ML20236C183
| ML20236C183 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon |
| Issue date: | 10/20/1987 |
| From: | Preston M GRUENEICH, D.M. (FORMERLY GRUENEICH & LOWRY), Sierra Club |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236C122 | List: |
| References | |
| 86-523-03-LA, OLA, NUDOCS 8710270046 | |
| Download: ML20236C183 (32) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:- _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 i I D8CKETED USHRC 57 CT 21 N0:27 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 0FFICE OF SECRfin9Y 00CKEitNG a SE0VICf. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BRANCH BEFORE THE COMMISGION ) In the Matter of: ) Docket Nos. 50-275-OLA ) and 50-323-OLA PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY ) ) (ASLBP No. 86-523-03-LA) (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power ) Plant, Units 1 and 2) ) ) INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR STAY Dated: October 20, 1987 Dian M. Grueneich Marcia Preston LAW OFFICE OF DIAN M. GRUENEICH 380 Hayes Street, Suite 4 San Francisco, CA 94102 Telephone: (415) 861-6930 Attorneys for Intervenor Sierra Club 8710270046 971020 PDR ADOCK 05000275 0 PDR
i I. INTRODUCTION This is a Request for Stay filed with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10 CFR S 2.788. The Sierra Club seeks a stay of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's (" Licensing Board") September 11, 1987 initial decision authorizing the issuance of operating license amendments ("OLAs") to Pacific Gas & Electric ("PGGE"). The Sierra Club previously sought such a stay from the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (" Appeal Board"); the Appeal Board denied this request on October 8, 1987.1 ( ALAB-877 ).2 The OLAs, if issued, would permit reracking of the spent 1 fuel storage pools at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Units i 1 and 2, thereby increasing the number of fuel assembly storage locations from 270 to 1324 in each unit. The Sierra Club requests this stay to prevent irreparable harm and to preserve the status quo unt11 administrative and judicial review of all matters underlying 1ssuance of the license amendments is complete. The NRC previously issued the requested OLAs on May 30, 1986. The Sierra Club requested a stay and a hearing, and filed 110 CFR S 2.788 provides that a stay request be made within l 10 days after service of a decision or action. Two days is added to this time period when service is by express mail, as in this case. 10 CFR S 2.710. 2 This Request for Stay also covers the Licensing Board's September 2, 1987 Order. At the same time that it requested a stay from the Appeal Board, the Sierra Club appealed the Septem-ber 2, 1987 Order in its entirety and that portion of the September 11, 1987 initial decision dealing with consideration of alternatives. 1 l
l l i l several contentions.3 Decause the NRC refused to stay the OLAs, l l interveners Sierra Club and Mothers for Peaced appealed to the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and were granted a stay and an order requiring the NRC to hold public hearings prior to the I issuance of the OLAs. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v.
- NRC, l
l 799 F.2d 1268 (9th Cir. 1986). When the proceeding was remanded to the NRC, the Licensing Board scheduled hearings for March, 1987 and admitted four of Sierra Club's earlier-filed contentions.5 The hearings were r eventually held in June, 1987. The Sierra Club presented testimony the failure of the OLAs to meet federal statutory and regulatory requirements and the resulting threat to the public health and safety. Despite this testimony, the Licensing Board's September 11 initial decision denied all four of Sierra Club's admitted contentions. On June 16, 1987, the Sierra Club moved to admit a conten-tion concerning the consequences of a loss of coolant accident for plants with spent fuel pool configurations such as that proposed in the OLAs. The motion also requested the dismissal the NRC's prior finding of no significant impact and the prepara-3 The NRC later issued an Env1ronmental Assessment, dated May 21, 1986, and Finding of No Significant Impact, dated May 30, 1986. 4 Mothers for Peace have since withdrawn from the proceeding. 5 The hearings were postponed, at the request of NRC staff, when a review of the seismic analysis, on which the initial issuance of the OLAs was based, raised questions which were relevant and material to Sierra Club's contention regarding rack-l to-rack interactions. Board Notification ("BN") 87-01, January f 29, 1987. 2 i
l tion of an environmental impact statement ("EIS") regarding the reracking.6 The Licensing Board's September 2, 1987 Order (" Order") denied Sierra Club's motion to admit the contention and denied the request for an EIS. The Sierra Club appealed the October 2 Order and a portion of the September 11 initial decision; this appeal is pending before the Appeals Board. II. LEGAL ARGUMENT The factors to be considered in deciding whether to grant a stay request are: (1) petitioner's likelihood of success on the merits; (2) possibility of irreparable injury to party requesting stay; (3) possibility of harm to other parties; and (4) the public interest. 10 CFR S 2.788(e). An analysis of these factors indicates that the requested stay should be granted. A. The Sierra Club is Likely to Prevall on the Merits The Licensing Board's authorization of the Diablo Canyon I OLAs is illegal in several respects; the Appeal Board denial of the Sierra Club's stay request contains faulty legal reasoning. 1. National Environmental Policy Act The National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. S 4321 et seq. ("NEPA"), requires that prior to making a licensing decision 6 A basis for this motion was a January 1987 report entitled "Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools (Generic Issue 82)", issued by the Brookhaven Laboratory ("BNL Report), which had only recently been made available to S1erra Club. Tr. 142-174. At the time the Sierra Club made its original motion, the report was in draft form. The final report has since been issued; "For purposes of this [ case), the final report does not differ sign 1ficantly from the draft report." Order, at n.1. All references to BNL Report herein are to the draft. 3
regarding a proposed action that may significantly affect the i environment, a federal agency must prepare an EIS regarding the possib)9 environmental effects of that action. 42 U.S.C. S 4332(2)(c). In addition to the EIS requirement, NEPA S 102(2)(e) requires agencies to " study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources." 42 U.S.C. S 4332(2)(e). The Sierra Club raised the issue of the inadequacy of the i NRC's compliance with NEPA in its Contention I(B)(7) and also sought to raise this issue through the introduction of a late-filed contention. The Appeal Board took the position that the Sierra Club's NEPA claim was not adequately raised by Contention I(B)(7) and the Club's arguments regarding consideration of alternatives therefore hinged on the question of whether the late-filed contention should have been admitted. October 8, 1987 Order (ALAB-877), at 8. Both the Licensing Board and the Appeal Board held that the Brookhaven Report could not serve as the basis for a NEPA-hased contention unless a sufficient " nexus" were established between the Report and the OLA's. The Licensing Board based its dismis-sal of the Club's contention upon a finding that the Club had failed to establish a sufficient nexus.
- However, the Appeal Board disagreed with the Licensing Board.
