Text

Proposed Tech Specs,Permitting Removal of Rod Sequence Control Sys & Reduce Rod Worth Minimizer Cutoff Setpoint to 10% Rated Thermal Power
	ML20012C444
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	03/14/1990
From:	; CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20012C443	List: ML20012C442; ML20012C444;
References
	NUDOCS 9003210297
	Download: ML20012C444 (38)
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ENCLOSURE 3.

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT,- UNITS 1 AND 2 f

NRC DOCKETS 50-325 4.50-324 i OPERATING LICENSES DPR-71.4.DPR-62 -l REQUEST FOR LICENSE AMENDNENT- .j ROD SEQUENCE CONTROL' SYSTEM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES - UNIT 1 -i j

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INDEX i

I LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVE!LLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PACE 3 / 4 . 0 A P P L I C A B I L I TY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 / 4 0 - 1 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM,S 3/4.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARCIN............................................ 3/4 1-1 3/4.1.2 REACTIVITY AN0MALIES....................................... 3/4 1-2 3/4.1.3 CONTROL RODS Control Rod Operability.................................... 3/4 1-3 Cont rol Rod Maximum Sc ram Insert ion Time s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 /4 1-$

Control Rod Average Scram Insertion Times.................. 3/4 1-6 Four Cont rol Rod Croup Scram Insert ion Times. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-7 Control Rod Scram Accumulators............................. 3/4 1-8 Cont rol Rod Dr i ve Cou pl i ng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 /4 1-9 Control Rod Position Indication............................ 3/4 1-11 Control Rod Drive Housing Support.......................... 3/4 1-13 l 3/4.1.4 CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS l

Rod Worth Minimiter........................................ 3/4 1-14

":d 5:g: :: ": :::1 Sy::: ..... ......................... 2f' l-!!

Rod Block Monitor.......................................... 3/4 1-17 3/4.1.5 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM.............................. 3/4 1-18 3/4.2 POWER DIS 1RIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.1 AVERACE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT CENERATION RATE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 2-1 3/4.2.2 APRM SETP0!NTS............................................. 3/4 2-2 3/4.2.3 MI NI MUM CRI TICAL POWER RATI0. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 /4 2- 3 l

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 IV Amendment No. 131

. O INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PACE 3/4.9 REFUELINC OPERATIONS (Continued) 3/4.9.3 CONTROL RCJ POSIT!0N.................................. 3/4 9-5

, 3/4.9.4 DECAY TIME............................................ 3/4 9-6 3/4.9.$ COMMUNICATIONS........................................ 3/4 9-7 3/4.9.6 CRANE AND HOIST OPERABILITY........................... 3/4 9-8 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL-SPENT FUEL STORACE P00L.................. 3/4 9-9 3/4.9.8 WATER LEVEL-REACTOR VESSEL............................ 3/4 9-10 3/4.9.9 WATER LEVEL-SPENT FUEL STORACE P00L................... 3/4 9-11 3/4.9.10 CONTROL ROD REMOVAL Single Control Rod Removal............................ 3/4 9-12 Multiple Control Rod Removal.......................... 3/4 9-14 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 PkIMARY CONTAINMENT INTECRITY......................... 3/4 10-1 gg,,ETbT3 /4.10. 2 :;C ;; ;; E ^ L ..;C E CC N T :L '"l ^ T L . .v . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 10-2 3/4.10.3 SHUTDOWN KARCIN DEMONSTRATIONS........................ 3/4 10-3 3/4.10.4 R EC I R CU LAT I ON L00 P S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 10-4 3/4.10.5 PLANT SERVICE WATER................................... 3/4 10-5 l

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BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 IX Amendment No. 133

. . REACTIVITY COWrROL SYFTEMS I LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued) i ACf!ON: (Continued)

\

2. Lf the inoperable control rod (s) is inserted l a) Within one hour disarm the associated directional control valves !

either:

1) Electrically, or

, 2) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water

isolation valves.

b) Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

c. With more than 8 control rods inoperable, be in at least HUT SKUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

3RVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1. 3.1.1 The scran discharge volume drain and vent valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days byt* ,

n. Verifying each valve to be open.

b. Cycling each valve at least one complete cycle of full travel.

4.1. 3.1. 2 All withdrawn control rods not required to have their directional control valves disarmed electrically or hydraulically shall be demonstrated ,

OPERABLE by moving each control rod at least one notcht

a. At least once per 7 days when above the preset power level of the RWM nf ?_fCE, and

b. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months when above the preset power level of the RWM ann and any control rod is ismovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference.

4.1.3.1 3 All withdrawn control rods shall be determined OPERABLE by demonstrating the scram discharge volume drain and vent valves OPERABLE, when the reactor protection system logic is tested per Specification 4.3.1.2, by ver1fying that the drain and vent valves:

a.

Close within 30 seconde af ter receipt of a signal for control rods to scram, and

b. Open when the scraa signal is reset or the scran discharge volume trip is bypassed.

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These ialves may be closed intermittently for testing under administrative control.

i BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 3/41-4 g l

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD MAXIMUM SCRAM INSERTION TIMES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.2 The maximum scram insertion time of each control rod from the fully withdrawn position to notch position 6, based on de-energization of the scram pilot valve solenoids as time zero, shall not exceed 7.0 seconds.

_APPLICARILITY: CONDITIONS I and 2.

ACTION:

With the maximum scram insertion time of one or more control rods exceeding 7.0 seconds, operation may continue snel the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable provided thatt

a. The control rod with the slow insertion time is declared inoperable,

b. The requirements of Specification 31.31 are satisfied, and A

7 X.d The Surveillance Requirements of Specification 4.1.3 2.c are performed at least once per 92 days when operation is continued with three or more control rods with slow scras insertion times:

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

k, SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.1.1 2 The maximum scram insertion time of the control rode shall be demonstrated through measurements

a. For all control rods prior to THERMAL POWER exceeding 40% of RATED '

l THERMAL POWER following CORE ALTEkATIONS or af ter a reactor shutdown that is greeter than 120 days,

b. For specifically affected individual control rods following maintenance on or undification to the control rod or rod drive systes which could affect the scram insertion time of those specific control rods, and

c. For 10% of the control rods, on a rotating basis, et least once per 120 days of operation.

