ML20010F887
| ML20010F887 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1981 |
| From: | Pigott D ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE, SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC CO., SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO. |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20010F885 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8109150077 | |
| Download: ML20010F887 (29) | |
Text
e 1 DAVID R. PIGOTT EDWARD B. ROGIN 2 ALAN C. WALTNER Of ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCL-IFFE 3 A Professional Corporation 600 Montgomery Street 4 San Francisco, CA 94111 Telephone: (415) 392-1122 5
CHARLES R. KOCHER .
6 JAMES A. BEOLETTO SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY 7 P. O. Box 800 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue 8 Rosemead, CA 91770 Telephone: (213) 572-1900 9
Attorneys for Applicants, 10 Southern California Edi~ son Company and San Diago Gas & Electric Company 11 12 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 13 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 14 15 In the Matter of )
4
) '
16 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON ) Docket No. 50-361 OL COMPANY, et al. )
17 )
(San Onofre Nuclear ) ,
18 Generating Station Unit 2) )
)
19 20 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR AN 21 OPERATING LICENSE FOR FUEL LOADING AND LOW-POWER TESTING 22 23 24 25 26 8109150077 810831 PDR ADOCK 050003g G
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1 Southern California Edison Company, San Diego Gas 2 and Electric Company, and the cities of Riverside and Anaheim 3 (" Applicants") submit this memorandum of, points and authori-4 ties in support of their alternative motion for an operating 5 12 cense for the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station 6 (" SONGS") Unit 2, for fuel loading and low-power testing.
7 As the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("C'ommission")
8 has recognized, due to the diversion of resources from 9 licensing proceedings by the Commission's analysis of the TMI 10 incident, construction of a number of power reactors will be 11 completed prior to the issuance of operating licenses for 12 full-power operations. SONGS Unit 2 is one of the reactors 13 that will be delayed,l/ particularly as a result of expansion 14 of the contentions in this proceeding. Faced with this 15 situation, the Commission has directed the Licensing Boards 1
16 to reduce d
- m to the maximum extent possible. In '.
17 particular, .e Commission recently held that Licensing
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18 Boards should rule promptly on motions for fuel loading and 19 low-power testing. In re Pacific Gas and Electric Co.
20 ///
21 1/ The Commission has recognized that "for the first time 22 the hearings on a number of operating license applications may not be concluded before constructior. is completed." 46 23 Fed. Reg. 28534 (May 27, 1981). The Commission has further recognized that "If these proceedings are not concluded prior 24 to the completion of construction, the cost of such delay could reach billions of dollars. The Commission will seek to 25 avoid or reduce such delays whenever measures are available that do not compromise the Commission's fundamental 26 commitment to a fair and thorough hearing process." Id.
2
1 (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-81-5, 2 CCH 130,581 (April 1, 1981) ("In re Pacific Gas and Electric 3 Co."). Applicants' Unit 2 will be ready for fuel loading and 4 low-power testing by October 15, 1981. Any delay in 5 commencement of low-power testing of Unit 2 will mean 6 substantial unnecessary and additional expenses to 7 Applicants' ratepayers.
8 Low-power testing will not prejudi:e intervenors 9 with re.=pect to any of their contentions in this matter.
10 Such testing will involve operation of SONGS Unit 2 at an 11 average output of only 1% of full thermal power, with 12 temporary periods of operation at ve to 5% of full thermal 13 pcwer. Operation of Unit 2 at such levels will not make 14 possible any serious accident that would require use of the 15 emergency response plan contested by intervenors. Seismic 1
16 questions will be resolved prior to the issuance of the i 17 requested license. In addition, due to the lack of 18 significantly irradiated fuel, even in the event of a serious -
19 accident, radioactive material inventories will pose a 20 substantially diminished risk. Issuance of a license for 21 fuel loading and low-power testing will serve the public 22 interest and reduce delays without limiting the rights of 23 intervenors to purzae their contentions or affecting publAc 24 health or safety.
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3
1 I. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ISSUANCE OF AN OPERATING LICENSE AUTHORIZING FUEL 2 LOADING AND LOW-POWER TESTING ARE SATISFIED IN THIS CASE.
3 4 This Board is authorized to iscue an operating 5 licanse for fuel loading and low-power testing if (1) such 6 issuance will not prejudice intervenors with respect to 7 contentions that have been admitted into this proceeding, (2) 8 all required findings under 10 C.F.R. 550.57(a) can be made .
9 with respe'ct to contested issuas and by the Director of 10 Nuclear Reactor Regulation with respect tc uncontested 11 issues, and (3) those TMI-related requirements in NUFEG-0737 12 relating to fuel loading and low-power testing have been 13 met. 10 C.F.R. $50.57(a), (c).2/ As outlined below, each of 14 these prerequisites to issuance of the requested license are 15 satisfied in this case.
L 16 17 ,2/ 10 C.F.R. $50.57(c) provides in relevant part that:
18 An applicant may, in a case where a hearing is held in cennection with a pending proceeding under this 19 section make a motion in writing, pursuant to this paragraph (c), for an operating license authorizing 20 low-power testing (operation at not more than 1% of full power for the purpose of testing the facility) 21 and further operations short of full-power operation. Action on such a motion by the 22 presiding officer shall be taken with due regard to the rights of the parties to the proceedings, 23 including the right of any party to be heard to the extent that his contentions are relevant to the 24 activity to be authorized. Prior to taking any action en such a motion which any party opposes, 25 the presiding officer shall make findings on the 26 (footnote continued on next page) 4
1 A. Intervenors Will Not Be Prejudiced
. With Respect to Any of the 2 Contentions Admitted in This Proceeding.
