimate PGA, making the predicted PGA values in the near field not useful for San Onofre (F0F 34, page 123).
_ ~.-
(90) The Board erred in misconstruing Dr. Boore's statements where he pointed out that his figures may be reduced by a factor of 1.13 for comparison with Campbell's results in that Boore was only suggesting that this can be done for comparison purposes only.
(91) For a magnitude 7.5 earthquake at 8 kilometers Dr. Boore predicts a mean of 84th percentile of.54g and.98g.
(Note:
Inter-venors submit that Dr. Boore's predictions are considerably higher than that.)
(F0F 35, page 123).
(92) When Boore and Joyner exclude from their analysis data beyond 50 kilometers the mean and 84th percentile values for PGA become.31 and.57 respectively for Ms7 at 8 kilometers (F0F 35, page 124),
(93) The model of 0FR 81-365 is not the most appropriate one for near field accelerations of a large earthquake.
In any event, in view of the results in the preceding paragraph application of the Boore and Joyner model to San Onofre does not produce results signifi-cantly at variance with the design spectrum developed for use there (F0F 36, page 124).
(94) Considerable evidence indicates that PGA's are not directly related to conventional static stress drop (F0F 44, page 129).
(95) Dr. Frasier's testimony with respect to actual comparisons between computed and recorded accelerations for IV-79 i n d i c a,t e good agreement for distances near 8 kilometers, which are primary interests for San Onofre (F0F 45, page 130).
(96) The Board in their finding that Dr. Luco was "not recom-mending a particular value of G or design" misconstrues the intent of Dr. Luco's testimony (F0F 48, page 131).
(97) For comparative purposes, the modelling approach serves a.-
useful adjunct'for emperical studies (F0F.50, page 132).
(98) The results of the Applicants' modelling studies support the conservatism both of the SSE and the emperically derived design i
spectrum (DS).
We therefore believe that we can take these studies 1
into account as bolstering our determinations about the adequacy of i
the San Onofre design spectrum (F0F-54, page 133).
(99) The Board erred in finding'that all estimates lie appre-j ciatively below the point.67g anchor point to which San Onofre was-designed, except for the Boore estimates.
When the Boore estimates 4
are adjusted appropriately for distance, they are aisc compatible.
I with the anchor point (F0F 55 page 134).
(100) The Board erred in. finding that when recordings beyond 50~ kilometers are excluded in the Boore and Joyner study.the f
i resulting values are.31 and.57g.
(101) The Board failed to address the issue of the ground acceleration which may be expected from an Ms7.5 event on the OZD and.makes no showing whatsoever in its findings on ground motion accelerations that the figures arrived at are conservative ror do f
they attempt to define what they mean by conservative anywhere.in the findings-(F0F 55, page 134).
(102) The Board erred in admitting the testimony of Robert McNeil and the Intervenors hereby object to any and-all findings made-6 relying on the testimony of Dr. Robert McNiel (see F0F-56, 57, 58, 59 and 60).
Intervenors hereby object to each and every said finding.
1 (103) The Board erred in finding that it concurs with Appli-cants and Staff that significant conservatisms are. introduced at
'f the design spectrum (F0F 62, page each stagerof the development o
I 137).
i 1
(104) Th'e Board ehred in its findings regarding the relationship t
between vertical and horizontal accelerations as set forth in numbers 63, 64', 65, 66, 67 and in finding 68 where the Board states it feels 4
no, concern over'the fact that the traditionally expected two-third's ratio.between vertical and horizontal acceleration has been exceeded in some recent recordings; the adequacy of the design criteria
~
for the plans has not been affected (see F0F 138, 139 and 140).
(105) The Board erred in finding that the PGA probably does begin to saturate to some extent within 10 kilometers of the fault between Ms6 and 6.5 and that saturation probably continues thereafter with increasing magnitude and decreasing distance from the fault rupture surface (F0F 81, page 47).
(106) The Board erred in finding that "in summary we conclude that the focusing phenomena is not a serious safety concern, at least in this case.
All the available evidence indicate tha.t' where _ f ocusing does occur the resulting difference in high and low PG's will be about a factor of 2 and that lesser differences will obtain between median and high PGA's.
Moreover, there are no major active faults 4
in the site vicinity " focused" -
i.e.,
aimed at - the site (F0F 93, page 152).
(107) The Board erred in finding that "in conclusion and con-sidering all of the factors discussed in this_section III C that a
.67 PGA predicated upon the occurrence of_a Ms7 e a'r t hq u a ke on the OZD about 8 kilometers from the site represents a conservative anchor point for the design spectrum of the San Onofre facility (F0F 94, page 152).
As regards to findings III B entitled Newiv Dis 2 overed Geologic Features the Board erred in finding and ruling as follows: '
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(108) The'Intervenors propose no finding based upon the testi-mony of Mark Legg and apparently do not rely on it.
Intervenors specifically object to the Board's statement in footnote ~ 72 whereby they state, "the witness conceded that he had not personally done any field studies of the A, B,
C, D features."
