ML20009G656

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Final Deficiency Rept Re Rebar Left Out of Concrete Pour, Originally Reported on 810629.Caused by Craft,Engineer & QC-civil Field Inspector Error.Top Face Bars of Pour W-H6 Spliced W/Grouted Splice Bars.Checklist Procedure Improved
ML20009G656
Person / Time
Site: Yellow Creek  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 07/27/1981
From: Mills L
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8108040520
Download: ML20009G656 (2)


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.* TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHCRITY' ~ - UFi

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CH ATTANCOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 400 Chestnut Street Tower II / ,]!!!

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~ i July 27, 1981 (( .* ;v ',. -

YCRD-50-566/81-16 YCRD-50-567/81-13 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director J  ? l 9 I Office of Inspection and Enforcement [g fg(L b q U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission ~

1 Region II - Suite 3100

- J" (i 0 3 I90I l u.5 TflisYm,wo i 101 Marietta Street ..f Atlanta, Georgia 30303 /

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

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1 YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - REBAR LEFT OUT OF CONCRETE FOUR

- YCRD-50-566/81-16, YCRD-50-567/81 FINAL REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Irapector  ;

R. V. Celenjak on June 29, 1981 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR YC-197. Enclosed is our final report. l If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at FTS 857-2581.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

- )1 LT M. Mills, Mhnager Nuclear Regulation and Safety Enclosure cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Jr., Director (Enclosure)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

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, YI 810804050 010727 PDR ADOCK 05000566 6 PDR

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5 CICLOSURE YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 REBAR LEFT OUT OF CONCRETE POUR YCRD-50-566/81-16, YCRD-50-567/81-13 10 CFR 50.5S(e)

FINAL REPORT

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Description of' Deficiency Concrete pour No. W-H6 was split into two pours W-H6 (east) and W-H6 (west) so that those portions that were not on " hold" by TVA could be poured.

W-H6 (west) was to be poured while the " hold" only affected the W-H6 (east) part of the pour. The preliminary work needed before pouring was completed i on concrete pour W-H6 (west) and concrete was placed. Subsequently it was I

discovered that the top face rebars (23) of pour W-H6 (east) were supposed l

to have extended into pour W-H6 (west) 21 inches.

! The apparent cause is that the craft, engineers, and Quality Control-Civil field inspectors failed to notice that the top face rebars of pour W-H6 (east) extended into W-H6 (west) 21 inches. "he Quality Control-Civil inspectors who made the inspection takeoff checklist for W-H6 (west) had noticed them and included them on the checklist. However, they were subsequently missed by the field inspector who signed off the W-H6 (west) l pour as being' acceptable. '

i Safety Implications Concrete pour No. W-H6 is part of a floor in the Waste Management Building. Had this subject deficiency gone uncorrected, there is a possibility that the floor might crack or be otherwise damaged. Because l

the volume reduction equipment is located in the area of the pour, damage l to the floor could result in damage to the equipment, and a possible release of radioactive waste.

Corrective Action Quality Control Investigation Report (QCIR) No. 36076 and nonconformance report (NCR) No. YC-197 were written to document this problem. The NCR was evaluated by TVA and the disposition was to drill 19 holes into the W-H6 (west) pour to a depth of 24 inches and grout rebar splices in accordance with TVA Construction Specification G-32. The top face bars of pour W-H6 (east) were subsequently spliced with the grouted splice bars. To prevent a recurrence Project Engineering-Civil will monitor the installation of l

rebre for double assurance that all rebar is installed in accordance with I drawings. Quality Control-Civil will continue to perform quality control i inspections, using an independently verified checklist, and will be held l responsible for verification that rebar has been installed in accordance j with drawings and specifications. Quality Control-Civil inspectors were l instructed en June 15, 1981 by the Materials and Civil Quality Control Unit l supervisor that:

1 (1) Takeoff checklist reviewers should always consult with the original l preparer of the checklist if a discrepancy is discovered.

l (2) Inspections should be initiated on the takeoff checklist on the day I that they are made in order not to overlook any item.

The corrective action was completed on July 5, 1981. .

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