3 4 Section 50.57(c) authorizes consideration, in a 5 hearing on a low-power testing application, of those 6 contentions which have been presented by intervenors in the 7 operating license proceeding, which are related to the 8 authorization of low-power testing. In the context of this 9 motion, therefore, contentions in tha proceeding can be 10 11 (footnote continued from previous page) 12 matters specified in paragraph (a) of this sec_..on as to which there is a controversy, in the form of 13 an initial decision with rt,spect to the contested activity sought to be authorized. The Director of 14 Nuclear Reactor Regulation will make findings na .
all other matters specif$ed in paragraph (a) of 15 this section.
16 The subparagraph (a) findings are as follows: I.,
17 (1) Construction c f the facility has been substantially completed, in conformity wi.th the 18 construction permit and the application as amended, -
the provisions of the Act, and the rules and 19 regulations of the Commission; and
. 20 (2) The facility w311 operate in ccnformity with the application as amended, the provisions of 21 the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; and 22 (3) There is reasonable assurance (i) that 23 the activitien authorized by the operating license can be conducted without endangering the health and 24 safety of the public and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the 25 regulations in this chapter; and 26 (footnote continued on next page) 5
1 resolved either (1) through a determination that those 2 contentions have been satisfied fer the purpose of the 3 proceedings as a whole, (2) on the limited basis that the 4 contentions.are not relevant to low-power operations, or 5 (3) through a finding that the contentions have been 6 satisfied to the extent required prior to low-power 7 operations.
8 The contentions in this proceeding fall into two .
9 general categories of sciemic and emergency planning. With 10 respect to the seismic contentions, Applicants propose that 11 the record on seismic issues, developed in the first phase of 12 hearings, form the basis for disposing, through a partial 13 initial decision, the seismic contentions as they relate to 14 both full and low-power operations.
15 Due tc the addition of the Board's new emergency 4
16 planning contention, the record on emergency planning may not '.
17 be complete until well after the date on which Applicants 18 will be prepared to load fuel and commence low-power 19 20 (footnote continued from previous page) 21 (4) The applicant is technically and l financially qualified to engage in the activities l 22 authorized by the operating license in accordance with the regulations in this chapter; and 23 (5) The applicable travisions of Part 140 of 24 this chapter have been satisfied; and 25 (6.) The issuance of the license will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to 26 the health and safety of the public, i
6
1 testing.
It is not necessary to delay issuance of the 2
requested low-power license until final determination of the '
3 er.ergency planning issues, however, because the Commission 4
has determined that submission of emergency response plans 5
alone is sufficient to support a fuel load and low-power 6 operating license. Final plan approval is not required 7
until a full-power license is issued. This distinction is 8
based upon the significantly lesser risks presented by 9 low power operations. Accordingly, this Board should find 10 that the emergency planning contentions are not relevant to i 11 low-power testing, or have been satisfied to the extent 12 required prior to low-power operations.
13
- 1. The Commission has Correctly 14 Determined that a Fully Approved Em<trgency Response 15 Plan is not Necessary for Low-Power "esting. ;
16 The Commission has determined that a fully approved 17
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emergency plan is only neces..ary for full-power operations.
18 On April 22, 1981, the Commission unanimously issued a .
19 clarificction to NUREG-0737, directly stating that emergency .
20 plans need not be demonstrated before fuel loading. L
?'
Memorandum from Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary, to William J.
22 ta Dircks, Executive Director for Operations, dated April 22, 23 1981, approving SECY-81-188, dated March 20, 1981 E 24 c
("SECY-81-18S"), revising UUREG-0737 " Clarification of TMI 25 Action Plan Requirements" November, 1980. A copy of -
26 SECY-81-188 is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 5=
If 7
hfI e
. -_ ___ _ _ _ H
i 1 In its recent decision on a contested motion for 2 low-power testing by Pacific Gas and Electric Company, the 3 Board in that case followed the Commission's approval of 4 SECY-81-188 in stating that "the conclusion is now inescap-5 able that the Commission clearly intends that full compliance 6 with the 16 planning standards in NUREG-0654 and the provi-7 sions of Appendix E are not required for fuel loading and 8 low-power testing . . . . Full compliance with Appendix E 9 prior to fuel loading and low-power testing is not required."
'l0 In re Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear 11 Plant, Units 1 and 2), Docket Nos. 50-275-OL, 50-323-OL 12 (Low-Power Test Proceeding), Partial Initial Decision, 13 July 17, 1981 ("PG&E Low-Power Decision"), at page 23.
14 The Commission's approval of SECY-81-188 is 15 consistent with the history and purpose of the emergency i '
16 planning requirerents. In response to the TMI incident, the 17 Commission began a reevaluation of a broad range of safety 18 irrues. In connection with this effort, in June 1979, the 19 Commission began formal reconsiceration of the role of 20 emergency planning in ensuring the continued protection of 21 the public health ana safety in areas around nuclear power 22 facilities.3/ In June 1980, the Commission issued 23 __
24 3/ Because of other more pressing safety concerns, the initial NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status 25 Report and Short-Term Recommendations," dated July 1979, did not even directly address emergency response planning 26 requirements.
8
1 NUREG-0694, entitled "TMI 'eelated Requirements for New 2 Operating Licenses" which addressed the emergency response 3 requirements for low-power and full-power operations. Under 4 NUREG-0694, requirements in excess of those imposed on 5 eviuting facilities were to be imposed at the low-power 6 testing stage only 7 when there was a significant advantage to have the new procedure or equipment in place 8 during fuel loading or power-ascension testing. As a general rule, however, 9 implementation schedules for near-term operating license requirements were 10 established with the intent of providing adequate safety improvement without incurring 11 significant additional schedule and construction delays.
12 ,
13 NUREG-0694 at p. 5. In order to obtain a low-power license 14 under NUREG-0694, the Applicants were to:
15 Comply with Appendix E las amended in 1973],
' Emergency Facilities,' to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, 16 Regulatory Guide 1.101, ' Emergency Planning 1 for Nuclear Power Plants,' and for the offsite '
17 plans, meet ;ssantial elements of NUREG-75/111 (Ref. 28) or have a favorable finding from 18 FEMA. .