Such finding is an absurdity since the A, B features are underneath the plant itself and are not observable and were not observable at any time except at the time of excavation (see F0F III D 2, page 153).
(109) Contention No. 3 is essentially uncontested except for a few findings proposed by the Intervenors (F0F 3, D,
page 155).
(110) The Board finds that any further investigation of the A, i
B, C,
D features would not have been useful (F0F 11, page 157).
(111) The decreasing progression of the width of the type A features indicate they were dying out as they approach the seac11ffs (F0F 27, page 161).
(112) The terrace deposit in the vicinity of the San Onofre site is about 100,000 years old (F0F '32, page 163).
f (113) The shear zones were formed within the San Mateo formation prior to the deposition of the overlying terrace deposits.
- Thus,
~
they can be assigned a minimum age of 70 to 120,000 years (F0F 33, page 163).
(114) It is not possible for a structural and tectonic relation-i ship to exist between the Cristianitos fault and the Type A and B feature.s (F0F 35, page 164).
(115) The A and B type features are not surface expressions of
-a deep-seated sheer zone.
There are only surface expressions of themselves and they exist in the San Mateo formation because of the characteristics of that formation.
They are not parallel to the' i _ _
Cristianitos fault or to any other known fault.
.In addition, the A and B type features have a sense of motion that is not compatible.with motion on the Cristianitos fault (F0F 36, page 164 and 165).
(116) The proof in this case is that the CZD does not-project onshore an'd that the A and B features do not project offshore at least not very far (F0F 42, page 167).
~
(117) The Board erred in ruling that the investigation of the A and B features and their relationship to the CZD were subject to exhaustive study and that the Applicants should not have performed further studies of the A and B features after the discovery of the fault known as the CZD to determine the structural and tectonic relationships between them (F0F 43, page 167).
(118) The Intervenors proposed finding 205 that the strike feature B is parallel to the general trend of the OZD is not fully supported by the record (F0F 43, page 167).
(119) The only direct evidence in the rccord is contrary to the proposed findings of the Intervenors chat the A features intersect the CZD out'at sea (F0F 44, page 167).
practical difference whether the A and B (120) It makes no features were of tectonic or non-tectonic origin or what their exact origins were- (F0F 4 8, page 168).
(121) The A, B,
C, D features are not capable faults within the meaning of 10 C.F.R. part 100 Appendix A 3g. 'They 'have no sig-nificance for the safety of San Onofre (F0F 49, page 159).
(122) Fault E is not a branch of the Cristianit6s fault (F0F 68, page 173).
(123) Fault E and F have had no movement in the past several
~
hundred thousand years.
They are not capable faults, and thus, are
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not significant to S0 HGS (F0F 72, page 174).
(124) The Board erred in finding that the request of Davis and Kennedy had been responded to'and the. material supplied satisfied' the. request of the State of California (F0F 18, page 181).
(125) The Board believes the Greene and Kennedy data voids are of little significance in relation to the seismic safety at San Onofre (F0F 24, page 182).
(126) The Board erred in adopting the results of the NEKTON 1
Survey designed to explore possible extention of the Cristianitos fault to the SC0ZD as set forth in finding No. 25.
Intervenors further object to the use of the NEKTON results since no person-from NEKT0n testified to these results and no person who was responsible for these results were subject to cross-examination (see F0F 24, and 25, pages 183 and 184).
(127) The Board erred in adopting the Applicants' proposed findings of fact regarding the CZD, No. 470 through 479, 481 through 495, 495 through 525, and 526, as set'forth and adopted as commission-findinguno. 27 through 67 inclusive ou pages 185 through 207 and L
Intervenors hereby' take exception to each and every said finding made as though fully set forth herein.
(128) The Board erred in finding.that "all seismic profiles l
examined show that faults associated with the CZD are at or below
' the surface,of an apparent wave cut platform that is' overlain by accousticly. transparent sediment.
Nowhere within the CZD is there evidence of a seafloor displacement.
The CZD dies out to the north and has essentially disappeared'within the area of the closed spaced Woodward Clide lines.
No faults of consequence extend onshore from
~ the CZD offshore (F0F 68,.page 207).
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(129) The only capable fault within 5 miles of the SONGS site is the SCOF which is an element of the SC0ZD (F0F 69, page 207).
(130) The onthore Cristianitos fault does not extend seaward for more than 2,000. meters and it does not have a connection or other structural relationship with the SC0ZD (F0F 70, page 208).
(131) Faults on the San Onofre shelf that nearly coincides with the onshore trend of the Cristianitos fault are confined to horizons deep within the section and does not extend into the Monterey formation.
They cannot be related to the much younger movement on the Cristiani-tos fault (F0F 71, page 208).
(132) Last displacement on faults of the CZD offshore SONGS occurred in Miocene times about 5 to 6 million ye'ars ago (F0F 73, page 208).
(133) Wave cut platforms offshore San Onofre range in age from about 5,000 to possibly 80,000 years old.
Neither the offshore platforms nor overlying sediments are displaced by the CZD (F0F 73, page 209).