The Appeal Board i "agroo[d] with the Sierra Club that, at least as articulated by ) the Licensing Board, the conclusion below on the nexus question i i 4 \\ \\ I
y is of dubious correctness." Id. at 9 (emphasis added). Despite its handling of the nexus question, the Appeal Board still refused to grant the stay request, finding that the Club had not shown a " reasonable possibility" that the spent fuel pools at Diablo Canyon would lose sufficient water to give rise to a fuel cladding fire. Id. at 9. The Appeal Board recognized that the Brookhaven Report listed seismic events as one cause of such a fire. Id. Yet the Appeal Board summarily stated that the spent fuel pools at Diablo Canyon will withstand design-basis earthquakes and that the NRC need not examine the likelihood of a beyond-design-basis earthquake because such an event is by definition remote and speculative. Id. at 11. The OLA's are likely to result in significant adverse impacts to the environment and yet no EIS has been prepared.
- Instead, the NRC prepared an Environmental Assessment ("EA")
which summarily concludes that the reracking will not have any s-ignificant environmental impacts.7 The EA relies on a seven year
- old, generic EIS on spent fuel storage and Ignores almost entirely the site-specific considerations of the Diablo Canyon reracking --
i.e., the free-standing nature and higher density of the replacement racks and the impact of the seismic forces active 7 Yesterday, the Sierra Club received a copy of a supplement-al EA relative to the Diablo Canyon reracking prepared by the NRC staff and accompanied by a Finding of No Significant Impact ("FONSI"), a W ahed hereto as exhibit A. While the earlier decisions in ws proceeding must stand or fall on the basis of the original EA, this supplemental EA does not cure the defects of the NRC's earlier noncompliance with NEPA, as explained infra. 5
4' near Diablo Canyon.8 Nor does the EA adequately consider alternatives.'
- Instead, it simply asserts that other alternatives -- including trans-shipment to another reactor, federal off-site storage, and "no project" -- are not feasible, without providing adequate support-ing data or analysis to justify this conclusion.
The EA ignores on-site storage alternatives such as those recommended in the BNL Report. NEPA does relieve an agency of the duty to consider " remote and speculative" events; determination of what constitutes such an event is governed by a rule of reason. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C.Cir. 1972). The agency may not rely on the label "beyond-design-basis" as a substitute for developing a factual record to determine whether a i eThe supplemental EA admits the non site-specific nature of I its analysis, stating that "[t]he lack of site-specific discus-sion of terrestrial and radiological impacts is due to the fact that causes for such impacts are not associated with reracking and operation of the high density pools." Supplemental EA at 6. l Since the BNL Report establishes seismic events as a cause of loss of coolant accidents, and since Diablo Canyon is located in a seismically active area, the EA is inadequate because it fails to analyze the greater likelihood of terrestrial and radiological impacts arising from the Diablo Canyon. The supplemental EA also attempts to justify the use of the dated, generic EIS by stating that the NRC staff has assured itself that the information relied on in the EIS is still current. NEPA is designed to assure the public's assess to information and ability to review agencies' environmental decisions. The mere statement that the staff la satisfied fulfills neither of these purposes and provides no I basis for a review of that judgment. 'The supplemental EA adds nothing to the inadequate discus-l sion of alternatives contained in the original EA. Exhibit A, at p. 5. l 6
r. ?:. l given. event is-remote and speculative.10 .The NRC's. initial failure to prepare an EIS and its inade-quate cons! -% ration of alternatives violated NEPA; in light of BN ' 87-01 and the BNL Report, the agency's shortcomings in these regards;are even more glaring. Its just-issued supplemental EA does not' cure the prior defects. 2. Public Health and Safety .The-Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. S 2239 et seq., requires the NRC. to assure. that nuclear plants wil'1 _ operate without 1 endangering the public health and safety. The Nuclear Waste ' Policy-Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 10101, 10152(1), prohibits the NRC from i authorizing expansion of on-site spent fuel facilities unless i such action is consistent with the protection of the public I health and safety. The BNL Report's implications for safety at Diablo Canyon' establish that the public health and safety may be unreasonably imperiled if the' proposed OLAs are ' authorized. Sierra Club sought to establish this threat.through its conten-tion regarding the'BNL Report and the consequences of a loss of coolant accident at Diablo Canyon. The Sierra Club established a nexus between the BNL Report and the proposed OLAs by pointing to: (1) the fact that exactly the same type of fuel storage racks are at issue; (2) the increased risk identified in the BNL Report ~l0 An : event is not, remoto - and speculative merely because there. - is a low probability that it will occur. Sierra Club v. S1oler, 695 F.2d 957, 971-974,(5th Cir. 1983); 40 CFR S 12002.22 (1986). There is no basis under NEPA for simply excluding from the' reach of NEPA, ipso facto, all edents which the agency places under.a g1ven label. '\\+ 1 i ) ^\\ __1 _ _ _ _ -- -_ -- 1' r - -_
i l i 1
- for'. pressurized water reactors'(which Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2
- are);-(3) the increased seismic hazard risk evident for any plant ' loca'ted near a major fault zone; and 4) the recommendation by two i of-the BNL Report's authors that spent fuel not be stored in the manner proposed in the OLAs. This contention must be admitted so that the OLAs will.be subject to the scrutiny required by federal law'to onsure that the public health and safety is protected. B. Sierra Club will Suffer Irreparable Injury in the Absence of a Stay .{ l The NRC's Office,of General Counsel has informed the Sierra -l ' Club.that the OLA's will be issued today, October 20, 1987. If the spent fuel reracking is allowed to take place at Diablo g I Canyon, the Sierra Club will be irreparably injured in several significant respects. Sierra Club, its members, and the public i will be endangered by the reracking because the facility will not i be designed consistently with the Commission's' mandate to protect the health and safety and to consider the environmental impacts of and reasonable alternatives to the reracking before approving the OLAs. The consequences of a major accident involving spent fuel-pools at a nuclear power plant can be catastrophic. The BNL Report concludes that the risk potential of loss of coolant in spent fuel pools with high density racks is equivalent to present risk estimates for core melt accidents, and that, in some respects, such accidents could be much worse than a reactor core 1 melt accident. BNL Report at S-6. The reracking therefore increases substantially the risks to the property and personal 8 l L