19 NUREG-0694 at p. 19. Appendix E generally addresses only the 20 submission of emergency response plans, and not the 21 demonstration of those plans. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E 22 (1977). Under NUREG-0694, full demonstration of the offsite 23 ///
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1 plan was not required until authorization of full-power 2 operation.4/
3 on August 19, 1980, the Commission issued its final 4 emergency planning regulations at 45 Fed. Reg. 55402. The 5 regulations provide that:
6 No operating license for a nuclear power reactor will be issued unless a finding is 7 made by NRC that the state of onsite and offsite emergency preparedness provides 8 reasonable assurance that .2dequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of 9 a radiological emergency.
10 10 C.F.R. Secticn 50.47(a)(1)(emphasir added). The August 19 11 regulations stated further that:
12 Failure to meet the standards set forth in paragraph (b) of this subsection may result 13 14 4/ The full-power testing requirements read as follows:
15 Provide an emergency response plan in substantial compliance with NUREG-0654, ' Criteria for 16 Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological (
Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in 17 Support of Nuclear Power Plants' (which may be modified as a result of public comments solicited 18 in early 1980) except that only a description of .
and completion schedule for the means for providing 19 prompt notification to the population (App. 3), the staffing for emergencies in addition to that 20 already required (Table B.1), and an upgraded I meteorological program (App. 2) need be provided (Ref. 10). NRC wjil give substantial weight I
l findings on offsi e plans in judging the adequacy 22 against NUREG-0654. Perform an emergency response exercise to test the integrated capability and a i 23 major portion of the basic elements existing within
! emergency preparedness plans and organizations.
I 24 l This requirement shall be met before issuance of a 25 full-power license.
26 NUREG-0694 at p. 25.
10
1 in the Commission declining to issue an Operating License; however, the applicant 2 will have an opportunity to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Commission that 3 ,
deficiencies in the plans are not significant for the plant in question, that adequate 4 'nterim compensating actions have been or till be taken promptly. or that there are 5 other compelling re3 sons to permit plant operation.
6 7 10 C.F.R. Section 50.47(c)(1)(emphasis added). Thus, the 8 regulations clearly require individual tailoring of the
'9 emergency plan requirements to specific facility operations, 10 including low-power testing.
11 On September 5, 1980, the Commission issued a 12 preliminary clarification of the TM7 Action Plan
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13 requirements, which retains the general requirements of 14 NUREG-0694, including the distinction between low-power and 15 full-power operations, and states that upgraded emergency 16 preparedness will be implemented in two phases. According to (
17 the plan .ar clarified, compliance with 10 C.F:R. 50, 18 Appendix E (submission of plans) is to be achieved before .
19 fuel loading; compliance with NUREG-0654 and conduct of the 20 emergency response plan exercise is to be achieved only 21 before full-power operations. " Letter to All Licensees of 22 Operating Plants and Applicants for Operating Licenses and 23 Holders of Construction Permits," Enclosure 2 at page 9, 24 September 5, 1980.
25 On October 31, 1980, the Commission issued its 26 final version of NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action 11
1 Plan Requirements." As clarified on April 22, 1981 by 2 SECY 81-188, NUREG-0737 clearly states that demonstration of 3 emergency plans is not required for fuel loading and 4 low-power testing. See Exhibit A.
5 Applicants have sabmitted and substantially 6 demonstrated their emergency plan and the requirements 7 relating to emergency planning have accordingly been met.
8 2. Low-power Operation of SONGS 2 .
Would Not Create a Risk to 9 Public_ Health and Safety.
10 The Commission's determination that emergency 11 response plans need not be finally approved prior to fuel 12 leading and low-pcter testing is consistent with public 13 health and safety concerns. Residual decay heat after 14 low-power testing is substantially less than that resulting 15 from full-power operations. Thus, worst case low-power core i'
16 degradation scenarios are substantially slower than 17 full-power scenarios. See PG&E Low-Power Decision at pages 18 19-35. Radioisotope inventories in the core during low-po;er 19 testing are also significantly lower, reducing substantially 20 the potential for significant offsite releases. See 21 SECY-81-188 at.p. 2. Therefore, as the Commissinn has 22 determined, final determination of the erargency planning 23 issues is not necessary prior to issuance of a low-power 24 license, and would only serve to delay licensing proceedings.
25 Because of the decreased potential risk of 26 low-power operations, the evidence in this proceeding 12
, 1 relating to full-power operations includes that necessary for 2 issuance of a low-power testing license. The Commission has 3
stated that "10 C.F.R. 50.57(c) does not generally 4 contemplate that a new evidentiary record, based on 5
litigation of new contentions, would be compiled on the 6
motion for fuel loading and low-power testing." In re 7 Pacific Css and Electric Company, supra.
8 3. Adequate Protective Measures 9 can and Will Be Taken in the Event of a Radiological 10 Emergency During Low-Power Testing.
11 The implementation of Applicants' emergency 12 response plan is now substantially complete as demonstrated 13 by Applicants in the current hearings. The Federal Emergency 14 Management eAo nc/ (" FEMA"), on the basis of a full-plan 15 exercise, found that " State and local government radiological 16 emergency response plans are minimally acceptable," but that I, 17 the capabii..ty of State and local jurisdictions to implement 18 those plans will not be " considered adequate," until 19
" corrective actions have been taken." Interim Findings and 20 Determinations Relating to the Status of State and Federal 21 Emergency Preparedness for the San Onofre Nuclear Generating 22 Station (Units 2 and 3), dated June 3, 1981. Implementation 23 of final plan improvements to respond to FEMA's comments and 24 criticisms is proceeding rapidly. There is now in place a 25 substantial emergency response capability that will likely be 26 found to meet all Commission requirements in the very near
, i 13 l 8
1 future. The status of Applicants' emergency response plan 2 goes far beyond that required for low-power operations.
