ML20040A966
| ML20040A966 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 01/14/1982 |
| From: | Lanpher L CALIFORNIA, STATE OF, KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20040A967 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8201230016 | |
| Download: ML20040A966 (21) | |
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- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ll
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,p NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION J At! 15 332 > 'r-BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
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- g In the Matter of ) m -4
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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-275 0
) 50-32 o N. N (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power )
S Plant, Units 1 and 2) ) )[ , _ , . . . . , . _ ,
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GOVERNOR ED:1UND G. BROWN JR. RESPONSE TO .g n g; . c.,. 3. m y. _ ,
SU!iMARY DISPOSITION MOTIONS FILED BY THE '\ d' 8/
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NRC STAFF AND PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY G,\
On December 21, 1981, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission NM Staff ("NRC Staff") and Pacific Gas and Electric Company ("PG&E")
filed summary disposition motions concerning Contentions 10 (pressurizer heater contention) and 12 (valve contention). In accordance with the schedule established by this Board, Governor Brown now responds to those motions and urges that this Board deny each. -
The substantive, bases for the Governor's opposition to these notions are set forth hereafter in this Memorandum and in the Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is a .
Genuine Dispute (Exhibit 1 hereto), the Affidavit of Dple G.
Bridenbaugh and Gregory C. Minor (Exhibit 2 hereto), the pre-filed testimony of the Governor's witnesses on these contentions (Exhibits 3 and 4 hereto) and the other exhibits attached hereto.
Briefly, these motions must be denied because there is a genuine and material factual dispute concerning whether the pressurizer heaters and relief valves / block valves at Diablo Canyon have go3 5
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been properly classified and qualified. It is the Governor's position that these items of equipment are not properly classi-fied and qualified. This equipment does not meet regulatory requirements for safety-grade (safety-related) equipment, despite the fact that Diablo Canyon operators are directed to rely upon this equipment in the Diablo Canyon Emergency Opera-ting Procedures to perform critical safety functions, often without being provided other safety-grade means to accomplish the same functions. Accordingly, given the material factual dispute which exists and since this equipent has not been classified at a level commensurate with the functions it performs, the summary disposi-tion motions must be denied.
Before addressing in detail the substantive bases for denial of these t.otions, there are two preliminary matters which are first addressed. These are whether the Board should even consider summary disposition motions on Contentions 10 and 12 in the special context of t'his case, a6d, second, the fact that PG&E's summary disposition motion is seriously defective for failure to comply with the NRC's regulations (10 C.F.R. S 2.749(a)) and thus must be denied out of hand.
I. The Board Should Not Consider Summary Disposition of Contentions 10 and {2 In their Memorandum and Order dated September 21, 1981, the Commissioners directed this Licensing Board to include Contentions ism % g mee e a& pg , g ee e a we e * *+ * = *
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See CLI-81-22, pp. 2-3, 10 and 12 in the full power proceeding.
The Governor submits that the CCH Nuc. Reg. Rptr. 1 30,631. ht NRC's clear purpose in taking this action was to ensure t a identiary record the Licensing Board would compile a complete ev itsel_ would regarding these two issues and that the Commission Such a d
ultimately be able to review that evidentiary recor '. disposition record, of course, could not be compiled if summary were now granted. 1981, In view of the Commission's directive of September 21, in essence, Commission the Governor submits that these issues are, Rather, it questions on which summary disposition is not appropr a e.
it is essential that the evidentiary record mandated by the iew of Commission be compiled so that the Sommission, in later rev to the issues the record, will have the benefit of full responses d to be which it has singled-out for consideration and deeme Accordingly, the Governor urges this Board to rule significant. i te and, thus, that the summary dispositio'n motions are inappropr a are denied.
II.
The PG&E Summary Disposition fiction Must Be_
Denied for Failure to Comply with NRC Procedural Requirements ii Even if the Board were to consider the summary dispos t on Section motions, the PG&E motion must be denied summarily.
its of the NRC's regulations required PG&E to annex to 2.749 (a) w .
summary disposition motion "a separate, short and concise state-ment of the material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be heard." 10 C.F.R. S 2.749(a).
This is a mandatory provision of law. See Houston Lighting and Power Comg (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station) , ALAB-629, CCH Nuc. Reg. Rptr. 1 30,562 (1981).
