ML20135D630
| ML20135D630 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 12/04/1996 |
| From: | CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20135D615 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9612100065 | |
| Download: ML20135D630 (13) | |
Text
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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.2 REACTIVITY ANOMALIES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1
3.1.2 The reactivity difference between the actua1GDrbEN6frD and the I
" ~
predicted giyn cEMSPfT) shall not exceed 1% Ak/k.
h"* ketC APPLICABILITY:
CONDITIONS 1 and 2.
ACTION:
With the reactivity dif ferent by more than 1% Ak/k:
Perform an analysis to determine and explain the cause of the a.
i reactivity difference; operation may continue if the difference is
-explained and corrected, or b.
Be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Submit a Special Test Program to the Commission describing the methods to be used to determine the cause and magnitude of the reactivity difference.
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.1.2 The GOND shall be predicted and compared to the actual @
CFJErnD for selected operating conditions:
j a.
During the first startup following CORE ALTERATIONS, and I
b.
At least once per effective full power month during POWER OPERATION.
9612100065 961204 PDR ADOCK 05000324 p
PDR Me,Jeot do.
3E BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 3/4 1-2
l
'3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS i
BASES 3/4.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARCIN l
A sufficient SHUIDOWN MARCIN ensures that 1) the reactor can be made subcritical from all operating conditions, 2) the reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and 3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently l
suberitical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.
l Since core reactivity values will vary through core life as function of i
fuel depletion and poison burnup, the demonstration of SHUTDOWN MARCIN will be performed in the cold xenon-free condition and shall show the core to be subcritical by a least R + 0.38% delta k/k.
The value of R in units of 1
% delta k/k is the difference between the calculated valua of maximum core reactivity during the operating cycle and the calculated beginning-of-life core reactivity.
The value of R must be positive or zero and must be l
determined for each fuel' loading cycle.
Sa?.isfaction of this limitation can l
be best demonstrated at the time of fuel loading, but the margin must be l
determined anytime a control rod is incapable of insertion.
(
During the SPIRAL RELOAD deviations from the scheduled core loading are j
l permitted in order to achieve the required 3 cps needed to gain SRM l
operabilirty provided the cold reactivities (zero voids) of the fuel bundles temporarfly loaded around the SRMs are individually less than that of the i
respective bundles scheduled for those locations.
The cold shutdown margin l
calculation performed for the scheduled core loading bounds the partially loaded core during the SPIRAL RELOAD process.
This reactivity characteristic has been a basic assumption in the analysis
)
of plant performance and can best be demonstrated at the time of fuel loading, but the margin must also be determined anytime a control rod is incapable of insertion.
ed 8 Y l. P h 3/4.1.2 REACTIVITY ANOMALIES l
Since the UTDOWN MARCI requirement r the reacto is small, a carefu check \\on actual nditions to e predicted ditions is cessary, a the changeh in reactiv'ty can be infe red from thes comparisons of rod patterns Since th comparisons a andiv done. freauent ch ks are no anj d moositio on normal perations M 1% change is larger than is expected for normal operatioAjso a change lf.lhis magnitude shou 1a ha rhproughly evaluated g e as lar II.%1d exceed design itiong (the y,eactor an is on the s e side of p postulat transien l
"During the first startup following CORE ALTERATIONS" implies that the specified surveillance should be performed upon the initial attainment of a high equilibrium power'1evel, preferably of at least 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER, during the unit startup.
3/4.1.3 CONTROL RODS -
The specifications of this section ensure that 1) the minimum SHUTDOWN-MARCIN is maintained, 2) the control rod insertion times are consistent with j
those used in the accident analysis, and 3) the i
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-1 Amendment No. 89
o.-
4 4
^
i l
INSERT B 3/4.1.2-1 1
1 Accurate prediction of core reactivity is either an explicit or implicit assumption in the accident I
analysis evaluations. Comparing predicted versus measured core reactivity validates the nuclear j
methods used in the safety analysis and supports the SHUTDOWN MARGIN demonstrations in assuring the reactor can be brought safely to cold, suberitical conditions.
4 a
i
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i 1
l
- 0 1
ENCLOSURE 6 l
BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS.1 AND 2 NRC DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324 i
OoERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 AND DPR-62 REQUEST FOR LICENSE AMENDMENTS REACTIVITY ANOMAllES i
l MARKED-UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AND BASES PAGES - UNIT 2 I
i l
~
REACTIVITY dONTROL SYSTEMS
[
3/4.1.2 REACTIVlTY ANOMALIES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1
3.1.2 The reactivity difference between the actual ROMN.
and the predicted ({0A-@ENSMY) shall not exceed 1% Ak/k.
C i
4keh)
CA* ke@
APPLICABILITY:
CONDITIONS 1 and 2.
ACTION:
With the reactivity different by more than 1% Ak/k:
\\
Perform an analysis to determine and explain the cause of the a.
reactivity difference; operation may continue if the difference is explained and corrected, or b.
Be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Submit a Special Test Program to the Commission describing the methods to be used to determine the cause and magnitude of the reactivity difference.
l SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.1_. 2 The @G&-17ENRTV3 shall be predicted and compared to the actual @
GIF.blMTD for elected operating conditions:
)
During the first start-up following CORE ALTERATIONS, and a.