l cafety of the surrounding population, including members of the Sierra Club, many of whom-live within the evacuation zone of the plant. By reducing the margin of safety and increasing the potential threat posed by new accidents, the proposed reracking .of the spent fuel storage system represents a significant risk of irreparable injury. i Also, when an agency has taken an action in violation of NEPA such as the failure to assess environmental impacts and to consider reasonable alternatives there is a presumption that injunct1ve relief should be granted against the continuation of that action until the agency complies with the Act. Realty Income Trust v. Eckerd, 564 F.2d 447, 456 (D.C.Cir. 1977). Such relief is designed not only to prevent harm to the environment but also to ensure that the agency decision-makers take an objective view of the project, unaffected by large commitments of resources to the project which could bias a decision. Conse-quently, " courts will not hesitate to stop projects that are in the process of affecting the environment when - the agency is in illegal Ignorance of the consequences [of the proposed actionj, as when it should have prepared an EIS but failed to do so." Id. at 456 (emphasis in original).11 An injunction ensures that environmental concerns are considered not only before actual harm 11 In Eckerd, an injunction was unnecessary because an j adequate EIS had been prepared: "Had no EIS been prepared, we i might be reluctant to prejudge whether the Committees might wish to stop or abandon the project, even this far into construction, once they knew of the expected impacts and the possible alterna-tives. But, of course, an adequate EIS was prepared..." 564 j F.2d at 457-8. l 9 i 1 i s
1 occurs but before the agency's' proposed approval of a project acquires irreversible momentum. Id. at 457. The substantial increase in the risk to public health and the environment necessitates the granting of an injunction. C. Other Parties will not Suffer Harm Sufficient to Justify Denying the Stay The : granting of a. stay will postpone the reracking only. .until review has been completed. The inability of the federal q government to remove spent fuel from Diablo Canyon has been known 4 'for.many years,'yet PG&E waited-until' October of 1985 to request the OLAs. 'Also, the NRC's original illegal refusal to grant the ) required prior public hearings, and its later decision.to postpone the hearings have resulted in further delays. .These 4 parties should not be permitted to complain of any postponement necessary to fully vindicate the rights of the Sierra Club, which has demonstrated that it is likely to succeed on the merits. D. The Public Interest Favors a Stay The public interest is best protected when matters of this magnitude ' are handled cautiously and with full compliance with all pertinent safety and environmental laws. To allow the reracking to proceed without first requiring such an analysis threatens the public health and safety and deprives the public of I the full disclosure of the project's consequences and alterna- .tives to which it is entitled. Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 { F.2d 1276, 1287 (9th Cir. 1974). I III. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the Sierra Club hereby 10 l
requests this Commission to stay the effectiveness of the September 2, 1987 order and the September 11, 1987 initial decision of the Licensing Board until the Sierra Club has had an opportunity to seek judicial review and to participate in any further administrative proceedings regarding the reracking. Dated: October 20, 1987 Respectfully Submitted, LAW OFFICE OF DIAN M. GRUENEICH By h[ Marcia Preston 11
m pa acog 1 .m UNITED STATES ' ?[Q l + OCT 1 9 t9hf g. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5 -l j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 October 15, 1987
- ..+
.DocketLNos. 50-275 and.50-323-Mr. J. D. Shiffer, Vice President Nuclear Power Generation c/o Nuclear Power Generation, Licensing Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77.Beale Street Room 1451-San Francisco, California 94106~
Dear Mr. Shiffer:
SUBJECT:
- SUPPLEMENT TO THE SAFETY EVALUATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT - DIABLO CANYOP RERACK k Enclosed for your information is a Supplement to the Safety Evaluation and Environmental Assessment providing our evaluation of wet reracking aspects and Boraflex for the. spent fuel pool expansion for.Diablo Canyon, Units 1 and 2. -In addition. -in accordance with the Opinion of September 11, 1986 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for' the Ninth Circuit, we have given further consideration to the applicability of the. generic environmental impact statement and the need for analysis of. severe accidents. Based on our review and evaluation of the infomatinn provided by you, we have concluded that no further changes to the Technical specifications as contained in Amendment Nos. 8 and 6 to the Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 licenses are required for the spent fuel pool expansions.- The effectiveness of these amendments will. be the subject of future amendments.to the.Diablo Canyon operating licenses. We have also enclosed a Notice of Supplement to Environmental j . Assessment and Finding of No Significar)t impact. This notice is being . forwarded to the Office of the Federal Register for publication. l Sincerely, A). Y Charles M. Tramell, Project Manager Project Directorate V Division of Reactor Projects-III, IV, Y and Special Projects I
Enclosures:
1. Supplement to the Safety Evaluation and Environmental Assessment 2. Notice cc: See next page EXHIBIT A
4 !y Ar -f 1 ~ i Mr' J. D. Sh'i f fer'. Pacific Gas and' Electric Company Diablo Canyon i cc: _.. Richard F. Locke,:Esq.: - NRC Resident ~ Inspector--
- Pacific-Gas & Electric Company.
Diablo-Canyon. Nuclear Power Plant-l -Post' Office Box 7442-c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-I San Francisco, California 94120 P. O. Box ~369 Avila Beach, California 93424
- Janice E.-Kerr, Esq.
California Public' Utilities Commission Mr. Dick Blakenburg 350 McAllister Street Editor.& Co-Publisher -San' Francisco, California 94102-South County Publishing Company P. O. Box 460 Arroyo Grande, California 93420 1 Ms? Sandra A. Silver 1660 Granite Creek Roa'd Bruce Norton, Esq.- LSanta Cruz, California 95065 c/o Richard F. Locke, Esq. Pacific Gas and-Electric Company i -Fost Office Box 7442 Mr. W. C. Gangloff. San' Francisco, California 94120. 1 Westinghouse Electric Corporation j P.'0. Box 355 'Pittsburgh,< Pennsylvania 15230 Dr. R. B. Ferguson Sierra Club - Santa Lucia Chapter Rocky Canyon Star Route - l Managing Editor: Creston, California 93432 { San Luis.Obispo County Telegram _j Yribune -1321 Johnson. Avenue Chairman .P. O. Box 112- . 93406 Supervisors S u Luis Obispo, California San Luis Obispo County Board of i Room 220 County Courthouse Annex i San Luis Obispo, California 93401 j Mr. Leland M.- Gustafson, Manager Federal Relations . Pacific Gas and Electric Company Director i -1726 M Street Ne W. Energy Facilities Siting Division j Washington, DC 20036,4502 Energy Resources Conservation and .1 Development Comission j 1516 9th Street Sacramento, California 95814 [DianN.Grueneich MarciiPreston Ms. Jacquelyn Wheeler __ ' Law Of'fice of Dian M. Grueneich 2455 Leona Street y-380 Hayes Street, Suite 4 San Luis Obispo, California 93400 1 . San. Francisco, California 94102 1 3
l 4 L; Pacific Gas & Electric Company Diablo Canyon i cc: k' Ms. Laurie McDermott,. Coordinator Ms. Nancy Culver Consumers Organized for Defense 192 Luneta Street of Environmental Safety San Luis Obispo, California 93401 731. Pacific Street, Suite 42 San Luis Obispo, California 93401 President California Public utilities Mr. Joseph 0. Ward, Chief Coninission Radiological-Health Branch California State Building i State Department of Health 350 McAllister Street i Services San Francisco, California 94102 714 P. Street, Office' Building #8 Sacramento, California 95814 Michael M. Strunwasser, Esq. Regional Administrator, Region V Special Assistant Attorney General U.S. Nuclear Regula'.ory Commission State of California 1450 Maria Lane Department of Justice Suite'210 3580 Wilshire Boulevard, Room 800 l Walnut Creek, California 94596 Los Angeles, California 90010 l, l U
^li i Pacific Gas and Electric Company Diablo Canyon Spent Fuel Pool Proceeding cc: Mr. Glenn 0. Bright Administrative Judge - . Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, DC 20555 Dr. Jerry Harbour ' Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i Washington, DC 20555 B. Paul Cotter, Jr., Chairman Administrative Judge. 1 Atomic Safety'and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear. Regulatory Comission l Washington, DC 20555 Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman - Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission i
- Washington, D.C.