PG&E ignored this mandatory requirement and submitted no statement of material facts as to which it alleges no genuine 1/
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dispute exists. This is not the first time that PG&E has flagrantly failed to follow this precise NRC regulation pertain-ing to summary disposition. Last spring, in the low power proceeding, PG&E moved for summary dispod tion. The Governor on April 24, 1981 filed an opposition to the PG&E motion and documented (at pp. 9-10) that PG&E had failed to file the necessary statement of material facts. See Exhibit 5 hereto. The Governor also pointed out at that time that PG&E had similarly failed to comply with the same' Section 2.749 (a) requirement in the Stanislaus proceeding. Id. PG&E now comes before this Board yet again --
indeed for at least the third time -- and fails to file the required statement of material facts. This Board should not contenance such flagrant violation of its regulations yet another time. The Governor urges summary dismissal of PG&E's motion.
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In contrast, the Staff has complied with Section 2.749(a).
See " Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is no Uenuine Issue," attached to NRC Staff Summary Disposition Mo tion .
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l It must be emphasized that the necessary statement of materia A party opposing summary dis-facts is not a procedural nicety. te, position must annex to its summary disposition motion "a separa h it short and concise statement of the material facts 10as to w is contented that there exists a genuine issue to be heard."
When PG&E fails to submit its_ required state-C.F.R. S 2.749 (a) . to discern ment, it is impossible for the Governor (and the Board) d thus what facts PG&E feels are material and not in dispute an the those facts which must be controverted in responding to 9 (a)
Accordingly, PG&E's failure to comply with Section 2.74 motion. This fact effectively subverts the summary disposition process.
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was clearly articulated by the Licensing Board in the Stan s a case, in which that Board sharply, admo, nished PG&E for its failure Thus, in Stanislaus to follow the summary disposition regulations.
the Licensing Board stated:
Subsection (a) [of Section 2.749] clearly
. requires that "There shall be annexed to the motion a separate short and concise statement of the material facts as to which the moving party contends that there is no genuine issue to be heard." PG&E has failedfacts. to file Such this a required statement of material requirement is notis merely of a procedural substantive techni-significance.
cality, but it This statement is necessary in order to impose upon other parties a duty to file a statementof m
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there exists a genuine issue to be heard under penalty of having uncontroverted material factsIt is necessa deemed to be admitted.
Board to have this information in a readily available form in order to evaluate the merits In re of a motion for summary disposition.(Stanislaus Nuclear Pacific Gas and Electric Co. t 30,211 (LBP 1977)
Proj ect) , CCH Nuc.' Reg. Rpt.
(emphasis supplied). .
That PG1E had been given the necessary lesson in Stanislaus, but still ignores that clear teaching now requires a firm and final rejection of PG&E's deficient motion.
Because of PG&E's failure to set forth the facts it alleges are not in disput e, the Governor's substantive response which follows and the Governor's Statement of Material Facts as to Fhich There is Genuine Dispute, attached hereto as Exhibit 1, f
will address directly only the factual allegations of the Staf f 2/
motion.
1 III. Summary Disposition of Contentions 10 and 12 Must Be Denied A. Contention 10 Contention 10, as admitted by the' Board in its September 30, 1981 Memorandum and Order, is as follows:
The Staff recognizes that pressurizer heaters and associated controls are necessary to maintain natural girculation at hot stand-by conditions.
Therefore, this equi'pment should be classified as ' components important to safety' and required to meet all applicable safety-grade design criteria, including but not limited to diversity (GDC 22) ,
seismic and environmental qualification (GDC 2 and 4), automatic initiation (GDC 20), separation and independence (GDC 3 and 22) , quality assurance (GDC 1), adequate, reliable on-site power supplies
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(GDC 17) and the single failure criterion. Tne
' Applicant's proposal to connect two out of four emergency power supplies does not provide an equivalent or acceptable level of protection.
2/ In directly addressing the Staff Motion, the Governor's response will likely address an,d rebut most salient points asserted by PG&E in its motion and the attachments thereto.
The essence of the Staff motion is that while pressuricer heaters are designated as " components important to safety," they are not relied upon to perform any critical safety functions and thus need not be classified as " safety-related" or " safety-grade."
l Staff Motion at 5. .The Governor disagrees and demonstrates below that sharp factual disputes exist over classification of the pressurizer heaters, which disputes preclude grant of the Staff motion.