3 Certain elements of Applicants' emergency response 4 plan are unnecessary for low-power operations. For example, 5 in the context of an extended accident sequence at low power, 6 public notification within 15 minutes would be unnecessary.
7 Moreover, the rigid chain of command requested by FEMA in 8 order to produce such a short response time would not be 9 applicable because ample time would be available for 10 emergency decisions. Any deficiences in the emergency plans 11 are not significant for SONGS 2 in the context of low-power 12 operations. 10 C.F.R. 550.47(c)(1), supra.
13 It is clear-from the current status of Applicants' 14 emergency response plan that adequate protective measures can 15 and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency 16 during low-power testing at SONGS 2. 4 17 B. All Required Findings Under 10 C.F.h; $50.57(a) and (c) Can Be 18 Made in This Case.
19 This Licensing Board is to make findings under 20 10 C.F.R. 650.57(a) and (c) with respect to those matters.as 21 to which there is a controversy in this proceeding. As 22 discussed above, findings on the seismic contentions will be 23 made with the benefit of a full hearing record. The 24 Commission has determined that final emergency plan approval 25 it not required prior to the issuance of an operating license 26 for fuel loading and low-power testing.
14 l
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1 As to those matters not in controversy, the i 2 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation is to make findings 3 under 10 C.F.R. 550.57(a) and (c). See in. 1, supra. Each 4 of these findings can appropriately be made. ,
5 C. The Regairements Contained in NUREG-0737 Eave Seen Met By G Applicants. ,
7 On October 31, 1980, t.he Commi s si on i s su ed its 6 final version of NUREG-0737, ' Clarification of TMI Action .
3 Pl an Requirements." In the absence of significant new 10 7MI-relatad evidence indicating that an NRC safety regulation 11 vould be violated by plant operation, NUREG-0737 sets forth, inter 12 alia, a listing of emergency preparedness requirements that must be 13 considered in acting on a low-power license. In Re Pacific Gas and 14 Ele'etric Co., supra. These requirements (NUREG 0737, III . A.2) will 15 have been met before low-power testing is undertaken. '
16 \
II. CONCLUSION '
17 .-
App:$ cants' Unit 2 will be ready for fuel leading '
18 and low-pcwer testing by October 15, 1981. Any delay in ,
It com.encement of low power testing of Unit 2 will mean 20 substantial unnecessary and additional expenses to 21 Applicants' ratepayers. I,ow-power testing vill involve '
22 operation of SONGS Unit 2 at an average output of only 1% of 23 full thornal power, with temporary periods of operation at 5%
34 of full thermal power. operation at such levels will not 25 make possible any serious accident that would require use of 26 a fully implemented emergency response plan. In addition, 15
1 due to the lack of significantly irradiated fuel, even in the 2 event of a serious accident, radioactive material inventories 3 and potential releases would be much less. A full record on 4 the seismic issues raised by intervenors has been developed.
5 All of the requirements contained in NUREG-0737 have been met 6 and the findings required under 10 C.F.R. 550.57 relating to 7 intervenor's contentions can appropriately be made by this
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8 Licensing Board.
9 Applicants accordingly request that the Licensing 10 Bonrd issue an operating license for fuel loading and 11 low-power testing to permit the program described in 12 Attachment 1 to Applicants' motion.
13 Dated: August 31, 1981 14 Respectfully submitted, 15 DAVID R. PIGOTT EDWARD B. ROGIN 16 ALAN C. WALTNER 4 Of ORPICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE 17 A Professional Corporation 18 CHARLES R. KOCHER ,
JAMES A. BEOLETTO 19 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY 20 21 by David R. Pigott 22 Attorneys for Applicants 23 24 25 26 4
16
. 1 2
3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 4
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5 -
BEFORE THE ATOMIC . SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 6
7 8 .
In the Matter of )
9 )
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON ) Docket No. 50-361 OL 10 COMPANY, et al. )
) ORDER (Proposed) 11 (San Onofre Nuclear )
Generating Station Unit 2) )
12 )
13 14 The Board finds that the filings in this 15 proceeding, the depositions, the answers to interrogatories, I
l 14 and the evidence developed in hearings before this Board '
l 17 support the following findings: -
1-
- l 18 1. As the result of ground motion analysis 19 techniques developed subsequent to issuance of the 1
20 construction permit or data gathered from earthquakes which 21 occurred subsequent to issuance of the construction permit, 22 the seismic design basis for SONGS 2 & 3 is not inadequate to 23 protect the public health and safety.
24 2. Neither characterization of certain offshore l
l 25 geologic features as a zone of deformation; referred to as 26 the Cristianitos Zone of Deformation ("CZD"), nor any l
l l
1 additional information about the CZD which became available 2 subsequent to issuance of the construction permit render the 3 seismic design basis for SONGS 2 & 3 inadequate to protect 4 the public health and safety.
5 3. The seismic design basis for SONGS 2 & 3 is not 6 inadequate to protect the public health and safety as a I result of discoveries subsequent to issuance of the 8 construction permit of the following geologic features:
9 (1) ABCD features at the site.
10 (2) Features located at Trail 6, Target 11 Canyon, Dead Dog Canyon, Horno Canyon, and " onshore 12 faults E and F".
13 (3) Su'ch other features as the parties have 14 agreed are relevant to the seismology of the SONGS 15 , site or with respect to which Intervenor Friends of 16 the Earth has made a threshold showing of relevance.
(
i 17 4. Based on the geologic and seismic 18 characteristics of the OZD, including its length, assignment ,
19 of Ms 7 ho the maximum magnitude earthquake for the OZD does 1
20 not render the seismic design basis for SONGS 2 & 3 21 inadequate to protect the public health and safety.
22 5. Adequate emergency plans have been submitted 1
1 23 which profide reasonable assurance that the transient and 24 permanant populations within ten miles of the site can be 25 evacuated in the event of a serious radiological emergency 26 ///
2 l
l
. 1 with off-site consequences occurring at SONGS 2 & 3 during 2 fuel loading and low-power testing.