20555 Thomas S. Moore Atomic-Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission { Washington, D.C. 20555 Howard A. Wilber
- . Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C.
20555 1 1 1 l i )
i SUPPLEMENT TO THE SAFETY EVALUATION AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATING TO THE RERACKING OF THE SPENT FUEL POOLS-AT THE DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-80 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. OPR-82 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NOS. 50-275 AND 50-323 OCTOBER 15, 1987 es - e i 1 L l u. 1
I 0 ' TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1.- INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 1 1 2. WET RERACKING ASPECTS 2 2.1 Rack Removal and Installation 2' 2.2 Radiati'n Protection and ALARA Considerations 3 2.3 Accidents 3 2.4 Environmental Impacts 4 2.5 Alternatives 5 3. 80RAFLEX NEUTRON ABSORBING MATERIAL 5 4. GENERIC FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 6 5. SEVERE ACCIDENT CONSIDERATIONS 7 6.
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS 7 . 7. CONTRIBUTORS 8 8. REFERENCES 9 m___._
l s 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND The Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E). licensee for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant,. Units 1 and 2, requested, by letter dated Octdber 30, 1985 (Ref.1), an-amendment to the operating license for each unit that would authorize an expansion of the capacity of each of the two spent fuel _ pools from 270 fuel
- elements to 132a fuel elements. The staff reviewed and evaluated the amendment request, and on May'30..1986, issued Amendment No. 8 and No. 6 to the Unit I d
.and Unit 2 operating licenses DPR-80 and DPR-82, respectively. These amendments, .j which were' supported by the staff's: Safety Evaluation (SE) and Environmental
- Assessment (EA), made appropriate changes to the Technical Specifications (Refs. ?
l and 3. respectively). Based on the staff's final detennination that the action involved no significant hazards consideration. the amendments became imediately effective. Thereafter, in ' September 1986, the U.S. Court of Appeals.for the Ninth Circuit, ruled on a petition for review jointly filed by the Sierra Club and San Luis Obispo Mothers' for Peace, holding that the NRC improperly determined that the . license amendments sought involved no significant hazards consideration (Ref. 4). As a consequence, the effectiveness of the amendments was stayed by_ the Court . until the completion of the requested NRC hearing. 1 In order to comply with the Court's holding, while,:at the same time providing for the continued operation of the facility, the licensee removed the new, high density racks which had been installed in Unit 1, reinstalled the original racks i and placed the spent fuel from the Unit I first refueling into the original racks. ] ) The new high density racks had not been installed in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool. -J The Unit 2 original racks are, as in Unit 1, being used to store the. spent j fuel offloaded from Unit 2 from-the first refueling. Because-of the foregoing, j the-reracking of Unit 1 and Unit ? with the new, high density racks will now have ) to be performed in a wet and radioactively contaminated environment rather than in a dry and uncontaminated environment. The license amendment application (Ref.1) provided little information concerning installation of the high density racks in a' wet environment, noting the licensee's preference to undertake the effort in dry, uncontaminated pools. Accordingly, the staff's Safety Evaluation and Environmental Assessment did not address the fonner. j This Supplement provides the staff evaluation of wet re*acking aspects, Boraflex neutron absorbing material, and further discussions on certain aspects of the Environmental Assessment in response to the Opinion issued by the Court of Appeals, in particular. that the staff's site specific environmental assessment was based on a seven year old generic environmental assessment and that no " worst case" analysis, in accordance with 40 CFR Section 1502.22 (Ref.17), appeared to have been conducted. The wet reracking aspects are discussed in Section 2 of this report and include installation procedures, radiation protection, accidents, radioactive waste, enytronmental consequences and alternatives to wet reracking. The staff's evaluation of Boraflex neutron absorbing material is contained in Section 3. Further discussion regarding the Environmental Assessment and documentation on the adequacy of a previous generic environmental assessment and on the need for a " worst case" analysis are addressed in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. I J
. f 2. WET RERACKING ASPECTS I As' discussed in Section 1, the issuance of the license amendments fEr the expanded spent. fuel pools and the supporting Safety Evaluation and ) Environmental Assessment by the staff (Refs. 2 and.3) were' based on the j assumption that the reracking process, that.is, the removal of the original racks'and installation of the new racks, would take place.in a dry'and uncontaminated environment. Since the' spent fuel pool reracking for both Units i must now be perfomed'in a wet and possibly contaminated environment, the l staff has re-reviewed and re-evaluated those aspects that are different and l of significance regarding the reracking process. They include the following i aspects previously discussed in the EA and SER: 4 l Occupational exposure, EA Section 3.2* i Installation of racks and load handling, SER Section 5; Radiation' protection and ALARA considerations, SER Section 8 j Reracking installation, SER Section 12, Item 7. i The staff evaluation for each of these aspects is provided in the following sections of this report.. The staff also has considered if the wet reracking involves any alternative action other than those previously evaluated, as o discussed in Section 2.5 below. The staff review and evaluation of the wet i reracking included requests for additional infomation to the' licensee i ] (Refs 5 and 6), a meeting with the licensee on January 22, 1987'(Ref. 7) and additional information provided by the licensee (Refs. 8 and Ref. 9). The wet reracking does not change any of the other matters _ previously evaluated in the staff's Safety Evaluation and Environmental Assessment, and i furthermore, does not require any other changes to the Technical Specifications than were included in Amendment Nos. 8 and 6 for Units 1 and 2, respectively. 1 2.1 Rack Removal And Installation In Section 2 of its SE (Ref. 2) the staff had concluded that the installation - in a dry and uncontaminated condition will not result in an accident with the potential release of radioactivity. The staff requested additional information on the rack removal and installation aspect for a wet and contaminated condition (Refs. 5 and 6), discussed this matter with the 11censeo in a meeting on January 22,1987 (Ref. 7) and the licensee provided further information (Refs. 8 and 9). In the February 2,1987 submittal (Ref. 9) the licensee stated that procedures will be developed for the removal of the original racks and the installation of the new, high density racks. These procedures will include requirements - for handling heavy loads, radiation protection, tool control and app _ropriate special lifting devices. Further, the special lifting devices and overhead i crane that will be used to remove the existing, low density spent fuel racks and install the new, high density racks will be tested and inspected in accordance with the requirements of ANSI B30.9-1971 and ANSI B.30.2.0-1976, j respectively. Additionally, the crane operators have been trained in accordance with ANSI B.30.2.0-1976. i j