First, it is not clear that the heaters are, in fact , classi-fied as " components important to safety." PG&E has asserted that the heaters are not required to be so classified and that they, in fact, are not classified as components important to safety.
PG&E Summary Disposition Motion, p. 4. .Thus, PG&E has stated:
There are no requirements for the pressurizer heaters and associated controls to be classi-fled as " components important to safety." .
. . . the pressurfeer heaters and associated controls are not classified as " components important to safety." 3/
The Staf f claims the heaters are classified as " components import-ant to safety." Staff Motion at 5. The Governor believes they should be c'lassified as important to safety but it is clear, at any rate, that a genuine dispute does exist regarding the actual classification of the pressurizer heaters. See Affidavit of 3/ PG&E Summary Disposition Motion, Af fidavit of John B. Hoch,
- p. 2, 11 6, 7.
=a. _ . = ,
e se e o 4 -
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Minor ("Bridenbaugh/ Minor Dale G. Bridenbaugh and Gregory C.
Affidavit"), Ex . 2, a t p . 2 (all Exhibit references are to the Prepared Direct Testimony of Dale G.
exhibits attached hereto); 10 i
Bridenbaugh and Gregory C. Minor Regarding Content on Ex. 3, at pp.
("Bridenbaugh/ Minor Contention 10 Testimony"),
4/ In view of such dispute, summary disposition is clearly
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6-7.
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inappropriate.
_ heaters 4/
The dispute over classification of the pressurizer is magnified by an apparent dispute over certain of itsT critical heatersfunctions.
are required to maintain system pressure at the PG&E claims that the hot standby condition. Staff Motion at S. l heaters are not required for hot standby Affiqpvit pressure of John B. Hoch, contro p.
1, and natural circulation. The Governor's attached to PG&E Summary Disposition Motion. be witnesses agree with the Staff that the heaters shouldsin d used for this function, mode, the procedures specify this mode of operation, an it is difficult for the operators to follow a different ditions.
and infrequently used procedure under stressful con 8.
t Bridenbaugh/ Minor Contention 10 Testimony in addition, the basic 5/ The material dispute concerns, es.
~ terminology utilized by PG&E for classification purpos ft The terms "important to safety," " safety-related" See November and "sa e y 20, 1981 grade" have been seriously confused.Denton, Attachment B to Bridenbaug 5-6. The Memorandum from Harold R. d Minor Contention 10 Testimony, Ex. 3, at pp.
Governor's position is that the pressurizer heaters f anrelated" associated controls should be classified as "s Memorandum.
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Further, the pressurizer heaters are utilized to perform critical safety functions. For instance, post-accident decay heat removal via natural circulation is normally achieved through use of the pressurizer heater system. .Cee Bridenbaugh/ Minor Affidavit, Ex. 2, at pp. 2-3. Indeed, the pressurizer heaters are the normal and preferred system for pressure control and maintenance of natural circulation cooling. Id. at 3; Bridenbaugh/
Minor Contention 10 Testimony, Ex. 3, at p. 4. The tinely and successful achievement of natural circulation cooling is clearly a critical safety function, particularly in light of the TMI-2 accident experience where operators were unable to achieve this essential cooling device. See Bridenbaugh/ Minor Contention 10 Testimony, Ex. 3, at pp. 7-8, 12. -The .PG&E Emergency Operating Procedure for Natural Circulntion, EP OP-23, " Natural Circulation of Reactor Coolant" specifically calls for use of the pressurizer heaters. See Exhibit 6 hereto. Clearly, the non-safety-grade pressuizer heaters are relied upon to perform this critical safety 6/
function.-
6/ PG&E's reliance on the pressurizer heaters is demonstrated further by the frequent reference to them in the Diablo Canyon Emergency Operating Procedures. No less than nine such procedures call for the use of the pressurizer heater system. See Applicant Pacific Gas and Electric Company's Answers to Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr.'s Second Set of Interroga tories , p. 47. PG&E claims that alternate means (to the heater system) for pressure control are available; however, none of the cited Emergency Operating Procedures specifically direct the operator how to proceed with alterna-tives if the heater system becomes unavailable. See Bridenbaugh/ Minor Contention 10 Testimony, Ex. 3, at pp.