3 6. Adequate protective measures can and will be 4 taken in the event of a radiological emergancy during 5 low-power testing.
6 The Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation is ,
7 hereby authorized to make findings with respect to the 8 following uncontested issues:
9 (1) Construction of the facility has been 10 substantially completed, in conformity with the 11 construction permit and the application as amended, 12 the provisions of the Act, and the rules and 13 regulations of the Commission; and 14 (2) The facility will operate in conformity 15 with the application as amended, the provisions of 16 the Act, and the rules and regulations of the \.
17 Commission; and 18 (3) There is reasonable assurance that such 19 activities will be conducted in compliance with the 20 regulations in this chapter; and 21 (4) The opplicant is tee?..nically and 22 financially qualified to engage in the activities 23 authorized by the operating license in accordance
}
24 with the regulations in this chapter; and 25 '5)
, The applicable provisions of Part 140 of 26 this chapter have been satisfied; and 3
. . v_
1 (6) The issuance of the license will not be 2 inimical to the ccmmon defense and security.
3 Accordingly, Applicants' motion for an operating 4 license for fuel loading and low-power testing under 5 10 C.E.R. 550.57(c) is hereby GRANTED.
6 ,
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED in accordance with the 7 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commissier s 8 re gulations , and based on the findings and conclusions set .
9 forth herein, that the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 10 is authorized to issue a license, consistent with the terms 11 of the Partial Initial Decision, to authorize fuel load and 12 low-power testing up to 5% of rated power generally in the 13 form submitted by Applicants in support of the motion.
14 THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 15 16 I, 17 18 .
19 DATED. at 20 this day of , 1981.
, 21 1
22 l 23 24 l 25 1 26 4
./c W^*%'e,
- UfJITED STATES
.P. , A NUCLEAR REGULATORY. COMMISSION
- f g e ,j ,. .. ,I w Assm ot ou. o.c. >osss ACTION
- Stello ,
O% April 22, 1981 Cys: Dircks
%, * * " * /e Cornell 3FFsEoFTHE .y /.Grimes R'ehm sicRETARY Perkins Denton liEMORANDUM FOR: . William J. Dircks, Executive Director for Operations FROM: Samuel J. Chilk, Secreta
SUBJECT:
SECY-81-188 - EMERGENCY P E REDNESS This is to advise you that the Concission (with all Comissioners approving) has approved the changes to page 2-11 of NUREG-0737 as provided in Enclosure 3 of the subject paper.
The Office of Inspection and Enforcement was informed of this action by telephone on April 22, 1981.
cc: Chairman Hendrie Co.m nissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Bradford Com:nissioner Ahearne Co.m:nission Staf f Of fices Director, Inspection and Enforcement ,
l l
l l CONTACT:
l E. W. McGregor (SECY) ,
41410 l
l I
l Exhibit A l Page 1 of 9
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p
./e en %,
March 20,1981 5[
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.j c
SECY-81-188 I~
~
^ .
% ,* . . . + ,o*
POLICY ISSUE -
(Notation Vote)
For: The Comissioners .
From: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations Sub,iect_: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
. Backcround: NUREG-0594, "TMI-Related Requirements for New Operating ~
Licenses," stated that prior to fuel loading it was
- necessary to comply with the then effective Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, " Emergency Plans for Production and Utilization Facilities," Regulatory Guide 1.101, "Emer-gency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants,' and for offsite plans to meet the essential elements of NUREG-75/111 or have a favorable finding from FEPA. The submission and evaluation of emergency plans against the stardards of NUREG-0654, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness
(
in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," was required prior to the issuance of a full power license. Copies of the appropriate pages from NUREG-0694 are attached as back-ground information in Enclosure 1.
When NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Reqvfrements," was being written, the timing for evaluation of offsite plans as set forth in NUREG-0554 I was in&dv rtently changed to include those licensees requesting permission to conduct only fuel loading or low power testing. These changes appeared as entries on page 2-11 of a table to NUREG-0737 (Enclosure 2) i l
as background information.
Discussion: 10 CFR i 50.47 became effective on November 3,1980, and required compliance with emergency planning and preparedness standards prior to the issuance of operr. ting licenses, including those authorizing fuel l
l loading and low power testing. 5 50.47(c) nevertheless
' provides a flexible approach for assessing the necessary j~ CONTACT:
l B. Grimes, OEP, OIE Ext.'27415 .
I t
l l
I Exhibit A
- Page 2 of 9 m m u .~ ,..- _.- x
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- ,- , _ _ _ _ . - ~ , . -. .,. , ,- ,- - - _ , . , , . ,- -,
The Commissioners
- degree of compliance, with the result that licensees requesting low power testfrig and fuel loading o.perating licenses can receive'such licenses without having to meet every individual factor stt forth in i 50.47, at .
least at that level of operation, provided that FEKA's findings support that approach. As discussed with the Commission prior to the issuance of NUREG-0594, it is unnecessary to require extensive offsite emergency cap-ability at nuclear power plants where the licensee is performing either initial fuel loading or operating initially at low power levels because of the low potential for significant offsite releases.
In a parallel manner,10 CFR E 50.57(c), governing adjudicatory hearings for the issuance of operating licenses, is specifically framed in terms of requir'..p Board findings only on those matters significant for the activity to be authorized. Thus, n 50.57(c) prt vides a basis for making a distinction between the Licensing Board. findings necessary for issuance of full power operating licenses and those necessary for issuance of operating licenses authorizing low power testing or fuel loading.