[' V j l .The handling of both the original.and the new racks is governed by criteria for the. handling-of heavy loads, as prescribed in NUREG-0612. " Control' of Heavy-Loads at Nuclear Power' Plants" (Ref. ' 10). These activities will be performed consistent with the licensee's previous commitments to the NUREG-06d2 guidelines. In the staff's' Safety Evaluation Report Supplement Nos. 27 and 31, SSER-27 and SSER-31, respectively ~(Refs.11 and ~12) the staff concluded that the. licensee's i program for the Diablo Canyon plant for the control of heavy loads complies with the guidelines.of NUREG-0612. This conclusion remains unchanged. The aspects of a potential accident involving spent fuel during thelreracking operations is' discussed in Section 2.3 below. j 2.2 -Radiation Protection and ALARA Considerations The staff evaluation for radiation protection and ALARA considerations was previously provided in.Section 8 of its Safety Evaluation (Ref. 2) for. the dry and uncontaminated condition. Additional information for the wet and . contaminated condition has.been provided by the licensee:(Refs. 8 and 9). Underwater. lighting. and TV. monitoring will facilitate diver and installation operations. Diver exclusion zones around spent fuel will be established and diver decontamination crews will be provided to ensure exposures are within the limits specified by 10 CFR Part 20 and meet ALARA Guidelines.. Spent fuel stored in original or new racks will be moved to positions furthest away from where divers are performing rerack operations. Diving operations will not be pennitted during fuel handling operations. -The effect on occupational exposure for the wet rerack is estimated to be 9.7 man-rem with a maximum individual dose of 1.1 rem. This exposure is approximately 3% of the plant yearly cumulative' dose. Regarding the disposal of the original racks, previously discussed in Section 5 and Section 8 of the SE, the licensee will decontaminate the racks in the cask ~washdown area following their removal from.the spent fuel pool. Original racks that are sufficiently decontaminated will be disposed of as scrap. The 4 disposal'of contaminated materials and equipment will be in accordance with plant procedures for radioactive. waste. Any additional solid waste requiring land burial is not expected to be significant and therefore not an environmental burden. This aspect is also discussed in Section 2.4 of this report. 2.3 Accidents In Section 12 of the SE the staff presented its evaluation of postulated accidents,. including an accident during the reracking operations. Because the reracking was expected to be performed prior to the first refueling and 'therefore in a dry and uncontaminated condition, the staff concluded that the probability of an accident involving the release of radioactivity and its consequences were insignificant. The staff has reviewed the additional infonnation provided by the licensee with respect to the reracking in a wet and contaminated condition. Movement of original and new spent feel racks ' during the' reracking operation will be perfonned only without fuel assemblies in the racks. The spent fuel assemblies will be positioned well away from the area where. spent fuel rack movement is being conducted. Appropriate procedures and rack transport methods will be developed and adhered to in order to control the movement of the spent fuel racks and to preclude the accidental dropping.
i. tipping, or swinging of a spent fuel rack inta an adjacent rack in which spent fuel assemblies have been loaded. Safe load paths will be designated to preclude the carrying of heavy loads over racks containing spent fuel. Therefore, collisions with spent fuel stored in racks during the original rack removal and new rack installation phase is not considered credible. Based on its review of the information provided by the licensee, the staff has detennined that an original or new spent fuel rack will not collide with any spent fuel assemblies. The staff also concludes that the consequences of the other accidents previously evaluated in Section 12 of the SE, including the spent fuel handling accident, also addressed in Section 9 of the SE, are not affected by the wet reracking and, U.erefore, the consequences do not change. The staff concludes that the method for removal of the original spent fuel racks and for the installation of the new, high density racks, as proposed by the licensee, provide reasonable assurance that the reracking will not result in an accident with a potential for the release of significant amounts of radioactivity or with a potential for criticality. 2.4 Environmental Impacts The non-radiological environmental impacts of dry reracking were previously addressed in Section 4 of the Environme; ital Assessment (Ref. 3). The non-radiological environmental impacts of wet reracking are the same as for dry reracking. The non-radiological environmental effects of the reracking operation itself and of operating the reracked pools are insignificant. Radiological environmental impacts of dry reracking were previously addressed in Section 3.0 of the Environmental Assessment. The dry reracking operation would not have involved radioactive materials and operation of the reracked pools would not significantly increase the radiological environmental impacts. Radiological environmental impacts of wet reracking are addressed in Section 2.2 of this Supplement. Two additional, potential sources of environmental consequences were identified by the licensee for wet reracking. The consequences of an accident during the reracking operations having offsite consequences were found to be enveloped by the fuel handling accident previously evaluated in Section 9 of the Safety Evaluation (Ref. 2). Another potential source of environmental consequences is the generation of radioactively contaminated wastes. The exact amount of radioactive waste which will be generated during reracking is not known at this time. It will partially depend on the extent to which the original racks can be decontaminated. If none of the racks can be decontaminated a conservative upper bound of the amount would be less than half the uncompacted volume of the racks, that is, approximately 9,000 cubic feet per pool (Ref. 8). Because the radioactive waste from wet reracking will be packaged, transported, and disposed of in a manner consistent with NRC regulations, there will be no significant radiological impact on the environment. This waste consists primarily of those original spent fuel racks which cannot be-decontaminated. It also includes potential additional filters and other disposable material generated during the wet reracking operations. This aspect is also addressed in Section 2.2 of this report.