8-9.
The Staff position seems to be that while operators are directed to use the pressurizer heaters to perform critical safety functions such as natural circulation cooling, the operators do not need to use the pressurizer heaters because other means, not utilizing the heaters, are available. This assertion must be rejected. Such other means to achieve natural circulation cooling have not been demonstrated at Diablo Canyon.
7/
Bridenbaugh/ Minor Affidavit, Ex. 2, at pp. 4-5. More important, the operators are not directed to utilize such alleged other means; instead, they are directed to use the heaters, with no safety-grade backup means specified in the Emergency Operating 8/
Procedures. Id. at 3.
On the one hand, PG&E has ar9ued that the pressurizer heaters are not required for natural circulation; rather, other methods are available to ensure t' rat this important cooling mechanism occurs. However, in the Diablo Canyon Emergency Procedures (OP-13 and 23) , no other methods are provided for
-7/ The fact that the high points of the coolant loops are normally covered with secondary coolant supplied by the nain or aux 41iary feedwater systems does not, of itself, assure adequate cooling of the core without the pressurizer heaters.
Other systems must be operable, operator actions must not interfere with the system's necessary function, and con-ditions conducive to maintenance of natural circulation must be present. This cooling mode has not been demon-strated at Diablo Canyon nor have the Emergency Operating
' Procedures been fully and adequately prepared to utilize this mode. Bridenbaugh/ Minor Affidavit, Ex. 2, at p. 4;
. Bridenbaugh/ Minor Contention 10 Testimony, Ex. 3 at p. 9.
8/ Emergency Operating Procedure OP-13, " Malfunction of Reactor Pressure Control System" (Exhibit 7 hereto), provides guidance on how to maintain primary pressure control when the pressure (cont'd on next page)
the oper'ators' use. Thus, . . . at a minimun, either the heaters should be upgraded to safety-grade or the other methods which presumably rely on safety-grade systems should be specified. Since the other methods are not specified in the procedures at this
" time, there can be no assurance in fact, that Diablo utilize Canyon operators would, such other systems if the non-safety-grade Thus, the procedures heaters were unavailable.
are inadequate or the heaters' classification is inadequate, or both. 9/
Thus, the non-safety-grade pressurizer heaters are relied upon hich to perform critical safety functions; backup systems w l t allegedly are available to perform the same or an equiva en function are not specified in the procedures for operators' There fore, there clearly is a sharply disputed material use.
fact concerning whether the pressurizer heaters have been correct-ly classified and whether the Dia.blo, Canyon Emergency Opera Procedures are adequate if the present non-safety-related classification persists.
l 8/ (Cont'd) This procedure only assumes control control devices channelmalfunction.
failure or failure to deenergize and there-fore provides corrective action only No guidance by placing is given the system as to how to pro-j in manual control.
ceed to " Similarly, feed and EPbleed" OP-23, or the other
" Natural " alternate Circulation of cont methods."
Reactor Coolant," has as 'a basic assumption that offsite power and the heaters are available, making it incomplete See Bridenbaugh/ Minor fo'r certain accident sequences.3, a t p. 10.
Contention 10 Testimony, Ex.
^/ Bridenbaugh/ Minor Contentica 10 Testimony, Ex. 3, at pp.We
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10-11 (footnote omitted) . 5-6) that pressurizer heaters d in the Staff hotion at pp.
cannot be utilized in the EOP's that whereifnon-safety-grade they are not safety-gra equipment e.
We do assert, hcwever, is relied upon for a critical function, a safety-gradeThe PG&E EOP'sback- do up device should be clearly specified. .
not do this.
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12-The Staff also asserts that the electrical power supply to the pressurizer heaters is adequate. Staff Motion at 7-8.
The Governor egain disagrees. In order to transfer some of the heaters to the onsite emergency power system, an operator must be dispatched to a remote location in the Auxiliary Building, three floors below the control room, to perform electrical breaker manipulations. Bridenbaugh/ Minor Affidavit, Ex. 2, at pp. 3-4; Bridenbaugh/ Minor Contention 10 Testimony, Ex 3, at
- p. 11. This is contrary to the TMI Action Plan recommendation that the transfer be performed from the control room. Bridenbaugh/
Minor Affidavit, Ex. 2, at pp. 3-4.-~10/ This is also contrary to the automatic initiation requirements of Genatal Design Criteria
- 20. Bridenbnugh/ Minor Contention 10 Testimony, Ex. 3, at p. 13.