I A literal interpretation of the table in NUREG-0737 (Enclosure 2) could lead to a conclusion that the Commission intended to disregard the flexible, case-by-case approach expressly provided for in il 50.47(c) and 50.57(c), and to require that licensees comply with every f acet of emergency plar;ning contained in 5 50.47 as prerequisite to the issuance of every operating license, even those where the activity sought to be authorized is fuel loading or low power testing. The staff did not
- intend, nor does it believe that the Commission intended, to interpret the table appearing in tiUREG-0737 with respect to the effectiveness of 10 CFR 5 50.47 so literally as to eliminate the flexibility provided by 10 CFR 15 50.47(c) and 50.57(c).
Consequently, the staff proposes that the Commission approve the suggested changes to the table in NUREG-0737 (Enclosure
- 2) to clarify the differences between the emergency planning requirements contained in 10 CFR l 50.47 that must be met prior to full power authorizations versus those prerequisite for operating license authorizations only for fuel loading or low power testing.
Exhibit A Page 3 of 9
The Comissioners -
Enclosure 2 contains page 2-11 as it appears in NUREG-0737 marked with the staff's recomended conforming changes.
Enclosure 3 is the same page retyped as it would be issued.
' The staff believes it is important to issue this change promptly to serve as the basis for consideration of low -
power applications now in the hearing process. s Recomendation: That the Comission approve the changes to page 2-11 of NUREG-0737 as provided in Enclosure 3.
William I Dircks Exe,cutive Director for Operations
Enclosures:
- 1. NUREG-0594 Pages-Ba:kground Information
- 2. NUREG-0737 Marked Page 2-11
- 3. NUREG-0737 Final Page 2-11 t
Comissioners' coments should be provided direcity to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. Monday, April 6,1981_.
Comission Staff Office coments, if any, should be submitted to the Comissioners 'L-If the pace-March 30,1931, with an infomation copy to the Office of the Secretary, is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical rev'iew and comer..
the Comissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when' commer.ts may be expected.
DISTRIBUTION _
Comissioners -
Comission Staff Offices Exec Dir for Operations ACRS ASLBP Secretariat Exhibit A ,
Page 4 of 9
- - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ )
. N
. II.K.3 ' FINAL RECOP.MENDATIONS OF B&O TASK FORCE 3 C.3.9** For Vestinghouse-designed reactors, modify the pressure integral
(. derivative controller, if installed o'n the PORV, to eliminate spurious openings of the PORV. ,
I .
l C.3.10 for Vestinghouse-designed reactors, if the anticipatory reactor trip upon turbine trip is to be modified to be bypassed at power levels less than'50 percent, rather than below 10 percent as in current designs, demonstrate that the probability of a small-break LOCA resulting from a stuck-open PORV is not significantly changed by this modification.
C.3.11 Demonstrate that the PORV installed in the plant has a failure rate equivalent to or less than the valves for which there is an operating history.
C.3.12 For Vestinghouse-designed reactors, confirm that there is an anti-cipatory reactor trip on turbine trip.
(
These requirements shall be met before fuel loading.
. III. A.1.1 UPGRADE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS I Cc: Fly with Appendix E, " Emergency Facilitie.5," to 10 CFR Part 50, Regulatory
. Guide 1.101, " Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants," and for the offsite plans, meet essential elements of NUREG-75/111 (Ref. 28) or have a favorable finding from FEMA.
L .--
I .
j _'The B.'0 reco..T.encations were not specifically delineated as to fuel-loading er full paer requirements prior to the review of Sequoyah, North Anna 2, and Salem 2. 1he NRR staff is presently confirming compliance with these four ite s for these plants.
- Table C.3 of the Action Plan lists the requirements derived from final recc..:endations of the B&O Task Force.
9 -
' ~
I 19 j Exhibit A g - - . - _ . -
Pace 5 of 9
( .
, Enclosure i
{This requirement shall be met before fuel loading.
- ~
III. A.1.2 UPGRADE EP.ERGENCY SUPPORT FACII.ITIES Establish an interim onsite technical support center separate from, but close ,
to, the control room for engineering and management support of reactor opera-tions during an accident. The center shall be large enough for the necessary utility personnel and five NRC personnel, have direct display er callup of plar.t parameters, and dedicated communications with the cr.ntrol room, the emergency operations center, and the NRC. Provic!e a description of the permanent technical support center.
Establish an onsite operational support center, separate from but with co=unica-tions to the control room for use by operations support personnel dur'ng an accident.
Designate a near-site emergency operations facility with communications with the plant to provide evaluation of radiation releases and coordination of all onsite and offsite activities during an accident.
These requirements shall be met before f uel leading. See NUREG-0578, 3ections 2.2.2.b, 2.2.2.c (Ref. 4), and letters of September 27 (Ref. 23) and j November 9, 1979 (Ref. 24) and April 25,1980 (Ref. 29).
III.D.3.3 INPUNT RADIATION HONITORING Provide the equipment, training and procedures necessary to accurately determine the presence of airborne radiciodine in areas within the plant where plant personnel may be present during an accident. .
This requirement shall be met before fuel loading. See HUREG-0578, Section 2.1.S: (Ref. 4), and letters of September 27 (Ref. 23) and November 9, 1979 (Ref. 24). ,
Exhibit A ,
Page 6 of 9 .
40
.m .v wrec C.2.16 D
for B&W-desi ned reactors, evaluate the effect of reactor coolant pump da . age and leakage following a small-break LOCA concurrent with a loss of offsite power that results in the loss of seal cooling.
See letter of August 21, 1979 (Ref. 30).
These requirements shall be met before issuance of a full power license .
II.K.3 FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF B&O TASK FORCE C.3.3*
Assure that any failure of a PORV or safety valve to close will be reported to the NRC promptly.
All challenges to the PORVs or safety valves shou'id be documented in the annual report.
This requirement shall be met before issuance of a full power license .