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS i

TOUR CONTROL ROD GROUP SCRAM INSERTION TIMES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.4 The average scram insertion time, from the fully withdrawn position, for the three fastest control rods in each group of four control rods arranged in a two-by-two array. based on deenergitation of the scram pilot valve solenoids as time zero, shall not exceed any of the following:

Position Inserted From Average Scram inser- <

Fully Withdrawn tion Time (Se cond s)

I 46 0.33 )

36 1.12 k 26 1.93 6 3.58 APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2.

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ACTION:

With the average scram insertion times of control rods exceeding the above limits, operation may continue and the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable provided:

a. The control rods with the slower than average scram insertion times are declared inoperable,

b. The requirements of Specification 3.1.3.1 are satisfied, and M

/. 4 The Surveillance Requirements of Specification 4.1.3.2.c are performed at least once per 92 days when operation is continued with l

three or more control rods with slow scram insertion times.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.4 All control rods shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by. scram time testing from the fully withdrawn position as required by Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.2. [e w >

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BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 3/4 1 7 Amendment No. 56 I

CONTROL ROD SCRAM ACCUMULATORS LIMITINC CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.5 All control rod scram accumulators shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 5*. %

ACTION!

a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2 with one control rod scram b accumulator inoperable, the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable and operation may continue, provided that within 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months st

1. The inoperable accumulator is restored to OPERABLE status, or

2. The control rod associated with the inoperable accumulator is declared inoperable, and the requirements of Specificatiun 3.1.3.1 are satisfied.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5* with a withdrawn control rod scram i accumulator inoperable, fully insert the affected control rod and electrically disarm the directional control valves within one hour.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.5 The control rod scram accumulators shall be determined OPERABLEt

a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that the pressure and leak detectors are not in the alarmed condition, and

< b. At least once per 18 months by performance of at

1. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the leak detectors, and

2. CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the pressure detectors.

At least the accumulator associated with each withdrawn control rod. Not l applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

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BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 3/4 1-8 Amendment No. 130

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

. CONTROL ROD DRIVE COUPLING LIMITING CONDITION POR OPERATION 3 1 3.6 All control rods shall be coupled to their drive mechanisms. i APPLICARILITY: CONDITIONS 1, 2, and $*.

ACTION:

a. In CONDITION 1 or 2 vith one control rod not coupled to its associated drive mechanism, the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable and operation may continue provided; RW N4

1. Within the preset power level of the 4999,#tte control rod is declared inoperable and fully inserted until recoupling can he ,

attempted with THERMAL POWER above the preset power level of the asest hwh ed. % reIair mee .+ Sta.iSc.h 3.l.4J.d

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2. Above the preset power level of the ese , t / control rod drive t is inserted to accomplish recoupling. If recoup 11ng is not accomplished on the first attempt, declare the control rod inoperable, fully insert the control rod, and electrically disarm the directional control valves.

3. The requirements of Specification 3 1.3.1 are satisfied.

b. In CONDITION 5*, with a withdrawn control rod not coupled to its

! associated drive mechanism, insert the control rod to accomplish recoupling. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable. ,

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.1.3.6 The coupling integrity of a control rod shall be demonstrated by withdrawing the control rod to the fully withdrawn position and verifying that the rod does not go to the overtravel position;

a. Prior to reactor criticality af ter completing CORE ALTERATIONS that could have af f ected the control rod drive coupling integrity, 1

l *At least each withdrawn control rod. Not applicable to control rods removed l

per Specification 3.9 10.1 or 3 9 10.2.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 3/4 1-9 /

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

, ' CONTROL ROD POSITION INDICATION ,

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.7 All control rod reed switch position indicators shall be OPERARLF..

APPLICABILITY: CONDITIONS 1, 2, and $*. ,

ACTION:

a. In CONDITION 1 or 23 gg

[CWith one or more contro rod reed switch position indicators

.%.," Full-in" or " Full-out" indication, the inoperable. : - ,.

provisions of Specification 3 0.4 are not applicable and -

operation may continue, provided that within one hour:

(, /) The position of the control rod is determined by an alternate method, or 1./) The control rod is moved to a position with an OPERABLE reed switch position indicator, or ,

3 , /) The control rod with the inoperable reed switch position f

indicator is declared inoperable and the requirements of Specification 313.1 are satisfied:

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

With one or more control rod reed switch " Full-in" and/o I. -out" position indicators inoperable, the control rod may passed in the Rod Sequence ol Systes, the provisions o p cification 3.0.4 ar applicable and operation may co(ntIn provide

, a) The actual contro od po i n is known, I

b) The af fectep trol rod is move he correct position in the r sequence, and c) ch bypassed control rod is separated in all direct fros any other bypassed control rod by at least two cont cells. _

b. In CONDITION 5* with a withdrawn control rod reed switch position indicator inoperable, fully insert the withdrawn control rod. The provisions of Specification 3 0 3 are not applicable.