Again, a clear and material factual dispute exists concerning the adequacy of the power supply to the pressurizer heaters.
The upgrading of all the pressurizer heater system components to a " safety-related" classification has been considered in the past and was, in fact, recommended by one of the major NRC groups assembled to review the TMI accident. The recommendations presented included:
The pressurizer heater system should be classified as safety grade which would assure emergency power availability and i protection from failures due to environ-mental conditions. 1/
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See NUREG-0737, Clarification of.TMI Action Plan Requirements,
- p. 3-86.
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Memorandum for J. Allan, NRC, from R. D. Martin, NRC,
" Operations Team Recommendations, " O.ctober 10, 1979, p.
23.
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4 *@ g ee 9 an ae ep a em.
- This recommendation, if followed, would require full adherence to all applicable safety requirements and qualification of the components to appropriate seismic and environmental conditions.
There are no reasons to believe that such upgrading could not be done and, indeed, neither the Staff nor PG&E provides any reason why such an upgrade would not be desirable from a safety .
standpoint.
If the safety classification of the heaters were upgraded, the pressurizer heater system clearly should become more reliable.
Plant Jafety would be improved by the minimization of the nuhber of challenges to the syster and by the optimization of the operability and controllability of syst ems used in the mitigation or control of abnormal events. The Ng3 Lessons Learned Task Force found that " maintenance of natural circulation capability is important to safety."-~12/Pressurizer heaters are the preferred components for this capability, and indeed, are specified to be However, although per-used 'in the Diablo Canyon proc'edures.
forming critical safety functions, the heaters are not classified as safety-grade and safety-grade backups are not specified for the operators ' use. The Governor submits that these essential com-In view of the genuine factual ponents are seriously misclassified.
disputes which exist, summary disposition must be denied and this contention set for hearing next week.
12/ NU REG-0 578, p. A-2.
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i B. , Contention 12 Contention 12, also admitted into this proceeding by the Board's September 30, 1981, Memorandum and Order, is as follows:
Proper operation of power operated relief valves, associated block valves and the instruments and controls for these valves is essential to. mitigate the consequences of accidents. In addition, their failure can cause or aggravate a LOCA. Therefore, these valves must be classified as com-ponents important to safety and required to meet all safety-grade design criteria. 13/
The Staff argues, in essence, that the power operated relief j
valves ("PORV's") and associated block valves ("BV's") at Diablo Canyon perform no critical safety function and thus are not A required to meet safety-grade criteria. Staff Motion at 9.
The Governor disagrees and demonstrate's below und in the attached 1
exhibits that these valves do in fact perform critical safety functions, that they are relied upon for safe operation of Diablo Canyon, and that they accordingly must be classified as safety-grade. At a minimum, a sharp factual dispute exists concerning Diablo Canyon PORV/BV classification and thus summary disposition must be denied.
13/ The Appeal Board's Order of December 11, 1981, expands
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Contention 12 to include "the testing and verification of these same components" since " testing and verification of these components is an integral part of theThus, qualification the process." ASLAB order, Dec. 11, 1981, p. 3.
including the adequacy adequacy of the qualification p.rocess,is included in the expanded of the EPRI testing program, scope of Contention 12. The NRC Staff has not addressed this expanded scope in its summary disposition motion.
See Staf f Motion at 4, fn. 2. .
First. the Diablo Canyon PORV's/BV's de perform critical safety functions. Thus, these valves perform the following functions:
- a. Maintain integrity of the primary pressure boundary.
- b. Provide pressure relief for low temperature overpresuarization conditions. .
- c. Reduce the number of challenges to the safety valves,
- d. Reduce the number of challenges to the ECCS.
- e. Provide a bleed capability during the feed-and-bleed mode of operation to remove decay heat from the core. 14/
Several of these functions are consistent with the functions in 10 C.F.R. Part 100, Appendix A, Section III.C, which is used
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by the NRC to define criteria for " safety-related" classification.--
Second, the PORV's/BV's are relied upon to perform the foregoing safety functions. For instance, the BV's and/or PORV's
'are called upon to be operated or checked for misoperation in several of the Emergency Operating Procedures. F7r example, EOP-20, " Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage," calls for checking the PORV's as a possible source of excessive leakage from the coolant system (i.e., a small LOCA). See,Ex. 8 hereto.