III. A.I.1 UPGRADE EMERGENCY PREPAREONE.SS 1
Provide an emergency response plan in substantial compliance with NUREG-05 ,
i Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiologt" cal Emergency Resp 1
Plans and Freparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" (which may be modified as a result of public comments solicited in early 1980) except that only a description of and completion schedule for the means for providing -
prompt notification to the population (App. 3), the staffing for emergencies it, addition to that already required (Table B.1), and an upgraded meteorol {[,
l program (App. 2) need be provided (Ref. 10). l findings on offsite plans in judging the adequacy against Perform NUREG-0 [
[
an emergency response exercise to test the integrated capability and a major i
portion of the basic elements existing within emergency preparedness plans and{
organizatiors. [t l
0 This requirement shall be met before issuance of a full power license. -
f u.
- lable C.3 of the Action Plan lists all of the recom endatio E Task force. ,
n of sthe B&O *=
n e
25 l
, Exhibit A *e Page 7 of 9
EMC(05URE 2 (COMilMutD) ,
C1arlfl- Implemen- Plant Require- C*arlfl- Tech cation Shnrtened tation Applica- cents cation Spec.
Itca iltle Description Schedule bility lasued lasued Req. Remarks l l . K. 3 Final recomendations, c. New analyses in accordance All
- Encl. 3 Mo i
B&O task force with review
- l (continued) schedule a Encl. 3 l
- 31. Plant-specific walysis 1/1/03a All Ne 1 44. Evaluate transier.ts 1/1/81A BVR
- Encl. 3 As with single fats re required 1/1/bla ^ Encl. 3 fio
- 45. Manual depressarlastion BWR
~
i 46. Michelson concerns Foal load BVR [ncl. 3 Ms lil.A.1.1 teergency Shcrt-ter,leprovements .Ja &-lea 4 W .3/4 w muafe-tNrst No .Als Aaf4EG-et p'O "M preparedness, d .
issuh short term
.TW8Gh--
- 1. Establish 15C, 05C. 180 All 9/27/19 11/9/19 No lit.A.1.2 Upgrade emergency
- y'c y support facilltles EOF (lpteria bests)
. ce g ;"
-31redtrad 8/19/80 NUR[G- .E=-
O rt lit.A.2 (mergency 1. Upgrade emergency plans All Cr,54 f*-
- p preparedness to App E, 10 CTR 50 7.M mer -
All 4/26/80 NUR[G- .Ng* '
e
- 2. Meteorological data d 0654 Heasure leak rates & Full power All 3/27/19 11/9/19 Yes ,
I l l . L .1.1 Primary coolant Encl. 3 outside establish program to -
containment keep leakage ALARA Fuel load All 9/27/19 11/9/19 Yes lit.D.3.J Inplant la redletion 1. Provide means to Encl. 3 monitoring determine presence of radiolodine
- 2. Modifications to 1/1/81 or All 9/2'/79 11/9/19 Yes j accurately .i.easure prior to ,
radiolodine licensing Encl. 3 l
- 1. Identify and evaluate Full power All 6/26/80 Encl. 3 Me 111.D.3.4 Control-room habitability potential batards
- 2. Schedule for l'ull power All J/26/80 Encl. 3 No rodificatione '
- 3. Modifications full power All 6/26/80 Encl. 3 Yes Four months before operating Ilcense !? Issued or 4 months before date Indicated.
Requirement formally issued by this letter.
[MCt05URE 2 (CottilMtstD) ;
Clarlfi- Im'lewn. Plant Regis t re. Clarlfl. Tech cation Shortened Lation Apriles. eents cation Spec.
Item litle escription Schedule bility issued Issued peq. Senerks final Recresendettons, in accordance All
- ll.K.) c. New analyses [rcl. 3 Mo BLU task force witti review (Continued) schedule
- 31. Plant-specific analysis 1/1/038 All
- Encl. 3 No
- 44. Ivaluate transients I/l/DIA DWft * [ncl. 3 As
- ulth single failure required
- 45. Pianual depresverlaation 1/1/ Illa Cult
- Incl. 3 No .
- 46. Michelson concerns fuel load DWR
- Encl. 3 Ma tmergency Sho.L-term leprovements Complete Mo
) lli.A.I.!
! preparedness, .
! thcrt tesw ]
l
'd p3 Ill.A.l.2 Upgraele emergency 180 All 9/21/19 11/9/19 No D' x support facilities 1. [0FEstablish 15C.05Cl (Interim bas's 100
, fp
% 2. Design 1D3 TUD 100 TUD 100 TOD 109 100
?ty 3. Hudiilcations 1Dll W co F*-
O
"" til.A.2 Emergency 1. lipgrade evergency plans full power All 0/19/00 tillRIG. Yes (654 l Hi y preparedness to App [, 10 CfR 50
- 2. Meteorological data full power All 6/26/D0 Nient G. Yes w 0654 lit.D.l.1 primary coolant Hessure leak rates I, full power All 9/21/19 11/9/19 Tes outside establish prograie to [ncl. 3 cont a inwent keep leakage /1 ARA 185.U.3.3 inplant 12 radiation 1. Provide Ptans to Iuol toad All 9/21/19 11/9/19 Tes monlloring determine presence Encl. 3 ,
of radiolodine . *
- 2. Modifications to 1/1/81 or All 9/21/19 11/9/19 fes accurately' measure pr ior to raillolodine licensing Encl. 3 Ill.D.J.4 Control-room 1. Identify and evaluate full power All 6/26/80 [ncl. 3 No habitability potential harards
- 2. Schedule for full power All 6/26/00 [ncl. 3 No modifications *
- 3. tsodifications full power All 6/26/00 Encl. 3 Tes Arour nitt s before operating IIcense is issued er 4 months before date Indicated.
- tiequirewent toimally issued by this letter.
APPENDIX 1.
TESTING PROGRAM
SUMMARY
Cranting of a low power license will allow four major test evolutions spanning approximately sixteen weeks to be performed. These evolutions are:
- 1. Fuel Loading, ,
- 2. Pcst Core Load Hot Functional Testing,
- 3. Initial Criticality and Lew Power Physics Testing, and
- 4. Power escalation to five percent of full power.