At least each withdrawn control rod. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9 10.1 or 3.9 10 2.

b.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 3/4 1-11 4 % W %I \%g w2 ?ceser TA) Git., LDEL OG 94E W2--- -

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. KEACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS :

i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.7 i The control rod reed switch position indicators shall be determined OPERABLE by verifying

a. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , that the position of the control rod la indicated,

b. That the indicated control rod position changes during the movement I of the control rod when performing Surveillance Requirement , 4.1.3.1.2, and

c. That the control rod reed switch position indicator corresponds to the control rod position indicated by the " full-out" reed switches 3 when performing Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.6.b. '

1 ___

4.1. . When the RSCS is required to be OPERABLE, the post f aa :d ~~

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bypassing of c rods with inoperable " Full i " .. u l-out" reed switch position indication sha u _-'Wsecond licensed operator or other qualified me e technical a l

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l BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 3/4 1-12 Amendment No. 76 ,

.R'EACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.4 CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS -

ROD WORTH MINIMIZER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.4.1 The Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) shall be OPERABLE when THERMAL POWER is 1esa thanp\o,of lo RATED THERMAL POWER.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2*. l ACTION:

)

With the WM ino rable, t e provisi ns of Sp ificatio 3.0.4 a not

k applic le, op ation ma continue nd conte rod mo ment is ermitt g( Q ,1\ prov ed tha a second icensed o erator o other qu ified . mber of he te nical s aff is pr ent at t reactor ontrol nsole a verifi s b mplianc with the prescribed ontrol r d patter l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.4.1.1 The RWM shall be demonstrated OPERABLE in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2, I prior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of making the reactor critical and in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 when the RWM is initiated during l control rod insertion when reducing THERMAL POWER byl

a. Verifying proper annunciation of the selection error of at least one out-of-sequence control rod, and

b. Ver.ifying the rod block function of the RWM by n.oving an out-of-m.luence control rod.

4.1.4.1.2 The RWM shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying the control rod Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence input to the RWM computer is correct l following any loading of the sequence program into the computer.

Entry into OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 and withdrawal of selected control rods is l permitted for the purpose of determining the OPERABILITY of the RWM prior to withdrsaal of control rods for the purpose of bringing the reactor to criticality.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 3/4 1-14 Amendment No. 127

ATTACHMDG 1 (3.1.4.1 ACTION) r

a. With the RWM inoperable after the first 12 control rods have l been fully withdrawn on a startup, operation may continue l provided that control rod movement and compliance l with the prescribed BPWS control rod pattern are verified by a second licensed operator or qualified member of the plant technical )

staff.

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b. With th'a RWM inoperable before the irst 12 control rods are withdrawn on a startup, one startup per . ear aay be performed provided that control rod movement and compliance with the prescribed BPWS control rod pattern are verified by a second licensed operator or qualified member of the plant technical staff,

c. With RWM inoperable on a shutdown, shutdown may continue provided that control rod movement and compliance with. the prescribed BPWS control rod pattern are verified by a second licensed operator or qualified member of the plant technical staff.

d. With RWM operable but 1:1dividual control rod (s) declared inoperable, operation and control rod movement below the preset power level of the RWM may continue provided:

1. No more than three (3) control rods are declared inoperable in any one BPWS group, and,

2. The inoperable control rod (s) is bypassed on the RWM and control rod movement of the bypassed rod (s) is verified by a second licensed operator or qualified member of the plant technical staff.

e. With RWM inoperable, the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS R,0D SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION DA\b 1.4.2 The Rod Sequence Control System (RSCS) shall be OPERABLE when THE -

Pt

.R is less than 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

APPL ABILITY: CONDITIONS 1* and 2* #.

ACTION:

a. W the RSCS inoperable:

1. ntrol rod withdrawal for reactor startup shal not begin.

2. If ntrol rod withdrawal has started and T POWER is less than 0% of RATED THERMAL POWER, control r movement shall not be pe tted, except by scram, until the sequence control system returned to OPERABLE status.

3. With THE POWER being reduced by c trol rod insertion, do not continu ontrol rod insertion ept by a scram.

(

b. With erroneous contr rod position i t to the RSCS, the sequence restraints may be bypa d for corr ion of the erroneous '

information and reiniti ation the RSCS provided that a second Itcensed operator or othet ual ed member of the technical staff is present at the reactor cont onsole and verifies compliance with the prescribed control rod p en.

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See Sp al Test Exception 3.10.2.

En f - into CONDITION 2 and withdrawal of selected control rods is raitted the purpose of determining the OPERABILITY of the RSCS prior to hdrawal control rods for the purpose of bringing the reactor to criticalit BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 3/4 1-15 gigy Q ,

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SlfRVEll.I.ANCE RE01f f REMENTS YkNb l 1

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4. e RSCS shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by attempting to se -

move an ou uence control rod in each of the other groups:

a. In CONDITION 2 p o control rod withdrawal for a reactor startu

b. as the RSCS is automatically in during control rod nsertion when reducing THERMAL POWER.

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SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS

3/4 10.2 ROD SEOUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM

/' ,

L LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (ML '

nd B 3g by the Rod Sequence Control System per Specification 3.1. ay be fo ended by means of the individual rod position bypass swite or the ing tests, provided that at least the requirements o cifications 3.1. . nd 3.1.4.1 are satisfied

a. Sh margin demonstrations, Spe tion 4 1 1,

b. Control r ran time and iction measurements, Specification 4.1 3.2.a.

c. Start-up Testi og w POWER. . ith THERMAL POWER < 20% of RATED 'INERMAL

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4 APPLICABILI OND1TIONS I and 2.

ACTION

the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, verif y that OPERAB12 per Specification 3.1.4.2.

[ SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS L4N _

f .10.2 When the sequence constraints of control rod groups A are bypassed, verify 12' A34' I

a. the RWM is OPERABLE per Specification kee,1,

b. That move -

o preset power le the control rofs.Je6in 0% ROD DENSITY to the RSCS

'or limited to the single notch mode,

c. Conf his spec need operator or other qualified me h dures by a second

- % hp3 chnical staff.

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BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 3/4 10-2 Amme M. ~ . .

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l REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM BASES CONTROL RODS (Continued) on a scram than has been analyzed even though control rods with inop9 table accumulators may still be inserted with normal drive water pressure.