- b. f At least once per ef fective full power month during POWER OPERATION.
CA ke@
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l l
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 3/41-2 Ame,dmed Mo.
RETYP ECH.
c.CS.
U ted Th. Amend. 78 j
3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTENS.,
BASES l
l 3/4.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARCIN l
l l
A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARCIN ensures that 1) the reactor can be made l
suberitical from all operating conditions, 2) the reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are, controllable within l
acceptable limits, and 3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently l
subcritical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.
Since core reactivity values will vary through core life as a function of fuel depletion and poison burnup, the demonstration of SHUTDOWN MARCIN will be i
performed in the cold xenon-free condition and shall show the core to be suberitical by at least R + 0.38% delta k/k.
The value of R in units of
% delta k/k is the difference between the calculated value of maximum core reactivity during the operating cycle and the calculated beginning-of-life core reactivity.
The value of R must be positive or zero and must be determined for each fuel loading cycle.
Satisfaction of this limitation can be best demonstrated at the time of fuel loading, but the margin must be determined anytime a control rod is incapable of insertion.
During the SPIRAL RELOAD deviations from the scheduled core loading are permitted in order to achieve the required 3 cps need'd to gain SRM e
operability provided the cold reactivities (zero voids) of the fuel bundles temporarily loaded around the SRMs are individually less than that of the respective bundles scheduled for those locations. The cold shutdown margin calculation performed for the scheduled core loading bounds the partially loaded core during the SPIRAL RELOAD process.
This reactivity characteristic has been a basic assumption in the analysis of plant performance and can best be demonstrated at the time of fuel loading, but the margin must also be determined anytime a control rod is incapable of insertion.
fruert"* B MI. l. ~2 - 2Q 3/4.1.2 REACTIVITY ANOMALIES
~
f Since the HUTDOWN MAR N requiremen for the re tor is small a carefuh che k on actual conditions t the predicte conditions is necessar and the
.chan es in react 1 icy can be ferred from ese compar ons of rod patte s.
Since e ccmpariso s are aW1v_ one. frecue t checks are et an cimoosi 'on on norma ocernrions M 1% change is larger than is expected for normal operation so a change of thi,s_m_agnitude s hniti d be thoroughly evaluated. fA ch p e as large a
% would not eed the d
'gn condit' s of (hefactorangisonthesa#
side of the ulated t.sients.
"During the first startup following CORE ALTERATIONS" implies that the specified surveillance should be performed upon the initial attainment of a high equilibrium power level, preferably of at least 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER, during the unit startup.
3/4.1.3 CONTROL RODS The specifications of this section ensure that 1) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARCIN is maintained, 2) the control rod insertion times are consistent with those used in the accident analysis, and 3) the
~
l r
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-1 A:.endment No. 1 U.
l l
,o l.
=
s l
INSERT B 3/4.1.2-2 Accurate prediction of core reactivity is either an explicit or implicit assumption in the accident analysis evaluations. Comparing predicted versus measured core reactivity validates the nuclear methods used in the safety analysis and supports the SHUTDOWN MARGIN demonstrations in assuring the reactor can be brought safely to cold, suberitical conditions.
l i
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ENCLOSURE 7 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS.1 AND 2 l
NRC DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324 OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 AND DPR-62 l
REQUEST FOR LICENSE AMENDMENTS l
REACTMTY ANOMAllES l
I 1
TYPED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AND BASES PAGES - UNIT 1 l
i l
i
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l l'
~
3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that 1) the reactor can be made subcritical from all operating conditions, 2) the reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and 3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently subcritical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.
Since core reactivity values will vary through core life as a function of fuel depletion and poison burnup, the demonstration of SHUTDOWN MARGIN will be performed in the cold xenon-free condition and shall show the core to be subcritical by at least R + 0.38% delta k/k. The value of R in units of
% delta k/k is the difference between the calculated value of maximum core reactivity during the operating cycle and the calculated beginning-of-life core reactivity. The value of R must be positive or zero and must be determined for each fuel loading cycle. Satisfaction of this limitation can be best demonstrated at the time of fuel loading, but the margin must be determined anytime a control rod is incapable of insertion.
During the SPIRAL RELOAD deviations from the scheduled core loading are permitted in order to achieve the required 3 cps needed to gain SRM operability provided the cold reactivities (zero voids) of the fuel bundles temporarily loaded around the SRMs are individually less than that of the-respective bundles scheduled for those locations. The cold shutdown margin i
calculation performed for the scheduled core loading bounds the partially I
loaded core during the SPIRAL RELOAD process.
This reactivity characteristic has been a basic assumption in the analysis of plant performance and can best be demonstrated at the time of fuel loading, but the margin must also be determined anytime a control rod is incapable of insertion.
3/4.1.2 REACTIVITY ANOMALIES Accurate prediction of core reactivity is either an explicit or implicit assumption in the accident analysis evaluations.