(134) No evidence has been observed for displacement of the 125,000 year old marine platform, the 60,000 year old terraces or the underlying tertiary rock in areas adjacent to SONGS where the OZD might be. projected on onshore (F0F 78, page 209).
(135) Certain offshore features characterized as a zone of deformation referred to as the CZD are not structurally'related to either the Crsitianitos fault onshore or to the SC0F offshore.
Therefore, neither characterization of the offshore fault features as a zone of deformation or any additional information a'b o u t this zone of deformation which became available subsequent to the issuance of the construction permit renders the seismic design basis f o'r SONGS -
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. 2 and 3 inadequate to protect the publ-ic heal.th and safety (F0F 7 9, '
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page.210).
( 36) T,h e Boar'd erred in finding.that the dhta voids are of San Ogofre.
the seismic safetygat
+ - ljttle pignificanc0 In determining N
ytrulymassive investigative effort was mounged by the Applicants, s
s which has been critically reviewed by the staff and the,DSGS to explore s ithe CZD and its relationship to the OZD and the Cristian'itos fault.
t The record strongly s u p p o r t's the conclusion that.the fau'lts associated
'with the CZD are inactive.
The Board co,nclufes that the question s
posed in contention #2 haf been laid to rest s (F0F' 80, page 210).
4 w
(137) The Board erre~d.in its findings entitled Small Earthquakes
,N After the Construction Perm 1t in finding F 1 entitled Trubuco Canyon
~
Earthquakes in that-the earthquskes' discussed actually occurred on w
or near the Cristianitos fault and)the ' Board allowed testimony from
'how that rne events did not occur the Applicants which attempted to s
on the Cristianitos fault while excluding th~e Intervenors from introducing any evidence regarding these earthquakes, which evidence s
was offered to show that the earthquakes occurred on the Cristianitos 5
fault (F0F F 1,,page 211).
(138) The Board erred in finding that the Applicants and NRC Staff agreed that these small' earthquakes were of no safety signifi-cance and that the Intervenats presented no d i.r e c t case and no pro-posed findings on these events.
The Intervenors attempted to present
- a. direct case on these earthquakes but their submitted evidence was i
\\
excluded on the basis of " foreclosure" (F0F F 2, page 211).
(139) The Board erred in finding that there is no evidence to indicate these earthquakes are associated with the Cristianitos fault or the known faults in the area (F0F 4, page 212).
~
[
7 (140) The Board nrred'in finding that on the basis of uncontra-
'dicated evidence that' these small earthquakea are unrelated to the Cristianitos fault and have no safety significance for the San-Onofre sight'(F0F 5, page 212).
(141) TheLBoard erred.in finding that there is~1ittle reason to believe that f u r the r.- inve s tiga tion s and hearings regarding the earthquake swarm of November 6"through 9th'in'the._ vicinity of the CZD and OZD would lead to any better knowledge of the-CZD and erred in not raopening the hearings (F0F 11, page 213 and 214).
F (142) The Board erred in the finding that the available_ evidence,
-although less than conclusive indicates the swarm was less likely to have been associated with the CZD than the OZD, and that nothing useful would be gained 1and that the outcome of the preceding would 1
not be affected by reopening the hearing (F0F 10, page 214).
The Board erred in their findings of' fact entitled-Conclusions of Law
>n Geology Seismology Issues by finding that:
(143) The geologic, seismic, and engineering characteristics of the San Onofre site and its environs have been. investigated in sufficient scope and detail to provide reasonable assurance that they L
are sufficiently well understood to permit an adequate -evaluation of the proposed, site, and to provide' sufficient information to: support 4
the required health and safety determinations and to permit pdequate l
_ engineering solutions to' actual or potential geologic and seismic 3
effects at'the plant site (F0F V 1,
page 215).
1 I
(144) Applicants have taken into account the potential effects of vibrating ground motion that could be caused by earthquakes.
ground motion and the The design basis for the maximum vibratory, expected vibrator.y ground motion have been determined through '
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evaluation of the seismologic and geologic characteristics of the site and the surrounding region.
Applicants have identified the most severe earthquakes associated with tectonic structures in the region surrounding the site.
Applicants have determined the most severe earthquake that could be associated with the controlling feature at the San Onofre site -- the Offshore Zone of Deformation -- by
~
considering its geologic history and other relevant factors.
Applicants then have determined the vibratory ground motion at the site and have designated the earthquake which could cause the maximum vibratory ground motion as the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (F0F V 2, page 215).
(145) Applicants have met their burden of proof with respect to each of the four geologic / seismic issues admitted into controversy in this proceeding (F0F V 3, page 216).
(146) From the standpoint of seismicity of the site and sur-rounding area, there is a reasonable assurance that San Onofre Units 2 and 3 can be operated without endangering the health and safety of the public (F0F V 4,
page 216).
DATED:
January 26, 1982 Raspectfully submitted,
} __ _.
l t -
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RI Cli A RD J. M.p' AkT O N Attorney fot Intervenors s
Carstens 'e[ al.
I!
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