EOP-38, " Anticipated Transient Without Trip," describes the need for automatic opening of the PORV's and checking later to see that they are not stuck open in the event of a pressure decay and
--14/ Bridenbaugh/ Minor Affidavit, Ex. 2, at pp. 5-6; Bridenbaugh/
Minor Contention 12 Testimony, Ex. 4, at p. 4. -
15/ Bridenbaugh/ Minor Affidavit, Ex. 2, at pp. 5-6; Bridenbaugh/
Minor Contention 12 Testimony, Ex. 4, at p. 4.
coolant loss. See Ex. 9 hereto. EOP-2, " Loss of Secondary Coolant," , describes the actions to prevent challenges to the
. pressurizer safety valves in the case of loss of secondary coolant.
It also mentions that a transient may cause the PORV's to open and requires that their resetting be checked, thus insuring against 16/
a small LOCA in the primary coolant. See Ex. 10 hereto.
Diablo Canyon has three PCRV's and three BV's. PG&E has described two of the PORV's and all of the BV's as being "important to sa fe ty . " It is unclear, however, how PG&E defines
' --17/
that term and, accordingly, the precise classification of all
--16/ Similarly, the procedure for Emergency Shutdown (OP-22) describes conditions where the use of a PORV/BV combination may be needed to depressurize the prinary loop so the safety injection pwnps may be used for boration. See Ex. 11 here-to . The PORV would be opened and the block valve used for throttling the flow. The procedure does not restrict the operator to any particular PORV nor does it identify a safety-grade alternative component to accomplish the task.
Thus, any of the PORV/BV combinations should be able to accomplish this, safety-related task. See id.
--17/ The FSAR is vague as to the safety classification of the PORV's/BV's and their circuits and controls. The Applicant has stated that the qualification level of the three PORV's and their circuits are not all identical. However, docu-ments which the operator relies on for guidance in operating the plant during emergency conditions (Emergency Operating Procedures) and deciding on an acceptable plant configuration (Diablo Canyon Technical Specifications) provide no evidence of differentiation between the greater or less " qualified valves or associated equipment." Bridenbaugh/ Minor Contention 12 Testimony, Ex. 4, at p. 5.
e 4
1 e aa* ~ g. e ge 4, 4 , ,,g * * * * , o e
- en- .
b f these valves is unclear and in dispute. See Bridenbaugh/ Minor l
Affidavit, Ex. 2, at p. 5; BriCenbaugh/ Minor Contention 12 Testimony, Ex. 4, at pp. 3-4.
Even assuming that two PORV's and three BV'r are classified as safety-related o,r safety-grade, the remaining non-safety-grade PORV may still be called upon to perform critical safety functions. For instance, Section 3.4.9.3 of the Diablo Canyon Technical Specifications requires that two PORV's be operable during Hot Shutdown (Mode 4) conditions for overpressure pro-tection. There is no guidance, however, to operators in the emergency procedures to utilize the more qualified, i.e., safety-related, safety-grade PORV. Thus, all PORV's should be qualified j to the same level or the operators '. EOE,'s should restrict which two valves are to be used. .Bridenbaugh/ Minor Contention 12 Testimony, Ex. 4, at pp. 6-7.
Similarly, during operating modes 1, 2 and 3 (Power Operation, Startup, and Hot Standby), Tech' Spec Section 3.4.4 requires that each PORV must be operable or, if not operable, to be isolated by an operable BV which is then deenergized. For these modes, either the 'PORV's or their associa~ted BV's are relied upon to protect the integrity of the primary pressure boundary. However, according to the Technical Specification, it is possible to block the two higher-qualified valves and rely only on the lesser-qualified valve and its associated controls. Again, there should be instructions to the operator to prevent this situation, i.e.
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e if the to prevent sole reliance on a non-safety-grade system, See i difference in valve classification continues to exist.
Bridenbaugh/ Minor contention 12 Testimony, Ex. 4, at p. 7.
At a minimum, a clear factual dispute exists concerning PG&E's apparent reliance on non-safety-grade systems to perform 18/
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safety functions.