Comparing predicted versus measured core reactivity validates the nuclear methods used in the safety analysis and supports the SHUTDOWN MARGIN demonstrations in assuring the reactor can be brought safely to cold, subcritical conditions. A 1% change is larger than is expected for normal operation so a change of this magnitude should be thoroughly evaluated.
I "During the first startup following CORE ALTERATIONS" implies that the specified surveillance should be performed upon the initial attainment of a high equilibrium power level, preferably of at least 90% of RATED THERMAL l
POWER, during the unit startup.
i 3/4.1.3 CONTROL RODS l
The specifications of this section ensure that 1) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, 2) the ccntrol rod insertion times are consistent with l
those used in the accident analysis, and 3) the BRUNSWICK - UNIT I B 3/4 1-1 Amendment No.
l
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d'w p
}
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.I.2 REACTIVITY AN0MALIES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l
3.1.2 The reactivity difference between the actual core k,,, and the predicted i
l core k,,, shall not exceed 1% ok/k.
I APPLICABILITY: CONDITIONS 1 and 2.
i ACTION:
f With the reactivity different by morc than 1% ok/k:
l l
a.
Perform an analysis to determine and explain the cause of the i
reactivity difference; operation may continue if the difference is explained and corrected, or b.
Be in H0T SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Submit a Special Test Program l
to the Commission describing the methods to be used to determine i
l the cause and magnitude of the reactivity difference.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l
l 4.1.2 The core k,,, shall be predicted and compared to the actual core k,,, for 1 selected operating conditions:
a.
During the first start-up following CORE ALTERATIONS, and l
b.
At least once per effective full power month during POWER j
OPERATION.
I i
J f
BRUNSWICK - UNIT I 3/4 1-2 Amendment No.
I i
e l
r ENCLOSURE 8 i
j BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS.1 AND 2 NRC DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324 f.
OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 AND DPR-62.
REQUEST FOR LICENSE AMENDMENTS REACTIVITY ANOMALIES l
S l
TYPED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AND BASES PAGES - UNIT 2 l
l l
l i
L 1
I i
l l
4 i
3 l
i
' REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS
^
3/4.1.2 REACTIVITY ANOMALIES 1
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1
3.1.2 The reactivity difference between the actual core k,,, and the predicted i
i core k,,, shall not exceed 1% Ak/k.
APPLICABILITY: CONDITIONS 1 and 2.
ACTION:
With the reactivity different by more-than 1% A k/k:
a.
Perform an analysis to determine and explain the cause of the reactivity difference; operation may continue if the difference is explained and corrected, or l
b.
.Be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Submit a Special Test Program l
to the Commission describing the methods to be used to determine the cause and magnitude of the reactivity difference.
l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l
l 4.1.2 The core k,,, shall be predicted and compared to the actual core k,,, for l selected operating conditions; a.
During the first start-up following CORE ALTERATIONS, and b.
At least once per effective full power month during POWER OPERATION.
t i
BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 3/4 1-2 Amendment No.
I 1.
'3/4 1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that 1) the reactor can be made 4
i subcritical from all operating conditions, 2) the reactivity transients j
associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and 3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently subcritical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.
4 Since core reactivity values will vary through core life as a function of I
fuel depletion and poison burnup, the demonstration of SHUTDOWN MARGIN will be performed in the cold xenon-free condition and shall show the core to be subcritical by at least R + 0.38% delta k/k. The value of R in units of
% delta k/k is the difference between the calculated value of maximum core reactivity during the operating cycle and the calculated beginning-of-life core reactivity.
The value of R must be positive or zero and must be determined for each fuel loading cycle.
Satisfaction of this limitation can be best demonstrated at the time of fuel loading, but the mergin must be determined anytime a control rod is incapable of insertion.
i During the SPIRAL RELOAD deviations from the scheduled core loading are permitted in order to achieve the required 3 cps needed to gain SRM operability provided the cold reactivities (zero voids) of the fuel bundles temporarily loaded around the SRMs are individually less than that of the respective bundles scheduled for those locations. The cold shutdown margin calculation performed for the scheduled core loading bounds the partially loaded core during the SPIRAL RELOAD process.
This reactivity characteristic has been a basic assumption in the analysis of plant performante and can best be demonstrated at the time of fuel loading, but the margin must also be determined anytime a control rod is incapable of insertion.
3/4.1.2 REACTIVITY AN0MALIES Accurate prediction of core reactivity is either an explicit or implicit assumption in the accident analysis evaluations.
Comparing predicted versus measured core reactivity validates the nuclear methods used in the safety analysis and supports the SHUTDOWN MARGIN demonstrations in assuring the reactor can be brought safely to cold, subcritical conditions. A 1% change is larger than is expected for normal operation so a change of this magnitude should be thoroughly evaluated.
I "During the first startup following CORE ALTERATIONS" implies that the specified surveillance should be performed upon the initial attainment of a high equilibrium power level, preferably of at least 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER, during the unit startup.
3/4.1.3 CONTROL RODS The specifications of this section ensure that 1) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, 2) the control rod insertion times are consistent with those used in the accident analysis, and 3) the BRUNSWICK - UNIT 2 8 3/4 1-1 Amendment No.
I