Each of these testing stages is briefly discussed below.
Fuel Loading During this activity each of two hundred and seventeen j fuel assemblies is transferred from the Fuel Handling Building to the Containment Building, where it is inserted into a specified location in the reactor vessel. After all tuel assemblies have been loaded into the reactor, each assembly is video taped to confirm its location. This location is then verified to be correct by plant personnel.
Next, several reactor structural members are placed above the fuel and the reactor vessel head is installed and bolted in place. The total duration of the fuel. loading activity from move-ment of the first fuel assembly to completion of the reactor vessel .
installation is expected to be four weeks.
! Post Core Loading Hot Functional Testing Following fuel loading an integrated plant test program, called Post Core Loading Hot Functional Testing, is performed. The primary purpose of this testing is to perform a verification of those parameters which can only be definatively measured with the fuel inplace. , the reactor is taken from ambient conditions DuringHotFunctionalTestgng/14.7psig)
(approximately 90 F to full operating temperature and pressure (approximately 545 / 2,250 psia) utilizing heat generated by pumps, heaters and other equipment but not by nuclear heat and then returned again to ambient. Typical tests which would be performed at this time include:
Reactor Coolent System (RCS) Flow Measurements, Flow Coastdown Measurements, Prescurizer Control Systems Tests, Control Rod Exercise Tests,
Control Rod Drop Time Tests, RCS Heat Loss Measurements, and RCS Inventory Measurements.
Testing is performed continuously during this period which is expected to take seven weeks.
Initial Criticality and Low Power- Physics Testing Upon completion of Hot g Functional Testing, the reactor is returned to approximately 260 F and 1,000 psia at which time the reactor is initially brought critical. Shortly thereafter, power is raised to approximately one tenth of one percent of full power. At this time nuclear physics are performed for three to four weeks. This activity is tarmed Low Power Phgsics Testing, and is performed at both 5 educed temperature (260 1-) and at normal operating conditions (545 F /2250 psia). Typical tests which would be performed at this time include:
Differential Boron Worth Tests, Control Rod Worth Tests, Control Rod Symmetry Tests, Moderation Temperature coefficient Measurements, Dropped Rod Worth Tests, Ejected Rod Worth Tests; and RCS Chemistry and Radio-Chemistry Tests.
he-Power Escalation to 5% of Full Power ,
Following completion of Low Power Physics Testing, reactor -
power is gradually raised to five percent of full power. At this -
l point the plant is stabilized and several equipment and instrumentation l
tests are performed. This activity is expected to last for one week.
1 In summarv, the granting of a five percent power license would allow approximately sixteen weeks of testing activities to be performed. For an estimated eleven of these sixteen weeks the reactor would not be critical, and for only about one week would the plant be expected to be at a power level of greater than one percent of full power.
l l
l l
s p
- r. ,
7 9 MCKETED L4MO h Lot b O Ok
- 1 ~ PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL -
\q V : 0 % h:ntry -l I & Seni:e
[/
3 I declare that:
4 I am employed in the City and County of San Francisco, S California.
6 I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party 7 to the within entitled action; my business address is 600 8 Montgomery Street, 10th Floor, San Francisco, California
~9 94113.
10 On September 2, 1981, I served the attached ALTERNATIVE 11 MOTION OF APPLICANTS SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPAtT_', ET AL.
12 FOR AN OPERATING LICENSE FOR FUEL LOADING AND LOW-POWER 13 TESTING in said cause, by placing a true copy thereof enclosed 14 in the United States mail at San Francisco, California addressed 15 as follows:
16 17 James L. Kelley, Chairman Robert Dietch, Vice President Administrative Judge Southern California Edison .
18 Atomic Safety and Licensing Company Board P.O. Box 800 19 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Commission Rosemead, CA 91770 20 Washington, D.C. 20555 l Alan R. Watts, Esq.
l 21 Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr. Rourke & Woodruff l Administrative Judge California First Bank Building l 22 c/o Bodega Marine Laboratory 10555 North Main Street University of California Santa Ana, CA 92701 23 P. O. Box 247 Bodega Bay, CA 94923 Lawrence J. Chandler, Esq.
2 Richard K. Hoefling, Esq.
l Mrs. Elizabeth B. Johnson Donald F. Hassell, Esq.
25 Administrative Judge Nuclear Regulatory Cc'amission Oak Ridge National Laboratory Office of the Executi e 26 Oak Ridge, TN 37830 Legal Director Washington, D.C. 20555 l
i
. \
I David W. Gilman Janice E. Kerr, Esq.
Robert G. Lacy J. Calvin Simpson, Esq.
2 San Diego Gas & Electric Lawrence C. Garcia, Esq.
Company California Public Utilities 3 P.O. Box 1831 Commis.sion i San Diego, CA 92112 5066 State Building 1 4 San Francisco, CA 94102 Mr. Lloyd von Haden 5 2089 Foothi11 Drive Atomic Safety and Licensing Vista, CA 92083 Board 6 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Mrs. Lynn Harris Hicks Commission I
GUARD Washington, D.C. 20555 3908 Calle Ariana 8 San Clemente, CA 92801 Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary James F. Davis U.S. Nuclear Regulatory State Geologist Commission 10 Division of Mines and Geology Washington, D.C. 20555 1416 Ninth Street, Room 1341 11 Sacramento, CA 95814 Charles E. McClung, Jr., Esq.
23521 Paseo de Valencia 12 Richard J. Wharton, Esq. Suite 308 University of San Diego Laguna Hills, CA 92653 13 School of Law Alcala Park Phyllis M. Gallagher, Esq.
Id San Diego, CA 92110 1695 W. Crescent Avenue Suite 222 15 Anaheim, CA 92801 16 17 18 7) 19 -- +JP
,dohn A. Mendez / J 20 One of Counsel for applicants SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY 21 and SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
22 23 24 \\
9.\'= $,' .
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