) o . s 2.5' Alternatives Alternatives to the reracking of the spent fuel pools were previously considered in Section 1.3 of the Environmental Assessment (Ref. 3). The six alternatives considered were found to be inferior to the licensee's proposed dry reracking. These alternatives have been re-examined in comparison to wet reracking. These same alternatives were found.not to offer an environmental advantage Lo.ver the wet rerack proposal. Because the impact of wet reracking on the natural. and man-made environment is not significant the burden to look for environmentally superior alternatives.tnd to examine relative costs is eliminated. Nevertheless,' the staff examined the relative economic advantage of wet reracking. The licensee. estimates that the wet reracking effort will cost $13 million for each unit. This is $6 million per unit more than for the previously expected dry-reracking. For a pool fully loaded with 1324 assemblies, this results in a cost of about $21 per.kg of storage capacity in 1987 dollars for the wet reracking. This is still considerably less expensive than building new, additional storage facilities either on site or away from the site. Costs associated with reracking relative to new storage were explored in an IAEA Advisory. Group / Specialist Meeting, (Ref.13). Capital costs for reracking were in the range of $5 per kg to $15 per kg, whereas capital costs for new fuel pools for a two reactor site were $S2 per kg, all in 1980 dollars. The . staff concludes that the wet reracking cost of $21 per kg (1987 dollars) is comparable to the-$5.to $15 per kg (1980 dollars) and is significantly lower than the cost for new fuel pools. 3. BORAFLEX NEUTRON ABSORBING MATERIAL By letter dated May 5,1987, Commonwealth Edison filed a report with the.NRC regarding gaps measured in '3oraflex, the neutron absorbing material used in the high-density fuel storage racks for the Quad Cities Station. Since the Boraflex material is also' proposed to be used in the Region 1 racks at Diablo Canyon, the NRC staff issued a letter to PG&E dated June 2, 1987 (Ref. 19) enclosing the report and requesting additional information. Boraflex is a trade name for a boron carbide dispersion in a rubber-like matrix material-(elastomeric silicone) manufactured by Bisco Products, Inc. The Boraflex is manufactured in long sheets which are placed on the outside of storage cells to absorb neutrons and thereby lower the effective multiplicat;on factor (k,ff). Gaps were found in some of the Boraflex sheets at Quad Cities, occurring in 7 the upper two-thirds of the cell length. The average gap was li inches, with the largest 4 inches. The problems found at Quad Cities were also the i subject of an NRC Infonnation Notice No. 87-43, " Gaps in Neutron-Absorbing Material in High-Density Spent Fuel Storage Racks", dated September 8,1987. The request for additional information for Diablo Canyon was focused.on the acceptability of the Boraflex material application at Diablo Canyon, surveillance procedures, and possible corrective actions if needed. In its response dated August 4, 1987 (Ref. 20), PG&E stated that it does not expect the Quad Cities problem to occur at Diablo Canyon, citing design differences. Nevertheless, PG&E will monitor ongoing industry programs to evaluate the nature and consequences of Boraflex shrinkage. Further, PG&E comitted to institute a surveillance program to monitor for possible long-tenn
'l d ' degradation to ensure that k does not exceed the Technical Specification upper limit of 0.95. In supht of that. program, PG&E will perfom an initial baseline neutron blackness test to both confirm the uniform presenceof Boraflex and to provide a data point for future reference. We have reviewed the surveillance program established by PG&E and have concluded that it should be effective in detecting possivle Boraflex degradation before it should become a problem. Should significant degradation occur, the staff will require that additional blackness' tests 'on full-length panels be conducted to establish the full extent of actual degradation in the racks. 4. GENERIC FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT In its decision, the United States Court of Appeals observed that "...the site-specific environmental assessment was based on a seven year old generic environmental assessment...", apparently referring to NUREG-0575, the Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement (Ref.14), implying, without-specifying any particular area of deficiency, that.neither site-specific nor current information was considered in the Environmental Assessment (Ref. 3). The continuing validity and site-specific applicability of the conclusions.in the NUREG-0575 have been confimed in the Environmental Assessments for the Surry and the H. B. Robinson Plants independent - s)ent fuel storage installations (Refs.15 and 16, respectively), and again in tie Environmental Assessment for the proposed reracking of the Diablo Canyon Plant spent fuel pools. Both site-specific and current infomation have been considered in these Environmental Assessments. In the context of reracking, the only potential Diablo Canyon site-specific impacts are those associated with the increase in waste heat; other impacts are generic in nature. Thus, the-staff determined in its Environmental Assessment for the Diablo Canyon Plant, that "the increase in waste heat from the additional storage of spent fuel will have a negligible effect on the Pacific Ocean water temperature 'l near the discharge." The lack of site-specific discussion-of terrestrial and radiological impacts is due to the fact that causes for such impacts are not associated with reracking and operation of the high density pools. In addition, in the absence of significant environmental impacts from the proposed action, an environmental impact statement (as opposed to an environmental assessment) need not be prepared and the burden of looking for environmentally superior alternatives is eliminated. However, due to the interest in possible alternatives to reracking a discussion of alternatives was provided in the Environmental Assessment which 4 summarized some of the significant problems associated with each. With respect to the currency of the infomation relied upon, the discussion in - the Environmental Assessment does take into account infonnation more recent than NUREG-0575, for example, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 and the Environinental Assessments for the Surry and H. B. Robinson Plants independent 1 spent fuel storage installations, prepared as part of the staff's licensing review and issued in April 1985 and March 1986, respectively (Refs.15 and 16). t furthermore, to the extent that the reliance was placed on NUREG-0575, the staff has examined that data and assured itself that the information is still current. 1 I l 1
g h Fnp b< m _y_ ~ 5. SEVERE ACCIDENT CONSIDERATIONS In its decision, the Court of Appeals also observed that no " worst case" analysis appears to have been conducted for the' spent fuel pool expansion at Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2. As required by 40 CFR 1502.22(b) (Ref. 17), a. " worst case" analysis in an environmental impact statement was to be perfonned when information concerning significant' adverse impacts relevant to full consideration of a proposed action was not known. In 1986, this regulation was amended to-delete the requirement for a " worst case" analysis and a requirement was substituted that an impact statement include, subject to the rule of reason, consideration of the " reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts" of anaction(Ref.l18). The. staff, in its Safety Evaluation and' Environmental Assessment (Ref. 2a) has addressed ooth the safety and environmental aspects of a fuel handling accident, an event which bounds the. potential adverse consequences of accidents attributable - ) to. operation of a spent fuel 3001 with'high density racks,-irrespective of whether the installation of t1e high density racks was accomplished in a dry, uncontaminated or a wet, contaminated pool environment...A fuel. handling accident' may be viewed as a " reasonably foreseeable" design-basis event which the pool and its associated structures.. systems and components (including the racks) are
- designed and constructed to prevent. The environmental impacts'of this accident were found not to be significant.