Operability of the accumulator ensures that there is a means available to insert the control rods even under the most unfavorable depressuritation of the reactors.

Control rod coupling integrity is required to ensure compliance with the analysis of the rod drop accident in the FSAR. The overtravel position feature provides the only positive means of determining that a rod is properly coupled and, therefore, this check must be performed prior to achieving criticality after reach refueling. The subsequent check is performed as a backup to the initial demonstration.

In order to ensure that the control rod patterns can be followed and, therefore, that other parameters are within their limits, the control rod position indication system must be OPERABLE.

The control rod housing support restricts the outward movement of a control rod to less than 3 inches in the event of a housing failure. The ,

amount of rod reactivity which could be added by this small amount of rod withdrawal is less than a normal withdrawal increment and will not contribute to any damage to the primary coolant system. The support is not required when there is no pressure to act as a driving force to raoidly eject a drive housing.

The required surveillance intervals are adequate to determine that the rods are OPERABLE and not so frequent as to cause excessive wear on the system components.

3/4.1.4 CONTROL ROD PROCRAM CONTROLS ControA rod withdrawal and insertion sequences are established to assure that the maximum in sequence individual control rod or control rod segments which gre withdrawn at any time during the fuel cycle could not be worth enough to result in a peak fuel enthalpy greater than 280 cal /gm in the event of a control rod drop accident. The specified sequences are characterized by homogeneous, scattered patterns of control rod withdrawal. When THERMAL POWER isgreaterthanorequaltoi[DEofRATEDTHERMALPOWER,thereisnopossible j

rod worth which, if dropped at the design rate of the velocit -limi ray. could result in a peak enthalpy o i 280 cal /gm. Thus, requiring th RWM to i be OPERABLE when THERMAL POWER is less than h of RATED THERMAU rVWLK provides adequate control. h%

Use of the Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence (BPWS) ensures that in the event of a control rod drop accident the peak fuel enthalpy will not be greater than 280 cal /gm (Reference 4).

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-3 Amendment No. 127 J

p dt4SE@T ht W A C- N M d T 1 RkACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM l BASES CONTROL ROD PROCRAM CONTROLS (Continued) he RSCS and RWM provid automatic upervision o assure t t ou of-sequence rods will ot be withd awn or ins ted.

The analysis of the rod drop accident is presented in Section 15.4.6 of the Updated FSAR and the techniques of the analysis are presented in a topical report (Reference 1) and two supplements (References 2 and 3). ,

The RBH is designed to automatically prevent fuel damage in the event of erroneous rod withdrawal from locations of high power density during high power operation. Two channels are provided. Tripping one of the channels will block erroneous rod withdrawal soon enough to prevent fuel damage. This-system backs up the written sequence used by the operator for withdrawal of l control rods.

1 3/4.1.5 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM l The standby liquid control system provides a backup capability for l maintaining the reactor suberitical in the event that insufficient rods are l inserted in the core when a scram is called for. The volume and weight percent of poison material in solution is based on being able to bring the reactor to the suberitical condition as the plant cools to ambient condition. The temperature requirement is necessary to keep the sodium pentaborate in solution. Checking the volume and temperature once each 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months assures that the solution is available for use.

With redundant pumps and a highly reliable control rod scram system, operation of the reactor is permitted to continue for short periods of time with the system inoperable or for longer periods of time with one of the redundant components inoperable.

Surveillance requirements are established on a frequency that assures a high reliability of the system. Once the solution is established, boron concentration will not vary unless more boron or water is added, thus a check on the' temperature and volume once each 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months assures that the solution is available for use.

1. C. J. Paone, R. C. Stirn, and J. A. Woodley, " Rod Drop Accident Analysis for Large BWRs, "C. E. Topical Report NEDO-10527, March 1972.

2. C. J. Paone, R. C. Stirn, and R. M. Yound, Supplement 1 to NESO-10527, July 1972.

3. J. A. Haum, C. J. Paone, and R. C. Stirn, addendum 2, " Exposed Cores",

supplement 2 to NEDO-10527, January 1973.

4. NEDE-24011-P-A, " General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel,"

Revision 6, Amendment 12.

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BRUN C UN 1 /4 -4 Amendment No. 127 l

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ATTACHMENT 2- l

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(3/4.1.4' BASES) l

- The RWM as a backup! to:procedurali control provides an automatic control rod -

! pattern- monitoring- function to' ensure adherence to the BPWS control movement .!

E sequences from 100% control rod density to 10% RATED THERMAL POWER and, thus,- ;

1 eliminates the postulated . control rod drop accident , fromiresulting in a peak

. fuel enthalpy greater' than 280 cal /gm .(Reference 5).~. . l, The' requirement that: RWM be operable for the' withdrawal of-the first .12 -

control 1 rods on a start'up is-.to; ensure that the' RWM' system maintainsia high:

degree of availability, s

Deviation from the BPWS control rod. pattern may be allowed 'for the performance of ~ Shutdown- Martin Demonstration tests.' ,

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.1/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS

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i 3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTECRITY The requirements for PRIMARY CONTAIN4ENT INTEGRITY is removed during the period when open vessel tests are being performed during low power PHYSICS TESTS.

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/ x 3/4.10.2 ROD SEOUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM EUt;( Q to perform the tests required in the Technical S ecif t is necessar the sequence restr movement. The additional surveillance ure that the specifications on heat r,enerstion own marg te not exceeded during the n these tests are being performed.

3/4.10.3 SHUTDOWN MARGIN DEMONSTRATIONS Performance of shutdown margin demonstrations with the vessel head removed requires additional restrictions in order to ensure that criticality does not occur. These additional restrictions are specified in this LCO.

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3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION LOOPS This special test exception permits reactor- criticality under no flow conditions and is required to perform certain start-up and PHYSICS TESTS while at low WERMAL POWER levels.