Finally, the Staf f argues that analyses have demonstrated that Diablo Canyon will suffer no severe harm even if the non-The safety-grade PORV should fail open. Staff Motion et 11.
f Governor disagrees and submits that no such confidence is war-ranted. The TMI-2 accident demonstrated that proper operation d
of PORV's and BV's can be important in mitigating the effects M/ Thus, it is impossible to assure that stuck-5 of an accident. _
open PORV's at Diablo Canyon could not lead to core damage.
(i.e., ignoring systems inter-Only under the most ideal conditions action, common-mode failures, operator error, and other system failures) can the' Staff and Applicant assume no fuel damage will See Bridenbaugh/ Minor Affidavit, result from a stuck-open PORV.
18/ The fact that Diablo Canyon has more PORV's and BV's t.han
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other plants doesThe notthird, alternon-safety-grade the'need to properly classify FORV maythus help the third PORV.
i- the reactor ride through a load rejection transient, preventing a challenge to the protection system, but it also creates additional failure points which could result in and a small LOCA, additional common mode failure mechanisms, l
the possibility of systems interaction which could impactBridenbaug I
other safety-rel tted functions.
l .
12 Testimony, Ex. 4, at p. 8.
19/ The PORV's and BV's also play'an important role in depressur-
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izing the reactor coolant so that backup boration techniques Bridenbaugh/ Minor Affidavit, Ex. 2, at pp.
L may be applied.The EOP's also assume the PORV's will automatically open in an ATWS event, an event which could lead to a major 6-7.
accident although .not presently recognized as a (cont'd) ,
. _ . . . ..-m...
20/
Ex. 2, at p. 7-8.
This Board should require all Diablo Canyon PORV's and BV's to meet safety-grade criteria. If, as appears postible, S of 6 valves do meet those criteria, it is inexplicable that the last PORV would be kept at a lesser classification, thus creating the potential for severe accident conditions. At a minimum, a sharp factual dispute exists concerning the correctness of PG&E's valve classifications, a dispute which precludes summary disposi-tion.
19/ (Cont'd) .
4 design basis event. BV.'s are also used to mitigate and control a small LOCA resulting from a failed PORV. Id.
20/ If a PORV failed, it would cause a small LOCA. If two or l --
more failed due to a common-mode failure or systems inter-action, the effects would be more severe. If the failure should occur simultaneously with a LOCA of other origin, it would produce confusing symptoms and indications to the operator, release additional contaminated coolant to the containment, and could result in more severe consequences than a LOCA would otherwise produce. Bridenbaugh/ Minor Affidavit, Ex. 2, at p. 7.
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For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons further stated in the exhibits hereto, we urge that summary disposition of Contention 12 be denied.
Respectfully submitted, Byron S. Georgiou, Esq.
. Legal Affairs Secretary Governor's Office State Capitol Sacramento, California 95814 c/' .. ,s v /
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Herbert H. Brown Lawrence Coe Lanpher KIRKPATRICK, LOCKHART, HILL, CHRISTOPHER & PHILLIPS 1900 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 Attorneys.for Governor Brown of the State of California January 14, 1982
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NI1X.D C'Tr'iCF90::r,:mnt EXHIBIT LIST l l
Exhibit 1 Statement of !!aterial Facts as to Which There is a Genuine Dispute Exhibit 2 Affidavit of Dale G. Bridenbaugh and Gregory C. Minor i
Exhibit 3 Prepared Direct Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh and Gregory C. Minor Regarding Contention.10 Exhibit 4 Prepared Direct Testimony of l
Dale G. Bridenbaugh and Gregory j C. Minor Regarding Contention 12 Exhibit 5 Pages 9-10 of April 24, 1981 Opposition of Governor Brown to NRC Staff and PG&E Motions for Reconsideration and Summary Disposition l
i Exhibit 6 EP OP-23, " Natural Circulation of Reactor Cgolant" 1
l Exhibit 7 EP OP-13, " Malfunction of Reactor Pressure Control System" Exhibit 8 EP OP-20, " Excessive Reactor 4 Coolant System Leakage" Exhibit 9 Ep OP-38, " Anticipated Transients Without Trip" i
Exhib.tt 10 EP OP-2, " Loss of Secondary Coolant" Exhibit 11 EP OP-22, " Emergency Shutdown"
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