In keeping with 40 CFR 1502.22(b), the staff has considered accidents whose consequences might exceed a fuel handling accident, that is, beyond design basis events. Such occurrences include a criticality accident and a zircaloy i clad fire caused by overheating due to a loss of spent fuel pool cooling caused by a pool. failure. Compliance with General Design Criteria 61, " Fuel Storage .and Handling and Radioactivity Control" and 62, " Prevention of Criticality in Fuel Storage and Handling" of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, and adherence to approved industry codes and standards as set forth-in the licensee's rerack application (which includos compliance with certain design and construction criteria contained in the Final Safety Analysis Report) provides assurance that such events are of very low probability by ensuring that pool and rack integrity and pool cooling capability are maintained. Acceptance criteria for the General Design Criteria consider all reasonably foreseeable events. For example, in this case, criticality is prevented by providing very' strong racks-which will maintain the proper spacing between fuel assemblies; the spent fuel pool walls are made of reinforced concrete about six feet thick, rendering j pool wall. failure a very unlikely event. In both situations, the environmental impacts could be significant; however, j L neither of these events is considered to be within the rule of reason, that is, they are not reasonably foreseeable events, in light of the design of the spent' fuel pools and racks. Therefore, further discussion of their impacts i is not warranted and the staff continues to conclude that the reasonably foreseeable impacts attributable to the proposed action are not sign.ificant and that an environmental impact statement need not be prepared. 6.
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS The staff has reviewed and evaluated the reracking aspects associated with a wet and contaminated condition for Units 1 and 2 and the gaps reported in the .Boraflex neutron absorbing material. The staff effort was based on information provided by the licensee in submittals and during the January 22, 1987 meeting. Based on its evaluation the staff concludes:
1 I l 1. The ' removal of the original spent, fuel racks and the installation of the.new, high density racks will be performed using qualified and l tested equipment and in accordance with procedures to provide l reasonable assurance that an accident with a potential for the release of a significant amount of radioactivity or for critifulity will not occur. 2. Radiation protection and ALARA considerations have been taken and will be implemented to minimize personnel exposures. 3. The disposal of the original racks does not involve new or unique techniques with respect to the. handling, decontamination and ultimate disposal. 4. There will be no non-radiological impacts. The radiological impacts
- )
remain enveloped by the consequences of the fuel handling accident previously q evaluated for the spent fuel pool expansion. There will be no significant l impact to the environment from any waste disposal associated with the wet l reracking. 5. None of the alternatives previously evaluated by the staff is superior to wet reracking. 6. The comitments for surveillance and other actions contained in PG&E's letter of August 4,1987 regarding Boraflex should be effective in detecting Boraflex degradation should it occur. The staff concludes that the proposed reracking of the Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 spent fuel pools in a wet and contaminated condition is acceptable, The staff has given further consideration, as suggested by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to the adequacy of the generic environmental impact statement and to the need for a " worst case" analysis with respect to its Environmental Assessment of May 21, 1986 for the spent fuel pool expansion. The staff concludes that the consideration of more recent infonnation does not change its conclusion regarding the environmental impact statement and that even i though a " worst case" analysis is not required, the potential adverse consequences j of either a wet or dry reracking operation are bounded by the staff's fuel i handling accident analysis. j l 7. CONTRIBUTORS l This report was prepared by the staff of the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Individuals participating in the preparation are: Donald Cleary Robert Fell Hans Schierling l-Amarjit Singh Charles Trammell James Wing
i l 8. REFERENCES 1.. PG&E Letter DCL 85-333, October 30, 1985 from D. A. Brand (PG&E) to H. R. Denton,
Subject:
License Amendment Request 85-13. Reracking of Spent Fuel Pools. 2a. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Letter from H. Schierling (NRC) to l J. D. Shiffer (PG&E) dated May 30, 1986, transmitting Safety Evaluation,- Notice, and Amendment No. 8 to Facility Operating License DPR-80, Diablo Canyon Unit 1, Docket No. 50-275, and Amendment No. 6 to Facility Operating 1 License DPR-82. Diablo Canyon Unit 2. Docket No. 50-323. 2b. Federal Register Notice, Vol. 51, No. 117, 22251, dated June 18, 1986. 3a. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Letter dated May 21, 1986 from H. Schierling (NRC) to J. D. Shiffer (PG&E),
Subject:
Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact - Spent Fuel Pool Expansion, Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units I and 2. 3b. Federal Register Notice, Vol. 51, No.103,19430, dated May 29, 1986. 4. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, "0 PINION", dated September.11,1986 [799 F.2d 1268 (9th Cir.1986) and 804 F.2d 523 (9th Cir.1986)]. 5. U.S. Nuclear Reculatory Comission, Letter dated November 24, 1986, from H. Schierling_ ( ARC) to J. D. Shiffer (PG&E),
Subject:
Diablo Canyon Spent Fuel Pool Reracking - Request for Additional Infomation. 6. U.S. Nuclear Re H. Schierling (gulatory Comission, Letter dated January15, 1986, from NRCI to J. D. Shiffer (PG&E),
Subject:
Request for Additional Information on Wet Reracking. 7. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission. Meeting Sumary dated January 28, 1987 by H. Schierling (NRC),
Subject:
Meeting Sumary - Wet Reracking of Spent Fuel Pools, January 22, 1987. 8. PG&E Letter DCL 86-360. December 18, 1986, from J. D. Shiffer (PG&E) to S. A. Varga (NRC),
Subject:
Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2, Additional Information on Spent Fuel Pool Reracking. 9. PG&E' Letter DCL 87-018, February 2,1987, from J. D. Shiffer,
Subject:
Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2, Request for Additional Information on Wet Reracking. 10. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Report NUREG-0612. " Control of Heavy loads at Nuclear Power Plants, Resolution of Generic Technical Activity A-6," July 1980. ~ 11. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Safety Evaluation of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2," NUREG-0675, Supplement No. 27, July 1984.
- l. 12.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Safety Evaluation of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2," NUREG-0675, Supplement No. 31, April 1985. 13. U.S. Department of Energy, DOE-SR-0009 (UC-85), " Spent Fuel Storage Alternative," Proceedings of an IAEA Advisory Group / Specialist Meeting, Las Vegas, Nevada, USA, November 17-21, 1980, 14. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Report NUREG-0575, " Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Handling and Storage of Spent Light Water Power Reactor Fuel," Volumes 1, 2 and 3, August 1979. l 15. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Environmental Assessment Related to i the Construction and Operation of the Surry Dry Cask Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Letter from L. C. Rouse (NRC) to W. L. Stewart (Virginia Electric Power Company), dated April 12, 1985. 16. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Environmental Assessment Related to the Construction and Operation of the H. B. Robinson Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation," Docket No. 50-261, Carolina Power and Light Company, March 1986.