3/4.10.5 PLAfff SERVICE WATER l .

l This Special Test Exception permits securing the Service Water System conventional header when the nuclear header is out of service and is required to permit flange installation in service water system header cross-connect piping.

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cENCLOSURE $ ~:

. BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNITS l'AND 2 -

7f NRC DOCKETS 50-325 & 50-324-. !

- OPER ATING - LICENSES DPR & . DPR-62 lf 7 REQUEST:FOR LICENSE AMENDMENT 3-JROD SEQUENCE CONTR0!! SYSTEM. i y

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-r ITECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES - UNIT 21 ;j

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l VNDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PACE 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY.............................................. 3/4 0-1 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARCIN.......................................... 3/4 1-1 3/4.1.2 REACTIVITY AN0KALIES..................................... 3/4 1-2 3/4.1.3 CONTROL RODS Control Rod Operability.................................. 3/4 1-3 Control Rod Maximum Scram Insertion Times................ 3/4 1-5 Control Rod Average Scram Insertion Times................ 3/4 1-6 Four Cont rol Rod Group Scram Insertion Times. . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-7 Control Rod Scram Accumulators........................... 3/4 1-8 Control Rod Drive Coupling............................... 3/4 1-9 Control Rod Position Indication.......................... 3/4 1-11 Control Rod Drive Housing Support........................ 3/4 1-13 3/4.1.4 CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS Rod Worth Minimizer...................................... 3/4 1-14 0 ;J C ; ; _ ; ;; ; C ;; ; . ; '. 0 3. : ;; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1 1; Rod Block Monitor........................................ 3/4 1-17 3/4.1.5 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM............................ 3/4 1-18 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.1 AVERACE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT CENERATION RATE............... 3/4 2-1

( 3/4.2.2 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO............................. 3/4 2-2 l

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l BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 IV Amendment No. 168 l

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i INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS .

SECTION PACE 3/4.9 REFUELINC OPERATIONS (Continued) 3/4.9.3 CONTROL ROD P0SITION.................................. 3/4 9-5 3/4.9.4 DECAY TIME............................................ 3/4 9-6 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS........................................ 3/4 9-7 3/4.9.6 CRANE AND HOIST OPERABILITY........................... 3/4 9-8 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL-SPENT FUEL STORACE POOL.................. 3/4 9-9 3/4.9.8 WATER LEVEL-REACTOR VESSEL............................ 3/4 9-10 3/4.9.9 WATER LEVEL-SPENT FUEL STORACE POOL................... 3/4 9-11 3/4.9.10 CONTROL ROD REMOVAL Single control Rod Removal............................ 3/4 9-12 Multiple Control Rod Remova1.......................... 3/4 9-14 3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTECRITY......................... 3/4 10-1 d /4.10.2 $0 OEQUENCE-00NTRob-eVeHMn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4

. . 10-2 TA 3/4.10.3 SHUTDOWN MARCIN DEMONSTRATIONS........................ 3/4 10-3 3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION L00PS................................... 3/4 10-4 3/4.10.5 PLANT SERVICE WATER................................... 3/4 10-5 l

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BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 IX Amendment No. 163

4 . I REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS I

. LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued) l ACTION: (Continued) l j

2. Lf the inoperable control rod (s) is inserted:

a) Within one hour disara the associated directional control valves j either i l

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1) Electrically, or

2) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.

b) Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ,

c. With more than 8 control rods inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.1.1 The scran discharge volume drain and vent valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days bys*

a. Verifying each valve to be open.

b. Cycling each valve at least one complete cycle of full travel.

4.1.3.1.2 All withdrawn control rods not required to have their directional j control valves disarmed electrically or hydraulically shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by moving each control rod at least one notch:

j a. At least once per 7 days when above the preset power level of the RWM m , and

b. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months when above the preset power level of the RWH aaN and any control rod is immovable as a result' of excessive friction or mechanical interference.

4.1.3.1.3 All withdrawn control rods shall be determined OPERABLE by demonstrating the scran discharge volume drain and vent valves OPERABLE, when the reactor protection system logic is tested per Specification 4.3.1.2, by verifying that the drain and vent valves:

'a. Close within 30 seconds af ter receipt of a signal for control rods to scras, and

b. Open when the scraa signal is reset or the scran discharge volume trip is bypassed.

These valvec may be closed intermittently for testing under administrative control.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 3/41-4 Ambed No.

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. . j AEACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD MAXIMUM SCRAM INSERTION TIMES LIMITINC CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.2 The maximum scram insertion time'of each control rod from the fully withdrawn position to notch position 6, based on de-energitation of the scram pilot valve solenoids as time zero, shall not exceed 7.0 seconds.

J APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2.

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l ACTION: I With the maximum scram insertion time of one or more control rods exceeding 7.0 seconds, operation may continue and the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable provided thatt

a. The control rod with the slow insertion time is declared inoperable,

b. The requirements of Specification 3.1.3.1 are satisfied, and k.bTheSurveillanceRequirementsofSpecification.4.1.3.2. care performed at least once per 92 days when operation is continued with three or more control rods with slow scram insertion timest k

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.2 The maximum scram insertion time of the control rods shall be demonstrated through measurement q['

a. For all control rods prior to THERMAL POWER exceeding 40% of RATED THERMAL POWER following CORE ALTERATIONS or after a reactor shutdown that is greater than 120 days,

b. For specifically affected individual control rods following maintenance on or modification to the control rod or rod drive system which could affect the scram insertion time of those specific' control rods, and

c. For 10% of the control rods, on a rotating basis, at least once per 120 days of operation.

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AA 40 SATheFl D r M BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 3/4 1-5 Amendment No. 119

. REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS FOUR CONTROL ROD GROUP SCRAM INSERTION TIMES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.4 The average scram insertion time, from the fully withdrawn position, for the three fastest control rods in each group of four control rods arranged in a two-by-two array, based on deenergitation of the scram pilot valve solenoids as time zero, shall not exceed any of the following:

Position Inserted From Average Scram Inser-Fully Withdrawn tion Time (Second s )

46 36 26 0.33 1.12 1.93

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APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS I and 2.

ACTION:

With the average scram insertion times of control rods exceeding the above limits, operation may continue and the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable provided:

a.

\ The control rods with the slower than average scram insertion times are declared inoperable,

b. The requirements of Specification 3.1.3.1 are satisfied, and L

The Surveillance Requirements of Specification 4.1.3.2.c are performed at least once per 92 days when operation is continued with three or more control rods with slow scram insertion times.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.4 All control rods shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by scram time testing from the fully withdrawn position as required by Surveillance Raquirement 4.1.3.2. d',

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ATJ ArL5o SAbSP sk AMD BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 3/4 1-7 Amendment No. 83

) REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD SCRAM ACCUMULATORS LIMITINC CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.$ All control rod scram accumulators shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 5*.

. ACTION:

a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2 with one control rod scram accumulator inoperable, the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable and operation may continue, provided that within 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months s:

1. The inoperable accumulator is restored to OPERABLE status, or

2. The control rod associated with the inoperable accumulator is declared inoperable, and the requirements of Specification m 3.1.3.1 are satisfied.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION $* with a withdrawn control rod scram accumulator inoperable, fully insert the affected control rod and electrically disarm the directional control valves within one hour.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.5 The control rod scram accumulators shall be determinei OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that the pressure and leak detectors are not in the alarmed condition, and

b. At least once per 18 months by performance of<t

1. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the leak detectors, and

2. CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the pressure detectors. )<[

At least the accumulator associated with each withdrawn control rod. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

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BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 3/4 1-8 Amendment No. 160

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL 900 DRIVE COUPLING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.6 All control rode shall be coupled to their drive mechanisme.

APPLICABILITY: CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 5*.

ACTION:

a. In CONDITION 1 or 2 with one control rod not coupled to its associated drive mechanies, the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 i are not applicable and operation may continue provided:

$WM

1. Within the preset power level of the 400lP.jthe control rod is declared inoperable and fully inserted until recoupling can be attempted with THERMAL POWER above the reset power level of the =R$0er RWM %d. %e feyvire mset of QecificAdien 3.l.Y.I.d mec. s.4 s 4 ed . we

2. Above the preset power level of the . he control rod drive is inserted to accomplish recoupling. Ir recoupling to not accomplished on the first attempt, declare the control rod inoperable, fully insert the control rod, and electrically disarm the directional control valves.

3. The requirements of Specification 3 1 3.1 are satisfied.

b. In CONDITION 5*, with a withdrawn control rod not coupled to its associated drive mechanism, insert the control rod to accomplish recoupling. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREDGtifr$

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4.1.3.

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integrity of a control rod shall be demonstrated by withde eisatp1 rod to the fully withdrawn position and verifying that the r M 'to the overtravel position

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At least each withdrawn control rod. Not applicable to control rode removed per Specification 3 9 10 1 or 3.9.10.2.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 3/4 1-9 4,y fg,g gg,

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. . i REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD POSITION INDICATION :

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b LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION t i

3.1.3.7 All control rod reed switch position indicators shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: CONDITIONS 1, 2, and $*.

ACTION: ,

a. In CONDITION 1 or 2 A

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/ C. With one or more kontrol rod reed switch position indicators inoperable, M 4 for " Full-in" or " Full-out" indication, the provisions of Specification 3 0.4 are not applicable and operation may continue, provided that within one hour

[./) The position of the control rod is determined by an.

alternate method, or

'l, . )) The control rod is moved to a position with an OPERABLE reed switch position indicator, or

). g) The control rod with the inoperable reed switch position indicator is declared inoperable and the requirements of Specification 3.1.3.1 are satisfied; .

(, A Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

2. With one or more control rod reed switch " Full-in" and/or

" Full-out" position indicators inoperable, the affected control rod may be bypassed in ' the Rod Sequence Control System, the provisions of Specificat'.on 3.0.4 are not applicable, and operation may continue, provided:

a) The actual control rod position is known, b) The affected control rod is moved to the correct position in the proper sequence, and c) Each bypassed control rod is separated in all directions from any other bypassed control rod by at least two control cells.

At least each withdrawn control rod. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

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_ BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 3/4 1-11 h A%"O; \F Wl'WH 'TwTr. P t s. M T ? m W Git LEY E O F T*E hlM m 9:.semein4GMTs eP SDEPIc4 he?""-

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS LIMITING ';WDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

b. In CONDITION 5* with a withdrawn control rod reed switch position indicator inoperable, fully insert the withdrawn control rod. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable. ,

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.7f E The control rod reed switch position indicators shall be determined OPERABLE by verifyings

a. At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , that the position of the control rod is '

indicated, 1

b. That the indicated control rod position changes during the movement of the control rod when performing Surveillance Requirement "'

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4.1.3.1.2, and 5 g

c. That the control rod reed swith position indicator corresponds to the ecntrol rod position indicated by the " Full-out" reed switches when I

performing Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.6.b.

4.1.3. 2 When the R CS is required t be OPERABLE, the positio and \

bypas ing of control rods with inoper le " Full-in" r " Full-ou " reed swice

. posi ion indication shall be verifie by a secord 1 censed ope ator or othe qu ified member o the technical s ff.

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At least each withdrawn control rod. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 3/4 1-12 Amendment No. 102

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I liEACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4 1.4 CONTROL ROD PROCRAM CONTROLS ROD WORTH MINIMIZER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.4.1 The Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) shall be OPERABLE when THERMAL POWER is less than RATED THERMAL POWER.