- 17. Code of Federal Regulations, 40 CFR, Section 1502.22(1985).
- 18. Federal Register Notice, Volume 51, No. 80, 15618 dated April 25, 1986.
- 19. NRC letter dated June 2,1987 from C. M. Trammell (NRC) to J. D. Shiffer (PG&E),
Subject:
Request for Additional Information re: Boraflex.
- 20. PG&E letter DCL 87-190, August 4, 1987 from J. D. Shiffer (PG&E) to NRC,
Subject:
PG&E's response to NRC staff request for additional information on Boraflex. 1 i m.m
u,. 7590-01 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION PACIFIC GAS AFD ELECTRIC COMPANY DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NOS. 50-275 AND 50-323 NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENT TO ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has issued a Supplement to its original Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact issued on May 21, 1986 and published in the Federal Register on May 29, 1986 (51 FR 19430) regarding proposed amendments to the operating licenses authorizing modifications to the Diablo Canyon spent fuel pools. The modifications would increase the capacity of each pool from 270 fuel assemblies to 1324 fuel assemblies. Identification of Proposed Action: The proposed action is an amendment to the operating licenses for Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 to authorize increased storage capacity of spent fuel by the installation of storage racks with closer spacing. The Supplement addresses the environmental impacts of conducting the conversion to the new spent fuel storage racks with spent fuel now stored in each spent fuel pool, which now are full of borated water (" wet reracking"). The original environmental assessment did not address this matter since the ~ conversion was originally planned before the first refueling of each unit and l l therefore could be performed in dry, empty spent fuel pools.
li 1' i; 'In addition, the supplement explains how the Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Handling and Storage of Spent Light Water Powef Reactor Fuel (NUREG-0575, August 1979) was relied upon in the staff's original site-specific environmental assessment. The supplement also briefly discusses severe beyond-design-basis accidents. Both of these discussions are in response to coments made by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace and the Sierra Club vs. NRC, 799 F.2d 1268(9thCir.1986). Sumary of-Environmental Assessment: With respect to the matters discussed above, non-radiological. environmental impacts due to the " wet reracking" are the same as those due to " dry" reracking, i.e., there are no additional environmental impacts due to this change, and the impacts are insignificant. As for radiological environmental impacts, the consequences of fuel damage during the wet reracking are enveloped by the standard fuel handling accident previously evaluated. The wet reracking would generate additional contaminated waste, but its disposal would not create a significant radiological impact on the environment. The previous analyses of six alternatives is not impacted by the change to wet reracking; the alternatives considered continue to be inferior to reracking. The supplement confirms the continued validity of the generic 1 environmental impact statement and its site-specific applicability to recent I 1 environmental assessments at Surry, Robinson, and Diablo Canyon. 1 Beyond-design-basis accidents, such as a criticality accident and a l zircalloy cladding fire caused by overheating due to a loss of pool water caused by pool failure, are very low probability accidents and are not viewed as reasonably forseeable events. Therefore, further discussion of their impacts is not required or presented.
~ 3,. 1 l } t l l Finding of No Significant Impact: The Comission has reviewed the 9roposed changes and other matters discussed above relative to the requirements-set ] forth in 10 CFR 51. Based <upon the supplement to the environmental 'j assessment, the Comission continues to cr.clude that there are no significant radiologicci or non-radiological impacts associated with.the proposed action ' -{ r l and that the proposed license amendments wili.not have a significant effect on l the quality of the human environment. 1Therefore, the Commission reaffirms its - determination, pursuant to 10-CFR 51.31, not to prepare an environmental - impact statement for.the proposed action. For.further details-with respect to this action, see (1) the Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact dated May 21, 1987 and related Notice published in the Federal Register on May 29,~1986(51FR19430)and-i references cited therein, and (2) Supplement to the Safety Evaluation and the Environmental Assessment dated October 15, 1987-and references cited therein. All.of these items are.available for public inspection at the Comission's Public Document Room,1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20555, i and at the California Polytechnic State University Library, Government Document and Maps Department, San Luis Obispo, California 93407. Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 15th day of October,1987. FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION k Charles M. Tramell, Project Manager Project Directorate V Division of Reactor Projects-III, IV, V and Special Projects 2 __m____________
l 1 DOCKETED 1 3" U$NRC l l l
- 2R OCT 21 #0:28 PROOF OF SERVICE
- d5Mh7, I
l I, Deborah M.. Hunt,- declare ' that on Oc u 'EghdhNc Shay in deposited copies of.the attached Intervenor's R the United States mail with postage thereon fully prepaid and I addressed to the parties listed below: ) l Dr. Jerry Harbour. Mr. Leland M. Gustafson, I Administrative Judge Federal Relations Manager. Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Pacific Gas & Electric Co. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. 1726 "M" Street, NW, Suite 1100
- Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington,.D.C. 20036-4502 ) Glenn.O. Bright Richard F. Locke, Esq.* Administrative Judge Pacific Gas G-Electric Co. Atomic Safety.& Licensing Board 77 Beale Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. San Francisco, CA 94105 Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Gordon A. Silver Benjamin Vogler, Esq. Ms. Sandra A. Silver Office of tne-General Counsel 660 Granite Creek Road U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. Santa Cruz, CA 95065 Washington, D.C. 20555 Ms. Laurie McDermott, j Atomic. Safety & Licensing Coordinator Board Panel C.O.D.E.S. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. 731 Pacific. Street, Suite 42 Washington, D.C. 20555 San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 B. Paul Cotter, Jr., Chairman Mrs. Jacquelyn Wheeler Administrative Judge 3033 Barranca Court Atomic Safety & Licensing Board San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. R.B. Ferguson Sierra Club / Santa Lucia Chapter Atomic Safety & Licensing Rocky Canyon Star Route Appeal Panel (5 copies) Creston, CA 93432 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. Washington, D.C. 20555 Ms. Nancy Culver 192 Luneta Street Bruce Norton, Esq.* San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 Pacific Gas & Electric Company ) 77 Beale Street Managing Editor l San Francisco, CA 94105 S.L.O. Telegram-Tribune l l P.O. Box 112 L R. Blankenburg/W. Soroyan San Luis Obispo, CA 93406 l. South County Publishing Company P.O. Box 460 Arroyo Grando, CA 93420 I.am, and was at the time of the service of the attached paper,. over the age of 18 and not a party to the proceeding. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. ) ( A '[,7 l
- hand' delivered Dsborah M.
Hunt}}