APPLICABILITY OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2*. l ACTION:

I With t RWM in etable,

@M e provis ns of Sp ification 3 4 are n l

appli able, op ration ma continue and cont ol rod move ni is per itted gg pro ded that a second icensed c.erator or other quali ied membe of the t nical s ff is pr ent at t ,

g reactor ontrol con le and-v tftes ) j 1 '

mpliance ith the rescribed ontrol r d pattern. J SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.4.1.1 The AWM shall be demonstrated OPERABLE in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2, l prior to withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of making the reactor s critical and in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 when the RWM is initiated during j control rod insertion when reducing THERMAL POWER byt

a. Verifying proper annunciation of the selection error of at least one out-of-sequence control rod, and

b. Verifying the rod block function of the RWM by moving an out-of-sequence control rod.

4.1.4.1.2 The RWM shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying the control rod i Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence input to the RWM computer is correct following any loading of the sequence program into the computer. l

Entry into OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2 and withdrawal of selected control rods is permitted for the purpose of determining the OPERABILITY of the RWM prior to l withdrawal of control rods for the purpose of bringing the reactor to criticality.

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 3/4 1-14 Amendment No. 157 j

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ATTACHMENT 1 (3.1.4.1 ACTION)

a. With the RWM inoperable after the first 12 control rods have been fully _ withdrawn on_a startup, operation may continue provided that control rod movement and compliance with the prescribed BPWS control rod pattern are verified by a second licensed operator or qualified member of the plant technical staff.

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b. With th'a RWM inoperable before the irst 12 control-rods are withdrawn on a startup, one startup per ear may be performed provided that control rod movement and compliance- with the prescribed BPWS control rod pattern are verified by a second licensed operator or qualified member of the plant technical staff,

c. With RWM inoperable on a shutdown,- shutdown may continue provided that control rod movement and compliance with the prescribed BPWS control rod pattern are verified by a second licensed operator or qualified member of the plant- technical staff.

d. With RWM operable but individual control declared rod (s) inoperable, operation and control rod movement below the preset power level of the RWM may continue provided:

1. No more than three (3) control rods are declared inoperable in any one BPWS group, and,

2. The inoperable control rod (s). is bypassed on the RWM and control rod acvement of the bypassed rod (s) is verified by a second licensed operator or qualified member of the plant technical staff.

e. With RWM inoperable, the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

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REACTIVITY 00RTROL SYSTEh3 l

, ROD SEOUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM t

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION h \ 4L t.4.2 The Rod Sequence Control System (RSCS) shall be OPERABLE when THERM P .R is less than 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

APPLI ILITY: CONDITIONS 1* and 2* f.

, ACTION:

a. With e RSCS inoperable

1. Cont rod withdrawal for reactor at up shall not begin.

2. If control withdrawal has sta and THERMAL POWER is less than 20% of D THERMAL POWE ontrol rod movement shall not be permitted, e t by sera ntil the rod sequence control system is returned OPE status.

3. With THERMAL POWER be educed by control rod insertion, do-not continue contro' d rtion except by a scram.

b. With erroneous contr rod position put to the RSCS, the sequence restraints may be '

assed for correc n of the erroneous information and nitialization of the CS provided that a second-('

licensed oper or other qualified membe f the technical staff is present he reactor control console a erifies compifance with the scribed control rod pattern.

See Spec Test Exception 3 10.2.

Ent nto CONDITION 2 and withdrawal of selected centrol rods is pe teed fo purpose of determining the OPERABILITY of the RSCS prior to wit Iggawal control rods for the purpose of bringing the reactor to criticality.

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BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 3/4 1-15 l RETYPED TECH. SPECS.

l I Updated Thru. Amend. 78 l

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, 4. ,

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

, SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS DED -

4.1. .

RSCS shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by attempting to select and move an out- ence control rod in each of the other three .

a. In CONDITION 2 the et ntrol rod withdrawal for a '-

reactor start-up, and-As soon SCS is automatically in ring control rod b.

on when reducing THERMAL POWER.

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BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 3/4 1-16 M%M .

M o^. 78

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SPECI AL TEST EXCEPTIONS

, .3/4.10.2 ROD SEOUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION W B'b A

f 10.2 The sequence constraints imposed on control rod groups Ag 4, n12 a by the Rod Sequence Control System per Specification 3. .. may be susp d by means of the individual rod position bypass sw es for the l follow ents, provided that at least the requirements pecifications 3.1.3.1 an .l.4.1 are satisfied

a. Shutd in demonstrations, Sp cation 4.1.1, i

b. Control rod se 4.1.3.2.a. and y*and/ riction measurements, specificatio V

c. Start-up Testin gram, with' L POWER < 20% of RATED THE POWER.

APPLICABILITY: ITIONS 1 and 2.

, ACTION: '-

i W the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, verify L e _ RSCS is OPERABLE per Specification 3 1 4 9.

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SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS

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2 When the sequence constraints of control rod groups A12, A , or B

34 a,ssed, verify: ,

a. That the *

.,,0PERABLE per Specifica g$. 4.1,

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b. That movement of the N.t from 5fA ROD DENSITT to the RSCS Cor limited to the single notch mode ,

preset power level i , i and

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c. Confo e'/

with this specification and proced

ed operator or other qualified member of the techn s

cond staff.

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e BRUNSVICK - UNIT 2 3/4 10-2 gg g g g Kr.urED TECH h L'rl_ ..J lu u . .-.O 78

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,4 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM l

l BASES CONTROL RODS (Continued)

( on a scram than has been analyzed even though control rods with inoperable accumulators may still be inserted with normal drive water pressure.

Operability of the accumulator ensures that there is a means available to insert the control rods even under the most unf avorable depressurization of the reactors.

Control rod coupling integrity is required to ensure compliance with the analysis of the rod drop accident in the FSAR. The overtravel position feature provides the only positive means of determining that a rod is properly coupled and therefore this check must be performed prior to achieving criticality after each refueling. The subsequent check is performed as a backup to the initial demonstration.

l In order to ensure that the control rod patterns can be followed and i therefore that other parameters are within their limits, the control rod j position indication system must be OPERABLE.

The control rod housing support restricts the outward movement of a control rod to less than 3 inches in the event of a housing failure. The amount of rod reactivity which could be added by this small amount of rod withdrawal is less than a normal withdrawal increment and will not contribute to any damage to the primary coolant system. The support is not required when there is no pressure to act as a driving force to rapidly eject a drive housing.

The required surveillance intervals are adequate to determine that l the rods are OPERABLE and not so frequent as to cause excessive wear on the I system components.

3/4.1.4 CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS Control rod withdrawal and insertion sequences are established to assure,that the maximum in sequence individual control rod or control rod segments which are withdrawn at any time during the fuel cycle could not be worth enough to result in a peak fuel enthalpy greater than 280 cal /gm in the event of,a control rod drop accident. The specified sequences are characterized by homogeneous, scattered patterns of control rod withdrawal.

l When THERMAL POWER is greater than or equal to 4 of RATED THERMAL POWER, there is no possible rod worth which, if dropp d at the design rate of the velocity limit d result in a peak enth py of 280 cal /gm. Thus, requiring th. C "" RWM to be OPERABLE wh THERNAL POWER is less than %

of RATED THERMAL POWER provides adequate con rol.

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BRL% MK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-3 Amendment No. 157

p seg_T PtTTg.RMc elT 2 .

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM BASES CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS (Continued)

Use of the Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence (BPWS) ensures that in the event of a control rod drop accident, the peak fuel enthalpy will not be greater than 280 cal /gm (Reference 4).

) tic superv/sion to sure tha out-of (seg/ence rodt will not/ be withdheRSCS/ndRWMp[videaut wn or inserted. y

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The analysis of the rod drop accident is presented in Section 15.4.6 of the FSAR, Updated and the techniques of the analysis are presented in a topical report (Reference 1) and two supplements (References 2 and 3).

l The RBH is designed to automatically prevent fuel damage in the event of erroneous rod withdrawal from locations of high power denstty during high power operation. The RBM is only required to be operable when the limiting condition described in Specification 3.1.4.3 exists. Two channels are provided. Tripping one of the channels will block erroneous rod withdrawat soon enough to prevent fuel damage. This system backs up the written sequence used by the operator for withdrawal of control rods. Further discussion of the RSH system is provided in Reference 5.

3/4.1.5 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM The standby liquid control system provides a backup capability for maintaining the reactor subcritical in the event that insufficient rods are inserted in the core when a scram is called for. The volume and weight percent of poison material in solution is based on being able to bring the reactor to the suberitical condition as the plant cools to ambient condition. The temperature requirement is necessary to keep the sodium l pentaborate in solution. Checking the volume and temperature once each 24 l hours assures that the solution is available for use.

With redundant pumps and a highly reliable control rod scram system, operation of the reactor is permitted to continue for short periods of time with the system inoperable or for longer periods of ti e with one of the redundant components inoperable.

1. C. J. Paone, R. C. Stirn, and J. A. Woodley, " Rod Drop Accident Analysis for Large BWRs " C. E. Topical Report NEDO-10527, March 1972.

1 i 2. C. J. Paone, R. C. Stirn, and R. H. Yound, Supplement 1 to NEDO-10527, July 1972.

3. J. A. Haum, C. J. Paone, and R. C. Stirn, addendum 2 " Exposed Cores" supplement 2 to NEDO-10527, January 1973.

I 4. NEDE-24011-P-A, "Ceneral Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel,"

Revision 6, Amendment 12.

5. NEDC-31654P, " Maximum Extended Operating Domain Analysis for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant," February 1989.

b . N E1DE -M oI l- f'- A j "Gc.gc \ Mt.cAvi( .54AN Y Ste.L b Nd RcVis{on } bMW O' BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-4 Amendment No. 168

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ATTACHMENT 2-3: (3/4.1.4, B ASES)

The RWM as-a backup to procedural control provides an.automatio control' rod -

pattern' monitoring function to ensure ' adherence to the BPWS control movement sequences from 100% control rod. density- to 10% ? RATED.. THERMAL. POWER and, thus, =.

oliminates .t he postulated control rod drop aooident from resulting in :a peak:

fuel. enthalpy greater -than 280 cal /gm (Reference. 5).

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Tho requirement.that RWM betoperableifor;the withdrawal'ofitheffirst112; . ,

control rods on' a startup . is to' erisure that the. RWH. system maintains ;a high1

-degree of' availability.

' Deviation from the BPWS control rod- pattern' may be allowed for the performance; of Shutdown Martin Demonstration tests. ,,

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3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS I i

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BASES 1 3/4.10.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY The requirement for PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is removed during the j period when open vessel tests are being performed during low power PHYSICS 1 TESTS.

3/4.10.2' ROD SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM ggh er to perform the tests required in the Techni 1 cations, it is nece bypass the sequence restrain ol rod movement.

The additional ou e re u e that the specifications on heat generatio rgin requirements are not exceeded during t n these tests are be .

3/4.10.3 SHUTDOWN MARGIN DEMONSTRATIONS Performance of shutdown margin demonstrations with the vessel head removed requires additional restrictions in order to ensure that criticality does not occur. These additional restrictions are specified in this LCO.

( 3/4.10.4 RECIRCULATION IDOPS This special test exception permits reactor criticality under no flow conditions and is required to perform certain start-up and PHYSICS TESTS while' at low THERMAL POWER . levels.

3/4.10.5 PLANT SERVICE WATER This Special Test Exception permits securing the Service Water System convencional header when the nuclear header is out of service and is required I to permit flange installation in service water system header cross-connect piping.

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